

● PSF

C.F.

U.S. Maritime Commission

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓
file

January 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

THESE CAN BE FILED. THEY
REQUIRE NO FURTHER ACTION.

HARRY L. HOPKINS *x4117*

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION

TO: Hon. Harry Hopkins

FROM: Jerry Land

For your information
& that of the President
a copy of this is
being sent to
Admiral Stark &
General Marshall.

Jerry.

x25-T

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

C. F.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*U. S. Maritime
Commission*

January 1, 1942

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

The decision to deliver to the Navy for conversion into combat loading transports nine C-3 combination passenger and cargo vessels has effected changes in the strategic shipping situation which, as Chairman of the Strategic Shipping Board, I believe I should bring to your attention. The estimated troop carrying capacity of eight of these nine vessels between now and April, as outlined in the joint memorandum of December 26, 1941 signed by General Somervell for General Marshall, Captain Burrough and Captain Alden for Admiral Stark and Mr. Wilcox, representing the Maritime Commission, addressed to the Allied Joint Planning Committee, is set forth below. The ninth would not have been available until August 1942.

Date	Capacity		
	Atlantic	Pacific	Total
January 15	3500	3300	6800
February 1	6500	3300	9800
March 1	6500	5700	12200
April 1	4500	6100	10600

In his memorandum of December 27th to you, Admiral Stark mentioned that he has directed discontinuance of the project for converting into aircraft carriers the KUNGSHOLM, the WEST POINT, the MOUNT VERNON, and the WAKEFIELD, to make these vessels available for troop transportation. In this decision I strongly concur.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By *Mc* Date APR 9 1973

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*x99
x18-R
x C. F. Navy*

The President -2 -1/1/42

Admiral Stark also proposes to supplement these four vessels with the NORMANDIE, the CONTE di BIANCAMANO, the ARGENTINA, the BRAZIL, and the URUGUAY (the latter three are the Good Neighbor vessels), and the five SANTA boats (passenger ships) now operating to the West Coast of South America. Recent discussions indicate that it would be preferable to leave at least one ship of the ARGENTINA, BRAZIL and URUGUAY class in commercial operation on the East Coast of South America and at least one of the Grace Line passenger ships for commercial operation on the West Coast of South America. I concur in both of these ideas.

All of the foregoing vessels, with the exception of the NORMANDIE, are included in the list of vessels to carry troops, when available, which accompanied the memorandum of December 26th, and their capacity has been taken into account in arriving at the limitation on any possible troop movements between now and April. With the exception of the NORMANDIE, therefore, none of these vessels can be considered as an offset against the loss of immediate troop capacity which will result from tying up the eight other vessels for conversion into combat loading transports. To the extent that the military strategy of the Allied Joint Planning Committee requires troop carrying capacity between now and April, it is apparent that additional capacity will have to be secured from sources not hitherto considered available.

Admiral Stark has already suggested to you the possibility of acquiring the CONTE GRANDE and WINDHUK from Brazil and I understand that a representative of the Navy Department is leaving for Brazil shortly to examine these vessels. In addition, the S.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON and H.F. ALEXANDER might be considered for operation with British crews to carry our troops. The GEORGE WASHINGTON is a coal burner with a speed of 16 to 17 knots and a capacity of 4300 officers and men. She is now being converted into a troop transport for the British under the Lend-Lease Act at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and will be completed January 15th. The H.F. ALEXANDER is an oil burner with a capacity of approximately 1700 men, and will be available in San Francisco the latter part of February. She also has been converted into a troop carrier for the British under the Lend-Lease Act. I believe the use of the GEORGE WASHINGTON and the H.F. ALEXANDER by the Army, in partial substitution for the immediate loss of troop carrying capacity through the conversions referred to, should be considered by the Allied Joint Planning Committee.

The President -3 -1/1/42

From the long range standpoint, that is, looking ahead to 1943, the need for constructing additional troopships cannot be too strongly emphasized or too often reiterated. In his memorandum of December 27th to you, Admiral Stark suggested the possibility of making additional troop transports out of the C-3 cargo vessels now under construction. There are but 28 of these vessels scheduled for delivery in 1942 and the Navy proposes to use 20 of them for conversion into AVGs. ^(convoy) ~~(carriers)~~ This leaves 8 which can be converted into troop transports for convoy loading. Obviously a sufficient number of C-3 cargo vessels will not be available to transport troops in anything like the numbers which the Army wants to move in 1943. Even if they were available, to convert them into convoy transports would, in my opinion, be a serious diversion of much needed fast cargo ships and an inefficient use of stringent resources.

It is the general opinion that the Commission's troopship program of C-4s, covered in my memorandum to you of December 22nd, and PXR's which we have discussed, should be carried out if capacity for large troop movements in 1943 and 1944 is to be assured. Turbines and gears for this program will be available out of the Commission's own turbine program and will not interfere with Navy requirements. I have sent Admiral Stark a personal memorandum to this effect.

It is respectfully recommended that the following steps be taken as soon as possible to alleviate the shortage of troop transports:

- 1) Approval of construction by the Maritime Commission of fifteen C-4 troop carriers, each with capacity for approximately 3675 officers and men on one new way to be constructed by the Maritime Commission and on Navy ways (1) and (2) and Navy facilities of the Moore Dry Dock Company, Oakland, California. These two 500 foot Navy ways are now being used by the Navy to build small auxiliary vessels. They should be made available to the Maritime Commission by April 1, 1942.
- 2) Approval of construction by the Maritime Commission of twenty PXR-type troop carriers, each with capacity for approximately 5750 officers and men, utilizing the design and engineering capacities of the Bethlehem Steel Company and Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company at new yards to be constructed.

Sincerely,

E. S. Land

E. S. Land
Chairman X1705

January 1, 1942

MARITIME COMMISSION TROOPSHIP PROGRAM

	<u>PXR</u>		<u>C-4</u>
	<u>Single Screw</u>	<u>Twin Screw</u>	
Length	530	570	475
Speed service	18½	19½	16½
Shaft horse power	15,000	20,000	8,500
Displacement	20,600	22,500	21,300
Approximate number of officers and men	5,750	5,750	3,675
Time to build (months)	12	12	11
Cost (approximate)	\$7,500,000	\$10,000,000	\$6,500,000
Proposed number of each type	10	10	15

Estimated Delivery Schedules

PXR

2 in August 1943
2 in September 1943
2 in October 1943
2 in November 1943
4 in December 1943

2 in January 1944
2 in February 1944
2 in March 1944
2 in April 1944

C-4

1 in June 1943
1 in July 1943
1 in August 1943
1 in September 1943
1 in October 1943
1 in November 1943
1 in December 1943
1 in January 1944

1 in February 1944
1 in June 1944
1 in July 1944
1 in August 1944
1 in September 1944
1 in November 1944
1 in December 1944

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Answering your query of December 30 concerning C-4 design ships for transport purposes, I have gone into this matter pretty carefully with Robinson and, boiled down to its essence, the Maritime Commission's proposal is to undertake to build 15 ships designed especially for transport purposes which would not be available for use until 1944.

Here in the Navy Department, we think it unwise to launch any shipbuilding campaign now of ships to be used for transport purposes which cannot be delivered until 1944 and 1945. It seems to me wiser for us to press on with the production of the types of ships we are now building and get them out as fast as possible rather than to undertake some new departure of special type ships for transport purposes. After all, a transport is merely a ship used to carry troops and troops expect and have to undergo, under such conditions, a lot of hardships. In the midst of a war, we cannot devote ourselves to developing some new type ship which would make the transport of troops a little easier two or three years from now.

I dined with Beaverbrook and Harry Hopkins last night and we spent a good deal of time on this question of transportation of troops. At our request, Beaverbrook made a list of vessels which he was satisfied the British could supply for this purpose, some of them immediately, and all of them to be delivered within the next few months. The total number of vessels from British sources which Beaverbrook indicated could be secured totaled over fifty and among these were such large ships as the QUEEN MARY, the old GEORGE WASHINGTON, the EMPRESS OF CANADA, and the KRIPSHOLM. The others are smaller size ships but just the size we ought to have for use on that North African project. These ships plus the ones that I was able to secure from the Maritime Commission, totaling 9, and the 8 Navy transports now available at Norfolk, provide us with an ample amount of shipping to carry on all three projects across the Atlantic now under discussion and carry them out as fast as the troops are ready to go aboard.

*18-Misc. Naval Bldg. Folder
*18-75

The President

December 31, 1941

- 2 -

In order to do this thing with some kind of order, some one officer of the Navy should be assigned the task of assembling the necessary ships for the transport of troops whenever and wherever they are required. The Joint Planning Board ought to be able to give such an officer immediately a fairly accurate estimate of the number of troops desired for each expedition and the points of embarkation could be indicated. If this were done and the man did his job competently, there need be no delay on account of tonnage and the maximum of smoothness of operation would be secured.

