

● PSF

CF

State Department 1943
(Jan. - June 15)

B. F.
State
World War II

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

117

January 4, 1943

7.
SFB

Personal

Dear Steve:

With reference to our telephone conversation of this afternoon, I think it would be helpful if the President could tomorrow, in reply to some question as to what basis there is in the charges made that the committee headed by the Archduke Otto of Hapsburg has control of the Free Austrian Battalion now in process of organization by the War Department, let it be known: (1) that any Austrian national resident in the United States of military age who desires to fight against Hitler for the reconstitution of Austria is entitled to apply for enlistment in the Free Austrian Battalion; (2) that the connection of Archduke Otto with this activity is merely that of having organized a committee to assist in informing reliable Austrian nationals in the United States as to how and where such individuals might apply to the War Department for enlistment; (3) that, as the War Department has announced, any reputable committee of Austrians would be given the same opportunities as those accorded the committee of which the Archduke Otto is a member; and (4) that two brothers of the Archduke Otto have already enlisted as privates in the Free Austrian Battalion.

x PP 78151

Secretary Hull feels it very desirable that the President make such a statement because of the continuing propaganda that this Government had some political motive for permitting the Archduke Otto and his associates to take part in the organization of the Free Austrian Battalion. I enclose a copy of a confidential


The Honorable
Stephen Early,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

x-25
x4675
x B. F. State
x166

memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover which shows the kind of propaganda which is going on, most of it emanating from Czechoslovak and Yugoslav sources.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. N. Kelly". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "A" and a long horizontal line extending to the right. The name "Kelly" is written in a cursive script.

x20

Enc.

COPY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: January 2, 1943

To: Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation *x10-7b*

Subject: MILITARY COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AUSTRIA

I am in receipt of information from a highly confidential source, the content of which alleges that Otto von Hapsburg's "Military Committee for the Liberation of Austria" has sent out requests to 6,000 Czechoslovakians in the United States to join the "Austrian Battalion".

The content of the requests reportedly being sent out by Otto von Hapsburg is unknown to this Bureau but I thought you might be interested in the above information in the event it has not already been called to your attention.

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

BY MESSENGER

EW

The Honorable
Stephen Early,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

PERSONAL

Union of S. Africa 1943

B. F. State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington
TO: AMERICAN CONSULATE, Capetown
DATED: February 3, 1943
NUMBER: 19

~~SECRET~~

The following message is for the Minister.

x558

*x861
x289*

Topic 1. You are advised that discussions on the problem of war production in South Africa, especially as it is effected by the present volume of gold mining, have been continued by the Department and other Governmental agencies since you left Washington. The Department and the other Governmental agencies are not interested in the quantity of fine ounces produced in the Union or in the monetary uses of gold, as you know; they are only concerned with the fact that industries more directly connected with the war effort need the materials and labor used by the gold mines. The War Production Board has ordered American gold mines to be closed for similar reasons.

Topic 2. It is believed by the mission which the Board of Economic Warfare sent to study the supply requirements of the Union that a substantial reduction in the present rate at which ore is milled, perhaps 25%, could be achieved within the year. This would effect an

*x4675
x4193
*B.F. Lend Lease
B.F. State World War II

DECLASSIFIED approximately
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 2 1972

approximately corresponding saving in the materials which the gold mines need and a somewhat smaller saving in labor. It is also believed by the mission that if the United States would make available the supplies needed to support the war industries of the Union such a reduction could be absorbed by the Union economy. We would consider further reductions, possibly to a total of 50%, according to the needs of the war effort and the economic position of the Union.

Topic 3. You are already familiar with the attitude which has been taken by Prime Minister Smuts on this question. He has definitely refused to consider any agreement by the South African Government to impose a quantitative restriction on gold mining operations, but, according to the mission sent by the Board of Economic Warfare, it is believed by Smuts that a shortage of necessary supplies may eventually reduce these operations and that Union economy could absorb the gradual reduction brought about in this way without creating political difficulties.

Topic 4. It is agreed by the Department and other interested Governmental agencies that the Union Government should not be pressed to give a formal commitment to curtail gold mining operations, but they are not willing to provide sufficient materials for maintaining

such

such operations at the present levels. Accordingly, it has been decided by them to suggest to the British Government that both Governments make available to South Africa the material assistance needed to maintain and expand the Union's war industries, but at the same time to indicate that there will inevitably be a substantial reduction in supplies for other purposes.

Topic 5. There was a formal meeting of the Board of Economic Warfare on October 15 which was attended by the Vice President, the Lend-Lease Administrator, the Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of War and other representatives of the Departments and agencies that are members of the Board. The following is the substance of a resolution which was adopted:

"WHEREAS, The most effective utilization of all the resources of the United States and United Nations is required for successful and early conclusion of the war;

"AND WHEREAS It is believed that the Union of South Africa is in a position to give further aid to the United Nations' war effort by the maximum conversion of its industries to war production;

"NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That it is

recommended

recommended by the Board of Economic Warfare that the maximum and rapid conversion of the economy of South Africa to full war economy be achieved, and assistance in such conversion be given by appropriate United States agencies by making available such supplies, within the limits of shipping and production facilities, as are necessary for the further development of the war industries of South Africa, and that appropriate administrative measures be taken for carrying out this program aggressively."

The text of this resolution is given for your confidential information only.

Topic 6. Pursuant to this resolution it is the intention of the American Government to offer to the Government of the Union of South Africa assurances of its best efforts, consistent with other war needs, to furnish the supplies required to support South Africa's war effort. Materials for the ISCOR extensions are among these supplies. It is hoped that these materials may be ready for shipment early in 1943 instead of late in that year. Supplies for the Union would consist largely of machinery, industrial chemicals, steel, and petroleum and related products. The greater part of these materials would be allocated to the Director General

of

of War Supplies, with smaller amounts being allocated to other essential industries, agriculture, railways, et cetera.

Topic 7. There would be a considerable reduction in supplies for direct use by the gold mines. If the gold industry could acquire from the United States about 41,000 tons of supplies for direct use in gold mining, and if it would draw on its stocks to a point that would leave a six month stockpile at the end of the year, the gold industry could maintain its present level of operations through 1943 according to the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. According to the Board of Economic Warfare present operations could be maintained by the gold industry through 1943 by using only 13,000 tons of American supplies and by reducing its stockpile position to a three month basis. With slightly less than 10,000 tons from the United States, the industry could make a 25% reduction in the rate at which ore is milled and have a three month stockpile at the end of 1943. Accordingly we would expect to furnish not more than 10,000 tons during 1943 to the gold industry and most of this amount would be delivered toward the end of the year. A much smaller quantity of supplies would be delivered if there were not a satisfactory reduction in the rate at which ore is milled during the year. This paragraph and the preceding one are for your confidential information.

Topic 8.

Topic 8. Among other factors the ability of the United States to furnish these supplies will depend upon the shipping situation. No definite statement concerning the availability of shipping space can be made by the War Shipping Administration until it has first consulted the British Ministry of War Transport about coordination of shipping to South Africa from the United Kingdom and the United States. This will be done as soon as the supply program has been submitted to Prime Minister Smuts.

Topic 9. A schedule of materials which the United Kingdom would endeavor to furnish to the Union of South Africa during 1943 must accompany the list of materials which the United States is to supply. For example, consumption goods should come mainly from the United Kingdom for only a small quantity has been included in the American list.

Topic 10. It is proposed that a Supply Council be established in South Africa to regulate the flow of supplies to the Union. The Union of South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom would have equal representation on this Council. All requirements of the Union for materials that must be obtained from overseas would be considered by the Council. Every effort consistent with

with the war needs of the United Nations would be made to provide these materials in accordance with schedules accepted by the three Governments concerned. If there should be a deviation from these schedules which the Council would not approve unanimously, the objecting Government would be released from its obligations to conform to the schedules. The Council should give first consideration to the needs of the war industries of the Union, and for industries not directly connected with the war effort only minimum quantities of supplies should be approved.

Topic 11. We would expect the Council's activities to cause a substantial reduction in gold mining operations. There are several benefits which might be derived from such a reduction. One of these benefits is the release of equipment and manpower for use in the war industries of the Union. The possible objections that the manufacture of war supplies can be conducted more economically in the United Kingdom and the United States should be outweighed by the advantages of producing additional quantities of war supplies in South Africa which is relatively near the areas where the supplies will be used. The saving in materials which the gold mines need, not only the relatively small

amounts

amounts required from the United States, but the substantial quantities that are obtained in South Africa would be another benefit from a reduction in gold mining operations. The reduced consumption of coal by gold mines and related industries would be perhaps the most important advantage. A large amount of shipping which is used now for transporting coal could be released for other purposes if enough coal were available in South Africa. Fifty thousand long tons of coal a month are moved from the United States to the eastern coast of South America at the present time and 70,000 long tons a month are moved from the United Kingdom. It is estimated that the total saving in shipping would amount to 500,000 tons if, in addition to its present exports, the Union could make 120,000 tons of coal available each month for shipment to South America in vessels returning in ballast from the Indian Ocean. This saving is equal to the full time use of 50 new vessels with a carrying capacity of 10,000 tons each, and it is stated by the War Shipping Administration that no greater economy in shipping can be envisaged at the present time, other than the saving resulting from the use of the Mediterranean route to the east instead of the Cape of Good hope route. We cannot overemphasize the importance of

sueh

such an economy, and the War Shipping Administration is extremely anxious that it should be accomplished as soon as possible. The question of giving priority to coal over other exports from the Union will be taken up by us with the supply authorities here if the increased shipments of coal should cause congestion in the use of port and railway facilities.

Topic 12. There was probably too much emphasis on closing the gold mines and too little on the development of Union war production in the previous discussion with John Martin and Prime Minister Smuts. Therefore, we hope that the present offer, which is of a more constructive ^{Nature} material, will be less likely to have political consequences and will be more acceptable to the South African Government. The President has approved the offer and it is to be transmitted to Prime Minister Smuts in the form of a personal message from the President. You are requested to deliver this message, orally and in person, directly to the Prime Minister. The following is the substance of the message:

Topic 13. The increasing difficulties in producing and delivering supplies for the United Nations have been taken up with me by my advisers. I am sure you will agree that all materials produced should

should be utilized to the greatest extent possible for the direct prosecution of the war and that the minimum amount possible under the circumstances should be retained for other essential purposes.

Topic 14. It is apparent what difficulties are attendant upon the sending of supplies to the Union of South Africa from this country and it is essential that a vital need be filled by all supplies sent. The Government knows and appreciates the considerable and valuable contributions to the war effort made by the production of war supplies and by base metal mining and ship repairing in the Union of South Africa.

Topic 15. This Government is anxious to give assistance to the Union of South Africa to increase the production of those supplies and materials which are required for the United Nations' war effort. An early increase in the quantity of coal available in the Union for shipment to South America is regarded by us as particularly important so that we may achieve a substantial saving in the use of shipping by the United Nations. The interested agencies of this Government will make every effort consistent with the war needs of the United Nations to send to the

Union

Union the supplies which are needed to maintain and expand its war industries. It is contemplated that the Union Government would likewise make every effort to expand the industries which are directly devoted to war purposes, and to increase the amount of its resources available to these industries.

