Mr. Stephen Early,

The attached is approved draft of release on high command. It is approved by the Navy. The original was sent to the British and is not yet, to our knowledge, approved by them.

J. Smith

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 8500.9 (9/27/88)

Date: 10-18-66
Signature: Carl S. Spaatz
As a result of the meeting of the British and American Chiefs of Staff and their recommendations to President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, it is announced, with the complete concurrence of the Dutch and Australian Governments, that there will be unity of command within the theater of operations of the Southwestern Pacific. All the forces of this region — sea, land, and air — will be directed by a single commander. This initial decision of the associated governments is the result of the bitter experience of years of uncoordinated effort among the Allies in World War I, that brought them to the verge of defeat in March, 1918.

Placed in supreme command in the theater is General Sir Archibald Wavell of the British Imperial forces. Under him, the joint naval forces will be directed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, United States Navy. Major General George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps of the United States Army, and now in the Far East, will be the Deputy Supreme Commander.

This decision for unity of command constitutes a precedent for similar action in other theaters wherever circumstances make joint operations necessary against the common enemy. Furthermore, it is proof of the complete accord with which the Associated Powers are approaching the organization of their vast resources toward the goal of total victory.

REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED
January 5, 1942

CAUTION: The following announcement must be held in THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, until released for publication.

NOTE: Release is automatic -- for 2:00 o'clock p.m. PST today.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

1. As a result of proposals put forward by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, and of their recommendations to President Roosevelt and to the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, it is announced that, with the concurrence of the Netherlands Government and of the Dominion Governments concerned, a system of unified Command will be established in the South West Pacific Area.

2. All the forces in this area, sea, land and air, will operate under one Supreme Commander. At the suggestion of the President, in which all concerned have agreed, General Sir A. Wavell has been appointed to this Command.

3. Major-General George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps of the U.S. Army, will be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. He is now in the Far East. Under the direction of General Wavell, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy, will assume Command of all naval forces in the area. General Sir Henry Pownall will be Chief of Staff to General Wavell.

4. General Wavell will assume his Command in the near future.

5. At the same time, His Excellency Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek has accepted the Supreme Command over all land and air forces of the United Nations which are now or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater, including initially such portions of Indo-China and Thailand as may become available to troops of the United Nations. United States and British representatives will serve on his joint headquarters planning staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Has this program been co­ordinated with the Army program?

F. D. R.

My Dear Mr. President,

Coordination with Army
with O.P.M. present.

F.

x4245
My dear Mr. President:

I submit herewith for your consideration a revised aircraft program of 27,500 airplanes, representing the requirements of the air components of the Navy and Marine Corps for a continuing war situation.

The program as submitted by the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics includes all modifications found necessary after study by an informal board consisting of representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board and the Bureau of Aeronautics, and a review by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations has recommended its adoption.

At the present time the authorized aircraft program for the Navy is 15,000 airplanes as provided for in Section 8 of the Act of July 19, 1940, Public Law 757 - 76th Congress, quoted as follows:

"The President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire or construct naval airplanes and spare parts and equipment, as may be necessary to provide and maintain the number of useful naval airplanes at a total of fifteen thousand: Provided That if, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy, the total number of airplanes authorized herein is not sufficient to meet the needs of national defense, he may, with the approval of the President, make such plans for procurement as the situation may demand."

I recommend your approval of the revised program to permit its adoption as provided by the quoted language of the Act.

Sincerely yours,

The President,
The White House.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

x249 official

Date- 2/12/59

Signature- Carl S. Spaatz
January 7, 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. x18-R
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Aircraft Program, Navy and Marine Corps.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval and adoption by the Secretary of the Navy with the approval of the President in accordance with Section 8 of Public Document No. 757 - 76th Congress of 19 July 1940, quoted in paragraph 4 of the basic letter.

2. The program as submitted by the Bureau of Aeronautics includes all modifications found necessary after study by an informal board consisting of representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board and the Bureau of Aeronautics, and a review by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. It represents the basic requirements of the aviation component for the two-ocean Navy under the current war situation.

/s/ H. R. Stark

Orig of these letters and Program
Not to Navy Dept. 1/3/42
SUBJECT: Aircraft Program - Navy and Marine Corps - Revision of.

3. In preparation of estimates of production requirements and arranging for necessary aircraft plant expansion, the Bureau of Aeronautics is providing for replacement aircraft on a war wastage basis for all combatant squadrons and predicted attrition for all other activities. It is to be noted that this will require productive capacity for manufacturing approximately 18,000 airplanes per year for the Navy. This is in accord with reference (b).

4. At the present time the authorized aircraft program for the Navy is 15,000 airplanes as provided for in Section 8 of Public Document No. 757 - 76th Congress of 19 July 1940, quoted as follows:

"The President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire or construct naval airplanes and spare parts and equipment, as may be necessary to provide and maintain the number of useful naval airplanes at a total of fifteen thousand: Provided that if, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy, the total number of airplanes authorized herein is not sufficient to meet the needs of national defense, he may, with the approval of the President, make such plans for procurement as the situation may demand."

5. In view of the existence of a state of war and in the light of the foregoing, the Bureau of Aeronautics recommends the adoption of the increased aircraft program by the Secretary of the Navy with the approval of the President.

/s/ J. H. Towers
Rear Admiral U.S.N.
Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics
February 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

To look this up and speak to me about it.

F.D.R.

Memorandum from John Franklin Carter,
1210 National Press Bldg., Washington, D. C.,
2/3/42 - "Final Report on 'Sea Otter' Experiment". Attached is a copy of a confidential memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, in use of Sea Otters as Escort Vessels. Mr. Carter suggests the designation of some competent and trusted individual such as John Hancock to act as "receiver" for the Sea Otter project. This individual might be able to salvage some of the values of this experiment, even though the vessel has been adjudged unsited for the purpose for which she was originally designed.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I think in the case of the Sea Otter type of ship you had better return to the R.F.C. the $91,000 on hand.

If the really patriotic people who are behind this experiment want to keep on trying, may I suggest that they work on a type of small cargo vessel 250 or 260 feet long, propelled by air propellers. The Russians have great experience in this type of propulsion, not only for water-borne ships, but also large snow-borne sleds.

I take it that the Navy at this time has little opportunity for an experiment of this character, but I am informed from a reliable source that the Russians have had such good preliminary success that they are continuing the experiments.

F.D.R.

Confidential letter from the Secretary of the Navy, 1/23/42, stating that he received from Jesse Jones an amount of $101,000 as working capital in connection with tests on the Sea Otter type of ships. Of this amount only $9,771.19, has been used. He asks if he should hold the balance of over $91,000 on hand or should he return it. Attached is letter from Ships, Incorporated, Buffalo, N.Y., to the Secretary of the Navy, with attached statement of funds covering the period from organization through 1/31/41.
March 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please read this and return.

Copies of the recommendations to King are enclosed. I think all three should be approved, especially the authority to Andrews to convert the ships purchased without having to go through the old rigamarole of referring plans, specifications, etc., to Washington.

F. D. R.

Letter from Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Headquarters Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, Federal Office Bldg., 90 Church St., NYC, 3/12/42, to the President, marked "Personal & Confidential". Encloses copy of his letter to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations regarding the purchasing and (over)
fitting out of surface craft. Expresses hope that he will be given blanket authority to obtain the ships, and to convert them and fit them out in the earliest possible time for service. Also encloses copy of his letter regarding "Scarecrow Patrol", which he thinks can be used effectively along this Coast until such time as we can get combatant planes of our own. Also enclosed is copy of his letter to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, requesting that ships from South America, the West Indies, and from the southeast be directed to join the sea lanes as soon as possible, preferably off the coast of Florida, for the reason that a great number of our sinkings have been well off shore. States a few of the British trawler have arrived and he has sent them to sea immediately on patrol duty.
March 25, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The President on March twenty-fifth signed the Proclamation "Establishing the San Francisco, Columbia River, Puget Sound, South-eastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, and Unalaska Maritime Control Areas and Prescribing Regulations for the Control Thereof," as recommended by you.

Very sincerely yours,

W. H. McIntire
Secretary to the President

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

March 14, 1942

Through Division of the Federal Register.

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting a proposed proclamation entitled "Establishing the San Francisco, Columbia River, Puget Sound, Southeastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, and Unalaska Maritime Control Areas and Prescribing Regulations for the Control Thereof".

The proposed proclamation, presented by the Secretary of the Navy and forwarded for my consideration by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget under date of March 10, 1942, has my approval as to form and legality.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Attorney General.

Declassified per letter of J.A. Andretta, 12-13-61
My dear Mr. Attorney General:

Hereewith is a proposed Executive Proclamation, presented by the Secretary of the Navy, entitled "Establishing the San Francisco, Columbia River, Puget Sound, Southeastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, and Unalaska Maritime Control Areas and Prescribing Regulations for the Control Thereof".

Representatives of the War and State Departments have informally advised this office of the concurrence of those Departments in the proposed proclamation.

This proclamation has my approval.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH

Director.

The Honorable,

The Attorney General.

Enclosures.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAR 3 1942

Sir:

In accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 7298 of February 18, 1936, the enclosed draft of a Proclamation "Establishing the San Francisco, Columbia River, Puget Sound, Southeastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, and Unalaska Maritime Control Areas and Prescribing Regulations for the Control Thereof", with accompanying letter to the President, is forwarded for approval and further transmission through usual channels for review and presentation for signature.

It is most urgent for military reasons that the Maritime Control Areas described in the enclosed draft of Proclamation be established at the earliest possible date. The authority which will be granted by the Proclamation is necessary to implement naval control and protection of friendly shipping and to provide a means for the protection of important military installations.

The limits of all the proposed areas of course extend beyond territorial waters. The proposed San Francisco Area extends at its furthest point approximately 25 nautical miles, the Unalaska Area approximately 40 nautical miles, the Columbia River, Puget Sound, and Prince William Sound Areas approximately 50 nautical miles and the Southeastern Alaska Area approximately 60 nautical miles beyond the shore line. The Kodiak area extends approximately 45 miles.

While the naval defensive sea areas established during the last World War extended a lesser distance beyond territorial waters, instruments of war developed since that time and improvements in aircraft, submarines, surface vessels and communication facilities have effectively reduced distances so that at the present time areas of the size described in the proposed Proclamation are essential for ade-
quate defensive purposes. These areas are not considered to unreasonably restrict the rights of neutral nations on the high seas.

The following are a few of the specific conditions now existing that require more extensive areas for defense purposes than were required during prior wars:

An enemy vessel carrying guns of large caliber disguised as a merchantman could effectively project its fire for a distance of 10 or more miles. Such a vessel on the high seas beyond the limits of a defensive area might not be subject to suspicion. If found within such an area without having complied with the governing regulations it would be subject to stoppage and search. Modern torpedoes may be discharged from a surface vessel and be effective for a distance of more than 10 miles. Mines may be laid from an otherwise innocent-appearing merchant vessel in coastal waters 200 fathoms or more in depth.

Our own mine fields and other underwater defenses may be laid beyond territorial waters in the approaches to important harbors or naval bases for the defense of those places. It is of course not desirable to indicate to the enemy the exact location of such mine fields or defensive installations although it is the practice of civilized nations to indicate the general defensive area for the protection of friendly and neutral shipping as well as local shipping.

Vessels disguised as merchant vessels could launch midget submarines which are operated by batteries at a distance of about fifty miles from shore. Such submarines are operated by batteries and would preferably be launched from a mother ship within 50 miles from shore so that they would have sufficient battery power to carry out a submerged attack and return to the mother ship. Such submarines have been developed by Japan and Italy, and possibly other nations since the last World War and are a definite danger to anything afloat, particularly ships in harbors, within their operating range.

Midget motor torpedo boats may be launched from enemy vessels which would have an operating radius, varying with
their size, up to 100 miles or more. Italy is known to have such boats and Japan may have them also. Also disguised vessels can approach the shore with small bomb or torpedo-carrying planes. Just what distance the planes could operate would depend upon the size of the mother ship and plane. Some of the German merchant raiders in the last and also in the present war have carried small seaplanes. Their range is now greater than in the last war.

With the long range of our large coast defense guns it is necessary to protect friendly vessels from being considered hostile and being fired on by our guns from shore.

Submarines may readily be disguised as fishing vessels and in view of the large number of fishing vessels operating in the areas covered by the proposed Proclamation it is essential that the defensive areas be of sufficient size to effect adequate control.

There are also enclosed six copies of the draft of the Proclamation for the files of the reviewing agencies.

It is requested that this matter be considered to be confidential until the proposed Proclamation is signed.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox

The Director,
Bureau of the Budget,
Executive Office of the President,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures.
My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit for your consideration a draft of a Proclamation "Establishing the San Francisco, Columbia River, Puget Sound, Southeastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, and Unalaska Maritime Control Areas and Prescribing Regulations for the Control Thereof."

The purpose of the proposed Proclamation is to establish maritime control areas at the places described therein and to prescribe regulations for the control thereof.

The authority which will be granted by the Proclamation is considered to be necessary in order to implement naval control and protection of friendly shipping and to provide protection for military installations.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.

Enclosures.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I am interested in this second report of the General Board on the problem of Negroes in the Navy.

The Ethiopian in the wood pile may be the last sentence of Section #5 in which it is recommended that wide latitude be given the several administrative authorities as to rate of enlistment, method of recruiting, training and assignment to duty and total number to be enlisted. I think that is a matter which should be determined by you and by me!

Please talk with me about this.

F. D. R.
SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

I am attaching herewith the result of another period of the General Board on the question of colored enlistments in the Navy and this time there are some really constructive suggestions contained in the report.

My informal recommendation is that we announce that the Navy is going to enlist negroes without specifying exactly how we are going to make use of their services, and announce at the same time or as soon thereafter as possible the creation of training facilities by establishing one or more negro training stations. Then after we have established these training stations and while the men are getting their training, we can decide on just how we will dispose of the men after they have covered their training period, following in the main the suggestions which the General Board has made. I am not at all sure that it would not be wise at the same time to announce boldly that nothing will be done to impair morale by introducing a racial problem in the Navy while the war is in progress.

This program will necessitate new training facilities. As soon as these are provided enlistments will be accepted.

If we could state that plans are now under way for the organization of the training center or centers contemplated, it would bolster the forward looking program suggested. Until we have experience with the new units and what good or ill effect these steps may have upon Navy morale, it does not seem wise to make any statements as to the future. They can, however, become the basis for opening other branches of the Naval service.

When you have had a chance to read this, I would like to talk it over with you and submit a proposed press release.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Frank Knox

The President
The White House

Enclosure
From: Chairman General Board;  
To: Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Enlistment of men of the colored race in other than messman branch.

References: (a) SecNav Memo. (SC)PL4-4/MM(08600A)/GEM dated February 14, 1942.  
(b) General Board let. to SecNav G.B.No. 421 (Serial No. 201) dated February 3, 1942.

Enclosures: (A) General Board study of the enlistment of men of colored race in other than messman branch.  
(B) Appendix I to Enclosure (A).

1. Reference (a) directed the General Board to give further consideration to the subject of enlistment of men of the colored race in other than the messman branch, with the object of determining to what additional tasks or special assignments in the naval establishment enlisted men of the colored race may be assigned without injecting into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question. A further study of the subject is forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A).

2. The General Board fully recognizes and appreciates the social and economic problems involved and has striven to reconcile these requirements with what it feels must be paramount in any consideration, namely, the maintenance at the highest level of the fighting efficiency of the Navy.

3. In considering any program for the induction of negroes into the Naval Service the problem of training these men becomes of paramount interest. The Navy is making every effort to train the crews required to man the vessels of the rapidly expanding fleet. In order to provide petty officers for training stations and for nucleus crews for new construction, every combatant vessel of the fleet has been, and will continue to be, called upon to furnish petty officers which they can ill afford to lose if they are to maintain their battle efficiency and which they cannot replace except by the development of non-rated men in their own complements.
G.B. No. 421 (Serial No. 204)

In the face of such a vital wartime problem, which applies equally to the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, the General Board feels impelled to express its conviction that to divert any part of the training effort to the development of negro crews or negro battalions would not produce a return in effective fighting units commensurate with the adverse effects on the training program and the efficiency of the Fleet.

4. If it is determined by higher authority that social, economic and other considerations require the enlistment of men of the colored race in other than the messman branch, then the General Board considers that the organization of the colored units specified below would offer the least disadvantages and the least difficulty of accomplishment as a war measure:

(a) Service units throughout the Naval Shore Establishment including shore activities of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard,

(b) Crews for yard craft and other small craft employed in Naval District local defense forces,

(c) Shore based units for other Naval District local defense forces,

(d) Crews for selected cutters of the Coast Guard and employment of non-rated colored men in small number by the U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Port,

(e) Construction Regiments, Navy,

(f) Composite Battalions, Marine Corps.

All of the above activities should be subject to current administrative arrangements by the proper agencies.

5. The General Board further believes that if a decision is made to proceed with this project, enlistments should be limited to the U.S. Naval Reserve, the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. This would permit the enlistment of skilled men in petty officer ratings for which qualified. It is recommended that wide latitude be granted the several administrative authorities as to rate of enlistment, method of recruiting, training and assignment to duty and that progressive experience determine the total number to be enlisted.

Copy to C.N.O.
General Board Study
of the
Enlistment of men of the colored race in other than the Messman Branch

I. DIRECTIVE:

Determine to what additional tasks or special assignments in the naval establishment enlisted men of the colored race may be assigned without injecting into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

1. That enlistment of men of the colored race for unrestricted service is considered by higher authority to be inadvisable.

2. That any practical plan, which would not inject into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question, must provide for:

   (a) Segregation of colored enlisted men insofar as quartering, messing and employment is concerned,

   (b) Limitation of authority of colored petty officers to subordinates of their own race.

III. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

1. Assuming that the enlistment of men of the colored race for unrestricted general service is inadvisable, the possible alternatives are as follows:

   (a) Enlistment in selected ratings in designated branches,

   (b) Enlistment in colored branches, to be established as such,

   (c) Enlistment in colored units, to be established as such.

2. Pertinent considerations with regard to these three alternatives may be outlined as follows:
A. **Enlistment in selected ratings in designated branches:**

(1) The several branches of Navy enlisted personnel are:

(a) Seaman branch,
(b) Artificer branch,
(c) Aviation branch,
(d) Special and Commissary branch,
(e) Messman branch.

In each of these branches a definite precedence of ratings by classes is established by the Bureau of Navigation Manual, which precedence fixes the seniority with respect to responsibility and authority of each rating of that branch. Enlisted men are quartered, stationed and messed largely by rating and class groups. These men live, work, and eat together in a closeness of contact which has few parallels outside of the Navy.

The Navy Regulations specify that all petty officers shall aid to the utmost of their ability in maintaining good order, discipline and all that concerns the efficiency of the command. To that end the Navy Regulations further provide that petty officers are always on duty and are vested with the necessary authority to report and arrest offenders.

It is manifest that a negro, if inducted into any existing branch of the Navy other than the messman branch, would work, eat, and sleep in the closest contact with his white shipmates, and in any but the lowest rating of the several classes would inevitably be in a position where he would exercise the authority with which all petty officers are clothed by the Navy Regulations.

There are many artisan ratings in the Navy where the man is rated a petty officer largely because of his skill as a workman, rather than his ability as a leader. Therefore, upon cursory examinations, it might appear that ratings of this kind, of which carpenter's mate, metalsmith, painter, and shipfitter are examples, offer tasks to which we could properly assign an additional number of enlisted men of the negro race. However, these artificers do not work alone but in groups where the senior petty officer is in charge. Moreover, on all ships the battle station of petty officers of these ratings is in the damage control party which includes men of many other ratings, thereby rendering segregation and limitation of authority impracticable. In action the survival of the ship may depend upon the leadership, initiative, self-reliance, resourcefulness or undirected prompt action on the part of any member of the damage control party.
Enlistment in selected ratings in designated branches would not provide the necessary segregation or limitation of authority which is necessary to prevent injecting into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question.

B. Enlistment in Colored Branches, to be established as such.

At the present time there are no colored branches other than the messman branch.

The establishment of other colored branches is subject to the following considerations:

1. The Seaman Branch includes rated and non-rated men, distributed by divisions or departments as follows:

- Boatswains mates
- Gunners mates
- Turret captains
- Torpedomen
- Quartermasters
- Signalmen
- Fire controlmen
- Coxswains
- Seamen
- Apprentice seamen
- Deck divisions
- Deck divisions
- Deck divisions
- Torpedo division
- Navigation Department
- Communication Department
- Gunnery Department
- Deck divisions
- Deck divisions
- Deck divisions

2. The Artificer Branch includes rated and non-rated men, distributed by divisions or departments as follows:

- Machinists mates
- Water tenders
- Electricians mates
- Radiomen
- Carpenters mates
- Shipfitters
- Boilermakers
- Molders
- Patternmakers
- Printers
- Painters
- Metalsmiths
- Firemen
- Engine Division
- Boiler Division
- Electrical Division
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- Communication Department
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- C&R Dept. Damage Control
- Boiler Division
(3) The Aviation Branch includes rated men only, distributed by divisions or departments as follows:

Aviation machinists mates 
Aviation carpenters mates 
Aviation metalsmiths 
Aerographers 
Photographers 
Aviation ordnancemen 

Carriers: Aviation Department.
Other Vessels: Aviation Division

(4) Special and Commissary Branch includes rated and non-rated men distributed by divisions or departments as follows:

Yeomen 
Storekeepers 
Musicians 
Buglers 
Ships cooks 
Bakers 
Pharmacists mates 
Hospital apprentices 

All departments and divisions
Supply Department
Band
Band & Marine Detachment
Supply Department
Supply Department
Medical Department
Medical Department

(5) The messman branch includes non-rated men only, distributed among the following officers messes:

Officers stewards, 1st, 2nd and 3rd class 
Officers cooks 1st, 2nd and 3rd class 
Mess attendants, 1st, 2nd and 3rd class

Flag, Captain, Wardroom, Junior Officer and Warrant Officer messes.

These branches and ratings have been established as the result of long experience, and cover all requirements and adequately provide for the effective operation of naval vessels of all types and sizes. There appears to be no field in the organization of naval vessels for the establishment of additional branches and ratings solely for the accommodation of men of the colored race, therefore any colored men inducted into the naval service would necessarily have to be assigned to one of the rated or non-rated classes included in an existing branch.

It is evident from the above tabulation that, except in the Messman Branch and in the Aviation Branch, the various ratings and classes are so widely distributed throughout the ship or station that it would be impracticable to effect segregation in quartering,
messing, and employment of colored ratings and also impracticable to effect the necessary limitation of authority of colored petty officers to men of their own race.

An all colored Aviation Department in an aircraft carrier, resulting as it would in a major portion of the crew being composed of men of the colored race, would inject the race question to a marked degree. An all colored Aviation Division in a battleship or cruiser, while constituting a unit of much smaller relative size, would nevertheless inject the race question to an equal degree. Segregation in quartering, messing and employment would be impracticable because of the necessity for frequent transfer of both flying and ground personnel between ship and ship, and ship and shore bases, and the relatively high rate of replacement of aviation personnel incident to war operations. Both in the case of the all colored Aviation Department of the carrier and in the case of the all colored Aviation Division of the battleship or cruiser, a limitation of the authority of colored petty officers to men of their own race would be impossible.

Enlistment for service in Colored Branch, to be established as such, would not provide the segregation or the limitation of authority which is necessary to prevent injecting into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question.

