PSF

C.J. Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum received today from the Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet. I agree with them. Will you please have the proper instructions issued discontinuing the cryptanalytical units in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission and the Strategic Services. If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this character, will you please have those discontinued also.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Enclosure.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972
copy to Gen. Marshall

Transmitting copy of memorandum which the President received from The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7/6/42, the original of which has been retained for our files; copy of President's memorandum and copy of memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to Gen. Marshall.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, in the interests of maximum security and efficiency, cryptanalytical activities should be limited to the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At present, small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Director of Strategic Services. It is also possible that other offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units.

In the interests of secrecy, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and most efficient use of the limited number of talented personnel skilled in cryptanalysis, it is believed that this work should be controlled and undertaken by a minimum number of agencies. As the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation now have large organizations well equipped and capable of handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these activities be limited to the three agencies mentioned. An agreement has been reached with regard to the allocation of this work between the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Presidential approval of the foregoing is respectfully requested.

E. J. KING
Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RWP, NLR, Date
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Cryptanalysis Activities

I have advised the Federal agencies concerned to discontinue all cryptanalysis activities as recently directed by you following a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Office of Censorship has transferred its cryptanalysis work to the Navy; the Federal Communications Commission is prepared to drop plans to employ cryptanalysts that were under consideration; and the Office of Strategic Services reports that it has no cryptanalysis services except in certain foreign offices. These latter are maintained with the knowledge and approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Though we have checked several other Federal agencies, none report the employment of coding experts. Responsibility for cryptanalysis will accordingly be vested in but three agencies; namely, the Army, Navy, and F. B. I.

Wayne Coy
Assistant Director
DO YOU THINK THIS NEEDS ANY FURTHER ANSWER? IF NOT, PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

ENCLOSURE

THIS LETTER WAS WRITTEN BEFORE THE RUBBER CONTROVERSY WAS REFERRED TO ME. IT HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AND THE LETTER CAN BE FILED.

J. F. B.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Number One Group Program

Following a conference with you and at your direction, November 26 the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested Mr. Nelson to state categorically if the "Number One Group" of military programs could be accomplished in 1943. This group included the 107,000 aircraft program; that portion of the Army Supply Program required in active combat theaters within each succeeding six months' period; certain specific combat ships for the Navy to be completed in 1943; materials for other specific combat ships to be completed in 1944; and the Maritime Commission program of transoceanic vessels, escort vessels, etc.

Mr. Nelson has replied that in an overall sense, these objectives would appear to fall within feasible limits. However, he has not stated categorically that the programs could be completed and has pointed out that a detailed study would be necessary to determine if competing claims for tools, materials, and common components could be reconciled.

In the meantime, Mr. Nelson has granted an over-riding priority to 20% of the programs for synthetic rubber and high octane gasoline which has already delayed the accomplishment of the "Number One Group." He proposes now to grant an over-riding priority to a still larger portion of the synthetic rubber program. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the importance of the synthetic rubber program, they are of the view that it must be brought along concurrently with other programs. Any delay to the synthetic rubber program involved in so doing will not be serious to our military effort. However, if the over-riding priority is granted, the production experts of the several services are convinced that it will result in a loss in delivery during 1943 of not less than 18,000 tactical planes, 75 escort vessels being constructed by the Navy, 15 escort type vessels being constructed by the Maritime Commission, a substantial delay in the completion of other parts of the Maritime shipping program, and a delay of approximately three months in the completion of 100 octane gasoline plants. Moreover, many other parts of "Number One Group" will also be retarded.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date
DEC 4 1973
It is vital to the war effort that the "Number One Group" of military programs be brought along concurrently to completion in 1943. No other programs can be placed above these in higher priority for accomplishment without serious impairment of the war effort and only those programs equally essential to our war effort should be granted a like priority. If this policy is to be established to permit our present strategical plans to be carried out, your approval is essential.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR

DIRECTOR JAMES F. BYRNES

I think you are entirely familiar with this and the decision not to ask the President to sign the prepared letter.

Do you want this for your files, or should I put it in the confidential files here?

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

File mentioned in memo for the President of Dec. 17, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
DIRECTOR JAMES F. BYRNES

I think you are entirely familiar with this and the decision not to ask the President to sign the prepared letter.

Do you want this for your files, or should I put it in the confidential files here?

[Signature]

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

[Handwritten note]

Dear Mac, the matter has been settled, at least for the present. I suggest you put it in your files.

[Signature]

FEB 2 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I have checked with Bill Jeffers and Admiral Leahy, and the Admiral suggested checking with Don Nelson. All three agree that it would be just as well if you would not sign this letter, and I have told them that the reply to Mr. Jeffers' letter will be held up indefinitely, requiring only a change in date if another squabble develops.

M. H. M.

Letter from Admiral Leahy to the President attaching letter to Mr. Jeffers in reply to his protest concerning Mr. Nelson's decision to give special priority to a portion of synthetic rubber and high octane gasoline programs, transmitting copy of Progress Report No. 1.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is a letter to Mr. Jeffers prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for your signature. This is in reply to his protest concerning Mr. Nelson's decision to give special priority to a portion of the synthetic rubber and high octane gasoline programs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

2 Encls.
Letter for signature.
Letter from Mr. W. M. Jeffers to the President, 12-1-42, transmitting copy of Progress Report No. 1.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973
December 16, 1942.

Mr. W. M. Jeffers,
Rubber Director,
War Production Board,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Jeffers:

I have given careful consideration to your Progress Report No. 1 stating that the construction of synthetic rubber plants must be given a "green light" over other programs if the recommendations of the Baruch Committee are to be accomplished.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advise me that the construction of the synthetic rubber plants requires many items of equipment common to the high octane gasoline program which is now behind schedule. Any delay in the production of synthetic rubber must be regarded as serious. However, war involves the taking of some risks and the immediate requirements for high octane gasoline to keep our aircraft flying justifies accepting this risk, so far as synthetic rubber is concerned, as being in the best interests of the war effort. The proposed preferential treatment for a portion of both programs appears to be a sound decision which will permit these programs to be brought along concurrently.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to Mr. Nelson that the effects of his decision on the entire production program be determined as soon as possible with a view to making such adjustments as may be necessary.

Sincerely yours,
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 1, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Attached please find copy of Progress Report No. 1 of the Office of Rubber Director, transmitted to Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of War Production Board by me today. In order to conserve your time, I quote the following conclusions from this report:

(1) The Office of the Rubber Director has been organized and is, at least partially, staffed at every appropriate point with thoroughly competent, outstanding personnel who bring to it broad scientific and engineering training and an invaluable knowledge and experience of the rubber industry.

(2) The recommendations of the Baruch Committee have been accepted as the basic policy of the Rubber Director. Many of the proposed moves are nearing completion.

(3) The construction program is behind that envisioned by the Baruch Committee. If it were possible to settle questions of relative importance between programs, it should still be possible to obtain an even flow of components and to build the required facilities in time to prevent the inventory of crude rubber and synthetics falling below the disaster dead-line determined by the Committee. Any further delay will make this impossible. Present indications are that, because of other programs, there will be such a delay.

(4) Working relationships have been established with several other sections of the Government to effectuate essential portions of the rubber program.

(5) Serious problems in connection with the work of the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation are to be solved so that the public may have a full understanding of the Rubber Program and help with it.

(6) Serious problems in connection with the work of the Office of Price Administration are to be solved so that all units of industry are given the proper incentive to help develop the use of synthetic rubbers and rubber substitutes.
I have before me a copy of Chairman Nelson's letter of even date to Admiral Leahy, which has reference to his decision to freeze 20% of the rubber and the 100-octane gasoline programs and bring them along concurrently. This may be inescapable, but if so, it is in direct conflict with the findings and recommendations of the Baruch Report. It will mean an exhaustion of our stock of crude rubber and will bring about the crisis envisioned in the Report.

The 100-octane gasoline program as well as the naval escort program, I appreciate, is extremely important, but even so, I still am of the opinion that the synthetic rubber program should be given a green light, to the extent at least of permitting our getting into operation the plants scheduled to be built during the first half of the year, so that we may be in a position to avoid the crisis which will not only wreck the civilian economy but which will also mean, in the words of the Baruch Report, that: "There will be no rubber in the fourth quarter of 1943 with which to equip a modern mechanized army."

* * * *

With reference to gasoline rationing: As you are doubtless aware, there has been a very considerable amount of confusion and criticism in placing into effect the gasoline rationing program throughout the country, largely because of the involved application blanks and questionnaires that farmers, small trucking concerns, dairymen, stock raisers, etc. are required to fill out. I now feel that this situation is well in hand, and it will be my purpose to see to it that a more simplified application blank is used and that enforcement of gasoline rationing, as well as tire rationing, as applied to farmers and stock raisers, is liberalised to the point where there will be no possible jeopardy in securing maximum production.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.

Enclosures: Report and Letter.
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Office of
W. M. Jeffers
Rubber Director

IN REPLY REFER TO:

November 30,
1942

Letter of Transmittal

Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman
War Production Board

I submit herewith Progress Report #1
covering the work of the Office of the Rubber Director
and the principal problems and situations confronting
the Office as of this date.

Because of the need to make clear to
the rubber industry and to the public the present status
of the rubber program, I ask your permission to print
and distribute this report.

(signed) W. M. JEFFERS

End to 12-1-42

War 12-10-42
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
OFFICE OF THE RUBBER DIRECTOR

PROGRESS REPORT #1

In stating the problem, the "Report of the Rubber Survey Committee" dated September 10, 1942, said:

"Of all critical and strategic materials, rubber is the one which presents the greatest threat to the safety of our nation and the success of the Allied cause. Production of steel, copper, aluminum, alloys or aviation gasoline may be inadequate to prosecute the war as rapidly and effectively as we could wish, but at the worst we are still assured of sufficient supplies of these items to operate our armed forces on a very powerful scale. But if we fail to secure quickly a large new rubber supply, our war effort and our domestic economy both will collapse. Thus the rubber situation gives rise to our most critical problem."

It then established the rubber program and, interspersed with clearly stated reasons, made many definite recommendations.