Alluding again to the memorandum which provoked this reply, my judgment is that we ought not to waste our time now on projects for the supply of troop transports which cannot be completed until 1944 or '45.

Frank Knox
x18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: x18

Can you straighten this out?
My head swirls!

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Chairman
of the U.S. Maritime Commission, 12/22/41, a copy
of which has been retained for our files, in re
building C-4 design vessels on Navy Department
facilities at Moore Dry Dock Company, Oakland,
Calif. x1705

Mr Miller is not interested

x99
x18-B

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

December 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Building C-4 Design Vessels on Navy
Department Facilities at Moore Dry
Dock Company *

The Moore Dry Dock Company has always been considered a Merchant Marine yard. Recently the Navy Department constructed an additional plant under the supervision of the Moore Dry Dock Company at Oakland, California. This plant has four ways capable of taking 500-foot vessels and the necessary facilities to support these ways. On two of these ways the Navy Department is building submarine tenders and on the other two they are building submarine rescue vessels. The latter are approximately 180 to 200 feet long, and three vessels are being laid on one way and two vessels on the other way.

There is sufficient ground adjacent to the ways for one additional way for a 500-foot vessel. The Maritime Commission has been requested by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, to investigate the possibilities of building additional tonnage capable of being used as troop transports. The Commission had been working on a C-4 design of cargo vessel of approximately 500 feet in length. The Commission immediately revamped this design so that it was basically a cargo vessel but superstructures were added and the design was finished as a transport capable of carrying approximately 3700 troops. This design was worked out in conjunction with the Army Transport Service.


The Commission submitted plans for the proposed construction of 15 of these vessels, beginning immediately, and all deliveries before the end of 1944. The Commission studied the feasibility of putting this construction in all yards capable of handling them (i.e., those yards which are considered to be under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Commission). The work loads in these yards, without seriously delaying standard cargo vessels of a high-class design also urgently required by the Army and Navy, as well as commercial work, are such that it was found impossible to

construct these vessels there. The Commission therefore devised a plan whereby a more economical use of the 500-foot ways presently engaged with submarine rescue vessels, a much smaller vessel, that these ways could be used for the longer ships and an additional way could be added so that the entire 15 ships could be built in the stated period.

This matter was taken up officially with the Bureau of Ships on December 11, 1941 and with the Chief of Naval Operations on December 9, 1941, but no written replies have been received but the Commission has been verbally informed by the Bureau of Ships that the request is not approved by them.

The Maritime Commission believes that the best utilization of facilities for the defense effort would be accomplished if the two ways presently engaged in submarine rescue construction were made available to the Commission immediately on launching these vessels and, if possible, by April 1, 1942; and that permission be granted for the Maritime Commission to put in the additional building way adjacent to these and that it be allowed to construct the C-4 transports in this yard.

This is all the more important since your recent directive to the Navy to convert the AMERICA, MANHATTAN, WASHINGTON and KUNGSOLM to airplane carriers, thus removing them from any service as transports.



E. S. Land
Chairman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 11, 1941

Rear Admiral S. M. Robinson
Chief of Bureau
Bureau of Ships
Navy Department

Dear Admiral Robinson:

This is to request the Navy Department for permission to construct fifteen (15) vessels of the Maritime Commission's C-4 design on shipbuilding facilities of the Moore Dry Dock Company, Oakland, California in accordance with our discussion of December 10, 1941.

The Maritime Commission requires Ways numbered 1 and 2 of the Moore Dry Dock Company for the construction of the aforementioned vessels. The Commission proposes to finance the construction of one additional way in the vacant area adjacent to Way number 1 which will make a total of three ways at this yard to be used for the construction of the C-4 vessels.

We are advised that Ways numbered 1 and 2 are now in use for submarine rescue vessels which are scheduled for launching in May and June, 1942. To make the earliest possible delivery of the C-4 vessels as requested by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, it will be necessary to have these ways available by April 1 and April 15, 1942.

The C-4 vessels are intended for use as troop transports immediately upon delivery. Approval of the proposed use of the facilities referred to and authority from the Navy Department to build an additional way and construct the fifteen (15) C-4 vessels in the Moore yard is urgently requested.

Sincerely,

(Signed) E. S. LAND

E. S. Land
Chairman

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72

By [initials]

Date

APR 9 1973

PSF

L.F.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

U.S. Maritime Commission

September 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JERRY LAND: x1705

I asked the Navy to investigate the possibility of building some freight carrying submarines of about the same size as our present 1600-ton type. The Navy opposes the idea and says that such a ship could only carry 370 tons of cargo.

This I do not believe. If you reduce the horsepower by one-half -- both sub-surface and surface, if you remove all tubes and all guns, I feel confident that such a submarine could carry 600 tons of freight. Also, there is no secret to building the hull of a submarine. It is now an old art. And this applies not only to hull, but engines.

Please look into this whole thing. There are going to be a lot more places in the world that we can get access to only by submarine and air than there are now.

F.D.R.

(over)

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, 8/26/42,
to the President, marked "Secret", with attached copy of
memorandum he received from the Chairman, General
Board, Navy Dep., 8/20/42, in re practicability of
building big freight-carrying submarines, and
copy of memorandum he received from H.S. Howard,
Bureau of Ships, Navy Dept., 8/15/42, in re cargo
submarine.

I asked the Navy to investigate
the possibility of building some freight
carrying submarines of about the same
size as our present 100-ton type. The
Navy opposes the idea and says that such
a ship could only carry 500 tons of
cargo.

This I do not believe. If you
reduce the horsepower by one-half -- both
sub-surfaces and surface, if you remove
all tubes and all guns, I feel confident
that such a submarine could carry 600
tons of freight. Also, there is no secret
to building the hull of a submarine.
It is now an old art. And this applies
not only to hull, but engines.

Please look into this whole thing.
There are going to be a lot more planes
in the world that we can get access to
only by submarine and air than there are
now.

F.D.R.

(over)

(SC)SS/s1-1
(037900A/GRC)

August 26, 1942.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

My dear Mr. President:

Recently you suggested to me a little investigation of the possibilities of freight carrying by submarines of our present size, that is the 1600-ton submarine.

My information is that the most we could hope to carry in the way of a dense cargo would be about 370 tons. For your information, I enclose both the letter from Admiral Howard, of the Bureau of Ships and a report of the General Board of the entire subject. My personal opinion, for what it may be worth, is that if we are going to attempt to get some concentrated cargoes of high value to the Russians, we use some of the existing fleet submarines, increasing their cargo-carrying capacity by stripping them down as much as possible. It will take so long to build submarines for this particular duty that the need for them may have disappeared by the time they would be finished.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX

x18

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-26-59

Signature- Col. J. Spicer

The President
The White House

enclosures

x18-Misc. Naval Bldg. Folder
x18-TBB
x16-F. Navy

Land folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1942

(L.F.)
U.S. Maritime
Commission

MEMORANDUM

Secret Memorandum to the
President 10/28/42 from Admiral Leahy
for the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff
re recommendation proposing
1,330,000 tons of steel be made
available to Maritime Commission
made by Admiral Land and Mr. Douglas.
sent to Hon. Harry Hopkins this date
to speak to the President about.

x4189

x5014

x4117

x1705

x342

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES.

R.A. Files
to file

66-2
Confidential
File
4

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date 9 September

From: Admiral Leahy

To: Mr Hopkins

This is the paper on
distribution of Steel Plates
that I spoke about on the
telephone


Leahy

9/10/23/42

B. F.

*U. S. Maritime
Commission*

September 25, 1942



MEMORANDUM FOR

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: *x5014*

The President in a message to me today asked me to advise you that he approved the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the allocation of steel plate during the balance of 1942.

HARRY L. HOPKINS *x4117*

*copy to
Mr. Nelson
Adm. Sec'd*

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 31 1972

C. F.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*U.S. Maritime
Commission*

September 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

x4189

I will O.K. this after it
has been checked with Land, Vickery and
Nelson and therefore, it should be agreed
on first, if possible.

x4735

F.D.R.


Memorandum for the President from Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, 8/29/42, marked "Secret", in re Report of Combined Steel Plate Committee. States the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the subject report. They stress the importance of early completion of the comprehensive steel survey which is recommended in the report.

x4774

*x1705
x342
x C. F. Navy*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Combined Steel Plate Committee.

The recommendations contained in the subject report have been further investigated in accordance with your memorandum of August 19.

Effect on Merchant Ship Construction

The decrease in steel plate allocated to the Maritime Commission in the subject report amounts to 220,000 tons for the last 4 months of 1942. This will result in an overall loss of only 81 vessels from a total of 2,388 in the entire 1942-43 program. The loss will not necessarily be sustained in 1942, and possibly it will not be sustained at all if, as appears likely, the steel plate situation improves in 1943 as the result of scheduled increase in steel production and the detailed study recommended by the special committee.