Topic 16. Such a plan would depend entirely upon the South African Government's approval and full cooperation for its success. The readjustment of available resources, including equipment, manpower and other facilities, within the Union would be required by an expansion of the war industries of the Union. It is realized by me that this can only be accomplished at the expense of those industries which do not contribute directly to the prosecution of the war. An attempt will be made by the United States Government to furnish supplies not only for the Union's direct war needs, but also for other urgent requirements. However, it will be impossible to avoid a substantial reduction of supplies to industries which have only an indirect share in the war effort because of the lack of shipping space and materials.

Topic 17. A detailed proposal to establish a
supply

supply program for South Africa together with a Supply Council to carry out that program will be presented to the Government of the United Kingdom and to your Government if these ideas meet your approval. I believe that such a program would have the most beneficial results in maintaining your country's war economy.

Topic 18. The President's message is being brought to the attention of the British Embassy here and the substance of this message has been forwarded to the American Embassy in London. We expect the next steps to be detailed technical discussions concerning the supply requirements of the Union if Prime Minister Smuts agrees in principle with this proposal. The British Government will be asked to prepare a schedule of materials which the United Kingdom will make available to South ^{Africa} America during 1943. For your information a list of supplies which the United States is to furnish has already been prepared by the Board of Economic Warfare. The two schedules must be coordinated with each other and then discussed and approved by the three Governments concerned.

Topic 19. During your conversations with Prime Minister Smuts and other Union Government representatives you should emphasize that the purpose of the program is

to

to maintain and expand the war industries of the Union. The only commitments that we expect to ask from the Union Government are (1) an early agreement to increase the quantities of coal available; (2) the establishment of a Supply Council; (3) agreement with the principle that there should be the maximum application of the resources of the Union to direct use in the war effort. Even though other points may not have been settled, it is our hope that arrangements with respect to coal can be completed first because of the urgent need of shipping space. Since the program is not directed primarily at the gold mines, there should be no specific agreement concerning them.

Topic 20. It is hoped by us that it will not be necessary to discuss the question of curtailing gold mining operations at length and it is our suggestion that you do not mention the subject first. You should make it clear, if the subject is raised, that our interest in the matter is as set forth in paragraph one of this telegram, but the contents of paragraphs two, five, six or seven should not be referred to by you. It is true that the effect of the program will probably be to curtail the operations of the gold mines, but it is felt by us that such a reduction is bound to take place

whether

whether or not the program is accepted in its present form. As regards materials for the maintenance of any industry that does not contribute directly to the wars prosecution, it is extremely unlikely that this country will be in a position to supply any such materials.

HULL x20

F.P.C.

2-1-43

*This approval
shown to Col.
M. S. Cairns*

*C.A.
@IC
JDR
2-10-43*

*L. F.
State
World War II*

February 4, 1943

SUMMARY OF
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

British Landing Rights at Roberts Field

1. The British wanted landing rights at Roberts Field, beginning the summer of 1942. Various reasons were given, none of them very convincing.
2. The Army objected, and there was a row which grew in intensity.
3. The British sought State Department intervention November 2, 1942; Army still recalcitrant; British case still unconvincing.
4. British (substantially) threatened reprisals, January 23, 1943. State decided this was no time for a row; prevailed on Army to grant landing and refueling rights but not commercial stop rights. Army acquiesced, but unconvinced.
5. January 29, 1943, Monrovia reported Arnold ordered grant of landing and servicing privileges to BOAC, after discussion at Casablanca. This was substantially the arrangement Army had been induced to accept.
6. Recommended that, the row having been generally settled on January 25 in Washington, the agreement be formalized. Arrangement here appears to be, on the whole, the arrangement ordered by General Arnold.

x476
x48
x249
x4675
x b. F. State

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

official Orig ret'd to Sec. State 2/10/43

x20

February 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Re General Marshall's memorandum of February 1:
British landing rights at Roberts Field, Liberia

1. Included in the agreement permitting American troops to enter Liberia was the right of military use of Roberts Field. We also have civilian rights granted to Pan-American Airways. We agreed that we would not permit foreign aircraft to use the field for civil purposes.

X2875
2. Shortly thereafter, the British flying officers asked that Roberts Field be made available to the British Overseas Airways. The American Commandant denied permission, as inconsistent with the Liberian agreement. One British plane came in and landed without permission (according to our officers: the British dispute this). A violent controversy ensued. The British renewed their application; the War Department has consistently opposed it, believing that there was no technical need of granting these landing rights; that it was in violation of the Liberian agreement; and that the alleged necessity was really a cover to permit British Overseas Airways to establish itself in Liberia. The dispute continued to grow.

3. On November 2, the British Embassy asked the State Department to intervene. The War Department continued its opposition. The dispute was not helped by the attempt of the British group to use the field, apparently on some misunderstanding of orders. Our technicians reported no reason why the field should be used, the British having a good air field at Preetown, about a hundred miles away. General Handy

maintained

X249

maintained the Army position.

A meeting of the British and American officers did not change the Army viewpoint.

4. Continued discussions were had, but on January 20, 1943, Sir Ronald Campbell again pressed his request with me and showed a telegram intimating that the British would undertake what were in effect reprisals, namely, decline to permit Army planes to carry mail in Africa.

5. We decided that the quarrel had gone far enough. Though the British case technically was bad, landing rights at Roberts Field were certainly not worth a row, and we expounded this view to the Army. Reluctantly, they assented to an arrangement by which we agreed to persuade the Liberians to permit British planes to land at Roberts Field, solely for refueling; ^{+arriving} no British installations to be made. Thus the British Overseas Airways could obtain refueling and transit rights, which was all they had asked; but could not establish Roberts Field as a commercial stop.

6. Before this arrangement had been consummated, Monrovia reported an order from General Arnold directing that the BOAC be allowed to stop and refuel, and on your return we were advised that this matter had been directly negotiated at Casablanca.

7. Conclusion. We believe here that the arrangement we had finally induced the Army to accept is substantially in accord with the order worked out at Casablanca. I recommend that we formalize the arrangement with the British Embassy here, in that sense. The aide-memoire we had drafted prior to receiving word from Casablanca I believe will do this. In that case, the subject will be off your mind.

Attached, a copy of the proposed aide-memoire.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Note: (569) ^{hm}
Attachment:
Aide-Memoire.
aide-memoire referred to
returned to Mr. Muboly, office of
A. A. Berle, Jr., State Dept., in
accordance with his instructions,
2/11/43 hm

Orig. ret'd to Sec. State 2/10/43

*Filed by
Mr. Miller 2-11-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7

February 4, 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. A. A. BERLE, Jr.

For immediate report.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Secret

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

February 1, 1943.

In the course of our conferences in Casablanca, the Prime Minister stated to General Arnold that we have denied servicing and landing rights at Roberts Field, Liberia to the Royal Air Force and to British Overseas Airways Corporation, in connection with their operations in support of the United Nations war effort. Accordingly I sponsored a message to the Commanding Officer, Roberts Field directing him to extend those privileges to British aircraft without discrimination.


Since returning to Washington and examining into the matter, I find that we have for several months accorded to the Royal Air Force the use of our facilities at Roberts Field to the extent of our capabilities. I understand that the State Department interprets the agreement between the Governments of the United States and Liberia as limiting our air operations in Liberia to those which are conducted by military agencies and, that all operations of commercial planes in Liberia, conducted by United States corporations, are in accordance with specific concessions granted those corporations by the Government of Liberia. Consequently, British requests for commercial use of U. S. Army facilities in Liberia have been referred to the State Department. I am informed that the British Embassy has raised the question with Assistant Secretary of State Berle and has been acquainted with the underlying facts and furthermore that a proposed arrangement with the Government of Liberia is about to be suggested.

Inasmuch as this matter may have been discussed by you with the Prime Minister, and possibly with the President of Liberia, I feel it necessary to ask your instructions in the matter before proceeding further.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)


Chief of Staff.

x 25-T 10-19-66

x 25-
Signature - Carl S. Spitzer

x 25-T

SECRET ||

P. 123

AS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Santiago

Dated February 10, 1943

Rec'd 10:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

272, February 10, 7 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

On request of Foreign Minister. Am informed
Wallace has said he would be delighted to accept
invitation to Chile provided you give permission.

Government here eager for visit and am informed
Welles has spoken to you about it and seems favorable.
In the event you have no objection and inform me, for
transmission to Fernandez, an official invitation will
be sent. Time not mentioned but invitation would go
forth at once. Have requested D to urge this upon
you. I urged that Wallace be sent for President's
inauguration but since Chile had not broken with Axis
this impossible. Now I feel it would be an immeasurable
service were he to come. It would greatly aid toward
the hearty collaboration we want, would arouse great
popular enthusiasm and would strengthen our position
generally. I need not add perhaps that Wallace is
very popular in Chile.

BOWERS

WSB

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By ET. Date OCT 17 1972

PSF
C.F
State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1943

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ //

MEMORANDUM FOR

UNDER SECRETARY WELLES

x20

Please prepare reply.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

x303

State Dept. dispatch 2/10/43 #272 from
Santiago Chile from Bowers re possible
visit to Chile of V. P. Wallace

x12

x429

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By KT

Date OCT 17 1972

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1943

E. B.


My dear Mr. President:

With regard to the request contained in your memorandum of February 12 to prepare a reply to Ambassador Bowers' telegram of February 10 urging that the Vice President accept an invitation from the Government of Chile to visit that country, will you let me know what your wishes in the matter may be?

I have no doubt that a visit from Henry Wallace would produce an excellent effect on Chilean public opinion, but I do not believe that he should undertake this trip if the visit would be limited solely to Chile. I think he should certainly visit the republics through which he would have to pass on his way to Chile, namely, Panama, Ecuador and Peru, since, obviously, feelings would be hurt if he passed through those countries without making the same kind of visit which he would make in Chile. If these additional visits were made, I suppose some two weeks would be required for the trip.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



The President,
The White House.

x87

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE FILES

The President directed me to telephone the Under Secretary of State and say that he approved of his suggestions about the Vice President's visit to South America and asked the Under Secretary to make the necessary arrangements with the Vice President.

G. G. T.

FEB 22 1972

By J. Schauble Date _____

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Consulate General, Capetown
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATE: February 15, 1943
NUMBER: 169

L. F.
State

~~_____~~

The following message is from the Minister. *x 558*

In connection with the following message reference is made to my cable from Capetown of February 10, 1943, No. 151.

I have had several conversations with John Martin to whom the message from the President was referred. He has discussed the Lend-Lease a great deal and it has been urged by him that Gage should be our representative on the supply council if it is established here and that the council should be composed only of United States and Union of South African members with perhaps a British representative present but on the outside. He seems to nurse the hope that if a council must be accepted it may somehow be rendered innocuous while a new extension is given to Lend-Lease with the manipulation of which he feels himself familiar. *x 861*

Beyond what was reported by me in my telegram to which reference is made above I have said nothing concerning gold mine supplies. From the Department's cable of February 13, No. 28 it would seem that the Union Government prefers to ask its direct questions on this critical subject in Washington. This morning, however, I asked Martin if he thought that a reply would be forthcoming soon from General Smuts and it was stated by him that it is certain that there will be. This afternoon *x AP 75949*

x 4193
x 289
x 229

-2-

he is seeing General Smuts concerning this.