In accordance with presidential executive order of September 17, 1942, the Chairman of the War Production Board appointed me Rubber Director, delegated to me the powers enumerated therein, and delivered to me a copy of a letter from the President. From this I quote the following two sentences: "I want to carry out the recommendations in the Baruch Report as fully as possible." ... "One of the main jobs is to start the mileage rationing program as quickly as possible."

In harmony with the spirit of the Baruch Report, I have staffed my organization with men who are by training and experience preeminently qualified to direct and execute the work of the major subdivisions of the problems entrusted to me. My first order to them was, in the absence of special and approved contrary reasons, to carry out the recommendations stated or implied in the Baruch Report. Because of this, most of the remainder of this Report takes up the work of the various subdivisions of my organization by describing the present status of those recommendations which it is their respective duties to effectuate. The subdivisions so treated are:
Executive functions incident to policies, programming and reports; and the direction of work carried out under directives from me by the Rubber Reserve Company, Defense Plant Corporation, the Board of Economic Warfare, Office of the Petroleum Coordinator, Office of Defense Transportation, Office of Price Administration, the Department of Agriculture and others.

Supervision of problems incident to plant construction and priorities therefor.

Operations pertaining to the rubber industry, statistics, allocations, requirements and schedules, priorities, reclaiming of scrap, re-capping and retreading of tires, etc.

The technology and specifications for industry uses of various natural rubbers, synthetic rubbers, rubber substitutes and reclaims.

Research on and development of synthetic rubbers, new ideas and inventions. This Section is charged with the duty of arranging for and coordinating research on mechanisms of polymerization, as well as the development and engineering of processes, and the piloting of new developments.

Research on and development of processes for the manufacture of raw materials other than those made by processes whose development has been entrusted to other Governmental agencies.

Of the above, the first is directed by me and my Deputy, and the remainder by Assistant Deputy Rubber Directors.

PROGRAM

The program of this Office cannot be stated better than in the Baruch Report where it said:

"We must supply not only the needs of our armed forces but most of those of the military machines of our Allies as well. We must equip our buses and trucks and other commercial vehicles and provide on a large scale specialty items for such purposes as factory belting, surgical, hospital and health supplies. And in addition to all these, we must maintain the tires on at least a substantial portion of our 27,000,000 civilian passenger automobiles."


To meet this program necessitates a statement as to our requirements, estimates of our inventory situation and information as to our ability to bring into production enough Buna S and other synthetic rubbers during 1943 to see us through that critical year.

The Baruch Report estimated that requirements of natural and/or synthetic rubber for 1943-1944 would be approximately as follows:

**Total Requirements of Natural and/or Synthetic Rubbers**

*(in terms of natural) are estimated as follows: in thousands of long tons*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Transportation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Vehicles</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Civilian Uses</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Countries</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Deficiency</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>577</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Baruch Report also definitely established that we cannot be permitted to reduce our domestic inventory of rubber stocks below 120,000 tons at any time. In determining a figure of 120,000 tons as an irreducible minimum, the Baruch Report stated that 50,000 tons thereof would represent a 30-day inventory for American manufacturers; 4,000 tons would be inventory for Canadian manufacturers, and at least 86,000 tons should be considered as necessary inventory on hand in Great Britain to protect against interruption of Atlantic transportation. They went on to state that at least 100,000 tons of this reserve should be kept in the form of crude to protect those requirements of the military which can only be met by the use of crude. This office believes that their findings were if anything too low and that it would be hard to operate 1,200 American rubber plants with a 30-day overall inventory at a time when they are converting from the use of crude to the use of Buna S, Neoprene, Thicken, Butyl, plus several grades of reclaim and several substitutes. This is especially true at a time when transportation facilities are already overcrowded.

Present indications are that our domestic accumulated inventory of crude and synthetic rubber (expressed in terms of crude) at the end of this year, 1943, may approximate 400,000 long tons. If it were not for other programs over which we have no control it seems probable that the accumulated production of synthetic and imports of crude rubber (expressed in terms of crude rubber) might be as much as 175,000
tons by September 30, 1943, and 390,000 tons by the end of 1943. The controlling conditions for these production estimates for 1943 are:

(a) Our ability to secure adequate priorities and proper allocations of fabricated components;

(b) Our ability to complete synthetic plant facilities on schedule; and

(c) The rate at which they come up to full production.

The foregoing is shown graphically in more detail on the accompanying chart. From it, it is obvious that even if these production objectives (175,000 tons and 390,000 tons respectively) are attained, the inventory of crude and synthetic rubber in the fall of 1943 will, to all practical purposes, be down to the absolute dangerous inventory dead-line of 120,000 tons, and by the end of 1943 will have been built up to only 175,000 tons.
1943
U.S. SUPPLY OF RUBBER
vs. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

IN THOUSANDS OF LONG TONS OF CRUDE AND/OR SYNTHETIC
IN TERMS OF EQUIVALENT CRUDE

NOTES:
1. RECLAIMED RUBBER AND BUNA N NOT INCLUDED.
2. ALL DATA SUBTRACTING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY FROM INITIAL STOCKS OF 400,000 TONS.
3. SEE NOTES ON OPPOSITE PAGE.
4. RESULTANT STOCKS OBTAINED BY

REQUIREMENTS
VS.
NEW SUPPLY

NEW SUPPLY
(Production + Imports)

RESULTANT STOCKS

BASED ON ESTIMATES OF NOVEMBER 25, 1942

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
OFFICE OF THE RUBBER DIRECTOR
PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER ONE
EXPLANATORY NOTES

Requirements

Essential requirements from Table II, page 28, Baruch Report, adjusted to latest quarterly requirement pattern. Therefore, do not include Buna N or reclaim here or in supply.

Supply

1. Imports reflect possible difficulties in exploitation of new areas, lack of equivalency to plantation crude, possible sinkings and/or disorganized transportation as well as shrinkage of wild rubber in washing and drying. They are estimated at 5,000 long tons per month.

2. Synthetic Production estimated for BUTYL, NEOPRENE, and THIOKOL and BUNA S after deducting for BUTADIENE a 60-ton plant inventory and for STYRENE a 30-ton plant inventory, plus transportation and in process allowances for both of these products of two weeks up to September 1st and one week thereafter. Production estimates based upon no production for first and second units at same location until second month following earliest possible plant completion date; for third and fourth units production starts month following plant completion date — BUTADIENE and STYRENE at rate of 20% first productive month; 40% second; 60% third; and 100% thereafter. BUTYL, NEOPRENE, and THIOKOL at rate of 40% capacity first productive month; 75% second; and 100% thereafter. COPOLYMER production estimates the same basis as third and fourth units and according to BUTADIENE and STYRENE rates up to September 1st and BUTYL production rates thereafter. BUTYL and NEOPRENE expressed in terms of equivalent crude by assuming nonwear usage and multiplying production by utility factor. BUNA S and THIOKOL expressed in terms of equivalent crude by assuming nonwear usage and multiplying production by utility factor. BUNA S and THIOKOL expressed in terms of equivalent crude by assuming wear usage and multiplying by use factor.

INITIAL STOCKS

Stocks at beginning of 1943 assumed to approximate 400,000 long tons. This estimated from October 1, 1942 inventories and estimates of imports, essential requirements and small synthetic production during last quarter of 1942.
From the above, it is clear that there is every necessity for continuing through the critical fall of 1943 a policy of rigid conservation of rubber, and that we must envisage the possibility of a complete exhaustion at that time of even so-called normal inventories of finished products. In fact, a delay of a month in the part of the program which includes plants that should be finished by May 30 would mean the loss of 40,000 to 50,000 tons, at a time when there will be none to lose. Present indications are that the impact of competitive programs will cause a delay. It is too early to say how much of a delay.

A scheduling mechanism, now being worked upon, may solve part of the problem and the Office of the Vice Chairman in Charge of Program Determination of W.P.B. is cooperating with us. Nevertheless, I am informed that, although the only sure solution of the Rubber problem is to subordinate other programs to it, the demands of the Services make this impossible. This is in direct conflict with my understanding and conviction that the President's Executive Order of September 17, 1942 and its accompanying letter endorsed unequivocally the Baruch Report, its program, and its statement, "Thus the rubber situation gives rise to our most critical problem."

PROGRAM EXPANSION

The Baruch Committee recommended certain plant expansion. New plants to provide the desired increase in Neoprene and Thielkol capacity are being started. Currently, existing copolymerizing plants promise to provide the required capacity in that direction. However, shortages of raw materials will forbid running these to even rated capacity for another year; hence, no further copolymerizing plants will be started for another six months.

Final arrangements have been made for a portion of the recommended 100,000 tons a year additional capacity of Butadiene from refinery conversions. Engineering work, together with pilot studies, will permit completing arrangements for the remaining capacity as rapidly as necessary critical materials can be obtained without disrupting other phases of the construction program.
The Baruch Report recommended the erection in grain-producing states (preferably accessible to water transportation) of facilities for the manufacture of 100,000,000 gallons per year more alcohol than was then contemplated by the Chemicals Branch of the War Production Board. In making this recommendation, they had in mind that plants being erected to make from alcohol the Butadiene for 242,000 long tons per year of Buna S might run at enough higher than rated capacity to utilize most of this additional alcohol. Furthermore, they emphasised that there must be enough alcohol to preclude the possibility of increased demands from smokeless powder and other munitions industries diverting alcohol from the rubber program.

After all, far more of the country's industrial alcohol is used for other military and civilian purposes than is required for the rubber program.

The Chemicals Branch of the War Production Board has been directed to provide these additional facilities for alcohol production, and has been given estimates of the quantities of alcohol that the butadiene and styrene plants now under construction could consume during the period estimated as necessary for the building of new alcohol producing facilities. The Chemicals Branch states that present facilities and stocks are such that, with present anticipated needs of alcohol, there is no reason for them to expedite the new facilities at the expense of the plants now under construction. They assure us that these new facilities will be available before the plants to consume the alcohol are operating at capacity.

Plans for building plants to make an additional 30,000 tons per year of Buna S from butadiene made from grain are being studied by my technical staff. It is expected that their studies will be sufficiently complete to permit building these as soon as possible after adequate piloting of the processes which the Baruch Committee recommended investigating. This step must also depend on avoiding serious conflict with the flow of materials to plants now under construction for our program.

