I suggest further study of another stop because none of us can be certain that we would obtain international recognition of American jurisdiction in the South Polar region by merely issuing Executive Orders. I suggest that Admiral Byrd and Mr. Ellsworth might be consulted on estimates of annual costs. Of course, the principal occupations for it is in geological and meteorological and zoological and botanical for the Cape of Good Hope now being explored in the South Polar region by Mr. Byrd and Interior Department would place men ashore at Little America and at the region Ellsworth might be sent to two separate South Polar regions an expedition every autumn to get snowed in there until the early Spring when it begins to get dark and take them on board ship again, repeating that this might be carried out as a comparatively low cost. I have received your letter in regard to a suggestion to cooperate with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to work out concrete suggestions. I suggest that you as the Interior Secretary might be placed under that Department immediately.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the oral directions given by you last spring the Department of State has had under consideration the formulation of a policy designed to protect such territorial rights as the United States possesses in the Arctic and Antarctic regions.

American policy with respect to assertions of sovereignty over territory in the Polar regions has in recent years been based on the application to the Polar regions of principles of international law developed, in the main, to control the acquisition of sovereignty over newly discovered territory in the more temperate zones. This policy has been concisely stated in a letter regarding Wilkes Land, in the Antarctic, written by Secretary of State Hughes to the Secretary of the Republican Publicity Association on May 13, 1924, in which it was stated:

"It

The President,
The White House."
"It is the opinion of the Department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country."

In my opinion the foregoing expression of policy fails to take into consideration the climatic conditions peculiar to the Polar regions and over-emphasizes the necessity of "effective occupation" as a condition incident to the acquisition of Polar sovereignty. It is of interest in this connection to note the apparent change of viewpoint of Mr. Charles Cheney Hyde, formerly Solicitor of the Department of State, who assisted in drafting the above-mentioned letter and who has recently written:

"The possibility that valuable mineral and other resources exist in Polar regions such as the Antarctic - and of which Admiral Byrd's testimony encourages the expectation - must inspire caution on the part of a state whose explorers have made distinguished achievements in its behalf, lest by inadvertence or perhaps by undue respect for the requirements of the law applicable to temperate zones, it may default and find itself deprived in the estimation of an international tribunal of the slightest vestige of a right in something greatly useful to itself. It reveals no dog in the manger policy when, uncertain of what the future may bring, such a state is alert to preserve its rights, whatever they may be, and not find itself caught napping."

Although the United States has not asserted any formal claim to territory in the Polar regions, such rights as it may have acquired by reason of the activities of American citizens in those regions have been reserved in conversations and
and correspondence with representatives of foreign governments. I am inclined to believe, however, that these naked reservations of American rights would, alone, have little practical weight in an ultimate settlement of Polar territorial questions when balanced against the positive steps to preserve their territorial rights which have been and are being taken by other countries pursuing vigorous and acquisitive Polar policies.

The development of trans-Arctic aviation; the existence of valuable fisheries in both the North and South Polar regions; the reports of potential mineral and fuel resources in the Antarctic; the interest of our own War and Navy Departments arising out of strategic considerations and considerations of national defense; the measures being taken by the Soviet, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, French and Norwegian Governments to establish more firmly their Polar claims; and the recently expressed interest of the German and Japanese Embassies at Washington in newspaper reports of possible American claims in the Antarctic warrant, in my opinion, early and serious consideration of the measures which should be taken by the United States to assert its claims, before the successful assertion of such claims is prejudiced through further undue delay.

A step
A step in the direction of more positive action by this Government in connection with its possible claims is indicated in the following quotation from an instruction dated August 30, 1938, from the Secretary of State to the American Consul at Capetown, regarding the Antarctic expedition now being undertaken by Mr. Lincoln Ellsworth:

"Upon the arrival of Mr. Ellsworth in Capetown you are requested to inform him, in strict confidence, that it seems appropriate for him to assert claims in the name of the United States as an American citizen, to all territory he may explore, photograph, or map which has hitherto been undiscovered and unexplored, regardless of whether or not it lies within a sector or sphere of influence already claimed by any other country. It is, of course, preferable that such claims shall relate to territories not already claimed by another country. Reassertion of American claims to territory visited by American explorers several decades ago would seem to be appropriate if he should desire to explore such areas. You may suggest the possibility of dropping notes or personal proclamations, attached to parachutes, containing assertions of claims, and subsequently making public the text of such claims, together with approximate latitude and longitude of the points concerned. It should be made clear to Ellsworth that he should not indicate or imply advance knowledge or approval of the Government of the United States but that he should leave it for this Government to adopt its own course of action."

Further steps which might be taken in connection with the safeguarding of American claims in the Polar regions are:

1. A determination
1. A determination of the lands and islands in the Polar regions to which the United States is clearly entitled to assert a claim because of discoveries, explorations and other acts of officers and men of official American expeditions, and of American citizens.

2. The assumption by the United States of the position that the so-called "sector principle" under which the Soviet Union, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Great Britain have laid claim to all land, discovered and undiscovered, in large pie-shaped areas converging at one of the Poles, is not an established principle of international law; and that sovereignty cannot be acknowledged in advance of the discovery of territory and the exercise therein of acts essential to the establishment of sovereignty, or through international agreements to which the United States is a party.

3. A modification of the American position that sovereignty in the Polar regions should be based, among other factors, on "effective occupation", as that term is understood when applied to territories in the temperate zones. The United States might take the position that appropriate bases for sovereignty claims in the Polar areas should be discovery, followed by "constructive occupation", such as exploration, the exercise in the

claimed
claimed territory of administrative functions, et cetera, coupled with a formal claim to possession.

4. The exercise of acts of sovereignty in the claimed areas, such as the issuance of an Executive Order placing these areas under some branch of the Government for administrative purposes as was done in the cases of Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Canton and Enderbury Islands.

5. Since it would be impracticable for climatic and other reasons physically to occupy the territory claimed for the United States, means should be found to give official sanction to acts and explorations of American citizens which might be considered as "constructive occupation" of the territories in question.

If you concur in the foregoing statements of general policy I propose, with your approval, to request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate officers of their respective Departments to meet with representatives of this Department and to give further detailed study to the problems involved, on the basis of which concrete suggestions may be formulated for your consideration. Representatives of other Government agencies, in particular the Department of the Interior and the Coast Guard.
Guard, might also be included from time to time in the conferences on this question.

There are attached hereto two maps indicating the principal discoveries and sovereignty claims in the Arctic and Antarctic regions.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

Two maps.
February 6, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE and UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Do you think a reply to Signor Mussolini's letter is advisable or called for?

F. D. R.

Copy of letter from Sumner Welles, State Dept., 2/3/39 to the President, with attached copy of translation of letter of 1/11/39 addressed to the President by Premier Mussolini on the Jewish refugees question which is in reply to the President's letter on the same subject. Miss Tully has the original of these letters and the carbon copy of the President's memo as above. The papers were sent to the Secretary of State.
March 6, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

We have only today received from the German Embassy the official request for an exequatur in favor of Captain Wiedemann.

At your suggestion before you left on your recent trip, I asked Mr. Lamar Hardy to call to see me and inquire whether Captain Wiedemann was in any way implicated in the testimony in the recent spy trial in New York. Mr. Hardy told me that no evidence involving Captain Wiedemann had been found and that the latter's name had only appeared in the trial in connection with the photograph taken at the German Embassy in Washington during his last visit to the United States.

Recent telegrams and despatches from Berlin have indicated that Captain Wiedemann has been urging a moderate policy on the part of the German regime, and that this had been the cause of the successful efforts on the part of von Ribbentrop and other extremists in persuading Hitler to remove him from the scene by appointing him Consul General in the United States.

The President,

The White House.
We have already arranged to have his activities closely followed and this procedure will be continued after he reaches San Francisco.

In view of the above, is it satisfactory to you that we acquiesce in the granting of the exequatur now requested in the usual routine fashion?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Summer Welles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Warm Springs, Ga.,
April 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

Please read enclosed from Bill Phillips and return to me.

I occurs to me that it might be a good thing to send a copy of my "curtain lecture" to Colonna in confidence to Phillips, Bullitt and Kennedy. Also I think we might send a copy of your memorandum of it to Halifax and Chamberlain for their confidential information. It all ties in with the current picture.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you speak to me about this at your leisure?

F. D. R.

Letter from Sumner Welles, State Dept., 4/5/39 to the President, with enclosed memorandum prepared by S. W. Bogg, Geographer of the State Dept., in re Easter Island. Also attached is part of H.O. chart No. 1119. Copy of Mr. Welles' letter retained for our files.

W. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. INGLING

The President, in going over some old papers recently, sent the attached letter and its enclosures to me, along with a number of other items.

I think the attached material should be kept in the files of the White House for possible future reference.

[Signature]

D. J. GALLAGHER
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 5, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

With further reference to your recent memorandum on the subject of Easter Island, I am enclosing herewith a memorandum prepared by the Geographer of the Department which I believe will give you the precise information concerning the Island that you desire.

I have written a personal letter to Norman Armour asking for certain further information with regard to the attitude of the Chilean Government in connection with a possible cession of the Island and as soon as I have a reply from him, I will inform you accordingly.

Believe me
Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
EASTER ISLAND

Location. The position of Easter Island (c. 27° 09' S., 109° 26' W.) in relation to other Pacific lands, is indicated in the following table of distances.

Approximate distances from Easter Island

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nautical miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama Canal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Circle route, Panama to Wellington (distance to southeast of the great circle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valparaiso, Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao, Peru (approximately the nearest continental point)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sala y Gomez (nearest island)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitcairn Island (nearest inhabited island)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Description. Easter Island (Rapa Nui) is triangular, about 14.5 statute miles long E.N.E.-W.S.W., and 7 miles wide, N.W.-S.E.; area, approximately 40 square miles.

Nearly
Nearly all coasts are bound by cliffs, 50 to 1,000 feet high. The treeless hills are smooth, rounded and green to the summit; the highest, Mt. Terevuka, is 1,969 feet. The island is entirely volcanic in origin, with numerous extinct or dormant volcanoes. No eruption or earthquake has been known in historic time.

Climate. Temperatures above 80° F. and below 50° are rare. The mean summer temperature, January to March, is about 74°, and in the coolest season, June to October, it is about 65° F. Variable rainfall, averaging 50 inches a year, is barely sufficient to make the island productive.

Southeast trade winds are constant from October to April, when there are only occasional showers. From May to September, when northerly and westerly winds prevail, there is more rain; southwest winter winds are accompanied by rain and heavy sea.

Adaptability to ships and airplanes. The island possesses no harbor, and no permanently sheltered roadstead, but temporary anchorage, with sand bottom and occasional rocky patches, may readily be found on the lee side of the island.
Seaplanes could probably alight and take off, in moderate weather, in the open coves on the lee side of the island. The island is apparently not adapted to the use of land planes.

Maps and charts. British foreign office handbook No. 142 (1920) says:

The British and American charts differ considerably in detail. Of the two the American is the later. The Chilean chart appears to be mainly a copy of the British. [p. 35.]

It is therefore somewhat surprising that the American H.O. chart No. 1119 (1925, corrected to 1934) is "from a Chilean Government chart of 1918", and that the authorities cited are:

- British Admiralty chart No. 1386
- Chilean Chart former No. 53
- U. S. Hydrographic Office Publications

A copy of part of the H.O. chart is attached.

The people and their history. The population, of Polynesian stock with Melanesian negroid admixture, numbered about 450 in 1935. Perhaps there were 2,500 when Roggeveen discovered and named Easter Island in 1722. (The first American to visit the island is believed to be Amasa Delano, 1802.) Slave raids and disease have reduced
reduced the population at times to a tenth the original numbers.

The present inhabitants are direct descendants of the people who fashioned the island's numerous remarkable sculptures, cut with stone implements from soft and easily worked stone consisting of compressed volcanic ash. These monolithic statues, weighing many tons, were carved in the quarry in the crater of Rano Roraku, and were transported and erected in many parts of the island. Unique ideographic script, incised on wooden tablets, has also been the subject of much speculation.

Enclosure:

Part of H.O. chart No. 1119.
11 April, 1939.

MEMORANDUM

Referring to Page 3 of Mr. Boggs Memorandum relative to Easter Island, under heading "Maps and Charts".

It appears that the American chart referred to in the British foreign office handbook No. 142 (1920) was a copy of Hydrographic Office Chart No. 1119 (7th Ed. Aug. 1919) on issue at that time (1920), which was based on a Chilean Government Survey in 1870 with additions and corrections in 1886 by the U.S.S. MOHICAN, and consequently quite different from the present Hydrographic Office Chart No. 1119 (8th Ed. Printed Feb. 1939) which is based on Chilean Government Chart No. 69 published in 1918.

