STUDY FOR
SYSTEM OF AIRPORTS
WASHINGTON AND ENVIRONS
NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION
SCALE OF MILES
DEC. 1928
March 13, 1942

Dear Harry:

I should like to see the schedule of production and proposed deliveries based on my letter to you of January 3, by months. What I am anxious to get is the estimated monthly delivery of these airplanes.

Incidentally, are there adequate funds to let contracts for all of these items and how many of each item have actually been contracted for?

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/mb

x249 official
x526
March 14, 1942

Dear Judge:

Thanks very much for your note of March twelfth, enclosing letter from C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, with reference to the Northwest Airlines matter.

I take it for granted, of course, that Mr. Howe now understands that your and my efforts were merely to avoid any further embarrassment than what had already been caused by the Merry-Go-Round article.

Sincerely yours,

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

Honorable Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War,
Washington, D.C.
March 12th, 1942.

Memorandum for Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre:

Attached is a copy of a letter which I have just received from C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply. This concerns the incident of a week or so ago when the Northwest Airlines were stopped on an air survey in western Canada.

Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War.

rpp:lm
Encs-
3/9/42-let.
fr. C. D. Howe
Considerable embarrassment has been caused to my Government and to myself by radio broadcasts and press articles sponsored by Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, of which the enclosed extract from the Detroit Free Press of March 7th is a sample. There would seem to be no doubt that the information reaches Pearson and Allen direct from the office of Northwest Airlines via Mr. Croll Hunter, President.

Civilian flying across international boundaries is covered by international agreement, which provides that application from a citizen of one country to fly in the other must come from the civil aeronautics authority of the country in which the applicant is resident to the authority in the other country, via the State Department. No such application from Northwest Airlines has been received in Canada.

Without notice of any kind, a civilian plane of Northwest Airlines, loaded with radio equipment and personnel, appeared in Winnipeg, and announced its intention to set up radio facilities between Edmonton, Alberta, and Fairbanks, Alaska, and to establish its own route. I may point out that if civilian flying is closely regulated in Canada, use of radio equipment is still more closely regulated. In this case, no application had been made to our communications authority for allocation of wave length. In the
circumstances, the Northwest Airlines plane was grounded at Edmonton, pending receipt of an application for the necessary permits.

I may point out that the so-called "new air route over Canadian prairies" is nothing of the kind. Regular service has been in operation for several years from Lethbridge to Edmonton by Trans-Canada Air Lines, and from Edmonton to White Horse by Yukon Southern Air Transport Limited, and Pan American Alaska service extends the route from White Horse into Alaska. Pan American Airways are also operating a second service from Seattle to Fairbanks, Alaska, over Canadian territory and using part of this route under permit from the Canadian Government. Modern facilities, in the way of airports, radio beams and radio telephone facilities, have been established by the Canadian Government for the purpose of providing a safe route for U. S. army operations, this at the request of the Canadian Army through the U.S.-Canadian Joint Defense Board. I may say that there has never been an accident with the civilian services operating these two routes, although army planes have been lost, due to lack of familiarity with the difficult flying conditions that maintain over this route.

Solely for the purpose of avoiding an international misunderstanding, I personally called on Brigadier General Olds at his office on Monday, March 2nd, when I obtained my first intimation as to what was contemplated, and immediately gave my permission for Northwest Airlines to survey the route. At the same time, I registered a vigorous protest at the manner in which Brigadier General Olds had handled the situation, and at the choice of Northwest Airlines to perform a service that could have been handled better either by Pan American Airways or the Canadian companies, all of whom are well established in the territory.
Canada, as you know, has granted the widest latitude to U.S. Army planes flying over Canada. I suggest, however, that, in the matter of civilian planes, Canada may reasonably expect international agreements to be observed, subject to advice from U.S. Army authorities that they wish to set aside such agreements as a matter of emergency. I may say that we have not up to this time received any communication whatever from your Civil Aeronautics Authority in the matter of Northwest Airlines, nor have we received an application to fly in Canada from that company direct.

I sincerely trust that the cordial relations that have maintained between the U.S. Army and my own Department of Munitions and Supply, which has control as well of civil aviation in Canada, will not be disturbed by this unfortunate incident. Canada is accepting the entry of Northwest Airlines as an operator over its route to Alaska with deep misgivings, in order to avoid the continuation of a possible cause for friction, and will continue to co-operate in bringing facilities on the route up to any standard desired by U.S. Army authorities, and in return it asks to be protected against unfavourable publicity in the United States.