The recommendation that additional styrene capacity be ready by January 1, 1944, to balance upwards the increased annual production of Buna S, is being watched. But, since, because of lack of materials, the construction of the butadiene
plants in the main program is behind that envisioned by the Baruch Report, decision upon this increased capacity has been postponed.

RUSSIA

The Baruch Report stressed the importance of promptly securing detailed technical information concerning the successful manufacture of synthetic rubber in Soviet Russia. This office immediately accepted the offer of the Soviet Republic to make complete disclosure and selected a small group of competent and technically qualified experts to proceed to Russia and report on all phases of this operation. This group has been assured complete cooperation by our Russian Allies and a similar group from the Soviets will come to this country to study our methods and receive reports on our research and technical developments.

NEED OF INFORMING THE PUBLIC

There is still a pronounced lack of public understanding of the rubber situation.

They do not yet understand that it is essential to our war effort and a prime duty of the Rubber Director to keep on the roads that portion of our essential transportation system which is dependent on our public and private motor vehicles.

They do not understand the vital importance of making their present tires last, nor do they comprehend the sacrifices in convenience driving and pleasure driving which must be made, if each man's own car is to continue at his own disposal for the essential driving our whole war economy demands.

In much of the newly rationed area, they do not fully understand that gas rationing is undertaken solely to conserve rubber. In many sections they resent gas rationing and will continue to resent it, and oppose it, until they have been made to see that less gas means less driving; that less driving means the preservation of their own tires for their own use against that period sometime in 1944 when further supplies of rubber should become available for civilian tires. Only when this rubber is available can rationing be relaxed.

In brief, the public does not yet understand that the vast majority of our motor vehicles must run from now until
COMMENT

The comments on the functions of a system and its performance, as they relate to the effectiveness of the system, should be based on the following considerations:

1. The system should be designed to meet the needs of the users.
2. The system should be tested and validated under realistic conditions.
3. The system should be maintained and updated regularly.
4. The system should be monitored for performance and efficiency.

MAGNETIC POLICY DECISIONS

- No change should be made to the system unless it is necessary.
- All changes should be documented and approved.
- The system should be tested before and after any changes are made.

THEME

Another kind of theme that could be discussed in this context is the need for cooperation and communication among the various components of the system. This theme could be used to illustrate the importance of teamwork and collaboration in achieving the goals of the system.

In summary, the system should be designed, tested, maintained, and updated in a way that meets the needs of the users and ensures its effectiveness and efficiency.
The Office of Personnel Coordinator is expected to draw attention to the development of new programs and arrangements that may affect the position of the personnel department.

The Board of Economic Welfare

We have not been able to determine the extent of the personnel department's responsibilities in this area. However, certain matters have been resolved to some extent by the personnel department and the personnel department has been able to take over these matters.

The Board of Economic Welfare has taken over the direction of the personnel department and to coordinate operations.

The personnel department is in charge of the personnel department's office with funds for the personnel department. The personnel department is responsible for the personnel department's office and to coordinate other programs.

10
Office of Petroleum Coordinator (Cont'd)

the building and operation of Government-financed facilities. They will also present to this office the necessary requests for priorities and allocations incident to refinery conversions. They are responsible as well for seeing to it that necessary petroleum feed stocks are ready and are available when needed, and for aiding in problems of operation that may arise because of the close inter-relationship of isobutylene and butadiene manufacture to other petroleum refinery operations. They are strengthening their technical staff and taking over responsibility for research and development in connection with the manufacture of butadiene from petroleum. The Committee recommended that funds be provided for this technical work, and in the absence of arrangements to the contrary, this office is having the funds for piloting operations provided, where necessary, by contract between research and development agencies and Rubber Reserve.

Office of Defense Transportation

This agency, in accordance with the recommendation of the Beruch Report, has been directed to limit the speed of motor vehicles to thirty-five miles per hour and to determine the needs of all commercial vehicles for gas and tires.

Office of Price Administration

In accordance with carefully elaborated recommendations of the Beruch Committee, the CPA has taken steps to limit civilian driving by the rationing of gasoline, to enlarge the present allotments of new and used tires of various descriptions, and to issue certificates for more retreading of worn tires. The CPA is responsible for a wider acceptance of "car pooling" as well as for periodic inspection of tires and a better understanding of the necessity of properly maintaining tires now in use. Under directive from me, they have arranged to buy those tires in excess of five which are owned by owners of passenger vehicles.

"All-reclaim" tires have been made for allocation by CPA, but it is still too soon for this office to state how much reclaim will be available for the manufacture of these tires after as much as possible of it has been used for the recapping of existing tires.

Steps are now being taken looking toward the best use of all reclaim available for the recapping of worn tires before their fabric has been so worn that the carcass is no longer recyclable.
To this end, it is planned to use to the maximum the facilities of all field recapping stations. Consideration will be given to the enlarging of some and the best use of molds and equipment to meet the problems that will arise as Thackol comes into the picture.

There has been much confusing publicity in connection with the availability of "all-reclaim" tires and the meaning of the word "essential" driving. It is imperative that rationing boards and the public both realize that available reclaim should wherever possible be used to recap tires before their fabric has been worn through so that they are no longer receppable.

We are rapidly approaching the time when our office must require certain manufacturers to use synthetics costing them much more per pound than the 22-1/2¢ now charged for crude rubber. Unless there is to be a complete dislocation and demoralization of various parts of the rubber industry, it will be necessary either to compensate for this by subsidies or to permit an equitable adjustment of selling prices. The problem of how this can be accomplished without dislocation of the rubber program has still to be determined in conjunction with Rubber Reserve and the OPA.

Department of Agriculture

The Baruch Report recommended a large increase in the program for guayule, and the Department of Agriculture is taking steps to effectuate their recommendations. 88,000 acres of plantations will be established this winter. These are expected to provide 35,000 tons of rubber late in 1944 and early in 1945. It is planned to establish another 120,000 acres next winter to produce an additional 47,000 tons of rubber in the harvest of 1945-1946. The request for priorities for critical materials incident to this program is now under examination and final determination will be agreed upon in the near future.

Two regional laboratories of the Department of Agriculture are working on the problems incident to the
extraction of rubber from guayule, cryptostegia, Russian dandelion, goldenrod, etc. At the Eastern Laboratories in Philadelphia, sixty-five men are working on these problems.

PLANT CONSTRUCTION

The primary responsibility here is that of overseeing plant and engineering construction. This involves special attention to insuring a minimum use of critical raw materials, and an even flow of raw materials to fabricators, and fabricated articles to plant sites. This operation also includes obtaining the priorities and allocations necessary if plant facilities are to be built in time. The situation pertaining to these problems have been discussed in some detail in the early section entitled "Program".

To facilitate the work of this section, every effort is being made to freeze designs. The recommendations of the Committee that certain pilot plants be established, are being followed and every effort is being made to complete one large-scale plant on the Standard Oil of New Jersey process of butadiene by March, 1945.

The Baruch Committee emphasized the desirability of completing as soon as possible one standard copolymerization plant. It is expected that the first of these units will be finished in March. To finish one earlier, would necessitate changes and interruptions which might result in almost disastrous delays to more critical portions of the program.

Facilities for the manufacture of considerable tonnage of Buna S by what is essentially standard plant design are already finished. These units are being run at less than one-fifth of their capacity because of the present unavailability of butadiene. Because of this shortage, all emphasis is upon bringing into production the first increments of butadiene and styrene. It is expected that the first butadiene will come from the first of the four units of the alcohol plant at Institute, West Virginia, and that this will be
followed closely by the first increment of butadiene from petroleum at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It is hoped that both of these will be producing early in the year. Unfortunately, these increments constitute only a little more than five per cent of the ultimate program.

**OPERATIONS**

Under "Operations" come all of the many functions of my office which have to do with rubber and closely related industries. In order that these operations may be efficiently carried out so as to conserve a maximum of rubber with a minimum dislocation of industry and labor, and of the needs of the armed services and other essential users of rubber, the organization of this group comprises many experts from various parts and units of the rubber industry. These experts have been chosen from both large and small manufacturers. Some are full-time members of the staff; others are acting as advisers.

The Baruch Committee emphasized the necessity of scrutinizing all requirements for rubber. We have inaugurated a plan to obtain detailed requirements from all the claimant agencies for end products of rubber or rubber substances to meet actual schedules of production of airplanes, trucks, ships and other products requiring rubber or rubber-like materials. This survey, which will be kept up-to-date monthly, together with our newly inaugurated survey of all inventories of all end products, will enable us shortly after the first of the year to control properly the consumption of natural rubber, synthetics and substitutes, and to regulate them by the possible liquidation of less-essential inventories of end products, in such a way as to conserve our diminishing stockpile of natural rubber.

We have taken the necessary steps to consolidate within the Office of the Rubber Director all important statistics with reference to rubber, with the understanding that only such reports as emanate from the Office of the Rubber Director will be considered authentic. This procedure should tend to relieve the confusion which has
existed in the past as a result of so many different agencies of the Government and others compiling and releasing figures and other information regarding the rubber situation.

While the specific delegation to the Rubber Director of those priority powers affecting rubber necessary to discharge the responsibilities with which I am charged has not been completed, I am confident that this will soon be the case. As soon as it is, this section will take over, in their entirety, the complicated problems incident to the detailed allocations of various crude rubber, synthetic rubbers, and rubber substitutes, and various grades of reclaim to be used for specific items, in such a way as to realize the maximum and most effective uses of each in effectuating the program as a whole.

The Baruch Report recommended that a survey of milling, mixing and tire-building facilities be made on or about May 1, 1943. Before another month we shall have complete engineering information covering milling and calendering equipment from practically all of the rubber industry. This will enable us promptly to complete the recommended survey, to the end that we may specify necessary and essential increases in milling and fabricating capacity in time to handle the increased requirements necessary when synthetic rubber is used in place of crude.

Within a month, a similar survey of reclaiming plants will be available in connection with the Baruch Committee's recommendation that reclaiming capacity be increased by about 20 per cent. Reclaimers estimate that we may expect these proposals to provide for an increase of about 10 per cent by the elimination of "bottlenecks" in existing reclaiming plants, by changes in specifications in desired types of reclaim, and by the elimination of unnecessary types.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Baruch Committee, we are proceeding with the preparation of a new drive for scrap to be inaugurated whenever the scrap is needed to maintain an adequate scrap pile. Meanwhile, the supply is coming in automatically as tires are rationed to users who are
turning in their worn-out tires and by the restriction against the possession of more than five (5) tires per vehicle.