British Admiralty Chart No. 1386 is based on the same Chilean Government Chart published in 1918. The accompanying copy of the present H.O. Chart No. 1119 carries lines of offshore soundings around Easter Island taken partly from sonic soundings by the Belgian Training Ship MERCATOR and partly from French Chart No. 5774 (received 13 May, 1937).
From a Chilean Government chart of 1918

Oba Spot s Lat. 27°08'37" S. Long. 109°26'10" W.


SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS
HEIGHTS IN FEET
 Contour interval 100 ft.
 9. sand, 10 shells, 8 stones

Natural Scale 100,000

AUTHORITIES
British Admiralty Chart No. 1316
Chilean Chart former No. 53
U.S. Hydrographic Office Publications

North Cape

109°10' W.

Part of H.O. Chart No. 1119
2nd edition, Oct. 1915
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE and UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you please be studying with the Treasury the following, in case it becomes necessary to take some sort of action.

(1) Stopping draft payments to Italy -- most of which are sent by immigrant families in the United States.

(2) The same thing in relation to remittances to Germany.

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied memo. Memo sent to the Secretary of State.
April 18, 1939.

Mr. President:

Remembering our brief discussion on the Labor Party on Sunday night, I am enclosing a memorandum which I prepared for Secretary Hull on the position of the Labor Party in Britain. I am sure that you are right in discerning a move toward national concentration in Britain and it seems to me that this move must come if the present line of foreign policy is to be sincerely carried through: moreover, there are elements in the labor movement (notably Ernest Bevin, who has cooperated with the Government in the industrial field, and Herbert Morrison, who has directed the Government's air raid precautions program in London) who would no doubt join the Government in a national emergency.

At the same time, it seems probable that conscription will become more
more and more significant as an issue in the future of British politics. In the past this issue has served to hinder a peace alliance between labor and the dissident conservatives, since the latter support conscription while the labor leadership is pledged to oppose it. At the moment, it seems to me that while many conservatives desire conscription and welcome the change in British foreign policy, since it may enable conscription to be carried through, Mr. Chamberlain himself may still regard it as a measure which would adversely affect his basic policy of appeasement. His present scheme of a voluntary register seems to be more a measure of controlling working-class forces than of preparing for war.

This measure has been enthusiastically supported by certain trade union leaders, and I am sure that if no further steps are taken these groups may agree to take more active participation in the government of Great Britain.
If this happens it would serve to obscure all issues in the coming general election.

P.S. Please forgive the dilapidated state of this memorandum. It has passed through many hands.
I think this is a splendid memorandum which Michael Straight has prepared on the British Labor Movement. I am inclined to think that this would be of general interest to higher officers of the Department. Will you be good enough to use your discretion in giving it circulation?

I hope you will congratulate Straight on this really very illuminating and constructive piece of work.

G.S.M. Messer'smith

March 21, 1939.
I request R.E. to give this view for the President to read.
May 18, 1939.

U: Mr. Welles.

S: Mr. Secretary.

Herewith a memorandum, prepared by PA/H and FE, in which there is discussed the question whether the American landed armed forces now stationed in Peiping and Tientsin might not to advantage be withdrawn at this time.

In the memorandum there is expressed the conclusion that considerations contra making this change outweigh considerations pro.

In as much as the President has spoken to you in regard to the matter and in as much as he has suggested that a telegram be sent to Ambassador Johnson asking the Ambassador to inquire of Chiang Kai-shek whether the Chinese Government would perceive objection to withdrawal at this time of our marines from Peiping and Tientsin, it is suggested that you may care to give the President the attached memorandum and discuss with him the subject under reference.
May 18, 1939.

American Landed Armed Forces at Peiping and Tientsin.
(Four companies of marines)

Question has been raised whether the American landed armed forces now stationed in Peiping and Tientsin might not to advantage be withdrawn at this time.

It is believed that considerations contra making this change outweigh considerations pro.

DISCUSSION:

It will be remembered that for many years preceding January 1938 the United States maintained at Peiping a marine guard and at Tientsin a force of infantry; that in January 1938 decision was made to withdraw the infantry force; that in March 1938 that force (15th United States Infantry, approximately 800 men) was withdrawn; and that from the marine guard at Peiping two companies were then sent to Tientsin. At present the American landed armed forces in north China consist of two companies of marines at Peiping and two companies of marines at Tientsin, total 587 officers and men. The landed armed forces of other foreign countries, other than Japan, at Peiping and Tientsin as of May 14, 1939, are in numbers as follows: British, 851; French, 419; Italian (at Tientsin only), 126.
The legal authority for the stationing of foreign landed armed forces in the Peiping-Tientsin area lies in the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

The mission of the American landed armed forces in that area is that of providing special protection (especially from the psychological point of view) for the lives, property and legitimate activities of American nationals and, in case of emergency that might call for evacuation, making available an armed escort. One very important feature of the present functioning of these forces is that of maintaining communications (by radio), for the benefit both of the American Government and (when other means of communication are interrupted) of American nationals in general, between Peiping and Tientsin and the rest of the world, especially the United States.

Considerations Pro Withdrawal

1. Japanese military forces are now in control of the cities and area under reference and of the lines of communication to the sea; the Japanese have set up a (puppet) Chinese administration there; and impression exists that there prevail conditions of order and security.

2. Impression exists that, American or Japanese armed forces being in juxtaposition, there may develop friction and clashes; and that there in the future to develop strained
strained relations between the United States and Japan, the position of these American forces might become one of extraordinary and embarrassing hazard.

Considerations Contra Withdrawal

1. Notwithstanding the fact that Japanese military forces are in control of the area and are (through Chinese puppets) administering it, conditions of order and security are not assured: on the contrary, active Chinese opposition to the existing Japanese-Chinese régime continues and the situation is one in which there are likely to occur at any time serious disturbances in the midst of which the presence of American armed forces would contribute substantially toward making safe the position of American nationals and giving assurance that, if evacuation were called for, the services of a reliable armed escort would be available.

2. The presence of the armed forces under reference makes possible the maintenance of direct and uninterrupted local communication (by radio) at all times between the American communities, official and unofficial, and the outside world.

3. The presence of the armed forces under reference has a definite psychological effect: on the one hand it gives the American communities a sense of security and on the other hand it has a restraining influence on lawless elements or individuals which, in the absence of such forces, might be inclined to make attacks upon American nationals or to interfere unlawfully with legitimate American activities.
4. Withdrawal of these forces at this time would be regarded by Chinese and Japanese authorities as an indication of an inclination on the part of the American Government to abandon its defense of its treaty position in China and to leave our nationals residing and carrying on business there to their own devices. It would be variously interpreted by Chinese and Japanese as animated by fear of involvement with the Japanese and as signifying tacit assent on the part of the American Government to changes brought about in north China by the Japanese military. Those Japanese who interpreted the move as being due to fear would probably become more arrogant and aggressive in their contacts with Americans, and in consequence of that development the likelihood of there occurring incidents between Japanese and Americans would be increased.

5. Withdrawal of the American forces would be regarded by British and French authorities as (1) abandonment by the United States of its share of the long established common responsibility of affording protection to foreign lives and property in the area under reference; as (2) a further breaking down of the system of cooperative action which has long been an objective of American policy in connection with the relations of the principal treaty powers in and regarding China; and as (3) a new blow to the position in
in China of the "Protocol" powers. The British and the French Governments would probably look upon this country's action as a defection, as an abandonment of the American sector of the common diplomatic front which has been fairly well maintained since the outbreak of and during the present Sino-Japanese hostilities.

6. The Japanese military are at this time actively considering possible moves toward seizing control of the International Settlement at Shanghai, the British and the French Concessions at Tientsin, and possibly the Legation Quarter at Peiping. Withdrawal of the American marines from Peiping and Tientsin at this moment would be likely to be interpreted by the Japanese military as giving them a free field, so far as the United States is concerned, toward taking such steps as they see fit in those directions.

With regard to the impression, mentioned under "Considerations Pro Withdrawal", that, American or Japanese armed forces being in juxtaposition, there may develop friction and clashes, etc., it is believed that the risk of such a development has at no time been great and is surely no greater today than it has been in the past. In fact, in the light of many indications that the Japanese Government is specially desirous of not antagonizing the United States,
United States, it is probable that such a risk is less today than it has been in the past.

CONCLUSION

In the light of many considerations, both historical and actual, it is believed that the present moment would be highly inopportune for withdrawal from Peiping and Tientsin of the small forces of marines which this Government still maintains at those points. It is realized that there may not for a long time to come arrive a moment entirely opportune for the withdrawal of these forces. The future being not predictable, but the present being susceptible of analysis with a reasonable degree of assurance, it is felt that withdrawal of these forces at this time would entail a balance of definite disadvantage. We regard as especially important an assurance of uninterrupted communications and avoidance of unwarranted implications and inferences (on the part of Chinese and Japanese and of Europeans) in regard to the attitude and policy of the United States. We therefore strongly recommend that withdrawal of these forces be not made under the circumstances and in the situation which now prevails.

(Note: In case the recommendation above made be not adopted, and if decision is arrived at to make at this time the withdrawal under consideration, it would still be highly desirable that, before making the withdrawal, this Government confer with the Governments of Great Britain and France, in view of the community of rights and
and obligations in regard to the maintenance of the military establishments at the places under reference which exist between and among this Government and the Governments of Great Britain and France, and of the community of interests which exists in relation to many problems which have arisen and will arise out of the present situation in the Far East.)
S

Mr. Secretary:

Referring to the memorandum of May 16 on the subject "American Landed Armed Forces at Peiping and Tientsin", the subject matter of which we have suggested that you discuss with the President, it is believed that it might be useful if there were attached to the memorandum, for the information of the President, a copy of telegram no. 11, May 17, 6 p.m., to the American Consul at Amoy, which shows the type of instruction under which American armed forces in China are functioning. A copy of that telegram is attached.

FE:MMH:EJL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A) May 17, 1939. 6 p. m.

AMERICAN CONSUL

AMOY (CHINA) VIA N.R.

RUSH

Il

There is quoted below for your confidential information and guidance the text of a telegram which the Department sent the American Embassy at Nanking on August 10, 1937, reading as follows:

QUOTE In the light of a considerable amount of apprehensive speculation in certain quarters with regard to the safety of American nationals at various points in China and of concern regarding the mission of and possible involvement of our armed forces there, we are trying to make clear, in responsible circles, this Department's concept of the mission and function of the United States armed forces in China.

It should be realized and be kept in mind at all times that the mission of these forces has not been and is not repeat not one of offensive action against
against authorized armed forces of China or of any other country; and it is not repeat not one of coercion of the Chinese or any other foreign governments. The primary function of these forces is to provide special protection for American nationals. Incidental to protection of life comes protection of property, but protection of property as such is not repeat not a primary objective. These forces are in no repeat no sense expeditionary forces. They are not repeat not in occupation of an enemy territory nor are they defending territory of the United States. They are expected to protect lives but they are not repeat not expected to hold positions regardless of hazards. They would be expected to repel threatened incursions of mobs or of disorganized or unauthorized soldiery, but they would not repeat not be expected to hold a position against a responsibly directed operation of occupation on the part of armed forces of another country acting on express high authority. Situations may arise in which, for the protection of lives, the logical procedure will become that of evacuation. Confronted with such a situation, the function of American official agencies would
would become that of calling for and making possible evacuation in an orderly manner and with a maximum of safety; the function of the armed forces would become that of assisting in the making of arrangements, of providing armed escort, facilities (including, where possible, means of conveyance, etc.), and of general assistance in the activities of evacuation as such. Presumably the necessity for such action, if it develops, will be sufficiently foreseeable, as regards time factor, to permit of appropriate communication between and among the appropriate agencies of the American Government concerned. Presumably, also, such necessity as may confront any one of the foreign countries concerned will likewise confront all, and constant consultation among their representatives on the spot and with their own governments in regard to developments will contribute toward making possible common and simultaneous action if and when called for in this connection.

It cannot be too often or too emphatically stated that the primary purpose for which American armed forces are maintained in China today is protection and safeguarding of the lives of our nationals. Protection of property may
be incidental and in some situations directly contributory to safeguarding of life, but is a secondary objective and should in no repeat no circumstances be permitted to stand in the way of the carrying out of the primary objective.

In the performance of their respective functions, officers of the various agencies of the Government, aware of the concept outlined above, will conduct the operations for which they are respectively responsible on the basis each of his own best judgment, in cooperation with other agencies, of ways and means appropriate to his agency under the circumstances with which they find themselves confronted.

Please promptly repeat this telegram to Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Tsingtao, and instruct the officers in charge at those places to bring the contents of this telegram informally and in confidence to the attention of the commanding officers of American armed forces at those places, with explanation that this material is for general orientation of all American agencies concerned and is believed to be in no repeat no way inconsistent with but merely expository of existing orders or instructions from the various Departments under
5-#11, To Amoy, May 17, 6 p.m.

under which the various agencies respectively function.
UNQUOTE.