Effect on Army Program

The decrease in steel plate imposed on the Army in the subject report will have an immediate effect on production because of the speed with which individual items are manufactured. A large number of items will be affected, all of which are urgently required. The following short tabulation shows the effect of the decrease on four selected items of the 1942 program and the additional effect if the decrease given the Maritime Commission were to be absorbed by the Army. (A full tabulation showing the effect on the entire list of some 40 critical items is attached.)

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
JCS memo, 1-4-74


By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

x 6. F. Combined Chiefs of Staff

x 99

x 25

x 18




<u>Item</u>	<u>Number Required</u>	<u>Produced under recommended decrease</u>	<u>Produced if Army absorbs Maritime Commission decrease</u>
Light Tanks	8,285	6,450	4,800
Medium Tanks	18,752	14,620	10,900
Armored Cars	26,686	20,810	15,500
90 mm and 4.7 AA Arty.	2,714	2,120	1,570

Effect on Navy Program

If the Navy were to be required to absorb the decrease given the Maritime Commission, the loss would be equivalent to the entire September program for 2100-ton destroyers, escort vessels (DE), and tank landing ships, totaling 172 ships. Actually such a loss would have to be widespread and this would require a complete revision of the Navy shipbuilding program.

Conclusion

That the subject report distributes the reduction in steel plate supply in the manner best calculated to preserve a balanced program in accordance with the approved strategic directive.

Recommendation

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the subject report. They stress the importance of early completion of the comprehensive steel survey which is recommended in the report.


For the Combined Chiefs of Staff: x4774

William D. Leahy x4189
 WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
 Admiral, U. S. Navy,
 Chief of Staff to the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

x773
 x342

Incl.



DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

**EFFECT ON ARMY MUNITIONS PRODUCTION OF STEEL PLATE DISTRIBUTION RECOMMENDED BY COMBINED STEEL PLATE COMMITTEE
AND EFFECT OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PLATES AVAILABLE FOR MARITIME COMMITTEE**

ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

ITEM	REQUIREMENTS FROM SEPT.-DEC., 1942 TO MEET ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM				PRODUCTION UNDER STEEL PLATE DISTRIBUTION RECOMMENDED BY COMBINED STEEL PLATE COMMITTEE				REDUCTIONS IF STEEL DISTRIBUTION TO ARMY, SEPT. TO DEC., 1942 IS REDUCED FROM PLATE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION TO PROVIDE STEEL FOR MARITIME COMMITTEE			
					APPROXIMATE DEFICIENCY IN ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM		APPROXIMATE DEFICIENCY IN ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM		100,000 TON ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS		110,000 TON ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS	
	Quantity of Steel Plate Net Tons	No. of Items of Munitions	No. of Items of Munitions	Percent	4 Month Period Sept.-Dec., 1942	6 Month Period July-Dec., 1942	Amount to be Produced from Steel Received Sept.-Dec., 1942	Percent	Amount to be Produced from Steel Received Sept.-Dec., 1942	Percent	Amount to be Produced from Steel Received Sept.-Dec., 1942	Percent
Ordnance**												
Light Tanks	94,000	8,285	5,480	20%	20%	4,800	6%	5,600	20%	15,700	20%	
Medium Tanks	211,702	14,752	14,600	20%	20%	10,900	6%	10,900	20%	10,900	20%	
Heavy and Aero 3-9 Tanks	4,065	472	368	20%	20%	274	6%	302	20%	302	20%	
Other Tanks	7,040	26,686	20,810	20%	20%	15,900	6%	18,200	20%	18,200	20%	
Armored Cars	10,228	9,001	7,040	20%	20%	5,200	6%	5,100	20%	5,100	20%	
75mm & 90mm AA Artillery	10,177	2,714	2,120	20%	20%	1,700	6%	1,900	20%	1,900	20%	
88mm & 105mm AA Artillery	2,504	9,701	7,570	20%	20%	7,560	6%	7,560	20%	7,560	20%	
Anti-Tank Weapons	4,192	1,679	1,400	20%	20%	2,140	6%	2,900	20%	2,900	20%	
Other Artillery	3,389	19,188	14,900	20%	20%	11,110	6%	11,000	20%	11,000	20%	
Machine Guns	1,635	690,000	506,000	20%	20%	378,000	6%	448,000	20%	448,000	20%	
Books	114,824	12,371	9,600	20%	20%	7,100	6%	8,400	20%	8,400	20%	
Tractors, Trucks & Other Vehicles	4,082	2,600,000	2,080,000	20%	20%	1,510,000	6%	1,770,000	20%	1,770,000	20%	
Steel Bolts	3,822											
All Other Supply & Equipment Items Including Maintenance	30,000											
Total	517,408											
Motor Transportation												
Ambulances	436	5,000	3,900	20%	20%	2,900	6%	3,400	20%	3,400	20%	
Jeeps	687	65,000	51,500	20%	20%	34,800	6%	41,000	20%	41,000	20%	
Other Trucks	90,780	274,136	214,000	20%	20%	140,000	6%	166,200	20%	166,200	20%	
Trailers and Semi-Trailers	2,513	34,084	29,700	20%	20%	22,000	6%	25,810	20%	25,810	20%	
Spare Parts	12,000											
Total	109,422											
Signal Corps												
Motor Equipment	698	28	22	20%	20%	15	6%	18	20%	18	20%	
Radio Equipment	254	70	59	20%	20%	36	6%	43	20%	43	20%	
Trailers and Trucks	215	64	51	20%	20%	37	6%	44	20%	44	20%	
Other Field Equipment	2,130	164	128	20%	20%	95	6%	110	20%	110	20%	
Total	3,389											
Medical Corps												
Medical Manufacturers	770	537	537	0%	51%	404	24%	467	45%	467	45%	
All Other Supply & Equipment Items	188											
Total	958											
Quartermaster Corps												
Tent Scaffolds	215	51,993	40,600	20%	20%	29,800	6%	35,000	20%	35,000	20%	
Tents, Hospital & Pyramidal	284	380,600	298,000	20%	20%	218,800	6%	262,600	20%	262,600	20%	
All Other Supply & Equipment Items	130											
Total	773											
Water Transportation												
Service Barges	11,200	56	40	28%	20%	15	6%	18	20%	18	20%	
Rebar Barges	9,400	266	177	28%	20%	133	6%	160	20%	160	20%	
Freight & Passenger Boats	3,000	60	43	28%	20%	16	6%	19	20%	19	20%	
Loading Lighters & Boats	3,090	115	83	28%	20%	31	6%	37	20%	37	20%	
Barge Bunkers	4,890	171	126	28%	20%	48	6%	58	20%	58	20%	
Barge	1,950	66	48	28%	20%	17	6%	20	20%	20	20%	
Miscellaneous Boats	800	24	17	28%	20%	6	6%	7	20%	7	20%	
Total	48,000											
Chemical Warfare Service												
1-ton Type B Containers	15,772	15,000	6,100	60%	50%	4,576	70%	5,339	65%	5,339	65%	
All Other Supply & Equipment Items	2,000											
Total	17,772											
Corps of Engineers												
Locomotives	15,445	9,118	7,100	20%	20%	5,280	6%	6,200	20%	6,200	20%	
Other Railroad Rolling Stock	13,135	615	480	20%	20%	356	6%	416	20%	416	20%	
Trailers	24,261	8,340	6,400	20%	20%	4,500	6%	5,100	20%	5,100	20%	
Rollingstock, anglebeams and other construction equipment	7,402	7,501	5,860	20%	20%	4,300	6%	5,100	20%	5,100	20%	
All other Supply & Equipment Items	21,121											
Total	87,377											

* - Similar percentage reduction in all other items required for balanced program
 ** - Figures on number of items not available
 *** - Does not include tonnage for steel cartridge cases which will be approximately 103,500 tons for four months

FACILITIES AND OTHER CONSTRUCTION

ITEM	PLATES REQUIRED FROM SEPT. TO DEC., 1942 TO MEET ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM			PRODUCTION UNDER STEEL PLATE DISTRIBUTION RECOMMENDED BY COMBINED STEEL PLATE COMMITTEE			REDUCTIONS IF STEEL DISTRIBUTION TO ARMY, SEPT. TO DEC., 1942 IS REDUCED FROM PLATE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION TO PROVIDE STEEL FOR MARITIME COMMITTEE			
				DISTRIBUTION RECOMMENDED SEPT.-DEC., 1942		REDUCTIONS FROM REQUIREMENTS		ADDITIONAL MONTHS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE PROGRAM		
	Net Tons	Percent	Additional Months Required to Complete Program	Net Tons	Percent	Net Tons	Percent	Net Tons	Percent	
Chemical Warfare Service - Facilities	7,827	5,090	35%	2	3,280	58%	5 1/2	4,460	43%	3
Ordnance - Facilities	107,717	70,000	35%	2	40,200	56%	5	61,400	43%	3
Parsons Canal - Repair & Improvement	1,605	1,360	16%	7/3	1,030	37%	2	1,185	27%	1 1/2
Engineers - Construction	64,965	46,600	28%	1 1/2	34,800	46%	3 1/2	40,600	37%	2
Army Air Forces	91,195	70,935	20%	1	50,900	40%	3	61,700	32%	2

Prepared in Steel Section
 Army and Navy Munitions Board
 WBS
 August 26, 1942

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

①
C. F.
U.S. Maritime
Commission

September 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS: x4117

Will you try and clear this
whole thing up while I am away?