James Orr DENBY
x



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Spain - 1943
Feb 24
noon

file

C. F.
State

February 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

With reference to the President's memorandum of February 5th addressed to the Under Secretary, Colonel Juan Beigbeder arrived in Washington this morning and is at the Statler Hotel.

- * Will you be good enough to check with the President and let me know when he desires to see Colonel Beigbeder? In this connection will you also let me know whether the President wants to see Colonel Beigbeder alone or to have him accompanied by the Spanish Ambassador.

G. T. Summerlin
George T. Summerlin

6. Summerlin advises that Colonel Juan Beigbeder has arrived in Washington. He is the Spaniard about whom Ambassador Hayes wrote you (His confidential letter attached). You wrote Sumner Welles that you wanted to see Beigbeder when he arrived.

Welles *26 noon*

FOR DEFENSE



BUY
UNITED STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

Beigbeder, Col. Juan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Col.

I want to see Juan Beigbeder who is coming over from Spain and will be here during February and March.

F. D. R.

(Request made as a result of letter from Ambassador Hayes - Jan. 21, 1943. Before Mr. Beigbeder comes in, the President wants Amb. Hayes' letter to refresh his memory - ~~filed with Miss Turner - Diplomatic file.~~)

Copy of this memo + Hayes' letter gotten from Miss Turner's file 2-25. 2B.

[Handwritten signature]

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Personal and ~~Confidential~~

Madrid, January 21, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

The "Peninsular Campaign" proceeds fairly well. Our only set-backs during the past month have been: (1) Franco's message to Hitler wishing him success against Communism, (2) a slight increase of Axis propaganda in the Spanish press, and (3) the present ceremonial visit of the Secretary of the Falangist Party, Señor Arrese, to Berlin.

But these are not taken too seriously by the general run of Spaniards, and on the other hand there are some substantial gains for us: (1) the formation of the "Iberian Block", followed by the recent publication of a Spanish "red book" about it, which is currently called "Spain's Declaration of Independence from the Axis"; (2) the instructions of the Foreign Office to its agents throughout the Americas to have nothing to do with Falangist organizations or activities; (3) Count Jordana's latest assurance that he has told Germany that if its forces attempt to enter Spain Spain will resist; (4) the recall of the German and Italian ambassadors, the former "in disgrace" for his "failure"; (5) the obvious satisfaction of both the Foreign Office and the non-Falangist press with the cordial call of our General Patton on General Orgaz in Spanish Morocco; (6) the prominent and extensive publicity given throughout Spain to your great message to the Congress; and (7) the recent steps taken by the Government here, the result, at least in large part, of our promptings, to improve conditions in Miranda and the other prisons and concentration camps

and

The President,
The White House.

x4675
x422
x L. F. State World War II

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 22 1972

and to release numerous categories of refugees and internees. We have just been enabled, for example, to obtain the release of some "interned" American aviators and to transport them to Gibraltar. In connection with the general refugee problem, I am eagerly awaiting the arrival of the promised representatives of the American Red Cross.

The recall of the German Ambassador, von Stohrer, who had been here since 1940, was the result, I am told, of Hitler's violent denunciation of his "weakness". The new Ambassador, von Moltke, is a nominal Catholic with eight children! I have only two!

One of the most interesting Spaniards I have met is Colonel Juan Beigbeder, who will leave shortly by clipper for the United States. He is very "Latin" -- impulsive and voluble, -- a good soldier, and a very good friend of ours and of the British. In 1939-40, before the meteoric rise (and descent) of Serrano Suñer, he was Foreign Minister and helped to deter Franco from imitating Mussolini's example and plunging into the war on the side of Germany. Indeed he somewhat scandalized Franco by openly describing Hitler as "Antichrist". He is a devoted Catholic and Monarchist and he hates the Falange.

Moreover, Beigbeder knows a vast deal about North Africa and has a large following among the Moroccan tribesmen. He was High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco for several years, and in addition to learning Arabic (which he speaks fluently) he has personally explored all the lands from Tangier to Cairo.

He now goes to America as a special military observer for the War Minister, General Asensio. The latter can't fully believe what our radios and our Madrid Embassy tell him about our gigantic war production and determination, and he wants Beigbeder to find out if we aren't "bluffing" a bit. Beigbeder expects to be in the States during February and March and to be able, through his reports, to overcome Asensio's doubts.

Beigbeder warns us that he is loyal to the present Spanish régime -- so long as it stays out of the war -- and that he should not be given any secret or confidential information about our war-plans. He adds, however, that, in the highly improbable event of Franco's letting the Germans come into Spain or failing to resist them vigorously, he will lead a revolt here and in Spanish Morocco and will join forces with us. A very entertaining man!

With

-3-

With cordial greetings,

Faithfully yours,

Carleton J. H. Hays

x 4848

L. F.
State

February 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

x 173 x You will probably recall that about a year ago a Mr. Walter G. Ross gave me a map that had been torn from a bill post board in Madrid, and which interested you very much as it was an appeal to the Spaniards to side with the Germans. The same Mr. Ross came in Saturday to see me, as he was disturbed by reading in a Spanish newspaper that the President had received Colonel Juan Beigbeder.

x Mr. Ross was Acting Military Attache in Lisbon during the last war. He has also lived in Spain for a long time. He is further vouched for by my old classmate, Colonel Robert Fletcher, former Military Attache at Madrid.

x Mr. Ross left with me a calling card bearing the full name of Colonel Beigbeder, which is "Juan Beigbeder Atienza". (attached to original)

x When Ross was in Spain Colonel Beigbeder was Foreign Minister, having received this appointment from Franco when he took over in Madrid. It is Mr. Ross's opinion that at that time Beigbeder was working with the Germans. Before his appointment as Foreign Minister Beigbeder was in charge of troops in North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and according to Ross, the Colonel probably knows more about North Africa than any other man.

When asked what he could tell me concerning Colonel Beigbeder's background, Mr. Ross asserted his greatest weakness was women, and it was because of this that he was returned to North Africa by Franco. Ross stated that while Foreign Minister, Beigbeder lived with a beautiful English girl named Rosamond Fox, whom the Germans claimed was a British spy. The Germans finally compelled Franco to force her to leave the country and she went to Portugal. Two weeks later, Serrano Suner, with whom Beigbeder had many fights, persuaded Franco to send Colonel Beigbeder back to North Africa.

Mr. Ross explained that he understood that Colonel Beigbeder did not come to the United States through the Spanish Ambassador, but was sent here by Franco. Ross felt that as he was here as a private citizen we should know his background, as he, Ross, felt Beigbeder would give to the Germans any

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 22 1972

x 422

x 20

x 4675

information he received in this country. Ross says that when he knew him in Spain as Foreign Minister, Beigbeder very definitely favored the German Embassy.

When I told this information to the Chief of the Spanish Desk in the State Department, he said that he didn't agree with Mr. Ross, as he thought probably Ross was exaggerating the Colonel's German proclivities. However, my classmate Colonel Fletcher, insists that he would believe anything that Ross said as he, Ross, was intensely patriotic. But, of course, he might make an error in judgment.

E.M.W.

March 10, 1943.

~~_____~~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

At the direction of the President I am forwarding to you herewith, confidential memorandum concerning Colonel Juan Beigbeder.

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 22 1972

See

e. f. State

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

March 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Tell this to Sumner Welles.

F.D.R.

1-2



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
Eu

March 18. 1943

My dear General Watson:

I have received your memorandum of March 10, 1943 in regard to Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza. E.P.

At the time when Colonel Beigbeder was Foreign Minister of Spain, he had inevitably to transact business with the Germans. I think you will agree that this need not necessarily reflect a pro-German bias. In fact it is our information that while in office as Foreign Minister the subject was reputedly pro-British, and it was popularly believed in Spain that his dismissal from office was brought about principally by a too active contact with the British Embassy.

The Department has no information concerning a connection with Miss Rosamond Fox. If this story is true the behavior attributed to the Germans and Serrano Suñer would scarcely tend to endear them to him.

It appears to be correct that Colonel Beigbeder did not come to the United States through the Spanish Ambassador, but that the Spanish War Minister, rather than General Franco, arranged his present mission.

Colonel Beigbeder has stated voluntarily that he will feel it his duty toward the War Minister to report what he sees in this country, and has asked that care

be


Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.



be taken not to show him anything we should not like to be communicated to our enemies. He has explained that this does not signify any doubts respecting the War Minister himself, but an uncertainty in his own mind respecting the loyalty of certain subordinates in the War Ministry.

In view of the above, I do not feel that the report of Mr. Ross is entirely justified.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. M. Ross', written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned to the right of the typed phrase 'Sincerely yours,'.

(670)

*Signed original of this letter sent to
Hon. Sumner Welles for delivery Norway 1943*

(L.F.)

February 26, 1943

State

Dear Tony:

Thank you for your letter of February 12 and for its enclosure giving me a forewarning of the subjects which the Norwegian Foreign Minister may discuss with me when he comes to Washington. Needless to say, I shall give careful consideration to any message which King Haakon may send me through Mr. Lie.

The King's wish that Crown Prince Olav be placed in nominal command of any United Nations forces sent to Norway is a matter on which I cannot commit myself at this time but which must be discussed with the British in the light of both military and political considerations.

x 1175653

x 4725

Please give my personal regards to King Haakon.

x 1178124

With all good wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Minister near the
Government of Norway,
Care of American Embassy,
London.

*x 1667
x 117 554*

*x B. F. State
x 4670*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

EB
February 23. 1943

My dear Mr. President:

In response to your memorandum of February 19, 1943, I return herewith a letter addressed to you by Ambassador Biddle, together with its enclosure, and a draft reply prepared for your signature.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

1. From Ambassador Biddle, with enclosure, returned.
2. To Ambassador Biddle.

The President,
The White House.

(640)

lan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE *x20*

For preparation of reply
for my signature.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from Tony Biddle, Embassy of the
U.S.A., 40, Berkeley Square, London, W. 1,
2/12/43, to the President, in re plans
of The Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Trygve Lie, to visit Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

FEB 19 1943

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.

February 12, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

x The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Trygve Lie, (who became Minister for Justice when the Labor Government came into power at the time that we took up our duties in Norway) has just informed me that at the request of King Haakon and his Government he plans to visit Washington within the next several weeks.

The King, he said, wished him to convey to you in strictest confidence an expression of his earnest desire that, in event of an Allied landing in Norway, H.R.H. Prince Olav be placed in nominal command of the liberating forces. This, Lie assured me, was in complete accord with the wishes both of the Government and of the "Home Front", which represented the opinion of well over 90% of the people of Norway. Lie, moreover, stated that in sounding out the British King, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, he had found them in accord with this idea, but reluctant to commit themselves, pending your approval.

The King had furthermore, requested Minister Lie to hand you a secret document which the King had approved, February 2, 1943. It was drawn up by the Norwegian authorities here only after full consultation with the "Home Front". For your

information

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

1/ information, I am attaching hereto a copy of this secret document.

