

P.S.F.

C.F.

Permanent Joint Board on Defense

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mrs. Dennison

N.Y.C.

November 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Dear Grace:

Will you see that the President gets this today as Fiorella LaGuardia is most anxious for him to sign it so I can return it tomorrow morning. Will you send it, or give it to Mrs. Dennison and she will put it in my safe overnight.

S. F.
Permanent Joint Board
for Defense

E. M. W.

X4090

Recommendation for Permanent Joint
Board on Defense
retd to Col. Clayton Russell
Com 2002, War Dept. by
Gen. Watson 11/14/41
22


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Thanks.

E. M. W.

TWENTY-FIRST RECOMMENDATION

Attention was directed to the question of the maintenance of the structures, etc., provided by Canada at Gander Lake for occupation by United States Forces and it was recognized that the course of events may make it convenient to permit the use by United States Forces of like facilities in both Newfoundland and Canada and also permit the use of facilities in United States by Canadian Forces. Consideration was accordingly given to the general principles which should govern the responsibilities of each country in respect of the maintenance of structures, etc., built by the Government of either which are occupied by the Forces of the other, and the Board decided to make the following 21st Recommendation:

x 41-72

The Board recommends that when facilities are provided by the Government of either country for the occupation of Forces of the other, the following principles should apply to the maintenance, upkeep and servicing of such facilities, subject to such local definition and if necessary modification as the circumstances require:

1. Any building constructed by the Government of one country and wholly occupied by Forces of the other should be maintained by the occupying Forces and at the termination of the occupation turned over to the Government of the country by which it was provided in the same condition as when the occupation commenced, ordinary wear and tear, act of God, enemy action, riot, insurrection or fire excepted.

2. The same rule should apply to structures appertinent to buildings when these are included in an area capable of delimitation and occupied by the Forces concerned which should in these circumstances undertake the policing of the area.

3. The occupying Forces should also be responsible for the heating, lighting and other services relating to any building or area occupied by them in all cases in which the service is derived from a source adapted exclusively to take care of the building or area in question but in other cases the services should be provided on an equitable basis by the Government of the country by which the occupation is permitted.

4. No occupying Forces should make any structural change in existing facilities without the approval of the service by which the area is set aside for occupation or the occupied buildings are provided.

OK
F.D.R.


PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Movement of Aircraft to Alaska.

1. Permanent Joint Board on Defense initiated action last November looking to the provision of aviation staging facilities in Western Canada and Alaska to permit the expeditious movement of aircraft to Alaska.
2. Very considerable construction difficulties have been encountered due to the inaccessibility of certain necessary staging sites, problems of satisfactorily handling of frozen earth and difficulties due to the lack of transportation facilities. Despite these handicaps, reports submitted at the last meeting of the Board indicate that heavy and medium bombardment can now be moved to Alaska as required. Short range aircraft can also be moved, but such operations will be considerably limited by available facilities. All practical measures have been, or are being, taken to ready this route to handle any movements required during the coming winter.
3. The above is verbatim from the service members. Means that we are in fairly good position during the winter. In the spring there will be some interruption because of ground conditions and, thereafter, work will be resumed and I would say that toward the end of the summer, the work will be entirely completed for the rapid moving of all types of planes, thus affording the necessary mobility and relieving the United States from keeping large reserve forces in Alaska.



F. H. La GUARDIA
Chairman, American Section.

x48-73

x249 official

x400 Alaska

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1941


MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

Will you please see that the President gets the attached recommendation from the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for his approval?

This clears up the situation very satisfactorily. You might inform the President that we made great headway during the last meeting and the cooperation at this time is excellent.

After the President has approved of the recommendation, will you please see to it that it reaches Lt. Col. Clayton Bissell, War Plans Division, Room 2002, War Department, Munitions Building, at the earliest possible moment.



F. H. LaGuardia

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

L. F.

Permanent Joint Board on Defense

December 24, 1941

*Originals
signed & handled
w/ Major J. G. ...
12/24/41*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Twenty-Second Recommendation.