C. Enlistment in Colored Units, to be established as such.

There are at present no Colored Units in the Navy. Possibilities for the enlistment of Colored Units serving under white officers and initially with white petty officers, within the requirements of the Directive, include the following:

(1) Construction regiments of skilled and unskilled workmen similar to those already organized, for service in advanced bases and outlying stations,

(2) Crews for yard craft and other small craft employed in Naval District local defense forces,

(3) Shore based units for other Naval District local defense activities,

(4) Service units throughout the Naval Shore Establishment including shore activities of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard,

(5) Crews for selected naval auxiliaries,
(6) Composite battalions in the U.S. Marine Corps,

(7) Crews for selected cutters of the U.S. Coast Guard, and employment of non-rated colored men in small numbers by the U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Port.

Construction Regiments.

The Bureau of Navigation is now recruiting six Construction Regiments of Class V-6 naval reservists, each regiment to be officered by commissioned officers of the Civil Engineer Corps and composed of ratings to a total of 3,219 men. These ratings cover a wide variety of the trades and crafts, skilled and unskilled labor as shown in Appendix I. Operations of these units, as of other naval units, will be directed by the Senior Officer Present of the force or station to which they are assigned.

The organization of one or more Colored Construction Regiments of Class V-6 naval reservists would offer:

(a) Employment for a considerable number of men of the colored race,

(b) Utilization of both skilled and unskilled labor in a wide variety of trades,

(c) Advancement in rating up to and including that of chief petty officer,

(d) A reasonable solution of the question of segregation and of the authority exercised by rated men.

Construction Regiments composed of enlisted men of the colored race are considered to be practical as a wartime project.

Crews for yard craft and other small craft employed in Naval District local defense forces.

Yard craft include tugs, lighters, barges, ferries, derricks, piledrivers, dredges, and other small craft used in connection with the widely varied activities of a navy yard, naval station, or naval base. Other small craft employed in the local defense forces include those used in connection with the Inshore Patrol, boom and net defenses, mine fields, and similar defense activities. In general they are manned by Navy enlisted men of the seaman and artificer branches up to and including the rating of chief petty officer.
Practical seagoing experience is essential in all ratings for the effective performance of what are often arduous duties, requiring considerable skill.

The assignment of all colored crews to many of these small craft could undoubtedly be effected if and when the required ratings became available. The determination of the craft to be so manned and the number of rated and unrated personnel required could be determined only by the several Naval Districts.

Crews composed of men of the colored race for yard craft and other small craft in Naval District local defense forces are considered to be practical as a wartime project.

Shore based units for other Naval District local defense activities.

Other local defense activities include:

(a) Net and boom harbor defenses,

(b) Mine defenses,

(c) Anti-submarine and mine detection units,

(d) Radio direction finder and radar units.

The above mentioned activities, with the possible exception of net and boom harbor defenses, require the specialized knowledge of highly trained and experienced personnel. The development of complete units for such activities would present a most difficult problem, and would require a considerable period of time. However, there appears to be a limited field for the employment of men of the colored race in this general category, in such manner as not to inject unduly the race question. Necessary segregation and limitation of authority would be the function of administrative authority.

Shore based units composed of men of the colored race for other Naval District local defense activities are considered to be practical as a wartime project to a very limited extent insofar as numbers are concerned.

Service Units throughout the Naval Shore Establishment including shore activities of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

There are undoubtedly numerous, indeterminate, miscellaneous activities in the various Naval Districts, navy yards and naval stations where men of the colored race could be employed without introducing the race question generally. The numbers that could
be employed and the activities would vary with the different
stations but could include such employment as chauffeurs, messengers,
dock workers and the like, grouped as service units.

Employment of men of the colored race in service units covering
miscellaneous activities ashore is considered practical as a
wartime project.

Crews for selected naval auxiliaries.

Naval auxiliaries may be broadly classified as to types as
follows:

(a) Troop transports,
(b) Common cargo carriers,
(c) Ammunition vessels,
(d) Tankers,
(e) Miscellaneous special service vessels.

The ships organization of every naval auxiliary follows the
basic Navy pattern. All naval auxiliaries are manned by naval
crews, and must be maintained in readiness for overseas operations
with the Fleet. As rapidly as possible all such vessels are being
armed for defense, particularly against submarine and air attack
and in a limited sense must be considered as combatant vessels.

A complete all colored crew for a specified naval auxiliary
would solve the questions of segregation and limitation of authority
but the organization and training of an efficient crew of men of
the colored race, composed of all ratings up to and including the
several classes of chief petty officer, would require a period of
many years. An all colored crew could not be organized and trained
at a training station, and then assigned as a unit to take over
and operate a naval auxiliary. Effective training could be gained
only at sea, under the tutelage of experienced white officers and
petty officers. This necessary training period at sea presents a
serious problem with regard to segregation.

To maintain a colored crew of required ratings at full strength
would necessitate the establishment and maintenance of a source of
replacements. This would require the establishment of a colored
training station ashore in which the negro recruit would be given
the fundamental training and processing necessary for all naval
recruits preliminary to service afloat and also the establishment
of trade schools for advanced training.
This project would involve an effort out of all proportion to the return in effective seagoing units which could be expected on the basis of the Navy's actual experience with vessels manned by crews of other than the white race.

Colored crews for certain naval auxiliaries are considered to be impractical and highly undesirable, particularly as a wartime project.

**Colored composite battalions commanded by white officers, to be organized by the U.S. Marine Corps.**

A composite negro battalion consisting of infantry, anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns, 5"/50 caliber guns and other components necessary to make it a self-sustained unit would have a strength of about 1,000 men.

The Marine Corps is making every effort and utilizing every facility to attain an authorized strength of 150,000. There are many more volunteer recruits than can be properly trained by the available commissioned and non-commissioned officers. At the end of January, 1942, there were sufficient trained regular personnel to operate a force of 30,000 troops whereas the Marine Corps then consisted of nearly 90,000, and continues to be expanded toward the authorized total.

The development of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers is a serious problem, and is a matter of grave concern to responsible authorities. To divert any part of the training effort to the development of negro battalions would have a most disadvantageous effect on the whole program, and the effort involved would be out of all proportions to the return in effective fighting units.

Colored battalions could unquestionably be developed in time. While their value generally for field service is gravely doubted, they probably could be used at some outlying stations. The amphibious warfare for which the Marine Corps is specifically designed and with which it is immediately faced, would prevent the maintenance of the necessary segregation because in war any combat unit would be subject to such action losses as to require the distribution of the remaining members of the unit among white units or the replacement of losses by white men.

Colored composite battalions in the Marine Corps are considered to be practicable, but undesirable, as a wartime project.
Colored crews, commanded by white officers and petty officers, for selected cutters of the U.S. Coast Guard and employment of non-rated colored men in other Coast Guard activities.

Coast Guard cutters perform services in both peacetime and wartime which require that their crews be composed of men whose integrity and specialized training must be of the highest quality. This training in all but the most elementary phase must be obtained under qualified officers and petty officers in actual service afloat.

Available information indicates that the non-rated complements of eighteen cutters to a total of 306 could be replaced by men of the colored race and that 210 more could be employed in various assignments in connection with Captain of the Port activities in six cities.

In the relatively small vessels of the Coast Guard the necessary segregation and limitation of authority would be increasingly difficult to maintain. Opportunities for advancement would be few.

Colored crews for selected Coast Guard cutters and employment in other Coast Guard activities are considered to be practicable, but not desirable, as a wartime project.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

1. That, of the possible alternatives to enlistment of men of the colored race for general service, "Enlistment in selected ratings in designated branches" and "Enlistment in colored branches (to be established as such)" are both inadvisable.

2. That "Enlistment in colored units (to be established as such)" presents the only course which may be expected to approximate the segregation and the limitation of authority which is essential to preventing "injecting into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question."

3. That the colored units, establishment of which would be practical and which would offer the least disadvantages and the least difficulty of accomplishment as a war measure, may be listed as follows:

(a) Service units throughout the Naval Shore Establishment including shore activities of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard,

(b) Crews for yard craft and other small craft employed in Naval District local defense forces,
G.B. No. 421 (Serial No. 204)

(c) Shore based units for other Naval District local defense activities,

(d) Crews for selected cutters of the Coast Guard and employment of non-rated colored men in small numbers by the U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Port,

(e) Construction Regiments, Navy,

(f) Composite Battalions, Marine Corps.

4. That if men of the colored race are to be inducted into the services they should be enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve, the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve and the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. This would permit the enlistment of skilled men in ratings for which qualified.
APPENDIX I

Composition of Construction Regiment

Each regiment to consist of 3 Battalions, each composed of -

1 - Headquarters Company 169 men
4 - Construction Companies 226 men each

Total per Battalion - 1073
Total per Regiment - 3219

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### Construction Company

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL BOARD:

The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter G.B. No. 421 dated March 20, 1942, have been taken, as follows:

By direction of the Secretary:
January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF NAVY

Please read enclosed from Mark Ethridge and return for my files. I think that with all the Navy activities, the Bureau of Navigation might invent something that colored enlistees could do in addition to the rating of messman.

F. D. R.

Letter from Walter White, Secretary, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 69 Fifth Ave., NYC, 12/17/41, to the President, urging President to issued an order to the Navy to abandon forthwith its policy of refusing to permit Negroes to enlist save as messmen, which was sent to Hon. Mark (over)
Ethridge, by Presidential memorandum of 12/22/41 "To reply to", letter from Hon. Mark Ethridge, Chairman, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 12/31/41, returning the letter from Mr. White. Mr. Ethridge feels that the Navy Dept.'s position is untenable and indefensible, and that if the statement of the Bureau of Navigation cited in telegram to Mr. White represents correctly the view of the high command of the Navy Dept., it is clear that the Navy Dept. is not alert to one of the major moral issues of the present war. Because any letter which Mr. Ethridge might write to Mr. White would incorporate these points, he believes that the President will wish to give this matter more consideration before directing Mr. Ethridge to follow his instruction to reply to Mr. White.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
MARK ETHRIDGE:

To reply to.

F.D.R.

Letter from Walter White, Secretary, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 69 Fifth Ave., NYC, 12/17/41, to the President. Quotes telegram the above organization sent to the Secretary of the Navy and reply sent to the organization by the Bureau of Navigation, asking revision of Navy policy which limits service of Negroes to Messmen Division of Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

February 9, 1942

I have yours of February fifth enclosing report of the General Board in regard to

1. Enlistment of negroes in greater numbers in the Service.

2. This report of the General Board I regard as (a) unsatisfactory and (b) insufficient.

3. The General Board falls into the habit, not dissimilar to certain previous cases which have come to my attention in the 150-year history of both the Army and the Navy, to wit; of using the word "political" when they mean something else. The word "political" has, in modern parlance, the connotation of doing things for political or partisan reasons. Doubtless many persons have used the word political when discussing economic or social matters which are not political, as for example, the problem of pensions for the aged, old age insurance and similar problems which arise from time to time.

It is, of course, human and easy to lump social and economic problems under the generic misnomer of "political".

4. Officers of the United States Navy are not officers only but are in addition American citizens and except in two or three states -- Virginia, for example -- they have the right of franchise. They should, therefore, be expected to recognize social and economic problems which are related to the national welfare.

5. The above being axiomatic, I think it is incumbent on all officers to recognize the fact that about one tenth of the population of the United States is composed of members of the negro race, who are American citizens. They are liable to military or naval service in the defense of their country.

6. The report of the General Board in effect reiterates that members of the negro race -- American citizens -- should be enlisted only in the Navy for mess duty -- in other words, that absolutely no change should be instituted.

7. I am not asking for any finding that negroes should be enlisted for all duties in the Naval service -- because I
recognize what the General Board does not seem to recognize -- that to go the whole way at one fell swoop would seriously impair the general average efficiency of the Navy. Yet that is the only alternative presented by the General Board to a retention of the present system. That seems to be unreasonable and badly thought out.

8. It is because I have a certain knowledge -- sympathetic knowledge of Navy personnel problems dating back to the earliest history of our Navy, that I am asking you to return the recommendations of the General Board to that Board for further study and report.

9. It is my considered opinion that there are additional tasks in the Naval establishment to which we could properly assign an additional number of enlisted men who are members of the negro race.

I trust that the General Board will forgive this somewhat lengthy homily from the Commander in Chief and will give it sympathetic consideration.

F. D. R.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Following the receipt of a recent memorandum from you on the subject, I asked the General Board to make a careful study of the whole question of enlistment of colored men in the Navy in other than the messman branch.

I am attaching herewith for your perusal when you have the time, the report of the General Board. It doesn't get you anywhere, however, because the Board finally recommends against the enlistment of negroes in other than the messman branch, and then winds up with a prize sentence which I got a laugh out of, and I am sure you will.

The meat of it is that if we ever have to take negroes for political reasons, then enlist them for the whole service. When I asked Admiral Sexton to elaborate on that last sentence, he told me that it was the judgment of the General Board that if negroes had to be taken, we had better go back to the old practice of taking them for the general service, which means mixing them up everywhere, rather than for some special service where they could be segregated.

The only special service that I can think of where segregation could be possible would be in the Marine Corps, and the Marines stand on their head and yell murder whenever the subject is discussed.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Enclosure

Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl I. Spencer
From: Chairman General Board;  
To: Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Enlistment of men of colored race in other than messman branch.

Reference: (a) SecNav Let. (SC) Fl4-L/MM (03200A)/GEM of January 16, 1942.

1. The General Board, complying with the directive contained in reference (a), has given careful attention to the problem of enlisting in the Navy, men of the colored race in other than the messman branch.

2. The General Board has endeavored to examine the problem placed before it in a realistic manner.

A. Should negroes be enlisted for unlimited general service?

(a) Enlistment for general service implies that the individual may be sent anywhere, - to any ship or station where he is needed. Men on board ship live in particularly close association; in their messes, one man sits beside another; their hammocks or bunks are close together; in their common tasks they work side by side; and in particular tasks such as those of a gun's crew, they form a closely knit, highly coordinated team. How many white men would choose, of their own accord, that their closest associates in sleeping quarters, at mess, and in a gun's crew should be of another race? How many would accept such conditions, if required to do so, without resentment and just as a matter of course? The General Board believes that the answer is "Few, if any," and further believes that if the issue were forced, there would be a lowering of contentment, teamwork and discipline in the service.

(b) One of the tenets of the recruiting service is that each recruit for general service is potentially a leading petty officer. It is true that some men never do become petty officers, and that when recruiting, etc.
men, it is not possible to establish which will be found worthy of and secure promotion and which will not. If negroes are recruited for general service, it can be said at once that few will obtain advancement to petty officer. With every desire to be fair, officers and leading petty officers in general will not recommend negroes for promotion to positions of authority over white men.

The General Board is convinced that the enlistment of negroes for unlimited general service is inadvisable.

B. Should negroes be enlisted in general service but detailed in special ratings or for special ships or units?

(a) The ratings now in use in the naval service cover every phase of naval activity, and no new ratings are deemed necessary merely to promote the enlistment of negroes.

(b) At first thought, it might appear that assignment of negroes to certain vessels, and in particular to small vessels of the patrol type, would be feasible. In this connection, the following table is of interest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ship</th>
<th>Total Crew</th>
<th>Men in Pay Grades 1 to 4</th>
<th>Men in Pay Grades 5 to 7 (Non-rated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battleship</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cruiser (10,000 ton)</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer (1630 ton)</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7 (5 seamen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2 messmen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat (180 foot)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat (110 foot)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5 (3 seamen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1 fireman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1 messman)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pay grades 1 to 4 include Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers, 1st, 2d and 3d Class; also Firemen, 1st Class and a few other ratings requiring length of service and experience equal to that required for qualification of Petty Officers, 3d Class. Pay grades 5 to 7 include all other non-rated men and recruits.
There are no negro officers and so few negro petty officers in
the Navy at present that any vessels to which negroes might be
assigned must have white officers and white petty officers.
Examination of the table shows the small number of men in other
than petty officer ratings that might be assigned to patrol vessels
and indicates to the General Board that such assignments would not
be happy ones. The assignment of negroes to the larger ships, where
well over one-half of the crews are non-rated men, with mixture of
whites and negroes, would inevitably lead to discontent on the part
of one or the other, resulting in clashes and lowering of the effi-
ciency of the vessels and of the Navy.

3. The Navy Department is accused of discriminating against
the negro by refusing to permit the enlistment of negroes, in the
Navy, in other than messman ratings. If such is discrimination, it
is but part and parcel of similar discrimination throughout the
United States not only against the negro, but in the Pacific States
and in Hawaii against citizens of Asiatic descent. The discrimina-
tion is less in some parts of the country than in others, depending
rather generally on the density of colored population. It may be
remarked that certain organizations and trade unions decline to
receive negroes as members and that in certain industrial plants,
employment of negroes is confined to common labor and to a very
few trades. The reasons for discrimination, in the United States,
are rather generally that:

(a) the white man will not accept the negro in a
position of authority over him;

(b) the white man considers that he is of a superior
race and will not admit the negro as an equal; and

(c) the white man refuses to admit the negro to
intimate family relationships leading to marriage.

These concepts may not be truly democratic, but it is doubted if
the most ardent lovers of democracy will dispute them, particularly
in regard to inter-marriage.

4. The General Board recognizes that part of the negro
problem is political, and that both major political parties
(Republican and Democratic) have endeavored, in one way or another,
to gain the support of the negro vote. A Congressman of the United
States supports the view of the Navy Department in a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy reading as follows:

"I am just this morning in receipt of form letter and
enclosure from the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People which letter and enclosure I am
herewith transmitting to you. These documents relate to
the rejection by the Navy of a certain Harold J. Franklin.
While this association criticizes you for discriminating against negroes, I noticed that you state that you were not discriminating. I have no objection to your statement, provided you do not carry out the wishes of this Association.

"In this hour of national crisis, it is much more important that we have the full-hearted cooperation of the thirty million white southern Americans than that we satisfy the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. I realize that you have never lived in the South. I have lived there all my life. You know that our people have volunteered for military service more readily than the people of any other section of the Nation. If they be forced to serve with Negroes, they will cease to volunteer; and when drafted, they will not serve with that enthusiasm and high morale that has always characterized the soldiers and sailors of the southern states.

"I do not mean to urge a complete seclusion of Negroes from military or naval service, but I do most earnestly plead with you to see that there is a complete segregation of the races. To assign a Negro doctor to treat some southern white boy would be a crushing insult and in my opinion, an outrage against the patriotism of our southern people."

5. The point has been made by some advocates of the negroes that negroes should be permitted to fight for their country. There are several negro organizations in the Army and those organizations will doubtless be utilized in the present war. Messmen on board ship are given stations during battle when they assist in fighting the ship as truly as do any other members of the ship's company.

6. The Navy of the United States is composed, except for messmen, of members of the white race. This condition has arisen because those in control have believed and experience has demonstrated that the white man is more adaptable and more efficient in the various conditions which are involved in the making of an effective man-of-war. The nation is now at war and the induction into the Navy of increasing numbers of negroes in the wider field of activities cannot fail to increase the difficulties of preparing for war and distract the attention of the Navy from concentrating all of its efforts toward winning a complete victory.

7. The General Board regrets that it is unable to comply with that part of reference (a) which requires submission of a
G.B. No. 421 (Serial No. 201)

plan for taking into the Navy 5,000 men of the colored race, not in the messman branch. The Board strongly recommends that members of the colored race be accepted for enlistment only in the messman branch. If, in the opinion of higher authority, political pressure is such as to require the enlistment of these people for general service, let it be for that.

Copy to C.N.O.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: 201 - Enlistment of men of colored race in other than messman branch.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL BOARD:

The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter G.B. No. 421 dated February 2, 1942, have been taken, as follows:

By direction of the Secretary:
This will reply to the report you received from Carter on the SEA OTTER business. I am returning the report herewith.

There is no doubt there is a little confusion about the present status of the SEA OTTER program, but I think it is being straightened out, although perhaps not to the satisfaction of Commander Bryan, who is probably in a state of disturbance about one thing or another.

You will remember that my first suggestion after this outcry that the SEA OTTER had not been given a real chance was that the whole matter be turned over to Bryan, Redmond, and Burgess, who had so far as my contacts were concerned, been the principal parties in the promotion of the SEA OTTER. You approved this suggestion and I sent for Bryan and told him of the decision to turn the whole project over to himself, Burgess and Redmond and told him I would expedite in every way the transfer of the little corporation that was building the experimental ship into their hands. To my surprise, the next morning, I got a letter from Bryan in which he appeared to be under the impression that I had said we were turning the whole thing over to him alone. I promptly corrected this statement in my reply and pointed out that two other men were associated with him in the matter.

Then Brewster and Gillette called on you at the White House and, as a result, you directed me to turn the experiment over to Weaver and Captain Swayne, with Bryan acting as an inspector. Acting on these revised instructions from you, I sent for Weaver and Captain Swayne and, with both present, told them of my instructions from you to turn the project over to them and I described the part which Bryan should play in the project as a naval inspector. Weaver assumed the active role at once and began negotiating for the transfer of the corporation and I think then that Weaver and Bryan had some difficulties over the matter. This is only a suspicion on my part because Bryan now seems to have his nose out of joint with respect to Weaver.

Signature: Paul V. McNutt
April 1, 1942

What Bryan now says about Weaver according to Carter, is very amusing because it was Bryan who brought the Weaver Associates into the picture and with whom Bryan was associated in the drawing of the plans for the experimental ship.

The whole thing is a headache and the bulk of the difficulties that have arisen grow out of the fact, in my judgment, that Bryan, while brilliant in some respects, is utterly irresponsible.

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
TO READ AND RETURN
F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972
REPORT ON DISPOSITION OF THE "SEA OTTER" PROGRAM.

The present status of the "Sea Otter" program is clothe with confusion. Secretary Knox, on March 17, wrote Commander Bryan that, at your direction, he was turning over to him the entire "Sea Otter" project. Yesterday, Secretary Knox called in the heads of Weaver Associates and told them that, at your direction, he was turning over to them the entire "Sea Otter" project.

Commander Bryan is very disturbed about the whole situation, especially because he feels that Secretary Knox blames him for all of the publicity on the "Sea Otter", whereas to my knowledge he refused two months ago to see Senator Gillette and tip him off as to the facts, waiting instead until he was ordered by the Navy Department testify before the Gillette Sub-Committee. In my own personal discussions with Bryan, I have found him consistently opposed to stirring up publicity, playing politics or taking any attitude which might be construed as insubordinate. I also found him unwilling to cultivate any relationship with commercial interests which might profit by the program, other than to facilitate the operation.

Bryan points out that if "Sea Otter" is given to Weaver Associates, not only will it be difficult for the firm to obtain the professional services of competent technicians (because Weaver Associates are distinctly second-rate and Starling Burgess can never work again--his heart has given out) but the naval officers such as Bryan, Lockwood and others who are working for the "Sea Otter" program will be estopped from giving their official services to a private commercial enterprise. Bryan says that Homer Ferguson of Newport News Shipbuilding or John Hancock should be put in charge. Ferguson is willing now; Hancock was last year.
April 2, 1942

My dear Don:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which the Secretary of the Navy sent to the President the other day and which the President sent to me with the attached note. I think No. 6 was the thing that bothered him the most.

Would there be anything to the idea that we would not give priorities to facilities which would not be in production prior to a certain date? The theory being that if we have to take risks we take them in favor of immediate production. Would there be any wisdom in the interests of getting our requirements rapidly in not giving priorities to facilities which would not be in production by April 1, 1943?

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Director, War Production Board.
MEMORANDUM FOR
H. L. H.

Will you take this up with
Don Nelson and let me have a
report on it?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Via the Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Priorities for Naval Shipbuilding Program.

1. Recently, drastic changes have been adopted in military priorities. The Chairman of the War Production Board has raised all types of aircraft with all their components from preference ratings of A-1-b and A-1-d to A-1-a. Similarly, 20,000 anti-aircraft guns for the Ordnance Department of the Army were advanced from various lower ratings to A-1-a. By action of the War Production Board, the programs for expansion of industrial facilities for high octane gasoline, aluminum, magnesium, synthetic rubber and many others have recently been placed in the highest priority group.