F.D.R.

Carbon of memorandum of 8/14/42 signed by Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, in reference to the U.S. Maritime Commission's letter of 8/14/42, to the President, a carbon of which is also attached, recommending that the President direct the WPB to allocate steel to the Maritime Commission for the accomplishment of the President's direction (24,000,000 d.w.t.) plus steel for such military vessels assigned to the Maritime Commission for construction and approved by the President.

x1705-

x342

x4735-

x99

L. F.
U. S. Maritime Commission

August 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL x25-7

FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: x4774

I have seen a copy of the report on steel plate submitted to you by the Combined Steel Plate Committee and I have this one observation which I want to make. *

The one and only sure effect of the recommendation is to decrease the number of merchant ships, inasmuch as it is left to the Army and Navy to determine what particular munitions or naval ships shall be curtailed because of the lack of steel over present requirements.

It seems to me that we need a more precise determination of what shall be cut before we decide finally to decrease the number of merchant ships to be built. It may be that certain other munitions of war could more properly be curtailed than merchant ships. I should like to have from you, before you give Mr. Nelson your final requirements, an indication, within important categories, of how this cut in steel plate will effect certain munitions and whether or not there are less important munitions of war than merchant ships that could be more drastically curtailed.

x4735

(Sgd) ~~FRANKLIN D.~~ ROOSEVELT

- x 342
- x 99
- x 178
- x 25
- x 18

HH
To read &
prepare reply

WHITE HOUSE
AUG 14 3 22 PM '42
RECEIVED

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

August 14, 1942

Jan. 3, 1942(?)

My dear Mr. President:

The Maritime Commission, as a result of directive received from you and as confirmed by Mr. Donald Nelson's letter to me of July 8th and my reply to him of July 14th and his reply to me of July 22d, and which directive called for deliveries in 1942-1943 of a total of 24,000,000 tons of merchant tonnage, based the scheduling of our program to meet this total on the desire to obtain the largest amount of deadweight tonnage as early as possible within the prescribed limitation. The rate at which production was accelerating in certain of the yards would make it possible to even exceed this tonnage if materials, such as steel as one example, were available to the shipbuilding industry.

As a result of the previous acceleration and the high rate of production in a number of the yards accomplished through July, it has been necessary for the Commission to take steps to restrict the amount of tonnage produced and these yards have been so informed so that in a short time the number of men employed in the shipbuilding industry in these particular yards will be reduced on account of the increased efficiency, and production will be stabilized so that a fixed number of ships will be required and expected from each yard. This statement applies to those which are already in production and have reached the accelerated stride.

There are two classes of yards which are not included in the above mentioned number, (1) those yards which are producing but have not yet reached the accelerated stride at which they will be later stabilized, and (2) those yards which have not yet started to produce and will not produce until the later part of the year. In other words, as the efficiency of the various yards is increased, they will be stabilized at a certain percentage of ship per way per month, so as not to exceed that portion of the steel capacity of the country which is allotted to the Maritime Commission. In order to leave a fixed schedule based on a certain percentage of ships per way and to be in accordance with your directive, it will be necessary that the Maritime Commission be assured by the War Production Board that it will receive the amount of steel each month

necessary to meet these requirements.

In order to meet the Commission's schedule for July, it was estimated that 391,000 tons of plate would be required, whereas the Commission had allocated to it by the War Production Board 381,000 tons, which is a 3% reduction. In August, in order to meet its schedule, the Commission requires 415,000 tons and this has been cut to 395,200 tons, a reduction of 5%. The reduction for September is from 426,000 to 368,800 tons, a reduction of 13%. The Combined Steel Plate Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has recommended that the tonnage be reduced in October from 427,000 to 368,800 tons, a reduction of 14%, and for November from 406,000 to 352,500 tons, a reduction of 13%, and in December from 406,000 to 352,500 tons, or a reduction of 13%. This results in a reduction for the last six months of this year from 2,471,000 tons to 2,219,200 tons, or a reduction of 10%.

If these proposed allocations are made final, they would most seriously affect the Commission's ability to fulfill the conditions of your directive to deliver 24,000,000 deadweight tons of merchant ships in addition to the scheduled program for minor and military types for 1942-1943. Specifically, the reduction in plate allocations could mean the elimination of fifty-three military type vessels which would require steel in the last four months of 1942, together with thirty-eight merchant vessels of the "Liberty" type. These ninety-one vessels amount to 553,700 deadweight tons. The fifty-three military vessels have scheduled plate requirements as follows:

Type	PLATE REQUIREMENTS (000 TONS)					
	Number	September	October	November	December	Total
Aircraft Transports	16	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	48.0
P-2 Transport	1	5.7				5.7
C-4 Troopships	5	11.3			17.0	28.3
Landing Ship, Tank	31	18.5	18.5			37.0
Totals	53	47.5	30.5	12.0	29.0	119.0


If it were considered to take all of the steel reduction out of purely merchant type cargo vessels, this would result in the elimination of eighty-one of the EC2s or "Liberty" type ships, a total of 850,500 deadweight tons for 1942-1943, which would result in a total tonnage of 23,150,600 deadweight tons against the 24,000,000 deadweight tons required by your directive.

All of the above statements are predicated only on the amount of tonnage allocated for 1942 and on the presumption that the steel required for 1943 would be supplied as required for the program.

The reduction in tonnage will not only affect the 1942 program but it will seriously affect the number of ships delivered for the first six months of 1943 and the loss of the eighty-one EC2s mentioned above would occur chiefly in the early part of 1943. The Commission's chief aim at the present is to have a stabilized schedule of steel deliveries which will meet the stabilized schedule mentioned in the first part of this letter.

The Commission has developed its schedule in accordance with your directive and wishes to be assured by you that it will be supplied with materials to meet its program. If, however, it is impossible to supply the required materials, then a new directive should be issued in accordance with the capacity of the material suppliers as set up by the War Production Board.

Sincerely yours,



E. S. Land
Chairman

x1705

The President
The White House

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1942

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Maritime Commission's letter of August 14th to the President

SUMMARY

- (a) The President gave a written directive to the U.S. Maritime Commission for 24,000,000 d.w.t. in 1942 and 1943.
- (b) This appears to be confirmed by correspondence between Nelson and Land (see paragraph 1).
- (c) Despite above, steel plate allocation was cut 3% for July; 5% for August; 13% for September; proposed cut of 14% for October; and 13% for November and December. Net result for last 6 months of 1942 is a 10% cut or 252,000 tons, which means elimination of 91 ships -- namely: 38 Liberty ships and 53 military types being built by the Maritime Commission; that is, 554,000 d.w.t.
- (d) If all the cut is taken by Liberty ships, it will eliminate 81 ships or 850,000 d.w.t., reducing your directive from 24,000,000 to 23,150,000.
- (e) Above results are based on cuts in 1942 and we assume 1943 allocations will not be cut.
- (f) Above results badly affect 1942 program and seriously affect first 6 months of 1943 program.
- (g) Essential for the Maritime Commission to have stabilized program. Otherwise, not only serious strategic military difficulties will follow but also serious regional economic disturbances, particularly labor difficulties will occur.

RECOMMENDATION

- (a) That you direct the War Production Board to allocate steel to the Maritime Commission for the accomplishment of your directive (24,000,000 d.w.t.) plus steel for such military vessels assigned to the Maritime Commission for construction and approved by you.
- (b) If (a) is impossible, a new directive is essential which states fixed limitations of the program -- cargo and military.
- (c) We strongly recommend approval of (a).

Jerry Hand.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C. F.
U. S. Maritime Commission
July 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. DONALD M. NELSON *x4735*

What about it?