1. Canadian-United States Joint Defense action can be materially improved by decentralization to appropriate military commanders of broad authority, previously exercised through various agencies in Ottawa and Washington, to effect, by mutual agreement, arrangement for installations of accessory equipment in the territory of either, the transit of armed forces and equipment, the use of facilities and other pertinent matters.

x4090

2. A list of the commanders concerned is attached.

x550

3. United States Army and Navy concur.

4. Your approval is requested.

F. H. LaGUARDIA,
Chairman, American Section.


2 Incls:

- Incl. 1 - Copy of 22nd Recommendation.
- Incl. 2 - List of commanders named in para. 12 of ABC-22.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 11 1974

*x48-B
x4675
x335*



PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

Washington

TWENTY-SECOND RECOMMENDATION

The Board considered the possibility that in the prosecution of the war, situations can arise suddenly, requiring immediately the further integration for joint defense of the military forces of the United States and Canada, advance preparation therefor, or the movement of military forces or equipment of one country into or through the territory of the other. The Board, therefore, approved the following as its TWENTY-SECOND Recommendation:

That the United States and Canadian governments now authorize the Commanders named in paragraph 12 of ABC-22, or their duly authorized representatives, to effect by mutual agreement any arrangements they deem necessary for the perfection of preparations for the common defense, including but not limited to, the installations of accessory equipment in the territory of either, the transit of armed forces, equipment or defense materials into or through the territory of either, and the utilization by either nation of the base and military facilities of the other.

OK
J. H. R.

COMMANDERS LISTED IN PARA 12 of ABC-22.

CANADA

Commodore Commanding
Newfoundland Force (RCN))

Commanding Officer, Atlantic
Coast (RCN))

Air Officer Commanding,
Eastern Air Command (RCAF))

General Officer Commanding
in Chief, Atlantic Command
(CA))

Air Officer Commanding
Eastern Air Command (RCAF))

Commanding Officer, Pacific
Coast (RCN))

Air Officer Commanding Wes-
tern Air Command (RCAF))

General Officer Commanding in
Chief Pacific Command (CA))

Air Officer Commanding Wes-
tern Air Command (RCAF))

UNITED STATES

(Commander in Chief, United
States Atlantic Fleet (USN)

-- (Task Force Commanders, United
States Atlantic Fleet (USN)

(Commander North Atlantic Naval
Coastal Frontier (USN)

(Commanding General Northeast
Defense Command (USA)

-- (Commanding General, GHQ

(Commander in Chief, United
States Pacific Fleet (USN)

(Task Force Commanders, United
States Pacific Fleet (USN)

(Commander Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier (USN)

(Commanding General Western De-
fense Command (USA)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File

12-27-41

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATTA:

Colonel Bissell, secretary of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, brought in these copies.

He says they were signed by the President during Mayor LaGuardia's visit on Tuesday, December 23d.

The papers are not dated as of December 23d, however, as they are still being held awaiting Canadian approval.

Col. Bissell left the papers for the White House files.

ld

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

Washington

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OK. F D R.

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General Officer Commanding
in Chief, Atlantic Command
(CA))
Air Officer Commanding
Eastern Air Command (RCAF))

Commanding Officer, Pacific
Coast (RCN))
Air Officer Commanding West-
ern Air Command (RCAF))

General Officer Commanding in
Chief Pacific Command (CA))
Air Officer Commanding West-
ern Air Command (RCAF))

UNITED STATES

(Commander in Chief, United
States Atlantic Fleet (USN)
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(Commander Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier (USN)

(Commanding General Western De-
fense Command (USA)
(
(

C. F.
Permanent Joint
Board on Defense

December 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR: *x25*

Subject: Twenty-Third Recommendation.

1. Attached is a copy of the approved Twenty-Third Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, pertaining to coordination of aviation training in Canada and United States. *x4090*

2. I desire that you initiate, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Navy, appropriate action to implement the recommendation.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Inclosure:
Copy 23rd Recommendation

x48-B
x249 official
x4675

December 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF NAVY: <18

Subject: Twenty-Third Recommendation.

1. Attached is a copy of the approved Twenty-Third Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, pertaining to coordination of aviation training in Canada and United States.

2. I have requested the Secretary of War to initiate, with your cooperation, appropriate action to implement the recommendation.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Inclosure:
Copy 23rd Recommendation

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

*Originals signed
and handed to
Major LaGuardia
12/24/41*

December 24, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Twenty-Third Recommendation.