2. While not questioning the importance of the programs that have been raised in priority, they will require large amounts of critical machinery and material. No new tools or additional sources of material are created by priority decrees. The requirements can only be met by a major shift in tool and material supply. It must be accomplished at the expense of programs whose priorities remain static. Of these, one is the Navy shipbuilding program, whose priorities continue to extend from the highest priority rating A-1-a to the lowest A-1-i.

3. The Material Bureaus of the Navy Department, under these priorities, were previously encountering increasing difficulty in meeting production schedules. Because of the recent priority decisions, the difficulties will become insuperable. For ships to be completed in 1942 there will be delay. Progressively more serious delays will arise for ships to be delivered after 1942. These delays are controlling as to our capacity to seek out the enemy and strike him.

4. Large-scale offensive operations to be carried out in distant theatres of operations are limited by several factors, chief among which are shortages in cargo tonnage and Naval escorts. I am of the opinion that fully equipped air and land forces together with operating and maintenance supplies are now available in excess of the shipping capacity to carry them. Furthermore, as our merchant ship tonnage is being sunk by Axis submarines it is imperative that the construction of destroyers and patrol vessels be unimpeded, if not substantially increased. Unless the whole priorities schedule is re-aligned to give assistance to those pro-
Subject: Priorities for Naval Shipbuilding Program.

4. (continued)

grams of greatest strategic urgency and importance, we shall continue to sacrifice the progress of naval shipbuilding in order to meet production schedules of tanks, planes, guns, etc. which are of no value on the present prospective fighting fronts unless they can be shipped.

5. As to competition with the production of other military requirements, there is now being undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff a revision of the Military Priorities Directive. It is hoped that the revised directive will accurately reflect the importance of the Naval building program in relation to other munitions programs.

6. Simply stated as an opinion and not by way of criticism, our most serious delays are caused by competition with programs for industrial development. These programs are enormous in scope. They will require vast quantities of critical machinery and materials. The following programs have been placed in the highest priority group (A-1-a):

Expansion of facilities for production of:-

- Copper (1942 program)
- Iron and Steel (Various)
- Electrical equipment (Various)
- Machine Tools (greatest portion)
- Cranes (greatest portion)
- Cutting tools
- Power generation and transmission (Various)
- High octane gasoline
- Aluminum
- Magnesium
- Synthetic rubber
- Chrome
- Toluene
- Nickel

7. Although production of the above-listed items must be expanded in the interests of the ultimate war requirements, the assignment of the highest ratings to the entire list will impair production of our immediate requirements. It is clear that careful consideration must now be given to determining how much it is safe to sacrifice present production of munitions for production which will not be actually useful in opposing the enemy for two or three years. No such determination has been made, but it certainly is of immediate importance.
Subject: Priorities for Naval Shipbuilding Program.

8. The letter of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet dated February 20, 1942 addressed to the Secretary of the Navy - copy herewith - urged the adoption of a definite policy bearing on this matter but no positive corrective action has as yet resulted. It is recommended that further representations be made to the Chairman, War Production Board (Mr. Nelson) pointing out the concern with which the Navy views the high priorities assigned to industrial development, this concern being based primarily upon the seriousness of the present military situation.

9. It is relevant to note that the announcement of the President on January 3, 1942 itemizing the War Production programs of 1942 and 1943 omitted any reference to Naval Shipbuilding. This has caused a loss of prestige to Naval Construction which, although doubtless unintentional, has contributed to our priorities difficulties. It is believed that this should be corrected.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations.

Office of the Secretary of the Navy March 27, 1942

FOR THE PRESIDENT

I most heartily concur in the views expressed by the Commander in Chief.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/11/51

Signature- Carl I. Spear
Dear Harry:

I have your note of April 2 regarding machine tools for combat aircraft factories.

Through the use of special out-of-line ratings, a number of critically needed machine tool deliveries have been expedited to aircraft contractors, most of whom were in the lower priority brackets. These were machines needed to round out either the pilot or production lines.

The A-1-a rating for aircraft, which we applied the latter part of February, has had a marked psychological effect in generally improving the production of aircraft in the War Program and we are confident that it promises much help toward meeting program requirements. Enough time has not elapsed to make this order really effective as yet.

There is a hand-picked group composed of experienced machine tool and production men, who make current surveys in which critically needed tool requirements are determined and deliveries and placements expedited. In particular, orders are checked on the ground against actual requirements to insure that requests and needs are in balance.

There is a steady and substantial increase in the production of those machine tools required in the aircraft industry, and there is sound reason to believe these tools will be available at approximately the time required.

Sincere regards,

Donald M. Nelson

Honorable Harry L. Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Additional Nonrigid Airships.

1. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations desires to increase the number of nonrigid airships.

2. At present, as an item in the "10,000 Plane Program", approved June 15, 1940, the number of nonrigid airships authorized is 48. The number of useful naval airplanes was increased by the subsequent Act approved July 19, 1940, to a total of fifteen thousand, with the following proviso:

"Provided, That if, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy, the total number of airplanes authorized herein is not sufficient to meet the needs of the national defense, he may, with the approval of the President, make such plans for the procurement as the situation may demand."

However, the authorized number of airships has not been changed.

3. At this time it is impracticable to state the exact number of nonrigid airships which may prove necessary but it is desired to order an additional 24 of the patrol type now. Accordingly, the Department plans to ask for legislation which will parallel for nonrigid airships the airplane flexibility indicated in the quoted proviso above, and is asking for funds for these 24 airships.

4. Presidential approval of this plan and procedure is requested.

(Signed) FRANK KNOX

"F.K. O.K. F.D.R."
April 24, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with Executive Order No. 9001 of December 27, 1941, I have the honor to transmit herewith report of contracts negotiated by the Navy Department under authority of Section 201 of Public Law No. 354, 77th Congress, for the period January 1, 1942, to March 31, 1942, inclusive.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.
Report by the Secretary of the Navy for the Quarter Ended 31 March, 1942, of Confidential Negotiated Contracts Executed under Authority of Title II, Sec. 201, Public Law No. 354, 77th Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Contract</th>
<th>Date of Contract</th>
<th>Name of Contractor</th>
<th>Subject of Contract</th>
<th>Basis of Contract</th>
<th>Fixed or Estimated Amount Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.A. Nord-130</td>
<td>27 May 1941</td>
<td>Bethlehem Steel Co.</td>
<td>15&quot; H. M. Projectiles Nose caps and Containers</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>$1,054,340.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-151</td>
<td>19 June 1941</td>
<td>The Midvale Co.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>28,975,429.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-177</td>
<td>27 June 1941</td>
<td>Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>3,863,828.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-180</td>
<td>13 Aug. 1941</td>
<td>Bethlehem Steel Co.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>13,393,613.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-224</td>
<td>28 Oct. 1941</td>
<td>Bethlehem Steel Co.</td>
<td>12&quot; A. P. (Exp.) Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>20,250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-226</td>
<td>28 Oct. 1941</td>
<td>The Midvale Co.</td>
<td>12&quot; A. P. (Exp.) Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>20,250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-228</td>
<td>28 Nov. 1941</td>
<td>Bethlehem Steel Co.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>99,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-229</td>
<td>28 Nov. 1941</td>
<td>Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>99,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-230</td>
<td>28 Nov. 1941</td>
<td>The Midvale Co.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>99,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-260</td>
<td>15 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>Bethlehem Steel Co.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>142,760.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-264</td>
<td>21 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>Cameron Iron Works</td>
<td>Depth charge projectors and spare parts</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>339,394.75</td>
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</table>
Report by the Secretary of the Navy  
for the Quarter Ended 31 March, 1942  
of Restricted Negotiated Contracts Executed under Authority  
of Title II, Sec. 201, Public Law No. 354, 77th Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Contract</th>
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<th>Fixed or Estimated Amount Involved.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nord-192</td>
<td>30 Aug. 1941</td>
<td>Fisher Body Division General Motors Corp.</td>
<td>3&quot; Breech Housings and Blocks</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>$9,288,750.00</td>
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<td>Nord-196</td>
<td>12 Sept. 1941</td>
<td>Flannery Bolt Co.</td>
<td>Finish machining 20 mm. Gun Barrels</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>587,500.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nord-222</td>
<td>5 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>The Amertorp Corp.</td>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>Cost Plus</td>
<td>1,170,225.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nord-227</td>
<td>15 Nov. 1941</td>
<td>Van der Horst Corp. of America</td>
<td>Chrome plating of 5&quot;/38 and 3&quot;/50 cal. Gun Barrels</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>215,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. A. Nord-251</td>
<td>12 Dec. 1941</td>
<td>The Wayne Pump Co.</td>
<td>Two Pounder Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>440,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-252</td>
<td>17 Dec. 1941</td>
<td>General Steel Castings Corporation</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>22,740.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-253</td>
<td>18 Dec. 1941</td>
<td>Union Steel Castings Div. Blaw-Knox Company</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>56,010.00</td>
</tr>
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Report by the Secretary of the Navy for the Quarter Ended 31 March, 1942, of Restricted Negotiated Contracts Executed under Authority of Title II, Sec. 201, Public Law No. 354, 77th Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Contract</th>
<th>Date of Contract</th>
<th>Name of Contractor</th>
<th>Subject of Contract</th>
<th>Basis of Contract</th>
<th>Fixed or Estimated Amount Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Nord-254</td>
<td>26 Dec. 1941</td>
<td>Matam Corporation</td>
<td>20 mm. A. A. Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>$1,080,000.00</td>
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<td>Nord-255</td>
<td>26 Dec. 1941</td>
<td>Tecumseh Products Co.</td>
<td>40 mm. A. A. Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>$1,800,000.00</td>
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<td>Nord-256</td>
<td>3 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>E. C. Atkins and Co.</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>470,635.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-257</td>
<td>2 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>The Midvale Co.</td>
<td>40 mm. Gun Barrel Forgings</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>266,850.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nord-259</td>
<td>12 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>Durham Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>40 mm. Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>2,520,000.00</td>
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<td>D.A. Nord-261</td>
<td>19 Jan. 1942</td>
<td>National Supply Co.</td>
<td>40 mm. and 20 mm. Gun Barrel Forgings</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>1,495,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. A. Nord-266</td>
<td>4 Feb. 1942</td>
<td>The Midvale Co.</td>
<td>Catapult Gun Forgings</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>57,800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. A. Nord-284</td>
<td>24 Feb. 1942</td>
<td>National Pneumatic Co.</td>
<td>20 mm. A. A. Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>1,425,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. A. Nord-286</td>
<td>23 Feb. 1942</td>
<td>S. F. Bowser &amp; Co., Inc.</td>
<td>20 mm. A. A. Projectiles</td>
<td>Fixed Price</td>
<td>6,180,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*First four items on Schedule $210,741.32 Remaining items by Negotiation 259,894.46
Memorandum for The President.

The recent directive concerning the construction of landing craft is covered by neither Congressional authorization nor appropriation. It is considered that the 190 - 316' tank landing craft and 300 - 155' Giant "Y" boats are properly chargeable against authorization to build auxiliary vessels. There is now pending before the Bureau of the Budget a bill to authorize 1,000,000 tons of auxiliary vessels. It is expected that appropriation to cover this authorization will be sought as soon as the authorization bill, itself, has progressed a little farther.

There are ample funds available to cover any expenditure which may be necessary in the construction of the landing craft over the next few months. It is essential that the contracts be awarded immediately and construction begun.

I would like to have your approval, therefore, to undertake these obligations in advance of definite Congressional authorization and appropriation.

The total tonnage involved is about 352,000 and the over-all cost about $65,000,000.

Frank Knox
Memorandum for The President.

On May 13 you approved an act to authorize the construction of 200,000 tons of combatant ships. The purpose of this legislation was to permit the continuation without break in continuity for the submarine construction program. It is expected that legislation to make existing appropriations available for the construction of this 200,000 tons of vessels will be obtained in the next supplemental appropriation bill. However, it is desirable, in the interest of planning and maintaining continuity of production, that awards for these submarines be made as soon as possible.

It is, therefore, requested that you approve entering into obligations against the total of the 200,000 tons in advance of specific appropriation for the purpose. If your approval is granted, it is intended to make awards for the construction of 120 submarines totaling about 186,000 tons and at an estimated over-all cost of about $850,000,000.

Frank Knox

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Date- 3/12/59
Signature- Carl Soluri

CONFIDENTIAL
June 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is Frank Knox memo and confidential report from Admiral Morreel with reference to the Norconian Hotel property.

MAC
To Mr. Marvin McIntyre - For your confidential information I attach herewith Admiral Roemer's comment on Mr. Richberg's letter which is also returned. You will note that Richberg has been misinformed as to matters of which the Navy Dept. is fully informed and therefore, in my judgment his argument falls. I am more than ever convinced that submitting the entire matter to impartial judicial determination in the Federal court is the only course to pursue.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR: REAR ADMIRAL BEN MORELL

Please note the enclosed letter which was sent to me confidentially from the White House. There is only one statement in this letter that gives me concern. That is the statement in paragraph 2. Who approved of the offer to Mr. Clark in writing and did a board of appraisers value the property at several hundred thousand dollars more than $2,000,000?

Let me have this information as quickly as possible.

J.K.

Attachment

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl S. Spencer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Relative to the attached correspondence in regard to the Norconian Hotel, the following statement is submitted.

I believe it pertinent to make a brief statement in regard to each of the points brought up in Mr. Richberg's letter, following his enumeration.

1. We have been unable to locate in the Files of the Judge Advocate General, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, or the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery an offer in writing by Mr. Clark to sell this property to the Navy for $2,000,000. Such an offer may well have been made to the Commandant of the Eleventh Naval District or to some other local authority. Whether or not the offer was made does not appear to be pertinent.

2. We can find no record in the files of the acceptance by the Navy of Mr. Clark's offer to sell for $2,000,000. The statement that Mr. Clark's offer "was officially approved, in writing, after a Navy board of appraisers had valued the property at several hundred thousand dollars more than $2,000,000" is at variance with the instructions sent to the Commandant of the Eleventh Naval District on December 8th as follows: "Commandant should arrange with owner to take over Hotel at earliest practicable date with understanding that final price of acquisition will be subject to negotiation or condemnation at fair market value".

3. The Department has no knowledge of threats by men claiming political influence to block the payment for this property.

4. Reference is here made to appraisals forwarded by Mr. Brett, Special Attorney, Lands Division, Department of Justice, to the Navy Department at our request. These appraisals were made by outside appraisers for the War Department some months previously(July, 1941). Mr. Brett did not comment on the propriety of the appraisals. We learned that these appraisals had been made and sent for them.

5. The reference to the "hopeless attempt" of the H.O.L.C. to support the false half-million appraisal is not understood, since the H.O.L.C. appraisal was second highest and amounted to $1,040,400. There were three other separate appraisals much lower than the H.O.L.C. appraisal.

6. The Department has no information in regard to the "gang of political holdup men".
On November 21, 1941, the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery sent a joint letter to the Commandant of the Eleventh Naval District telling him that we were giving consideration to the acquisition of the Norconian Hotel and suggesting that the Commandant constitute a Board to determine the suitability of the property for use as a convalescent center and estimates of the cost of adaptations, rehabilitation, repairs and extensions as may be considered necessary, together with estimates of cost of the annual maintenance and operation of the plant. The Commandant also was informed that the Department desired to obtain a formal appraisal of the property. Before the report of the Board was received the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, and on December 8th the Bureau of Yards and Docks sent a dispatch to the Commandant referring to the joint letter mentioned above and stating that the "President has directed active steps be taken to take over hotel with view to operation as hospital". The dispatch went on to state the conditions under which the Commandant should negotiate with the owner as quoted above in paragraph 2.

The report of the Board was submitted to the Commandant on December 29, 1941, and forwarded by him to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery on January 12th, who forwarded it to the Bureau of Yards and Docks on January 17th. This report is evidently the one to which Mr. Richberg refers in his statement marked 2 wherein he refers to a "Navy board of appraisers".

The Board in its report discusses under the heading "Appraisal - general" the value of the property, and states as follows: "A business man might consider twenty cents or twenty-five cents on the dollar an outside purchase price. Referring to paragraph 12 above, this would indicate a going price of, in round numbers, something between $800,000 or $1,000,000 at the most, although at this time it is difficult to visualize consummation of a deal involving the purchase, commercially, of the property."

Later in the Board report the Board quotes Mr. Beelman, architect, who was engaged to make an examination and appraisal of the buildings as stating, "If a forced sale were made of these holdings you would arrive at a cost of 20 percent or 25 percent of the original value. This percentage has been substantiated in and around Los Angeles. There is a use value, which I would say would be 55 percent of the original cost; which would include the buildings, land, furnishings and equipment."

Mr. Richberg's statement, no doubt, has reference to this so-called "use value". By "use value" is meant that part of the original cost of the property which would represent the value to the Navy if the property were taken over for use as a hospital. The "use value" is, of necessity, largely a matter of guesswork or "judgement."

In condemnation proceedings the "use value" does not determine the amount that the Navy can pay for a piece of property. The law requires that the value be the "fair market value."

Relative to these two items, i.e. "market value" and "use value," the following is quoted from the Board's report:

"The "market value" has been figured from $500,000 to $960,687.90, and in the belief that the chances of a commercial sale in the recent past,
present, or reasonably distant future are so remote as to be practically non-existent, it is believed the lower figure more nearly represents the actuality.

"The "use value" for Army use has been figured, on the basis of use as an air base, as $1,200,000. The "use value" for Navy purposes, wherefor the plant is better suited, has been figured at $2,103,650.58, although obviously such a figure is compounded of elements each of which is a matter of judgment."

It may well be that the Court will make an award in excess of $850,000, which it is proposed to deposit with the declaration of taking, but in view of the wide discrepancies in the appraisals and the other ramifications connected with the case, we feel that the Department would be on the safe side in allowing the Court to determine the final amount to be paid the owner.

B. Moreell

B. Moreell 18-0
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

This is the letter I spoke to you about which the President wanted you to see for your confidential information.

Will you advise me after looking into the matter?

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

Attachment: Letter 6-18-42 from Donald Richberg, 815 15th St., Washington, D.C. re the purchase of the Norconian Hotel property which has been occupied as a naval hospital for more than six months.

MFM:J

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2-1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAC:

Will you take this up with the Secretary of the Navy? I think there is a great deal in it.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The attached is self-explanatory.

Do you want it held until you get back or just let it ride?

MAC
Personal, and Urgent.

Honorable Marvin H. McIntyre,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mao:

Yesterday I was given to understand that the President had ordered that immediate payment be made for the Norconian Hotel property, which has been occupied as a naval hospital for more than six months.

Today, Admiral Woodson tells me that the Secretary of the Navy recommended, and the President approved, condemnation proceedings to establish the value. I think Admiral Woodson must be mistaken, but anyhow I am sure neither the Secretary nor the President would take such an action if informed of the following facts:

1. Mr. Clark offered, in writing, to sell this property to the Navy for $2,000,000.

2. Mr. Clark's offer was officially approved, in writing, after a navy board of appraisers had valued the property at several hundred thousand dollars more than $2,000,000.

3. Men claiming political influence threatened, orally and in writing, to block the payment if they were not paid 10% of the purchase price.

4. A special condemnation attorney of the Department of Justice, in this territory, thereafter sent an indefensible appraisal of approximately $500,000 to the Navy, which caused the Navy to ask for an HOLC and an RFC appraisal.

5. The RFC appraisal of $1,800,000 substantially sustained the agreed-upon purchase price. I complained of the HOLC appraisal while it was being made, because of the obvious hostility of the appraisers and their hopeless attempt to support the false half-million appraisal. One of the best-informed, least partisan appraisers refused to sign the HOLC appraisal.

6. To authorize a condemnation proceeding would mean to give unintentional support to a gang of political holdup men. It will further insure a litigation thoroughly discreditable to the government. I do not question the integrity or good faith of any of the government officials involved, but hostile critics will find ample evidence of conduct subject to many varieties of criticism.

If a businessman made an agreement to buy a property, after thorough examination and appraisal, and then repudiated it, he would suffer in damages and reputation. The government cannot be made to respond in damages but,
If 'Honorable Marvin H. McIntyre

June 18, 1942.

after a fruitless lawsuit to repudiate a contract, it would certainly suffer in reputation.

I write this because I am certain the Secretary of the Navy would not have made his recommendation if he had knowledge of these facts, and I am positive the President would not approve such treatment of a man who relied on the President's own order and the understanding reached with his representatives, and turned over his property immediately, without formality, for the urgent needs of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

Donald R. Richberg

*1961

DRR:CLB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Recommend that the President approve
the attached request for authority to sell,
as useless hulks, six former submarines of
the U. S. Navy.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea

John L. McCrea
25 June 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a memorandum recommending that authority be given for the sale of the Ex-USS 0-1, S-3, S-6, S-7, S-8, and S-9, as hulks, at the earliest time possible in lieu of the customary three months and at such price as the Secretary of the Navy may approve, irrespective of the appraised value of the hulks. Your consideration and approval of such recommendation is requested.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The President,
The White House.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/11/59
Signature- Carl L. spacer

CONFIDENTIAL

The White House,
June 1942.

July 6,

APPROVED: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Memorandum

The Ex-USS O-1, a submarine having an over all length of 172 feet, 4 inches, a standard displacement of 480 tons, built at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, during the period 1917 to 1918, was stricken from the Navy Register on May 14, 1938. The appraised value of this vessel as of December 23, 1938, was $2,000.

The Ex-USS S-3, S-6, S-7, S-8 and S-9, submarines, each having an over all length of 231 feet and a standard displacement of 790 tons, were built at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, during the period from 1916 to 1921, and were stricken from the Navy Register on January 25, 1937. The appraised value of each as a hulk, as of December 20, 1938, was $5,000.

These vessels are no longer suited for further naval service and it is believed to be to the best interests of the Government that they be sold as hulks at such prices as the Secretary of the Navy may approve.

The Chief of Naval Operations has certified that the submarine hulks Ex-USS O-1, S-3 and S-6 to S-9, inclusive, are not essential to the defense of the United States as required by Section 14(a) of Public Act No. 671 - 76th Congress, approved June 28, 1940.

The Act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. 299; 34 U.S.C. sec.492), provides that the sale of a condemned vessel shall be advertised for a period of three months and that the sale be made for cash at the highest price offered above the appraised value "unless the President of the United States shall otherwise direct in writing".

Advertisement for a shorter period but long enough for sufficient notice to prospective purchasers and consequent earlier sale of these hulks would effect a saving to the Government in the cost of upkeep.
It is therefore recommended that authority be given for the sale of the Ex-USS G-1, S-3 and S-6 to S-9, inclusive, as hulks, at the earliest time possible in lieu of the customary three months, and at such prices as the Secretary of the Navy may approve irrespective of the appraised values of the hulks.

James Forrestal

Secretary of the Navy.
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Submarine Hulks - Ex-USS O-1, S-3 and S-6 to S-9 Inclusive.
Reference: (a) Sec. 14(a) Public Act No. 671 - 70th Congress, Chapter 440, 3d Session, approved June 28, 1940.

1. In compliance with the provisions of reference (a), it is certified that the O-1, S-3 and S-6 to S-9 Inclusive are not essential to the defense of the United States.

E. J. KING
From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies & Accounts.
Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subject: Submarine Hulks - Ex-USS O-1, S-3 and S-6 to S-9 inclusive.

(c) NYd Phila. conf. ltr. A8-8(I) of March 19, 1942.

1. The subject hulks are unfit for naval service and will be disposed of by sale or in such other manner, in accordance with law as may be most advantageous to the Government.

2. The Commandant, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, in reference (c) advises that all equipment will have been removed in accordance with reference (b).