The functions of the Board of Economic Warfare, Rubber Reserve and the State Department, in the development and procurement of natural rubbers from South and Central America, are confused. I am studying this situation and hope to determine a clear and definite program under which these agencies will operate.

Problems of Civilian Supply as they pertain to the organization of W.P.B. will receive further attention.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baruch Report recommended the establishment of a technical division, adequately staffed and with branches in charge of all phases of research and development (except for the production of butadiene from petroleum.) It advised that there should be an interchange of information among those engaged in a competitive spirit in research, development and operation. A strong technical group of thoroughly competent, experienced, outstanding men has been gathered together under three Assistant Deputy Directors. These are discussed separately below.

TECHNOLOGY AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY USES

This is the problem of technology and specifications governing the use of selected synthetics for each type of product now made from rubber. Since some of the proposed synthetics and substitutes may be available earlier than others, the saving of a maximum amount of crude rubber may involve, in the case of a single article, first using one substitute or synthetic and later switching to another. Much has already been done, but there is still a Herculean task ahead. Needless to say, results depend upon obtaining the full cooperation of industry and a close and constant working relationship with the statistical, allocations, and industry advisory groups of the operating section. Also
concerned is the research group working upon improving the quality of the available synthetics. The practical problems of this section will be closely tied to the policies which will govern the pricing of synthetics and products made from them. Unless these provide an incentive to use synthetics, many of the weaker units are bound to hold back.

The staff of this section, made up of thoroughly competent men (at present there are sixteen) recruited primarily from both large and small units of the rubber industry, help by advising with the industry.

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF SYNTHETICS**

The Baruch Committee recommended centering all research for and upon synthetic rubber and substitutes in the Office of the Rubber Director. To accomplish this, the work of this group was organized under men of proven competency and scientific reputation into groups dealing with:

1. Research into the mechanism of various polymerizations, and the character and structure of resulting polymers.
2. Studies of and development of polymerization processes.
3. The engineering of polymerisation plants and equipment.
4. The operation of pilot plants for the development of new methods of polymerization and new copolymers.
5. The appraisal of new ideas and inventions.

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF RAW MATERIALS**

This section is responsible for the development of processes to make raw materials other than isobutylene, butadiene, and others developed by OPC, for use in making
synthetic rubber and rubber substitutes. Particularly are they entrusted with the encouragement of and study of the piloting of proposed methods for making butadiene from alcohol or other chemicals made by the fermenting of grains.

The small but highly trained staff of this group include outstanding chemical engineers from faculties of leading educational institutions. These men also serve as Staff Consultants to me and my Deputy Director.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion I present the following:

(1) The Office of the Rubber Director has been organized and is, at least partially, staffed at every appropriate point with thoroughly competent, outstanding personnel who bring to it broad scientific and engineering trainings and an invaluable knowledge and experience of the rubber industry.

(2) The recommendations of the Baruch Committee have been accepted as the basic policy of the Rubber Director. Many of the proposed moves are nearing completion.

(3) The construction program is behind that envisioned by the Baruch Committee. If it were possible to settle questions of relative importance between programs, it should still be possible to obtain an even flow of components and to build the required facilities in time to prevent the inventory of crude rubber and synthetics falling below the disaster dead-line determined by the Committee. Any further delay will make this impossible. Present indications are that, because of other programs, there will be such a delay.
(4) Working relationships have been established with several other sections of the Government to effectuate essential portions of the rubber program.

(5) Serious problems in connection with the work of the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation are to be solved so that the public may have a full understanding of the Rubber Program and help with it.

(6) Serious problems in connection with the work of the Office of Price Administration are to be solved so that all units of industry are given the proper incentive to help develop the use of synthetic rubbers and rubber substitutes.

November 30, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY: 4189

Do you think this letter to you is all right? I think the Budget has talked with the Joint Staffs about it already and that they approve. The whole matter is of such interest I believe it would not hurt to let me give it out to the press.

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Letter, undated, signed by the President, to Admiral W. D. Leahy, in re establishing mechanisms for joint logistics planning, and especially for a top-side continuing review of the various war supply programs. This letter was signed on 9/6/43, by the President, but the date was not put on the letter.
My dear Admiral:

I agree that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have done a fine job of planning. However, what I had in mind when writing my earlier letter was going further in establishing mechanisms for joint logistics planning, and especially for a top-side continuing review of the various war supply programs.

What I am talking about is the formulation of detailed joint Army-Navy plans for supply, transportation, and use of technical non-combatant personnel for specific campaigns. I know of the work done by the Joint Staff Planners in developing the so-called color plans, and I know that each Service has formulated detailed logistics plans, but these plans have not been worked out jointly by continuous, systematic staff work. You have recognized this situation in your present plans for a Joint Logistics Committee.

In addition I want a continuous review of supply programs comparing various Army programs with each other, various Navy programs with each other, and Army programs with Navy programs in order to attain better balance among them and to develop one coordinated military program. Furthermore, these programs should be coordinated with that of the Maritime Commission.

The Services have done a grand procurement and production job. We set high production goals because of urgent needs and to promote an all-out conversion of industry. But now we must shake the programs down to meet conditions as we find them. Our productive capacity is now fully utilized, and manpower is stretched thin. Some cut-backs have been made, more will be needed. We must switch things around as strategic plans change. These are the reasons that prompted my previous letter which I wanted discussed at a Joint Chiefs meeting so that all steps would be taken for a continuous review of the total supply program from a joint viewpoint. This review should be made by high ranking officers attached on the Army side to the General Staff, and on the Navy side to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

In addition to balancing various military programs a staff of this kind will criticize individual items, look at the way
programs for initial equipment, and spares, and spare parts have been built up. The kind of individuals I have in mind for this staff will be those who can forget their loyalty to one branch of the Service and view the whole problem from the standpoint of the total effort. This means that the job must not be done by men who have been responsible for building up these programs.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Admiral William D. Leahy

The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a note for your signature to Admiral Leahy along the lines suggested by you in our recent conversation concerning his answer to your letter of July 16. I believe it desirable that this note be delivered prior to next Tuesday's meeting of the Joint Chiefs at which, it is my understanding, they are to discuss a proposal for a Joint Logistics Committee. It is important to emphasize the need for appointing as members of this committee staff from the General Staff in the Army and from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Secret memorandum for the President, 7-20-43 from Admiral Wm. D. Leahy, re joint logistics planning to parallel joint strategic planning and re establishment of the Joint Administrative Committee.
My dear Admiral:

I have given careful consideration to the proposed Executive order defining the organization and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff delivered to me through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. It is my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are encountering no new condition currently requiring clarification of their status or a new definition of their functions. It seems to me that such an order would provide no benefits and might in some way impair flexibility of operations. Consequently, I consider the issuance of an Executive order now as superfluous. If at a later date an Executive order seems necessary to meet a new situation, the matter can be reconsidered.

I believe that we have recently made important forward strides in joint as well as combined strategic planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are to be commended for their contribution to the welding of the military efforts of the two services into one unified operation. However, it is my opinion that more attention should now be given to organizing for the same kind of joint effort in dealing with questions of supply. Joint logistics planning should parallel joint strategic planning. Likewise the joint military supply program should receive continuous review in order to attain a more perfect balance among the various programs. The supply program of each service should be carefully scrutinized as to its relationship to the programs of the other services to the end that there shall be one unified and balanced supply program consistent with up-to-date strategic concepts.

Sincerely yours,

Admiral William D. Leahy

The White House
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted the attached proposed Executive order with a covering letter to me stating that they "consider it advisable to have their organization and a definition of their functions made a matter of record in order that their status may be clarified in the eyes of the various government agencies with which they must deal."

We have given this matter careful consideration and have discussed it with Admirals Leahy and King, General Arnold, and Brigadier General Deane through whom we have obtained the views of General Marshall. From our discussions it appears that Admiral King more than any of the other members feels the need for an Executive order. He desires a definite written statement of authority, particularly in respect to the authority of the Joint Chiefs over the war supply programs. He does not believe that these programs should be questioned by such civilian agencies as the WPS.

We have been told that the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now running quite smoothly. Further, we understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are encountering no new condition currently requiring clarification of their status or a new definition of their functions. Consequently, I consider the issuance of an Executive order now as superfluous, and I recommend that no such order be issued. In any event the attached order would require substantial revision. If at a later date an Executive order seems necessary to meet a new situation, the matter can be reconsidered. At such a time the order could incorporate provisions appropriate to meet the particular situation then existent.

On several previous occasions I have suggested to you certain administrative changes to strengthen the Joint Chiefs in their work relating to the review of supply programs. I believe that a competent full-time staff should give continuous review and consideration to the total war supply program — Army, Navy, and Maritime — with attention directed towards the balancing of one program against the other. At the present time, the supply program is given some review in the Joint Administrative Committee, but on the Army side, at least, by representatives of the procuring services rather than by staff detached from the services who report directly to the General Staff.
Furthermore I believe that logistics planning now being carried on by each of the services quite independently of the other should be carried on jointly in a manner generally paralleling strategic planning. The proposed Executive order does not treat with these matters, nor does it include any provisions for improving or strengthening the work of the Joint Chiefs.

Attached is a draft of a letter to Admiral Leahy for your signature if you concur in this disposition of the proposal.

Enclosures:
- Proposed Executive order with covering letter
- Letter for signature
RESTRICTED

16 June 1943.

The Honorable
Harold D. Smith,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Executive Office of the President,
Room 252 State Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Smith:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it advisable to have their organization and a definition of their functions made a matter of record in order that their status may be clarified in the eyes of the various government agencies with which they must deal.

