

● PSF:CF: War Dept., Jan. - Aug. 1942

PSF

C. F.  
War

January 3, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The victory over our enemies will be achieved in the last analysis not only by the bravery, skill and determination of our men, but by our overwhelming mastery in the munitions of war.

x178

The concept of our industrial capacity must be completely overhauled under the impulse of the peril to our nation.

Our associates amongst the united nations are already extended to the utmost in the manufacture of munitions and their factories fall far short of the needs of their own armies. We must not only provide munitions for our own fighting forces but vast quantities to be used against the enemy in every appropriate theater of war, wherever that may be.

x4193

I am, therefore, sending this directive and instruction to the War Department, which relates to two phases of our munitions effort.

First, a large increase in the production of various munitions of war in 1942 and, secondly, the production to be achieved in 1943.

Every non-essential civilian use must give way to the urgency of the needs of our armed forces. Our men and machines must be used to the very limit to attain our goals.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War.

x25

x4675  
x249 official  
x4488

DECLASSIFIED.  
BY F.D.R.L.  
DOD Dir. 5200.9 (9/27/58)  
Date 2/13/67  
by J.V.Deyo - E.B.Drewry  
Dir.

Following are the list of munitions and the schedule you are directed to fulfill:

	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>
AIRCRAFT		
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	30,000
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	17,000
Pursuits	16,000	38,000
Observation & Transports	6,700	15,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	100,000
TANKS		
Heavy	500	5,000
Medium	25,000	50,000
Light	19,500	20,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	75,000
ANTI-AIRCRAFT		
Light 37 mm.	1,600	-
40 mm.	13,000	25,000
Heavy 90 mm.	5,400	10,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	20,000	35,000
ANTI-TANK		
37 mm.	13,700	
3"	1,200	4,000
MACHINE GUNS (Ground, Tank A.A.)		
.30"	330,000	330,000
.50"	170,000	170,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	500,000	500,000

- 3 -

In addition to the above, I want the ammunition produced commensurate to this program on the assumption that these munitions of war are to be used in combat.

In so far as aircraft are concerned, I wish you would confer with Secretary Knox as to the appropriate distribution by types as between the Army and the Navy. x/8

I realize that you may wish to recommend some increases or amendments in this program but I wish the substance of this instruction to be initiated at once in all its implications.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Copies to:  
Secretary Knox.  
Mr. Knudsen.  
Mr. Hillman.

HLH/lmb

~~SECRET~~

January 5, 1942

My dear Mr. Hillman:

The victory over our enemies will be achieved in the last analysis not only by the bravery, skill and determination of our men, but by our overwhelming mastery in the munitions of war.

The concept of our industrial capacity must be completely overhauled under the impulse of the peril to our nation.

Our associates amongst the united nations are already extended to the utmost in the manufacture of munitions and their factories fall far short of the needs of their own armies. We must not only provide munitions for our own fighting forces but vast quantities to be used against the enemy in every appropriate theater of war, wherever that may be.

I have, therefore, sent this directive and instruction to the War Department, which relates to two phases of our munitions effort.

First, a large increase in the production of various munitions of war in 1942 and, secondly, the production to be achieved in 1943.

Every non-essential civilian use must give way to the urgency of the needs of our armed forces. Our men and machines must be used to the very limit to attain our goals.

The Honorable  
Sidney Hillman, x4245  
Associate Director,  
Office of Production Management.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
LUD 1111 5200.9 (9/22/88)

Following are the list of munitions and the schedule you are directed to fulfill:

	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>
<b>AIRCRAFT</b>		
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	30,000
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	17,000
Pursuits	16,000	38,000
Observation & Transports	6,700	15,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	100,000
<b>TANKS</b>		
Heavy	500	5,000
Medium	25,000	50,000
Light	19,500	20,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	75,000
<b>ANTI-AIRCRAFT</b>		
Light 37 mm.	1,600	-
40 mm.	13,000	25,000
Heavy 90 mm.	5,400	10,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	20,000	35,000
<b>ANTI-TANK</b>		
37 mm.	13,700	-
3"	1,200	4,000
<b>MACHINE GUNS (Ground, Tank A.A.)</b>		
.30"	330,000	330,000
.50"	170,000	170,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	500,000	500,000

- 3 -

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Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

RLH/lmb

~~SECRET~~

January 5, 1942

My dear Mr. Knudsen:

The victory over our enemies will be achieved in the last analysis not only by the bravery, skill and determination of our men, but by our overwhelming mastery in the munitions of war.

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I have, therefore, sent this directive and instruction to the War Department, which relates to two phases of our munitions effort.

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The Honorable  
William S. Knudsen,  
Director, Office of Production Management.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DOLPHIN  
100 W. 6200 S (9/27/50)

Following are the list of munitions and the schedule you are directed to fulfill:

	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>
<b>AIRCRAFT</b>		
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	30,000
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	17,000
Pursuits	16,000	38,000
Observation & Transports	6,700	15,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	100,000
 <b>TANKS</b>		
Heavy	500	5,000
Medium	25,000	50,000
Light	<u>19,500</u>	<u>20,000</u>
	45,000	75,000
 <b>ANTI-AIRCRAFT</b>		
Light 37 mm.	1,600	-
40 mm.	13,000	25,000
Heavy 90 mm.	5,400	10,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	20,000	35,000
 <b>ANTI-TANK</b>		
37 mm.	13,700	-
3"	1,200	4,000
 <b>MACHINE GUNS (Ground, Tank A.A.)</b>		
.30"	330,000	330,000
.50"	170,000	170,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	500,000	500,000

- 3 -

In addition to the above, I want the ammunition produced commensurate to this program on the assumption that these munitions of war are to be used in combat.

I realize that the War Department may wish to recommend some increases or amendments in this program, but I wish the substance of this instruction to be initiated at once in all its implications.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

HLH/lmb

HENRY L. STIMSON  
SECRETARY OF WAR

FRANK KNOX  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WILLIAM S. KNUDSEN  
DIRECTOR GENERAL

SIDNEY HILLMAN  
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR GENERAL

*file*

OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 7, 1942

THE WHITE HOUSE  
JAN 8 9 10 AM '42  
RECEIVED

*LF*  
*War*

The President  
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of January 5 dealing with your instructions to the War Department regarding the "all out" program for war munitions.

Please be assured that the schedule you have outlined shall go into effect immediately and the necessary steps taken to insure the deliveries as specified.

There will be a large amount of funds required for facilities and which I trust Congress will speedily provide.

Yours very sincerely,

*W. S. Knudsen*  
William S. Knudsen

PPF  
1050  
710  
PSF War Dept-1942

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR <sup>x25</sup>

I think Frank Knox is right.  
For the time being the matter can  
be possibly maintained "under  
consideration". Please return  
for my files.