3. Paragraph 3 of reference (c) is quoted for your information and guidance:

"3. Based on the past experience of this Yard in the scrapping of similar hulks, and having in mind the possible interference with the productive efforts of the Yard, it appears that the best interests of the Navy can be served by disposing of these hulks to private contractors, to be scrapped by them, and it is accordingly recommended that the Department approve this procedure. The Commandant understands that there are several scrapping concerns in the vicinity of Philadelphia that will be glad to bid on these hulks for scrapping purposes."

4. The subject hulks were stricken from the Navy register on the following dates:

EX-USS O-1 - - - - - - May 14, 1938.
" " S-3 - - - - - - Jan. 27, 1937
" " S-6 to S-9 inc. Jan. 25, 1937

5. In order to avoid delay and expense incident to sale, the Judge Advocate General will prepare the necessary
papers requesting executive authority to sell these hulks at the earliest time possible in lieu of the customary three months, at such price as may be approved irrespective of its appraised value.

6. Upon receiving notification from the Judge Advocate General that the necessary Executive Authority has been received, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts will proceed with the sale of these hulks.

JAMES FORRESTAL
Acting

Copy to: Buships NYd Phila Op-38

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Date- 2/11/59
Signature- [Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

July 6, 1942.  

CONFIDENTIAL  

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:  

I am inclined to go along with this idea. If I understand it, Towers now occupies two jobs, which of course is fundamentally contrary to good organization. Perhaps Jack Towers could be made a vice admiral in his capacity as the Aeronautics Officer in Operations -- and put someone in his place as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.  

Will you speak to me about this at your convenience?  

F.D.R.  

Letter from Cong. Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee on Naval Affairs, undated, to the President. (Received at the White House on July 4, 9:07 P.M., 1942). Refers to his suggestion some time ago that the President consider the question of providing the rank of vice admiral for chiefs of bureaus in the Navy Dept., and in reply to which the President had advised that it did not appear, at that time, appropriate to confer such rank upon the officers in question. Cong. Vinson still feels that there should be one exception thereto, that is, in the case of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and states his reasons as to why he feels that this exception should be made.
My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your memorandum of July 6 to which was attached a letter from Congressman Vinson suggesting that Towers be made a Vice Admiral.

I thoroughly approve of the suggestion you make, that is, of making Towers a member of King's staff for Aeronautics with the rank of Vice Admiral and then appointing someone else in his place as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

At my first opportunity, I will discuss this with you.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President

The White House

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Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl T. Sprueck
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I am inclined to go along with this idea. If I understand it, Towers now occupies two jobs, which of course is fundamentally contrary to good organization. Perhaps Jack Towers could be made a vice admiral in his capacity as the Aeronautics Officer in Operations -- and put someone in his place as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Will you speak to me about this at your convenience?

F.D.R.
My dear Mr. President:

You will recall that some time ago I suggested for your consideration the question of providing the rank of vice admiral for chiefs of bureaus in the Navy Department. You were kind enough to afford me the benefit of your views on this subject, with which I was in complete accord, to the effect that it did not appear, at that time, appropriate to confer such rank upon the officers in question.

While I am constrained to adhere to the above view, still I feel that there should be one exception thereto, that is, in the case of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is my considered opinion that he should, during the continuance of the present war, have the rank of vice admiral. This is not solely because of the statutory duties imposed upon the chief of that bureau but is occasioned principally by the important additional duties which have been assigned to the officer occupying that position.

As an illustration of the above, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics attends the meetings of the joint chiefs of staff as the Navy Department's aeronautical representative and at such meetings he is outranked by all other officers present, including the Chief of the Army Air Forces. The latter officer holds the rank of lieutenant general, the corresponding rank to that of vice admiral, which it is proposed be conferred upon the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Similarly, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics is a member of the Joint Aeronautical Committee which is charged with the allocation of our aircraft and, at the meetings of this committee, he is also junior in rank to the other members attending, including the British representative.

The according of the rank of vice admiral to the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics would also seem to be necessary and desirable in view of the fact that there are
a number of other officers holding the rank of rear admiral in the aeronautical organization of the Navy, who, in effect, are serving under Rear Admiral Towers, the present Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. They occupy, however, the same rank that he does. In addition, there is one officer with the rank of vice admiral serving at sea in an aviation command. This would not appear to be sound from an administrative standpoint or to be in accord with the general principles inherent in any military chain of command.

In view of the above, and in the interest of the more efficient administration of the Navy's vast aeronautical organization, I suggest that consideration be given to the advisability of authorizing the rank of vice admiral for the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

I would be grateful, Mr. President, if at your convenience you would be good enough to let me have the benefit of your thoughts in connection with this matter.

Assuring you of my highest esteem, I am

Very respectfully,

CARL VINSON,
Chairman.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

JUL 13 1942

The attached copy of Admiral Nimitz' letter to Admiral King is self-explanatory.

In order to take care of the situation I propose to issue the following:

"1. Article 660, U.S. Navy Regulations, shall be construed as giving Commanders-in-Chief authority to order in command of Task Forces or Task Groups any officer he desires, regardless of relative rank.

2. Any provisions of Navy Regulations in conflict herewith are suspended.

3. A Commander-in-Chief ordering an officer to command a Task Force or Task Group to which a senior may be attached shall, in his orders, refer to this letter as authority."

Your approval of the foregoing is requested.

FRANK KNOX.
June 24, 1942

Dear King:

Paragraph 705, Navy Regulations, requires in effect that officers shall be assigned to command task forces according to rank. Under Section 1434 of the Revised Statutes, the President, and the Secretary of the Navy by direction of the President, may assign an officer to command over officers holding commissions of an older date. Also, it has been held that it is the President's right, as Commander-in-Chief, to decide according to his own judgment what officer shall perform any particular duty.

I foresee that a situation may arise in which I will desire to designate a task force commander who is junior in rank to the commander of the cruisers in the force. In such a situation the time element may not permit referring the matter through you to the Secretary of the Navy. I should have the authority, delegated if necessary, to make spot assignment of a task force commander regardless of his relative rank and request that you obtain that authority for me.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ C. W. Nimitz

C. W. Nimitz

Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Article 660, U.S. Navy Regulations.

"Nothing in these regulations shall be construed as limiting the discretion of a commander in chief or other naval commander in making at any time such disposition of his command, or such special temporary organization of the forces under his command, as he may deem appropriate for the accomplishment of a particular task or purpose."
MEMORANDUM - for The Under Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Export Licenses issued to the Sydney Ross Company allowing shipments of certain Drugs to Latin America.

1. The first indication the Medical Department of the Navy had of this matter was on July 18th when we were informed that a license had been issued to the Sydney Ross Company which allowed the exporting of certain critical drugs. We were told at that time that the license included some 8000-ounces of quinine.

2. The following morning the President, having seen something in the newspapers on this matter, asked me to look into the situation and find out why quinine was being shipped out of the country. I told him that it was on the order of the Board of Economic Warfare and that the matter was closed. That we had known nothing of it whatsoever, but since the Navy had a representative on this Board we supposed the matter had at least been brought to his attention.

3. The President called in one of his secretaries, Mr. Marvin McIntyre, and instructed him to look into this matter and see what could be done about stopping shipment until some investigation could be made. The matter then rested and on July 27th Marvin McIntyre told me that considerable pressure was being brought to bear to have something done about lifting the prohibition on licensing.

4. Later in the day Tom Corcoran called at my office in the Navy Department and stated that he felt we were all working under misapprehension in this matter. I told him very frankly that my interest was to protect the Navy in regard to critical drugs and whenever I heard of an order of 8000-ounces of quinine being taken from our present stock-pile I was at least going to raise some kind of an outcry. He then presented what he said was the true picture and that the only quinine they proposed to send out was made up in the form of cold pills; that they had no intention of shipping out quinine as a separate drug.

5. There was a considerable amount of caffeine in his order, but the entire amount came only to $1,200,000 instead of the $3,000,000 that we had originally been told was in their license. Of course, I do not know what the facts are as to the items in the original license but if, as he stated, the amounts
MEMORANDUM - for The Under Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Export License Issued to the Sydney Ross Company allowing shipments of certain drugs to Latin America.

under the $1,200,000 order are correct, we would have no objection to this item's being shipped out. Quinine that is already made up into cold tablets would be of no particular value as far as we are concerned in the treatment, or prophylaxis, of malaria.

6. It would seem to me that the proper attitude for the Navy Department to take in these matters would be that a very clear explanation should be presented when critical drugs are involved that will affect the conduct of operating troops in certain areas of the world. Further, thorough investigation should have been made in advance as to the reliability of the companies to which these drugs were to be shipped. I have every sympathy for the drug firms in this country which are attempting to compete with German and Italian firms in South America and feel that they should be helped whenever we can, but we do have a responsibility that we must protect.

ROSS T. McINTIRE
The Surgeon General

x/18-71

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/11/59
Signature- Carl S. Spaer
July 20, 1942

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The licenses to the Sydney Ross Company were issued to assist that company in maintaining its trade war in Latin America against Nazi controlled producers and distributors of pharmaceutical goods.

The Board's decision was a considered one. It was reached only after thorough discussion with all interested government agencies.

As you requested on Saturday, all licenses heretofore issued to the Sydney Ross Company have been suspended. However, we have no present basis for believing that the licenses should not be reinstated.

The salient facts in the matter follow:

1. The company's trade war is being waged mainly against the German aspirin and caffeine compound called "Cafiaspirina": Sydney Ross competed against this "commercial swastika" with its own aspirin and caffeine compound called "Mejoral".

   Apparently its trade war strategy has been expertly conceived and vigorously executed. The June issue of "Fortune" gives the company a big "hand" for its aggressive campaign. The article deplores the government's lack of initiative in not itself seizing the opportunity to strike vigorously at I. G. Farben through the Sterling controlled companies.

2. In May of this year Sydney Ross faced an increasingly critical supply problem, and requested BEW to expedite the licensing of the company's minimum requisites of supply and shipping.

Since the Sydney Ross Company had originally been part of the I. G. Farben cartel group, a meeting was promptly called of the interested agencies to review the status of the Sydney Ross Company and to decide what, if any additional aid should be extended. The meeting, held on June 5, 1942,
was attended by representatives of the Treasury Department, the Department of State, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Alien Property Custodian.

As a result of this meeting -- at which the company was given a substantially clean "bill of health" by the Treasury Department* — a decision was reached to extend further aid to the company in its trade war.

3. After this decision, the company's applications for additional export licenses were granted. The chief items involved were the acetyl salicylic acid and caffeine needed by Sydney Ross for "Mejoral", its big competitive item against the similar German compound "Cafiaspirina". The licenses also covered advertising matter, labels and other material necessary in the effective sales distribution of "Mejoral".

4. The decision to grant the licenses obviously involved considerations of economic warfare as well as those of requirements and supplies. However, the amounts actually licensed were within the quantities allotted for export to the countries in question by the Drug Branch of the War Production Board. Neither these nor any other figures on exports are now being made public. A tabulation of the relevant quantities involved is attached for your information.

5. In adopting this program of increased assistance at the interdepartmental conference on June 5, it was specifically understood:

   a. That the Sydney Ross Company would keep the Board fully informed at all times as to its operations, activities and affairs; and,

   * A 500 page investigation report of the Treasury Department completed early in July concluded that in general and subject to investigation of purchasers and personnel abroad the Sterling Products group "has apparently made a sincere effort to fill its obligations under the Representations it made to the Foreign Funds Control Committee on August 15, 1941". The Board of Economic Warfare plans to make a secret check-up of the company's operations abroad. Should there be any unfavorable developments, licenses would, of course, be suspended at once.
b. That similar aid would be made available to any other American companies in good standing, engaged or proposing to engage in similar economic warfare against Axis firms in Latin America.

I shall be happy to give you any further information you may desire.

Respectfully yours,

Milo Perkins
Executive Director
x 42260

Attachment
ASPIRIN (Tablets and Bulk)

Licenses Granted Jan. 1, 1942, to Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(In Pounds)</th>
<th>Sterling Products and Subsidiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licenses Granted</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>39,894</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>147,454</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>71,336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>34,282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>44,137</td>
<td>270,525*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 343,359                                    274,025

* 3-6 months' supply

Drug Branch War Production Board has indicated our exports should not exceed 50,000 pounds a month, but also indicated we could have an additional annual reserve of 200,000 pounds.

Prepared by
Division of Statistical Controls
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

July 20, 1942
## CAFFEIN

(Licenses granted Jan. 1, 1942, to date)

(in pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Licenses Granted</th>
<th>Sterling Products &amp; subsidiaries including Sydney Ross Co.</th>
<th>Caffein content of tablets to Sterling Products Co. &amp; subsidiaries.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2,873</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>5,959</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5,267</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>914</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>15,750*</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>19,077</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 3-6 months supply

Drug Branch W.P.B has indicated our exports should not exceed 10,000 pounds monthly.

Prepared by
Division of Statistical Controls
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

July 20, 1942
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Licenses Granted</th>
<th>Sterling Products &amp; Subsidiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>42,080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>101,456</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>167,889</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>75,364</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>156,606</td>
<td>1,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>44,187</td>
<td>3,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>28,850</td>
<td>3,367*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>616,432</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,466</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 3-6 months supply.

W.P.B Drug Branch has asked us to clear individual shipments with them. It is realized, however, that 2 million ounces will be needed in 1942 in Latin America, but local inventories are not accurately known. Since April no quinine has been exported except for antimalarial control unless it was compounded in other medicines and in stock prior to April. This is in strict compliance with W.P.B order M-131.
From: The Chief of the Commodities Division, Resources Branch, Office of Procurement and Material.

To: Mr. Adlai Stevenson, Special Assistant to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Supply and Requirements for Aspirin, Caffein, and Quinine.

(B) Report of Supply and Requirements on Caffein dated July 29, 1942.
(C) Report of Supply and Requirements on Quinine dated July 29, 1942.

1. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) show the stocks on hand and requirements for 1942 and 1943 on subject items.

F. L. Smith
Lt. Comdr. - USNR

CC: Mr. Ferol D. Overfelt, SO
Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, NAS
Supply and Requirements

ASPIRIN
(Acetylsalicylic acid)

SUPPLY

Production in 1941 - 7,810,338 pounds
Stocks (manufacturers) as of January 1, 1942 - 711,224 pounds
Estimated Production in 1942 - 5,400,000 pounds

REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1942 pounds</th>
<th>1943 pounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>65,250</td>
<td>79,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>9,662</td>
<td>596,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend-Lease</td>
<td>667,853</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foreign</td>
<td>1,232,000</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,474,765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Requirements for third and fourth quarters of 1942.
** Requirements not available.

Source: All data obtained from Health Supplies Section, Statistics Division, War Production Board, except Army and Navy Requirements.
Supply and Requirements

CAFFEIN

**SUPPLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock as of January 1, 1942</th>
<th>132,508 pounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated production in 1942</td>
<td>1,002,563 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated imports in 1942</td>
<td>5,000 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,140,071 pounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REQUIREMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1942 pounds</th>
<th>1943 pounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>7,500*</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>7,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>750,972</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend-Lease</td>
<td>149,839</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to American Republics</td>
<td>35,305</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>943,742</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Requirements (caffein, citrated) for third and fourth quarters of 1942.
** Requirements not available.

Source: All data obtained from Health Supplies Section, Statistics Division, War Production Board, except Army and Navy Requirements.
Supply and Requirements

QUININE
(Basis - Quinine Sulfate)

SUPPLY

Stocks as of June 1, 1942.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockpile</th>
<th>Pounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Treasury Department</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Supplies Corp. Stockpile</td>
<td>93,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industrial Stocks*</td>
<td>493,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,037,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supply available in 1943 (principally from South America) is estimated by the War Production Board to be \(93,125(1,300,000 \text{ ozs.})\)

REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>10,720</td>
<td>10,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>121,929</td>
<td>227,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend-Lease</td>
<td>232,717</td>
<td>281,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>490,366</td>
<td>644,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Quinine inventories reported to War Production Board in response to General Limitation Order M-131
** Requirements for third and fourth quarters of 1942.

Source: All data obtained from Health Supplies Section, Statistics Division, War Production Board, except Army and Navy Requirements.
My dear Mr. President:

In May, 1942, your approved a strength of 4,000 commissioned officers, 2,000 warrant officers, and 100,000 enlisted men for the Coast Guard. Since that date additional duties have been assigned to the Coast Guard by directives of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, in connection with the establishment and maintenance of an anti-submarine patrol along the Eastern and Gulf Sea Frontiers comprised of yachts and other seagoing small craft for rescue, observation, and anti-submarine combat duty, and the maintenance on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Coasts of the United States of a continuous patrol on shore of all coastline capable of being effectively patrolled.

The strength of the Coast Guard on August 26th, 1942, was:

- Commissioned Officers, 2,800
- Warrant Officers, 1,244
- Enlisted Men, 77,798

In order to meet the new demands in connection with anti-submarine patrol, both afloat and ashore, it is requested that you approve a strength for the Coast Guard as set forth in the following table. The dates by which that strength is expected to be reached are indicated.

- Commissioned Officers, 6,000 April 30, 1943.
- Warrant Officers, 3,000 March 31, 1943.
- Enlisted Men, 150,000 February 28, 1943.

The proper distribution and use of manpower being of such vital concern in the war effort, I am sure you will be interested to know that under the policy adopted for the procurement of these additional men for the Coast Guard it is proposed to effect this increase in Coast Guard strength without an appreciable effect on manpower available for war industries and combat forces of the United States. Instructions have been issued to the recruiting officers of the Coast Guard to inaugurate an intensive recruiting campaign to obtain men who are not allocated to war industries and whose physical defects and age, while precluding them from assignment to first-line combat duty, will nevertheless permit them to perform Coast Guard duties in connection with beach patrol, port security, and similar preventive war-time duties. Men in this category assigned to such Coast Guard duties will release personnel who meet all age and
physical requirements for assignment to duty afloat and will enable the Coast Guard to carry out its functions in connection with the manning of Naval auxiliaries and transports, anti-submarine patrol craft, and Coast Guard vessels assigned to Naval duty, without a corresponding drain on manpower. The same general policy is being extended through the utilization of temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve who serve on part time and intermittent duty without pay and allowances.

The foregoing meets with the approval of the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) FRANK KNOX

The President,
The White House.

"F. K.
O.K.
F.D.R."
My dear Mr. President:

Under date of August 19, 1942, the original of the attached letter regarding the strength of the Marine Corps was submitted to you for your approval.

In order that the proper budget estimates may be submitted early next week, it is requested that action be taken as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Frank Knox

The President
The White House
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

August 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I have just had made for me a careful study of the distribution of the Marine forces of the Navy Department and attach hereto this report for your possible perusal.

 Admiral King has studied this report and is of the opinion that the general distribution of manpower in the Marine Corps is in accord with the prospective employment of the corps. This report indicates that over seventy per cent of the Corps will be assigned to combatant amphibious and supporting units, both ground and air, by the end of this year. At the same time, approximately one-half of the Corps will be on foreign duty. Admiral King believes and I concur in the conviction that it is necessary for the Marine Corps to continue without interruption organizing additional ground and air units for offensive operation.

Therefore, I desire to recommend that the authorized strength of the Marine Corps on June 30, 1943 be set at 21,661 officers and warrant officers and 285,000 enlisted men.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Frank Knox
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

In the light of our discussion the other day, I would like to refer this to the Chiefs of Staff for their recommendation.

In advising me regarding this and similar matters, I wish that recommendations be made in the light of military requirements, rather than from the point of view of production possibilities. Once the Chiefs of Staff determine what is required successfully to prosecute the war, then Mr. Nelson can appropriately reach his conclusions as to production.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Re: distribution of the Marine Corps forces of the Navy Dept. and listing assignment of various units.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

This was attached to the other document and has nothing to do with it so far as I can see.

H.L.H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS

Will you be good enough to
take this up with me the next time
we meet with the Chiefs of Staff?

F.D.R.

Secret memo from Knox, Aug. 19th
re strength of Marine Corps and sugges-
tions. Also file from downstairs on
Marine Corps strength, etc.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

May 11, 1942.

Basic letter of April 30th in regard to strength of Marine Corps is approved as to paragraph two authorizing a total strength on June 30, 1943 of 16,248 Officers and Warrant Officers and 220,000 Enlisted Men.

The figures in paragraph one for dates subsequent to June 30, 1943 are not approved as those dates are too far ahead for present action.

F.D.R.

Confidential memorandum from the Chief of Staff, Russell Willson, Navy Dept., 5/1/42, at bottom of which is memorandum from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 5/5/42 to the Secretary of the Navy, recommending approval of request in re Strength of Marine Corps as outlined in paragraph 3 of basic letter, a copy of which has been retained for our files.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Additional strength of the Marine Corps over and above the strength authorized by you in response to my memorandum of February 10, 1942 is requested in order that the Commandant of the Marine Corps may carry out the directives given him by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Such request is attached.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal
MEMORANDUM

1st endorsement on Comit.
USMC ltr AO-213-hem (0xC11942)
of April 30, 1942

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Strength of Marine Corps.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, approves the proposal in paragraph 3 of basic letter. It is accordingly request-
ed that the necessary effectuating steps be taken.

(Signed) RUSSELL WILLSON

RUSSELL WILLSON,
Chief of Staff.

MEMORANDUM

Op-12E-shg
P16-1/KK
Doc. 49621 CONFIDENTIAL
Ser. 035612

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
to: Secretary of the Navy.

1. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations recommends approval
of the request as outlined in paragraph 3 of basic letter.

(Signed) F. J. HORNE

F. J. HORNE

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Approved 8 May 1942

"Forrestal"
Secretary of the Navy
From: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: Strength of Marine Corps.

References:
(a) CominCh Serial 00325, dated 29 April 1942.
(b) SecNav Memo for President, KK/P16-1 (411212), dated February 10, 1942.

1. Reference (b) authorized an enlisted strength of the Marine Corps as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers and Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1942</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1943</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1943</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1944</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The employment of Marine Corps units contemplated in reference (a) will require the following total officer and enlisted personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers and Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1942</td>
<td>7,475</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1942</td>
<td>12,560</td>
<td>186,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1943</td>
<td>16,243</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. It is therefore requested that the approval of the Secretary and the President be obtained for the procurement as required of the personnel and material necessary to meet this program.

(Signed) T. HOLCOMB

T. HOLCOMB

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/21/59
Signature- Carl S. Spaer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On December 16, 1941, you authorized a strength of 104,000 enlisted for the Marine Corps and equipment for 150,000. Since war was declared 41,274 men of the very finest type have been enlisted, giving a total strength of 98,074 on February 9, 1942, and large numbers of applicants are still flowing into the Marine Corps recruiting stations.

Unless the strength of the Marine Corps is increased, it will be necessary to stop recruiting entirely within a few days.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has recommended 200,000 enlisted strength by June 30, 1943. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet has recommended a strength of 180,000 by December 31, 1943; the Chief of Naval Operations recommends a strength of 200,000 by June 30, 1943.

After a study of the above recommendations and our prospective needs for amphibious operations, I recommend that the following program be approved:

- 150,000 - by June 30, 1942
- 160,000 - by June 30, 1943
- 180,000 - by December 31, 1943
- 200,000 - by June 30, 1944

Note – The above figures include 6,000 Limited Service Reserves previously authorized.

We are facing a situation where amphibious operations of all types are going to be of increasing importance and, as you know, our aviation program is being tremendously expanded. I feel, therefore, that we will need the above numbers of Marines as a minimum and strongly recommend approval of this program.

The present legal limit of 104,000 regular Marines will be sufficient to take care of the proposed expansion to 160,000, the difference to be made up by the use of reserves, so that no new legislation will be required for at least a year.

James Forrestal

Acting
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 26, 1942

There are forwarded herewith for your approval recommendations of the Board of Awards for recognition of the services of certain officers and men.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy has approved these cases.