1. The belligerency of the United States necessitates a reorientation and a careful coordination of aviation training plans of Canada and the United States. Great Britain has an interest in aviation training conducted in Canada and the United States.

2. Although political and financial considerations beyond the purview of the Board are also involved, the Board considered that it should initiate action to insure most effective use of all training facilities in Canada and the United States. To that end, it is requested:

a. That the attached Twenty-Third Recommendation be approved.

b. That attached letters to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy be signed.

3. The United States Army and Navy concur.



F. H. LaGUARDIA,
Chairman, American Section.

3 Incls.

Incl. 1 - Cpy. 23rd Recommendation

Incl. 2 - Draft of ltr. to S/W

Incl. 3 - Draft of ltr. to S/N

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 11 1974

1223
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Twenty-Third Recommendation.

1. Attached is a copy of the approved Twenty-Third Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, pertaining to coordination of aviation training in Canada and United States.

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Franklin D. Roosevelt

Inclosures:
Copy 23rd Recommendation

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Franklin D. Roosevelt

Inclosure:
Copy 23rd Recommendation

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

TWENTY-THIRD RECOMMENDATION

The Board discussed the effect of the belligerency of the United States on the aviation training programs in Canada and the United States. The Board is of the opinion that the defense effort will be best served by action to insure the fullest utilization of available aviation training facilities of Canada and the United States and the coordination therewith of plans for any additional facilities required. The Board, therefore, adopted the following as its TWENTY-THIRD Recommendation:

That the Canadian and United States Governments should consider the advisability of arranging for a meeting of appropriate representatives of Great Britain, Canada and the United States to make appropriate recommendations for coordination of the entire aviation training programs to be conducted in Canada and the United States.

OK F D R

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1-23-42

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Colonel Clayton Bissell, secretary
Permanent Joint Board on Defense, phoned.

He says the two letters to the
Secretaries of War and Navy (re aviation
training in Canada), which were signed by the
President December 24, 1941, have been
held pending receipt of approval from
Canada.

This approval has just arrived,
and the letters to War and Navy, signed by
the President 12-24-41, have been dated
January 23, 1942 and forwarded to the addressees

This information for the White
House records.

ld

CANADA

UNITED STATES

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

March 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mrs. Dennison, Secy.
Maj. General E. M. Watson,
White House.

Enclosed are copies of memorandums requested as per our telephone conversation of this afternoon.

It was my understanding that sufficient copies had been forwarded with the originals and regret this delay, supplying the above information.

E. Janet Bestor

(Miss) E. Janet Bestor, Secy.
Lt. General S. D. Embick.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 11 1974

CANADA

UNITED STATES

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

B. F.

*Permanent Joint Board
March 7, 1942 on Defense
Canada & U.S.*

x4090

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Defenses of Sault Ste. Marie. *
(25th Recommendation of Permanent
Joint Board on Defense)

1. The accompanying recommendation of the Defense Board proposes the augmentation of the air defense of the locks and accessory installations of the Sault Ste. Marie.
2. The United States Army and Navy concur.
3. Your approval is requested.

F. H. La Guardia
F. H. LaGUARDIA,
Chairman, American Section.

per S.D.E.

Encl:
Cpy. 25th Recommendation
of Joint Defense Board.

*x249 official
x335
x48-B*

2

WVVDY

[REDACTED]

DEFENSE OF SAULT STE. MARIE
AGAINST AIR ATTACK

The Board again considered the defense of the locks and accessory installations at Sault Ste. Marie against air attack. The threat to this area is from Europe or from the Hudson Bay - James Bay area which might be used by the enemy for the concentration of gasoline and other supplies for use in subsequent air attacks by seaplanes.

The Board was informed that United States defensive forces in the Military District would be augmented in the immediate future by an antiaircraft regiment (less one gun battalion) and by a squadron of pursuit planes and a battery of barrage balloons as soon as equipment becomes available and that a general officer will be assigned to command the Military District.

The Royal Canadian Air Force stressed the impossibility of air attack from the Hudson Bay - James Bay area until after the opening of navigation which is normally around the 25th of July. The Royal Canadian Air Force in the past open season carried out reconnaissance of the Hudson Bay - James Bay area and linked all radio facilities in this area with their aircraft Detection Corps. More extensive reconnaissance of the area is planned during the danger period.