F. D. R.

x18 Memorandum for the President from the Secretary  
of the Navy, ~~xxx~~ 1/1/42, referring to letter sent  
to him by Mr. Early which someone had written to  
the President concerning Lindbergh's offer of his  
services to the Army. Mr. Knox states he would not  
become involved in any discussion but would leave  
it to the Army to handle. If it were a Navy  
question the Secretary would offer Lindbergh an  
opportunity to enlist as an air cadet, like  
anybody else would have to do.

x18  
92  
xPP7 1080  
x16. F. Navy

DECLASSIFIED.

The original of this page (in NA) was  
declassified by R.H. Bahmer on 2/7/67.

Note: The original was classified  
"Secret" by the War Department.

*Confidential*

*D. F.  
War*

January 12, 1942

Dear Mr. Patterson:

I have your letter of January 10 making recommendations relative to the schedule for 1942.

It seems to me the recommendations as to anti-aircraft guns are so modest that my original objective should be maintained.

I agree to the 37 mm. anti-tank guns from 13,700 to 17,00 and am quite willing to include the new 57 mm. gun along with the 3" gun, making the total of those 3,700, and to reduce the machine gun to 400,000 in 1942, providing a goal of 125,000 50 caliber and 175,000 30 caliber.

Very sincerely yours,

*(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt*

The Honorable  
Robert P. Patterson,  
Under Secretary of War, x25  
War Department.

HLH/lmb

x178  
x249 *official*  
x4488

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1942

Miss Tully:

Mr. Hopkins said he would  
like very much to have this  
signed tonight if it is possible.

Lois Berney

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have gone over this and recommend  
that the following amendments be made.

I have therefore drafted the attached  
letter to Judge Patterson.


HARRY L. HOPKINS x4117

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 10th, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Attached is a letter for the President,  
along the lines which we discussed by telephone this  
morning.



Robert P. Patterson,  
Under Secretary of War.

rpp:lm  
Enc-let to  
President.

Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-24-54

Signature- *Carl S. Speer*

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

January 10th, 1942.

The President,  
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Your directive of January 3, 1942, relative to the production of specified munitions in 1942 and 1943 is now being implemented by the War Department.

In order that the specified munitions may be produced in balance with each other and in accord with the needs of the united nations, I desire to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the last paragraph of your letter to recommend amendments in this program. These recommendations will have little effect on the over-all production desired in 1942; the dollar value of the quantities you proposed for production in that year is approximately the same as the dollar value of the quantities here recommended. It is believed that the objective on machine guns for 1942 stated in your directive, a total of 500,000, came about through clerical error in the data submitted to you.

<u>Items</u>	<u>1942 Objective Prescribed by the President</u>	<u>1942 Objective Recommended by the War Department</u>
<u>Anti-aircraft</u>		
Light 40 mm.	13,000	12,559
Heavy 90 mm.	5,400	5,060
<u>Anti-tank</u>		
37 mm.	13,700	17,048
3-inch or 57 mm.	1,200	3,680
<u>Machine Guns (ground, tank, A.A.)</u>		
.30 Cal.	330,000	265,876
.50 Cal.	<u>170,000</u>	<u>123,542</u>
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library	500,000	389,418

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-24-59

**SECRET**

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

The President

-2-


January 10th, 1942.

It has been necessary to introduce the 57 mm. gun with the 3-inch gun as an anti-tank weapon, primarily because the needs of the united nations for anti-tank weapons are considerably greater than indicated in your directive.

Computations of the quantities of other munitions which are to be the goals for 1942 production are under way in the War Department, and every effort will be made to insure the production of these items in order to furnish the munitions of war in proper balance. The distribution of the aircraft objective set by you is now under consideration between the War Department and the Navy Department and should be in shape for your approval within a few days.

Your approval of the above amendments is desired.

Respectfully yours,



Acting Secretary of War.

rpp:lm


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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-19-66

Signature-



**SECRET**

①  
L. F.  
War

February 6, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I understand some difficulty has arisen over the use of the airplane production figures which were included in my letter of January 3 to the Secretary of War.

I hereby authorize you to make these figures available to any person to whom these data are necessary in the fulfillment of our airplane production program.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable Robert P. Patterson  
The Under Secretary of War  
Washington, D. C.

x25

x249 official

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

M E M O R A N D U M

February 6, 1942

TO: MISS TULLY

FROM: MR. LUBIN *x4529*

I would appreciate it if the President could untangle a bit of red tape which seems to have tied the WPB in a knot.

*x4735*

The Secretary of War has made available to the Aircraft Division of WPB the President's directive of January 3, which specifies the airplane production program for 1942. It appears that this letter was stamped SECRET. As legally interpreted, this means that the figures in the directive cannot be made available to the various manufacturers with whom negotiations are to be made. If the word "secret" on the letter is changed to "confidential", the figures could then be released with "the specific approval of the Secretary of War."

The War Department says it has no authority to change the document from "secret" to "confidential" without the express authority of the President.

I am attaching herewith a letter for the President's signature which I think will rectify the situation.

*C. F. War Dept*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

This was answered on January 4  
by a letter to the Secretary of War  
which the President signed. No  
further action is necessary.

H.L.H.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

The desires you expressed in your letter of December 28, 1941, concerning the Soviet aid program have been the objectives of the War Department since the protocol was received. The importance of the maintenance of the whole Russian program is fully appreciated by this Department and the only steps which have been taken thus far to alter that program have been in the interest of filling certain vital emergency needs of the United States. We have been giving consideration to as full a resumption of this program as possible and in order that you may be familiar with these studies, I am enclosing a tabulated schedule of what I propose to forward during January, February and March, 1942. While this schedule is not in all cases in accordance with the protocol, there are certain difficulties, including shipping and production difficulties as well as our entry into war, which have made some departures from the protocol inevitable.

Because of these primary considerations, as well as more detailed reasons given in each case, I request you to authorize the specific amendments which are described below, which I believe you will agree are well within the spirit of the protocol.

In the past three months it has been possible to dispatch to Russia but 452 of the 750 tanks called for by the protocol. The shortage of 298 tanks cannot be made up prior to April 1, 1942, for the following reasons:

Although the United States Forces are scheduled to receive less than 25% of our own tank production for the next three months, it has been necessary to supply certain tank units of the United States Forces which have been sent to Hawaii and to the Pacific Coast, and which may shortly be sent abroad.

The British have been forced to forward tanks to Malaya from other theaters for immediate use there but this has been done on the basis of replacing them with tanks scheduled for transfer from our production to the British in the next three months. Another reason for the reduced quantities available is the shortage in production of 75 mm tank guns.

After considering these factors, a schedule has been worked

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 9 1973

~~SECRET~~

H.H.  
Will you send  
and do the  
necessary?

out which will increase the monthly protocol rate of 250 to 300, and the deficit of 298 tanks will be made up by June 30, 1942.

Due to the acute shortage for our own forces and the likelihood of their early employment in combat zones, the total number of anti-tank guns originally scheduled for the period December 1941 - March 1942 will now be scheduled for the month of March 1942.

The protocol calls for 152-90 mm AA guns. Four have been shipped. The meagerness of our production, together with the great need for anti-aircraft equipment in our own forces makes it undesirable in my opinion to forward any anti-aircraft equipment in the next three months.