They have therefore prepared a charter which they would like to have published by the President in an Executive Order. The proposed charter is enclosed herewith and is submitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that you may give it your consideration and make such comments as you care to before they submit it to the President.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
EXECUTIVE ORDER

Defining the Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354 - 77th Congress), and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) is the planning and executive agency of the President of the United States in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will consist of:
   a. The Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
   b. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
   d. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
   a. Advise the President with regard to:
      (1) Military strategy.
      (2) The requirements, production and allocation of munitions needed for the operations and training of the Armed Forces in the prosecution of the war.
      (3) The requirements, production, and allocation of shipping needed by the Armed Forces in the prosecution of the war.
      (4) Manpower requirements of the Armed Forces.
      (5) Matters of joint Army and Navy policy.
   b. Establish policies relating to joint Army and Navy functions and activities which do not require Presidential approval.
c. Make joint Army and Navy plans to accord with the approved concept of Military strategy.

d. Issue joint directives to implement joint policies and plans.

e. Exercise jurisdiction over all matters of strategy and all operations in any theater in which the United States is assigned separate strategic responsibility.

f. Request other executive government agencies for reports of progress in the implementation of the Presidential decisions referred to in paragraph e above.

g. Initiate proposals leading to the better coordination of joint Army and Navy functions and activities with those of other executive governmental agencies.

h. Insure that the program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations is coordinated with Military plans.

i. Represent the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations will implement decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters relating to the Army and Navy respectively. The Chief of Staff of the Army will implement decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to a theater or area in which an officer of the Army is in supreme command. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations will implement decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to a theater or area in which an officer of the Navy is in supreme command.

THE WHITE HOUSE
June 1943.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You have requested an expression of opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the danger of loss or damage from enemy action that is likely to result from returning the originals of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence to their peace-time depository in the Library of Congress.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the danger of loss or damage to these documents from enemy action would be negligible if they were returned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

No memorandum in file and Miss Turner does not have.
The attached list was used in sending this letter dated February 19, 1944 and signed by the President, to the Departments, Establishments and Agencies of the Government.

Mr. Wagner sent this down by Eddie Bradshaw with the message that it was not slipped in the staff room.

E.B.

Letters were sent out on Feb. 22, 1944. They were submitted through Admiral Radisson's office and there were no carbons of the individual letters with the file.

2/22/44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 23, 1944

FILE MEMO:

Stewart Brown, Public Relations of the American Red Cross, called in reference to the letters sent out to the heads of the Govt. Depts, Establishments and Agencies of the Government, on Feb. 19th, 1944, by the President. He wished to know if it could be distributed to their personnel or if it should be paraphrased.

Mr. Early said that the letter was marked RESTRICTED and could not be distributed to their personnel. If Norman Davis wanted to put that policy into effect throughout the Red Cross he should do it under his own signature without reference to this letter.

R.R.

Above message given to Mr. Brown by telephone by R. Rumelt 2-23-44
My dear ______________:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our military commanders in the field have expressed their serious concern over comment in the press and on the radio by prominent persons in this country with respect to projected military operations. This concern is shared by me.

From a study of such material, it is apparent that there is serious danger of compromising the security of projected military operations which conceivably could result in unnecessary loss of lives and jeopardy to the operations themselves. The Office of Censorship is taking such action as lies within its power to prevent disclosures of classified information in the press and on the radio.

Will you please see that your particular department and its various bureaus and divisions issue instructions to their personnel to refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication, regarding secret weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans and the movements of troops and ships, prior to announcement by the proper military or naval or higher authority; and, in cases of high level international conferences, prior to authorization being secured from the Executive Office of the President.

I am sending an identical letter to the responsible head of each Department and Agency of the Federal Government which may be concerned in this matter.

Very sincerely yours,
RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War,

The Honorable
The Attorney General,

The Honorable
The Postmaster General,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior,

The Honorable
The Secretary of Agriculture,

The Honorable
The Secretary of Commerce,

The Honorable
The Secretary of Labor,

Honorable Paul V. McNutt,
Administrator,
Federal Security Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Major General Philip B. Fleming,
Administrator,
Federal Works Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Marvin Jones,
War Food Administrator,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Norman H. Davis,
Chairman,
American National Red Cross,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Robert E. Webb,
(until 9/18/44)
Acting Chairman,
Board of Investigation and Research--Transportation,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Marriner S. Eccles,
Chairman,
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable L. Welch Pogue
Chairman,
Civil Aeronautics Board,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Lindsay C. Warren,
Comptroller General of the
United States,
Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General
William J. Donovan
Director of the Office of
Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Byron Price,
Director of Censorship,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable James L. Fly
Chairman,
Federal Communications
Commission,
Washington, D. C.
Honorable Robert E. Freer
(for 1944)
Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D. C.

Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson,
Chairman, United States Members,
Joint Mexican-United States
Defense Commission,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Frank B. Jewett,
President,
National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker,
Chairman,
National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Harry A. Millis,
Chairman,
National Labor Relations Board,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Chester Bowles,
Administrator,
Office of Price Administration,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Fiorello H. LaGuardia,
Chairman, United States Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defense-
United States and Canada,
c/o Mr. John Hickerson,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Joseph E. Davies,
Chairman, The President's
War Relief Control Board,
Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Frank T. Hines,
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

Major General Lewis B. Hershey,
Director of Selective Service,
Washington, D. C.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Richard R. Brown,
Director,
Division of Central Administrative Services,
Office of Emergency Management,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable James Lawrence Fly,
Chairman,
Board of War Communications,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Coordinator,
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable William H. Davis,
Chairman,
National War Labor Board,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman,
War Production Board,
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Director,
Office of Scientific Research Development,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Joseph B. Eastman,
Director,
Office of Defense Transportation
Washington, D. C.

Rear Admiral Emory S. Land,
Administrator,
War Shipping Administration,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Leo T. Crowley,
Administrator,
Office of Foreign Economic Administration,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman,
War Manpower Commission,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Elmer Davis,
Director,
Office of War Information,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Fred M. Vinson,
Director,
Office of Economic Stabilization,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable James F. Byrnes,
Director,
Office of War Mobilization,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Harold D. Smith,
Director,
Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable John B. Martin,
Acting Director,
Office of Civilian Defense,
Washington, D. C.
March 14, 1944

The President,
The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of February 19, 1944, requesting that instructions be issued to personnel of the General Accounting Office to refrain from private or public discussion, in the case of certain classes of military information, prior to announcement by the proper authority; and, in the case of high level international conferences, prior to authorization being secured from the Executive Office of the President.

Every effort is being made by this Office to prevent the premature disclosure of military information coming to the notice of its personnel. To this end, I am bringing the contents of your letter to the attention of all officers and employees of the Office, with the request that all abide strictly by the rules therein set forth.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Comptroller General of the United States
February 23, 1944

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

This letter will acknowledge receipt of your request of February 19 that I ask the personnel of this Board to refrain from private or public discussion of military and naval operations, or matters pertaining to high level international conferences. I am glad to cooperate to this end and have addressed a memorandum to the staff accordingly.

Respectfully yours,

Robert E. Webb
Chairman
The Federal Trade Commission is today in receipt of your letter of February 19 with reference to the danger of compromising the security of projected military operations. We will comply fully with the requirements of your letter and have already issued notice and instructions to all the officers and employees of the Commission to comply strictly with your letter.

In this connection may I enclose for your information a copy of the remarks on security which I made on December 21, 1943, before the staff of the Commission.

By direction of the Commission.

Cordially,

R. E. Freer,
Chairman.

Enclosure.
REMARKS ON SECURITY
BY
HON. ROBERT E. FREER, VICE CHAIRMAN
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
BEFORE THE STAFF OF THE COMMISSION
AUDITORIUM, NATIONAL ARCHIVES BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 21, 1943, 10 A.M., E.W.T.

Just a little over two years ago, to quote Major Albert J. Stowe, personal representative of Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, of G-2, our Military Intelligence, Tojo probably was telling his minions, "a single peep out of you as to what we're going to do to Pearl Harbor, and your heads come off."

Democracies, we're told, don't talk to their subjects like that. We must accomplish the same vital objective -- the preservation of our military secrets -- by recourse to other methods. The principal method and the logical one is through an appeal to the common sense of all of us, civilians as well as soldiers and sailors.

Danger lies in the fact that many of us do not realize that anything we know has any value to the enemy. Many of us feel that we could stand in the grand concourse of Washington Terminal and tell everything we know on any subject and it still wouldn't have any military significance.

Recently a man locked up in New York as an enemy agent suspect confessed to getting his information by hanging around places where defense workers and service men gathered and picking up a chance remark here, another there, and doing it so effectively that he was able to fill out many a picture long-puzzling to the German Intelligence.

Bits and fragments of secrets, that's all. Remember that Enemy Intelligence may need only the apparent triviality of information you could talk about, to combine with similar "trivialities" overheard from somebody else, and thus to sketch at least the broad outlines of a picture ruinous to our military plans; deadly to our troops.
Enemy Intelligence seeks all the information it can obtain about our troops: where they are, the extent of their training and the character of their equipment, as well as where they are going, what their plans are, where and when they are going to strike and in what order of battle.

You may depend upon it, too, that the German genius for detail does not stop there; nor at the borders of any science, any business, any industry, or any country. German Intelligence is hungry for more details also as to the movement of war materials, location of war industries, shortages of raw materials or food supplies in specific areas and any other information about our daily affairs. These every-day details are bits and fragments too.

Recently General Strong authorized the release of the following: An enemy submarine lay off our eastern coast. It allowed one of our merchantmen to pass in safety. Following a considerable interval, another of our vessels was allowed to go unmolested. A third ship was likewise ignored. But finally, a fourth hove in sight. The sub went into action... our ship was torpedoed and sunk. The few survivors were told that of the four ships, theirs was singled out for liquidation because it had the most critical material aboard. This was the case and our men knew that the sub commander didn't find it out just by crystal gazing! And, more than likely, he didn't find it out through the deliberate act of a traitor. Again, his agents had pieced together bits and scraps of information so generously scattered to the four winds by careless talkers.

Remember, too, that military censorship is designed not only to safeguard the effectiveness of SECRECY and SURPRISE in our military operations, but also to keep hazard from the paths of your friends and relatives in the service and to speed their victorious and safe return. Hence, no matter how full of censor's deletions your service man's letters may be, your own good judgment should dictate that you keep to yourself any bits of secrets you still may be able to delineate therefrom.