Please bring the contents of this telegram informally and in confidence to the attention of the senior American naval officer at Amoy.

HULL

FE :MNH :EJL   FE   PA/H
My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of June 26th, in which you direct that all investigations of espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department; and that no investigation in this field is to be conducted by any other investigative agency of the Government.

Your instructions in this matter will be carried out by Treasury personnel.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

Referring to your memorandum of June 26, 1939, relative to the handling of espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters, I find that on March 14, 1939, the Chief Inspector of this Department instructed his organization to report promptly to the nearest field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information received concerning espionage and other subversive activities. Since receiving your memorandum these instructions have been reissued and extended to cover specifically espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters.

Sincerely yours,

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

After a careful check-up on this matter of espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage, I agree that the principal work in this country should be done under the leadership of the F. B. I., C-3 Section of the War Department and O. N. I. of the Navy Department.

This does not mean that the intelligence work of the State Department should cease in any way. It should be carried on as heretofore but the directors of the three agencies should be constantly kept in touch by the State Department with the work it is doing.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE POSTMASTER GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

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I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR - THE SECRETARY OF STATE  

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  

THE SECRETARY OF WAR  

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  

THE POSTMASTER GENERAL  

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
June 26, 1939

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Signed (Franklin D. Roosevelt)
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(Handwritten) Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/24/39

MEMO FOR R. F.

I think the proposed letter to the seven Cabinet officers is 'OK.

Please make out seven copies for me to sign.

I am dictating a memorandum to the Secretary of State to go with his copy.

F. D. R.
The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I desire to direct your attention to the importance of investigations involving espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage. For some time an informal committee composed of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of War, the Department of Justice, the Post Office Department, and the Department of the Navy, has been acting as a clearing house for data or information concerning such matters. Such data or information was then transmitted to one of the investigative agencies for further action. The great majority of the investigations in this field have been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

Experience has shown that handling such matters through a committee such as is described above, is neither effective nor desirable. On the other hand, the three investigative agencies last mentioned have not only gathered a tremendous reservoir of information concerning foreign agencies operating in the United States, but have also perfected methods of investigation and have developed channels for the exchange of information, which are both efficient and so mobile and elastic as to permit prompt expansion in the event of an emergency.

As of course you are aware, the Department of Justice has developed in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation a highly skilled investigative force supported by the resources of an exceedingly efficient, well equipped, and adequately manned technical laboratory and identification division. The latter contains identifying data relating to more than ten million persons, including a very large number of individuals of foreign extraction. As a result of an exchange of data between the Departments of Justice, War and Navy, comprehensive indices have been prepared.

With a view to organizing investigative activities in this field on a more efficient and effective basis, I recommend the abandonment of the interdepartmental committee above mentioned, and a concentration of investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters in the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

The directors of these three agencies should in that event function as a committee for the purpose of coordinating the activities of their subordinates.

If the foregoing recommendations meet with your approval, I suggest that confidential instructions be issued by you to the heads of the Departments interested in accordance therewith.

A draft of a memorandum which you may possibly care to use for that purpose, is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

Respectfully,

Attorney General.

Enclosure
No. 2100
June 17, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Postmaster General.

Confidential

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Mr. Woodward phoned re telegram in code which he left with Gen. Watson this morning - State Dept No. 1254 of July 5, in confidential code from Paris, Mr. Bullitt. It starts: "The French Press--"

Mr. Woodward asks that this telegram be destroyed.

Telegram destroyed

7/6/39

x203
x20
x144
MEMORANDUM

July 5, 1939

General Watson:

The Department has received a telegram from Ambassador Bullitt, dated July 5, saying that the French Press has published several reports to the effect that the President will spend a part of July 14 visiting French cruisers, which will be in New York City on that date.

Mr. Bullitt inquires whether the President intends to make this visit. I should be obliged if you would let me have this information.

S. Woodward

861.3311/333
My dear Mr. President:

In recent negotiations with the French Embassy concerning the abrogation of American capitulatory rights in French Morocco the French Government has raised the question of the possible abrogation by this Government of its rights under the Act of Algeciras.

The French Government proposes that, in return for the abrogation by the United States of that Act in relation to French Morocco, by which the United States is assured of the open door in that country, the most complete guarantees will be given American commercial interests in French Morocco for a period of at least thirty years.

In view of the many disputes which have arisen between the American and French Governments in the past over the application of the principle of the open door in French Morocco, I am of the opinion that the acceptance of this revised basis of negotiations would be in the interest of this Government. I enclose a memorandum on the subject in the event you may care to consider the matter in more detail.

The French Embassy has requested us to consider this proposal as ultra-confidential.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL
MEMORANDUM

Following the conclusion of the Montreux Convention by which this Government agreed to relinquish its extraterritorial rights in Egypt, the French Government approached the United States with regard to similar action with respect to the like rights exercised by this Government in French Morocco. The extraterritorial rights of the capitulatory powers in French Morocco were, with the exception of those enjoyed by the United States and Great Britain, renounced at the beginning of or during the World War. In 1916 when this Government recognized the French protectorate over Morocco, it was agreed to enter into negotiations subsequently with the French Government for the abrogation of our extraterritorial rights in that country. In accordance with this obligation and following the relinquishment by Great Britain as of January 1, 1938 of its extraterritorial rights in the French Zone of Morocco, discussions were begun between this Government and the French Government looking to the negotiation of new treaties defining the rights of American nationals, ships, and goods incident to the abrogation of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by us.

The rights of the United States in Morocco generally are defined in the following instruments:

(1)
(1) Treaty of Friendship concluded in 1836 with the Sultan of Morocco which is subject to denunciation upon one year's notice;

(2) Multilateral Convention of Madrid of 1880, with no terminable date, defining the right of protection in Morocco; and

(3) General Act of the International Conference at Algeciras signed April 7, 1906, with no terminable date.

The Act of Algeciras is of particular importance as it affirms the principle of the open door in Morocco.

In the present negotiations the French Government has been disposed to grant this Government guarantees equivalent to those recently accorded Great Britain. Accordingly the French Government has been prepared to grant adequate guarantees for American nationals and ships but it has been unwilling to accord guarantees with respect to goods for a period longer than seven years. Moreover, the French Government, while admitting its obligation under the Act of Algeciras to maintain the open door in Morocco, refuses to reaffirm or reinterpret that principle in any new treaty with any power.

The French position is that the principle of the open door in Morocco was forced upon France at the beginning of this century under the threat of war by Germany. It is represented that the development of the North African Coast comprising Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco has become a matter of vital necessity to France if that country is
to maintain its position as a world power. Algeria is a part of metropolitan France and no treaty obligations now stand in the way of the full exercise by France of its protectorate over Tunisia. The treaty obligations contracted by France in relation to French Morocco under the Act of Algeciras before the establishment of a French protectorate over that country, however, have made impossible the binding of Morocco to France in the manner in which Algeria and Tunisia are now bound to France.

The difficulties in our present negotiations with the French have been further complicated by reason of our non-adherence to the Franco-German Accord of 1911 concerning Morocco to which all other powers signatory of the Act of Algeciras have adhered. That accord granted France a certain liberty of action in respect to the application of the Act of Algeciras. France has found it impossible to exercise that liberty, however, without violating our treaty rights.

In view of these difficulties and in view of the fact which has become apparent during our negotiations that any new treaty instruments considered in conjunction with the Act of Algeciras, would give rise to endless disputes with the French authorities, the French Government has proposed an alternative basis for our negotiations. The French propose that in return for the abrogation by this Government
in French Morocco of all of its rights under the Act of Algeciras, including the principle of the open door, the French Government would be prepared to grant us the most explicit and binding guarantees in respect of the treatment of our particular economic interests in French Morocco for a period of at least thirty years. The treaty would be framed, however, with a view to giving France the same general economic liberty of action, outside of our particular economic interests, which that Government has enjoyed in the political sphere in French Morocco since 1912. At the end of thirty years France would possess both complete economic as well as political liberty of action in French Morocco.
When this is returned, will you please see that it is given to Mrs. Larrabee for her files?

G. G. T.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND RETURN.

F. D. R.

Ltr. to the Pres. not dated from the Attorney General re his opinion whether the Secy of Treasury under your direction may issue instructions to all collectors of customs substantially as follows: "Immediately upon the Pres. being satisfied that Germany is in armed conflict with another nation with or without formal declaration of war seize all German and Italian vessels in American territorial waters remove officers and crew therefrom and take all precautions against sabotage in engine rooms or otherwise."

x3603
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
9-15-39

Pryor -

Can you find out from the files if this man Kuwashima is the same man who was sent to General Watson from Mr. Theodore Roosevelt - probably about an appointment with the President?

Id

It is the same man.

Id
Confidential

July 27, 1939

My dear Colonel:

Please let this be by way of acknowledging your note of July twentieth. I have had an opportunity to speak to the President and "lay the matter before him," as you requested. Therefore, I am in a position now to advise you that if the gentleman in question comes to Washington, the President will see him unofficially for ten minutes, or thereabouts. Such appointments, however, as you well know, are very much against the rules as they are generally applied to cases of this sort.

I am giving General Edwin M. Watson, the President's Military Aide, a copy of this letter. General Watson has been appointed to the Presidential Secretaryist and is now pinch-hitting for McIntyre. He has charge of appointments. May I suggest that when the gentleman in question makes definite plans that General Watson be informed concerning the time of his expected arrival in Washington. The General will fix the appointment day and hour.

I am glad to tell you that McIntyre is making definite progress. Recent reports have been most promising and we all expect to see him back on the job early in the new year.

Best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, x/177-A
14 West 49th Street,
New York, N.Y.
July 24, 1939

My dear Mr. Early:

Reference is made to your memorandum of July 24, 1939, in which you request the Department's recommendation with reference to a letter from Colonel Theodore Roosevelt addressed to you concerning the desire of Mr. Hisao Kuwashima to obtain an interview with the President.

It is not believed that any useful purpose would be served by the President's receiving Mr. Kuwashima. The Department has no information which would indicate that Mr. Kuwashima is a person of importance in Japan. Although it is true that Count Kaneko, mentioned in Colonel Theodore Roosevelt's letter as having given a letter to Mr. Kuwashima, is a person of considerable personal

The Honorable

Stephen Early,

Secretary to the President,

The White House.
personal prestige in Japan, it is understood that he has today very little actual political influence with the Japanese Government. In the circumstances the Department would recommend that the President not see Mr. Kuwashima.

The foregoing comments are for your confidential information and I believe that you will concur in my view that it would not be advisable for you to communicate them to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.

Colonel Roosevelt's letter to you is returned herewith, a copy having been retained for the Department's files.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

From Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, July 20, 1939.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
S. T. E.

Write to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and tell him while it is very much against every rule, if this Japanese gentleman comes to Washington I will see him for ten minutes unofficially.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

May I have a recommendation on this before the President is advised of Col. Theodore Roosevelt's request.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Letter from Col. Theo. Roosevelt, 14 W. 49th St.
New York.

to STE

RE: Mr. Hisao Kuwashima, a Japanese, who has letter of introduction from Count Kaneko, who wishes to have interview with Pres. Mr. Roosevelt explained that he should go thru the proper channels -- his Ambassador -- but he does not want to do this for several reasons.
Theodore Roosevelt  
Oyster Bay, Long Island  

14 West 49th St.,  
New York, NY  
July 20, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Steve:

A rather peculiar situation has arisen that I think should be drawn to the President's attention. In Japan, probably the most respected of the elder statesmen is Count Kaneko. He is well over eighty. He has been a personal friend of our family for more than thirty years. He is very close to the Emperor of Japan. His summer place is between the Emperor's summer place and Prince Chichibu's summer place. For years he has been a personal companion of the Emperor, swimming with him, etc. You know society in Japan, and you know what the facts I have given you mean. I doubt if there is anybody in that country who sits closer to the Emperor.

About two weeks ago a Japanese, Mr. Hisao Kuwashima came to me bringing a letter from Count Kaneko. I realized at once that there was something on his mind, what I could not tell. Yesterday he told me.

He wants to have an interview with the President. I said at once that the way for him to arrange his interview was through his own Ambassador. He explained that he could not. This interview could not come through official channels. I asked why. He said that he came as the emissary of Count Kaneko and "that one to whom he was close", that he represented therefore the point of view of the people of Japan, not the point of view of the army, which he gave me to understand was what the Ambassador represented.

Ordinarily I would pay no attention to this, but knowing as I do the relationship between the Emperor and Count Kaneko I think the matter is one that might well be considered.

Mr. Kuwashima is here in New York now at the Waldorf Astoria. His sole purpose in coming to this country is this mission.
I do not know what he has to say, or the nature of his mission. He probably would not tell me even if I asked. If you think it right, will you speak to the President and lay the matter before him? Anyhow, drop me a line and tell me what your decision is, so I can give Mr. Kuwashima an answer.