Calibre 30 ammunition will be forwarded at an approximate rate of 5,000 rounds per machine gun during the next three months. However, calibre 50 stocks are so small, and production so uncertain that only 2,000 rounds per aircraft machine gun can, in my judgment, reasonably be forwarded in January, and further examination will have to be made toward the end of that month on the basis of the expenditure by our own forces, and the actual production available, before further schedules can be made. Calibre 45 ammunition can be furnished at the rate of 2,000 rounds per submachine gun.

The 37 mm A.P. shot was exported to the exclusion of the needs of U. S. forces in continental U. S. until December 7, 1941. To support the armored force units, as well as the anti-tank weapons in our divisions, which are destined for early employment, there is a stock of less than 200,000 rounds now on hand. The January production from U. S. orders will only increase this to 400,000. In view of these circumstances, it is unwise to forward to Russia in January more than the number of rounds per tank gun which it has been possible to furnish in the past, namely, 300 rounds. Pending a clarification of the employment of our own forces, and possible increases in production, schedules for February and March have not been made.

With regard to aircraft, the protocol provides for the shipment of 100 pursuit airplanes and 100 light bomber type airplanes each month beginning October, 1941, and extending through June, 1942. There has actually been shipped to USSR, 76 pursuit airplanes and 44 more are in process of being shipped, making a total of 120 which will have been shipped by December 31, 1941. There will remain a balance of 780 to fulfill the protocol commitment. It is planned to

deliver these 780 airplanes at the rate of 100 per month beginning January, 1942.

The protocol provides for 828 light bomber type airplanes of which 48 have actually left the United States, 33 are now on dock-side, making a total of 81. The balance of 747 we intend to ship at the rate of 100 per month beginning January, 1942.

Neither the approved, and what I consider to be the essential, plans for the organization of 24 pursuit groups and seven light bomber groups of the United States Air Force by June 30, 1942, will permit any increase in these categories beyond those set forth above.

The protocol requirements for Toluol will be met by the end of August 1942 and for Diphenylamine by September 1942. Approximately one-half of the protocol requirements for Dibutyl-Phtalate will be delivered by the end of June 1942. This item is being restudied with a view to increasing deliveries. The protocol deliveries on Dimethylaniline will be completed in September 1942. The need for these items in the manufacture of explosives and powder to balance our own production lines necessitates the indicated delays.

The protocol requirements on Phenol, Sodium Bromide, Phosphorus, T.N.T. and Ethylene Glycol will be completed either before or by the end of June 1942. Boric Acid, Formaldehyde and Metallic Sodium, which are not included in the protocol, will be delivered as desired by the U.S.S.R.

The protocol requirement for sole leather will be met before June 1942. U.S.S.R. has placed orders for 900,000 pairs of Army shoes on which delivery will be completed in April. It is expected that an additional order for 600,000 pairs of shoes will be placed.

Army cloth is being supplied in accordance with total protocol requirements.

Approximately 12,000 trucks have been furnished U.S.S.R. to date and this will be increased by 15,000 to 20,000 during the period January - February 1942. During the period March to June 1942 trucks will be furnished at a rate sufficiently in excess of 10,000 per month to complete the protocol requirements by the end of June 1942. It is currently intended to furnish the 4,000 - 1/4 ton trucks (jeeps) desired


by the Russians at the rate of 1,000 per month commencing in March 1942 which will be in conformity with the protocol. The delay in commencing shipments is due to the necessity of equipping certain task forces prior to their departure from the United States.

Medical supplies are being procured and forwarded in accordance with various agreements which have been made with the representatives of the U.S.S.R.

In the interest of the most effective employment of all munitions, it has been determined that hereafter anything in excess of one month's accumulation of supplies awaiting transport may be diverted for the use of United States or other forces.

It is also necessary to point out now that we are at war that any substantial failure to produce the supplies as scheduled must serve as a basis for a readjustment of the amounts to be forwarded. I anticipate that our deliveries will be increased rather than reduced now that we are at war but I feel that I must, as a matter of caution, point out that exigencies may arise as a result of our entry into the war which preclude us from making any absolute commitments.

Sincerely yours,



Secretary of War

The President  
The White House

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**OSD Letter, 5-3-72**

PROSPECTIVE TRANSFERS

Under

RUSSIAN PROTOCOL

During

JANUARY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH

1 9 4 2  
- - - -

Office Defense Aid Director  
Dec. 30, 1941  
(4 pages)

TANKS			ARMAMENT FOR TANKS					Gun 37mm A.T.	Shot, 37mm A.P. M51
Light Tanks	Medium Tanks	Machine Guns Cal..30 M1919A4	Mount Tripod Cal..30 M2	Gun, Sub- machine Cal..45	Gun 37mm Tank	Gun 75mm Tank			
1942									
Jan.	146	152	1338	596	450	298	152	0	90
Feb.	146	154	1346	600	454	300	154	0	not scheduled
March	146	154	1346	600	454	300	154	63	not scheduled

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION  
(Units 1,000)

	Cartridge Cal..30			Link, M.B. Cal..30 M1	Cartridge Cal. .50		Link, M.B. Cal..50 M1 & M2	Cartridge Cal..45 Ball	Shell, 75mm H.E. Normal Charge
	Ball	AP	Tracer		A.P.	Tracer			
1942									
Jan.	5,780	950	1,270	1,187.5	800	200	1,000	900	136
Feb.	5,600	1,040	1,360	1,300	not scheduled	not scheduled	not scheduled	900	138
March	5,600	1,200	1,200	1,500	"	"	" "	900	139

SIGNAL				EXPLOSIVES	
	Wire W 110 - B (miles)	Telephone, Sound Power.	Telephone, Field, Russian.	T. N. T. (tons)	Toluol (tons)
1942				1942	
Jan.	74,000	0	9,500	Jan.	100 2,000
Feb.	50,000	2,000	18,900	Feb.	100 2,000
March	62,000	10,000	21,900	March	500 2,000

QUARTERMASTER

	Trucks, Assorted.	Leather (tons)	Shoes, Service.	Cloth Overcoating. (yards)	Cloth, Suiting. (yards)
1942					
Jan.	7,500	1,500	100,000	1,000,000	400,000
Feb.	7,500	0	250,000	completed	completed
March	10,000	0	250,000	completed	completed

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 5-3-78

CHEMICALS

	Phenol	Sodium Bromide	Phosphorus	Dimethyle-Aniline	Kollox-iline
	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)
1942					
Jan.	750	132	300	75	300
Feb.	750	150	300	130	300
March	750	150	50	130	300

CHEMICALS

	Ethylene glycol	Boric Acid	Formaldehyde	Sodium Metallic	Diphenylamine	Dibutylphthalate
	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)	(tons)
1942						
Jan.	120	150	425	at rate desired	100	100
Feb.	120	completed	completed	" " "	100	150
March	120	completed	completed	" " "	100	150

AIRCRAFT

	<u>Bombers</u>		
	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Light</u>	<u>Pursuit</u>
Jan.	12	100	100
Feb.	12	100	100
March	12	100	100
April	12	100	100
May	12	100	100
June	12	100	100
July	-	100	100
Aug.	-	100	100
Sept.	-	100	100
Oct.	-	-	-
Nov.	-	-	-
Dec.	-	-	-

*C. F.*  
*War*

January 4, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The recommendations contained in your letter of December 30, 1941 as to the revised allocations under the Moscow Protocol are, in general, approved as minimum schedules.

x220

However, in view of the probability of accelerated production due to our entry into the war, and on account of the rapidly changing world situation, I desire that a monthly review be made and revised schedules of allocations be submitted to me as of the fifteenth of each month, beginning February 15, 1942.