As I note that Secretary Marvin MacIntyre has interested himself in this situation, I will appreciate the favour if you will pass this letter on to him after it has received your attention.

With warm regards,

Yours truly,

/s/ C. D. Howe

R. P. Patterson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of War,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

(Via diplomatic pouch.)
Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen

Detroit Free Press - March 7

Washington, March 6--Here is the inside story on how the Army finally got permission to improve and develop a new short-cut air route over the prairies of Canada to Alaska.

Last Sunday night, Senator Scott Lucas, of Illinois, telephoned to Under-secretary of War Robert Patterson.

"If the Army doesn't act on this immediately," Senator Lucas said, "I'm going to start a Senate investigation within 24 to 48 hours. It's about time we knew whether the Canadians were with us or not. I'm a friend of the President's and a strong administration supporter, but if he doesn't act, the Senate is going to".

The Senator from Illinois was referring to the fact that two days before, a Northwest Airlines plane had left to pioneer the new air route over Canadian prairies, had been stopped by Canadian officials, impounded for 48 hours and then forced to return to the United States.

Lucas's threat was sufficient. Early next morning, White House Secretary Marvin MacIntyre phoned him to "hold his horses," that everything would be OK.

A few hours later, the Northwest Airlines plane flew back to Canada to begin setting up ground crews, radio equipment, and technicians, not for a commercial route but on behalf of the Army.

CANADIAN YANKEE

The man who has caused countless delays to the Army in getting a commercial airline to pioneer this route is C. D. Howe, Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, and Acting Minister of Transport.

C. D. Howe is a native American, born in Waltham, Mass., and educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Later he migrated to Canada and applied his New England shrewdness to building grain elevators and pulp mills. Today he and Premier Mackenzie King are the two strong men of Canada.

Howe has no objection to the U. S. Army flying over Canada, but like a good many U. S.-British businessmen he is looking beyond the war. And he seems adamant against a U. S. commercial airline getting a foothold over any part of Canadian territory—especially a route which after the war will be the short-cut over Alaska to Asia. And he haggled for several weeks, while precious time passed, vital to the strengthening of Alaska.
On the other hand, the Army finds that commercial airlines, accustomed to flying under winter conditions, can develop air routes quickly and efficiently permitting the Army to concentrate on other things. That is why Northwest Airlines finally will do the job for the Army.

NOTE: On the American side of the negotiations, the Air Corps got only the most dignified and circumspect help from General Stanley Embick, a coast artilleryman, who feels toward the Army's ground forces as the Admirals do toward the battleship.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of the Under Secretary
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

March 26, 1942

Honorable Jesse Jones,
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jesse:

I spoke to General Marshall concerning the appointment of a military governor in the Virgin Islands. He consulted the Judge Advocate General of the Army. The Judge Advocate General has advised that a civil governor may not lawfully be transformed into a military governor. If an invasion should occur or if there should be imminent danger of invasion, the civil governor may call upon the commander of the armed forces to place the islands under martial law, and in that event the military commander becomes more or less the military governor. The Judge Advocate General says further that Congress might pass a statute setting up a military governor in the islands, and in that case the civil governor might be appointed a brigadier general (subject to confirmation by the Senate) and detailed as military governor.

Under the circumstances, it seems clear that there is no power at the present time to appoint the civil governor to be military governor also.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Robert P. Patterson

Under Secretary of War

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 2-24-59

Signature - Carl F. Scear
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. M. H. McINTYRE

Reference attached letter from Gene Vidal, attention is invited to the fact that at the present time the Army Air Forces has on order something over 13,000 training airplanes and several hundred transports all of which are largely of wooden construction. There are also 1,000 gliders, 9- and 15-place, being built of wood and 26,000 wooden propellers.

Up to the present time, the Air Forces has been reluctant to go to wooden construction for high performance combat type aircraft. As a matter of fact, even in training types, numerous disappointments have occurred such as were encountered in the attempt of Mr. Vidal to build a basic trainer XBT-11 out of wood. After 23 months from contract delivery date, the static test article of this aircraft had failed to pass the normal static tests demanded of this type of aircraft.