Naturally I will bring nobody's name into the answer.

How is Mac? I have not heard a thing from him in months now. I hope he is better.

Sincerely yours,

Theodore Roosevelt

Stephen Early, Esq.,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

TR/meh
August 2, 1939

Dear Colonel:

Please let this be by way of acknowledging your note of July thirty-first. You can rest assured that the President was informed concerning the request and the background thereof.

I am giving this note of yours to General Watson who will handle Mr. Kuwashima's appointment.

Best wishes,

Cordially yours,

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt,
14 West 49th Street,
New York, N. Y.
Confidential

Dear Steve:

Many thanks for your letter of July 27th. I had Mr. Kuwashima come into the office today and gave him your instructions.

I also told him the matter must be treated as absolutely confidential.

I realize just as much as you do that such procedure is very much against the rules. I did feel, however, that under the circumstances the President should be informed of the request that had been made to me and the background.

I don't know what if anything may come out of it, but on a question of such far-reaching importance I thought perhaps the President might desire to hear what this man has to say and draw his own conclusions therefrom.

I am delighted that Mac is really coming along. He always looked so frail that I had feared he might develop something like T.B.

Best wishes,

Theodore Roosevelt

Stephen Early, Esq.,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

TR/meh
July 27, 1939.

Confidential

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I am glad to tell you that McIntyre is making definite progress. Recent reports have been most promising and we all expect to see him back on the job early in the new year.

Best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt,
14 West 49th Street,
New York, N. Y.
7-27-39
Mr. Kanne:

General Watson has seen this letter

Id

Mr. Hisao Kuwashima
Tokyo, Japan

CABLE ADDRESS: 'WALDORF, NEW YORK' / ELDORADO 5-306

The WALDORF·ASTORIA
PARK AND LEXINGTON AVENUES / 49TH AND 50TH STREETS / NEW YORK

My dear General Watson:

I sincerely hope that you will pardon me of taking too a great liberty on myself of writing to you.

Through Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, I have been informed that you are kindly fixing an unofficial appointment
day and hour with the Hon. President Roosevelt when I have arrived to Washington.

Now, my dear General, I am heartily pleased to say that I shall be in Washington tomorrow Thursday
at the Hotel Mayflower, and if I could have an opportunity of meeting you first as there will be highly appreciated,
and I wish to express my hearty thankfulness of your Courtesy of which you are bestowing on me.

With be assurance of my highest regard,
my dear General Watson, I wish to remain

Most Sincerely yours,

V. Neumark

August Second-1939.
The Mayflower
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Watson:
I am sorry to say that I was not able to leave New York on the day I have written to you. I shall be highly appreciated of it.
Could hear from you here.

Thanking you of your kind attention,

My dear General,

Most sincerely yours,

H. Kwastekia.

August 5th.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

Mr. Kuwashima is coming in to see you at three-thirty.

Mr. Early's letter to Colonel Roosevelt indicated that he would endeavor to arrange an appointment for Mr. Kuwashima. Note also the letter from the State Department recommending against this appointment.

I did not indicate to Mr. Kuwashima that the President would see him. I told him that you would be glad to confer with him.

K.

[Signature]
September 13, 1939

My dear Mr. Kuwashima:

General Watson has requested me to acknowledge the receipt of your recent letter stating that you were sending to him a few books in regard to the Orient.

The books have now been received and General Watson will be pleased to look them over. Your courtesy in sending them to him is appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary to General Watson

Mr. H. Kuwashima, x
Hotel Waldorf-Astoria,
New York, New York.
September 7, 1939

Respectfully referred to the State Department for preparation of reply for my signature.

EDWIN M. WATSON,
Secretary to the President

Letter from H. Kawashima, Tokyo, Japan, sending 3 books and 3 pamphlets on the Orient to General Watson.

Books: "Action and Counteraction in China".
"Building up Manchuria".
"Japan - A Country Founded by "Mother" - An outline History."

Pamphlets: "History of China".
"The Cases for Japan and China".
"Central China in Motion".
General Watson:

I am sending you a few books on a subject you may read on them, I shall be highly appreciated.

Sincerely,

H. Kuroshima

Otemachi, Tokyo, Japan

My home address:

1148 Hachigaku- Otemachi, Tokyo
In reply refer to PR 811.001 Roosevelt - Publications - Kuwashima, H.

September 14, 1939

My dear General Watson:

With reference to your memorandum of September 7, I am enclosing a draft of a letter to Mr. H. Kuwashima which has been prepared for the signature of your secretary.

The publications, which are being returned herewith, are pro-Japanese propaganda full of inaccuracies designed to mislead the reader. Accordingly, it is believed that the letter to Mr. Kuwashima should not be signed by you unless he is a personal friend.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:
Six books and booklets; letter from Mr. Kuwashima, with draft reply thereto.

Brigadier General Edwin Watson, U.S.A.,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Feb. 14th
1940

Your Holiness: 

In my letter of December 23, 1939 I had the honor to suggest that it would give me great satisfaction to send to you my own representative in order that our parallel endeavors for peace and the alleviation of suffering might be assisted. Your Holiness was good enough to reply that the choice of Mr. Myron C. Taylor as my representative was acceptable and that you would receive him.

I am entrusting this special mission to Mr. Taylor who is a very old friend of mine, and in whom I repose the utmost confidence.

His humanitarian efforts in behalf of those whom political disruption has rendered homeless are well known to Your Holiness. I shall be happy to feel that he may be the channel of communication for any views you and I may wish to exchange in the interest of concord among the peoples of the world.

I am asking Mr. Taylor to convey my cordial greetings to you, my old and good Friend, and my sincere hope that the common ideals of religion and of humanity itself can have united expression for the reestablishment of a more permanent peace on the foundations of freedom, and an assurance of life and integrity of all nations under God.

Cordially your friend,

(signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
MR. INGLING:

This is a copy of a personal letter kept in the President's files. We had to make a copy for the State Dept. and thought you might like a copy for your "confidential files".

F.L.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUMNER WELLES: x 20

Please take up the matter of the German Consul General in New York with the Attorney General. x 10

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to Mr. Welles.
My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of May 20, I most decidedly feel that we should do something with regard to the action reported in Mr. Hoover's letter of May 15 which, in accordance with your request, I am returning herewith.

In order to do something, I think we should have specific information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that an American citizen of German origin has actually been approached by the German Consul General in New York in the manner described. The statements contained in Mr. Hoover's letter are in general terms and before taking it up with the German Embassy I feel that this Department should be able to refer to a specific case which is beyond question upon which to base its representations.

If you agree, I should be very glad to take the

The President,

The White House.
matter up through the Attorney General.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
From J. Edgar Hoover,
May 15, 1940.
May 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Do you think we should do anything about this? Please return enclosure.

F. D. R.

Letter to General Watson, dated May 15, 1940, regarding reports that the German Consul at New York City is making inquiries of persons of German origin in re their radio activities in the United States.
May 15, 1940

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Watson:

I thought you and the President might be interested in learning of recent information which has been received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from a strictly confidential source. It has been reported that the German Consul at New York City is making inquiries of persons of German origin regarding their radio activities in the United States.

The following illustrates the type of information in which the German Consul appears to be interested and the questions that he usually propounds to those of German origin who maintain contact with the German Consulate at New York City:

1. Do you have in your residence a radio apparatus with reception facilities for short wave?

2. Do you hear more or less regularly German and foreign stations? If so, what stations?

3. What are your experiences with reference to the radio reception of various stations at Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, indicating wave lengths and time of day best results obtained?
This information is being transmitted to you with the thought that the recent activities of the German authorities in regard to radio operations in the United States might be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

J. Edgar Hoover
May 25, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Will you let me know if the proposed answer to Bullitt's telegram to you of May 24 is satisfactory. If so, I will send the telegram at once.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosures:

From Paris, No. 865,
May 24, 4 p.m.
To Paris, May 25.

The President,

The White House.
REB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated May 24, 1940
Rec'd 2:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

865, May 24, 4 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Charles Roux, new Secretary General of the French Foreign Office, asked me today if Mussolini had ever indicated to you the terms of his demands against France and England for which it now appeared he was prepared to make war.

Charles Roux added incidentally that the Italian Ambassador and all the members of his staff were now engaged in packing all their personal property.

I should be obliged if you would let me know if you have any information on this subject.

BULLITT

HPD

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT

I think someone should
look into this.

F. D. R.

Copy of "Facts in Review" issued by the
German Library of Information, 17 Battery
Place, N.Y.C., Vol. II, No. 21, 5/20/40,
in which are articles on "The German Memorandum
to the Dutch and Belgian Governments",
"Statement of the German General Staff" and
"Germany Calling", which was sent in by
Mr. R. L. Holt, Finlay, Holt and Co., Ltd.,
24 State St., NYC.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

May 31, 1940

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The publisher of this, the German Library of Information, 17 Battery Place, New York City, has registered as the agent of a foreign principal, namely, as agent of the German Government. It required some pressure by the State Department to force its registration.

I am suggesting that publications issued by agents of foreign principals must be plainly labeled on the front page that the publication is made by such an agent.

A. A. Berle, Jr.

Enclosure
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

In the matter of clippers stopping occasionally at Bermuda on voyages from Europe, the theory seems to be that if the voyage on which the stop is made is not known, securities will not be sent here for German accounts.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Under Secretary of State.
June 4, 1940

Dear Frank:

I have your personal and confidential letter of May 16, with its enclosures, relating to your trip to Japan.

Telegraphic accounts which Joe Grew sent us of your conversations in Tokyo with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, supplemented now by the more detailed record as given in your memoranda covering those conversations, shed interesting light upon the thought and desires of the group in Japanese public life which Mr. Arita represents. I am inclined to think that your comments to him on the Philippine immigration bill and the activities of the Japanese Consul at Manila were very helpful.

I note your statement that unless you hear from me to the contrary you plan to leave Manila by clipper the latter part of June and that you would like a cable from me indicating whether anything has occurred which would make inadvisable your return to the United States at that time. I have made note of this with a view to cabling you within the next few weeks. Should the trip materialize at the time indicated, I suggest that you make announcement there of your plan and that in so doing you say simply that, feeling the desirability of renewing contacts at home, you are making a quick trip which has no special significance.

With all best wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Francis B. Sayre,
United States High Commissioner
to the Philippine Islands,
Manila, Philippine Islands.
Dear Frank:

I have your personal and confidential letter of May 16, with its enclosures, relating to your trip to Japan.

Telegraphic accounts which Joe Grew sent us of your conversations in Tokyo with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, supplemented now by the more detailed record as given in your memoranda covering those conversations, shed interesting light upon the thought and desires of some Japanese high officials. I am inclined to think that your comments to Mr. Arita on the Philippine immigration bill and the activities of the Japanese Consul at Manila were very helpful. Your discussion with Mr. Arita of subjects of high policy, while productive of information that is useful for us to have, had one result which seems to us to be unfortunate: Mr. Arita apparently thought that you had some special authorization and that you might be sympathetically disposed toward participating in some way in bringing about meetings between representatives of the Chinese and of the Japanese Governments, and a situation evolved in which it became necessary for you to back away from an approach which he made. We try of course to prevent the development of such situations.

I note your statement that unless you hear from me to the contrary you plan to leave Manila by clipper the latter part of June and that you would like a cable from me indicating whether anything has occurred which would make inadvisable your return to the United States at that time. I have made note of this with a view
view to cabling you within the next few weeks. Should the trip materialize at the time indicated, I suggest that you make announcement there of your plan and that in so doing you say simply that, feeling the desirability of renewing contacts at home, you are making a quick trip which has no special significance.

With all best wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Francis B. Sayre,
United States High Commissioner
to the Philippine Islands,
Manila, Philippine Islands.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to the request contained in your memorandum of May 28, there are attached for your consideration two drafts of a reply to Mr. Sayre's personal and confidential letter of May 16. The only difference in substance in the two drafts is that the longer contains a statement somewhat critical of Mr. Sayre's discussions of high policy with Japanese officials and is in line with the purport of the telegrams which we sent, after consultation with you, to Mr. Grew at the time the discussions were going on.

In the last substantive paragraph of the drafts, there is a statement that you will expect to radio Mr. Sayre within the next few weeks in regard to your attitude toward the question of his returning to the United States the latter part of June. In case you see no objection to his returning at that time, it is suggested that you will probably wish to include in your radiogram to him the substance of the last substantive paragraph of the drafts.

Mr. Sayre's letter to you, with enclosures, is returned herewith.

Enclosures:
Draft replies (2) to Mr. Sayre;
From Mr. Sayre, letter of May 16, with enclosures.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Confidential letter of May 16th to the President respecting from Frank B. Sayre reporting his conversations in Tokyo.
May 16, 1940.