The objective should remain as indicated in my letter of December 28: to reestablish monthly protocol commitments at the earliest practicable time and to make up existing deficits by April 1.

I am especially concerned with the situation with respect to T.N.T. and ammunition. The Soviet representatives are constantly pressing for increased shipments. In view of the recent favorable reports of accelerated production of T.N.T., the situation should be restudied, and delivery made of the maximum quantities of T.N.T. consistent with overall strategic plans.

x178  
x4193

It is noted that the allocations of ammunition are not adequate to permit the continued use in combat of weapons, airplanes, and tanks allocated. The balancing of delivered weapons with ammunition should be under constant study and shortages in any item made up whenever the situation permits.

x249 official  
x4488

Your recommendation, that any munitions in excess of one month's accumulation of supplies awaiting transport may be diverted, is approved subject to the condition that these diversions will be replaced from production as soon as transportation becomes available.

x173-B

Very sincerely yours,

*x C. F. Lend Lease*

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of War.

x25

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By RT

Date APR 9 1973

DOROTHY:

This same letter went to the  
Secretaries of War, Navy and Treasury.

Let's

December 28, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I desire that the Soviet aid program as provided in the Protocol Agreement be re-established beginning January 1.

Existing deficits are to be made up and shipped from this country not later than April 1.

I realize that some amendments such as relate to anti-aircraft guns and their ammunition must be made as to time of delivery but I wish if possible when such amendments must be made you would give consideration to increasing the Protocol in other items essential to the Russians.

The whole Russian program is so vital to our interests I know that only the gravest consideration will lead you to recommend our withholding longer the munitions our Government has promised the U.S.S.R.

I wish, therefore, that all items go forward promptly after January 1, unless I authorize the specific amendment.

Very sincerely yours,

*W. Franklin Boardman*

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Navy.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

*PT*

Date APR 9 1973

HJH/lmb

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
CF.  
war

file for

January 12, 1942

x rd.

Dear Mr. Patterson:

I have your letter of January 10 making recommendations relative to the schedule for 1942.

It seems to me the recommendations as to anti-aircraft guns are so modest that my original objective should be maintained.

I agree to the 37 mm. anti-tank guns from 13,700 to 17,000 and am quite willing to include the new 57 mm. gun along with the 3" gun, making the total of those 3,700, and to reduce the machine gun to 400,000 in 1942, providing a goal of 125,000 50 caliber and 275,000 30 caliber.

Very sincerely yours,

*Franklin D. Roosevelt*

The Honorable  
Robert P. Patterson,  
Under Secretary of War,  
War Department.



Declassified  
2/7/67  
Records of Belknap

11612



**RESTRICTED**

*BSF*  
*G. F.*  
*War*  
*7 3/4/42*

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

*x249 official*  
*x51*  
*x25-U*  
*x51-EE*

This will acknowledge your recent note enclosing a letter from Mr. Frederick A. Delano relative to the subject of Camp Springs airport site.

I have carefully gone over the matter of requirements for military airdromes in the vicinity of Washington. I have also had my Air Force staff investigate these requirements. Investigation brings forth the following:

a. Additional military airports are necessary in the vicinity of Washington.

b. There are no better sites in the Washington area than that afforded by the Camp Spring site.

c. From an engineering standpoint, this site can be developed more economically than other sites of commensurate size in the vicinity of Washington.

d. It is believed that options on the 3,000 acres within this tract can be acquired readily. The cost of the acquisition of this land should not exceed \$250.00 an acre. It will be noted that this amount is \$50.00 an acre in excess of that offered in 1938.

Therefore, I recommend that the Camp Springs site be procured for the development of a military airport required in this vicinity.

In view of the fact that there has been considerable discussion in reference to this tract, your approval is desired on this project.

Respectfully yours,

Secretary of War *x25*  
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
DDP DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-24-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

*H. L. S.*  
*C.I.C. Go ahead*  
*Delano knows all*  
*about the options*  
*F.O.C.*  
*2/26/42*

*x79*  
*x723*

**RESTRICTED**

57-58  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL ARNOLD:

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Frederic A. Delano, Chairman, National Capital Park and Planning Commission, to the President, 1/23/42, with attached copy of President's memorandum of 4/6/38 to Mr. Delano, Report to Congress of Airport Commission dated <sup>x3091</sup> 7/9/37 and small chart of available areas for Airports around Washington. Copy of Mr. Delano's letter retained for our files.

x51-7/see.



220 State Dept. Bldg.  
INTERIOR BUILDING,

WASHINGTON, D. C. January 23, 1942.

The Commander in Chief

of the Army and Navy of the United States.

My dear Mr. President:

I venture as a matter of duty to bring to your attention even in this intensely busy time the subject of the Camp Springs Airport. The reasons I venture to again bring this matter to your attention are:

1. Your memorandum to me of April 6, 1938, of which I enclose a copy. *Filed 51-88*
2. The conviction, stronger now than ever, that the Nation's Capital can not safely rely on Bolling Field - Army and Navy fields. They are dangerously located for modern planes and open our city to attacks by plane.
3. Gravelly Point, which cost three times the original estimate, is not a safe field for bad weather instrument landing.
4. What Maj. Gen. Westover, General Sultan, and I (not to mention others) said about the proposed Camp Springs field in the formal report to Congress in July, 1937, is even more true today, because the rapid development

of airplanes and the art of flying require more than they ever did long runways in all directions on well drained high land. This, all experts agree, is more essential than close proximity to any city.

5. At the present time money has been made available out of defense funds to acquire or improve suitable airports. For this reason, the subject of a safe airport for Washington has again been brought up.

The property, some 2000 acres near Camp Springs, can still be acquired at a moderate price (say \$250.00 per acre on the average).


To the best of my knowledge and belief, and I have scoured the area around Washington (say on a 25-mile radius), there is no area equal to this.

6. There is only one objection that has ever been raised to this site which, in my estimation, is entitled to serious consideration, considering war-time needs,- that is the objection made by Naval officers in regard to the Cheltenham long distance radio development, which is five miles from the center of the field I recommend. In regard to this, scientists whom I have consulted assure me that this station can be

protected absolutely and to the entire satisfaction of those interested. The area owned by the Government at Cheltenham is less than 50 acres and that is not adequate protection. We believe it needs perhaps 500 acres, or say a half mile radius. Protecting the Cheltenham installation and the small Bureau of Standards installation is, I believe, properly a part of the cost of a suitable airport near Camp Springs.