The Board adopted the following as its 25th Recommendation:

(a) That the Royal Canadian Air Force undertake to make an immediate and comprehensive further study of the data available regarding the danger of air attack to the Sault Ste. Marie area.

(b) That the Canadian Army assign a 4-gun, heavy, antiaircraft battery to Sault Ste. Marie, to protect the Canadian Locks and to tie in with the United States force in order that all-round zone defense may be established. In the event of Canada being unable to provide this equipment within the near future, the United States Army endeavor to land the necessary guns and stores for manning by the Canadian Army until such time as Canada can meet this commitment from her own production.

(c) That the said Canadian antiaircraft battery come under the operational command of the Commanding General, Sault Ste. Marie Military District, (Michigan).

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 11 1974

"O.K.
F.D.R."

Original of this recommendation
returned to Lt. Col. S. D. Embick, Room 2002,
Munitions Bldg. 3/9/72
[REDACTED] hwm

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

March 7 , 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Military Highway to Alaska.
(24th Recommendation of Permanent
Joint Board on Defense)

1. On February 11, 1942 you approved a joint proposal of the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior for the construction of the above.

2. The accompanying recommendation of the Defense Board is in accord with and furtherance of that proposal.

In order to formalize the record, a notation of your approval is requested.

3. The United States Army and Navy concur.

F. H. LaGuardia

F. H. LaGUARDIA,
Chairman, American Section.

per S. W. E.

Encl:

Cpy. 24th Recommendation
of Joint Defense Board.

x 1566

x 400 Alaska

x 129

██████████

MILITARY HIGHWAY TO ALASKA

The Board considered the increasing gravity of the military situation in the Pacific and possible developments therein affecting Alaska. The Board was informed that the United States Government believes that the construction of a land route to Alaska as an alternative to the sea route is imperative for the defense of North America and that the United States Government, for military reasons, favors the route that follows the general line of the Canadian airports, Fort St. John-Port Nelson-Watson Lake-Whitehorse-Boundary-Big Delta, the respective termini connecting with existing roads in Canada and Alaska. The Board shares this belief for the following reasons:

(1) That the effective defense of Alaska is of paramount importance to the defense of the continent against attack from the West, since Alaska is the area most exposed to an attempt by the enemy to establish a foothold in North America;

(2) That sea communications with Alaska in the future may be subject to serious interruption by enemy sea and air action;

(3) That construction of the highway will provide a secure inland route not exposed to attack from the sea, will alleviate the shipping situation, and will provide an alternate route for use in case sea communications are interrupted;

(4) That the air route to Alaska and the defense facilities in Alaska cannot be fully utilized without adequate means of a supply for the air route. This can best be provided by a highway along this route.

(5) That the additional line of communications via the inland route will be of great value in the event of an offensive against Japan projected from Alaska;

(6) That there is already on this continent a sufficient supply of land transport vehicles to enable the road to be used to its full capacity for the rapid reinforcement and supply of

-1-

██████████

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 11 1974

[REDACTED]

the forces in Alaska, without adding to the burden on industry, and that the machinery for the construction of the road is already in existence;

(7) Air transport service does not offer a practicable substitute for the proposed road because of the shortage of aircraft and of aircraft constructional facilities.

(8) That the use of Skagway as a sea terminal with a road only from Whitehorse to Fairbanks would not be a satisfactory solution of the problem. (It is understood that the Whitehorse-Fairbanks section of the highway would probably be given first construction priority.)

The proposed highway would have its southern terminus on the Edmonton, Dunvegan and British Columbian Railway, which has available carrying capacity substantially in excess of the possible carrying capacity of the road. Its northern terminus would be at a point about 60 miles south of Fairbanks on the Richardson Highway, which connects Fairbanks with Valdes. From Fairbanks there is also a railway connection with Seward. According to information furnished by General Sturdevant of the United States Army Engineers, the estimated approximate length of the road is 1,600 miles of which about 1,200 miles would be in Canada and 400 miles in Alaska; that the cost of a 24 foot gravel road capable of carrying heavy traffic during both summer and winter is likely to average in the neighborhood of \$50,000 to \$60,000 a mile; and that the total cost might conceivably exceed one hundred million and probably would not be less than seventy-five million. The information of the Canadian members in respect to costs was to the same effect.