The main points therein are:

(a) a statement on the Government's position in carrying out its task outside Norway;

(b) the Government's position in connection with the liberation of Norway, whether by gradual military reconquest, or as a result of German collapse on other fronts. As regards an Allied occupation, the document states that the Government must try to arrange that this be carried out in close cooperation with the Norwegian authorities, and preferably under Norwegian supreme military direction; that if the country were liberated through an invasion, the invasion troops would be accompanied by representatives of the Government; that the liberated districts would have to be placed under Norwegian civil administration as soon as possible. In this connection, the document emphasises that "we must at all costs try to avoid being drawn into conditions of the French type";

(c) as regards the question of supplies during the "transition period", the Government was trying to ensure that supplies were shipped to the country at the earliest possible moment; that Norwegian authorities retained the right to dispose of these supplies;

(d) in event of the possibility that the present regime in Norway were altered before the end of hostilities, for instance if the German Army Command superseded the Reichskommissariat and the Quisling regime were liquidated, there would perhaps be a demand for the establishment of a new "Administrative Council". Such a Council should be appointed by the Supreme Court, and it would formally occupy the same position as the Administrative Council of 1940. It would not have the position of a government, but, as King Haakon had stated in his letter of April 19, 1940, to the President of the Supreme Court, Paal Berg, it would "be an auxiliary to the civil

administration

administration for such time as the military occupation lasts". Its term of office would cease as soon as the Government were again able to exercise its authority in Norway. In event of the reconquest of a part of Norway, the Government would gradually assume power in the regions liberated. (During its session at Elverum, April 9, 1940, the Storting invested the Government with authority to make decisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the Kingdom "until the moment comes when the Government and the Presidential Board of the Storting agrees to summon the members of the Storting to their next ordinary sitting");

(e) as regards the term of office of the last Storting, it had lapsed, and its convocation, even if only for a brief period, might possibly antagonize the people. On the other hand, while circumstances might arise which necessitated the old Storting's convocation as the "last constitutional organ, apart from the present Government", this possibility was remote. The question might also be solved, the document continues, by the Government's ordering elections to the Storting immediately following the country's liberation, and thereupon handing its resignation to the King, reserving only its duty to report to the new Storting. Since it appeared, however, that some time, perhaps six months to a year, should elapse between liberation and new elections, the Government, as previously declared by the Prime Minister on December 25, 1942, had concluded to hand its resignation to the King as soon as the country had been freed, for instance at the time when the King and his Council were able to assemble in Oslo;

(f) the new Government should be formed after deliberations between the King, the present Government, and the leading personalities at home. It must be a coalition government with the broadest possible base. This government would govern the country until the new Storting convened. Among other tasks, it must

take

take the necessary decisions concerning the new election to the Storting, which should take place, at the latest, within a year of the appointment of the new Government. It would then be a matter for the new Storting to decide the fate of this government;

(g) actions of the Government had to be investigated, according to the constitution, by the Protocol Committee of the Storting. Since it was out of the question to accord this privilege to the Protocol Committee of the old Storting, and since it would seem inadvisable to postpone such an investigation until the new Storting's nomination of its Protocol Committee, it might be advisable to invite the Supreme Court to appoint a Commission to investigate the Government's actions to cover the period since immediately preceding April 9, 1940.

Another question, Minister Lie said, that the King would like him to discuss with you discreetly was that concerning post-war regional agreements. (I am aware that in this connection Lie would discuss the question in light of his frequently declared policy of "Atlantic Partners".

Another question he has been requested to discuss with the authorities concerned, is that regarding replacements of shipping tonnage.

The foregoing is by way of apprising you in advance of the main points of Lie's proposed talks.

Lie is not only a grand fellow - a regular fellow and a human being with good common horse sense - but also a statesman of proven ability. Once he breaks through his preliminary shyness, I believe you will find in him one of the soundest men in Europe.

With my warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidder

C O P Y

THE PRIME MINISTER

Translation

[2-2-43]

Secret

The first and foremost task of the Government has been to uphold the position of Norway as a sovereign state and to organize our war effort outside Norway in order thereby to prepare the way for the reconquest of the country. This requires certain administrative and economic measures, which must be planned beforehand. These measures will be of a provisional character and the Government does not, of course, wish to tie the Norwegian people to any fixed policy for the future. This also applies to foreign policy. Our foreign policy must at present be regarded as a part of our war effort. The same applies to our information service, which aims at arousing interest in Norwegian points of view and Norwegian interests and at counteracting attempts to influence the opinion in allied and neutral countries in a way disadvantageous to Norway.

It can be taken for granted that only such binding agreements as are necessary for our war effort, will be concluded. The Norwegian people must themselves decide the future lines of our foreign policy through their constitutional organs.

As is well known the Government has never tried to issue directions for the struggle of the home front. Whenever the Government has taken action or has issued official statements with a direct bearing upon the work in Norway, this has always taken place as a result of an appeal from home, or because the Government considered it necessary, for the sake of the liberation and the future of Norway, to issue a warning against some threatening danger, as for instance during the negotiations between the Presidential Board of the Storting and the Administrative Council on the one side and the Germans on the other during the summer and autumn of 1940. Later, the Government has tried to follow, as far as possible, the advice received from responsible quarters in the home front, - advice which has in general been consistent with the Government's own point of view. It has not always been easy for the Government to ascertain who were representing the home front. The Government has, however, tried and will continually try to strengthen its contact with such responsible circles as may be presumed to enjoy general confidence at home.

Nobody

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS Memo

10 Feb 1995

By [Signature] Date 3/2/85

Nobody knows whether the liberation of Norway will come through a gradual military re-conquest of the country, or whether it will result from a German collapse on other fronts. Even in the latter case, we will have to reckon with an allied occupation, inter alia because the Allies will wish to supervise the evacuation of the country and the disarming of the German military units. In any case, we must try to make such an occupation as brief as possible. We shall have to try to arrange for it to be carried out in close co-operation with the Norwegian authorities and preferably under Norwegian supreme military direction. If the country is liberated through an invasion, the invasion troops will be accompanied by representatives of the Government and the liberated districts must as soon as possible be placed under Norwegian civil administration.

If the Government is to be in a position to solve all the complicated problems which arise in this connection, it is indispensable that it should be able to count upon receiving the support and confidence of all sections of the Norwegian people and that the moral and constitutional authority of the Government should not be questioned. We must at all costs try to avoid being drawn into conditions of the French type.

The second important question which presents itself in connection with the transition period is the question of supplies. The Government is trying to ensure that supplies are shipped to the country at the earliest possible moment, and that Norwegian authorities obtain the right to dispose of these supplies. The Government will do all within its power to solve these problems.

It is possible that the present regime in Norway may be altered before the end of hostilities, for instance if the German Army Command supersedes the Reichskommissariat and the Quisling-regime is liquidated. In such an event there will perhaps be a demand for the establishment of a new "Administrative Council". Such a council ought, in any event, to be appointed by the legal Supreme Court. Formally, the Council would occupy the same position as the Administrative Council of 1940. It would not have the position of a Government, but it would, as H.M. the King stated in His letter of April 19th, 1940, to the President of the Supreme Court, Hr. Paal Berg, "be an auxiliary to the civil administration for such time as the military occupation lasts." Its terms of office will cease as soon as the Government is able again to exercise its authority in Norway.

In

In the event of the re-conquest of a part of Norway, the Government will gradually assume power in the regions liberated by military invasion.

The Government will not be able to recommend or to agree that an Administrative Council, or any other Norwegian institution should enter into negotiations with the German Wehrmacht or other German authorities, except in matters of absolute necessity to the civil administration during the German military occupation. We must avoid difficulties similar to those experienced during the summer and autumn of 1940. During the sitting at Elverum on April 9th, 1940, the Storting invested the Government with authority to make the decisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the Kingdom, "until the moment comes, when the Government and the Presidential Board of the Storting agree to summon the members of the Storting for their next ordinary sitting."

The term of office of the last Storting has, however, lapsed long ago, and it is also possible that the feelings of the people, or sections of the people, will be against a convocation of this Storting, even if it were only a question of quite a brief session. On the other hand, situations may arise which make it necessary to convoke the old Storting as the last constitutional organ, apart from the present Government. The possibility of such a situation arising is, however, very remote.

The question might also be solved by the Government's ordering elections to the Storting immediately after the liberation of the country and thereupon handing in its resignation to the King, reserving only its duty to report to the new Storting. It appears evident, however, that some time ought to elapse after the liberation of the country before new elections are ordered, perhaps from six months to one year. Consequently the Government has reached the conclusion, already stated by the Prime Minister in his speech on Christmas Day 1942, that it ought to hand in its resignation to the King as soon as the country is free, for instance at the time when the King and his Council are able to assemble in Oslo. It is yet too early to say anything regarding the composition of the new Government. It should be formed after deliberations between the King, the present Government and leading personalities at home. It must be a coalition Government with the broadest possible foundation in the Norwegian people. This Government will govern the country until the new Storting convenes. The tasks of the
Government

Government should be limited to the solving of the problems which are immediately connected with the re-conquest and the reconstruction of the country. Further, it must take the necessary decisions required in connection with the new elections to the Storting which ought to take place at the latest within a year of the appointment of the new Government. It will then be a matter for the new Storting to decide whether this Government enjoys its confidence or whether a new parliamentary Government will have to be formed.

According to our Constitution, the actions of the Government have to be investigated by the Protocol committee of the Storting. It is out of the question, however, to accord such a privilege to the Protocol committee of the old Storting, and it will hardly be advisable to postpone such an investigation until the new Storting has nominated its Protocol committee. The Government therefore thinks that it might be advisable to invite the Supreme Court, as soon as the country is liberated, to appoint a Commission charged with the task of investigating the actions of the Government. The task of this Commission should also probably cover the period immediately preceding the 9th April, military affairs and disposition during the campaign, as well as the activities of the Administrative Council and the negotiations which took place between the Presidential Board of the Storting and other Norwegian circles and the Germans during the summer of 1940. The result of the Commission's investigations would then have to be placed before the Protocol committee of the new Storting. By entrusting these investigations to such a Commission, which could be presumed to enjoy general confidence, it will be possible to avoid the transition from occupation to freedom and peace being disturbed by ill-natured and disruptive controversies.

CA
OIC
JBR
5-10-43

C.F.
State
PSE

May 7, 1943

*Miss Truman does not
have anything
on this.*

My dear Mr. President:

You will recall last October your insistence that
an American mission should go to the Near East to assist
the cause of the United Nations by taking advantage of
the goodwill that exists for the United States in that
area. The final agreement with the British was for
Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S., and one
officer to make a survey trip. *

x912

Colonel Hoskins has now returned after three and
one-half months in which he visited all of the Near
East and North Africa.

During the course of his visit he saw and talked
to British, French, and American military and political
officials, and to a large number of the leading Arab
and Jewish officials and prominent persons in that area. *

A copy

The President,
The White House.

C.F.

x4675-L

A copy of his report is attached.

I believe that at least the summary warrants your careful reading. I also trust I may have your approval for further efforts along the lines indicated and for the wording of the proposed United Nations' declaration attached hereto, which, if you concur, we could first discuss with the British and subsequently with other United Nations.

Faithfully yours,

Gerdeell Hull

Enclosures:

x20

1. Summary of Colonel Hoskins' report on the Near East.
2. Proposed United Nations' declaration.

x48
x4725
x700
x76-6
x4351
x4675

BSF
CF
staty

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

CF: State
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE
NEAR EASTREPORT BY: LT. COLONEL HAROLD B. HOSKIN
AUSSUMMARY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOSKINS' REPORT ON THE NEAR EAST

Part I gives the outstanding facts developed in the course of his three and one-half months' trip through the Near East and North Africa and may be summarized as follows:

(1) The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded, as their only effective means of protest, into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists, by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine, have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that, unless they do something, they will be faced, when the war is over, with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly and effectively harped.