7. Finally, Mr. President, I believe, after some 23 years' study of the development of aeronautics, that this question of a safe airport for Washington can not be tossed off as unimportant. I feel very strongly that the subject is of major importance as a war necessity.

Respectfully submitted,



Frederic A. Delano  
Chairman

x32

Enclosures:

- 1-Copy of the President's Memorandum of April 6, 1938.
- 2-Report to Congress of Airport Commission dated July 9, 1937.
- 3-Small chart of available areas for Airports around Washington.

C  
O  
P  
Y

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington

April 6, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
HON. FREDERIC A. DELANO

Who is spreading the story that I am against the Camp Springs airport, I do not know, but I have just discovered the fact that this story is being widely circulated.

The bill last year was vetoed principally because I did not think and do not think, that the present airport can ever be made a safe permanent principal airport for the District.

I understand the Department of Commerce people are now recommending municipal airports with runways 6,000 feet in length. The present airport could never be developed to that size and both Camp Springs and Gravelly Point could be.

Here is my best judgment:

- (a) Do a little fixing up of the present airport, putting it in better shape for use for a year or two, closing Military Road for that period and abandoning the whole airport as soon as possible.
- (b) Develop the Camp Springs site as quickly as possible. I understand this could be done from a year to a year and a half.
- (c) Develop the Gravelly Point site for fair weather use, which is between 80% and 90% of the time. This will take probably four to five years on account of settling.

What do you think of the above?

F.D.R.

C  
O  
P  
Y  
1/24



*Enclosed by Frederick D. Fair*

75TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { DOCUMENT  
1st Session } { No. 288

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIRPORT COMMISSION

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIRPORT  
COMMISSION TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  
REQUIRED BY SECTION 2 OF THE ACT

JULY 12, 1937.—Referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia and  
ordered to be printed

JULY 9, 1937.

The Honorable WILLIAM B. BANKHEAD,  
*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

SIR: In conformity with the provisions of an act of Congress (Public,  
No. 529, 74th Cong. (H. R. 3806), approved April 21, 1936, a District  
of Columbia Airport Commission was created to examine all available  
data concerning potential sites for commercial airports, to inspect such  
potential sites, and to select a site for such purpose.

I have the honor, therefore, to submit herewith confidential report  
of the Commission required by section 2 of the act.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM H. KING,  
*Senator from Utah,*  
*Chairman, District of Columbia Airport Commission.*

To the Honorable WILLIAM B. BANKHEAD,  
*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

SIR: In conformity with section 2 of the provisions of the act of  
Congress, approved April 21, 1936 (Public, No. 529, 74th Cong. (H. R.  
3806)), entitled "An act to establish a commercial airport for the  
District of Columbia"; the District of Columbia Airport Commission,  
authorized under section 1 of the act, has the honor to submit the  
following report:

## I. ORGANIZATION

1. Under the authority contained in the act the following appointments to the Commission were made:

1. By the President of the Senate:

William H. King, Senator from Utah.  
Royal S. Copeland, Senator from New York.  
Warren R. Austin, Senator from Vermont.

2. By the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

Mary T. Norton, Representative from New Jersey.  
W. Sterling Cole, Representative from New York.  
Jack Nichols, Representative from Oklahoma.

3. By the President of the United States:

Mr. Frederic A. Delano, chairman, National Capital Park and Planning Commission.  
Col. Daniel I. Sultan, Engineer Corps, United States Army; Engineer Commissioner, District of Columbia.  
Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, Air Corps, Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army.

2. The first meeting was held on May 7, 1936, at which time the Commission was organized with Senator William H. King as chairman and Mr. Jack Nichols, Representative from Oklahoma, as secretary.

3. A subcommittee with Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover as chairman and Senator Warren R. Austin and Representative Jack Nichols, members, was appointed to undertake an investigation of available data upon which the Commission as a whole could act.

## II. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

4. Having perfected the organization, the Commission then examined the scope of its responsibility, particularly in view of the very definite directive contained in the closing words of section 1 of the act:

and shall select a site for such purpose with due regard to the cost of its acquisition and development, its safety, and its adaptability to the requirements of commercial aviation and national defense.

The Commission also outlined basic principles to cover its procedure and considered a schedule for accomplishment. In outlining these principles it took cognizance of the tremendous growth of commercial aviation in recent years and particularly the tremendous strides in engineering development. It informally reviewed the operating records of the major transport companies so far as those records are of common knowledge. The great strides in technical development which forecast the operation of commercial and military planes under conditions of weather which today keep airplanes grounded, was discussed in its relation to the problem presented. These ramifications of the problem crystallized the minds of the members of the Commission on the paramount issue of safety of operation under all conditions at the expense of other requirements.

5. The Commission then charged the subcommittee with the preparation of an agenda. This the subcommittee did at a meeting on May 14, 1936. The agenda was presented to the Commission as a whole on May 20, 1936, at which time it was considered and approved.

6. The Commission met regularly thereafter to discuss progress, recommend procedure and to expand its investigation as the need became apparent. Throughout, the Commission was determined that no factor that might contribute to a final, fair, and unbiased decision would be ignored. Every interested party was given consideration, either in person or by the medium of correspondence or past testimony on this subject. Every site suggested was investigated.

### III. ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY THE SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

7. Prior to discussing the mechanics of its study, the Commission, at this time, desires to pay tribute to the splendid cooperation of the several Departments of the Federal Government in the invaluable assistance those Departments rendered to the Commission in its study.

8. Every request brought forth whole-hearted, intelligent, and sympathetic response. It was only thus that the investigation upon which this report is based could be made so exhaustive, so lacking in prejudice. Thus, too, was it possible for the Commission to submit its report at this time.

9. The Commission particularly wishes to express its appreciation for the assistance rendered by the following agencies of the Federal Government:

The War Department: The Air Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, the Engineer Corps.

The National Capital Park and Planning Commission.

The Bureau of Air Commerce of the Department of Commerce.

The Public Works Administration.

### IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

10. Prior to the compilation of any data or the investigation of any site, the subcommittee made a thorough study of all records available of past research affecting the selection of a site for an airport for the District of Columbia. These records consisted of hearings before congressional committees, files of the United States Army Air Corps, of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, and of the Bureau of Air Commerce. Among other data available was a Washington and vicinity map prepared by the National Capital Park and Planning Commission indicating 48 sites suggested for investigation. Personnel of these agencies who had made studies of the problem in the past were interviewed and the subcommittee made generous use of their experience and advice.

### V. AIRPORT QUESTIONNAIRE

11. Based on the study of the records referred to above, and after consultation with personnel of both the Army Air Corps and the Bureau of Air Commerce experienced in the problems involved in large airplane operation and in the layout and construction of airports, the subcommittee formulated an airport questionnaire designed to contain all information essential for a preliminary decision as to the relative value of any site as an airport.