You of the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, who have for years been trained to consistently treat as confidential the information submitted in the routine of our investigative procedure, I am sure, can and will employ like restraint to comply with our Government's common sense request that all of us contribute to the general security by withholding from our conversation all bits of secrets, no matter how trivial or unimportant they may seem.
My dear Mr. President:

I am in receipt of your letter of February 19, 1944 advising me of the serious concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our military commanders in the field over comment in the press and on the radio with respect to projected military operations, and I note this concern is shared by you.

Certainly, we all should guard against any action which tends to compromise the security of projected military operations and which conceivably might result in the unnecessary loss of lives and even jeopardize the operations themselves.

In line with your request I am immediately issuing instructions for the guidance of all personnel of the Veterans Administration to refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication, regarding secret weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans and the movements of troops and ships, prior to appropriate public announcement.

Very sincerely yours,

Frank T. Hines
Administrator.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The President of the United States,
The White House
February 23, 1944.

The White House.

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

This is to acknowledge your letter of February 19 instructing me to see that the personnel of the Office of Censorship refrains from speculation or discussion regarding various critical military matters. I will see that this is done.

I would like to say also that this injunction upon Government personnel will be of great assistance to the work of the Office of Censorship which often has been embarrassed by the disclosure by responsible public officials of secret information which the newspapers and broadcasters have been keeping out of circulation.

Sincerely yours,

Byron Price,
Director.
February 23, 1944.

The President,
The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

This is to acknowledge your letter of February 19 instructing me to see that the personnel of the Office of Censorship refrains from speculation or discussion regarding various critical military matters. I will see that this is done.

I would like to say also that this injunction upon Government personnel will be of great assistance to the work of the Office of Censorship which often has been embarrassed by the disclosure by responsible public officials of secret information which the newspapers and broadcasters have been keeping out of circulation.

Sincerely yours,

Byron Price,
Director.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1944

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of February 19th and am glad to inform you that no one in this Department has, in any public speech, address, interview, or private conversation, made any comments whatever with regard to projected military operations. I have, however, called to the attention once more of every officer who has any likelihood of meeting the public the importance of making no comments whatever on these matters or on the matters of construction and production, which are related to them.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your letter of February 19, 1944, instructions will be promptly issued in this Department calling upon the personnel to refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication, regarding secret weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans and the movements of troops and ships, prior to announcement by the proper military or naval or higher authority; and, in cases of high level international conferences, prior to authorization being secured from the Executive Office of the President.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

The President,

The White House.
The President

The White House

My dear Mr. President

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 19 February 1944 and report that I have instructed all personnel of the Board of War Communications to refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication, regarding secret weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans and the movements of troops and ships, prior to announcement by the proper military or naval or higher authority; and, in cases of high level international conferences, prior to authorization being secured from the Executive Office of the President.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Chairman
February 24, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

In the absence of Mr. Davis I am replying to your letter of February 19, 1944, concerning comment with respect to projected military operations.

Appropriate instructions are being issued to the members of the Red Cross staff.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Cornelius N. Bliss
Acting Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:

In Mr. Eastman's absence, I wish to acknowledge your letter of February 19 expressing your concern over comment in the press and on the radio by prominent persons with respect to projected military operations.

All personnel of the Office of Defense Transportation have been furnished with a copy of your communication and cautioned to be governed accordingly. You may be sure that I shall do everything possible to impress upon the employees of this Office the need for secrecy in all matters pertaining to military operations and any transportation operations indirectly related to military movements.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. Young
Deputy Director

The President
The White House
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of February 19, requesting that I caution all members of the staff of the Office of Civilian Defense against revealing any information which might be useful to the enemy in connection with projected military operations.

In accordance with your request, I have taken this matter up with our staff. I can assure you that every effort will be made to comply with your request to the fullest extent.

Sincerely yours,

John B. Martin
Acting Director
My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your letter of February 19, requesting that personnel of this Department "refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication, regarding secret weapons or equipment, current or future military operations or plans and the movements of troops and ships, prior to announcement by the proper military or naval or higher authority; and, in cases of high level international conferences, prior to authorization being secured from the Executive Office of the President".

The personnel of this Department is being informed of your request and you may be sure that compliance will be prompt and effective.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of February 17, 1944, directing that instructions be issued to the personnel of each Department to refrain from any discussion, either privately or for publication, of war or international conference information prior to announcement by proper higher authority.

Action was taken immediately to see that these instructions were issued, and to see that they are effectively carried out.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Postmaster General

The President,

The White House.
Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of the 19th has been received, and circulated among the heads of departments under my supervision.

I am confident that every official and employee will be glad to cooperate in observing the secrecy which is so vital to our war effort.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of Commerce

The President
The White House
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 29, 1944.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of February 19, requesting that instructions be issued within the War Department directing renewed caution against the disclosure of military information, has been brought to the attention of staff and division chiefs. Necessary action has been initiated to inform all military personnel of their individual responsibilities.

The danger of revealing information of value to the enemy through speculation and careless conversation has been a subject of constant concern to me, and the War Department has taken strong measures to guard against disclosures which might jeopardize lives and the success of future operations.

I should like to assure you of my utmost cooperation in maintaining adequate safeguards.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War
February 28, 1944.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of February 19, 1944, in reference to "comment in the press and on the radio by prominent persons in this country with respect to projected military operations."

Permit me to advise you that the American Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense has but one civilian member. The military and naval members are experienced, trained, professional soldiers, disciplined and do not talk. There is only one non-military member and he is not a prominent person but has sense and hence has to date caused you or the military commanders no worry.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Mayor
The President
The White House

MAR 1 1944

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of February 19, 1944 dealing with the necessity for stricter care in refraining from speculation or discussion of secret and confidential matters, such as weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans, the movement of troops and ships, and high level international conferences.

I am issuing instructions to each employee of the Foreign Economic Administration cautioning him to maintain silence on these matters both privately and publicly.

Sincerely yours,

Leo T. Crowley
Administrator
March 1, 1944

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your letter of February 19th concerning the dangers arising from discussions regarding projected military operations.

The War Shipping Administration, because of the nature of its operations, has already taken action to maintain the security of information concerning ships, ship movements, and other related matters. I concur in your concern as to the danger inherent in the present situation and I have prepared a notice to all officers, administrative employees, district offices and agents of the War Shipping Administration asking them to refrain from any discussion regarding secret weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans, and the movement of troops and ships prior to announcement by the proper authority, in accordance with the instructions contained in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

E. S. Land
Administrator
February 29, 1944

The Honorable
The President of the United States

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to reply to your letter of February 19, 1944, and to inform you that I am again bringing to the attention of the personnel of this Agency the responsibility which is theirs with respect to the classified information with which they have been entrusted.

Because the work of this Agency is of high military importance and significance, we have had occasion to develop security measures commensurate with the importance of the work and to inculcate in our personnel the necessity for handling classified information with the utmost secrecy and discretion.

I am taking your letter as the occasion for another of the periodic reminders which we are accustomed to issue as a matter of precaution and emphasis.

Respectfully yours,

V. Bush, Director
The President

The White House

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of February 19, 1944, concerning statements by prominent persons in this country with respect to projected military operations.

I have brought your letter to the attention of the Members of the National War Labor Board, as well as to the top staff officials, and have instructed them to be governed accordingly.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

William H. Davis
Chairman
February 28, 1944

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of February 19, 1944, concerning statements by prominent persons in this country with respect to projected military operations.

I have brought your letter to the attention of the Members of the National War Labor Board, as well as to the top staff officials, and have instructed them to be governed accordingly.

Respectfully yours,

William H. Davis
Chairman
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 19, 1944 calling attention to serious concern over comments in the press and on the radio in this country with respect to projected military operations.

I am sure that all the members of the staff of the National Academy of Sciences and its committees have been exceedingly careful in such matters, but I am taking this opportunity of sending them a copy of your letter in order that they may know of your wishes in the matter.

Very sincerely yours,

Frank B. Jewett
President
March 2, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your letter of February 19th concerning the indiscriminate release of information concerning military operations, secret weapons, and so forth.

I am, at once, issuing instructions to the entire Naval establishment to instruct their personnel along the lines you desire.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of February nineteenth, concerning the need for security measures in connection with military operations.

I have issued the instructions which you requested and want to assure you of the complete cooperation of this Office in complying with your request.

Sincerely,

Nelson A. Rockefeller
Coordinator

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 19, relative to the danger of compromising the security of projected military operations by disclosures of classified information in the press or on the radio.

Instructions have been issued to the personnel in the Headquarters and field stations of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in accordance with the third paragraph of your letter.

I am pleased to be able to assure you that the NACA has always conducted business well within the spirit of your request.

Very sincerely yours,

J. C. Hunsaker

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of February 19 in which you ask us to make sure that all members of our agency receive instructions to refrain from any speculation regarding war equipment, military operations or plans.

Today I have sent a memorandum to the person in charge of each of our operating departments, requesting that these instructions be passed on immediately and that every care be taken to avoid such comment or discussion.

Sincerely yours,

Chester Bowles
Administrator
My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of February 19, regarding the security of projected military operations, has been received. Officers and employees of the War Production Board have always been extremely careful to avoid the release of any information that might be useful to the enemy. I am not aware that any of them has ever made any comments in the press or on the radio regarding projected military operations.

Nevertheless, I am taking immediate steps to bring the contents of your letter to the attention of officials and employees of the War Production Board. I am confident that everyone will concur in the need for refraining from idle speculation or the divulging of any facts which may jeopardize the future naval or military activities.

Respectfully yours,

Donald M. Nelson

The President

The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Merchant Shipping

By: Deputy Administrator

MEMORANDUM TO: ADMIRAL E. B. LAND

November 20, 1944

I am enclosing copies of the following memoranda which I have signed today and which are self-explanatory.

F.J.

[Handwritten note:]

[Signature]
November 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE JAMES F. BYRNES

SUBJECT: Manpower Shortage in Shipyards

I am greatly disturbed about the manpower shortage in our shipyards. I am convinced that we could be building at least 10 more ships a month were it not for these manpower shortages. These ships are needed desperately and I wish you would explore the ways and means of getting this manpower into the shipyards.

It might be well for you to get Murray and Green together and lay before them the urgent necessity of this phase of our war program.