(2) The Jews feel that with their increased numbers and with their increased stocks of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American military forces.

(3) There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated.

(4) There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an

overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France.

In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.

(5) Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower. The unenthusiastic, and in some places uncooperative, attitude of the North African Arab populations reflects hostile propaganda that has claimed that American successes in North Africa would aid the Jewish cause in Palestine.

Obviously the security of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a critical stage. But the situation is definitely unhealthy. The experiences of British troops during their retreat in Burma are a grave and recent warning of the serious effects that a hostile, rather than friendly, native population can have on our military operations.

(6) Since Zionist propaganda in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine.

It should be very clear to the American people, therefore, that only by military force can a Zionist State in Palestine be imposed upon the Arabs.

Part II notes some of the effects of the Arab-Jew conflict in Palestine on the United States.

Our domestic disunity is aggravated by dissension among American citizens of various foreign born groups and increasing conflicts among various Jewish groups, as well as increasing anti-Semitism.

An unfortunate effect for the Jews themselves has resulted from mixing together two problems that should be kept quite separate. Support for all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe, on which there can be no difference of

opinion

opinion, should not be diminished by tying it up with the extremely controversial proposal to establish a Jewish political state in Palestine.

Part III suggests a specific step toward winning wartime support for our United Nations' cause of the 60 million Arabs in North Africa and the Near East.

(1) By the issuance now of a brief statement by the United Nations (or at least by the four major powers) giving assurances regarding the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only restate as official policy of the United Nations, in regard to Palestine what the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only consist of two points: (1) that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war; (2) that any post-war decisions will be taken only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

A statement along these lines issued as soon as possible would go far to relieve existing tension in the Near East and would, in the opinion of officials in that area, be the military equivalent of at least several extra divisions of troops.

Part IV outlines a post-war solution.

The existing population of one million Arabs and one-half million Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is to form a bi-national state within a proposed Levant Federation. This independent Levant Federation would be formed by the re-uniting of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after the last war, had for years been one natural economic and political unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa and Bethlehem, are to be an enclave under United Nations' control. The cession of some specific territory other than Palestine for a Jewish State is proposed -- possibly northern Cirenaica, which is now virtually uninhabited.

The Jewish refugee problem is met to the extent that, under the proposed plan, the Jews could put another half million in Palestine so as to reach parity with the Arabs and up to a half million Jews in northern Cirenaica.

PROPOSED DECLARATION

The United Nations, having in mind the terms of their Declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such a degree as to create undue anxieties among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the United Nations have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. Accordingly, the United Nations declare it to be their view that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be considered until after the conclusion of the war. When the matter is considered, both Arabs and Jews should be fully consulted and their agreement sought.

April 20, 1943

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART I - THE FACTS

I. Purpose of Memorandum

The object of this memorandum is to summarize the facts and information collected during three and one-half months (November 1942 to March 1943) when, in compliance with instructions from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, I visited the Near East.

II. My Mission

1. Itinerary.

Although physically familiar with most of the areas visited on this trip, I had not been in the Near East since the spring of 1939. Fortunately, it was possible on this visit not simply to hit the high spots in whirlwind fashion but actually to spend approximately two weeks in each country--Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. I also visited Turkey and Iran in order to get first-hand information on the attitude of these neighboring states toward the Arab world. In addition I motored over 800 miles through Egypt and Cirenaica along the coast from El Alemein to Bengazi. My return flight to the United States took me along the rest of North Africa via Tripoli, Algiers, and Casablanca to Marrakech and Dakar.

2. People Seen.

The facts and information given in this memorandum reflect conversations with:

- (a) British and Fighting French military and diplomatic representatives in the various countries.
- (b) American consular, diplomatic, and military representatives.
- (c) American missionary and educational leaders.
- (d) Arab leaders both in and out of political office.

In my contacts with Arab leaders I was assisted by a list especially prepared for me by President Bayard Dodge of outstanding graduates of the American University of Beirut living in the areas visited. I also renewed contact with many friends of my father and mother who had served as missionaries in Syria for 50 years.

3. Procedure.

In all my contacts I explained that I was there to collect information not to give it, to listen and not to talk. I hoped that they cared to give me their views as the information which I was collecting was not for publication in any way but for the benefit of the United States Government. In gathering first-hand information I was naturally aided to a great extent by my ability to converse in Arabic or, where necessary, in French or German.

III. Background - American Interests and Standing in the Near East

Although American interests in the Near East

have centered primarily on the importation of tobacco and dates, and our exports have centered on films and automobiles, our main interests in the Near East, due to 100 years of missionary and educational efforts, have remained in the cultural field. The facts that these missionary and educational efforts were supported entirely by private philanthropic contributions rather than by Government funds has added to the prestige that the United States gained from these efforts. The standing and influence, for example, of the American University of Beirut and of Robert College in Istanbul and of their graduates is hard to realize except after a first-hand visit to the area.

As a result, American prestige has for many years been extremely high throughout the whole Near East. This situation was strikingly confirmed in 1919 when, from the Crane-King Commissions' investigation, over 60 per cent of the petitions submitted by the people of this area gave the United States as their first choice for a mandatory power. This was over four times the request for Great Britain, which was the second power suggested.

At the same time, the fact must also be clearly recognized that American prestige has declined considerably in recent years and is still declining. Some of the reasons for this decline are suggested in the later sections of this memorandum.

IV. Outstanding Facts:

The outstanding facts developed in the course of my trip may be summarized as follows:

1. The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded as their only effective means of protest into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that unless they do something, when the war is over, they will be faced with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly harped.

2. There is clearly a hardening of feeling on both sides which is reflected in an increasingly unyielding

attitude by the extremist leaders of both Arabs and Jews in regard to any compromise solution. Both sides are armed and indicate a willingness to fight.

It is common knowledge that the Zionist undercover military organization, the Hagana, has made plans and has stocks of tommy guns and machine guns as well as small arms. Much of this equipment was bought from French Vichy troops in Syria and has, during the past two years, been smuggled into Palestine.

The Jews particularly feel that ^{with} their increased numbers and with their increased stock of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American Military forces.

3. It is also increasingly clear that the growing interest of Jews and Moslems in all parts of the world in the Palestine settlement is now so large that it makes quite impossible any purely domestic or local solution that might otherwise have been arrived at by the Arabs and Jews living in Palestine itself.

4. The outbreak of internal conflict in Palestine is obviously one of the major objectives of Nazi propaganda in this area. It is aimed at precipitating Arab-Jewish fighting at a moment when combat troops of the United Nations can least readily be spared for putting down domestic insurrection. Furthermore, Axis propaganda in this area has of late become increasingly effective because the Nazis have played down reference to Axis interests and have laid their main emphasis on the one fact that, if the United Nations win the war, the Arabs can be certain that they will lose Palestine to the Jews. Nothing could be simpler or more readily understandable to the average Arab than the Axis three-point program which in their daily broadcasting promises:

- (a) the elimination of all alien control, whether British or French;
- (b) the liquidation of the Jews in Palestine; and
- (c) "complete independence".

5. Traveling through Palestine one clearly realizes that it is not an unpopulated area into which an indefinite additional number can immediately be poured. For quick comparison, Palestine in area is a little smaller than the State of New Hampshire and already has a population four times as large. The figures, which, like all Near Eastern statistics, are only approximations, indicate

the large growth that has taken place:

	<u>1920</u>	<u>1942</u>
Arabs	600,000	1,000,000
Jews	<u>70,000</u>	<u>500,000</u>
	670,000	1,500,000

6. There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated. The Zionist press in Palestine claims the support of public opinion in Britain and the United States for its aspirations and the Arab press makes no effective denial.

Although the State Department has taken no official position in the dispute as to the correct interpretation of the Balfour Declaration calling for a "national home for the Jews", the recurring petitions of members of both houses of Congress have been interpreted both by Zionists and by Arabs as indicating clearly where American sympathies lie. Furthermore, it should be clearly realized that every American statement in favor of Zionism is within a few hours widely broadcast by the Axis radio to the whole Arab world in support of its main propaganda theme that a United Nations victory means for the Arabs the certain loss of Palestine to the Jews. For example, the

December 1942 petition supporting the Zionist position signed by 67 Senators and 180 Congressmen was very widely broadcast by the Axis radio throughout all the Near East. It was, of course, referred to not as a petition but an expression of government policy. It resulted in unprecedented demonstrations against the United States that culminated in Damascus in the closing of the bazaars for several days as a protest against the United States.

7. There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France. As a result many pro-American supporters in Syria have for years felt the displeasure of the French and claim that since that time they have been discriminated against or passed over in Government appointments.

In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.

8. Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower. On my return to the United States via North Africa I found in both the Eighth Army and the First Army American officers responsible for the security of American troops who were increasingly disturbed by the unenthusiastic, and in some places hostile, attitude on the part of the North African Arab populations toward the United States. They expressed fear of still further difficulties if the issues of a Jewish political state and of a Jewish Army continue to be pressed at this time. The uncooperative attitude of the North African Arabs reflected, in their opinion, the irritation of the Arabs at the behavior of some of the local Jewish populations in North Africa as well as the effectiveness of hostile propaganda which continued to claim that United States' successes in North Africa would only give greater support to the Jewish claims in Palestine.

9. From my trip through North Africa I also got the impression that American political efforts had, quite naturally and perhaps of necessity, concentrated on the problems of our relations with the various French groups or factions. The effect of our military occupation on the Arabs who form approximately 95% of the population and their attitude toward the United States had

as a result not been given the attention it deserved. Furthermore such information on the attitude of the Arabs as was available to American officers had almost invariably been received at second hand from the local French authorities.

Obviously the situation of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a very critical stage. But it is definitely unhealthy and now is the time when steps should be taken to prevent a further deterioration. The unfortunate British experience during their retreat in Burma is only too recent an example of the serious effects that a hostile rather than friendly native population can have on military operations.

10. Since Zionist propaganda and political pressure in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine. The Arabs in Palestine have on many occasions fought both the Zionists and the British military forces sent against them, and there is absolutely no basis for assuming that they will not again fight when they feel it necessary. It should therefore be very clear that a Zionist State in Palestine can only be imposed upon the Arabs by military force.

April 20, 1943

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART II - THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

In view of the difficulties involved, the United States might well prefer, if it were possible, to keep out of any responsibility for a part in the settlement of the complicated problem of Palestine. However, the facts outlined above are already having repercussions on the United States and must therefore be considered for their effects on:

- (1) Our military situation -- aid for our United Nations war efforts and particularly the security of American troops in North Africa.

After a visit to these areas there can be no question about the lack of enthusiasm, suspicion, and, in some instances, passive resistance toward the United States in different parts of the Near East and North Africa. Unless steps are taken to correct it, this situation can deteriorate further and develop into native hostility such, for instance, as that from which the British suffered so heavily during their retreat in Burma.

- (2) Our domestic unity in wartime.

Jewish leaders in the United States should in fairness be advised of the effects both at home and abroad of continued agitation for a Jewish State in Palestine. Without

any denial of their constitutional freedom of speech, these leaders might decide, in the interests of their cause as well as in the interest of domestic unity in wartime in the United States, to curtail at least for the duration their efforts to achieve political Zionism.