## VI. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A MODERN AIRPORT

12. The subcommittee then reviewed the situation existing or developing at some of the Nation's major airports. It immediately became apparent that engineering development of aircraft was rapidly outdistancing ground facilities; that is to say, that the distance required for take-off and landing of our largest planes and the angle of ascent and glide had become of such an order as to preclude the use of airports that but a few years ago were considered ample for any contingency. And the end is not yet in sight, for even now airplanes are being projected that are more than twice the size of present craft.

13. The result of this unforeseen and unprecedented development has been extremely unfortunate for some municipalities. Either it has been necessary to restrict the use of the airport to the smaller type of airplanes, with a consequent decrease in importance as an aviation center, or the community has been forced to acquire additional land for expansion at tremendous cost. The situation in the United States is not unlike that in Europe. Le Bourget at Paris, France, is preparing a runway 10,000 feet long. It is reported that the German Government is expanding Templehoff Airdrome at Berlin to 2 miles at tremendous cost, and Croyden in England is being enlarged.

14. In most cases the early proponents of municipal airports attempted to locate them as close to the cities which they served as was possible. With older, slower type ships and no attempt to maintain schedules in bad weather, and with generally poor road communications, this was indubitably the ideal situation. But for the same reason that the small airport is outmoded, the airport at the gates of a city has become dangerous.

15. The Commission is well aware that scheduled air-transport operations are being conducted from this type of field with only minor accidents, but they are convinced that no serious, impartial student of the situation will contend that the danger of an appalling accident is not imminent.

16. With these thoughts in mind the subcommittee laid down the following requirements for a modern airport:

(1) That runways at least 5,000 feet long on the major points of the compass with provision for blind-landing runways and unobstructed approach 2 miles long, parallel to the direction of bad weather winds (for blind landings).

(2) That it be located in an area which permits of expansion.

(3) That it be free from obstructions, positively from buildings, towers, stacks, and similar types of construction, and as much as possible from natural hazards.

(4) That the land selected should be relatively flat, with firm soil, good drainage, and preferably high.

(5) That the cost of the land and its preparation be neither exorbitant nor unreasonable.

(6) That it be convenient to the city of Washington, which it is to serve, and that a suitable express highway connecting the two be considered in the cost of the entire project.

(7) That it be as free from the disadvantages of local-area fog prevalence as other circumstances will permit.

It will be observed from a study of these requirements that the Commission desired to select a site that would provide the maximum of safety at the minimum of cost and yet be sufficiently close to Washington to warrant short-haul traffic.

#### VII. PHOTOGRAPHIC MOSAIC OF WASHINGTON AND VICINITY

17. Having progressed thus far, the Commission called upon the Air Corps to photograph and lay a mosaic of Washington and vicinity. This mosaic covered an area of 36 miles in diameter, with the Capitol as the focal point. In addition to this map, the Air Corps furnished individual prints of every site, thus making it possible to discover particular features of the site that even a close inspection on the ground might not disclose.

#### VIII. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

18. In all, 49 sites were investigated. These 49 sites included every site that was suggested either by citizens associations, owners, real-estate agents, or other persons interested in the development of an airport for the District. Each site was inspected from the air and on the ground. For each site an individual file was prepared containing an airport questionnaire and an aerial photograph.

19. The greater majority were limited in size and not subject to expansion due to surrounding construction or terrain. In some, the cost of grading and filling would have made the development of an airport prohibitively expensive. In every case where a site showed possibilities a preliminary runway layout was made on a photographic enlargement of a contour map section and a rough estimate made of the amount of earth it would be necessary to move to provide a level area of the dimensions desired. Where it was obvious that development costs would be unduly high, the site was eliminated from further consideration.

#### IX. SITES SELECTED FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

20. After reviewing the work of the subcommittee to this point, the Commission selected nine sites as most nearly meeting the requirements, and directed that estimates be prepared showing the cost of development.

21. These nine sites are listed below without priority of choice:

Washington-Hoover Airport, Va.

Gravelly Point, Va.

Hybla Valley, Va.

Fort Hunt, Va.

Suitland, Md.

Forestville, Md.

Oakland, Md.

Silver Hill, Md.

Camp Springs, Md.

These sites the Commission inspected.

## X. FINAL INVESTIGATION

22. The subcommittee then caused to be prepared photographic enlargements of a contour map of each site as well as aerial photographs measuring 18 by 24 inches. On each of these enlargements the most advantageous runway lay-out, eliminating as much as possible expensive grading and filling by taking full advantage of level areas and natural drainage, was superimposed. Where hazards existed, either constructional or natural, the take-off and glide angle of large transports was plotted, showing dangerous areas and the directions toward which take-off and from which a landing was difficult if not dangerous. For these data the subcommittee again consulted the Bureau of Air Commerce, which agency was in the process of developing some extremely illuminating and interesting information on accident rates and performance of aircraft. The Matériel Division of the Army Air Corps also submitted data of value.

23. Abstracts of costs were then prepared covering each site. Due to the confidential nature of the study, the estimates for land costs were approximations, but later developments indicate that these approximations were reasonably accurate. Runway and building and other costs are based on standard local prices, so may be assumed to be reasonably correct in the absence of detailed drawings and specifications.

The totals are listed below:

Washington-Hoover Airport, Va., 219 $\frac{1}{4}$ acres.....	\$4, 672, 000
Gravelly Point, Va. (approximate), 500 acres.....	4, 746, 000
Hybla Valley, Va., 2,000 acres.....	3, 396, 250
Fort Hunt, Va., 1,800 acres.....	4, 653, 750
Suitland, Md., 2,000 acres.....	5, 619, 125
Forestville, Md., 2,000 acres.....	5, 392, 000
Oakland, Md., 2,000 acres.....	5, 556, 875
Silver Hill, Md., 1,500 acres.....	5, 048, 125
Camp Springs, Md., 1,900 acres.....	3, 286, 250

25. The disparity of costs is attributed to the fact that, with the exception of Gravelly Point, Hybla Valley, and Camp Springs, each site is in an area of either industrial or residential development. A comparison of acreage will also disclose the high cost, for benefits gained, of several sites.

## XI. SELECTION OF THREE SITES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGENDA

26. In accordance with the agenda, the Commission as a whole selected three sites from which a final choice was to be made. However, prior to making this choice and recommending any one of the three, it was decided to secure the suggestions and opinions of a number of air-line operators and persons similarly interested, as well as some other witnesses who had expressed a desire to be heard. A number of witnesses were heard and their testimony well covered the scope of the study.

27. It was also believed advisable to gain all possible information relative to management and costs of maintaining and operating an airport.

28. The Commission wishes to express its appreciation to the following named gentlemen, managers of the Nation's leading air-

ports, for the excellent cooperation they afforded in the study of this phase of the Commission's investigations:

Richard Aldworth, superintendent, Newark Airport.

Ralph W. Page, manager, Lambert-St. Louis Municipal Airport.

John J. McLean, airport manager, Allegheny County (Pa.) Municipal Airport.

John A. Casey, superintendent, Chicago Municipal Airport.

John Berry, Commissioner of Airports, Cleveland Municipal Airport.