As its TWENTY-FOURTH RECOMMENDATION, The Board accordingly, as a matter pertaining to the joint defense of Canada and the United States, recommends the construction of a highway along the route that follows the general line of airports, Fort St. John-Fort Nelson-Watson Lake-

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 11 1974

[REDACTED]

Whitehorse-Boundary-Big Delta, the respective termini connecting with existing roads in Canada and Alaska.

The Board was informed by the United States members that the United States Government appreciating the burden of the war expenditure already incurred by Canada since her entry into the war in September, 1939, and in particular on the construction of the air route to Alaska, and being convinced of the necessity of the road and the urgency of its construction, would be prepared to meet the whole of the cost of its construction and of its maintenance during the war, without asking Canada to do more than provide certain facilities as indicated below. If this offer on the part of the United States Government were accepted, that Government would:

(A) Carry out the necessary surveys for which preliminary arrangements have already been made and construct a Pioneer Road by the use of United States Engineer troops for surveys and initial construction (It would expect to complete this work during the current year and is advised that the Pioneer Road should be sufficiently advanced to be capable next winter of carrying a small amount of emergency traffic);

(B) Arrange for the highway's completion under contracts made by the United States Public Roads Administration and awarded with a view to insuring the execution of all contracts in the shortest possible time without regard to whether the contractors were Canadian or American (It expects that the road should be able to carry traffic to its full capacity not later than the end of 1943);

(C) Maintain the highway until the termination of the present war unless the Government of Canada prefers to assume responsibility at an earlier date for the maintenance of so much of it as lies in Canada;

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JCS Memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 11 1974

[REDACTED]

(D) Agree that at the conclusion of the war that that part of the highway in Canada shall become in all respects an integral part of the Canadian Highway system subject to the understanding that there shall at no time be imposed any discriminatory conditions in relation to the use of the road by Canadian or United States civilian traffic.

In the event of this proposal being accepted, the United States Government would ask the Canadian Government to agree:

(A) To acquire rights of way for the road in Canada, the title to remain in the Crown; in the right of Canada or of the Province of British Columbia as appears most convenient;

(B) To waive import duties, transit or similar charges on shipments originating in the United States and transported over the highway to Alaska, or originating in Alaska and transported over the highway to the United States;

(C) To waive import duties, sales taxes, license fees or other similar charges on all equipment and supplies to be used in the construction or maintenance of the road and on personal effects of the construction personnel;

(D) To take the necessary steps to facilitate the admission into Canada of such United States citizens as may be employed in the construction or maintenance of the highway, it being understood that the United States will assume the expense of repatriating any such persons if the contractors fail to do so.

"O.K.
F.D.R."

Original of this returned to Lt Gen. S.D.
Embick 3/9/42, Room 2002, Munitions Bldg.
[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 11 1974

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

October 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

I do want to see La Guardia
on Saturday or Sunday. Will you
give the attached to me when he
comes in?

F. D. R.

10-5-42

Respectfully referred to
the President.

E.M.W.



CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

B.F.
*Permanent Joint Board on
Defense*

October 3, 1942.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Chief:

x 490
The Permanent Joint Board on Defense has just returned from a tour of Newfoundland including Labrador. I am enclosing report and my personal observations which I submitted to Lieutenant General Drum, Commanding the Eastern Section.

x 48-71 *at Gander* *x 174*
You will be glad to hear that I met Elliot just before he took off. He was in fine spirit and looked great. He had command of a bombing squadron and all of his men were in fine shape, enthusiastic and ready to go. The weather was favorable that evening with a good tail wind and I was happy to note their safe landing.

At your convenience, I would like to discuss the civilian public health situation in Newfoundland. I sincerely believe that it is something that should not be neglected. The expense will be very little and the task not very great. The most difficult part of it would be to negotiate some sort of an arrangement with the Commission Government of Newfoundland. I think it can be done. I will be glad to come to Washington any time you may indicate that it is convenient to you.