Every attempt is being made to substitute wood for metal in order to alleviate the shortage of this critical material, and progress is believed to be as fast as the more advanced knowledge of the application of wood to aircraft construction will allow.
Dear Mac;

Last week the Planning Division of the WPB informed me that recent accurate surveys indicated conclusively that due to shortage of aluminum production facilities the President's aircraft program would be reduced by at least 55,000 planes. While the reports of this division recommended quick substitution where most practical of molded plywood for aluminum, concern was expressed over the past and present attitude of Army and Navy officials. It was known that large aircraft manufacturers have been willing to substitute plywood for aluminum but were discouraged by the military services.

It is difficult to understand this attitude since plywood in aircraft is not new in this country. Until a few years ago when the material was replaced by metal the fastest planes in the US were plywood such as the Lockheeds, and even today planes such as the Beechcrafts in plywood are being purchased by the Army. Abroad, England, Russia, Italy, Japan, Canada and smaller countries have not only plywood training planes but many of their best combat planes are partly or entirely of plywood construction. No Allied nation would object to US airplane parts of this material.

While foreign countries currently employ the old time method of building plywood planes by bending, gluing and nailing flat panel material similar to forming and riveting sheet aluminum, the molding of plastic treated veneer into curved reinforced aircraft structures is a purely American development. It is as important to this field as casting and the use of presses and dies is to the metal art.

A plywood built-up airplane is a satisfactory substitute for one in metal; however, both types of construction are slow, complicated and expensive compared to the so-called molded plastic plywood process. Briefly, this more recent development is a method by which plastic treated veneers placed over inexpensive slotted wooden forms are molded under heat and fluid pressure in such a manner as to weld and shape in a single cooking operation a completely reinforced structure such as a fuselage.

This fluid pressure structural molding has been developed by our company during a four year period of designing, experimenting and testing and we now have eight plants in operation or production in the US and Canada. Small and large plane metal fuselages, wings and other parts have been duplicated and final
tests have demonstrated that the structures are equal to or
greater in strength than the equivalent weight in metal.
Also, since the thicker skin surfaces are smoother and
more rigid faster speeds and lower landing performances
have been obtained.

As assurance that this process and its material is past
the experimental stage, it may be mentioned that our com­
panies after satisfactory tests have on order from larger
manufacturers, fuselages, wings, tail assemblies and bomber
noses, nacelles, fillets, bomb doors, flaps, wing tips,
sailors, etc. Under construction is a Navy Transport
Glider, an Army converted Basic Trainer and a two motored
transition plane. A trainer type plane, a radio controlled
plane and a two motored plane each with molded wings,
fuselage, etc are flying. Fuselages for the small Ercooupe
and the two motored Anson have been load and flight tested.

For aircraft the expansion of this field presents fewer
problems than has the expansion of the metal working plants
which require presses, dies, jigs, tools, etc as well as a
greater ratio of skilled labor. Furniture, piano and other
out-of-luck wood working plants are available with the equip­
ment and labor, lacking only the easily obtainable used
pressure tanks for molding. The materials, wood and plastic,
are plentiful.

Because of the design and engineering involved, an expanded
program would follow two courses; one, the duplication at
once of certain parts for existing aircraft for immediate
relief, the other, duplicating after longer design periods
certain complete aircraft.

Naturally, this situation and problem has been studied by
myself and our group for some time and I hope that I may be
given an opportunity to discuss the subject with the proper
official. However, if the individual hasn't sufficient au­
thority to handle the Army-Navy attitude, progress may be
slow.

Sincerely,

Geoff Vidal

Wardman Park Hotel
Washington, DC
RECEIPT FOR SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

SUBJECT: Leir frn Gene Vidal

Receipt is acknowledged of Leir fr HH Arnold for
the Mr. M. H. McIntyre , subject
__________________________
as above

dated 3-28-42

__________________________
Officer

__________________________
Rank

__________________________
Office

NOTE: To be accomplished and returned to the Air Adjutant General.

AAF-3
W-4759, A. C.

Air AG 470.1 (6)
MEMORANDUM for Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,
The White House:

Dear McIntyre:

The other day Colonel Taylor gave me your tip-off to the effect that there was a growing criticism as to the number of Army Generals around Washington. This moves me to the following outline of the situation:

In 1917-18 there were in Washington some 6,000 officers. At Chaumont, General Pershing's Headquarters, there were approximately 800 officers, and at Tours, General Harbord's S.O.S Headquarters, about 2,000 officers. These included a great many general officers, but they were scattered among these widely separated places.

Today, due to the fact that we have a number of overseas theatres and are engaged in a colossal program of military material for our Allies, all of the responsibilities of the War Department of the first World War, and most of those of General Pershing at Chaumont and General Harbord at Tours have all centered here. Furthermore, we are involved in a vast and complicated air expansion for which the old AEF had no counterpart.