Very respectfully,

(s) John L. McCrea

Sec. Nav. x 18

Approved

Franklin D. Roosevelt

C. in C.

10/27/42
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are forwarded herewith for your approval recommendations of the Board of Awards for recognition of the services of certain officers and men.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy has approved these cases.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA

Secnav.

Approved

Franklin D. Roosevelt
CinC

10/27/42

copy: feg
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: U.S.S. BLAKELEY - report on conduct of subordinates during enemy action.

1. Forwarded for consideration.

R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.
From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. BLAKELEY - report on conduct of subordinates during enemy action.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of Awards.

2. This correspondence contains a recommendation for the Legion of Merit which is a matter of interest to the President.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OCT 23 1942

Approved

Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy.

L. E. Denfield
The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 2/12/59
Signature: Carl T. Spencer

Copy to:
Cominch
Enlisted Pers.
Bd of Awards
Secy Files

copy: feg
THIRD Endorsement
to CO USS BLAKELEY ltr.DD150/P15 (030) of June 19 1942.

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel.
      (2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. BLAKELEY - report on conduct of subordinates during enemy action.

Reference: (a) C.O. USS BLAKELEY letter DD150/P15 (030) dated June 19, 1942.
(b) Comdr. Caribbean Sea Frontier lst end. on reference (a).

1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held October 7 1942.

2. Recommendation: The Board carefully considered the report of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BLAKELEY and the forwarding endorsement of the Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier and makes the following recommendations:

   (a) That the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BLAKELEY, Lieut. Comdr. Mitchell D. Matthews, U.S.N., be awarded the Legion of Merit of appropriate degree.

   (b) That the following officer and enlisted men be awarded the Legion of Merit, fourth degree:

   Lieut. Comdr. Roger V. Mullany, U.S.N.R.
   BREWSTER, Hubert Allen, CWT (AA) USN
   VICTOR, Anthony Paul, WTlc USNR
   SAVAGE, Leo Martin, WTlc USN

   (c) That the following enlisted men be awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal:

   ROBERTI, Joseph CQM(PA) USNR

   (d) The Board further recommends that all enlisted men mentioned in reference (a) who have not been awarded a decoration be addressed Letters of Commendation by the Commanding Officer.

Copy to: Cominch
      Enlisted Pers.
      Bd of Awards - Secy Files.
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS BLAKELEY ltr.
DD150/P15 (OJ0) of
June 19, 1942.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Board of Awards).

SUBJECT: U.S.S. BLAKELEY - Report on Conduct of Subordinates
during Enemy Action.

1. Forwarded for consideration.

R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/57
Signature- Carl T. Spence
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Report on Conduct of Subordinates during Enemy Action.

Enclosure: (A) Official photograph of U.S.S. BLAKELEY.

1. Forwarded approved.

2. In the opinion of the Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BLAKELEY is deserving of praise for the way in which he handled his vessel and crew at the time of the attack and since that time. Although the BLAKELEY was suddenly and very seriously damaged, excellent judgement and initiative was shown in bringing her into port and effecting temporary repairs.

J. H. HOOVER.

cc: CO, USS BLAKELEY

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl S. Spencer
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during enemy Action.

SUTTON, Wayne George  622-23-83, Seae2c, V-6, USNR,
TANCREDI, Michael Anthony, 403-03-57, Sealc, 0-1, USNR,
HOLMES, Charles, 274-39-78, Mattlc, USN,
REEVES, Oscar 287-37-55, Matt2c, USN.

8. The following entry has been made in the service records of all men not listed above:

"Commended by Captain for meritorious performance of duty during enemy action on 25 May, 1942".

M. D. MATTHEWS.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl T. Spencer
From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
Via: Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier.


References: (a) Art. 712(1) U.S. Navy Regulations.
(b) BLAKEYEY Conf. Ltr. DD150/111-1(028) of June 4, 1942.


1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. The particulars of the torpedoing of BLAKEYEY on May 25, 1942, were furnished in reference (b). The following is a report on the conduct of BLAKEYEY personnel.

3. The conduct of the officers and crew of BLAKEYEY immediately following the explosion was exemplary and in keeping with the high traditions of the Naval Service. This was particularly remarkable in view of the fact that sixty-six percent (66%) of the personnel were Naval Reservists of whom eighty percent (80%) had less than two years of active duty to their credit and the remaining twenty percent (20%) had less than five months active duty. There was no disorder at any time. There was a complete disregard for individual safety during the preparations to defend the ship from further attack, to re-establish maneuvering control, and during the passage from the scene of the attack to Fort-de-France.

4. The tremendous personal inconveniences such as complete loss of living quarters, toilet articles, money, clothing (the only clothes remaining for half the crew were the oil-soaked ones on their backs), and the temporary shutdown of the galley as well as the necessity to eat in relays could not be overcome even by the generous, friendly and sympathetic hospitality of the personnel of BERN. Despite the hardships the morale remained high and was characterized by the spirit of the Golden Rule. Not only were the more fortunate ones (those quartered in the after living compartments) unselfish in their division of clothing, but also the French sailors personally contributed some of their already...
meager supply of clothing. The crews of both ships fraternized in a most satisfactory manner. The Commanding Officer is deeply grateful to Captain Le Tesson, his staff and crew members of BEARN for all that they did to lessen the hardships of our stay in Fort-de-France.

5. The departure from alongside BEARN was undertaken in as military a manner as conditions permitted. Passing honors were rendered by both ships. The spirit of all hands was very high and commendable as the crippled BLAKELEY stood out of Fort-de-France towards Castries. The personnel were at battle stations ready to give or take. There was no excitement when DAVIS reported "submarine in area" and opened fire with her main battery.

6. Although the entire ship's company conducted themselves in a commendable manner the Commanding Officer considers that certain ones are worthy of special mention as follows:

(A) Lieutenant Commander Roger V. Mullany, U.S.N.R.
Executive Officer.

Lieutenant Commander Mullany displayed exceptionally meritorious conduct during and after the emergency. His courage, initiative, leadership, rapid thinking and resolute action with total disregard of personal safety were largely responsible for keeping the ship under control and maintaining her fighting ability at the time of the emergency. His untiring efforts, unflinching devotion to duty, sound judgment and leadership under very trying conditions resulted in expediting the readiness of BLAKELEY for sea at Fort-de-France. His performance of duty was above and beyond the call of duty and in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

(B) Lieutenant Ivan Monk, U.S.N.R., Engineer Officer.

Lieutenant Monk displayed heroic conduct, leadership and devotion to duty with total disregard of personal safety during and after the emergency. Lieutenant Monk made an inspection of all engineering spaces immediately after the explosion, quickly analyzed the situation, made the proper decisions and personally directed the engineering personnel in the performance of their duties. His excellent leadership, example, untiring efforts, constant vigilance and flow of information to the Commanding Officer, and previous indoctrination of engineering personnel were responsible for the absence.

of panic, the excellent morale which has existed in the engineering force throughout, and thus contributed materially in making it possible for BLAKEY to reach port under her own power. His performance of duty, was above and beyond the call of duty as in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

(C) Lieutenant Julius W. Owens, U.S.N.R., First Lieutenant.

Lieutenant Owens received multiple lacerations of the head, back, face, and right leg. He also suffered shock as a result of the explosion. He was working in his stateroom (A-308) when the forward bulkhead was completely blown away and the door to the Wardroom passageway was blocked. He reached the well deck by climbing forward and upward through the debris and opening to the main deck caused by the explosion. Although not recovered from the shock, Lieutenant Owens assisted in securing the forward fireroom from the topside. In Port-de-France he reluctantly obeyed the Commanding Officer's orders to go ashore to the hospital for treatment. Lieutenant Owens' devotion to duty in face of great stress is in keeping with the traditions of the Naval Service.

(D) The coolness and attention to duty of the following officers set a fine example to others and was in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service:

Lieutenant D. L. Russell, Jr., U.S.N.R., Torpedo Officer.
Lieutenant W. G. Hall, U.S.N.R., Communication Officer.

(E) WADE, Harold Eugene, #620-15-96, Sea2c, V-6, USNR.

WADE was on watch in the crow's nest at the time of the attack. He was struck on the left shoulder and injured by the fore-top-mast as it carried away. WADE descended to the flying bridge by means of the starboard forestay and proceeded to the galley deck house where he joined a gun's crew and remained there until taken in charge by the Chief Pharmacist's Mate, as WADE was found to have a broken collar bone. After his arm was put in a sling, WADE turned to and despite his physical discomfort assisted in various ways and far beyond the call of duty. His devotion to duty, courage and fine example was inspiring to other men.
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during Enemy Action.

(F) SAVAGE, Leo Martin, 311-03-43, W.T.1c, U.S.N.

SAVAGE was in charge of the forward fireroom (which was steaming) when the torpedo struck. Although the fireroom was deluged with oil and water through the blowers, SAVAGE and his men remained at their stations until the fireroom was later secured in accordance with the order "prepare to abandon ship". Immediately after the explosion he secured the boiler fires and personally examined the forward bulkhead and bilges for damage. Upon finding the fireroom still intact he shifted fuel oil suction to the after tanks, relighted fires under the boilers and signalled "all right" to the engine room. His calm and intelligent orders to his men who were assisting him and his leadership and complete disregard for personal safety contributed largely to the absence of panic and to the excellent morale that existed throughout the engineering force during the entire emergency.

(G) HATHAWAY, John Harold, 371-70-39, CPhM(AA), U.S.N.

The explosion of the torpedo resulted in the complete loss of the dispensary and damage to the battle dressing station and the first aid bags about the ship. HATHAWAY obtained his supplies by salvaging same from the soiled first aid bags and the battle dressing locker. He then visited each General Quarters station where he rendered such first aid as he could under the circumstances. During his visit to the stations he discovered a number of injured who required immediate attention but who would not voluntarily leave their stations for treatment despite their injuries. After his visit to the stations HATHAWAY quickly improvised a dressing station in the vicinity of the Torpedo Workshop where he attended the more seriously wounded.

HATHAWAY quickly and correctly diagnosed the type and extent of injury in each case and immediately instituted the proper treatment. His treatment of the injured was commented upon most favorably by the French surgeons who had occasion to re-examine the wounds of some of the patients.

For days after the attack HATHAWAY worked tirelessly with meager supplies and crude facilities administering to the medical needs of the personnel without thought of self.
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during Enemy Action.

The Commanding Officer is of the opinion that through the energy, ability, initiative, leadership and good judgment of HATHAWAY all injured men were discovered and treated promptly and properly so that no infections developed and the loss of man-days due to injuries was remarkably small.

(B) BREWSTER, Hubert Allen, 355-77-22, CWT(AA), U.S.N. (In general charge of firerooms).

BREWSTER was in the after fireroom when the torpedo struck. He immediately secured the steaming fireroom from topside at the order "prepare to abandon ship". During the subsequent lighting off and getting underway operations his coolness and outstanding leadership were largely responsible for the confidence and calmness with which his men manned their stations in places of extreme personal danger. While securing the steaming fireroom BREWSTER extinguished with a blanket a small fire in the galley which was caused by fuel oil dropping on the hot range. By this timely action BREWSTER most probably prevented a disastrous fire as the ship was drenched with fuel oil. BREWSTER's courage, unaltering devotion to duty and fine example was inspiring to other men and far beyond the call of duty.

(I) MARTIN, Howard Joseph, 402-92-34, F.1c, O-1, USNR. (Assistant Oil King).

MARTIN was in the after living compartment at the time of the attack. After the explosion he noted the list to starboard and shared the feeling of others that the ship was going on over. He immediately sought permission of the Engineer Officer to sluice oil in the after tanks. Permission was granted and MARTIN carried out the sluicing with such dispatch that the list was quickly removed from the ship. This act was largely responsible for the return of confidence to all hands that the ship was still seaworthy. MARTIN's initiative, cool assurance and unaltering devotion to duty were noteworthy.

(J) VICTOR, Anthony Paul, 243-33-49, W.T.1c, O-1, USNR.

VICTOR was in the after fireroom at the time of the attack. His general quarters station was in this fireroom.
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during Enemy Action.

During the events following the explosion VICTOR was conspicuous by the coolness and complete disregard for personal safety with which he performed tasks outside his normal duties. Although the fireroom spaces had been secured and abandoned in accordance with the order "prepare to abandon ship", VICTOR accompanied the Engineer Officer on an inspection tour of the firerooms, one of which was filled with escaping steam. Following this inspection and in accordance with orders from the Engineer Officer, VICTOR, unassisted, began lighting off the forward fireroom at a time when he believed that all hands were abandoning ship and that the ship was in a sinking condition. He later lighted off the after fireroom and was in charge of the fireroom steaming watch that brought the ship into port. His coolness and courage under the circumstances was noteworthy.

(K) GLITITENBERG, Helmer Olaf, 403-66-20, QM3c, 0-1, USNR.

GLITITENBERG had just been relieved from the watch on the sound gear and was still on the bridge at the time of the attack. By voluntarily manning the Bridge battle circuit telephones in the place of the regular talker who had been injured by the explosion, GLITITENBERG showed excellent initiative. His steadiness, cool thinking and calming words over the circuit were instrumental in spreading confidence to the other telephone talkers and in the rapid restoration of normal communications. GLITITENBERG's calmness, initiative, and presence of mind are noteworthy and in keeping with the high traditions of the Naval Service.

(L) TARDY, Leo Henry, 103-52-40, CRM(PA), F4D, USFR.

TARDY is the senior radioman and was on watch in the radio room when the attack occurred. The main transmitter was damaged, and the main antenna carried away by the explosion. TARDY's cool thinking and initiative in attempting to repair the main transmitter, in directing the starting of the emergency generator and in rigging an emergency antenna are praiseworthy. The rapid recovery of the radio personnel from the shock of the explosion and the efforts to overcome damage to radio equipment are indicative of TARDY's leadership. His courage and unaltering devotion to duty were far beyond the call of duty.
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during Enemy Action.

(M) LEMILY, John Thomas, 402-88-69, SM2c, O-1, USNR.

LEMILY was on watch on the port side of the bridge at the time of the attack. Without regard to his own personal safety LEMILY helped MILLER rescue one of his shipmates (ALLEN) who was seriously injured and slowly sliding over the side due to the fuel oil on the deck and the list of the ship. By using his initiative in sending for a stretcher and caring for his injured shipmate until he was removed from the bridge, LEMILY, with the help of MILLER, was undoubtedly responsible for saving the life of ALLEN. After the above act, LEMILY, though suffering from eye irritation due to fuel oil, carried on visual communication with the French ships while entering port. Two days later, still suffering from eye irritation, he manned a signal searchlight for nearly 5 hours while the ship was enroute to Port Castries. LEMILY's endurance and devotion to duty was noteworthy.

(N) ROBERTI, Joseph, 206-40-28, CQM(PA), 0-1, USNR.

ROBERTI was on watch on the bridge. Though painfually wounded in the leg when he was blown from the bridge to the well deck, ROBERTI assisted in rigging an emergency antenna and supervised the restoration of the bridge to normal operation. His leadership, courage, and unfaltering devotion to duty were of the highest order and far beyond the call of duty.

(O) WATSON, Deane, 380-56-61, CMM(AA), U.S.N.

WATSON, who was in the after fireroom at the time of the attack immediately proceeded to his General Quarters station in the forward engine room and there directed the operations in both enginerooms. His leadership, calmness, correct decisions, and detailed execution of general orders given by the Engineer Officer resulted in a complete lack of confusion in the engine rooms and contributed materially to the excellent morale that existed throughout the engineering force during the emergency. He was in charge of the watch which brought the ship into port. WATSON's fine example, courage and unfaltering devotion to duty were noteworthy.
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during Enemy Action.

(P) MILLER, Joseph Ernest, 403-00-64, T.M.3c, 0-1, USNR.

MILLER was on the starboard wing of the bridge when the attack occurred. Immediately after the explosion, MILLER saw that one of his shipmates (ALLEN) who was injured and unable to move, was slowly sliding over the side due to the fuel oil on the deck and the list of the ship. Without regard to his own personal safety MILLER assisted LEMILY in removing the injured man from his dangerous position. MILLER then brought a stretcher and helped move the injured man to the whaleboat. Through the prompt action of both MILLER and LEMILY, ALLEN's life was undoubtedly saved.

(Q) FAGAN, Charles William, 403-02-38, SN3c, 0-1, USNR.

FAGAN miraculously escaped death as he was relaxing under the breech of #1 gun. Although he was injured when he was blown violently against the bridge structure by the explosion, he manned his station on the bridge and aided in rigging the emergency antenna. He then voluntarily manned the .30 Cal. machine gun on the flying bridge where he remained until directed to leave this station for medical aid. His courage, devotion to duty, and fine example was inspiring to other men and far beyond the call of duty.

(R) LARKIN, John Robert, 403-53-53, Sealc, 0-1, USNR.

LARKIN was in the after part of the ship at the time of the explosion. He voluntarily manned Secondary Conn and directed the shifting of control to this station when the word was passed to "shift control aft". His coolness, courage and devotion to duty were noteworthy.

(S) PSOTTO, John Carl. 403-02-35, Sealc, 0-1, USNR.

PSOTTO was on lookout watch on the galley deck house when an unknown object struck him on the head and caused extensive lacerations. Despite injuries and with disregard to his own personal safety, PSOTTO manned his battle station, which was trainer at Gun #2, and remained there until he became semi-conscious. His devotion to duty in face of physical pain was inspiring to other men.
Subject: USS BLAKELEY - Report on conduct of subordinates during Enemy Action.

(T) ALLEN, Earl Tyson, 268-07-25, SK1c, U.S.N.

ALLEN was on watch as bridge talker when the explosion occurred, and his courage and attention to duty despite being seriously injured was a splendid display of naval discipline.

(U) The following men showed initiative and intelligence in their performance of duty under adverse circumstances. Their untiring efforts following the torpedo explosion contributed greatly either to the successful operation of getting the ship into port or to the subsequent preparations of making the ship ready for sea:

FRITCHARD, Carlos Edgar 258-03-53, MM1c, USN,
GEORGE, Edward 278-39-40, BM1c, F4c, USFR,
SEDERHOLT, Charles Walter 403-66-21, F1c, 0-1, USNR,
SALEM, Earl Alman 239-20-59, GCStd(FA), USN,
WINNIE, Joseph Stanislaus 402-74-30, F1c, 0-1, USNR,
O'BRIEN, Robert James 403-53-72, F1c, 0-1, USNR,
KAPAUN, Frederick Arthur 316-53-18, MM2c, USN,
DENLEA, James Robert Peter 403-52-62, F2c, 0-1, USNR,
WORTLEY, William Leonard 700-08-05, F3c, 0-1, USNR,
YOUNG, Isaac Giffen 261-26-36, CEM(FA) USN,
KAUTZ, Robert John Jr 403-52-55, EM3c, 0-1, USNR,
KECKLER, Roland Wilbur 258-22-36, EM2c, USN,
BERLINER, Alexander 403-03-54, F1c, 0-1, USNR,
WOODS, Dale 612-03-56, F3c, V-6, USNR,
PETTY, James Lawrence 403-53-70, F1c, 0-1, USNR,
GEHRMANN, Charles Philip jr 258-22-13 FC1c(M), USN,
KIRBY, Richard Manuel 287-13-59, TN3c, USN,
GERMAINE, Francis Fredrick 402-59-60, SO3c, 0-1, USNR,
AQUATERO, Joseph 403-56-77, Sealc, 0-1, USNR,
VERSAGGI, Henry Anthony 223-44-20, MM1c, USN,
BRAHMER, Joe 270-00-08, MM1c, F4c, USFR,
DRONEN, George 328-39-23, MM2c, USN,
DOLL, James Henry 290-73-34, MM2c, F4c, USFR.

7. The following men were performing their regularly assigned duties at the time of the attack and were lost in the subsequent explosion. None of the bodies have been recovered:

BARON, William Kraft 403-66-98, Sealc, 0-1, USNR,
BARBIERI, Stephen 402-91-79, Sealc, 0-1, USNR,
From: Lieutenant Commander R. V. MULLANY, USNR
      Executive Officer
To: Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report after Enemy Action of May 25, 1942.

           (b) BLAKELEY Conf. Ltr. DD150/I111-1(028) of June 4, 1942.
           (c) BLAKELEY Conf. Ltr. DD150/P15 (030) of June 19, 1942.

1. The details of the enemy action which took place at 1000 on May 25, 1942 are thoroughly covered in reference (b).

2. The conduct of subordinates has been reported in reference (c).

3. The Executive Officer collaborated with the Commanding Officer in the preparation of references (b) and (c), with the exception of that part of reference (c) which pertains to himself. The Executive Officer does not desire to amplify or modify either reference (b) or (c).

/a/ R. V. MULLANY

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl I. Spicer

COPY - FEG
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are forwarded herewith for your approval recommendations of the Board of Awards for recognition of the services of certain officers and men.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy has approved these cases.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA

Secnav.

Approved

Franklin D. Roosevelt
CinC

10/27/42
CONFLICT

Subject: Awards to officer personnel of Task Force TWENTY-FOUR.

3. The original of the reference has been forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy with other correspondence.

THOS. C. HART

DECORATED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 2/12/59

Signature: Carl I. Spencer

Copy to:
SecNav (2)
Bd Awards (2)
CominCh
BuPers
October 12, 1942

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel.
      (2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: Awards to officer personnel of Task Force TWENTY-FOUR.
Reference: (a) Enclosure A to Comtask Force 24
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. In the reference Commander Task Force TWENTY-FOUR makes certain recommendations for awards to officers of that force.

2. At its meeting of October 7, 1942, the Board carefully considered these recommendations and recommends as follows:

   (a) That Captain Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

   (b) That the below named officers be awarded the Legion of Merit of the Third Degree:

          Captain Marion Y. Cohen, U.S. Navy.
          Captain John B. Heffernan, U.S. Navy.
          Commander George W. Johnson, U.S. Navy.
          Commander Ralph W. Hungerford, U.S. Navy.
          Commander Paul R. Heineman, U.S. Navy.
          Commander Albert C. Murdaugh, U.S. Navy.

   (c) That the below named officers be addressed a special letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy:

          Captain Frederick W. Pennoyer, Jr., U.S. Navy
          Commander Stuart H. Ingersoll, U.S. Navy.

   (d) That the below named officers be addressed a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy:

          Rear Admiral James L. Kauffman, U.S. Navy.
          Captain Henry M. Mullinnix, U.S. Navy.
          Commander Lawrence T. Haugen, U.S. Navy.
          Commander Harold C. Fitz, U.S. Navy.
          Commander Logan McKee, U.S. Navy.
Recommended recognition for distinguished, meritorious, and commendable service rendered by officers attached to the Support Force (Task Force 4 - Task Force 24) during the period 3 March 1941 - 17 April 1942. Recommendations are based on the results cited in CNO/NAV (171440 of April 1942) and are considered in three groups.

GROUP I
Operational Planning and Tactical Development

During the period 3 March 1941 - 17 April 1942 Captain Robert B. Carney, USN, as Operations Officer and later as Chief of Staff, Support Force (TF-24), U.S. Atlantic Fleet) prepared all operational plans preparatory to and during belligerent operations of the Force; made important contributions to the escort-of-convoy instructions which resulted in safe escort of over two thousand ships with a loss of only eight ships; contributed to the development of escort tactics which have been highly successful in combatting the submarine menace; planned and developed the specialized training program for surface vessels and aircraft which made possible the successful operations previously mentioned. Recommended for award appropriate for distinguished service contributing in major degree to a highly successful belligerent campaign.