Albert L. Edson, airport superintendent, Boston Municipal Airport.

29. It was found that there is no fixed policy in management, charges, nor control of the several airports. It did find, however, that the income is generally only sufficient to care for ordinary operating and maintenance expenses and in no case sufficient to pay off the bonded indebtedness and interest.

30. The benefits that are derived from a well-operated airport are indirect and intangible. It is the Commission's confident opinion that while this situation may continue for some years, major airports may eventually become self-sustaining.

## XII. SELECTION OF THE SITE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIRPORT

31. The three sites selected for further consideration were Washington-Hoover Airport, Va., Gravelly Point, Va., and Camp Springs, Md.

32. Washington-Hoover at best, if the land now belonging to the Department of Agriculture's Experimental Farms and a fill in the boundary channel were included, could not exceed 219½ acres. In addition, it lies at the bottom of a hill, and on the southeast is an industrial area. To the west also are the Arlington radio towers, the tops of which are 800 feet above the field. Not far to the northeast is the Washington Monument. The field has been flooded under periods of unusual high water and is subject to river fogs. To overcome flooding would require a considerable fill. Five-thousand-foot runways are not possible in all directions.

33. Statistics indicate that many accidents occur on the airports in motor failure on take-off. Motor failures occur as an average 40 seconds after take-off has begun from a dead stop. It has also been demonstrated that 5,000 feet is the minimum allowable distance to bring the plane to a safe stop from the point of start if a motor fails after 40 seconds.

34. Large planes are also landed under power; that is, the motors are never completely throttled until the plane is but a few feet from the ground. If at any time during the approach glide a motor fails, it results in a "short" landing which in the case of Washington-Hoover Airport would be fatal in view of the surrounding obstacles and the limited area of the field. In addition, the hills, radio towers, Monument, and other obstacles surrounding the airport make an approach under conditions of bad weather hazardous. Certainly, Washington-Hoover Airport does not fulfill any of the basic requirements, except its proximity to the city, and, as the Commission has previously stated, the safety factor should be stressed at the expense of the convenience factor.

35. The Commission feels that the efforts of the owners of Washington-Hoover constantly to improve the facilities at that airport in the interests of safety are worthy of hearty commendation of all concerned. It is greatly to be regretted that due to the rapid development of aviation and limitations of the possible expansion of Washington-Hoover Field, the Commission, in the interests of safety of air transportation at all times and under all conditions cannot favorably consider this airport, although so favorably situated to facilitate travel to and from the city, as capable of meeting modern airport requirements.

36. In the case of Gravelly Point, it is proposed to develop a site by fill. The Commission is of the opinion that the general experience in similar developments is an excellent indication of what may be expected in the present instance.

37. Any fill, unless built up with carefully selected materials at a very high cost, requires years to settle sufficiently to provide a good base for the purpose intended. Thus, it believes that construction could not be started until at least 2 years after the fill at Gravelly Point was completed. Further, similar objections raised with reference to Washington-Hoover have application here, except that the available area would consist of 500 acres.

38. In both developments the cost would be extremely high per acre, and since the bill directed the Commission to " \* \* \* select such a site with due regard to the cost of its acquisition and development \* \* \* ", it is the opinion of the Commission that all these considerations and the further danger inherent in heavy operating schedules at both the Naval Air Station, Anacostia, and Bolling Field warrant the elimination from favorable consideration for use at all times, or under all conditions, of both Washington-Hoover and Gravelly Point.

39. In harmony with the opinions of the experts who gave the Commission the benefit of their experience, the Commission found that the site at Camp Springs, Md., most nearly met the requirements for a site for a modern airport for the District of Columbia.

40. Camp Springs is on some of the highest ground in the vicinity; thus it offers excellent drainage as well as being free from river fogs. It is the largest extent of level high ground within miles of Washington, thus reducing to a minimum the grading and filling necessary in the development of the airport and as a consequence the ultimate cost. Five-thousand-foot runways can be developed and constructed immediately, with expansion possibilities of at least 1 mile in the east and west directions and 2 miles in the north and south directions at relatively small cost.

41. The surrounding territory is free of industrial and residential development as well as natural hazards, more so than any other site inspected, thus making its safety factor for blind landings very high.

42. The land is relatively undeveloped, consisting for the most part of scrub timber, or young growth, thus reducing the cost below sur-

rounding land that is now under cultivation. It is accessible to the city on good roads and within 10.2 miles of the Willard Hotel. All facilities are available or can be made available without undue cost except railroad connections which latter the Commission does not believe to be essential.

### XIII. OPTIONS

43. Options have been secured on most of the parcels of land comprising the site. Included in the area is a small tract of land owned by the Bureau of Standards which would be required in the development of the site.

### XIV. RECOMMENDATIONS

44. The Commission recommends that the site at Camp Springs be selected as the location for the District of Columbia Airport and that a bill be prepared and enacted, authorizing the project; that the necessary funds be appropriated at the earliest possible moment to carry into effect the recommendations of the Commission to establish a modern airport for the District of Columbia.

45. The Commission urges that conclusive action be not delayed, as the continued use of the present airport is, in the frank opinion of the members, inviting disaster.

46. The Commission also recommends that in preparing the bills authorizing and appropriating for the project that provision be made for the construction of a suitable express highway from the airport to the bridge over the Anacostia River.

47. There was testimony before the Commission to the effect that in addition to an airport such as was contemplated by the act creating the Commission an auxiliary airport would prove advantageous.

### XV. RECORDS OF THE COMMISSION

48. All the records prepared by the subcommittee and the Commission are available for official inspection and research in the office of the chairman of the subcommittee, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, Air Corps, Chief of the Air Corps.

### XIV. CONCLUSION

49. The Commission, having made its study, found and recommended, in accordance with the provisions of the act authorizing it, closes its report with the urgent recommendation that in the interests of aviation and in order that there may be available at the District of Columbia the most modern and best air communication and transportation service, its recommendations be accepted.

50. The establishment of such ground facilities and air-transportation service will serve to attract the attention of the world, and should

contribute to national unity and leadership and international peace through closer and more frequent good-will contacts.

WILLIAM H. KING, *Senator from Utah,*  
*Chairman, District of Columbia*  
*Airport Commission.*

ROYAL S. COPELAND,  
*Senator from New York.*

WARREN R. AUSTIN, *Senator from Vermont.*

MARY T. NORTON,  
*Representative from New Jersey.*

W. STERLING COLE,  
*Representative from New York.*

JACK NICHOLS,  
*Representative from Oklahoma.*

FREDERIC A. DELANO,  
*Chairman, National Capital Park*  
*and Planning Commission.*

DANIEL I. SULTAN,  
*Colonel, Engineer Corps.*

O. WESTOVER,  
*Major General, Air Corps,*  
*Chief of the Air Corps.*

JULY 9, 1937.

→ 3/3/42

Kate:

Mrs. Brady said  
Mr. Foster gave her  
this for her confidential  
files before the  
Army reorganization  
was given to the  
Press. She now  
wants us to file  
it in our confidential  
files. E.P. —

[CF;War]

ATT. 2/26/42

file PSF L. F. War 7 3/3/42.