My dear General Watson:

Will you be good enough to put into the President's hands the enclosed extremely confidential letter? I shall greatly appreciate your kindness.

Ever sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure.

Brigadier General Edward M. Watson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Personal and Confidential.

May 16, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

I have just gotten back from my trip to Japan and want to write you briefly of my conversations in Tokyo. I enclose herewith copies of my conversations with Mr. Arita, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, held on May first, May second, May third and May sixth. The first conversation was confined to my explanation to the Foreign Minister of the Immigration Bill passed by the Philippine Assembly. At the end of that conversation, however, Mr. Arita requested me to return and, in the subsequent conversations, which were unofficial and carried on in a very personal and intimate way, the question arose and was discussed as to the possibilities of terminating the Sino-Japanese hostilities. As you will see from the conversation held on May sixth, Mr. Arita, as set forth on page two of this memorandum, said that his Government would accept American good offices to arrange for a secret meeting between a representative of General Chiang Kai-shek and a representative of the Japanese Government "to negotiate concerning the conditions of the cessation of actual fighting".

I asked Joe Grew, whom I kept thoroughly informed throughout these conversations and with whom I kept in constant and intimate contact throughout the discussions, to send copies of these conversations to the Department of State. The Department is therefore thoroughly informed concerning the matter.

I also enclose a copy of the letter which Dr. John Leighton Stuart, the President of Yenching University of Peiping told me, in a conversation with him in Shanghai on April twenty-seventh, that he had written you from Hong Kong on April 10, 1940.

The general impression which I gained from my conversations with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was that Japan is increasingly realizing the difficulties of carrying on her operations in China and that if a way could be found to retire gracefully and save her face she would not be adverse to doing so, provided of course that she were given certain compensations in North China.

As

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
As a result of the conversations, perhaps the way lies open now, if and when the time becomes ripe to do so and if you should so desire, to extend American good offices or mediation in the effort to find some basis of reconciliation between Japan and China. Probably the time is not ripe at this moment, but it may be useful to know that such an avenue apparently lies open if and when you should want to use it.

Ambassador Grew knows all the details of the conversations so that you could turn to him at any time that you want to pursue the matter further.

In your letter to me of March twenty-fifth you wrote: "I like the idea of your coming back to Washington later on. I suggest that you get here about July first, which will be immediately after the Republican Convention and two weeks before ours begins." I am wondering whether the tragic developments taking place in Europe will cause any change in your thoughts about my returning. I presume not and, unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall plan to leave Manila by Clipper the latter part of June so as to reach Washington by July first. I should appreciate your cabling me confirming this. Will you make the announcement of my return from Washington or do you wish me to make it here?

These are tragic days and I well realize the terrible strain and responsibilities resting upon your shoulders. God bless you and help to sustain you! I rejoice that you are at the helm. No other man in the country could carry the load as splendidly as you.

Ever sincerely yours,

Enclosures.
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
U.S.A.

My dear Mr. President,

Claiming again the privilege of writing you regarding American aid to China in view of your concern over this subject as revealed in our conversation early in May, 1933, I should like to report to you some statements recently made to me by General Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. It happens that I had been approached several times by Japanese representing groups anxious to find a solution for ending the present conflict. I always replied that there would be nothing gained by opening negotiations with the Chinese Government until the Japanese authorities were themselves ready to do so on the only terms that General Chiang could possibly consider and unless those who undertook these were really able to speak for the Japanese nation.

In such discussions I also tried to make it clear that not only I as an individual but the American Government and people as a whole desired China and Japan to have relationships of mutual benefit, whatever might be the consequences to ourselves, that we were only concerned that China be free from coercion and have her territorial integrity and political independence assured. In reporting these experiences to General Chiang he told me, however, that he would not consider any peace negotiations except through the President of the United States. This is because of his confidence in American friendship for China and in our sense of international morality. It is also a very genuine tribute to you personally. I asked if I might report this to our Ambassador and did so upon securing his permission. It may seem superfluous or even to savor of meddling for me to write to you in addition. But I felt that you might care for this unofficial account of what is a momentous decision.

In asking the Generalissimo if I might write you he consented on the express understanding that he was not asking for such mediation now nor would he be ready for any such proffer for some time yet, even from you. What I take him to mean is that the Japanese are a long way yet from being sufficiently desperate to agree to a procedure so contrary to their interest and so humiliating to their pride, and that China prefers to continue the struggle until a peace can be arranged that will guarantee her freedom from further aggression. This implies of course the withdrawal of all Japanese
Japanese troops from south of the Great Wall and either the inclusion of Manchuria in the discussions or the frank recognition by both parties that this issue remains unsettled.

Knowing from your own lips of your active desire to do something for China may I bring to your attention what seems to be the most practical form such help could take, apart from an economic embargo against Japan. Let me first confess that I am writing now entirely on my own initiative and that this topic did not even enter into my conversation with the Generalissimo. Could there not be some form of further financial assistance to China? The most effective would be an outright loan. This would strengthen confidence in the currency and reduce the danger of inflation. Or the actual money could be held in America to China's credit under certain stipulated conditions. Or there might be an extension of long terms commercial loans, or some other method of helping toward exchange stabilization. These qualified can advise on the technical aspects. But the essential point is that while there will probably be no financial collapse the heaviest strain is at this point and that with comparatively small assistance China's financial and political integrity are assured. The risk seems to me very slight indeed and the benefits, even from the somewhat sordid standpoint of our own self-interest, are enormous. Meanwhile the sobering warning to Japan which such aid implies is a cogent secondary argument for it.

When the time for peace discussions draws near there are relevant questions as to anachronistic foreign rights in China (extraterritoriality, settlements etc.,) which should be included. Among other advantages this would ease the Japanese approach to the whole issue.

If in some slight measure I can be of use to you in this delicate but supremely worth-while task which seems to be awaiting you, I am at your service.

With sincerest good wishes;

Believe me,

Very respectfully yours,

Yenching University, 
PEKING. CHINA.
Conversation

May 6, 1940

The United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Mr. Sayre, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita.

At the conclusion of the luncheon given me by Mr. Arita, the Foreign Minister, today Mr. Arita took me upstairs in order to continue our conversation of last week. Mr. Arita began by saying that he had talked over with the Premier the matter which we had discussed and he then orally gave me the following reply, translating from a Japanese memorandum which he had previously prepared:-

"In view of all the circumstances in connection with the situation and in particular because of our policy of assisting the Wang Ching-wei regime in every possible manner it would not be appropriate for the representative of the Japanese Government to get into direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek at this time. It is desirable therefore, supposing Chiang Kai-shek has the intention of relinquishing his anti-Japanese and pro-Communist policy and of bringing the present hostilities to a stop that he should get into direct negotiations with Wang
Ching-wei. I think there will always be a way open for the Chinese to enter into conversations between themselves (namely between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei). But if Chiang Kai-shek should find it impossible for the present to enter into conversations with Wang Ching-wei 'it would be an idea for him' to enter into negotiations with our military representatives with the object of arranging for the cessation of general fighting. If Chiang Kai-shek is inclined to do so I shall be ready to arrange to send our military representative to some neutral spot, for example to Hong Kong or Manila, in order to meet in strictest secrecy and in an informal manner Chiang Kai-shek's representative in order to negotiate concerning the conditions of the cessation of actual fighting. If you (namely Mr. Sayre) propose to offer your good offices to arrange for such a meeting I shall accept with pleasure such a proposal."

Mr. Arita repeated this message a second time so that I could have a chance to write it down as he dictated the rough translation.
I replied to Mr. Arita that I much appreciated this reply. I recalled, however, our conversation of last Friday when we agreed that each of us would give the matter further thought and that he would discuss the matter with the Prime Minister and I similarly would discuss the matter with Ambassador Grew. We agreed that we would then exchange at this afternoon's meeting the conclusions thus reached. In pursuance of this arrangement I said that I had talked the whole matter over with Ambassador Grew to whom I had reported all of our conversations. I said that Ambassador Grew and I after giving considerable thought to the situation had independently reached the same conclusions. I reminded Mr. Arita that the whole purpose of such a preliminary exploratory conference as proposed would be defeated if there were any leaks; and I said that both Ambassador Grew and I felt that for an official of a third Government to participate in any way in the arrangement of such a meeting would unduly increase the danger of leaks and that it therefore seemed wise to each of us that no American Government official should participate in any way in arranging for such a meeting. I also reminded Mr. Arita of his statement at our last meeting that in his
judgment the chances for reaching a reconciliation at this time are extremely small; and I said that I had been thinking over this statement of his and in view of it I could not but wonder whether the time was yet ripe for such a meeting. I also spoke of the danger to himself and to the Japanese Government as well as to the American Government if any leaks should occur. In view of all these circumstances I said to him that I felt sure that if the Japanese Government desired to enter into such preliminary secret exploratory conversations with a representative of Chiang Kai-shek the Japanese Government did not lack the means of arranging for such a conference and that I felt that at least at this time it would not serve any useful purpose for an official of the American Government to participate in arranging for such a meeting.

Mr. Arita then said that under these circumstances it would be better for him to withdraw the more or less formal reply which he had made and to forget the whole matter. To this I agreed. I added that I would, however, inform Ambassador Grew of everything so that he could report it to the Department.
I also cautioned Mr. Arita that it might prove highly injurious if any leak should occur as to the topic of our conversation and that I felt that he would agree with me that this should under no circumstances be divulged. He agreed.

Next spoke about the Philippine immigration bill. Mr. Arita said that he had not replied to my explanations of last Wednesday morning because he wanted to study the matter further. He said that now he had done so and that although he recognized that the enactment of the legislation from the technical and legal standpoint was entirely unobjectionable he did feel that it was unfair to the Japanese. When I assured him that the bill was in no way directed against the Japanese and that its terms applied equally to the citizens of every nation and that the object of the legislation is to regularize the whole question of immigration into the Philippines he agreed that the legislation was not discriminatory. He went on to say however that cutting down the number of immigrants each year to 500 would hurt the Japanese and he asserted that the gross annual number of Japanese immigrants into the Philippines was over 2000. He said that cutting the number from 1000 to 500 was unfair and injurious. I
reminded him again that the original bill as first
drafted allowed an annual quota of one thousand and I told
him that the cutting of the quota from one thousand to
500 was first proposed on the floor of the Commonwealth
Assembly and that the cutting of the quota was therefore
the action of the Commonwealth authorities over which
the United States had no direct control other than through
the approval or disapproval by the President of the
United States of the bill in its entirety.

The conversation then passed on to the activities of
the Japanese Consul General in Manila. Mr. Arita said
that he would not undertake to pass on the actual facts
involved in the Consul General's conduct with regard to the
immigration bill but that although he recognized that the
Consul General should not enter into conversations with
members of the Commonwealth Assembly in order to influence
pending legislation he nevertheless asked whether the
Consul General might not give facts and statistics to
members of the Assembly particularly if he was approached
originally by them. I replied that giving facts and
statistics was very frequently for the very purpose of
influencing legislation and said that a consul by doing so
opened himself to the charge that he is seeking to influence legislation since no one can tell what might be in his mind. After discussing this aspect of the matter Mr. Arita finally agreed that he would instruct the Japanese Consul General in Manila not to approach members of the Assembly directly with the view of influencing legislation but to come instead to the office of the High Commissioner. I promised him that if the Consul General desired to place facts or statistics before members of the Assembly I should be very happy to assist him and see that such information was transmitted to the Commonwealth Government authorities.

After a cordial exchange of good wishes and farewells the meeting ended.
Conversation

The United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Mr. Sayre, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita.

In pursuance of the request of Mr. Arita, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I met him at five o'clock this afternoon at the house of Baron Harada in order to continue our discussions. We were closeted alone and talked for about forty-five minutes.

Mr. Arita, in answer to what I had said yesterday, began by repeating what he had told me yesterday that the Japanese Government must in every way support the Wang Ching-wei regime in China. He said that the Japanese Government had determined that they must do so and they hoped that negotiations with the Chinese Government might be carried on through the medium of the Wang Ching-wei Government. He added that for the Japanese Government now to enter into negotiations with China would be bound to weaken the Wang Ching-wei Government and therefore the way seemed to be blocked toward entering into direct negotiations between the two Governments. He went on to say that after thinking over our conversation of yesterday he felt that the chances are small of finding a basis of negotiation.
He did not mean that there is no possibility of finding a basis of negotiations, -- only that he felt the chances are small. He said that Japan had already stated its terms and that if General Chiang Kai-shek desired to open up negotiations it was for him to state his terms. I suggested in reply that although I had not seen General Chiang Kai-shek and therefore did not know what is in his mind, such reports as I have received indicate that General Chiang Kai-shek is not eager to enter into negotiations. Nevertheless, General Chiang Kai-shek had indicated to Dr. Leighton Stuart certain terms upon which he might be prepared to negotiate.