F.D. R.

x1705
Letter from Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission, 7/15/42, to Hon. Harry L. Hopkins, *x4117* marked "Confidential", enclosing copy of Ad. Land's letter of 7/14/42, to Hon. Donald Nelson, and copy of Mr. Nelson's letter of 7/8/42 to Ad. Land, in re supply of and requirements for steel plate in particular relation to recent proposals for increasing certain parts of shipbuilding program. The Maritime Commission has been advised that there is to be a five per cent cut in August allocation of steel and the inference is that this cut will continue through the rest of 1942 allocations. Douglas, Vickery and Ad. Land feel that this is a serious mistake.

x342

x99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1942

Grace:

This came after H.L.H.
left this morning so I turn
it over to you to show the
President if you think he
should see it.

Lois

C. F.
U. S. Maritime Commission

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

x18

Is this O.K.?

F.D.R.

x1705

Memorandum for the President from Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission, 6/26/42, in re various conferences held at the President's directive relative to the construction of 100 escort vessels, 50 airplane transports and necessary steel for the President's approved merchant marine program for 1942 and 1943, carbon of letter which Admiral Land received from W. L. Batt, 6/25/42, marked "Secret", with attached memorandum "Proposed Steel Plate Allocations for Period July Through December 1942", marked "Secret", and carbon of memorandum for the President from Ad. Land, 6/25/42, at top of which is notation "not approved by conferees. E.S. Land".

x4752

x99

x18-Misc. Naval Bldg. Folder

x342

77/21/42

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file
confidential*

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

June 26, 1942

C. F.

U.S. Maritime Commission

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing copy of a letter which was written yesterday to Admiral Land in regard to your most recent directive given to us orally through him with respect to merchant shipping.

x1705

x99

Realizing the importance of the Maritime program, we have been at work on steel plate for the past week. The matter was in process of being discussed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff so that our allocation of steel plate could be attuned to strategy. In view of your directive we have made a substantial reduction in other necessary requirements using steel plate, but this reduction gives me grave concern.

Respectfully yours,

Donald M. Nelson


Donald M. Nelson

x4735

x342

The President

The White House



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date FEB 19 1974

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C

REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

June 25, 1942

Rear Admiral Emory S. Land
Chairman, Maritime Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Land:

As you requested, we have this afternoon explored with representatives of the armed Services the sources from which must come the approximate 2,500,000 tons of steel plate which you will require during the balance of this year to meet the President's directive of yesterday.

The aggregate requests for steel plate during the next six months greatly exceed the estimated supply of approximately 7,100,000 tons, and the War Production Board had already completed tentative allocations among the users for the balance of this year, as set forth on the schedule attached hereto. In order to meet your new request, an additional 125,000 tons must be added to the tonnage which had been tentatively allocated to you.

In the short time and limited information available, we would propose to make a horizontal cut of not to exceed 5% in any one instance of the tentative allocations made to other claimants. The cut will fall most heavily upon the Army and Navy because of the type of plate which your program requires.

The tentative allocations of plate for the balance of the year to the armed Services are already considerably below their stated requirements: In the case of the Army, by approximately 250,000 tons, and of the Navy, by approximately 200,000 tons. Representatives of the armed Services have therefore requested that it be made clear that the indicated amount of plate during the balance of the year which will be available to them will not permit the fulfillment of their program objectives. Defense plant construction, which includes aluminum, synthetic rubber, high octane gas, and other similar essential groups, will also be further set back, as you will note that their stated requirements cannot be met by approximately 300,000 tons. While it is not immediately pertinent, the statement made by representatives of the Navy should be noted that the proposed construction of certain naval ships by the Maritime Commission will result in unused naval facilities, while at the same time an expansion of Maritime Commission facilities will have to be provided.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. Batt

W. L. Batt

Chairman



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date FEB 19 1974

Duplicate Original

[REDACTED]

PROPOSED STEEL PLATE ALLOCATIONS FOR PERIOD
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER 1942

	<u>Stated Requirements</u>	<u>Tentative Allocations</u> *
Army	1,512,120	1,240,000
Navy	1,788,799	1,595,000
Maritime	2,486,000	2,385,000
Ship Repairs	113,000	115,000
Defense Plants	1,118,830	790,000
Lend Lease	240,120	225,000
Other Export	206,240	175,000
Railroads	412,000	280,000
Warehouse	266,000	115,000
All Other	<u>196,500</u>	<u>155,000</u>
TOTAL	8,339,609	7,075,000

* These tentative allocations were made prior to the June 24 directive which requires an increase in the amount of plate allocated to the Maritime Commission of approximately 125,000 tons and a corresponding reduction in the allocations to other users.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (A)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-72
By RHP, Date FEB 19 1974

MISS BERNEY:

*Filed
by Mrs. Brady
7/30/42
EB.*

Do you want to let Mr. Hopkins
see this before filing?

djb

*Thanks - HH has
seen - Berny*

Handwritten notes on a small piece of paper, possibly a label or a note, with some faint printed text visible in the background.

Handwritten text:

- HH
- to see
- and then
- file

Faint printed text (likely from a form or label):

- SEARCHED
- SERIALIZED
- INDEXED
- FILED
- NOV 19 1964
- FBI - MEMPHIS

Other faint markings:

- 912
- 1/20/64
- 1/20/64

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

file → [redacted]
July 24, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you for sending me Admiral Land's letter of July 15th to Mr. Hopkins, to which he attached a copy of his letter of July 14th to me on the matter of our ship-building program for 1942 and 1943. In the latter connection, I attach herewith a copy of my reply of July 22nd, which I think now thoroughly clarifies this whole situation insofar as objectives are concerned.

Admiral Land refers to the recent 5% cut in the Maritime Commission's steel plate allocation for August, which cut he feels may continue for the rest of 1942, and states that in his opinion this is a serious mistake.

As you know, we have for some time been concentrating above all else on increasing the production of steel plate. The results achieved have been considerable, production having gone up from 593,000 tons in October 1941 to approximately 1,100,000 this month. Principally because of this large increase in plate production, however, stringent shortages have developed in other essential steel items. Our steel exports, amounting to about 20% of total production, have also contributed to the stringency.

Therefore, we found ourselves at a point where the entire war production program was threatened with great dislocation, because we were going to have enough steel plate but not enough of other steel products to go with the plate so that it could be fully employed in producing finished tanks, ships, and synthetic rubber and 100-octane plants.

In other words, we felt that the 5% cut in steel plate allocations to the Maritime Commission would enable them to complete more ships than if we gave them the full 100% of their requirements and thus made it impossible for them to obtain, for example, the necessary structural shapes.

Moreover, I have a feeling that, because of the increasing efficiency of the merchant shipbuilding yards, which


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date FEB 19 1974

- 2 -

enables them to operate on smaller inventories, this 5% cut ought not to prevent them from meeting the program.

If you would like me to provide any additional information, I would be only too glad to do so.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. M. Nelson". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Donald M. Nelson

The President
The White House

██████████
July 22, 1942

Dear Admiral Land:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 14th replying to mine of July 8th concerning our shipbuilding program for 1942 and 1943. In accordance with your suggestions, I shall be glad to clarify certain points, so that our mutual understanding of the matter may be on a more specific basis.

My letter was not intended to imply any change in the President's written directive to you to complete this year 9 million deadweight tons of merchant shipping, and that figure still stands as our objective. I used the phrase "8 million tons, or slightly more if possible", as an approximation only, which was meant to exclude minor and military types. The President's 9 million ton objective, however, includes as you state approximately 435,000 deadweight tons of these minor and military types, including 42 A.T.L. boats.

For 1943 the program is to be 16 million deadweight tons. In addition, however, you are to construct 814,000 tons of minor and military types, including 48 A.T.L.'s and 50, rather than 44, airplane transports.

With reference to the term "escort vessel", my understanding of it is the same as yours, namely, that the President's directive with regard to such vessels applies only to this special type and not to any other type of combat-ant ship that may be used for escort purposes.

After your staff has had an opportunity to translate the above programs into definite schedules of ship completions and steel plate requirements by months to the end of 1943, I would appreciate receiving a copy of such data, in order that appropriate monthly allocations of plate can be made.

With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, no one is more anxious than I am to build an overwhelming number of merchant ships this year and next, for I know that they can be well and promptly used to hasten the defeat of our enemies. As I explained to the President, however, lack of steel plate, but even more particularly lack of basic steel capacity, is such that the limits on our shipbuilding must be approximately as set forth above, unless substantial curtailments are made in other parts of our war program. These curtailments the President was unwilling to sanction. In any event, if you still feel that from the point of view of the over-all strategy of the United Nations this decision should be altered, I shall be glad to discuss the matter with you further at any time.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Nelson

Rear Admiral Emory S. Land
Chairman, U. S. Maritime Commission
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (5)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-78
By RHP, Date FEB 19 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 12, 1944

C. F.
U. S. Maritime Commission

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION

By direction of the President, the enclosed copy of his secret memorandum of July eleventh to the Director of the Budget is sent for your information and guidance.