This means a large number of officers with very high and responsible positions. Almost without exception, the officers of the line of the Army - air and ground - wish to get out of Washington. They feel that their advancement is penalized, which it is, by staying here. For example, I have three Assistant Chiefs of Staff with the rank of Brigadier General, all of whom would be Major Generals and division commanders were they not held on duty here.

All of these men will do their duty without regard to rank, but for two reasons, failure to promote is against the public interest. In the first place, promotion gives seniority, which permits me to place a junior, usually a younger man, in a position of control. Otherwise, I must take a senior, who
may be on the side of mediocrity, or I have to relieve everybody senior to the junior officer who I think should be the head man. The other reason is that when an officer has a tremendous responsibility, for thousands of men or hundreds of millions or maybe billions of dollars, and is working about fourteen hours a day, it is only human that the individual should feel that he is receiving very poor treatment when he is denied a promotion - usually that of brigadier general - which would give him prestige and therefore assist him in his job, and which literally does not cost the Government a nickel.
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

1. Referring to Governor Lehman's wire of April 6th, 1942, relative to rumors that the War Department might withdraw rifles from State Guards of New York, attached is a draft of a reply for your signature.

BREHON SOMERVELL,
Lieut. General, Commanding.

Incl.
Draft of reply.
Honor~ole Herbert H. Lehman,
Governor, State of New York,
Albany, New York.

Dear Governor Lehman:

Referring to your wire of April 6, 1942, regarding the withdrawal of rifles from State Guards of New York by the War Department, I understand that General Marshall has written you as follows:

"While the source of such rumors is not known, the fact is that a decision has been made to withdraw these rifles, and instructions relative to their withdrawal were issued to Corps Area Commanders April 2.

The War Department fully appreciates the valuable defense potentialities of the State Guards of all states, including New York. The decision to withdraw these rifles was made with extreme reluctance and only after careful consideration of all factors including the defensive strength of such units. This war, however, can only be won by carrying the war to the enemy. The War Department is now engaged in building a great Federal Army for the purpose of attacking the enemy wherever found. The rapid expansion of this offensive force requires the use of every rifle owned by the Federal Government, including those loaned to the various states last year."

I can assure you that the War Department fully appreciates your problem. In order that some weapons may be made available to you and the Governors of the other states for the purpose of guarding vital installations and maintaining domestic tranquility within the boundaries of the various states, Corps Area Commanders have been directed to replace with shotguns the rifles in the hands of members of the State Guards now on active duty. If desired, additional shotguns for arming of State Guards will be loaned to the states as they become available from production."

I feel sure that the Guard will be able to perform its duties equally satisfactorily with the shotguns which the War Department advises it will place in your hands.

Sincerely,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
BRIGADIER GENERAL BREHON B. SOMERVELL

Will you be good enough to prepare a reply to the enclosed telegram from Governor Lehman for my signature and let me have it back by one o'clock tomorrow? Also, will you stand ready to come to the White House at two o'clock in case Governor Lehman wants to see you?

F. D. R.

Telegram from Hon. Herbert H. Lehman, Albany, N.Y., 4/6/42, to the President, in re rumors that Army might take from the New York State Guard the rifles with which they are equipped.
Please send to General Somervell by land the first thing this morning.

G.T.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
BRIGADIER GENERAL BREHON B. SOMERVELL

Will you be good enough to prepare a reply to the enclosed telegram from Governor Lehman for my signature and let me have it back by one o'clock tomorrow? Also, will you stand ready to come to the White House at two o'clock in case Governor Lehman wants to see you?

F. D. R.
The White House
Washington

C Albany NY 1210 pm April 6 1942

The President

The White House

Referring to our telephone conversation I will be delighted to lunch with you tomorrow Tuesday at one p.m. stop So that you may be familiar with the matter I wish to discuss with you I repeat letter which I wrote to General Marshall on March 30th. "My dear General Marshall: Paragraph

I have heard rumors that possibly the army might take from the New York state guard the rifles with which we are equipped period even though I do not credit this rumor I feel that I should lay my views before you period Paragraph

To take from the New York state guard its rifles would I fear result in almost complete destruction of the guard. It would be almost impossible in my opinion to keep the men together or to maintain their morale (comma), since they would feel that there was nothing effective that they could do in an emergency.