During the period 3 March 1941 - 17 April 1942 Commander E.T. Wooldridge, USN, as Assistant Operations Officer and later as Operations Officer, Staff, Commander Support Force (TF-24), U.S. Atlantic Fleet, prepared the details of training plans; made important contributions to the escort-of-convoy instructions and to the art of anti-submarine tactics which in large measure made possible the safe escort of over two thousand ships with a loss of only eight ships; as Operations Officer formulated operational plans and conducted the details of supervision of surface and air escort-of-convoy in the Western North Atlantic. Recommended for award appropriate for distinguished service contributing in major degree to a highly successful belligerent campaign.

During the period 3 March 1941 - 17 April 1942 Commander S.H. Ingersoll, U.S. Navy as Assistant Operations Officer, Staff, Commander Support (TF-24), U.S. Atlantic Fleet, made important contributions to the development of training plans, and to the Anti-submarine tactics of surface vessels and aircraft employed in the safe escort of over two thousand ships with a loss of only eight ships. At times, and for extended periods, conducted the details of supervision of surface and air escort-of-convoy operations in the Western North Atlantic. Recommended for special letter of commendation for meritorious service contributing in large measure to the success of a belligerent campaign.
GROUP II

TRAINING

During the period 3 March 1941 - 23 September 1941
Rear Admiral J.L. Kauffman, U.S. Navy, as Commander Destroyers, Support Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet conducted the specialized training of Destroyers, Support Force in the anti-submarine tactics which subsequently contributed to the safe escort of the HX and ON convoys and other shipping in the Western North Atlantic. Recommended for letter of commendation.

During the period 3 March 1941 - 21 March 1942 Captain H.M. Mullinnix, U.S. Navy, as Commander Patrol Wing Seven and Commander Patrol Wings, Support Force, conducted the equipping, specialized training and operations of patrol aircraft of the Support Force (TF-24) in high latitude operation and anti-submarine and escort-of-convoy tactics which contributed to the safe escort of shipping in the vicinity of Newfoundland and Iceland. Recommended for letter of commendation.

GROUP III

MATERIAL PREPARATION

During the period 3 March 1941 - 10 February 1942 Captain F.W. Pennoyer, U.S. Navy, as Material Officer, Staff, Commander Support Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, planned and supervised the conversion and alteration of surface vessels and aircraft for escort-of-convoy employment and thereby made an important contribution to operations which resulted in the safe escort of over two thousand ships with a loss of only eight ships. Captain Pennoyer's energy and resourcefulness in maintenance matters also contributed largely toward offsetting storm damage and permitting the surface escorts to maintain a heavy schedule in the face of serious and unusual difficulties. Recommended for special letter of commendation for meritorious service contributing in large measure to the success of a belligerent campaign.

During the period of 3 March 1941 - 17 April 1942, Commander L. T. Haugen, U.S. Navy, as Force Constructor, Staff, Commander Support Force (TF-24), U.S. Atlantic Fleet by his resourcefulness and energy contributed largely to the material preparation and maintenance of the escort vessels of the Force prior to and during belligerent operations which resulted in the safe escort of over two thousand ships with the loss of only eight ships. Recommended for letter of commendation.

During the period 3 March 1941 - 17 April 1942, Commander Logan McKee, U.S. Navy, as Force Engineer, Staff, Commander Support Force (TF-24), U.S. Atlantic Fleet, by his resourcefulness and energy contributed largely to the material preparation and maintenance of the escort vessels of the Force prior to, and during the belligerent operations which resulted in the safe escort of over two thousand ships with the loss of only eight ships. Recommended for letter of commendation.
Enclosure (B)

Recommended recognition for distinguished, meritorious, and commendable service in actual protection of shipping against Axis submarines.

Commander G.W. Johnson, U.S. Navy, while in command of Task Unit 4.1.6, escorting convoy ON-28 repelled attacks by enemy submarines during the period 27-31 October 1941 by skillful and aggressive tactics which denied to the enemy every opportunity to attack except for the initial attack on the U.S.S. SALINAS, and resulted in the certain damage and probable destruction of three enemy submarines. Commander Johnson's conduct of this operation in the face of determined and concentrated enemy attack was an outstanding example of stamina, skill, resourcefulness, aggressive spirit, and success. Recommended for award appropriate for distinguished service in belligerent operations against the enemy.

Commander A.C. Murdaugh, U.S. Navy, while Commanding U.S.S. EDISON, and also Commanding Task Unit 4.1.4 escorting convoy ON-67, by bold and skillful handling of his forces 21-24 February 1942 outfought, out-maneuvered, and finally eluded a determined and persistent attack by a concentration estimated to consist of 5 or 6 submarines. Three enemy submarines were damaged or destroyed; one of the aforementioned submarines was damaged or destroyed by U.S.S. EDISON. Recommended for award appropriate for distinguished service in belligerent operations against the enemy.

Lieutenant Commander William L. Erdmann, U.S. Navy as Commander Patrol Plane Squadron VP-82 of Task Force 24 by his leadership, persistence, high professional attainments, and fighting spirit, so trained, disposed, and operated his squadron that four enemy submarines were unquestionably destroyed and three other submarines so well attacked as to neutralize them with respect to concurrent surface operations in the vicinity. Recommended for award appropriate for distinguished service in the conduct of air operations against the enemy.

Captain M.Y. Cohen, U.S. Navy, during the period 16 September - 10 March commanded escort units with North Atlantic trade convoys and on numerous occasions handled his convoy and escort in skillful manner in contact with enemy submarines. On November 1, 1941 while in command of Task Unit 4.1.1, vessels of the unit attacked enemy submarines with tangible evidence of success; the skillful handling of the escort prevented any attack on the convoy. Recommended for the same award as may be considered appropriate for the commanding officer of a ship which successfully engages an enemy submarine.

Commander Ralph Hungerford, U.S. Navy as Commander of Escort units with North Atlantic trade convoys during the period 16 September 1941 to 17 April 1942, on several occasions so conducted his convoy and escorts as to out-maneuver and elude enemy submarines which were in favorable position to concentrate and attack, thereby carrying out his mission with great skill and in a most creditable manner. Recommended for the same award as may be considered appropriate for the Commanding Officer of a ship successfully engaging an enemy submarine.
Commander Paul Heineman, U.S. Navy, as Commander of Escort units with North Atlantic trade convoys during the period 12 February 1942 to 17 April 1942, on two occasions so conducted his convoys and escorts as to detect the presence of enemy submarines before they could concentrate and attack, and by his aggressive and highly skillful operations foiled all attempts by the enemy to attack, thereby avoiding imminent damage to his convoy and carrying out his mission in the most commendable manner. Recommended for the same award as may be considered appropriate for the Commanding Officer of a ship successfully engaging an enemy submarine.

Captain J.B. Heffernan, U.S. Navy as Commander Task Unit 24.1.3 escorting convoy ON-92 skillfully detected the presence of enemy submarines and commenced offensive counter measures before they could attack the convoy. Although later heavily attacked and suffering convoy losses to a persistent and determined enemy, Captain Heffernan, by bold and aggressive tactics, finally succeeded in driving off and eluding a concentration estimated to include a minimum of three submarines. Recommended for the same award as may be appropriate for the Commanding Officer of a ship successfully engaging an enemy submarine.

Commander W.K. Phillips, U.S. Navy during the period 22 September 1941 to 17 April 1942 as Escort Commander with Trade Convoys in the North Atlantic, conducted his escort operations with skill and success and in the most commendable manner. Recommended for letter of commendation.

Commander H.C. Fitz, U.S. Navy, during the period 22 December 1941 to 17 April 1942, as Escort Commander with Trade Convoys in the North Atlantic, conducted his escort operations with skill and success and in the most commendable manner. Recommended for letter of commendation.
From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Awards to officer personnel of Task Force TWENTY-FOUR.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of Awards.

2. This correspondence contains a recommendation for the Legion of Merit which is a matter of interest to the President.

3. The classification of the Enclosure is hereby changed to "Confidential".

L. E. Denfeld
The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl I. Streui

Copy to:
SecNav
Bd. Awards
CominCh
BuPers
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
Board of Awards ltr.
QB4-MSD, of Oct. 12, 1942.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Awards to Officer Personnel of Task Force
TWENTY-FOUR.

1. Forwarded, contents noted.

R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/2/59

Signature- Carl T. Spence.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are forwarded herewith for your approval recommendations of the Board of Awards for recognition of the services of certain officers and men.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy has approved these cases.

Very respectfully,

/s/  
JOHN L. MccREA

Secnav.

Approved

Franklin D. Roosevelt
CinC

10/27/42

COPY - JJS
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS - recommendation for recognition of exceptional performance in rescue operations.

1. Forwarded.

/s/ R.S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl I. Spicer.
CONFIDENTIAL

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT to Comdit. Nob Iceland Conf. ltr. 0076 of Sept. 9, 1942

October 20, 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS - recommendation for recognition of exceptional performance in rescue operations.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of Awards.

L. E. Denfeld
The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Copy to:
Bd of Awards
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COPY - JJS
THIRD ENDORSEMENT

to Comit. NOB Iceland Conf. ltr. 0076 of Sept. 9, 1942.

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel.
       (2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS - recommendation for recognition of exceptional performance in rescue operations.
Reference: (a) Comit. NOB Iceland Conf. ltr. Serial 0076 of Sept. 9, 1942 with forwarding endorsements.
            (b) Public Law 671 dated July 20, 1942.

1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held Oct. 7, 1942.

2. Recommendation: After careful consideration of reference (a), the Board recommends that Lieutenant de Vaisseau A. Bergeret, the commanding officer of Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS be awarded the Legion of Merit, third class, for outstanding service in connection with the rescue of the survivors of six Russian convoy vessels, sunk by reason of striking mines. In spite of the difficult conditions of the sea and weather and with total disregard of his own ship's safety, Lieutenant Bergeret skillfully maneuvered his ship to perform the rescue operations and succeeded in picking up one hundred and seventy-nine persons, of which 41 were members of U.S. armed guard crews and 121 were members of U.S. Flag merchant vessels.

/s/ THOS. C. HART

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59
Signature- Carl T. Spitzer

COPY - JJS
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Senior Member, Board of Awards.
Subject: Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS - recommendation of recognition of exceptional performance in rescue operations.

1. Forwarded.

/s/
R.S. EDWARDS
Chief of Staff
From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.  
To: The Secretary of the Navy.  
Via: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subject: Fighting French Corvette ROSELS - recommendations for recognition of exceptional performance in rescue operations.  

1. Forwarded, recommending favorable action.  
2. In reference (a) the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, submitted recommendations relative to recognition of meritorious services of our Allies.  
3. The classification of this correspondence is hereby changed to confidential.  

/s/ R.E. INGERSOLL  

Copy to:  
Comdt. NOB Iceland  
CTF 24  

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)  
Date- 2/12/59  
Signature= Carl L. Spencer
In Reply Refer to
Initials and Number

Llll-1
Serial 0076

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commandant.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
     (2) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS - recommendation for recognition of exceptional performance in rescue operations.

1. On July 5, 1942, between 2000 and 2220, off the northwest coast of Iceland, in low visibility and in rough seas, six vessels of a Russian convoy were lost by reason of striking mines. Four of the vessels were U.S. Flag ships. The F.F.C. ROSELYS (Lieutenant de Vaisseau A. Bergeret), one of the escorts, rendered especially meritorious service in picking up the survivors of the sunken vessels. In spite of the difficult conditions of the sea and weather, and with total disregard for own ship's safety, the ROSELYS was skillfully handled and maneuvered in rescue operations and picked up a total of 179 persons of which 41 were members of U.S. Naval armed guard crews and 121 were members of U.S. Flag merchant vessels. These survivors all paid the highest tribute to the promptitude and efficient manner in which the rescue operations were carried on and to the exquisite handling of the ROSELYS. Not only were the survivors skillfully rescued but ROSELYS carried out a regular production line system for caring for these survivors which excited the admiration of the young organization-minded U.S. Naval armed guard officers.

2. In view of the above it is recommended that the Commanding Officer and Ship's Company of the Fighting French Corvette ROSELYS be accorded recognition appropriate for the meritorious services rendered.

/s/ D.B. Bear

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59

Signature - Carl Edgley

COPY - JJS
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, U.S. Navy: recommendation for advancement to Chief Nurse and appropriate award.

References: (a) M&S 5th end., F15/OG(093), Sept. 17, 1942.
(b) 6th end., Sr. Member of Navy Dept. Permanent Board of Awards, QB4-ARH, Sept. 28, 1942.
(c) 7th end., BuPers, Pers 328-MBY, Oct. 1, 1942.

1. Forwarded. It is noted that the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards recommends that Nurse Bernatitus be awarded the Legion of Merit, fourth degree, when available, in recognition of her outstanding service during the campaign in the Manila-Bataan Peninsula area during the period December 1941 and April 1942.

2. It is further noted that in forwarding this correspondence, the Bureau of Naval Personnel notes that recommendation for the Legion of Merit is a matter of interest to the President.

ROSS T. McINTIRE.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)
Date- 2/19/59
Signature- [Signature]

copy:seg
Seventh Endorsement

Sept. 29, 1942

to Cdr E.L. Sackett USN ltr dated May 27 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Subject: Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, U.S.N. - recommendation for advancement to Chief Nurse and appropriate award.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of Awards.

2. This correspondence contains a recommendation for the Legion of Merit which is a matter of interest to the President.

L. E. Denfield
The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel.

Copy to:
Bu N&S
Bd of Awards
Secy Files

Copy: seq
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Sixth Endorsement
to Cdr E.L. Sackett USN ltr dated May 27 1942

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel
     (2) The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

Subject: Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, U.S.N. - recommendation for advancement to Chief Nurse and appropriate award.


1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held Sept. 23, 1942.
2. Recommendation: That Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, U.S.N. be awarded the Legion of Merit, fourth degree, when available in recognition of her outstanding service during the campaign in the Manila-Bataan Peninsula area during the period December 1941 and April 1942.

THOS C. HART

Copy to.
Bu M&S
Bd of Awards
Secy Files
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
The Secretary of the Navy (Board of Awards).

To: Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, U. S. Navy; recommendation for advancement to Chief Nurse and appropriate award.

Subject: Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, U. S. Navy; recommendation for advancement to Chief Nurse and appropriate award.

References: (a) Ltr of Comdr. E. L. Sackett, USN, May 27, 1942.
(b) 1st end Lt. Comdr. C.M. Wassell, USNR, May 25, 1942.
(c) 2nd end Comdr. Base Activities, Allied Naval Forces, Western Australia, May 28, 1942.
(d) 3rd end Comdr Task Force Fifty-One, May 30, 1942.
(e) 4th end Comdr U.S. Naval Forces, S.W. Pacific Area, June 5, 1942.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval of the proposal contained in basic correspondence and endorsements thereon and that the services rendered by Miss Bernatitus be recognized by the award of the Navy Cross.

2. This Bureau already has taken action which will place in effect in the near future that part of the recommendation contained in attached correspondence regarding the promotion of Miss Bernatitus from Nurse to Chief Nurse.

ROSS T. MCINTIRE.
Ann Agnes Bernatitus was born at Exeter, Pennsylvania, January 21, 1912, the daughter of Mrs. Margaret Bernatitus. She received her education in the Exeter Public Schools, graduating from High School in 1928. In 1931 Miss Bernatitus entered Nurses' training at the Wyoming Valley Homeopathic Hospital Training School, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, with an affiliation at the Philadelphia General Hospital, from which she graduated in 1934. In 1935 she took a Post-Graduate course in operating-room technic at the University of Pennsylvania Graduate Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and continued duty in that hospital in a surgical assignment.

In September 1936 Miss Bernatitus was appointed in the Navy Nurse Corps, and ordered to duty at Chelsea, Massachusetts. In 1938 she was transferred to Mare Island, California, for duty, awaiting transportation to the U. S. Naval Hospital, Canacao, P. I. In July 1940, Miss Bernatitus arrived in Canacao, Philippine Islands, for duty.
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

F17-2/00/F15

Serial 471

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT to
Gdr. E.L. SACKETT's ltr.
of May 27, 1942.

Melbourne, Australia,
June 5, 1942.

From: The Commander U.S. Naval Forces,
Southwest Pacific Area.

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery.

Subject: Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, Navy Nurse Corps,
U.S. Navy, recommendation of for advancement
to Chief Nurse, Navy Nurse Corps, U.S. Navy.

1. Forwarded recommending approval.

H. F. LEARY.
May 28, 1942.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT

From: Commander Base Activities, Allied Naval Forces, Western Australia.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Via: Commander Allied Naval Forces, Western Australia.


1. Forwarded concurring in the recommendation contained in the basic correspondence.

2. This example of courage and devotion to duty by a Navy Nurse is an honor to the Nurse Corps and it is believed that the advancement in rank and such other recognition as may be considered suitable should be made in this case.

H. L. GROSSKOPF.

FF6/CG 3rd endorsement 64/Hd
(64-911) TASK FORCE FIFTY-ONE

May 30, 1942

From: The Commander TASK FORCE FIFTY-ONE.
To: Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Via: The Commander ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Copy to:
Basacts
USN Medical Unit,
Australian General
Hospital 110.

copy: feg

80 913 226
U.S. NAVAL MEDICAL UNIT
AUSTRALIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL 110
HOLLYWOOD, WESTERN AUSTRALIA

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

May 25, 1942.
From: Lieutenant Commander Corydon M. Wassell, MC-V(S), U.S.N.R.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Via: (1) Commander Base Activities, Allied Naval Forces, Western Australia.
     (2) Commander Allied Naval Forces, Western Australia.

1. The following information is cited in the case of the subject nurse as basis for recommendation for advancement to Chief Nurse, Navy Nurse Corps, U.S. Navy.

2. Miss Bernatitus received an appointment as Nurse, Navy Nurse Corps, and reported for duty as of 25 September 1936. She departed from the United States 21 June 1940 and report to the U.S. Naval Hospital at Canacar, Philippine Islands on 20 July 1940 at which hospital she remained on duty until the entry of the United States into war.

3. On 9 December 1941, Miss Bernatitus rendered valuable assistance in evacuating patients from the Naval Hospital at Canacar to vessels in port and to the Sternberg Hospital at Manila.

4. In mid December 1941, Miss Bernatitus joined Surgical Unit #5, headed by Lieutenant Commander C.W. Smith, (MC), USN., and Lieutenant (jg) C. Fraliegh, (MC), U.S.N., at St. Scholastica, Manila, P.I., where this unit established their operating rooms. On 24 December 1941 this unit moved to Limay, Bataan, P.I., and reestablished operating rooms. Due to the front lines being established at this point, this unit was again forced to vacate and reestablished at Little Baguio, Bataan, P.I. Due to the bombing of this center and wrecking of the surgical unit the nurses were evacuated to Corregidor on 9 April 1942 by a small boat.

5. Miss Bernatitus was evacuated from Corregidor, P.I., on May 3, 1942, arriving at Fremantle, Western Australia, May 20, 1942, reporting to Commander Allied Naval Forces for duty on May 21, 1942.

6. Most personal belongings, including uniforms, were lost during the above transfers, Those salvaged being only the slacks worn and a small Musette bag.

7. From December 8, 1941 to May 3, 1942, Miss Bernatitus was constantly in the front lines of defense, being bombed out on two separate occasions, and though suffering attacks of dysentery this did not in any way lower her efficiency as a nurse nor the courage demonstrated by her which prompts this recommendation and other suitable rewards that may be considered.

C. M. WasseLL.
From: Commander E.L. SACKETT, U.S. Navy.
To: Commander Base Activities, Allied Forces, Western Australia.

Subject: Recommendation for Advancement to Next Higher Rank and Appropriate Award in the case of Miss ANN BERNITITUS, U.S. Navy Nurse Corps.

1. The subject recommendation is made in view of the services rendered by Miss Bernititus during the campaign in the Manila-Bataan peninsular area as described below.

2. Miss Bernititus was regularly attached to the Naval Hospital, Camarao, P.I., having reported for duty there on July 20, 1940. Shortly after hostilities commenced in December, 1941, the Naval Hospital staff and patients were moved to a new establishment in Manila. On December 24th, 1941, when Manila was being evacuated Miss Bernititus accompanied by two Navy Medical Officers proceeded to the Army hospital at Limay, Bataan. The remainder of the Naval Hospital staff stayed in Manila and were taken prisoners. On January 25, 1942, Miss Bernititus was transferred to Army field hospital No. 1 at Little Baguio, Bataan, and remained there on active duty until that hospital was destroyed by enemy bombing on April 7th. When Bataan fell Miss Bernititus was transferred to Corregidor. During her stay in Bataan she worked directly under Lieut. Comdr. C.M. Smith (MC), U.S. Navy, who is now a prisoner of war.

3. The conditions under which the nurses lived and worked lacked everything in the way of comfort. They were constantly exposed to enemy bombing attacks and experienced several as well as the endemic jungle diseases of that area. Miss Bernititus suffered from both dysentery and beri-beri during her tour of duty in Bataan.

4. In spite of all difficulties Miss Bernititus performed her duty in an exemplary manner with courage and good spirit. She was officially transferred from Corregidor three days before the surrender of that fortress.

5. As former Commander of Naval Forces in the Mariveles-Bataan area, Miss Bernititus came under my command (although her services were rendered at an Army field hospital) and I am pleased...
Subject: Recommendation for Advancement to Next Higher Rank and Appropriate Award in the case of Miss ANN HERNITITUS, U.S. Navy Nurse Corps.

To recommend that she be advanced to the next higher rank in her corps and cited for suitable award.

E. L. SACKETT.
November 6, 1942.

Dear Mr. Poynton:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of November fourth, and to assure you that the message enclosed with that letter has been handed to the President.

With best wishes, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN H. WATSON
Secretary to the President.

Mr. A. H. Poynton,
Private Secretary to
The Minister of Production,
The British Embassy,
Washington, D. C.

x 48
x 7695
Dear General Watson,

I have pleasure in sending you the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister to the President, which was handed to me by Mr. Churchill's Private Secretary to bring over with us. I also enclose a note of amendments which were telephoned to me just before our departure. I understand that these have already been telegraphed direct to the President from the Prime Minister, but I thought I had better forward this copy in confirmation.

Would you be kind enough to let me have an acknowledgment of this letter to confirm that the Prime Minister's letter has been safely delivered.

Yours sincerely,

A.H. Poynton.
Private Secretary to The Minister of Production.

Major General Edwin Watson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.,

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of British Govt., telegram 1-12-72
By 3A/4, Date 4-21-72
November 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Dear Admiral:

I am returning for your files the amendments to the Prime Minister's message to the President, as I suppose that should go with the original message.

E.M.W.

Enclosure
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT.

It is recommended that the award of the Legion of Merit, Fourth degree, to Lieutenant Commander Clarence A. King, R.C.N.R., be approved.

It will be noted that the Board of Awards has reconsidered its recommendation of an award of the Legion of Merit to Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, U.S.N., and now recommends that that officer be awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

1 December 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

There is forwarded herewith for your approval a recommendation of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards for the award of the Legion of Merit, Fourth degree to Lieutenant Commander Clarence A. King, R.C.N.R.

s/ FRANK KNOX

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 12/3/42

Signature- Carl I. Spicer
CONFIDENTIAL

Fourth Endorsement

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: (1) 

(2)

Subject: Sinking of U-96 by Patrol Squadron NINETY-TWO, Plane 96-P-6, and HMCS OAKVILLE.


(b) Memorandum from the Naval Aide to the President dated Nov. 23, 1942.

1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held Nov. 27, 1942.

2. Recommendation:

(a) In view of the revision of policy towards awards for anti-submarine warfare and the tentative agreement between the CinC U.S. Fleet and the War Department concerning this policy, the Board has reconsidered its recommendation of an award of the Legion of Merit to Lieutenant Corder R. Fiss, U.S.N., and now recommends that that officer be awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

(b) The Board further recommends that Lieutenant Commander Clarence A. King, R.C.N.F., Commanding Officer of the HMCS OAKVILLE be awarded the Legion of Merit, fourth class.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 2/11/59

Signature- Carl I. Speer

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Approved ------------------

Secretary of the Navy.
Confidential

Second Endorsement to
Cominch Conf. Tr. FF1/A16-3/P15
Serial 02546 dated Oct.17, 1942.