Your trip was great.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Fruelle

x PP71376



CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

October 3, 1942.

Major General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
Washington D. C.

Dear Pa:

Will you please see that the President
gets the enclosed.

Sincerely,

Rockefeller

[REDACTED]

October 1, 1942.

M E M O R A N D U M

From: F. H. LA GUARDIA - Chairman, American Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

To: Lieutenant General HUGH A DRUM - Eastern Section Command.

Subject: OBSERVATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND

It occurred to me that you would want to have my observation of a quick tour made with the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, of bases in Newfoundland, including Labrador.

1. We found conditions much better than we had expected. Construction is progressing very satisfactorily. It is really astounding how much construction has been fully completed, or up to the stage of being serviceable. The morale of our troops is excellent. The cooperation between American troops and Canadian is all that can be expected and the feeling between officer and enlisted personnel is sincerely friendly and wholesome.
2. Goose is a veritable beehive. The construction of the American section is going up splendidly and a great deal of work will be done before freezing weather sets in. I did not have an opportunity to attend any of the pilots briefing meetings here. The Senior Commanding Officer, Colonel A. D. Smith, has the situation well in hand and is most enthusiastic in his work and seems to be the right man in the right place. Accommodations for ferrying pilots may yet be improved and that is only a matter of time. Recreation for the men is one of the difficult problems. There is absolutely nothing in the immediate vicinity. I strongly recommend more USO activity and more recreational equipment to be shipped in before freezing time. Colonel Smith seems to get along very nicely with the Canadian Commanding Officer.
3. Gander -- the housing facilities here are advanced much farther than at Goose, being in use a longer time. The routine for pilots briefing before hopping off, weather reports and forecasts, has been very well worked out. The information is given in a most friendly and kindly manner and seems to be well worked out in every detail. Gander is kept under the direct eye of Major General Brant.

x4675

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 11 1974

Relations between the United States Commanding Officers and the Canadian Commanding Officers here are also very cordial, friendly and wholesome. It would seem that eventually Goose will have the greater portion of the ferrying traffic.

4. Unity of Command -- I will first discuss unity of command and in this and following paragraphs will touch upon conditions at Tor Bay, St. Johns and Argentia. For the moment the question of unified command has been settled. I gave you details of our discussion on this subject this morning. Major General Brant and Major General Paige have worked out an agreement between themselves, based on their understanding of the provisions and meaning of Section 22 of ABC, and strategical command was given to the Senior Officer, which happens to be General Paige. I said this agreement is satisfactory for the "present" because I see it as satisfactory only because of the personalities of the individuals involved. General Brant is a competent, able, experienced and forceful person, has self-confidence and knows very well that in the event of an attack he would dominate, and has no misgivings who the actual Commander would be. He is perfectly reassured on this, and is so big as to let the other fellow take the title. What worries me is, supposed there should be a change. No one could be assured that our interests and the proper carrying out of the task would fall into competent hands. This all goes back to the real meaning of Section 22 of ABC. Personally I am not sure that it provides for the command to be given to the Senior Officer at present (I have not the agreement before me). Any formula which provides command in any given theatre where there are troops of more than one nation, to the Senior Officer is just not logical or constructive. Under this formula, particularly in the western hemisphere, the United States would constantly be at a disadvantage. Small countries like Canada and Mexico always have greater number of general officers in proportion to the relative strength of the respective armies. These small countries can always create Lieutenant Generals, Field Marshals, etc., and besides when it comes to seniority, there always is an abundance of politicians who have both rank and seniority. I strongly urge that the agreement be clarified to the extent that supreme command be given in each theatre to the commanding officer of the largest force there present. That would solve our trouble, I am sure, in all theatres affecting joint defense of Canada and the United States.

The American base at St. Johns is beautifully situated and construction well advanced. Here too, the relations between officer and enlisted personnel of the two forces are excellent. Additional land should be acquired by the United States at the earliest possible moment in accordance with the recommendations made by General Brant. It would be economy to do so. Claims for damages will continue and are liable to run high, but what is more important is that these claims are sources of irritation and should be eliminated.