(3) Dissension among different racial groups in the United States.

The United States in its domestic life is affected by the Zionist demand for a Jewish State in Palestine from two clearly defined angles. On the one hand there are five million Jews in this country who, along with the rest of the population, are being subjected to a steady stream of propaganda in favor of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State.

On the other hand there is the relatively inarticulate opposition of several hundred thousand American citizens of Syrian and Arab racial descent, as well as the considered opinion of the overwhelming majority of these Americans who have made a deep study of the Palestine problem and who feel that the Zionist solution is not a sound or correct one for this area. As far back as the report of the Crane-King Commission in 1919, there is the statement in their report that the Commissioners had reluctantly come to the conclusion that a Jewish State in Palestine was inadvisable, although they had "begun their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor".

(4) Development of divisions and conflicts among Jews in the United States.

At a time when the primary effort of everyone must be centered on winning the war there would seem to be some question whether now is the time for an active Jewish minority to put pressure for the support of political Zionism on the majority of American Jews who, while remaining Jews by religion, do not think it advisable to support political Zionism. Like other American citizens they should be free to make their decision and when they have made it they should not be subject to a continuing pressure that in not supporting political Zionism they are virtually forswearing their faith.

(5) Anti-Semitism in the United States.

There seems to be little question that if this active minority of American Jews continues to agitate for a Jewish Army and a Jewish State in Palestine it will add fuel to the anti-Semitic charges already rife that the primary loyalty of American Jews is to political Zionism and not the United States. This will be particularly unfortunate if, in addition, it is felt that such agitation has an unfavorable effect on our military efforts and the security of American troops abroad.

(6) Effect on all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe.

Not only in the United States but in the Near East

and, in fact, in every part of the world there is the important job of keeping the desire of everyone to aid in alleviating the suffering of the Jews in Europe from being diminished by tying up this problem, on which there can be no difference of opinion, with the extremely controversial one in regard to the establishment of a Jewish political state in Palestine. These are two very different issues and, for a proper solution of each, should be kept apart.

(7) American influence in the Near East.

The people of the United States must be made to understand more clearly the seriousness of the Arab-Jew conflict in the Near East and the influence which, perhaps unconsciously, they wield in this area. For example, when American citizens or members of Congress sign petitions advocating the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, they should realize that, for all practical purposes, they are asking the American Government to commit itself to the use of American armed force in the Near East after the war. Based on British experience this means that American soldiers will be killed in Palestine in the enforcement of such policy. Whether the American people, if they realized more fully this implication, would still favor its adoption may be a matter for debate. At least,

however, they should be clearly informed that only by force can a political Zionist policy in Palestine be made effective and, as a result, they should have a chance to express themselves on such an issue before they are committed to such a serious step.

(8) A sound solution in Palestine and post-war peace.

A sound solution for the problem of Palestine must be found since otherwise there will be a continuation after this war of the conflicts that for centuries have plagued the Near East. For the United States, as for the rest of the world, such conflicts must be prevented since, if they continue, they contain the seeds of a possible third World War with its inevitable consumption of American money, materials, and most valuable of all, American lives.

(9) Basis of any peaceful solution.

Without at the moment attempting to outline detailed suggestions for a peaceful solution, one basic fact must be taken into account. Palestine now contains one million Arabs and a half million Jews. The great majority of neither group wishes to be moved and can only by force be transferred elsewhere. Any proposed solution, therefore, if it is not to cause still greater injustices to either one side or the other, does not start with a

"tabula rasa", but must assume the continuation in Palestine of both the Arabs and the Jews that are there.

- (10) The need for a definition of American policy toward Palestine and the Near East and the announcement of a decision on the part of the United States Government to help find a proper solution of this problem.

Since it seems clear that we in the United States cannot on the one hand wash our hands of all responsibilities in the Near East nor on the other hand even escape domestic repercussions of the Arab-Jew problem, is it not advisable for us to apply our best energies and intelligence in helping to find a sound and peaceful solution?

The problem is indeed difficult but not insoluble.

April 20, 1943

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
PART III - WINNING WARTIME SUPPORT OF ARAB WORLD FOR
THE UNITED NATIONS' CAUSE

(1) Uncertainty the main cause of Arab-Jew tension.

As noted in Part I of this memorandum, uncertainty as to the future of Palestine is at the present time perhaps the major cause of rising tension between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In the rest of the Arab or Moslem world -- North Africa, the Middle East, and India -- this problem is primarily reflected in the indifference or lack of active support of the Arabs for the cause of the United Nations.

(2) A United Nations' assurance regarding the post-war settlement of Palestine.

Fortunately this rising tension can be relieved and considerable progress can be made toward winning greater support for our United Nations' war effort from the 60 million Arabs that inhabit North Africa and the Near East. Furthermore, such a result can be accomplished without the necessity of announcing now any final solution to the Palestine problem. It would consist in the issuance by the United Nations (or at least by its four major members) of a statement giving assurances regarding

the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only re-state as official policy of the United Nations with regard to Palestine what the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only say that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war and then only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. A statement along these lines, issued as soon as possible, would go far to relieve existing tension and would, in the opinion of officials in the Near East, be the military equivalent of at least several extra divisions of troops.

Here is a practical, concrete step on which the Foreign Office in London might be promptly consulted. Then with their agreement, the matter might be referred to Russia and China for their approval and joint action.

- (3) Suggestion that group of Arab leaders and moderate Jewish leaders meet in U.S. to discuss and attempt to arrive at a settlement of Palestine problem.

As a further step and in an endeavor to have the Arab as well as the Zionist position presented to the American people, it is suggested that Emir Abdullah of Trans-jordan or some other Arab prince, following the precedents set

by the visits of George of Greece and Peter of Yugoslavia, be allowed to visit the United States. He should be accompanied by five or six moderate-minded Arab representatives from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan. Such a group could contain Christian as well as Moslem members.

At the same time certain moderate Jewish leaders from Palestine who recognize the necessity of arriving at a peaceful solution with the Arabs might also be allowed to visit the United States. This group should include among others Dr. Judah L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who, in the January 1943 issue of Foreign Affairs, outlined a middle of the road program for a possible Arab-Jew settlement.

While in the less heated atmosphere of this country, these two groups, together with representatives of both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish organizations as well as of various Christian church groups, might be urged to meet and attempt to work out a peaceful post-war settlement for the age-long conflict over Palestine.

April 20, 1943

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART IV - A PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST

The principle has been suggested previously that, since we cannot escape repercussions from an unsound solution of the Arab-Jew problem, we had better use our best efforts toward finding a sound solution. A concrete plan for post-war peace in the Near East is offered below at least as a starting point for discussion and consideration. It does not represent the opinion of any one group but is a composite of ideas and suggestions obtained by the writer from many varied sources during his three and one-half months' tour of the Near East between November 1942 and March 1943.

Also, as mentioned in a previous section, this proposed plan starts with the assumption that the one million Arabs and the half million Jews who are already in Palestine and wish to remain there shall be allowed to do so. An injustice in one area cannot be righted by causing a corresponding injustice in another area.

In the interests of brevity a knowledge of the basic facts is assumed and only conclusions, without the detailed

reasoning back of each point, are therefore given:

(1) Reunion in a Levant Federation of the four existing states of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Trans-jordan

Prior to the decisions of the Peace Conference in 1919 the territories of these four states formed one political and economic area. The efforts to split this area four ways have not been successful and have always been contrary to the basic interests of the people themselves. Since no single unit is large enough or economically capable of standing alone, these four areas must again be united in a full economic union; fundamentally this means at least no customs barriers and as many other joint government activities (such, for instance, as defense, currency, and postal services) as can be agreed upon.

Politically, after almost 25 years of fragmentation there can and probably must be, at least to begin with, considerable local political autonomy for the various sections of the proposed federation, although Trans-jordan might be joined to existing Syria and thus reduce the number of political sections to three -- Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Suggestions on the practical details of such a federation have been worked out by several British officials long resident in this area, and a copy of one of these plans is attached as annex to this report.

(2) Abolition of both French and British Mandates

In Syria and the Lebanon, France has failed so completely and has lost so much prestige that only by force can she remain. On the other hand, Britain has not been much more successful in Palestine where Arab-Jew conflicts have continued to break out at intervals and a large and expensive bureaucracy ~~has~~ been saddled on the country. It would not help the cause of the United Nations, not be fair to the people of these areas, nor in line with the promises of the Atlantic Charter to transfer control of Syria and the Lebanon from France to Great Britain, or even to an Anglo-American control, were such a thing feasible.

(3) Complete Independence for this Area

The people of this area are as capable and

perhaps more capable of self-government than some of the neighboring states that are already independent. Admittedly, independence will result in mistakes and mismanagement but from this experience in self-government, these peoples will learn better and more soundly than if they continue to be controlled in most of their activities by foreign powers. Furthermore, independence has been promised to them by France and Britain and these promises should be lived up to.

(4) Foreign Technical Assistance Only as Requested
And Paid for by the Arab States Themselves

To the extent that any foreign technical assistance is given, this should come through whatever form of postwar organization is set up by the United Nations. Such technical assistants should not serve as watchdogs for the interests of the foreign power that urges their appointment, but they should be employed and paid by the local state and be responsible only to it, along the lines already adopted for the employment of Americans in Iran.

(5) Freedom for an Eventual Federation of Arab
States If Desired

After the Levant Federation has been formed and the choice left to the people of that area both as to the extent of political federation and the form of government -- whether a monarchy or a republic -- then, and perhaps not even then, such a federated state might decide on economic and political collaboration with neighboring Arab states such as Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt. It should be clear from the start that if any of these states eventually found it to their advantage to join or form such a federation of Arab states, they should be free to do so, even though the immediate prospects for the formation of such a federation may not appear very bright.

(6) External Boundaries to Remain as They Are

Fortunately no serious boundary disputes exist in this Near East area and no external boundary changes need be contemplated unless, perhaps, Turkey were willing to cede back to Syria the small but purely Arab area in the Hatay south of the Amanus Range, which includes the ancient city of Antioch. Such a cession would still leave Turkey the Amanus Range as a sound strategic frontier and give back to Syria an area racially and economically Arab.

Internal boundaries between Lebanon and Syria might also, at least to begin with, be left as they are. Greater Lebanon contains almost 50 per cent Moslems, but this may prove an advantage rather than otherwise, since as a result there will be little likelihood of persecution of minorities. Furthermore, with the economic union that must be developed, the question of internal boundaries, where no customs barriers exist, becomes much less important.

(7) Palestine, a Bi-National State within the Levant Federation

The question of Palestine is, of course, the most difficult and the most controversial feature of this whole problem but is one the solution of which must be frankly and firmly undertaken. As a first step, a statement by the United Nations should be issued stating that Palestine is not to become either a purely Arab or a purely Jewish state but a bi-national state to which Jews migrate up to but not to exceed parity in numbers with the Arabs. Were such a policy to be established it would allow for the further settlement in Palestine after the war of approximately half a million Jews. Any migrations of Jews into Lebanon, Syria, or Trans-jordan should be subject to the consent of the people of those areas. Such a solution for Palestine will, of course, not have the support of either the extremist Arabs or the extremist Jews but can be justified as a necessary compromise to prevent Palestine remaining a festering sore capable of continuing to infect not only the Near East, but virtually all of the Moslem world from Casablanca to Calcutta. *might*

(8) The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Jaffa, to be an Enclave under United Nations' Control

In the conflict between the Arab Moslems and the Jews, the even stronger numerical claim of the Christian peoples of the world to a share in the administration of Jerusalem and the Holy Places has tended to be overlooked. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the Vatican with its world-wide influence will not favor any settlement that allots Jerusalem exclusively to either the Moslems or the Jews. An international administration of an enclave

containing Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Jaffa under the United Nations will more nearly solve this long-standing problem since it will assure free access to the Holy Places and particularly to Jerusalem to the believers of all three religions.