13 November 1942.

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: Sinking of U-94 by patrol squadron NINETY TWO, Plane 92-P-6, and HMCS OAKVILLE.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of Awards, first endorsement.

2. This correspondence contains recommendations for the Legion of Merit which is a matter of interest to the President of the United States.

/s/L. E. DENFELD

Copy to:
Bd. of Awd (2)
Secy Files (2)
Cominch
White House

(Copy for White House Files)
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

First Endorsement

to Cominch confid. ltr FF1/
A16-3/P15 Serial 02546 of
October 17 1942

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Permanent Board of Awards.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel.
(2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Sinking of U-94 by patrol squadron NINETY TWO, Plane 92-P-6,
and HMCS OAKVILLE.

(b) CinClant confid. ltr A16-3/(02187) dated Sept 26 1942.

1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held Oct. 27 1942.

2. Recommendation: (a) In view of other correspondence recommending a
definite policy towards awards for anti-submarine warfare, based on the Anti­
submarine Warfare Assessment Board's action and classification of individual
cases now pending, the Board recommends that Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, USN
be awarded the Legion of Merit of appropriate degree.

(b) The Board further recommends that Lieut. Commander Clarence A. King,
R.C.N.R. be awarded the Legion of Merit with appropriate degree.

THOS. C. HART

Copy to:
Bd of Awards
Secy Files
Cominch
White House

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.3 (9/27/58)

Date- 11/15/57
Signature- Carl L. Speier
UNIVERSAL STATES FLEET.
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Naval Department, Washington, D.C.

FF1/A16-3/P15
Serial 02546

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Board of Awards)

Subject: Sinking of U-94 by Patrol Squadron NINETY-TWO,
Plane 92-P-6, and HMCS OAKVILLE.

Reference: (a) Cominche conf. 1tr FF1/A16-3, serial 02232,
dated Sept. 21, 1942.

1. The Assessment Committee appointed by the Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet, has assessed the subject attack as a sure kill - assessment A.
It is recommended that an appropriate decoration be awarded Lieutenant Gordon A. Fiss, U.S. Navy, and that such recognition of commensurate rank, as may be legally given to an officer of the foreign allied service, be awarded to the Commanding Officer of HMCS OAKVILLE.

2. Other awards to the crews of the plane and HMCS OAKVILLE should be based upon reference (a).

/s/ R. S. Edwards
R. S. EDWARDS
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CinClant

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/11/59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer
26 SEP 1942

Subject: Action Reports - sinking of U-94.

R. E. INGERSOLL

Copy to:
ComCaribSeaFron (with copy encl. D)
ComPatWingLant     do
ComPatRon 92        do
CG LSA             do
LantFIt ASW Unit   do
From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.  
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subject: Action Reports - sinking of U-94.  
Reference: (a) CinClant 1st end. serial 2261 of August 26, 1942.  
Enclosure: (A) ComPatRon 92 serial 281 of Sept. 1, 1942, with 1st and 2nd end. thereto.  
(B) HMCs OAKVILLE ltr. of Aug. 29, 1942, with 1st and 2nd end. thereto.  
(C) ComTaskUnit 92.1.8 serial 00768 of Sept. 2, 1942, with 1st end. thereto.  
(D) LantFlt ASW Unit serial 0028 of Sept. 19, 1942, complete.  

1. Enclosures (A) to (D) are forwarded herewith in connection with the sinking of the German submarine U-94 on August 27, 1942.

2. But for the fact that Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, USN, who is regularly attached to a unit of this Fleet, was temporarily under another commander, I would have immediately awarded him the Distinguished Flying Cross. It is urged that his name be presented to the Board of Awards with the recommendation that such award be made.

3. Similarly, had H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE been an American vessel under my command, I would have awarded the commanding officer a Navy Cross. As the policy with regard to awards to personnel of other Navies under operational control of the U. S. Navy is not known (paragraph 4 of reference (a) suggested that this policy be made known) I recommend that his name be presented to the Board of Awards with suitable recommendation or, if this is not possible, that appropriate representations be made to the Canadian authorities, as may be appropriate.

4. The classification of enclosures (C) and (D) is hereby changed to confidential.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date: 2/14/59

Signature: Carl I. Spencer
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:

From: Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded, concurring in recommendation contained in paragraph four (4) of first endorsement.

/s/ S. A. Clement

S. A. CLEMENT
Chief of Staff

Copy to: NOB Gtmo.
September 3, 1942

First endorsement

From: Commandant.
To: Commander-in-Chief United States Atlantic Fleet.
Via: Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier.

1. Subject report, a bombing attack on an enemy submarine by a PBY-5A type aircraft of Patrol Squadron 92, piloted by Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, U.S.N., which occurred at 0230, Zone 4 time in Latitude 17° 40' North and Longitude 74° 50' West, is forwarded herewith.

2. The attack was excellently conducted inasmuch as the pilot on observing the surfaced submarine went immediately into a dive and within fifty seconds dropped four 650 pound depth bombs. The submarine sustained damages inasmuch as it was later observed that the vessel was unable to submerge. It was later learned that the damage consisted of the destruction of the horizontal rudders, extinguishing the lights in the submarine and the slowing it to from ten to twelve knots.

3. In other reports it is seen that the final destruction of the submarine was accomplished by the HMSCS OAKVILLE by gunfire and ramming. The airplane which was covering a convoy remained in the vicinity until relieved. Had not the OAKVILLE been in the vicinity and completed the destruction of the submarine, some hour and a half would have elapsed before a second plane would have been gotten in the area. It is believed that when practicable planes should operate in pairs and this doctrine has been established at Guantanamo by the use of six B-18-B Army bombers recently reported to this Station for duty.

4. The action of Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, U.S.N., in this incident is commendatory and it is recommended that such recognition be given.

/s/ Geo. L. Weyler
GEO. L. WEYLER
From: The Commanders, Patrol Squadron NINETY TWO.
To: The Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo.
Via: The Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo.
Enclosure: (A) Action report dated 27 August, 1942.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, U.S.N., is considered worthy of the highest commendation for services above and beyond the call of duty. The flight on which this action occurred was not a required convoy coverage. Lieutenant Fiss had been engaged in arduous duties at the Joint Operation Center, Guantanamo, working from fifteen to eighteen hours daily. He specifically requested permission to conduct this flight in the belief that he could encounter enemy submarines in their suspected fueling areas. A mechanical failure in the aircraft assigned to the convoy resulted in its return to base which would thus have left the convoy temporarily uncovered had it not been for the immediate availability in the convoy area of Lieutenant Fiss. His prompt actions in sighting, engaging and damaging the U-94 to the extent that it could not submerge are believed to have contributed appreciably to the ultimate sinking. Had it not been for his extreme devotion to duty under trying circumstances there is little doubt that our losses during the evening of 27 - 28 August would have been considerably larger.

/s/ J. A. Moreno

J. A. MORENO

Copy to: CompatwingZELE VEN

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 9/11/54
Signature- Carl T. Speer
U.S. AIRCRAFT - ACTION WITH ENEMY

INSTRUCTIONS

(a) To be filled out by unit commander immediately upon landing after each action or operation in contact with the enemy.
(b) Do not "Omit Deck" this report - If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.

1. Date 27 August, 1942 Lat. 17°30 Long. 74°50 Time 0230 Zn. 4
2. Weather Scattered clouds 1000 ft. Excellent night vision
3. Unit reporting Patrol Squadron NINETEEN Type Planes PBY-5A
4. Nature of operation Air escort for WAT-15 Convoy
5. Specific objective Protection of WAT-15 Convoy
6. Forces engages (include models and markings)

OWN

PBY-5A
Corvette HMS OAKVILLE
Destroyer USS LEX

ENEMY

German Submarine

7. Type of attack (Own/Enemy) (Scratch one)

Low altitude bombing Anti-submarine approach

8. Enemy tactics Attempted to crash-dive

9. Brief description of action (include altitudes and range of contact. Altitudes and directions of release and withdrawal)

4 - MK29 650 lb. depth bombs set for 50 ft.

10. Weapons employed

OWN

4 depth bombs

ENEMY

none

11. Evasive action employed - None

12. Ammunition expended (include types and fuse settings. Indicate no. of duds.)

4 MK29 depth bombs All exploded

(over)
13. Results (certain) — Caused submarine to surface immediately.

14. Damage to own craft — Effectiveness to leak-proofing and armor
   None

15. For attack on submarine —
   (a) Submarine was (on surface) \[\text{certain} \] when sighted.
   (b) Direction of attack relative to submarine was 015°.
   (c) Elapsed time between first sight of sub and first bomb explosion 50 seconds
   (d) Was any part of sub in sight when bomb released Conning tower?
   (e) Elapsed time between last sight of sub and explosion of bomb
   None Submarine stern raised to surface by explosion
   (f) Estimated distance between sub or last surface indication of sub and explosions. 25 ft. or closer

16. REMARKS — Submarine was sighted at 2230 Q on the surface forward
   of the port beam, distance one-half mile. Commenced attack immediately. The approach was made in a direction of 45
   degrees relative to the course of the submarine.

Sketch of the course and relative positions of convoy, plane, and submarine at time submarine was sighted.
Lt. Gordon R. Fiss, USN, in 92-P-6 was providing night air coverage for TAW-15 convoy in a PBY-5A armed with four MK 29 six hundred and fifty pound depth charges with 50 foot depth settings. An enemy submarine was sighted at 2230 Q, 27 August at Lat. 17°40' Long. 74°50'. The submarine was visually sighted in the moon path three miles astern of the main convoy body, fully surfaced.

It was sighted about one quarter of a mile off the port beam, estimated speed eight to ten knots. The altitude of the plane was five hundred feet and an attack was commenced immediately without additional power to prevent gaining too much speed, since it was apparent the submarine could not submerge prior to the drop. The approach was made into the moon path 235° relative to the submarine, at an attempted lead of three quarters of the submarine's length. The starboard manual bomb release was pulled when the submarine was about 200 feet distant and about 45° relative bearing; a speed of 125 knots and an altitude of 50-75 feet was obtained at the instant of the drop. The second pilot released the port bombs manually about 1 second later; the submarine was submerging with the bow awash as far as the conning tower at the time of release.

"A quick glance astern a few seconds later revealed the conning tower becoming obliterated by the bomb upheaval. Members of the crew in the waist hatch stated the stern of the submarine was raised clear of the water. However I did not see this, my attention being necessarily on the airplane which was close to the water.

"A Corvette was sighted about two miles away while commencing a return circle and the word "SUB SUB" was flashed by Aldis lamp. Upon completing the circle to the position of the drop a flare was released. At this time the submarine was sighted again on the surface in the moon path but lost as we continued the circle. It was sighted once again on the successive circle.

"The Corvette was approaching and commenced firing at about two to three hundred yards. It continued to approach and rammed the submarine. A great deal of gun fire was issuing from what appeared to be the submarine and the Corvette.

"After about five to ten minutes the submarine and Corvette separated about two hundred yards with the gun fire attack continuing. After about fifteen minutes a destroyer approached from the direction of the convoy and it too opened fire from about three hundred yards. After a few minutes the firing ceased and the Corvette approached closer. Two small life boats were then seen in the vicinity. I did not see the submarine disappear but later an oil slick was observed and sharp white flashes which appeared to be gun fire was issuing from the general area at about five second intervals. However upon closer observation it was seen that no submarine was afloat and that the flashes were coming from what looked like under the water, since they could be seen dimly prior to their final bubble like flash. This continued for an hour while prisoners were being picked up. At 0050 we returned to base."
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
Comdt. NOB, Guantanamo
ltr. Serial 0299 of 3 Sept.
1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Attack on enemy submarine by HMCS OAKVILLE.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier is in thorough agreement with the remarks of Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, in paragraph five (5), of basic letter. The activities of the LEA in connection with this affair and thereafter are being investigated.

/s/ J. H. Hoover
J. H. HOOVER

Copy to:
NOB, Guanmo.
Sept. 3, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commandant.
To: Commander-in-Chief United States Atlantic Fleet.
Via: Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier.

SUBJECT: Attack on enemy submarine by HMCS OAKVILLE.

Enclosure: (A) Commanding Officer, HMCS OAKVILLE, report of attack on "U-94" dated 29 August 1942.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. This attack was conducted with great energy and determination. Every method of destruction available to the Commanding Officer was employed. While it is not intended to detract even a scintilla of praise due to Captain King of the OAKVILLE and for the courage he, his officers and men displayed during the entire incident, and subsequently in bringing his severely damaged ship into port unassisted, several points present themselves which might be worthy of comment.

3. It is pointed out that the submarine was initially bombed by a plane of Patrol Squadron 92 during which four 650 pound depth bombs were dropped. The pilot of the plane, Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, U.S.N., observed the submarine on the surface and members of the plane crew observed the stern of the submarine to be forced out of the water by the explosion of the bombs. The plane crew further observed that the submarine did not submerge or disappear from the surface of the water until after the OAKVILLE sunk her by gunfire. It was later learned from members of the submarine crew that the vessel was damaged by the original bombing to the extent of being unable to submerge, all lights in the vessel being extinguished, and its speed reduced from ten to twelve knots.

4. The matter of ramming the submarine by the OAKVILLE after the enemy vessel had been damaged by bombing and while under fire by all guns that bore from the OAKVILLE, appears to be extending the doctrine beyond the limits of necessity. It is pointed out, however, that the Commanding Officer of the OAKVILLE did not know to what extent the submarine had
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Attack on enemy submarine by HMCS OAKVILLE

been damaged but, after the first unsuccessful attempt at ramming, it appears that the submarine was unable to submerge or to offer battle with her guns. This comment is made in view of certain severe damage, if not the sinking of the OAKVILLE, in carrying out repeated ramming.

5. While the rescue of members of the submarine crew was a highly humane act, it is submitted that under the circumstances the protection of the convoy was of immediate concern of the Commanding Officer of the LEA. On the other hand, the OAKVILLE being severely damaged and making water, properly engaged in the rescue work if by so doing the Commanding Officer was assured that steps looking toward saving his own ship were not necessary.

6. The Commanding Officer, OAKVILLE, in ordering the sinking submarine boarded, showed outstanding foresight under the circumstances and his conduct in this respect was extraordinarily meritorious.

/s/ Geo. L. Weyler

GEO. L. W Eyler
The Commanding Officer
HMCS OAKVILLE

Date: 29th August 1942

To: The Commandant
Naval Operating Base
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Subject: REPORT OF ATTACK ON "U-94"
All times G.M.T.

SUBMITTED:

While escorting TAW 15 from Curacao to Guantanamo on Thursday, 27 August, 1942, in Latitude D.R. 17° 40' North, Longitude D.R. 74° 22' West, the following incident took place:

At 0258Z/28th August, H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE was screening convoy, Station 5,000 yards 30° from port column, speed 12 knots; course of convoy 351° true, speed of advance 8 knots, state of sea 34.

Visibility 4 miles up moon and 2 miles down moon, the convoy being plainly visible.

(1) SubLieutenant E. G. Scott, RCNVR. was on watch at 0258Z/28th and ship was in station on its outward zigzag steering 300° true when three explosions were heard ahead. A column of water was observed fine on the port bow about one mile distant, course was altered towards and the Commanding Officer called, speed increased to 15 knots.

(2) The Commanding Officer ordered guns crew, depth charge party and all officers called.

(3) United States aircraft was flashing "S's" by signal lamp at surface of water but no object was visible.

(4) Aircraft circled and dropped a flare ahead which was extinguished on contact with water.

(5) Immediately "Full speed ahead" was ordered; submarine alarm sounded and Engine Room informed we were about to drop depth charges.

(6) Five charge pattern "B" set to 100 feet was dropped on the approximate position of the flare without A/S contact; altered course 30° to starboard, reduced speed to 160 revolutions, depth charge pattern "B" set.
(7) Immediately afterwards A/S contact was obtained 10 degrees on the starboard bow bearing 335° true, range 600 yards. "Full speed ahead" ordered, course was altered towards and bearing was reported moving rapidly left. Less than one-half minute afterwards SubLieutenant K. O. Fenwick, RCNR, sighted the bow of a submarine on the bearing indicated about half a cable distant on the starboard bow moving left and slightly opening. Two white rockets were fired. Course was altered to ram and First Lieutenant ordered to shore up bulkheads. The submarine passed under our bow "Hard a Port" ordered and the submarine bumped against the portside.

(8) The port 5"s opened fire on the bow of the submarine which was the only portion visible. The order "Hard a starboard" was given to open the range in order to bring the 4" gun to bear and to ram. When the range had opened to about one cable, one round of 4" was fired at the bow which landed close by, ship's course was altered to a collision bearing and two rounds 4" were fired at the conning tower which was by this time visible. One hit was observed on the conning tower. At this time the Oerlikon was raking the submarine, also .5"s Lewis gun and small arms to such an extent that it was impossible for the submarine to man any gun throughout the action, marksmanship being extremely effective.

(9) The submarine was taking avoiding action, completely surfaced and had increased speed considerably. The submarine passed ahead across to the starboard side and at this time one 4" shell carried away the 88 mm. deck gun. OAKVILLE maneuvered to ram and struck the starboard side of the submarine which passed down the portside. Order given to fire depth charge and one charge exploded directly under the submarine. Submarine rapidly decreased speed. OAKVILLE maneuvered to open range sufficiently to again ram. This was carried out at approximately 0345Z/28. Submarine being rammed squarely abaft the conning tower; OAKVILLE receiving three distinct shocks.

(10) Dome and oscillator were smashed and Asdic compartment flooded, No. 2 boiler room leaking considerably. Steps were taken to control the damage by shoring up watertight bulkheads.

(11) After the submarine had been rammed, OAKVILLE was laid alongside in moderately heavy swell and SubLieutenant H. E. T. Lawrence, RCNVR, and Stoker Petty Officer A. J. Powell O'N 22004, succeeded in boarding (see separate report) OAKVILLE opened to about one-half cable and two survivors, the Commanding Officer and one mechanic, swam over and climbed on board with assistance. The port sea boat was sent away with SubLieutenant K. D. Fenwick, RCNR., in charge to assist the boarding party and collect prisoners.
(12) The USS LEA was requested to close submarine to cover OAKVILLE's boarding party in case submarine should sink.

(13) The submarine was afloat for some 15 minutes after final ramming, sinking by the stern at approximately 0400Z/28.

(14) The starboard sea boat was sent away in charge of SubLieutenant E. G. Scott, RCNVR. as soon as submarine was observed to have sunk to assist in the rescue of boarding party but they had already been picked up by the port sea boat and put on board the USS LEA.

(15) The starboard sea boat picked up three survivors and had two clinging to the gunwales.

(16) A motor boat from USS LEA put out in response to request and was directed by the two officers in charge of OAKVILLE's boats to the area where the survivors were swimming.

(17) The starboard sea boat brought back SubLieutenant H. E. T. Lawrence and the three prisoners already in the boat, the port boat having already returned to OAKVILLE with Stoker Petty Officer Powell.

(18) At 0506 engines "Slow ahead" closing USS LEA to pick up our boats. Difficulty was experienced in hoisting boats due to heavy swell and defective disengaging gear. At this time considerable activity was observed from the direction of the convoy and I decided to tow the sea boats temporarily.

(19) The starboard sea boat had been damaged to some extent and broke away. We therefore made another attempt to hoist the port sea boat which was eventually successful and by 0705Z/28 we were under way and increased speed to 10 knots, proceeding to overtake convoy.

(20) Set course for Guantanamo, arriving without further incident at 1722Z/28.

(21) Prisoners were taken ashore by U. S. Authorities and we secured at "A" Wharf at 1918Z/28.

In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the pilot of the U. S. aircraft for his excellent reconnaissance work in spotting submarine; a splendid example of the cooperation between our respective Services.

/s/ Clarence A. King

CLARENCE A. KING, Lt. Comdr., RCNR.
Headquarters
TENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
San Juan, Puerto Rico  JWS

ND10/A16-3/A14-1
Serial CCSF-00113-42
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS LEA Secret ltr.
DD118/A14-1/A14-3 serial
(00768) dated 2 Sept.
1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

To: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and sinking
of German Submarine U-94.

Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and sinking
of German Submarine U-94.

Reference: (a) CCSF ltr. ND10/A16-3, Serial 0242 of 4
September 1942.

1. Forwarded.

/s/ J. H. Hoover

J. H. HOOVER

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/11/54
Signature- Carl D. Speer
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

From: The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LEA - Escort
      Commander - Escort Group 92.1.8
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
Via: Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier.

Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Skining of
          German Submarine U-94.

Reference: (a) CinClant Conf. Ltr. 7CL-42
           (b) U. S. Navy Regulations Art. 712 and 874(6).

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report
   is submitted:

   On August 27, 1942 Convoy TAW-15, consisting of twenty-
   nine ships, was enroute from Trinidad, B.W.I. to Key West, Florida.
   The Convoy was formed up in seven columns with three to five ships
   in each column. The Convoy Commodore, Commander C. B. Platt, U.S.N.,
   was in the SS ESSO ARUBA, the leading ship in the third column.
   Convoy course was 351°T., convoy speed 8 knots.

   The escort group consisted of the USS LEA (DD118),
   Escort Commander, HMMS JAN VAN BRAKEL, HMCS HALIFAX, OAKVILLE, and
   SNOWBERRY, PO559, SC499, 506 and 522. The disposition of the escort
   group was as follows: JAN VAN BRAKEL ahead, HMCS HALIFAX on star-
   board bow, SC506 on starboard beam, PO559 on starboard quarter,
   SC522 astern, HMCS OAKVILLE on port quarter, SC449 port beam,
   HMCS SNOWBERRY on port bow. All distances 5000 yard from convoy.
   All ships were patrolling station except the SO boats whose
   limited fuel capacity will not permit patrolling station on a
   trip of this length. the USS LEA was patrolling outer screen
   across entire rear and both quarters, distance 6000 to 9000
   yards.

   The convoy was in latitude 17°54'N., longitude 74°36'W.,
   on course 351°T., speed 8 knots. A full moon was directly over-
   head; a clear bright moonlight night with excellent visibility.
   The wind and sea were from the east, both force 4. This caused
   moderate high swells and some white caps. Depth of water was about
   1000 fathoms. The estimated sound range was 2500 yards.

   At 2300 August 27 the explosion of depth charges was
   felt. Almost immediately thereafter an aircraft flare was sighted
   on the port quarter of the convoy in the sector patrolled by HMCS
   OAKVILLE. This was followed by another shock which was thought to
   be a depth charge barrage. LEA went to full speed, headed for the
   flare and sounded general quarters. In about ten minutes rockets
   and gun fire could be seen coming from the direction of the OAKVILLE.
SUBJECT: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94 (Continued)

Upon approaching the OAKVILLE a dark object could be seen in the water close to her. Machine gun tracers from the OAKVILLE could be seen ricocheting off the object. OAKVILLE reported over 2410 kcs and 3000 kcs (voice) that she had rammed a submarine twice and was now firing on her. He was asked if he needed assistance and replied that he did not. LEA then headed for the port quarter of convoy to take the OAKVILLE's station and order all escorts to remain on stations. Before completing the turn away the OAKVILLE requested the LEA to close her as she was taking water badly. LEA closed the OAKVILLE and saw off her port beam a submarine with conning tower and forward deck awash. In the water many survivors were swimming around. A boat was lowered and a boarding officer and party were sent to the submarine to pick up any information possible and take any prisoners. When the boat arrived only the conning tower was visible above the water and this soon disappeared below the surface. However a boarding party from the OAKVILLE had gotten aboard and one officer had gone below in the darkness to look around. He stopped by the LEA on his way back to the OAKVILLE and reported the control room was a complete shambles and the submarine was filling up rapidly. He did not have time for a thorough examination in the darkness and reported he had been unable to find anything of importance, however, he stated the ship was the German Submarine U-94.