WILLIAM D. HASSETT

July 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET x79

In reply to your inquiry of 21 June 1944, regarding the shipbuilding program of the Maritime Commission for 1945, I approve the Commission's Program No. 31 as a basis for scheduling completions during the remainder of 1944 and the first six months of 1945. I desire that any major cutbacks or extensions of this program be referred to me for approval after consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but such modifications in the program as are mutually agreed upon by the Maritime Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be made provided that no insurmountable difficulties in accomplishing the program result therefrom. In this connection I note that a subsequent recommendation, embracing a review of the program for the first six months of 1945 and its extension to the end of the year, is to be submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff about 1 October 1944. x99 x5014

Your data and discussion as to the post-war shipping situation and the Nation's ability to meet the demands to be made upon it are noted; however, I consider that victory is sufficiently distant to demand that the shipbuilding program be designed to meet wartime requirements as completely as possible, and that post-war requirements be given consideration only to the extent that they do not conflict with the requirements of planned or proposed military operations. x4951

It is important that everyone in any way responsible for the consummation of the shipbuilding program constantly bear in mind the fact that the implementation of important planned and projected military operations is dependent upon the availability of ships as determined by the approved building schedule. Every possible means should be employed to prevent any slippage in this schedule. It is also of great importance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed promptly whenever a situation develops which indicates that future slippage in the program cannot be avoided.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 31 1972

[REDACTED]

I note from your report the proposed re-allocation of certain facilities from shipbuilding to ship repair. It is necessary that a suitable balance be maintained between repair and construction capacities to maintain the present shipping; but this should be done without curtailing shipbuilding capacity unnecessarily.

*xlb 7 Lend Lease
74193*

Due to the critical situation with regard to manpower and steel in the third and fourth quarters of this year, it is my present belief that additional commitments under Lend-Lease and for private account for ships of any kind should not be undertaken prior to the submittal of the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to the Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission for his information and guidance.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 31 1972



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

[REDACTED]

10 July 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Maritime Commission Shipbuilding
Program No. 31.

Enclosed herewith is the reply which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you make to the letter from the Director of the Budget.

Aside from general approval of the program you will note that we recommend that you withhold approval at this time of additional Lend-Lease ships of even small size. We do this because of the critical manpower situation which is well known to you, and of the increasing difficulty of meeting all requirements for steel.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74 |
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

[REDACTED]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7-6-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Jerry Land sent this note, and also came in to see me.

He says they are definitely in a jam about their budget for 1945 ship building until they get clearance from the President.

He also wants to talk about going overseas to look into shipping from that angle.

E.M.W.

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
25, D.C.

~~File~~
File

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

July 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON,
THE WHITE HOUSE.

Dear "Pa":

There is enclosed copy of President's memorandum to me of last November. The Budget promised to get clearance for this program but have fallen down on the job. It is therefore imperative that I see the President at the earliest possible date as we are definitely in a jam until the President acts on the matter. There is a very long memorandum submitted by the Bureau of the Budget covering the whole situation.

Will you please let me know if it is possible to see the President this week.

Cordially yours,

Jerry

E. S. Land x1705

Encl.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C
O
P
Y

November 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION:

The present construction program of the United States Maritime Commission for the calendar year 1944 is 21,700,000 dead-weight tons. It appears desirable to budget through fiscal year 1945 at the rate of 22,000,000 dead-weight tons of merchant type ships.

During calendar year 1944 it must be realized that you will be called upon to build certain vessels for use as naval auxiliaries. I am advised that the plans of the Navy for immediate construction of auxiliaries will reduce your final output for the merchant fleet to about 16,000,000 dead-weight tons in the calendar year 1944; but I think you should budget and schedule on the capacity basis of 22,000,000 dead-weight tons so as to include the naval auxiliary program therein.

Major changes and cut-backs should not be made without my approval; although I want to review the situation with you about June 30, 1944.

/S/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Maritime Comm. folder 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you please take this up
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
prepare a reply?

F. D. R.

*J.C.S.
get this out P.D.Q.*

W.H.F.

DECLASSIFIED
 E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(b) and 5(D) or (2)
 OMB letter, 11-27-72
 Date FEB 10 1974
 RNF

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
 BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUN 21 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Correspondence is in Miss Turner's files.

You issued a directive to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission on November 12, 1943, in which you stated your understanding that then existing plans for construction of naval auxiliaries would reduce final output for the merchant fleet to about 16,000,000 deadweight tons in the calendar year 1944 and your opinion that budgeting (without a specific construction program) should be on the capacity basis of 22,000,000 deadweight tons for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1945, so as to include the naval auxiliary program therein. You also stated "Major changes and cut-backs shall not be made without my approval; although I want to review the situation with you about June 30, 1944." The following, as a result of collaboration by officials of the Maritime Commission and members of my staff, is presented for use in your review and as an aid in reaching your decision.

Budget allowances for the Maritime Commission were based upon your directive of November 12, 1943. Maritime Commission ship construction for calendar year 1944, as accomplished to end of May and now planned for thereafter, is as follows:


Type	1944		1944		Total 1944	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Merchant	798	8,204,900	692	7,132,000	1,490	15,336,900
Military	125	548,300	294	1,639,500	419	2,187,800
Total	923	8,753,200	986	8,771,500	1,909	17,524,700

and the construction program as now planned for the 12-month period from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945 is as follows:

Type	1944		1945		Total	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Merchant	692	7,132,000	796	8,185,200	1,488	15,317,200
Military	294	1,639,500	63	406,600	357	2,046,100
Total	986	8,771,500	859	8,591,800	1,845	17,363,300

while present plans schedule only 39 vessels of 349,100 dwt. (18 merchant of 213,500 dwt. and 21 military of 135,600 dwt.) for completion after June 30, 1945.

Continuing studies of the Maritime Commission are reflected in monthly programs scheduling future deliveries. Program 30, dated May 15, 1944, was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a probable schedule of accomplishment from June 1, 1944 through June 30, 1945. After a study of the prospective availability of merchant shipping with respect to the military situation and planned operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on June 6, 1944, recommended the execution of Program 30 with certain modifications. All modifications recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been made, resulting in Maritime Commission Program 31.



DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OMB letter, 11-27-72

2 By RHP

Date FEB 19 19

Program 31 contemplates the completion of 2,042 ships approximating 19,178,300 dwt., including certain naval auxiliaries and specific military types but excluding future Lend-Lease requests, between June 1, 1944 and February 16, 1946. It is summarized, by types of vessels (with speed ranges indicated in parentheses) and periods of scheduled completions, below.

MARITIME COMMISSION CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 31

TYPES	COMPLETIONS		COMPLETIONS		COMPLETIONS	
	Month of June 1944		July 1944-June 1945		After June 30, 1945	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Dry Cargo: (Speeds)						
Various (9-12)	10	34,400	288	1,339,900	2	9,300
Liberty (10-11)	61	658,800	404	4,401,600	-	-
C-Types (14-17)	11	108,050	144	1,718,000	16	204,200
Victory (15.5-17)	17	184,450	359	3,656,400	-	-
Total dry cargo	99	985,700	1,195	11,115,900	18	213,500
Tankers	20	337,100	263	4,139,800	-	-
Strictly Military	28	113,000	357	2,046,100	21	135,600
Barges and tugs	11	30,100	30	61,500	-	-
Total by periods	158	1,465,900	1,845	17,363,300	39	349,100

The presently scheduled disposition for use upon completion of the dry cargo vessels (1,312) and tankers (283) included in Program 31 is as follows:

TYPE	MILITARY CONVERSION		LEND-LEASE		WSA	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Dry Cargo: (Speeds)						
Various (9-12)	75	372,000	66	255,600	159	756,000
Liberty (10-11)	18	194,400	17	183,600	430	4,682,400
C-Types (14-17)	18	213,600	-	-	153	1,816,650
Victory (15.5-17)	-	-	-	-	376	3,840,850
Total dry cargo	111	780,000	83	439,200	1,118	11,095,900
Tankers	-	-	21	50,800	262	4,426,100
Total by use	111	780,000	104	490,000	1,380	15,522,000

The construction under this program is required in its entirety by military needs as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There apparently is no dearth of tonnage for post-war shipping; and about half of the present world tonnage is controlled or owned by the United States. It will be noted from the tabulations hereafter presented that the construction under Program 31 provides approximately a 50 percent increase in USA controlled vessels, which are already almost three times as much tonnage as was under United States control in September 1939. While approximately 90 percent of the present dry cargo tonnage under USA is composed of Liberty and other type ships with speeds of less than 12 knots, only about 50 percent of the dry cargo vessels in the portion of Program 31 destined for USA is of such slow types. Any consideration of post-war needs in merchant shipping, however, must take into account many technical factors other than tonnage volume and speeds, since specific types of vessels will be required to perform specific tasks.