(9) The Proposed Settlement to Include an Offer of a Cession of Territory -- Possibly Northern Cyrenaica -- For a Jewish State

As part of a further effort to assist the Jews driven from their homes in Europe and to satisfy the demands of that Jewish minority that favors the formation of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State, the United Nations should offer a definite piece of territory to the Jews in which a Jewish State may be formed. This offer might consist of the renewal of the previous British offer of land in Uganda or perhaps in some part of South America. The important point is that, to offset the decision that Palestine is not to become a Jewish State, a specific area somewhere else should be made available for the establishment of a Jewish State to which politically-minded Jews from any part of the world who wish to do so can emigrate.

There might at the same time be considered the possibility of ceding to such a proposed Jewish State the Jebel Achdar area of northern Cyrenaica. Any area chosen will have difficulties, drawbacks, and disadvantages, but the Jebel Achdar perhaps more nearly fits all requirements, with less drawbacks, than any other area one can suggest. Its location in relation to Europe, its soil and climate so similar in many respects to Palestine and, most important of all, its present virtually uninhabited conditions make it worth careful consideration. The Italian colonists previously installed are gone but have left behind them farm lands and cleared areas that can almost immediately begin to support many thousands of Jews. Eventually this region might again support a half million inhabitants that history indicates at one time lived there.

The question of the rights and claims of the Senussi (numbering less than 200,000) to reacquire this northern portion of Cyrenaica would need to be studied and fairly met. However, even under the plan suggested, three-fourths of Cyrenaica would in any case remain to the Senussi. As nomadic people whom the Italians drove from the Jebel Achdar area, the claims of the Senussi to

consideration would undoubtedly have the support of their co-religionists throughout the Moslem world. If, therefore, the Arabs were to agree to a Jewish State in northern Cyrenaica, they could in all probability only be induced to do so if at the same time they were given a definite assurance that, as a result, a Jewish State would never be imposed on them in Palestine.

Conclusion

Even if no final solution can be put into operation until the war has been won, the problem of Palestine is so complicated and has defied solution so long that it is not too soon to be studying intensively what should be done when the war is over. This time it should be our aim to arrive at the peace table with a suggested solution that, because it is in line with American principles, commands the support of both the Government and of the American people. At the same time those responsible for the development of such a plan should also have had the practical suggestions of all important organizations and individuals, both here and abroad, who might have something constructive to contribute to its content.

Harold B. Hoskins
Harold B. Hoskins
Lt. Colonel AUS

A. F.
State

May 8, 1943.

Dear Joe:

Miss Tully has shown me your letter of April seventh with regard to the possible publication in your forthcoming book "Ten Years in Japan" of my letter to you of January 21, 1941.

It seems all right for you to publish this letter, provided, of course, that your own letter of December fourteenth, to which my letter is a reply, is also published. My view is naturally subject to there being used in your book other material of a similar character: material based on or taken from official reports and despatches. I understand that the proper people in the Department of State are now giving attention to this general question.

As ever,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Joseph C. Grew,
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

x197

C.F.
State

7

JUN 15 1943

Great and Good Friend:

I have received Your Majesty's communication of April 30, 1943, relating to matters affecting Palestine, and I appreciate the spirit of friendship you have manifested in expressing these views to me.

x700

I have noted carefully the statements made in this communication, as well as those contained in Your Majesty's letter of November 19, 1939, and the oral message conveyed to Mr. Kirk, the American Minister, at the conclusion of his recent visit to Riyadh.

in the

copy of the President's reply dated 1/9/39, filed 3500.

Your Majesty, no doubt, has received my message delivered by Mr. Moose to His Highness the Amir Faisal. As I stated therein, it appears to me highly desirable that the Arabs and Jews interested in the question should come to a friendly understanding with respect to matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts prior to the termination of the war. I am glad of this opportunity, however, to reiterate my assurance that it is the view of the Government of the United States that, in any case, no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

x4180

This Turner does not have message.

x76-6
x3500

I renew my expressions of best wishes for Your Majesty's good health and for the well-being of your people.

Your Good Friend,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Majesty
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, x9977960
King of Saudi Arabia.


*In Muller
+ new + to
State Dept
sent 6-15-43*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 14. 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of June 4, 1943, there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a letter addressed to King Ibn Saud in reply to his communication addressed to you on April 30, 1943.

The enclosed letter to the King reiterates the assurances given in your recent telegram to him and incorporates substantially the same phraseology contained therein.



Enclosure:
To King Ibn Saud.

(1168)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE STATE DEPARTMENT ^{x20}

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, 4/30/43,
together with translation of same, which refers
to situation regarding the Jews and the Arabs.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

As per request for return of
translation of King Ibn Saud's
letter of April 30, 1943

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a communication addressed to you by King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, which has been transmitted to the Department for delivery to you by the American Minister at Cairo. There is attached an English translation of the King's letter, which is written in Arabic.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. Letter from King Ibn Saud.
2. Translation of the letter.

The President,
The White House.

C
O
P
Y

TRANSLATION

In the Name of God

the Merciful and Compassionate

From Abdel Aziz, Ibn Abdel Rahman El Faisal,
King of Saudi Arabia.

To His Excellency Franklin Roosevelt, President
of the United States of America.

Excellency,

In this great world war in which nations are shedding their blood and expending their wealth in the defence of freedom and liberty, in this war in which the high principles for which the Allies are fighting have been proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, in this struggle in which the leaders of every country are appealing to their countrymen, allies and friends to stand with them in their struggle for life, I have been alarmed, as have other Moslems and Arabs, because a group of Zionists are seizing the opportunity of this terrible crisis to make extensive propaganda by which they seek on the one hand to mislead American public opinion and, on the other hand, to bring pressure upon the Allied Governments in these critical

times

times in order to force them to go against the principles of right, justice and equity which they have proclaimed and for which they are fighting, the principles of the freedom and liberty of peoples. By so doing the Jews seek to compel the Allies to help them exterminate the peaceful Arabs settled in Palestine for thousands of years. They hope to evict this noble nation from its home and to install Jews from every horizon in this sacred Moslem Arab country. What a calamitous and infamous miscarriage of justice would, God forbid, result from this world struggle if the Allies should, at the end of their struggle, crown their victory by evicting the Arabs from their home in Palestine, substituting in their place vagrant Jews who have no ties with this country except an imaginary claim which, from the point of view of right and justice, has no grounds except what they invent through fraud and deceit. They avail themselves of the Allies' critical situation and of the fact that the American nation is unaware of the truth about the Arabs in general and the Palestine question in particular.

On November 19, 1938 (Shawal 7, 1357 H.) I wrote to Your Excellency a letter in which I set forth the true situation of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. If Your Excellency would refer to that letter, you will find that

the

the Jews have no right to Palestine and that their claim is an act of injustice unprecedented in the history of the human race. Palestine has from the earliest history belonged to the Arabs and is situated in the midst of Arab countries. The Jews only occupied it for a short period and the greater part of that period was full of massacres and tragedies. Subsequently they were driven out of the country and today it is proposed to re-install them in it. By so doing the Jews will do wrong to the quiet and peaceful Arabs. The Heavens will split, the earth will be rent asunder, and the mountains will tremble at what the Jews claim in Palestine, both materially and spiritually.

Having sent to Your Excellency my above-mentioned letter, I believed, and I still believe, that the Arab claim to Palestine had become clear to you, for in your kind letter to me dated January 9, 1939 you made no remark about any of the facts which I had mentioned in my previous letter. I would not have wasted Your Excellency's time over this case nor the time of the men at the head of your government at this critical moment but the persistent news that these Zionists do not refrain from bringing forth their wrong and unjust claim induces me to remind Your Excellency of the rights of Moslems and Arabs in the

Holy

Holy Land so that you may prevent this act of injustice and that my explanation to Your Excellency may convince the Americans of the Arabs' rights in Palestine, and that Americans whom Jewish Zionism intends to mislead by propaganda may know the real facts, help the oppressed Arabs, and crown their present efforts by setting up right and justice in all parts of the world.

If we leave aside the religious animosity between Moslems and Jews which dates back to the time when Islam appeared and which is due to the treacherous behavior of the Jews towards Moslems and their Prophet, if we leave aside all this and consider the case of the Jews from a purely humanitarian point of view, we would find, as I mentioned in my previous letter, that Palestine, as every human creature who knows that country admits, cannot solve the Jewish problem. Supposing that the country were subjected to injustice in all its forms, that all the Arabs of Palestine, men, women and children, were killed and their lands wrested from them and given to the Jews, the Jewish problem would not be solved and no sufficient lands would be available for the Jews. Why, therefore, should such an act of injustice, which is unique in the history of the human race, be tolerated, seeing that it would not satisfy the would-be murderers, i.e., the Jews?

In

In my previous letter to Your Excellency I stated that if we consider this matter from a humanitarian point of view, we would find that the small country we call Palestine was crammed at the beginning of the present war with nearly 400,000 Jews. At the end of the last Great War they only constituted 7% of the whole population but this proportion rose before the beginning of the present war to 29% and is still rising. We do not know where it will stop, but we know that a little before the present war the Jews possessed 1,000,332 donams out of 7,000,000 donams which is the sum total of all the cultivable land in Palestine.

We do not intend, nor demand, the destruction of the Jews but we demand that the Arabs should not be exterminated for the sake of the Jews. The world should not be too small to receive them. In fact, if each of the Allied countries would bear one tenth of what Palestine has borne, it would be possible to solve the Jewish problem and the problem of giving them a home to live in. All that we request at present is that you should help to stop the flow of migration by finding a place for the Jews to live in other than Palestine, and by preventing completely the sale of lands to them. Later on the Allies and Arabs can look into the matter of assuring the accomodation of those

those of the Jews residing in Palestine whom that country can support provided that they reside quietly and do not foment trouble between Arabs and the Allies.

In writing this to Your Excellency I am sure that you will respond to the appeal of a friend who feels that you appreciate friendship as you appreciate right, justice, and equity, and who is aware that the greatest hope of the American people is to come out of this world struggle, rejoicing in the triumph of the principles for which it is fighting, i. e., to ensure to every people its freedom and to grant it its rights. For if--God forbid!--the Jews were to be granted their desire, Palestine would forever remain a hotbed of troubles and disturbances as in the past. This will create difficulties for the Allies in general and for our friend Great Britain in particular. In view of their financial power and learning the Jews can stir up enmity between the Arabs and the Allies at any moment. They have been the cause of many troubles in the past.

All that we are now anxious for is that right and justice should prevail in the solution of the various problems which will come to light after the war and that the relations between the Arabs and the Allies should always be of the best and strongest.