Argentia -- Wonders in construction have been accomplished here also. This is a very busy area containing the Naval Base and Fort McAndrews. Cooperation and team-work between the army and the navy is so surprisingly fine that it just overwhelms me, still retaining memories of the last war. Here too, additional land should be acquired by the United States government. Recommendations have been submitted and are awaiting approval. All the guns have not yet arrived, but beds and foundations have been completed and are ready to receive the guns. Very clever defense locations have been selected -- some are already in operation. The installation of the system of communications has overcome a great many difficulties and is now in operation. Personally I believe more guns are needed and surely there are not sufficient anti-aircraft batteries. This brings up the offensive force and equipment of our bases, and frankly, fighting and bombing planes are woefully lacking. The number of planes on hand is nothing short of pathetic.

We have been saying a great deal about the strategic value of the bases acquired in Newfoundland. The American people have been given assurance that this outpost is our first defense against any air attack on the northern section of the Atlantic Coast. As I understood it, that was the real purpose of establishing bases on Newfoundland. As the situation now stands, there are not sufficient planes to repulse an air fleet on its way to the United States, or to destroy a plane carrier taking them over, or to maintain an efficient, wide scale patrol for submarines.

I strongly recommend at least four or five additional bombing squadrons, three or four additional pursuit squadrons and the necessary observation planes to round out as a complete organization the increased air force here recommended. I want to point out that I fully appreciate the demands for planes here and elsewhere. I have, though, taken into consideration, the number of planes that are being ferried, and have given thought to a plan whereby a certain amount of planes could always be held in Newfoundland as a reserve for any unforeseen situation elsewhere farther east. A number of squadrons in Newfoundland could be staggered in such a way that after a certain number of months at these bases where opportunities for training are excellent and climatic conditions such as to create splendid experience, they could be replaced by others and then moved on to Great Britain, or elsewhere where service is more active. These men would have had additional experience and would have acquired additional confidence in themselves and would be far better prepared than going fresh from the home fields to the battle-front in Europe. I do not mean to suggest a weekly turn-over, thereby giving little benefits to the personnel and little efficiency to the task at Newfoundland, but the staggering on the basis of say at least four months' periods. This plan would decrease the normal supply of planes to Great Britain only slightly for a very short period. However, let not this suggestion weaken my urgent personal plea for additional planes at the earliest possible moment at these bases, which include Goose, Gander, Tor Bay, St. Johns and Argentia.

5. Roads -- There is urgent need for more roads. There is no use expecting the government of Newfoundland to construct any. If we need them, as I believe we do, negotiations should be initiated immediately with the Newfoundland Government and we prepare to construct the roads and pay for them.
6. Health --- The health of our troops up to this time has been excellent. I believe ample provisions have been made for their proper care during the severe winter. Venereal disease is still a problem. This brings up the subject of the public health condition among civilians in the entire Newfoundland-Labrador country. I intend to take this matter up with the United States Public Health Service and interest the President in seeking to negotiate a plan with the Government of Newfoundland. Military forces will not be able to cope with the situation as it now stands.

It would be great economy in money as well as personnel if grant and aid were given to the Newfoundland Government to establish clinics for the treatment of infected civilians. At the present time there is no provision for this and as far as I have been able to ascertain no money, personnel or equipment to take care of it. A system of clinics with American supervision and local nurses and perhaps doctors, would in a great measure eliminate the venereal disease problem. Tuberculosis is another problem that unless very carefully watched, might grow into a menace to the health of our troops. I will also discuss this subject with the United States Public Health Service.

7. Relations with Civilian Authorities -- As could be expected many problems are presenting themselves. None I consider serious. Jurisdictional questions are bound to arise where troops are stationed in a foreign-friendly country. The smaller the country the more difficult the problem. Here we have a very small country and a small population. The American Consul General is rendering excellent service to the armed forces in this respect. General Brant has adopted the policy of referring all these matters to the State Department. A well-balanced, seasoned, experienced, patient man who has had experience in civil government might be commissioned in the army to serve as liaison officer between the American command and the Newfoundland civil authorities. He must be tactful and should be provided with a small contingent fund for incidental expenses. Proper accommodations should be provided for him in the City of St. Johns and not on the army post. If he has a tactful wife, accustomed to social activities pertaining to civil officials, he should be permitted to take her along. The problem is not serious, but just as above indicated, must be met on the level we find.