Excluding Liberty ships, the preponderance of vessels heretofore constructed by the Maritime Commission has been built as military types or converted to naval auxiliaries and military types. Further, notwithstanding the large number of ships and great amount of tonnage heretofore completed and now scheduled by the Maritime Commission, it is significant that the great majority of fast-type vessels, which otherwise might have been available for certain post-war merchant ship requirements, has been converted or completed for specific military purposes.

For September 1939, the Division of Economics and Statistics, Maritime Commission, has estimated world tonnage of merchant vessels (ocean-going iron and steel, steam and motor of 2,000 gross tons and over) at approximately 72,000,000 dwt. (dry cargo 56,000,000 and tankers 16,000,000) and United States tonnage of merchant vessels (1,000 gross tons and over) at approximately 11,700,000 dwt. (dry cargo 7,500,000 and tankers 4,200,000). World tonnage, similarly estimated for March 31, 1944, approximates 76,000,000 dwt. (dry cargo 60,000,000 and tankers 16,000,000).

The monthly inventory of United States controlled dry cargo vessels (ocean-going steam and motor of 1,000 gross tons and over) and tankers (ocean-going steam and motor of 1,600 gross tons and over) prepared by the Division of Statistics and Research, War Shipping Administration, shows, as of May 31, 1944, the following:

AGENCY CONTROL	DRY CARGO		TANKERS		TOTAL	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
War Shipping Administration	2,498	23,600,000	649	8,870,300	3,147	32,470,300
Army and Navy	641	5,333,600	123	1,531,700	764	6,865,300
Total	3,139	28,933,600	772	10,402,000	3,911	39,335,600

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)

OMB Letters, 11-22-72
By RAS Date FEB 19 1974

The inventory figures immediately preceding deal with all ships originally of merchant type, of which the ones listed under Army and Navy control have been converted to military use. Certain troopships actually under WSA control have been tabulated as Army and Navy, while tankers of private companies and ODT have been tabulated as WSA. Vessels under United States ownership but under foreign control by Lend-Lease agreement are not included; but vessels of private and foreign ownership operating under WSA control are included.

The following tabulation shows merchant ships and tonnage, by types: (1) under control of the War Shipping Administration as of May 31, 1944; (2) scheduled for construction in Program 31 and for use of War Shipping Administration; and (3) a total of the two items without downward revision for either sinkings or assignments to other than War Shipping Administration control after May 31, 1944.

TYPES	UNDER WSA CONTROL MAY 31, 1944		M.C. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 31 FOR WSA		TOTAL OF TWO ITEMS	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Dry Cargo:						
(Speeds)						
Various (8-11.9)	476	2,589,000	159	756,000	635	3,345,000
Liberty (10-11)	1,693	18,276,000	430	4,682,400	2,123	22,958,400
Various (12-14.4)	94	643,000	-	-	94	643,000
C-Types (14-17)	169	1,489,000	153	1,816,650	322	3,305,650
Various (14.5-17)	35	267,000	-	-	35	267,000
Victory (15.5-17)	31	336,000	376	3,840,850	407	4,176,850
Total dry cargo	2,498	23,600,000	1,118	11,095,900	3,616	34,695,900
Tankers	649	8,870,300	262	4,426,100	911	13,296,400
Total	3,147	32,470,300	1,380	15,522,000	4,527	47,992,300

The scheduled work under Program 31, as indicated above, contemplates: (1) the transition from new construction to ship repair, during the period indicated, of the facilities of

YARD	LOCATION	FROM	TO
Kaiser-Richmond No. 3	San Francisco, California	May 1945	August 1945
Moore Dry Dock	San Francisco, California	February 1945	June 1945
Western Pipe and Steel	San Francisco, California	January 1945	July 1945
Kaiser-Swan Island (partial)	Portland, Oregon	April 1945	June 1945

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OMB letter, 11-27-72

By RMP Date FEB 10 1974

SECRET

and (2) the continuing in ship construction, to capacity on a six-day week (overtime being authorized as required) with manpower ceilings now in effect, of

<u>YARD</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNTIL SCHEDULED COMPLETION</u>
East Coast:		
MacEvoy	Savannah, Georgia	June 30, 1944
Walsh-Kaiser	Providence, Rhode Island	April 15, 1945
New England	Portland, Maine	April 24, 1945
Southeastern	Savannah, Georgia	April 30, 1945
J. A. Jones	Brunswick, Georgia	April 30, 1945
Sun	Chester, Pennsylvania	June 30, 1945
Bethlehem-Fairfield	Baltimore, Maryland	June 30, 1945
North Carolina	Wilmington, North Carolina	June 30, 1945
East Coast	Bayonne, New Jersey	June 30, 1945
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point	Baltimore, Maryland	October 31, 1945
Pusey and Jones	Wilmington, Delaware	November 26, 1945
Federal	Kearney, New Jersey	February 16, 1946
Gulf Coast:		
St. Johns	Jacksonville, Florida	January 31, 1945
J. A. Jones	Panama City, Florida	February 19, 1945
Houston	Houston, Texas	February 28, 1945
McCloskey	Tampa, Florida	March 31, 1945
Avondale	New Orleans, Louisiana	March 31, 1945
Pendleton	New Orleans, Louisiana	March 31, 1945
Pennsylvania	Beaumont, Texas	May 25, 1945
Gulf	Mobile, Alabama	May 29, 1945
Delta	New Orleans, Louisiana	June 13, 1945
Alabama	Mobile, Alabama	June 30, 1945
Ingalls	Pascagoula, Mississippi	December 31, 1945
Great Lakes:		
American	Cleveland, Ohio	October 30, 1944
American	Lorain, Ohio	October 30, 1944
Globe	Superior, Wisconsin	December 20, 1944
Froemming	Milwaukee, Wisconsin	March 13, 1945
Leathem Smith	Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin	April 10, 1945
Walter Butler	Duluth, Minnesota	June 1, 1945
Walter Butler	Superior, Wisconsin	June 1, 1945

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OMB letter, 11-22-72

By *RAF* Date FEB 19 1974

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<u>YARD</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNTIL SCHEDULED COMPLETION</u>
West Coast:		
Concrete	San Diego, California	August 30, 1944
Barrett and Hilp	San Francisco, California	October 20, 1944
Consolidated	Los Angeles, California	May 31, 1945
Kaiser-Richmond No. 4	San Francisco, California	May 31, 1945
California	Los Angeles, California	June 30, 1945
Kaiser-Swan Island (partial)	Portland, Oregon	June 30, 1945
Kaiser-Vancouver	Vancouver, Washington	June 30, 1945
Oregon	Portland, Oregon	June 30, 1945
Marin	San Francisco, California	June 30, 1945
Permanente	San Francisco, California	June 30, 1945
Bethlehem-Alameda	San Francisco, California	August 31, 1945

No major delays in merchant ship repair have resulted thus far; but the Navy at all times has about ten ships awaiting their turns at Navy Yards on the West Coast. The above proposed transitions from new construction to ship repair will not aid in easing the over-all ship repair problem on the West Coast until sometime next year. The Navy and the Maritime Commission agree that no additional repair facilities for naval vessels should be provided at the expense of the Maritime Commission's program. However, the Navy advises that certain of the naval shipbuilding facilities in both Navy Yards and commercial yards are being shifted from construction to repair.

The Maritime Commission considers Program 31 to be feasible. Replacement training necessitated by turn-over has thus far been off-set by increased efficiency of continuously employed workers; however, inability of merchant shipyards to retain or recruit experienced workers will undoubtedly result in some slippage of schedules. The Commission is also apprehensive that some delays may result from workers' concern over future employment as contracts approach completion in various yards.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes, as a result of further studies, to recommend to the Maritime Commission on or about October 1, 1944, such modifications as may then appear desirable, and advise as to the ship construction requirements through December 31, 1945, for planned military operations. Existing contracts and agreements cover all vessels in Program 31, except 213 ships. The Maritime Commission considers it necessary to cover these 213 ships by contracts at the earliest practicable date but desires your decision before proceeding further.

The Maritime Commission also desires your authorization to make necessary alterations within the volume of construction contained in Program 31 upon agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to construct, to the extent found practicable in meeting military requirements, such vessels of 5,000 dwt. or less for Lend-Lease requirements as may be presented by the Foreign Economic Administration and such vessels as may be ordered for private account.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OMB letter, 11-27-22
By *RAH* Date FEB 19 1974

[REDACTED]

It is proposed by the Maritime Commission that such programs as may be developed for future periods, after recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on or about October 1, 1944 and thereafter, be presented for your consideration; and I consider such procedure to be highly desirable. As indicated above, whether the program proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Maritime Commission should be approved depends entirely upon your appraisal of the military situation and I believe that, if after your review of the present situation you authorize the Maritime Commission to proceed as planned under Program 31, any major cut-backs and any program extensions should be based upon decisions by you.