In

In closing, I beg you to accept my most cordial greetings.

Written at Our Camp at Roda Khareem on this the 25th day of Rabi'Tani, of the year 1362 Hegira corresponding to April 30, 1943.

*C. F.
State*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

X
XXXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXX
XXXX

Signed 5/26/43

~~April 27, 1943.~~

AMERICAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

Your 723, April 7, 10 a.m.

*x700
x76-6*

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE MINISTER.

Please arrange for the transmission of the following message from the President to King Ibn Saud through the confidential media he indicated:

*x3500
x1177960*

QUOTE The American Minister, Mr. Kirk, has communicated to me Your Majesty's expression of friendship for the United States and sympathy for the United Nations' cause, which I am most grateful to receive. He has informed me also how Your Majesty has manifested this friendship and sympathy by remaining silent in regard to issues affecting the Arab peoples among whom Your Majesty is revered as a distinguished leader.

In conveying my appreciation of Your Majesty's sympathetic understanding and helpful cooperation, I wish to express my thorough agreement with Your Majesty's considered opinion that continued silence with respect to such matters would prove most helpful to the United Nations

Returned to Secretary of State, May 26, 1943.

in their bitter struggle to preserve the freedom of mankind. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews should reach a friendly understanding in regard to matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, however, I assure Your Majesty that it is the view of the Government of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I take this opportunity to express my best wishes for Your Majesty's good health and for the well-being of your people. Franklin D. Roosevelt. UNQUOTE

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

890F.00/81 Conf.

NE:WLP:EML PA/M

signed 5-26-43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

x2418
There is enclosed a copy of a telegram from the American Minister at Cairo conveying to you an important confidential message from King Ibn Saud. Expressing his personal interest, as an Arab and Moslem leader, in the Arab question, with particular reference to Palestine and Syria, the King states that, although urged to make representations to this Government respecting Palestine, he has refrained from doing so only because of his desire not to embarrass the United States at this time or to prejudice the United Nations cause by taking a step likely to increase Arab-Jewish antagonisms. He desires to ascertain, therefore, whether you approve of his attitude of silence and, if so, whether he will be advised in advance of any steps of an affirmative character contemplated by the Government with respect to this question.

The necessity of replying to the King's message and of providing him with the assurances which he

requests

requests is emphasized by the receipt of a further telegram from Mr. Kirk, a copy of which also is enclosed, stating that the King has delivered to him for transmission to you a personal letter regarding the Palestine question constituting substantially a reiteration of the King's views expressed in his previous oral message delivered by Mr. Kirk and in his letter addressed to you in 1938.

Accordingly, there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a message addressed to King Ibn Saud conveying to him substantially the viewpoint expressed in the proposed statement on Palestine which you approved on May 10, 1943. *Filed b. F. State.*

CH
x 20

Enclosures:

1. Telegram no. 723, April 17, 10 a.m., from Cairo.
2. Telegram no. 857, May 10, 5 p.m., from Cairo.
3. Draft telegram to Cairo.

COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SC)

Cairo

Dated May 10, 1943

Rec'd 4:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

857, May 10, 5 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

~~SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

My 723, April 17, 10 a.m. and Jidda's 40, May 3,
7 p. m.

Shaikh Youssef Yassine who is now in Cairo en route to Syria has delivered to me for forwarding a sealed personal letter from King Ibn Saud to the President regarding Palestine question, together with copy thereof for Legation files of which translation has been made to accompany Arabic original.

In general, letter constitutes reiteration of King's views as set forth in my telegram under reference and his previous letter to President in 1938. Following are principal points covered:

One. Confidence of Arabs in high principles of Allies is being shaken by Zionist attempts to profit by stress of war to spread false propaganda in United States and other Allied countries having as purpose elimination

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

of

of peaceful Arabs in Palestine and replacement by Jews who have no valid claims on country.

Two. In his letter of November 19, 1938 to President, King explained rights of Arabs as contrasted with Jews in Palestine and disastrous consequences which would follow fulfillment of Jewish designs. King's remarks were presumably clear to President since latter made no comment thereon in his reply of January 19, 1939.

Three. King would not importune President by bringing up matter again now were it not for reports of renewed Zionist activity and necessity that President and American people should know facts in order to avoid a great injustice to Arabs.

KIRK

x 4180

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated May 10, 1943

Rec'd 7:55 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State

Washington

857, May 10, 5 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Leaving aside matter of traditional animosity between Jews and Arabs and viewing matter from purely humanitarian standpoint it is obvious that Jewish problem cannot be settled by colonization in Palestine since country could not absorb sufficient number of Jews even if all Arabs in country were exterminated. As it is Jewish population and land holdings increased tremendously.

Five. Elimination of Jews from Palestine is not demanded but merely that immigration should be stopped by finding other refugees for the land, that further land purchases be prohibited. If each of Allied countries were prepared to bear one tenth of burden of Palestine problem could be settled. Subsequent Allies and Arabs could discuss accommodation in Palestine of Jews now resident there in light of absorptive capacity of country.

Six. Trusts that President will respond to this appeal of a friend who respects principles for which American people are fighting because if Jewish desires should be fulfilled in Palestine a permanently disturbed situation would result which would create difficulties for the Allies in general and Great Britain in particular.

All

All that is desired now is the assurance that right and justice will prevail in the solution of post war problems and that Arab Allied relations may remain of the best.

Original letter is being transmitted by next pouch. I would appreciate advice as when President's reply to matter presented in my telegram under reference may be expected.

KIRK

(COPIED:NE:EML)
890F.00/81 Conf.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VCH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated April 17, 1943

Rec'd 9:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER
SECRETARY

The greater part of my conversation with Ibn Saud and his advisors during my visit at his desert camp midway between Ryadh and Dahran was confined to supply and Lend-Lease matters and to an exchange of cordialities which this time were especially marked on the part of the Saudi Arabians. On the day of my departure, however, the King sent for me and in a private audience said there was a matter which he desired to discuss with me personally and in strictest confidence and which he would request that I bring to attention of President. He referred, he said, to the Arab question and particularly to certain aspects thereof in respect of Palestine and Syria.

Turning first to Palestine he said situation there was of more concern to him than to any other Arab leader because Jews had been hostile to Arabs from time of Prophet Mohamed to present and he, Ibn Saud, as the leading Arab and Moslem, therefore, had a special interest in developments in Palestine where, because of vast wealth

at

-2- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo

at their disposal and their influence in Britain and the United States Jews were steadily encroaching on Arabs. If this trend was allowed to continue it could only be expected that Jewish-Arab conflict would become more acute, which would be deplorable from Arab standpoint and would also cut across Allied war effort.

Recently he had heard of representations in respect of Palestine made to American Government by Egyptians and certain Arabs had urged him to do likewise, but he had hitherto refused for following two reasons:

One. He had made his views on subject known to President on a previous occasion and had received President's reply.

Two. He did not want to do anything at present time which would cause difficulty to United States at a time when it needed to devote its undivided attention to prosecution of war. Thus should he write the President and receive a reply favorable to Arabs, Jewish antagonisms would develop and, should reply be favorable to Jews or no reply at all made, Arabs dissatisfaction would be aroused. Were it not for these considerations arising out of war he would feel obligated to act, but under existing circumstances his sympathy for the United Nations' cause and his friendship for the United States had led him to conclude that it would be preferable to remain silent.

Although

-3- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo

Although Palestine received the chief emphasis the King also referred to question of Syria and said Syrians were his friends and independence of country was of great personal concern to him. He had noted in this connection the announced intention of the Allies to give Syria complete independence and he felt he must believe in their sense of justice and fidelity to their given word. In this case, like that of Palestine, he had desired, therefore, to maintain silence in order to avoid causing embarrassment to Allies.

In adopting this policy of silence, however, he said that it was obvious that he, as the leading Arab and Moslem, would be placed in a difficult position if the American Government should respond favorably to the overtures of others since it might be made to appear that his silence had been motivated by lack of interest on his part, whereas the contrary was the case. He, therefore, wished to be advised whether President concurred in his views regarding the maintenance of silence for the time being. Should such not be the case, he had certain plans for action clearly in mind. On the other hand, should President agree, he would appreciate being so advised and at same time receiving an assurance that he would be informed in advance of any affirmative steps which American Government might contemplate taking in response to

overtures

-4- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo

overtures by other Arab persons or agencies in order that he might consider possible adjustments in his policy. Since his own decision in matter had been taken in deference to our vital interests he hoped he could count on our being equally understanding of his position.

KIRK

NPL

(Section Two appears on following page)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FMH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated April 17, 1943

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Turning from specific question of Syria and Palestine, King said he had heard indirectly of recent proposal to call Arab conference but that he had not been approached by sponsors of idea who had apparently been guided by knowledge of his policy of not desiring to do anything to make trouble for Allies. Whether he was or was not invited in this particular instance was a matter of relative indifference to him because he knew full well that no bona fide Arab conference could achieve any important results without his participation. He was, however, concerned by the fact that much of this present Pan Arab agitation emanated from Iraq and had as its ultimate purpose the extension of Hashemite power. Ibn Saud emphasized that he had no personal territorial ambitions outside his own country but merely wished to see Syria and Palestine attain individual independence and take their place along side Saudi Arabia and Iraq in a balanced comity of Arab states; in other words Syria for the Syrians, Palestine for the Palestinians, et cetera. There was, however,

-2- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from Cairo

however, strong indication (mentioning Nuri Abdul Illah and Abdullah by name) that an effort was being made to use Pan Arabism as a means for formation of Iraq, Palestine and Syria into a Hashemite bloc. Such a development he could only view with gravest apprehension in view of traditional hostility of Hashemites to House of Saud and King trusted Allies would not countenance materialization of such a serious threat to Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion King stressed confidential nature of his observations and asked that they be revealed to no one not even the British although latter were cognizant of his general views. He also requested that any reply of President to question regarding his present policy of silence in respect of Palestine and Syria should be transmitted only to Prince Faissal or Shaikh Youssef Yassine. King referred on several occasions in course of his remarks to friendly private and official relations which had so happily developed between Saudi Arabia and United States and suggested that American interests in Saudi Arabia were such as to justify its occupying a special place in the formulation of American policy in Near East.

In transmitting this message from Ibn Saud for the President, it is difficult if not impossible without incurring the criticisms of hyperbole or even emotionalisms,
adequately

-3- #723, 10 a.m., April 17 (SECTION TWO) from Cairo

adequately to reflect the sincerity of the King and his profound conviction in the virtue of his own judgment. He is simple, honest and decisive and these qualities transcend the limited formula of his special experience. He believes that we are his friends and to him friendship bespeaks complete confidence. Compromise is inadmissible. He truly feels that his problems are ours and ours are his and in giving this message for the President, he confirmed throughout an absolute faith in the justice of the democracies and a conviction that the order which is to follow their victory will justify that faith.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KIRK

LMS

B. F. State file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 6. 1943


EB

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your telegram of May 26, 1943, addressed to King Ibn Saud regarding the status of Palestine.

The Legation at Jidda has informed the Department that this message was forwarded to the Amir Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, who transmitted it promptly to King Ibn Saud. The Amir Faisal has requested the Legation to express to you the King's gratitude for your friendly communication.

Faithfully yours,



x 3500

x 700

x 20

The President,
The White House.