February 26, 1942

Dear Harry:

x161

I am quite willing to approve this Order, which you and General Marshall have worked over so carefully, in so far as it concerns the reorganization of the Army. I am sure that is a good thing to do.

I wish, however, that the wording of Paragraph 6 would be rephrased to make it very clear that the Commander-in-Chief exercises his command function in relation to strategy, tactics and operations directly through the Chief of Staff. You, as Secretary of War, apart from your administrative responsibilities, would, of course, advise me on military matters.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D Roosevelt

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War. x25

HLH/lmb

x25-T  
x285-b  
x773  
x25-U

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - -

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND  
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354, 77th Congress), and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Army of the United States is reorganized to provide under the Chief of Staff a ground force, under a Commanding-General, Army Ground Forces; an air force, under a Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and a service of supply command, under a Commanding General, Services of Supply; and such overseas departments, task forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as the Secretary of War may find to be necessary for the national security.

2. The functions, duties, and powers of the chiefs of the following-named branches of the Army of the United States are transferred to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and

Coast Artillery Corps (except those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

3. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) and of the Chief of the Air Corps are transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

4. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

5. Any officers holding offices the functions, duties, and powers of which are transferred by this order shall be reassigned to suitable duties but shall continue to hold their respective offices until vacated.

6. The Secretary of War is authorized and directed to prescribe such functions, duties, and powers of the commanders of the various forces and commands of the Army of the United States and the agencies of the War Department and to issue from time to time such detailed instructions regarding personnel, funds, records, property, routing of correspondence, and other matters as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order.

7. This order shall become effective on March 9, 1942, and shall remain in force during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February , 1942.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I THINK THIS LETTER TO STIMSON IS  
WHAT THIS REQUIRES. I SUGGEST THE  
EXECUTIVE ORDER BE RETURNED TO HIM FOR  
REDRAFTING.



HARRY L. HOPKINS x4117



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.

February 21, 1942.

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting a proposed Executive order entitled "Reorganization of the Army of the United States and Transfer of Functions within the War Department".

The proposed order, presented by the Secretary of War and forwarded for my consideration by the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget this date, has my approval as to form and legality.

For the sake of expedition I am transmitting the proposed order to you direct instead of through the Division of the Federal Register.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Francis B. Biddle".

Attorney General.

FEB 21 1942

My dear Mr. Attorney General:

Herewith is the draft, as revised as to form in this office, of a proposed Executive Order, presented by the Secretary of War, entitled "Reorganization of the Army of the United States and Transfer of Functions Within the War Department".

The purpose of the order is explained in the communication of the Secretary of War, who states that all principle War Department agencies and Mr. Donald Nelson and Lieutenant General Knudsen have concurred in the desirability of the proposed reorganization.

The revised form of order has been informally approved by a representative of the War Department, and has my approval.

Very truly yours,

/s/ HAROLD D. SMITH

Director.

The Honorable,

The Attorney General.

Enclosures.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1942.

Honorable Harold D. Smith,  
Director, Bureau of the Budget,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Smith:


There is enclosed, herewith, a self-explanatory letter for signature by the Secretary of War to the President transmitting a Military Order, a copy of which is also enclosed with the request for approval by the President.

Although it is impossible to estimate the immediate effect on expenditures, there is every reason to believe that the reorganization of the War Department, proposed in the enclosed papers, will eventually result in a material savings in War Department appropriations.

The Secretary of War has approved the proposed reorganization of the War Department.

After action by your office and by the Attorney General, it is requested that these papers be returned to this office for presentation to the President.

Sincerely yours,

  
Chief of Staff.

2 Encl.  
Ltr for the President  
Military Order

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**DECLASSIFIED**

**DOD DIR.** 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-24-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

Approved by D. T. ...  
DUBLIN, I.  
DOW ... 5200.9 (S/P/140)  
2-20-42

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In order to more effectively execute the War Department's functions in winning this war, a reorganization within the War Department is believed essential.

It is proposed to provide the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff with an effective planning staff, generally similar to the organization of the War Department General Staff originally intended by Secretary of War Elihu Root, but including the proper balance of air and ground components. Such a staff is necessary for the proper training and control of the air-ground fighting teams in the Army.

It is proposed to free the Chief of Staff of the necessity to coordinate a vast amount of internal detail by decentralizing authority and responsibility for all zone of interior functions to the commanders of the three fundamental activities--air forces, ground forces and common supply and service agencies. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, will be charged with the responsibility to provide and maintain air equipment and trained organizations for combat operations, which is substantially his present function. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, will be charged with the responsibility to provide trained and equipped organizations for combat operations. Portions of this responsibility are now distributed between the War Department General Staff, General Headquarters, and the chiefs of the ground arms. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will provide the services and supplies which are common to both ground and air forces, but the services and supplies peculiar to the Air Force will be provided by the Materiel Command of the Army Air Forces. The offices of the chiefs of certain separate arms, Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps and Air Corps will be eliminated, and the functions of those chiefs in respect to the development of materiel and training will be performed by the commanders of the units which will eventually do the fighting. This elimination of the chiefs of certain separate arms will further the effort now being made throughout the Army to remove all emphasis on the separate branch and place it upon the coordinated functioning of the combined arms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


**CONFIDENTIAL**

These actions will reduce the size and clarify the responsibilities of the War Department General Staff and will assure more rapid and properly considered action by the War Department. The Chief of Staff, having delegated to the respective Commanders of the Army Air Forces, the Ground Forces and the Services of Supply, the function of coordinating internal detail, will be freed to devote his energies to the conduct of the war through his activities as one of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and as an advisor to the President and Secretary of War.

All principal War Department agencies and Mr. Donald Nelson and Lieutenant General Knudsen have concurred in the desirability of this reorganization.

The enclosed Executive Order authorizes the desired reorganization. Your approval is requested.

Respectfully yours,



Secretary of War.

Encl.

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
**DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)**

Date- 2-24-59


Signature- Carl L. Spicer

**CONFIDENTIAL**


# ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY



# ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY



# ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY GROUND FORCES



# ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES




CHART C (2/20/42)

# ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY




Chart D  
2/20/42

- (a) Acts as Comptroller for the War Department.
- (b) Requirements, programs, resources, procurement planning, including consolidation of Air Force requirements with other requirements.
- (c) Includes Air requirements.
- (d) Each operating division is responsible for the training of personnel pertaining to its functions.
- (e) Reports direct to Secretary of War for Civil functions.
- (f) Design, development, purchase, production, storage, issue, maintenance.

- (g) Includes Ports of Embarkation and regulating and reconignment stations; liaison with Air Force for assignment of space.
- (h) Includes present supply functions of CAC.
- (i) Field agents of the Operating Divisions on designated functions.
- (j) Personnel, classification, assignment, allotments; National Guard Bureau; Reserve and ROTC affairs.
- (k) Deals directly with Secretary of War regarding court-martials and certain legal matters.