We then discussed the general problem of reconciliation. We referred to the reluctance of belligerents publicly to state in advance the extremes to which each might be willing to go to end the war, and we agreed that opportunity for each side to sound out in strict privacy and without publicity the position of the other would not only hasten the opening of the formal negotiations but would tend to increase the chances of their ending with success. Mr. Arita said that the possibility of following such procedure toward ending the Far Eastern conflict interested him, and after further thought he said that his Government probably would be willing to send a representative to meet with a representative of General Chiang
Chiang Kai-shek for exploratory conversations to be held in some neutral territory, such as Hong Kong, if these were unannounced and conducted entirely without publicity. If as a result of such a meeting a common basis for negotiations could be found, then formal negotiations could subsequently be undertaken.

The question arose as to how General Chiang Kai-shek could be sounded out with regard to the sending of a representative presumably to Hong Kong to confer with the Japanese Government's representative.

Mr. Arita said that he liked the idea of exploratory conversations without publicity and would consult the Premier. I said that I wanted to report our conversations to Ambassador Grew (with whom as a matter of fact I have been consulting throughout the conversations). We agreed to have a final talk on Monday following the luncheon given me by Mr. Arita at his house.

It is needless to say that I made no commitments of any kind.
Conversation

May 2, 1940. 3 p.m.

The United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Mr. Sayre, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita.

In pursuance of the engagement made yesterday I was received this afternoon by the Foreign Minister at his private residence. We talked for about forty-five minutes alone in his drawing room upstairs.

After the exchange of a few pleasant remarks Mr. Arita opened the conversation by asking me what my views are with regard to the situation in the Far East. I asked him whether he wanted me to speak officially and formally or whether he preferred me to speak unofficially and with entire frankness and intimacy. He said definitely the latter. I then said to him that I would be glad to do so but that he must understand that I was not speaking in any sense officially nor was I commissioned by my Government to express its views. I explained that I was here simply on a friendly visit to see Ambassador Grew and that naturally he would be the one to carry on any official conversations. Mr. Arita replied that he understood perfectly. Several times during the course of the conversation I reiterated and emphasized the unofficial nature of my conversation.
In reply to his request that I lay before him my personal views I began by saying that I felt that the relations between our two countries are not as happy as they should be and that this caused me sincere regret. I said that surely we must brush aside present misunderstanding and find a way to build for permanent understanding and lasting friendship. I continued by saying that it seemed to me that the present difficulties and tensions between the two countries focused upon the present situation in China. I spoke of the long series of unjustifiable bombings of American properties in China and said that their continuation caused pronounced resentment among the American people and that they seemed quite unnecessary even from the viewpoint of obtaining Japanese military objectives. In the second place, I said, the present situation in China is causing tensions in Japanese-American relationships because of the way in which Japan is crowding American trade out from the occupied areas through monopolistic practices of one kind or another. I said that as soon as the Chinese situation could be settled I felt sure that the difficulties between the United States and Japan could easily be ironed out and
therefore I greatly hoped that Japan would be able at not too distant a period to find some way of settling the Chinese situation. Is there no way of finding some solution of the difficulties in China?

I also spoke of the situation confronting Japan in regard to her future policies. I said that it seemed to me apparent that sooner or later Japan would have to choose whether to throw in her lot with the United States, the British Empire and France, or whether to look instead to Germany and perhaps Russia. I said that Japan needed many raw materials which the United States was equipped to give her and that similarly the United States needed many things from Japan. I said that of course clearly it was for Japan and for Japan alone to choose what her future policy will be; but I added that if Japan, taking a long look ahead, decides in favor of throwing in her lot with the United States and the British Empire, it is manifestly to her interest to begin at the earliest possible moment to smooth away any difficulties between these countries and herself.

I went on to say that however strongly the Japanese and the American Governments might desire to avoid trouble
we must recognize that both the Japanese and the American peoples are emotional, and that if the Chinese difficulties continue for too long a period the strain of Japanese-American relations might become so great that unhappy consequences might follow. For these reasons I said that it seemed to me from the viewpoint of Japan important that she should find some solution for the Chinese difficulties at the earliest possible time.

We then went on to speak about the Chinese situation. I asked whether it might not be possible to find some method of reconciling the differences between China and Japan. I said that I quite realized Japan's difficulties and her desire to secure access to raw materials such as iron, coal, cotton and the like. I also spoke of the difficulties due to differing opinions between the Japanese Foreign Office and the military. I said that, on the other hand, one could well understand China's position and her determination to maintain her independence. I asked whether there might not be some way of reconciling these two objectives so as to terminate present hostilities?

I then paused and asked Mr. Arita whether his mind went along with mine and whether he saw the picture more
or less as I did. He replied in the affirmative. He added, however, that the real difficulty was to find some kind of terms which could be agreed to by both sides. He said that Japan had already stated her terms and that it was now for General Chiang Kai-shek to reply to them.

We next spoke about the Wang Ching-wei regime. In reply to his question I said that I had no personal knowledge of the matter and had talked neither to Wang Ching-wei nor to General Chiang Kai-shek, but that such reports as I had received did not indicate that the Wang Ching-wei regime was likely to prove successful. I asked Mr. Arita what the Japanese policy would be if it should fail. He replied that it could not fail, that Japan would have to give it such support that there would be no failure. I answered, but suppose it does fail, what then? He had no answer to give.

In reply to his question whether so far as I knew General Chiang Kai-shek had any definite terms to propose, I said that not having talked with General Chiang Kai-shek I could not answer him. I added, however, that I did have
a talk with Dr. Leighton Stuart, the President of Yenching University, who has just returned from Chungking and who had a long talk with General Chiang Kai-shek. I said that of course Dr. Leighton Stuart was not an official and was not commissioned by any Government to do anything; but that he had confidentially told me in Shanghai of his conference with General Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Arita was much interested in this and asked me about President Stuart's conversation. I told him that although the matter was highly confidential I felt sure he would not abuse my confidence. I then proceeded to tell him what Dr. Leighton Stuart had told me, namely that General Chiang Kai-shek had told him that he would be unwilling to consider negotiations except upon the basis, first, that China should have complete and entire independence within the Great Wall; and, second, that the question of Manchuria either should be the subject of negotiation or should be left undecided. General Chiang Kai-shek had also indicated that he would insist upon the participation of the President of the United States in any arrangements which might be made to bring the belligerents together in negotiations. Mr. Arita seemed greatly interested in
this and asked me to repeat a second time the conversation, which I did. I added that of course this was not official and also that even if both Japan and China were to approach President Roosevelt I had no idea what his attitude would be. I said that I could only pass along this confidential conversation to him for what it might be worth.

Mr. Arita listened intently to all that I had to say. When I reached this point he said that he would like to think over and give study to some of the things which I had said and then have another talk with me tomorrow. I replied that I should be glad to place myself at his service. He then asked me to return to his residence and have another talk with him tomorrow afternoon at 4 o'clock.
The United States High Commissioner
to the Philippine Islands, Mr. Sayre,
with the Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Tani.

I talked to Mr. Tani very informally at the
conclusion of a luncheon given by Ambassador Grew at
the American Embassy on May 1st. Our conversation was
in a corner of a room filled with guests and was en-
tirely on a social and unofficial basis.

After we had touched upon many topics I asked
Mr. Tani how he viewed the picture of the European
war. He replied that he believed that Russia, who
felt it to be to her interest that Europe should bleed,
would ally herself with the weaker side and thustend
to prolong the war and to prevent a complete victory
by either side over the other. He said he felt sure of
this and that therefore he was convinced that the
result of the conflict would be a stalemate.

I asked him whether there was any possibility of
Japan's allying herself with Russia or of a Russo-Japanese
understanding. He replied that in his mind there was
no possibility whatsoever of such an alliance. He
said that the Japanese people were convinced anti-communists
and that they never would tolerate a rapprochement between the Japanese and the Russian Governments.

We then went on to speak about the Sino-Japanese conflict. I said that the existing conflict between China and Japan seemed to me to present increasingly thorny and almost insoluble problems and greatly added to the dangers and difficulties of relations between Japan and third powers. I said that I greatly hoped that the present hostilities would not be too long continued. He replied that he shared this hope and went on to say that in his opinion the conflict would be prolonged if Japanese sentiment should be inflamed by such measures as, for instance, an embargo by the United States of goods shipped to Japan. He said that such a measure would produce violent resentment in Japan and would in his opinion make the Japanese all the more set to continue toward the achievement of their objectives in China. I asked him how long in his opinion the conflict is likely to continue. He replied that he thought for another year or two.

I must emphasize that the above conversation was wholly unofficial and occurred in the course of a purely social conversation.
Conversation

May 1, 1940.

The United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Mr. Sayre, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita. Ambassador Crew present.

I opened the conversation by saying to Mr. Arita that I hoped I might talk with him on an entirely frank, personal and intimate basis rather than as an official of the Government. I said that I wanted to speak with him first about the pending immigration bill in the Philippines. I said that I had read various comments in the Japanese press about this which seemed to me to make for misunderstanding and that I wanted to correct some of the false impressions which I feared were current.

I began by explaining to Mr. Arita the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act under which the Philippine Assembly is given full and unrestricted power to enact legislation concerning matters such as immigration but subject to the provision that such enactments shall not become law until approved by the President of the United States. I explained to Mr. Arita that the enactment of the bill therefore was entirely within the control of Philippine officials. I said that it was true that the Commonwealth Government, desiring assistance in the
drafting of the bill, had requested the aid of two technical experts who had been sent out from Washington; but I explained that these were technicians and had no voice in the determination of policy. The bill thus drafted was carefully gone over and studied by various Commonwealth officials and finally after months of consideration was introduced into the Assembly this spring. I also explained that the bill as drafted provided for an annual quota of immigrants from each country of one thousand but that as the result of an amendment introduced in the debate on the floor of the Assembly this number had been reduced to 500.

I explained to Mr. Arita that the bill was not in any sense directed against the Japanese. The same quota applies equally to all nations, and in fact the Chinese have objected to the bill equally with the Japanese. I explained that the Commonwealth Government was confronted with various problems of immigration, including not only the question of Japanese immigrants but also the question of Chinese immigrants and of Jewish refugees. I pointed out that the Philippines are at present without any adequate immigration legislation, and explained that the
desire of the Commonwealth Government was to limit immigration so as to prevent the creation of racial difficulties and misunderstanding which might easily arise in the future if unlimited numbers of immigrants should pour into the country at too rapid a rate to allow the immigrants to be digested and become an integral part of the Philippine nation. I said that the object of the Commonwealth Government in enacting the bill was thus to prevent and avoid future misunderstanding and difficulties with the Japanese and other nations, and that I felt sure that Mr. Arita would understand and appreciate the situation which has necessitated this legislation.

I further explained that the reports that the legislation was crowded through abruptly and suddenly were untrue and that as a matter of fact the legislation had been drafted more than a year ago and had been given long study and consideration.

Mr. Arita listened attentively to my explanations and raised no objections.

I next went on to speak of the activities of the Japanese consul in Manila. I spoke first of his
conversation with President Quezon, urging President Quezon against the passage of the immigration bill, and also of his conversations with Speaker Yulo of the Philippine Assembly and with the Chairman of the Immigration Committee of the Assembly. I also spoke about the consul's three letters to Mr. Vargas, the secretary of President Quezon, in which the consul in rather peremptory and quite undiplomatic language demanded that certain alleged Chinese boycott activities must be stopped forthwith. I went on to explain to Mr. Arita the position of foreign consuls in Manila. Until the time comes, if at all, when the Philippines are granted their independence, the control over Philippine foreign relations rests exclusively in the United States, and foreign consuls in Manila possess no diplomatic functions. I explained to Mr. Arita that if diplomatic representations of any kind with respect to the Philippines are to be made they should be made in Washington or Tokyo through ordinary diplomatic channels, or else the matter should be taken up in Manila through the High Commissioner's Office. I explained that the Japanese consul's action in talking directly to President Quezon and the members of the Philippine Assembly about pending Philippine legislation was therefore quite irregular.
I recounted to Mr. Arita my conversation with the Japanese consul and told him that at the end of my conversation asking that such conduct should not be repeated I had turned to the consul and asked him whether I was correct in the position which I was taking. The consul replied unequivocally that I was. I told Mr. Arita that I had then asked him whether I could give a positive assurance to the State Department in Washington that such conduct on his part would not be repeated. He unqualifiedly gave such an assurance. I told Mr. Arita that I had then said to him that as long as there was no repetition of such conduct we would consider the matter a closed incident. I also told Mr. Arita that I had explained to the consul that I spoke to him in this frank way because I was anxious to clear away any possible misunderstanding so that Japanese-American relations might be on a firm and friendly basis and that so far as I was concerned I saw no fundamental conflict of interests in the Philippines between Japan and the United States and that I desired with all my heart a close and friendly understanding with the representatives there of the Japanese Government.
Mr. Arita paid close attention to all that I said and made no objection or criticisms. He said that he was glad to have my explanation and his silence appeared to indicate his assent to what I said.