I have told Land that he should make certain that all of our shipbuilding companies have war contracts throughout all of the year 1945 so that we may be assured of enough ships and the men, in turn, given what amounts to a guarantee of a full year's work in the calendar year 1945.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 4 1973
For any purposes.

For any purposes in order that those whose may be used

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*2. I believe that we would try to expose the container

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"That the..."I believe that we would try to do our part.

"That the..."I believe that we would try to do our part.

"That the..."I believe that we would try to do our part.

"That the..."I believe that we would try to do our part.

SYNOPSIS

November 20, 1944
November 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

SUBJECT: Merchant Shipping

The War Shipping Administration tells me that if the convoy cycle to the Mediterranean could be changed from 10 days to 5 days it would result in from 10 to 12 additional sailings per month of merchant ships from this country for war purposes.

I realize the urgent need for escort vessels throughout the world, but I wish you would carefully explore the possibilities of this because of the great need for merchant shipping.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 4 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Existing and prospective demands for cargo shipping are beyond the prospective allocations to the War and Navy Departments. A reassignment of shipping must be sought whereby existing American and British resources can be applied more effectively to the military effort.

The increased tempo of operations in the Pacific together with increasing demands for shipping to handle civilian supplies for occupied countries has produced deficits in sailings necessary to support the military effort during coming months. The most recent request for additional shipping to support the movement of more tonnage to Siberia on Russian account has accentuated these deficits to a degree which requires a decision on the highest level as to the use of American bottoms, and a request on the U. K. for other shipping to supplement American resources.

The attached Charts 1 and 2, prepared by the War and Navy Departments and the War Shipping Administration, set forth the shipping position of the United States in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Chart 3 shows the position resulting from recommended changes in shipping allocations. It will be noted that the following adjustments are included:

- Elimination of U. S. assistance to U. K. imports - 40 sailings per month.
- Reduction of U. S. assistance to other British Lend-Lease programs - 12 sailings per month.
- Drastic reductions in civilian relief allocations - an average of 9 sailings per month for N. W. Europe and up to 24 per month for the Mediterranean.
- Reductions in U. S. non-military commitments - 10 sailings per month.
Curtailment of Russian Protocol shipments by 10 sailings per month.

Limiting U. S. military shipments to the continent (N. W. Europe) to 200 per month.

After accepting these cuts, including reductions of over 50 for each of two months in U. S. military allocations for the continent and deficits averaging 45 per month for November through January in the Pacific, it still will be necessary, if military operations are to be supported to secure the following additional sailings:

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<th>1944 Dec</th>
<th>1945 Jan</th>
<th>1945 Feb</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sailings to be provided</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>99</td>
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</table>

The Chiefs of Staff are informed by the Chairman of the Maritime Commission that there are at present labor shortages in the yards having contracts with the Maritime Commission of over 35,000 men. If these shortages can be overcome by 1 January 1945 the monthly output of the Commission can be accelerated by about 5 ships. Even if this is done there still will remain a shortage of 128 sailings over a three month period.

It is essential, if the war against our enemies is to be driven home with all the force at our command, that all of the war powers available to the Executive be used to man the yards of the Maritime Commission with due regard for other important military programs, and that urgent representations be made to the British Government to secure the additional assistance needed.

It is strongly recommended that the Executive action necessary to bring about these results be taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J. J. King
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date Dec 4 1973
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Merchant Shipping

Here are the memoranda I promised to get up for you on Saturday. I think they are all right.

H.L.H.  

encls.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
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<td>218</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Total Lend-Lease &amp; U. S. Non-Military</td>
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<td>124</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>131</td>
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| Total Requirements            | 464      | 596      | 633     | 591      | 582   | 571   | 572 | 571  |
| Returners                     | 396      | 440      | 442     | 422      | 485   | 520   | 511 | 513  |
| Construction                  | 41       | 44       | 41      | 42       | 40    | 37    | 34  | 31   |
| Net availables               | 457      | 493      | 483     | 464      | 523   | 557   | 545 | 544  |

| Deficit or Surplus            | -27      | -103     | -150    | -127     | -57   | -24   | -27 | -27  |

**NOTE:**
1/ The normal commitment for U. S. Assistance to UK imports remains at 40 in this month, but by adjustment with the British is being contributed in terms of ships in use to other British programs.
2/ May requirements of nine vessels for December allocation may be extended to a vessel from West to East Coast.
## CHART 2
### U. S. DRY CARGO SHIP POSITION - PACIFIC

<table>
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<th>1945 Mar</th>
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<td>-39</td>
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<td>-44</td>
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</table>

(1) 10 November availables are used for October commitments.

(2) 54 East Coast sailings in November meet requirement of 57 after adjustment for 6 advances in October and 3 October slips to November.
### CHART 3

#### U.S. SHIPPING POSITION

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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<td>472</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>457</td>
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<td>467</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>460</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Atlantic Requirements as Presently Stated**

- **Military Requirements**
  - Land-Lease & U.S. Non-Military Requirements: 111
  - Total Atlantic Requirements: 464

- **Availability in Atlantic**
  - Deficit or Surplus in Atlantic: -27

- **Corresponding Pacific Position**
  - Manageable Pacific Position: -76

- **Assistance Required from Atlantic**
  - Resulting Atlantic Position after Creating Balance in Pacific Shown as Manageable: -71

**Recommended Adjustments**

- **British Programs**
  - Eliminate U.S. Assistance to U.K. Imports: 40
  - Reduce U.S. Assistance for other British Land-Lease: 11

- **Russian Land-Lease**
  - Reduction: 10

- **U.S. Non-Military Programs**
  - Reduction: 10

- **Civil Relief Programs**
  - N.W. Europe Reduction: 8

- **Mediterranean Reduction**
  - Mediterranean Reduction: 12

- **U.S. Military Programs**
  - ETO Reduction: 57

**Total Reductions**

- Total Atlantic Position after Recommended Adjustments: 148

**Conclusions**

This final deficit position represents British assistance to U.S. programs in equivalent Atlantic sailings or increased construction if directed military operations are to be supported.

If the necessary British assistance cannot be furnished, directed military operations must be postponed.

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

DEC 4 1973
DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

WASHINGTON, D.C.

18 November 1944

J08/011

Jos. S. Department of War, A.M. 26, 1944

Re: Reductions in S. non-military commitments

The attached Customs Report, prepared by the War and Navy Departments, shows the position in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas. Chart 3 shows the position resulting from the following adjustments in shipping resources:

1. Reduction of U.S. assistance to U.K.
2. Reduction of U.S. assistance to other countries.
3. Reduction of U.S. assistance to other countries.
4. Reduction of S. assistance to U.K.
5. Reduction of S. assistance to other countries.
6. Reduction of S. assistance to other countries.

The increased tempo of operations in the Pacific and Atlantic areas has produced deficits in shipping supplies for occupied countries. The recent request for additional shipping support has accelerated these deficits to a degree which requires the reassessment of the highest level. A reassessment of the high

 Existing and prospective demands for cargo shipping must be sought more effectively to the military effort. The joint chiefs of staff.
Curtailment of Russian Protocol shipments by 10 sailings per month.

Limiting U. S. military shipments to the continent (N. W. Europe) to 200 per month.

After accepting these cuts, including reductions of over 50 for each of two months in U. S. military allocations for the continent and deficits averaging 45 per month for November through January in the Pacific, it still will be necessary, if military operations are to be supported to secure the following additional sailings:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailings to be provided</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
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</table>

The Chiefs of Staff are informed by the Chairman of the Maritime Commission that there are at present labor shortages in the yards having contracts with the Maritime Commission of over 35,000 men. If these shortages can be overcome by 1 January 1945 the monthly output of the Commission can be accelerated by about 5 ships. Even if this is done there still will remain a shortage of 128 sailings over a three month period.

It is essential, if the war against our enemies is to be driven home with all the force at our command, that all of the war powers available to the Executive be used to man the yards of the Maritime Commission with due regard for other important military programs, and that urgent representations be made to the British Government to secure the additional assistance needed.

It is strongly recommended that the Executive action necessary to bring about these results be taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed)

E. J. KING,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations.
**CHART I**

**U.S. DRY CARGO SHIP POSITION — ATLANTIC**

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<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
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<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>218</td>
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<td>178</td>
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<td>-127</td>
<td>-57</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
1/ The normal commitment for U.S. assistance to the UK for imports remains at 40 in this month, but by adjustment with the British is being contributed in terms of ships in use to other British programs.  
2/ Navy requirements of nine vessels for December allocation may be expected to arrive from West to East Coast.
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<td>Dec</td>
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1. 10 November availables are used for October commitments.
2. 54 East Coast sailings in November meet requirement of 57 after adjustment for 6 advances in October and 3 October slips to November.
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<tr>
<td>Atlantic Position after Recommended Adjustments</td>
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This final deficit position represents British assistance to U.S. programs in equivalent Atlantic sailings or increased construction if directed military operations are to be supported.

If the necessary British assistance cannot be furnished, directed military operations must be postponed.
WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON
December 9, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LAND:

Subject: Merchant Shipping

I am writing to report to you on the action taken by the War Shipping Administration in accordance with the instructions contained in your memorandum to me of November 20.

Immediately on receipt of your memorandum we discussed with the British the possibility of reducing WSA allocations to their services. On December first we made a formal request in writing to Mr. MacIay to release us for the months of December, January, and February, from our commitment to provide forty sailings per month against the U.K. Import Program. A copy of our letter to him is attached.

We received yesterday the British reply, a copy of which is also attached, stating that the Ministry of War Transport would, as in the past, reduce the level of assistance requested of us month by month whenever possible but could not now concur in any reduction for the months of January and February. As the British explain in their letter, they have accepted reductions in WSA assistance to the extent of more than eighty sailings in October, November, and December. In the first quarter of 1945, however, the factors that are operating to make our own shipping position critically tight will have a similar effect on theirs. The principal one of these is, of course, the continuation of the European War at a time when the impact is being felt of new requirements which it was thought would not have to be met until after its termination. The British position is reflected in the fact that their imports from North America will be smaller in January and February than in any months since early 1942.