It was later found out that the escort patrol plane had spotted the submarine on the surface well off the quarter of the convoy, approaching for an attack and had bombed it, then dropped flares. Apparently the bombing had disabled the submarine to such an extent that he could not submerge. The OAKVILLE then picked it up on the surface in the light of the flare and had attacked with gun fire and rammed twice. The first time the bow gun of the submarine was knocked off, the OAKVILLE had knocked off her sound dome and opened a hole in her forward fire room.

At 0400 August 28, while standing by the OAKVILLE and awaiting the return of the boat, a burst of flame illuminated the sky in the direction in which the convoy had disappeared. This was followed by many flares, rockets and starshells. The boat was immediately recalled and hoisted aboard.

By this time the OAKVILLE had investigated the extent of damage and signalled that although one boiler room was flooded out and the hull forward was leaking she could proceed cautiously to Guantanamo Bay at very slow speed. The LEA then went to full speed in order to rejoin the convoy. Twenty one German prisoners were picked up by this vessel. It was later found out that the OAKVILLE had picked up five more, among whom was the Captain of the Submarine.
SUBJECT: Submarine Attack on Convoy TA-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94 (Continued).

Upon rejoining the convoy communication was established with the SC522 who reported that the SS SAN FABIN and the SS ROTTERDAM, the first and second ships respectively in the second column had definitely been sunk and it was thought that the Convoy Commodore's ship, the SS ESSOARUBA, the first ship in the third column had been hit but did not know if it had been sunk. It was later found out that although the ESSOARUBA had been hit she remained afloat and made Guantanamo with the convoy. The SC522 further reported that he had picked up 59 survivors from the SAN FABIN and the ROTTERDAM.

Inquiries of the Convoy Commodore brought out the fact that no one in the convoy saw the submarine, nor did any of the escorts. He also stated that all three ships were torpedoed on the port side. Immediately after the explosions were heard, the SNOWBERRY conducted a starshell search down the port side of the convoy. All other vessels conducted a sound search, and where equipped, a radar search, over their entire stations, but of no avail.

From an analysis of the facts presented, namely,
(1) a bright moonlight night, (2) a choppy sea, with medium heavy swell, (3) all ships hit were in the front of the convoy, (4) all ships hit on port side, (5) no one in convoy or escorts saw the submarine, it is my belief that the attack was made from about 60° on the port bow of the convoy at maximum range outside the escorts, and by one submarine. Since some German submarines are equipped with four (4) bow tubes, it is possible that a fourth torpedo was fired in the spread but ran erratic.

It is my opinion that the aviator on escort patrol who first sighted the submarine, delivered the first attack and caused sufficient damage to force it to stay on the surface to be lighted by a flare, and the Commanding Officer of the HMCS OAKVILLE, who displayed keen judgement and quick decision in ramming and otherwise damaging the submarine with gunfire, causing it to sink, both deserve special credit.

In view of the fact that no depth charge attack was made, or sound contact obtained on either submarine, this report is made in lieu of Conf. ASW-1.
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S. Atlantic Fleet  
Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit.  

To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.  

Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94.  

Reference: 
(a) The Commandant, NOB, Guantanamo serial 0299 of 3 September 1942.  
(b) CO, U.S.S. LEA serial 00768 of 2 September 1942. (Comdr. Escort Group 92.1.3).  
(c) CO, H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE secret letter of 29 August 1942.  
(d) Anti-Submarine Action Report from Patrol Squadron 92 dated 27 August 1942.  
(e) CominCh despatch 111614 of August 1942.  

Enclosure: 
(A) Sketch of the possible positions of the escorts with Convoy TAW-15 at 2300Q/27 August 1942.  
(B) Analysis of reference (d)  
(C) Analysis of reference (c)  

1. At 2300Z/27 August at the time LEA heard the first depth bomb explosions caused by 92-P-6 eight escorts were placed in sectors around the convoy in accordance with LantFlt 9A. Escorts were patrolling stations at distance 5000 yards. It is hoped that the patrolling of stations involved a variation of distances of escorts from the convoy as well as a variation in bearing. The LEA (Escort Commander) was patrolling astern and on the quarters in the sector indicated in Enclosure (A).  

2. Visibility was reported to be from 2 to 4 miles and the convoy was easily visible from OAKVILLE. However, the attack by the plane was within 2 miles of OAKVILLE and the submarine running fully surfaced at about 10 knots had not been seen. Whether or not OAKVILLE had radar equipment is not indicated. 

3. The attack by 92-P-6 was well executed and damaged U-94 sufficiently so that the latter did not dive. She remained on the surface for 15 minutes after the final ramming by OAKVILLE. In view of the difficulty in sinking U-94 it may be assumed that the attack by 92-P-6 did not rupture the pressure hull. It must be assumed that reference (e) was not available to Patrol Squadron 92 since all depth bombs were set for
Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94.

50 feet. Had 25 feet settings been used it seems likely the attack by 92-P-6 would have been much more destructive.

4. This incident furnished a splendid example of coordination between an aircraft and a surface vessel which resulted in the destruction of the German U-boat 94.

5. Interrogation of survivors of U-94 will aid in the estimate of the damage done by 92-P-6 but it seems reasonable that in view of the uncertainty of this prior damage OAKVILLE was justified in ramming tactics until it became clear that the submarine was unable to escape.

6. LEA ordered all escorts to remain on their stations. Somehow in the excitement and in spite of the high visibility, another submarine attacked from the port side of the convoy at 0400Q/28 August about 1 hour and 40 minutes after the first bombing of U-94 without being seen. In view of the extreme accuracy of the salvo (3 ships were hit but only 2 sank) it seems most likely the torpedoes were fired from close range by a submarine on the surface "flooded down" or from periscope depth. Firing from the periscope depth at short range seems possible in this attack since the visibility was reported as excellent with clear bright moonlight.

7. It is unfortunate that 92-P-6 returned to base at 0500Q/28 August (There appears to be some discrepancy in the times used by surface vessels and plane). It was not reported whether a relief was furnished. The attack by the second submarine must have occurred about the time 92-P-6 took its departure from TAW-15.

8. The establishment of voice communication with 92-P-6 was not reported by LEA. Communication by light from the aircraft to OAKVILLE was quite effective, and in any case it is felt that the aircraft might have been directed to continue screening operations since OAKVILLE apparently had the situation well in hand. Such action might possibly have prevented the attack on the convoy which occurred at 0400, 28 August.
Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94.

9. The transmission of this correspondence via registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ T. L. Lewis

T. L. LEWIS
ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

Reference: (a) VP-92 Aircraft Action with Enemy Report dated August 27, 1942.

1. Following is the identifying data covering the subject attack:

(a) Unit: VP-92
(b) Airplane type: PBY-5A.
(c) Location of attack - Latitude 17-40 N.
(d) Date - August 27, 1942.

2. Pilot sighted a submarine about one quarter of a mile off the port beam, estimated speed eight to ten knots. The U-boat was three miles astern of the main convoy body, fully surfaced, and plainly visible in the moonlight. Approach was properly made from down moon, and attack was promptly delivered at 235° relative to the U-boat, speed 125 knots, at altitude 50-75 feet. Attempt was made to lead the U-boat three quarters of its length, a sound estimate. The starboard manual bomb release was pulled at about 200 feet distance and the port bomb release about one second later. Obviously these estimates are in error since the explosion enveloped the submarine. Had the starboard bombs been released at 200 feet distance, altitude 50 feet, they would have hit the water over 200 feet beyond the submarine and the port bombs, one second later, would have struck over 400 feet beyond. Evidently the starboard bombs were released at about 460 feet distance (underwater carry of 60 feet) and are the ones that exploded under the submarine.

3. No explanation is contained in the report of the use of manual release. The electrical release, with intervalometer, is more accurate and gives the proper stick spacing. It is noted that in an attack by this same pilot on June 26, the first bomb failed to release and was considered to be the cause of a failure to straddle or hit the U-boat.

4. Flare was properly not used on the attack since the U-Boat was plainly visible.

5. The subsequent action of the pilot in guiding the corvette to the attack by signal and flare resulted in good teamwork. Communication difficulties have been so great in the past that successful use of even the elementary signals used in this case are encouraging. It is thought that the pilot should have dropped another flare on a subsequent sighting of the submarine after his first flare had been extinguished, to assure contact by the corvette.

6. The use of 25 foot depth settings is even more definitely indicated at night than in daylight and probably would have caused lethal damage in this case. By the use of 50 foot settings the pilot simply was subjected to a self imposed handicap. That the submarine actually was damaged to the extent that it was unable to submerge may be attributed to good aim by the pilot and bomber and to the fact that the heavy Mark 29 depth charges were used.

7. As a direct result of this attack the U-boat was destroyed and prisoners taken. The pilot and crew deserve every credit for a successful attack.
ANALYSIS OF ACTION REPORT
H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE

Attack at 2345, LST, August 27, 1942. Employment: Escort of
Convoy TAW-15

Latitude 17-54 N; Longitude 74-36 W.

Sound conditions: 2500 yards.

Range at which contact was obtained: 600 yards.
Range at which contact was lost: Not lost - submarine sighted.

The report of these attacks is made as a chronological history
of events rather than on the standard from ASW-1. Accordingly it must
be analyzed in the same fashion.

The first attack was a five charge pattern of depth charges set
at 100 feet dropped on the approximate position of the flare dropped
by the plane. No contact was made. This was an urgent attack proper-
ly delivered in view of possible danger to the convoy.
Though the position of 5000 yards on the port quarter, if that be
assumed the nearest position of the potential submarine to the convoy,
was not a favorable one for attack, an urgent attack under these cir-
cumstances may well divert the submarine from its efforts to obtain
a more favorable position, causing him to submerge or to escape at
high speed.

Immediately afterward sound contact was obtained at 600 yards,
10 degrees on the starboard bow. Course was altered toward the bear-
ing and full speed was ordered. The intended depth charge attack was
again to be an urgent one since little time was available to evaluate
the target's motion and danger to the convoy was still present. Less
than one-half minute later the bow of a submarine was sighted on the
contact bearing, distant 100 yards, moving left, as was also indicated
by the sound contact. Two white warning rockets were properly fired.
Attempt was immediately made to ram, and though the OAKVILLE missed
this pass due to insufficient time to turn, the conning officer in
seamanlike fashion used the kick of the rudder by his order of 'Hard
port' to give the submarine an unfriendly nudge with his port side.
Subject: Analysis of Action Report - H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE

The port 50 calibre machine guns were the first to be brought to bear and opened fire at the bow. The conning officer opened the range to bring the 4 inch gun to bear and to ram. In this maneuver he displayed excellent seamanship and a fine knowledge of the tactical characteristics of his ship. All guns which could bear were in use: 4 inch, Oerlikon, 50 calibre, and small arms, which swept the submarine's deck clear. One shot carried away the U-boat's deck gun. Despite the avoiding action and increase of speed of the U-boat, OAKVILLE rammed her on the starboard side, then used her only remaining weapon, the depth charge, to further blast the enemy as they dropped aft topside. The depth setting used was not stated but is assumed it was shallow.

After this attack the submarine decreased speed. The OAKVILLE then maneuvered to ram a third time, which was done at 2345, the only time given in the report since the first sighting of the airplane flare. As a result of this the OAKVILLE received considerable damage herself. As a matter of pure hindsight, it appears that this final ramming was perhaps unnecessary. This is so stated not because of the damage to the OAKVILLE which did result, but because it must have been evident by this time that the submarine could neither submerge nor escape on the surface. The entire action had taken about three-quarters of an hour, and during this time the submarine would certainly have taken advantage of any capability she had of escaping. It is thought that the use of gunfire alone was sufficient to complete the job.

The rescue of survivors and boarding of the submarine reflects additional credit upon the Commanding Officer and crew of the OAKVILLE. This was a most determined attack and is exemplary of the tenacious and aggressive spirit necessary in anti-submarine warfare.
From: The Commanding Officer, U. S. Atlantic Fleet  
Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit.  
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.  
Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of  
German Submarine U-94.  

Reference: (a) The Commandant, NOB, Guantanamo serial  
0299 of 3 September 1942.  
(b) CO, U.S.S. LEA serial 00768 of 2 September  
1942. (Comdr. Escort Group 92, 1, 8).  
(c) CO, H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE secret letter of 29  
August 1942.  
(d) Anti-Submarine Action Report from Patrol  
Squadron 92 dated 27 August 1942.  
(e) Cominch despatch 111614 of August 1942.  

Enclosure: (A) Sketch of the possible positions of the  
escorts with Convoy TAW-15 at 2300Q/27  
August 1942.  
(B) Analysis of reference (d)  
(C) Analysis of reference (c)  

1. At 2300Q/27 August at the time LEA heard the first  
depth bomb explosions caused by 92-P-6 eight escorts were placed  
in sectors around the convoy in accordance with LantFlt 9A.  
Escorts were patrolling stations at distance 5000 yards. It is  
hoped that the patrolling of stations involved a variation of  
distances of escorts from the Convoy as well as a variation in  
bearing. The LEA (Escort Commander) was patrolling astern and  
on the quarters in the sector indicated in Enclosure (A).  

2. Visibility was reported to be from 2 to 4 miles and  
the convoy was easily visible from OAKVILLE. However, the attack  
by the plane was within 2 miles of OAKVILLE and the submarine  
running fully surfaced at about 10 knots had not been seen.  
Whether or not OAKVILLE had radar equipment is not indicated.  

3. The attack by 92-P-6 was well executed and damaged  
U-94 sufficiently so that the latter did not dive. She re-  
mained on the surface for 15 minutes after the final ramming  
by OAKVILLE. In view of the difficulty in sinking U-94 it may  
be assumed that the attack by 92-P-6 did not rupture the pres-  
sure hull. It must be assumed that reference (e) was not avail-  
able to Patrol Squadron 92 since all depth bombs were set for
Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94.

50 feet. Had 25 feet settings been used it seems likely the attack by 92-P-6 would have been much more destructive.

4. This incident furnishes a splendid example of coordination between an aircraft and a surface vessel which resulted in the destruction of the German U-boat 94.

5. Interrogation of survivors of U-94 will aid in the estimate of the damage done by 92-P-6 but it seems reasonable that in view of the uncertainty of this prior damage OAKVILLE was justified in ramming tactics until it became clear that the submarine was unable to escape.

6. LEA ordered all escorts to remain on their stations. Somehow in the excitement and in spite of the high visibility, another submarine attacked from the port side of the convoy at 0040Q/28 August about 1 hour and 40 minutes after the first bombing of U-94 without being seen. In view of the extreme accuracy of the salvo (3 ships were hit but only 2 sank) it seems most likely the torpedoes were fired from close range by a submarine on the surface "flooded down" or from periscope depth. Firing from periscope depth at short range seems possible in this attack since the visibility was reported as excellent with clear bright moonlight.

7. It is unfortunate that 92-P-6 returned to base at 0050Q/28 August (There appears to be some discrepancy in the times used by surface vessels and plane). It was not reported whether a relief was furnished. The attack by the second submarine must have occurred about the time 92-P-6 took its departure from TAW-15.

8. The establishment of voice communication with 92-P-6 was not reported by LEA. Communication by light from the aircraft to OAKVILLE was quite effective, and in any case it is felt that the aircraft might have been directed to continue screening operations since OAKVILLE apparently had the situation well in hand. Such action might possibly have prevented the attack on the convoy which occurred at 0040, 28 August.
SECRET

Subject: Submarine Attack on Convoy TAW-15 and Sinking of German Submarine U-94.

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T. L. LEWIS.
ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

Reference: (a) VP-92 Aircraft Action with Enemy Report dated August 27, 1942.

1. Following is the identifying data covering the subject attack:

(a) Unit: VP-92
(b) Airplane type: PBY-5A.
   Squadron No.: 92-P-6.
   Pilot: Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, USN.
(c) Location of attack - Latitude 17-40 N.
    Longitude 74-50 W.
(d) Date - August 27, 1942.
   Time - 2230, LST (2300 as reported by Escort Commander; 2258 by H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE).

2. Pilot sighted a submarine about one quarter of a mile off the port beam, estimated speed eight to ten knots. The U-boat was three miles astern of the main convoy body, fully surfaced, and plainly visible in the moonlight. Approach was properly made from down moon, and attack was promptly delivered at 235° relative to the U-boat, speed 125 knots, at altitude 50-75 feet. Attempt was made to lead the U-boat three quarters of its length, a sound estimate. The starboard manual bomb release was pulled at about 200 feet distance and the port bomb release about one second later. Obviously these estimates are in error since the explosion enveloped the submarine. Had the starboard bombs been released at 200 feet distance, altitude 50 feet, they would have hit the water over 200 feet beyond the submarine and the port bombs, one second later, would have struck over 400 feet beyond. Evidently the starboard bombs were released at about 460 feet distance (underwater carry of 60 feet) and are the ones that exploded under the submarine.

3. No explanation is contained in the report of the use of manual release. The electrical release, with intervalometer, is more accurate and gives the proper stick spacing. It is noted that in an attack by this same pilot on June 26, the first bomb failed to release and was considered to be the cause of a failure to straddle or hit the U-boat.
Subject: Analysis of Aircraft Action Report.

4. Flare was properly not used on the attack since the U-boat was plainly visible.

5. The subsequent action of the pilot in guiding the corvette to the attack by signal and flare resulted in good teamwork. Communication difficulties have been so great in the past that successful use of even the elementary signals used in this case are encouraging. It is thought that the pilot should have dropped another flare on a subsequent sighting of the submarine after his first flare had been extinguished, to assure contact by the corvette.

6. The use of 25 foot depth settings is even more definitely indicated at night than in daylight and probably would have caused lethal damage in this case. By the use of 50 foot settings the pilot simply was subjected to a self imposed handicap. That the submarine actually was damaged to the extent that it was unable to submerge may be attributed to good aim by the pilot and bomber and to the fact that the heavy Mark 29 depth charges were used.

7. As a direct result of this attack the U-boat was destroyed and prisoners taken. The pilot and crew deserve every credit for a successful attack.
ANALYSIS OF ACTION REPORT

H.H.C.S. OAKVILLE


Latitude 17-54 N; Longitude 74-36 W.


Sound conditions: 2500 yards.

Range at which contact was obtained: 600 yards.
Range at which contact was lost: Not lost - submarine sighted.

The report of these attacks is made as a chronological history of events rather than on the standard form ASW-1. Accordingly it must be analyzed in the same fashion.

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Immediately afterward sound contact was obtained at 600 yards, 10 degrees on the starboard bow. Course was altered toward the bearing and full speed was ordered. The intended depth charge attack was again to be an urgent one since little time was available to evaluate the target's motion and danger to the convoy was still present. Less than one-half minute later the bow of a submarine was sighted on the contact bearing, distant 100 yards, moving left, as was also indicated by the sound contact. Two white warning rockets were properly fired. Attempt was immediately made to ram, and though the OAKVILLE missed on this pass due to insufficient time to turn, the conning officer in seamanlike fashion used the kick of the rudder by his order of 'Hard aport' to give the submarine an unfriendly nudge with his port side.
Subject: Analysis of Action Report - H.M.C.S. OAKVILLE.

The port 50 calibre machine guns were the first to be brought to bear and opened fire at the bow. The conning officer opened the range to bring the 4 inch gun to bear and to ram. In this maneuver he displayed excellent seamanship and a fine knowledge of the tactical characteristics of his ship. All guns which could bear were in use: 4 inch, Oerlikon, 50 calibre, and small arms, which swept the submarine's deck clear. One shot carried away the U-boat's deck gun. Despite the avoiding action and increase of speed of the U-boat, OAKVILLE rammed her on the starboard side, then used her only remaining weapon, the depth charge, to further blast the enemy as they dropped aft to port. The depth setting used was not stated but it is assumed it was shallow.

After this attack the submarine decreased speed. The OAKVILLE then maneuvered to ram a third time, which was done at 2345, the only time given in the report since the first sighting of the airplane flare. As a result of this the OAKVILLE received considerable damage herself. As a matter of pure hindsight, it appears that this final ramming was perhaps unnecessary. This is so stated not because of the damage to the OAKVILLE which did result, but because it must have been evident by this time that the submarine could neither submerge nor escape on the surface. The entire action had taken about three-quarters of an hour, and during this time the submarine would certainly have taken advantage of any capability she had of escaping. It is thought that the use of gunfire alone was sufficient to complete the job.

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Date- 2/1/54
Signature- Carl J. Specin
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Authority is requested to proceed immediately with the construction of two (2) of the 45,000 ton aircraft carriers.

Frank Knox

F. K.
O. K.
F. D. R.

x 18

Misc. Naval Bldg. Folder
x 249 official

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2/11/59
Signature- Pearl S. Buck
To
KNOX, Hon. Frank
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
1-31-42

The President quoted to Sec. Knox a memorandum he received a day or two ago listing items of aluminum ordered by the Navy Dept. from the American Aluminum Corporation and re aluminum for motion picture cameras, and light fixtures ordered from Bohn Aluminum Co. The President stressed need for reducing amount of aluminum used on ships and suggest that Navy Dept. engineers work on this in order that aluminum may be used for airplanes. --- The President wrote to Donald M. Nelson, Director, War Production Board, Jan. 31, 1942 re handling this matter with the Navy.

SEE C.P. ALUMINUM
STARK, Admiral H. R.
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 3-11-42

Wrote to President re letter of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Jan. 7, 1942, in support of letter on same subject, and written in a similar vein by Commanding General Hawaiian Dept., - concerning aircraft situation in the Hawaiian Islands for air reconnaissance and combat duties. Said this letter, together with an appreciation of the Hawaiian defense forces (copy attached, dated Feb. 12, 1942), was presented by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. Asked the President to approve certain recommendations submitted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, re use of Army forces and present Naval local defense forces on the Islands, increase of Army ground and air forces, and re handling of Japanese residents from the Islands. --- Returned to Admiral Stark with notation (copy retained): "R.R.S. Approved F.D.R. 3/13/42". --- Copy of letter and copy of mimeographed paper (J.C.S. 11)* supplied to Capt. McCrea by Comdr. McDowell, 5-12-42.

SEE C.F. HAWAII
To

McGABE, Hon. Thomas B. - Acting Lend-Lease Administrator,
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF WAR,
3-24-42

The President sent identical letters to each of the above re termination of present Protocol agreement with the U.S.S.R., in large part, with end of this fiscal year, and review which he shares with the Army and Navy that aid should be continued and expanded as consistent with shipping and needs of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and others of the United Nations. Referred to discussion with U.S.S.R., and asked that each of the above submit certain schedules to him by April 6, 1942. President said he is asking Mr. Harry Hopkins to consolidate and coordinate recommendations of various departments and agencies concerned and would like Mr. McCabe and the two Secretaries to designate someone to represent views of their respective departments. Preparation of estimates is to be kept confidential.

SEE C.F. LEND LEASE
HAMBRO, Dr. C. J.  
Princeton, N. J.  
4-27-42

Wrote to the President inquiring about getting in touch with Mr. Harry Hopkins concerning possibility of celebrating King Haakon's 70th birthday in the way he (Dr. Hambro) suggested. Wrote re desire of Mr. Nygaardsvold, the Prime Minister, to have a private talk with the President after he has been formally presented.

--- Attached is President's memo for Mr. Hopkins, May 5 asking if he has any word for Dr. Hambro. --- President replied to Dr. Hambro, May 20, 1942 re gift to the Norwegian Government, and transfer of ship on King's birthday. --- Edvard Hambro, Princeton, N. J., replied to the President, May 22 saying he has cabled to Dr. Hambro who is on lecture trip, and has forwarded the President's letter to him.

SEE C.F. - Land-Lease