Our talk was on a very frank, intimate and friendly basis throughout. At the conclusion of our talk Mr. Arita said that he hoped he might have an opportunity to talk with me further before my departure from Tokyo. I replied that I should be most happy to be at his service at any time and hour which he might name. Subsequently he asked to see me at his private residence at 3 p.m. on the following day, May 2.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. K. BURLEW

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Copy of attached message from the President to Sayre in re cancelling his trip.
June 8, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
NAVY RADIO

Please send the following message in code:

"Sayre, U. S. High Commissioner,
Manila

After consultations we are all agreed situation is such you should cancel trip for the time being. Hope things will clear up a little later.

ROOSEVELT"
Mr. Rudolph Forster,
Executive Clerk,
The White House.

My dear Mr. Forster:

This Department has received from the Honorable Francis B. Sayre, United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, the following message for the President:

"In view of European situation do you prefer that I remain here or come to Washington July 1st as planned? Would appreciate early reply by radio since if I go to Washington it is necessary to secure Clipper reservation. If I go do you approve appointment of Golden Bell as Acting High Commissioner during my absence? Will you announce my trip to press at Washington or do you wish me to do so here? Sayre."

This message was received in code and this Department will be glad to transmit in the same manner any reply which the President may care to send to Mr. Sayre.

Sincerely yours,

E. H. Martin
First Assistant Secretary.
My dear General Watson:

Will you be kind enough to give the enclosed letter personally to the President?

What tragic and terrible news comes from Europe! It seems as though the bottom was dropping out of things. I wonder how you all are standing the pace. I hope that the President is keeping in good health in spite of the awful strain.

My best to you.

Ever sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure.

Brigadier General Edward M. Watson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:

I have just received, through Admiral Smeallie, your executive despatch saying that my trip to the United States should not now be made in view of existing conditions. In the light of the grave events in Europe, I heartily concur in your decision. Anything might happen; and, at least until the international situation clarifies itself a bit, I believe I should stay on the job here.

I felt a great sense of relief that, thanks to the efforts of yourself and others, the Congressional appropriation for our work here was not seriously cut. The cut made in the House would have seriously crippled the work, and just at a time when under the present war conditions our work has increased in volume, in importance, and in difficulty. I feel very grateful for your help.

I know what heavy burdens you are carrying these days and I pray that God may sustain you and guide you in the momentous decisions which you must make. I feel proud of the confidence with which all the country turns to you for leadership. One of the purposes which I had in mind in suggesting a trip to America at this time was to help in working for your re-election. Now this is quite unnecessary for all the country realizes that you are the one man to lead us through the gravely critical months ahead.

I liked tremendously your speech of June tenth before the University of Virginia. It seems to me that we must move full steam ahead to make all our resources available to the Allies; and time is of the essence. I have been hoping that in view of the present state of opinion in the country we could secure at once the repeal of the Johnson Act.

Everything out here seems at present to be going along smoothly. On June eighteenth a plebiscite vote will be taken on three constitutional amendments, which if adopted will have to be submitted for your approval. I shall report on this through the Division of Territories and Island Possessions.

With admiration and profound confidence in your leadership, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Letter from the Under Secretary of State, 6/8/40 to the President, in re Americans who have been awarded decorations by the German Government since 1933; copy of letter in our files.
June 8, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made yesterday, I have had a search made of our records here in the Department and I find that in addition to Mr. Thomas J. Watson, the following American citizens have been awarded decorations by the German Government since 1933:

In 1937 Mr. Lester L. Snare, former Consul at Hamburg, was awarded the insignia and diploma of the German decoration "Cross of Merit", which was conferred by the President of the German Red Cross with the consent of the Chancellor of the German Reich. This decoration was returned to the German Embassy in Washington on May 28, 1937 with an appropriate covering note. Mr. Snare had been transferred as Consul at Milan on December 7, 1935.

The decoration and diploma of the order of merit of the German Eagle, first class, was conferred by the German Government on Lieutenant-Commander James D. Mooney, United States Naval Reserve, in 1938. This decoration is being

The President,

The White House.
detained in the custody of the Department of State until such time as Commander Mooney may be in a position legally to receive it. Mr. Mooney is Vice-President of the General Motors Corporation.

Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh was decorated by Field Marshal Goering at Berlin in 1938.

Mr. Henry Ford was also decorated by the German Government in 1938.

The New York Times on November 25, 1938 reported on the authority of a wireless despatch to it from Berlin dated November 24 that seven American citizens, including four university professors and one lawyer, were awarded the Merit Cross of the Order of the German Eagle on that day by Chancellor Adolph Hitler. Three of the professors, William Alfred Cooper, Karl Geiser and Frederick Kreuger, were named as having received orders of the first degree. Professor Ralph Haswell Lutz, Fritz Heiler and F. W. Elvin received the order in the second degree, and E. C. Miller in the third degree.

Dr. Cooper is a professor emeritus at Stanford University, California.

Dr. Karl Frederick Geiser is at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.

Dr. Frederick Conrad Kreuger is a professor of political science at Wittenberg College, Oberlin, Ohio.
Dr. Ralph Haswell Lutz is Chairman of the Directors of the Hoover War Library at Stanford University and Dean of Graduate Study at Stanford.

The foregoing biographic indications were also published in the New York Times' article above cited.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES
June 25, 1940

Dear General Watson:

Following a telephone conversation with the President, getting his instructions, I am sending the attached memorandum to Military Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the record.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

General E. M. Watson,

The White House.
Memorandum to:

Brigadier General Sherman Miles,
Acting Chief of Staff, S-2,
War Department

Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson, Director,
Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice.

June 24, 1940

In the presence of General Sherman Miles, I telephoned the President. Referring to the conversations we have had with Mr. Welles, I said that the Inter-Departmental Committee charged with coordinating intelligence work wished his direction as to the formation of a unit for foreign intelligence work (in addition, of course, to the intelligence work now being carried on by the Army and the Navy).

The choice lay between the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The President said that he wished that the field should be divided. The FBI should be responsible for foreign
foreign intelligence work in the Western Hemisphere, on the request of the State Department. The existing Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence branches should cover the rest of the world, as and when necessity arises.

It was understood that the proposed additional foreign intelligence work should not supersede any existing work now being done; and that the FBI might be called in by the State Department for special assignments outside the American Hemisphere, under special circumstances. Aside from this, intelligence outside the American Hemisphere is to be left to the officers of the Army and Navy.

A. A. Berle, Jr.
July 10, 1940

My dear Commissioner Neprud:

This will acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter addressed to the President under date of July nine.

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President

Honorable Carl Neprud,
Commissioner,
Chinese Maritime Customs,
Hay-Adams House,
Washington, D. C.
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
Washington, D. C.  

My dear Mr. President:

I beg to append hereto a memorandum stressing the importance to the democracies of maintaining control of the Singapore area. Briefly, there are, in my opinion, three vital points at stake, namely,

(1) Preventing an important world trade channel from being developed for the Axis Powers.

(2) Preventing the closing of China's communication line through Burma -- so essential in keeping Japan bogged down.

(3) Preventing such important units of the British Empire as India, Malay, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand -- all of which are dependent in some measure upon Singapore for their defense -- being exposed to possible domination by Japan and the Axis Powers.

With our fleet in the Pacific, it is suggested that part of it -- possibly a third would be sufficient -- be based in Manila with an understanding being arrived at with both the British and Netherlands East Indies Governments that should an emergency arise our fleet could use both the Singapore and Surabaya naval bases where they could cooperate with the existing British and Dutch sea, land, and air forces. It would be a case of being there first instead of letting the Japanese get in to establish a hornets' nest of their own from which it would be difficult to dislodge them.

The move could be announced as a precautionary measure designed to safeguard the Philippines and our trade channels in that general area and so would not be directed against any particular power.

Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Col. Frank Knox and Mr. Henry L. Stimson, your recent nominees for Cabinet defense posts, and to Secretaries Hull and Morgenthau.

Respectfully yours,

Carl N. Neprud
MEMORANDUM
Importance of Democracies Maintaining Control in the Singapore Area

Having lived in the Far East during the last twenty-seven years and, besides, having traveled extensively in other parts of the world, I have had an opportunity to study conditions -- particularly those pertaining to foreign trade and international politics -- and to form some views, some of which, with your permission, I should like to bring forward for consideration. The thoughts I have particularly in mind at this time center around the importance of the Singapore area in the world struggle now waging.

It is heartening to know that the fleet is not deserting the Pacific. It would seem that there can be no question that as long as the British Navy is functioning effectively in the Atlantic, then the place for the American fleet is in the Pacific.

Fully desirous of exploiting the situation which has developed by the collapse of the French Armies in Europe and by Britain's preoccupation in home waters, Japan has turned her eyes southwards -- talking in terms of French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, and contiguous territories yet to be mentioned specifically. It would seem that at present the only country which is really in a position to keep Japan from entering upon such an adventure is America -- who, in my opinion, has it in her power to do it without being involved in war. So far, Japan has been slowed up by the timely statements made by your Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, on each and every occasion that Japan's
Foreign Minister, Mr. Arita, has seen fit to speak in regard to the different territories to the south of China. I should like to submit for consideration the thought that what would definitely check Japan in her aggressive designs southwards would be moving part of our fleet -- possibly a third would be sufficient -- from Hawaii to the Philippines -- at the same time arriving at an understanding with both the British and Netherlands East Indies Governments whereby in case of need we might use both the Singapore and Surabaya naval bases. We would then be assured of being in the happy position of being there first. The tables would be reversed with respect to Japan. Thus, in the event of an emergency, instead of our fleet being in the awkward position of having to think in terms of going far afield from its bases and entering a hornets' nest, as it were, in Japanese waters, the Japanese fleet would have to consider whether it would be prepared to leave its main base at Sasebo and venture some thousands of miles away to put itself into a hornets' nest in the Manila, Singapore, Surabaya area, where in addition to our units there would be substantial British and Dutch forces -- land, sea, and air.

Surely the democracies must realize that the time has come when they can no longer stand on ceremony -- at least vis-a-vis one another. There would seem to be no valid reason why democracies should always be late. Letting Japan move part of her fleet into that area first -- thereby creating a second Japanese hornets'
nest -- would, in my opinion, be most dangerous for the democracies. There would then be the danger of the Japanese and the Italian navies linking up to permit the important raw materials obtainable from Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, China, and other near-by territories to flow to the Axis powers.

Not only is control of the Singapore area vital from the point of view of not permitting the aggressors in Europe from obtaining an important avenue for the development of their commerce, but if the Axis powers succeed in overcoming British resistance on and around the British Isles then maintenance of the British dominions overseas which, in reality, constitute the British Empire itself, rests in large measure on whether or not Britain has control of Singapore -- the base which is so uniquely situated with respect to such important units of the Empire as India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya.

I think history would record it as a stupendous error were we to permit Japan to maintain her bluff to the extent that she succeeds in this, her next great adventure.

In my opinion, Japan would not dare to attempt to take over those regions by force were part of our navy in those waters -- with two such strong naval bases as Singapore and Surabaya from which to operate should necessity dictate. Japan is over-extended now. After three years of fighting she has not succeeded in defeating China, her gold supply is about exhausted, and her opportunity of obtaining war materials is gradually being lessened --
especially with the power recently conferred by Act of Congress to prohibit the export of articles considered essential for our own defense. Japan continues, however, to put up a bold front -- speaking with a voice far beyond her power.

Instead of being able to defeat China, Japan's armies have been spread out over a wide area and are now bogged down with no graceful retreat in sight. The Chinese armies instead of getting weaker have, in reality, become stronger. They have learned more about conducting warfare and are more effective in the field today than they were when the war first started. In fact, the democracies of the world owe a debt of gratitude to China for the fight she has been waging against aggressive Japan these last three years. The maintenance of a free China is of great importance to the cause of the democracies. Control of the Singapore area will permit continued communication with China via Burma, thus assuring that Chinese resistance will go on. China's almost inexhaustible man power and the vastness of her territory are important factors in wearing down the Japanese, but they are not enough in themselves. A continual flow of war equipment is necessary, which requires that supply routes remain open.

Such a movement of part of our fleet need not be announced as aimed against Japan. It could be declared that the additional units have been detailed to the Manila area to give added protection to the Philippine Islands and to safeguard the trade channels through which flow the bulk of our requirements in rubber, tin,
and some other products. It could be a precautionary measure against any aggressive designs on the part of any power or group of powers and hence not necessarily against Japan. We would need to make no statement except to say that the serious political situation in the world necessitates that we take appropriate measures to protect our interests in that general area.