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH

Director

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OMB letter, 11-27-72

By RHP

Date FEB 19 1974

[REDACTED]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY ⁴¹⁸⁹

Will you please take this up
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
prepare a reply?

F. D. R.

RECEIVED
 E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(2) and 5(D) of (2)
 OMB letter 11-27-72
 Date FEB 19 1974

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D. C.

JUN 21 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You issued a directive to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission on November 12, 1943, in which you stated your understanding that then existing plans for construction of naval auxiliaries would reduce final output for the merchant fleet to about 16,000,000 deadweight tons in the calendar year 1944 and your opinion that budgeting (without a specific construction program) should be on the capacity basis of 22,000,000 deadweight tons for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1945, so as to include the naval auxiliary program therein. You also stated "Major changes and cut-backs shall not be made without my approval; although I want to review the situation with you about June 30, 1944." The following, as a result of collaboration with officials of the Maritime Commission and members of my staff, is presented for use in your review and as an aid in reaching your decision.

Budget allowances for the Maritime Commission were based upon your directive of November 12, 1943. Maritime Commission ship construction for calendar year 1944, as accomplished to end of May and now planned for thereafter, is as follows:

Type	1944		1944		Total 1944	
	January-June		July-December			
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Merchant	798	8,204,900	692	7,132,000	1,490	15,336,900
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Total	923	8,753,200	986	8,771,500	1,909	17,524,700

and the construction program as now planned for the 12-month period from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945 is as follows:

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while present plans schedule only 39 vessels of 349,100 dwt. (18 merchant of 213,500 dwt. and 21 military of 135,600 dwt.) for completion after June 30, 1945.

Continuing studies of the Maritime Commission are reflected in monthly programs scheduling future deliveries. Program 30, dated May 15, 1944, was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a probable schedule of accomplishment from June 1, 1944 through June 30, 1945. After a study of the prospective availability of merchant shipping with respect to the military situation and planned operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on June 6, 1944, recommended the execution of Program 30 with certain modifications. All modifications recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been made, resulting in Maritime Commission Program 31.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

2 OMB letter, 11-27-72

By RHP

Date FEB 19 1974

Program 31 contemplates the completion of 2,042 ships approximating 19,178,300 dwt., including certain naval auxiliaries and specific military types but excluding future Lend-Lease requests, between June 1, 1944 and February 16, 1946. It is summarized, by types of vessels (with speed ranges indicated in parentheses) and periods of scheduled completions, below.

MARITIME COMMISSION CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 31

TYPES	COMPLETIONS		COMPLETIONS		COMPLETIONS	
	Month of June 1944		July 1944-June 1945		After June 30, 1945	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
Dry Cargo: (Speeds)						
Various (9-12)	10	34,400	288	1,339,900	2	9,300
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The presently scheduled disposition for use upon completion of the dry cargo vessels (1,312) and tankers (283) included in Program 31 is as follows:

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SECRET

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AGENCY CONTROL	DRY CARGO		TANKERS		TOTAL	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
War Shipping Administration	2,498	23,600,000	649	8,870,300	3,147	32,470,300
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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(B) and 5(D) or (E)

DMB letter, 11-27-72

By RHP

Date FEB 19 1974

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TYPES	UNDER WSA CONTROL MAY 31, 1944		M.C. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 31 FOR WSA		TOTAL OF TWO ITEMS	
	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.	Ships	Dwt.
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(Speeds)						
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The scheduled work under Program 31, as indicated above, contemplates: (1) the transition from new construction to ship repair, during the period indicated, of the facilities of

YARD	LOCATION	FROM	TO
Kaiser-Richmond No. 3	San Francisco, California	May 1945	August 1945
Moore Dry Dock	San Francisco, California	February 1945	June 1945
Western Pipe and Steel	San Francisco, California	January 1945	July 1945
Kaiser-Swan Island (partial)	Portland, Oregon	April 1945	June 1945

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OMB letter, 11-27-72

By RHP Date FEB 19 1974

and (2) the continuing in ship construction, to capacity on a six-day week (overtime being authorized as required) with manpower ceilings now in effect, of

<u>YARD</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNTIL SCHEDULED COMPLETION</u>
East Coast:		
MacEvoy	Savannah, Georgia	June 30, 1944
Walsh-Kaiser	Providence, Rhode Island	April 15, 1945
New England	Portland, Maine	April 24, 1945
Southeastern	Savannah, Georgia	April 30, 1945
J. A. Jones	Brunswick, Georgia	April 30, 1945
Sun	Chester, Pennsylvania	June 30, 1945
Bethlehem-Fairfield	Baltimore, Maryland	June 30, 1945
North Carolina	Wilmington, North Carolina	June 30, 1945
East Coast	Bayonne, New Jersey	June 30, 1945
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point	Baltimore, Maryland	October 31, 1945
Pusey and Jones	Wilmington, Delaware	November 26, 1945
Federal	Kearney, New Jersey	February 16, 1946
Gulf Coast:		
St. Johns	Jacksonville, Florida	January 31, 1945
J. A. Jones	Panama City, Florida	February 19, 1945
Houston	Houston, Texas	February 28, 1945
McCloskey	Tampa, Florida	March 31, 1945
Avondale	New Orleans, Louisiana	March 31, 1945
Pendleton	New Orleans, Louisiana	March 31, 1945
Pennsylvania	Beaumont, Texas	May 25, 1945
Gulf	Mobile, Alabama	May 29, 1945
Delta	New Orleans, Louisiana	June 13, 1945
Alabama	Mobile, Alabama	June 30, 1945
Ingalls	Pascagoula, Mississippi	December 31, 1945
Great Lakes:		
American	Cleveland, Ohio	October 30, 1944
American	Lorain, Ohio	October 30, 1944
Globe	Superior, Wisconsin	December 20, 1944
Froemming	Milwaukee, Wisconsin	March 13, 1945
Leathem Smith	Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin	April 10, 1945
Walter Butler	Duluth, Minnesota	June 1, 1945
Walter Butler	Superior, Wisconsin	June 1, 1945

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<u>YARD</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNTIL SCHEDULED COMPLETION</u>
West Coast:		
Concrete	San Diego, California	August 30, 1944
Barrett and Hilp	San Francisco, California	October 20, 1944
Consolidated	Los Angeles, California	May 31, 1945
Kaiser-Richmond No. 4	San Francisco, California	May 31, 1945
California	Los Angeles, California	June 30, 1945
Kaiser-Swan Island (partial)	Portland, Oregon	June 30, 1945
Kaiser-Vancouver	Vancouver, Washington	June 30, 1945
Oregon	Portland, Oregon	June 30, 1945
Marin	San Francisco, California	June 30, 1945
Permanente	San Francisco, California	June 30, 1945
Bethlehem-Alameda	San Francisco, California	August 31, 1945

No major delays in merchant ship repair have resulted thus far; but the Navy at all times has about ten ships awaiting their turns at Navy Yards on the West Coast. The above proposed transitions from new construction to ship repair will not aid in easing the over-all ship repair problem on the West Coast until sometime next year. The Navy and the Maritime Commission agree that no additional repair facilities for naval vessels should be provided at the expense of the Maritime Commission's program. However, the Navy advises that certain of the naval shipbuilding facilities in both Navy Yards and commercial yards are being shifted from construction to repair.

The Maritime Commission considers Program 31 to be feasible. Replacement training necessitated by turn-over has thus far been off-set by increased efficiency of continuously employed workers; however, inability of merchant shipyards to retain or recruit experienced workers will undoubtedly result in some slippage of schedules. The Commission is also apprehensive that some delays may result from workers' concern over future employment as contracts approach completion in various yards.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes, as a result of further studies, to recommend to the Maritime Commission on or about October 1, 1944, such modifications as may then appear desirable, and advise as to the ship construction requirements through December 31, 1945, for planned military operations. Existing contracts and agreements cover all vessels in Program 31, except 213 ships. The Maritime Commission considers it necessary to cover these 213 ships by contracts at the earliest practicable date but desires your decision before proceeding further.

The Maritime Commission also desires your authorization to make necessary alterations within the volume of construction contained in Program 31 upon agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to construct, to the extent found practicable in meeting military requirements, such vessels of 5,000 dwt. or less for Lend-Lease requirements as may be presented by the Foreign Economic Administration and such vessels as may be ordered for private account.

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It is proposed by the Maritime Commission that such programs as may be developed for future periods, after recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on or about October 1, 1944 and thereafter, be presented for your consideration; and I consider such procedure to be highly desirable. As indicated above, whether the program proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Maritime Commission should be approved depends entirely upon your appraisal of the military situation and I believe that, if after your review of the present situation you authorize the Maritime Commission to proceed as planned under Program 31, any major cut-backs and any program extensions should be based upon decisions by you.

John D. Arnold
Director

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