Since the date of your memorandum to me our own shipping prospects have somewhat improved as a result of steps taken by the Army and Navy and by ourselves. Reductions enforced by the current shortage of ships in the number of sailings to the two European Theaters and the development of greater reception capacity, especially in Antwerp, have operated to reduce congestion and increase the number of vessels returning to the United States. Military requirements for January and February have been cut to a minimum. Pursuant to the instructions in the last paragraph of your memorandum, we have made sharp cuts in civilian services, especially those to Latin America, which have permitted the withdrawal of some twenty-eight ships from employment in this Hemisphere. After taking these steps, we are left with a deficit of about thirty-five sailings in January and fifty-five in February, assuming that we meet our commitments to the British in full.

x6014
If either our situation or that of the British improves further, it may be possible for us to cover what they regard as their absolutely essential needs and still meet presently stated military requirements. With this possibility in mind, we propose, subject to your approval, to tell the British that we will provide as many sailings as possible for their programs but will have to reduce our assistance rather than allow military operations to be interfered with. If this position is not acceptable to them, or if in due time it appears that our situation is such that we are not able to cover their absolutely essential needs, it would be open to them to ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to undertake an examination of Allied strategy as related to the shipping position and to arrange for the preparation by the U. S. and British military authorities in conjunction with the MWT and the WSA of a new Shipping Resources Paper of the sort produced at each of the major Staff Conferences prior to Octagon. Should the British make this request, I strongly recommend that it be supported. We could then come to grips with the major strategic and political questions that have already been raised as a result of the shipping shortage.

E. S. Land
Administrator

Enclosures (2)
December 1st 1944

Mr. John S. Maclay

British Merchant Shipping Mission

Commerce Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Maclay:

I am writing to confirm the request I made to you last week that you review British programs and the availability of British controlled shipping to ascertain whether you can accept a reduction in WSA assistance to the British Import Program in December, January, and February, by the amount of forty sailings per month. As I explained to you in our conversations, the President in a memorandum to Admiral Land directed us to discuss with you as a matter of the greatest urgency the possibility of obtaining such relief so as to make additional shipping available for purely military purposes.

We are currently taking every step within our power both to reduce the turnarounds of WSA controlled ships and to cut U.S. civilian programs to the bone. As I need not remind you, we are left with very sizable shipping deficits in spite of our efforts in this direction.

We greatly appreciate the relief we have already obtained from you, but we shall obviously need such relief even more in the months to come.

Very sincerely yours,

Granville Conway
Deputy Administrator
Dear Captain Gentry,

With reference to your letter of December 1st addressed to Mr. McIvor inquiring whether the Ministry of War Transport could accept a reduction in U.S.A. assistance, the amount of 40 sailings of the shipping position for December, January and February 1945 is determined from time to time as a result of combined reviews of the shipping position and the requirements of the U.S.A. and the British for further assistance to be given to the U.K. to meet the serious shipping problems which have faced both governments during the past months and the Ministry of War Transport have recently been able to meet.

The 40 sailings per month to the U.K. to which you refer, represent the estimated deficiency at the beginning of this year. The British share of the deficit is approximately 100 sailings for December, January and February, assuming the same tonnage to continue to be released as in December and January. The Ministry of War Transport has, however, recently been able to meet the requirements of the U.S.A. for sailings on the U.K. and the tonnage available for December, January and February will be approximately 100 sailings.

In addition to the reductions in the regular level of sailings required, the Ministry of War Transport has recently been able to release the previous level of sailings for the U.K. by 8 sailings for the month to lift coal from South Africa to the Middle East.

8th December 1945.
In considering shipping allocations against stated programmes, you will appreciate that it is H.M. policy to make tonnage available only to the extent of proved acceptance capacity and not to delay the turn-round of shipping by sending vessels to ports where they cannot obtain prompt discharge.

Apart from the above restricted releases of some 90 W.S.A. ships, the Ministry have in conjunction with the War Office imposed a cut in tonnage allocations to the United Kingdom, the United States, and other Allied countries. The cut is largely in respect of the essential land transport requirements of the Army and the Air Forces. The arrangements are in a large degree by requests from these programmes. The Ministry are making use of all the available shipping up to the limit of weekly tonnage agreed upon by the four countries and none beyond that limit is being imported from outside the United States and United Kingdom. In the case of cargo which is basically essential, the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of War Transport in consultation with the Ministry of Food, are making an effort to meet urgent needs with the available tonnage. The Ministry of Shipping, however, have been unable to maintain a continuous discharge of overseas tonnage due to the limited tonnage available for export. The Ministry of Shipping, however, have been unable to maintain a continuous discharge of overseas tonnage due to the limited tonnage available for export.

All British controlled shipping is wholly engaged either in direct war service under agreed strategy or in essential civil supplies. All scheduled war shipping assistance to U.K. imports of food or war materials is agreed, and the U.K. has been unable to continue the programme of assistance to U.K. imports of food or war materials. The Ministry of Food, however, are able to continue the programme of assistance to U.K. imports of food or war materials. The Ministry of Food, however, are able to continue the programme of assistance to U.K. imports of food or war materials.
William O. Hurt

Your sincerely,

Of greater magnitude and strategic significance are the recommendations for the proposed program, not only of strategic defense and deterrents, but also of counterprocedures for the destruction of the European war. These recommendations are to be reviewed and evaluated at the NATO level. In accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of State, I feel that you will appreciate that.

In view of these recommendations and the critical nature of the situation, I propose to make a recommendation for the destruction of the European war. These recommendations are to be reviewed and evaluated at the NATO level. In accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of State, I feel that you will appreciate that.

Washington, D.C.
Office of the Secretary

Subject: European War

To: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

From: Secretary of State

Re: European War

In view of the critical nature of the situation, I propose to make a recommendation for the proposed program, not only of strategic defense and deterrents, but also of counterprocedures for the destruction of the European war. These recommendations are to be reviewed and evaluated at the NATO level. In accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of State, I feel that you will appreciate that.

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November 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

Harry Hopkins says he believes that the shipping situation is improving. I will enquire further of King what he intends to do to reduce the tieing up of ships used for temporary storage purposes and to speed up the turn-around in unloading.

Very respectfully,

W. Brown

Wilson Brown.

December 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

With reference to Admiral King's memorandum of November 28th about frequency of convoys, I have had a talk with Edwards and he assures me that steps are in progress to stir up all area commanders -- British and Americans -- to release ships that have been tied up in ports unduly. He is confident of at least a temporary improvement.

Very respectfully,

W. Brown

Wilson Brown.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 07/2

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 13/2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

1. In reply to your memorandum of 20 November on the subject of merchant shipping, and with particular reference to the second paragraph, I wish to assure you that the matter of exploring ways and means of increasing the economy of employment of merchant shipping is under constant review.

2. Those agencies whose interests lie primarily in delivery of goods are naturally disposed to reduce or eliminate convoys. While we have no less interest in the delivery of goods, we have a considerably greater interest and responsibility in getting the shipping through, and I have, therefore, on numerous occasions been forced to deny requests premised primarily on quick turn-around and with little or no regard to security.

3. To change from a 10-day to a 5-day sailing interval and thus to provide 10-12 additional sailings per month would require 6 additional escort groups (total 42 ships). Such ships are not available in the Atlantic and could only be provided by taking them from the Pacific. Only within the last week we have had to order from the Atlantic 30 additional destroyer escorts and 29 smaller escort craft to the Southwest Pacific theatre in support of the current and projected Philippine campaign under General MacArthur.

4. In view of the foregoing and of the imminence of renewed U-boat activity in the Atlantic on what may be a large scale, I am constrained to recommend that we do not, at this time at least, change the cycle of the Mediterranean convoys from 10 to 5 days.

Signature: [signature]

Admiral, U.S. Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Points to be considered in my conference with the President on Sunday, November 26th.

(a) Present indications definitely indicate that there will be no cutbacks in the present approved shipbuilding program.

(b) This program is to be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January, 1945.

(c) The present approved program calls for the delivery of 896 ships, 3,708,000 d.w.t., between January 1, 1945, and June 30, 1945.

(d) The present approved program calls for the delivery of 180 ships, 1,620,000 d.w.t., between July 1, 1945, and December 31, 1945.

(e) Contracts will begin to run out about February, 1945, and continue progressively until June 30, 1945, with the abrupt break taking place in the second quarter of 1945.

(f) Even though the shipbuilding program is augmented, as outlined by you, this abrupt break must take place sooner or later and the augmentation proposed will postpone the matter for about six (6) months.

(g) The question of appropriations is definitely in the picture and the question of Congressional action on the Appropriation Bill should be given consideration. The maximum program outlined by the Maritime Commission is now before the Bureau of the Budget and consists primarily of ships in the category of our long-range program; that is, C-types, P-types, tankers and specials.

E. S. Land
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ref. (a): Your memorandum to me of November 20, 1944.

Paragraph 2 of reference (a) is quoted, as follows:

"I believe that we would improve the manpower situation substantially if shipyards building ships for war purposes were given an assurance that the yards would be used to capacity during the calendar year 1945. Several ship contractors have told me that their contracts were expiring."

In order to carry out your instructions properly and efficiently, it is recommended that you approve the procedure outlined in enclosure (A) attached to this memorandum.

E. S. Land

Encl.
(1.) No more Liberty ships should be built.

(2.) Contracts will be awarded only on the basis of competitive bids unless otherwise approved by the President.

(3.) Eight (8) modern passenger ships of suitable design to be contracted for at the earliest practicable date; the designs to be proceeded with at once.

(4.) Contracts to be awarded to efficient yards only and to those yards capable of satisfactorily performing the work, which means proper facilities and satisfactory personnel.

(5.) Military requirements to be given consideration in the types of ships to be built.

(6.) Full consideration to be given to areas throughout the United States where the employment problem is of major importance and full consideration to be given to the shipbuilding manpower available in these areas.

(7.) In letting contracts either by competitive bidding or by negotiation, consideration to be given to the future use of the yards, especially where present policy indicates the desirability or the necessity of converting certain existing yards from construction yards to repair yards.

(8.) In awarding contracts consideration should be given to the ownership of the yards and facilities; that is, whether Government-owned or private-owned.

(9.) Consideration should be given to special types of ships for the future requirements of the American Merchant Marine.

(10.) Consideration should be given to the utilization of certain yards for reconversion work which will inevitably follow the conclusion of hostilities.