I might add that I quite realize that moving part of our fleet might conceivably go counter to a more or less fixed policy of having our fleet operate as one unit. There is the thought, however, that the whole fleet would continue to be in the one ocean, and that the fleet's two units would be so situated with respect to the Japanese fleet that they could cooperate effectively should any hostilities arise.

Washington, D. C.,
July 9, 1940.

[Signature]
Honorable Stephen Early  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Early:

In connection with our previous correspondence concerning the President’s desire for the establishment and direction of a means for "listening-in" on voice radio broadcasts originating in foreign countries, there are returned herewith for the completion of your files the original communications dated July 1st and July 16th addressed to the President and to you from the Secretary of State.

With assurances of my highest esteem,

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover  

Enclosures
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In our efforts to consolidate the resources of the United States in national defense, there is one factor which has been for some time in the mind of the Department and which seems to have a particularly important bearing on the general subject.

I refer to "listening in" on radio broadcasts originating in other countries. We all know that the radio is used for propaganda purposes and that that agency is employed by some of the governments of Europe in an aggressive way to build up sentiment in other countries to which the radio addresses are directed. It is also known that the short wave is used from other countries and directed to receiving sets which are clandestinely operated within the territories of the government which is the objective of the scheming government.

It

The President,

The White House.
It is less known, however, that even the open broadcasts are used for the transmission of secret intelligence. One instance comes to mind as an example of this last procedure. In the open broadcasts certain words are emphasized by the speaker and their intonation is a little different from the words in immediate context. The persons for whom the messages are intended simply listen to an innocuous broadcast and write down the emphasized words and at the end of the broadcast they find that they have received a coherent and exact message in correct language.

The Department has for some time felt that some steps should be taken by the American Government to keep itself informed of messages which were sent out of Europe and were intended for persons in this country or for persons in neighboring countries and that it should have an entire view of the picture of propaganda intended for consumption in the American continent.

Recently, several of the divisions of the Department have been entrusted with the work of studying this question and a committee has been formed. It makes a definite recommendation which I am pleased to present to
to you with the hope that it will have your favorable consideration.

In brief, the proposal is that the Federal Communications Commission be authorized to enlarge its monitoring station at Baltimore. It would be authorized to expend whatever sums might be necessary out of the allocations made to it by you for the purchase of necessary equipment and that possibly additional sums be allocated to it for the employment of trained expert personnel who would be familiar with the various languages concerned and whose understanding could soon be developed to include a rather intimate knowledge of radio messages and broadcasts. These persons would require an intimate knowledge of various languages and they would have to work in three shifts so as to cover the entire twenty-four hours. The program would envisage that the Department of State have a liaison officer in Baltimore with possibly an assistant to be in direct communication with an officer in the Department of State. The State Department, however, would not enter into the operation, management or control of the listening station. That would be entirely under the direction of the Federal Communications Commission.

I feel rather strongly that the American Government is confronted with an aggressive diplomacy similar
in organization and tone to the aggressive military organization which has done such damage in Europe, and I feel that we might be derelict in our duty if we did not now proceed as quickly as possible to set up an organism through which could be intercepted the intelligence with which we are to be confronted.

I might add that two of the broadcasting companies have maintained listening stations on a modest scale and that some attempt has been made at Princeton University under a grant of the Rockefeller Foundation to study radio broadcasts and that a part of their time has been given to the character of messages which I have alluded to herein. It does not seem, however, that the Government of the United States should depend upon the efforts of private citizens in this matter and the thought appeals strongly to me that the Government itself should undertake this very important work and do it in a thorough way.

If you will approve it in principle you may care to submit the matter for the consideration of the Federal Communications Commission and if you feel that the work should be undertaken you may care to consider the allocation of additional funds to that Commission for the purchase of whatever additional equipment may be
be necessary and for the employment of expert personnel. The Department of State will probably need no funds in order to cooperate to the fullest extent with the Federal Communications Commission.

In closing I express the hope that you will approve my suggestions in principle.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Cordell Hull
July 16, 1940

My dear Mr. Early:

I have received your memorandum of July 12, 1940, which is accompanied by a letter dated July 5, 1940 which you have received from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both of which refer to my letter to the President of July 1, 1940 with respect to "listening in" on radio broadcasts originating in other countries.

The information in Mr. Hoover's letter is of much interest to this Department and it is believed that favorable action is warranted on the proposal to allocate at least $250,000 to the Federal Communications Commission in order to monitor foreign language broadcasts originating in the United States and radio broadcasts originating in foreign countries.

I recommend that when Mr. Hoover has completed

The Honorable

Stephen Early,

Secretary to the President,

The White House.
the work of coordinating the needs of other interested Departments and agencies in this field, that a conference of representatives of all such Departments and agencies, including this Department, shall be arranged with as little delay as possible for the purpose of submitting final and definite recommendations to the President in regard to this matter.

It is considered a matter of great importance to this Department, and particularly in carrying out its functions with respect to the national defense, that this proposed program be put in effect.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
From Mr. Hoover,
July 5, 1940,
with enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has asked me to call your attention to the letter of July fifth, addressed to me by J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

As a part of this file, you also will find a copy of my memorandum to Mr. Hoover, dated July third. This memorandum and the letter from Mr. Hoover came about as a result of your letter to the President of July first.

Will you please return this file to me, together with such a statement as you may care to make.

The President has directed that I "follow up" in this effort, until all government agencies are properly coordinated and the whole radio field is covered by government officials whose duty it is to "listen in".

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Enclosures: Letter to Mr. Early from J. Edgar Hoover, July 5, 1940, re: what action is being taken to "listen in" on radio broadcasts originating in foreign countries; Letter to the President from Cordell Hull,
under date of July 1, 1940 re: importance of "listening in" on radio broadcasts originating in other countries in connection with efforts to consolidate the resources of the US in national defense; Memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover from Mr. Early, July 3, 1940 re: enclosing copy of above letter from Sec. Hull to the President, of July 1, 1940, in which STE states that the President would like Hoover's opinion concerning the suggestions advanced by the Sec. of State having to do with the proposal that the Fed. Communications Commission be authorized to enlarge its monitoring station at Baltimore.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR J. EDGAR HOOVER:

Dear Chief:

Again I am returning to you the file of correspondence with reference to "listening in" on radio broadcasts originating in other countries and, I might add, on foreign language broadcasts originating in this country.

The President asks me to call your attention to the letter from the Secretary of State, addressed to me under date of July 16th. He concurs in the Secretary's recommendation that when you have completed the work of coordinating the interested departments and agencies that you call a conference of all representatives of such departments and agencies for the purposes suggested by the Secretary of State.

Please return the attached file to me at your convenience.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Enclosures. Complete file on "listening in" in which the Secy. of State says it is believed that favorable action is warranted on the proposal to allocate at least $250,000 to the FCC in order to monitor
foreign language broadcasts originating in the U.S. and radio broadcasts originating in foreign countries.

WASHINGTON

July 16, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR H. HUGGARD HOOVER

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Again I am returning to you the title of Secretary of Peace, addressed to me under the advice of Mr. Field. In accordance with the Secretary of Peace's recommendation that when you have completed the work of coordinating the Interdepartmental Committee and the International Committee of Non-Government Associations and Agencies for the Prevention of Aggression at the Seaside.

Please return the enclosed title.

For me to your convenience,

[Signature]

SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

Foster Kittredge

[Handwritten note: "Complete title on "Interdepartmental in which the Secret of Peace joins to battle with the forces of aggression as well as to allocate at least $50,000,000 to the SEC in order to monitor"].

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1940.

F. Y. I.

Mr. Hosmer of the State Dept. calls at the request of Breckinridge Long, (who is at Chicago) to say that he is very much interested in this "listening in" subject and would like to take part in any final action. He will return this week to Washington.

Refer him to J.E. Hoover who is coordinating that work.
J. Edgar Hoover - 7-26-40
given to S.T.E.

JOHN EDGAR Hoover
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 26, 1940

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11952, Sec. 5(d)(3)

Honorable Stephen Early
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Steve:

I am transmitting herewith a formal communication which pertains to a proposed program for the "monitoring" of certain radio broadcasts upon which you requested my recommendations.

I wanted to point out to you informally that the recommendations outlined herein, if adopted and placed in operation, would no doubt be twisted by some elements in our country as an effort to establish a censorship of radio broadcasting. The proposed program, of course, does not in any sense of the word constitute a real censorship, but irrespective of what the motives and intent may be in developing such a project, there will be certain people who will endeavor to misinterpret it and attach some political significance to it.

I wanted to mention this because I thought you should have this in mind in discussing this with the President, for if he considers the suggested project feasible and desirable, the initiation of it would be bound to be accompanied with some degree of publicity. Therefore, irrespective of how small that publicity may be, certain reverberations critical of the project initiated would ensue.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Early:

Pursuant to the instructions contained in your letter of July 3, 1940, as augmented by the contents of your note of July 16, 1940, I have contacted the interested governmental departments for the purpose of ascertaining their views and interests in establishing an appropriate method whereby it will be possible for representatives of the Federal Government to "listen in" on certain radio broadcasts. In an effort to accomplish the objectives desired by the State Department as indicated by the letter of Secretary of State Hull of July 1, 1940, I have held a series of conferences with representatives of the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, have advised the State Department representatives of the developments in this situation and not only have consulted representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, but have received from them excellent cooperation and assistance in an effort to work out this program.

In order to carry out the President's expressed desire that there be outlined a program which would accomplish the objectives desired and at the same time prevent the departments and agencies from duplicating their work of "listening in", I am attaching hereto a set of specific recommendations which I feel are desirable at this time.

It is my recommendation that the Federal Communications Commission limit its monitoring operations
as outlined in Recommendation I at this time to a coverage of those broadcasts which are of German and Italian origin and that spot checks only, consistent with the personnel and equipment available, be made of broadcasts of Spanish origin. I have learned that at the present time there are no broadcasts of French origin reaching the United States. No broadcasts of Russian origin reach the United States and it is only occasionally that broadcasts of Japanese origin reach the United States. I feel that the sources of propaganda detrimental to the interests of the United States will primarily be found in those broadcasts of German and Italian origin, and consequently recommend the restriction of this plan to the programs of this origin, with the intermittent monitoring of the Spanish broadcasts as outlined above.

I must say that my experience and inquiries in connection with this matter have convinced me that there is a definite interest on the part of the United States Government in radio broadcasts of propaganda, confidential and intelligence information, both in foreign language and in English. This interest exists in strictly domestic broadcasts originating in the United States and received locally or transmitted to foreign countries, as well as those originating in foreign countries which can be received in the United States.

From my study of this problem I recommend that the proposal that the Federal Communications Commission be authorized to enlarge its monitoring station at Baltimore and at such other points in which monitoring facilities have been requested, be approved.
The attached recommendations have been prepared after detailed conferences with the interested governmental departments and the Federal Communications Commission, and in these recommendations I have attempted to incorporate the best and most practical suggestions and ideas advanced by the representatives of those departments.

With assurances of my highest esteem,

Sincerely,

Enclosure
July 25, 1940

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF "LISTENING IN" STATIONS FOR CERTAIN RADIO BROADCASTS

I. It is recommended that the Federal Communications Commission be instructed by the President to immediately establish a monitoring of radio broadcasts originating in foreign countries and received in the United States, Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

II. It is recommended that the Federal Communications Commission by administrative regulation immediately require that all commercial stations under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission furnish to the Federal Communications Commission an actual and complete recording, translation and transcript of all broadcasts originating in those stations which are made in any language other than English. These recordings, transcripts and translations shall be furnished by the stations to the Federal Communications Commission. It is further recommended that this requirement include broadcasts originating in the international broadcasting stations of the United States.

III. It is recommended that when recommendation II has operated a sufficient time to have served its educational and practical purposes, its provisions be extended by the Federal Communications Commission by administrative requirement to necessitate every broadcasting station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, furnishing to the Commission a recording and transcript in English of every broadcast transmitted by those stations.

IV. It is recommended that there be created in the Federal Communications Commission a division under a suitably qualified individual to be selected by the Commission, who will administer and be responsible for the carrying out of these recommendations.
V. It is recommended that an inter-departmental committee to consist of representatives of the State and Treasury Departments, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence and the Federal Communications Commission be designated, said committee to coordinate, cooperate with and assist the newly established division of the Federal Communications Commission in such a manner that the interested agencies of the Government will have complete and up-to-date information concerning all pertinent material.

VI. It is recommended that the official to be designated in charge of this program at the Federal Communications Commission make the necessary arrangements for the transcription, translation, classification and digesting of the material received.

VII. It is recommended that all expenses of operation, including the hiring of additional personnel necessary for this program, be borne by the Federal Communications Commission and that such additional funds as that Commission requires for the carrying on of this program be granted to it. Members of the liaison committee will, of course, be continued on the payroll of the departments to which they are assigned.