The state guard, which as you know was organized nearly eighteen months ago, has grown into a very useful auxiliary force of the United States army. We have seventeen thousand officers and men in twenty-two regiments,
WITH UNITS IN VIRTUALLY EVERY LARGE COMMUNITY OF THE STATE.
THE STATE HAS SPENT A VERY LARGE SUM OF MONEY IN UNIFORMING
AND EQUIPPING THESE MEN. IT ALSO HAS APPROPRIATED ONE MILLION
Dollars TO GIVE EVERY UNIT FIELD SERVICE THIS SUMMER EITHER
AT CAMP SMITH OR AT FORT ONTARIO. THE STATE HAS WILLINGLY MADE
THESE APPROPRIATIONS WHICH NOW AGGREGATE ABOUT $2,500,000 IN
THE CONVICTION THAT THE STATE GUARD WOULD NOT ONLY ADD TO THE
SECURITY OF THE STATE BUT OF THE NATION AS A WHOLE. THE STATE
GUARD HAS LEARNED A LOT IN THE YEAR AND A HALF OF ITS TRAINING.
I BELIEVE IT IS NOW READY TO RENDER IMPORTANT PROTECTIVE SERVICE
SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE HOME GUARD IN ENGLAND. ENLISTED MEN AND
OFFICERS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GIVE FREELY OF THEIR TIME AND
EFFORT, WITHOUT COMPENSATION, IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WERE REN-
DERING PATRIOTIC AND USEFUL SERVICE. WE HAVE WORKED IN THE
CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH GENERAL PHILLIPSON, SECOND CORPS AREA
COMMANDER, WHO I BELIEVE CAN GIVE YOU AN ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE
OF THE STATE GUARD. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFERENCES WITH GENERAL
PHILLIPSON AND WE HAVE WORKED OUT PLANS OF FULL COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE STATE GUARD IN THE EVENT
OF ANY EMERGENCY.
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

These plans contemplate that the state guard shall serve as a fighting unit under the superior command of the Second Corps Area Commander.

I am convinced that in the present situation the New York State Guard in addition to its usual duties can render very useful, auxiliary combat or protective service, thus relieving our regular forces at least to some extent.

The New York State area is of course the most vital and one of the most vulnerable in the country. Whatever the situation may be in other parts of the country I am convinced that in the interest of national security everything should be done to maintain and possibly to increase the strength and efficiency of the State Guard in this State.

As I have said I doubt very much whether there is any truth whatsoever in the rumor but I feel it my duty to lay my views before you in the event that there has been any thought of taking away the rifles of the State Guard. Such action would of course make the State Guard nearly powerless and would probably lead to its virtual dissolution. Very sincerely yours (signed) Herbert H. Lehman.

Herbert H. Lehman.
Honorable Herbert H. Lehman,
Governor of New York,
Albany, N. Y.

My dear Governor Lehman:

Your letter of March 30th relative to rumors that the War Department might withdraw rifles from the State Guard of New York has been received.

While the source of such rumors is not known, the fact is that a decision has been made to withdraw these rifles and instructions relative to their withdrawal were issued to four Area Commanders April 2nd.

The War Department fully appreciates the valuable defense potentialities of the State Guards of all States including New York. The decision to withdraw these rifles was made with extreme reluctance and only after careful consideration of all factors, including the defensive strength of such units. This war, however, can only be won by carrying the war to the enemy. The War Department is now engaged in building a great Federal army for the purpose of attacking the enemy wherever found. The rapid expansion of this offensive force requires the use of every rifle owned by the Federal Government including those loaned to the various States last year.

I can assure you that the War Department fully appreciates your problem. In order that some weapons may be made available to you and the Governors of the other States for the purpose of guarding vital installations and maintaining domestic tranquillity within the boundaries of the various States, four Area Commanders have been directed to replace with shotguns the rifles in the hands of members of the State Guard now on active duty. If desired, additional shotguns for arming of the State Guards will be loaned to the States as they become available from production.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY
Acting Chief of Staff

DATE: 2-24-54

Signature: Carl S. Spetz
The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the desire expressed in your letter of January 4, 1942, I am transmitting herewith a chart showing the availability of all military items under the Moscow Protocol as of March 31, 1942, and the availability of such items as estimated for the months of April, May and June of 1942.

It will be noted that the monthly assignments of certain items such as Toluol are quite large. These assignments were necessary, however, in order to meet requirements under the Protocol by June. It is felt that such heavy assignments can not be sustained beyond June.

Let me assure you again of the fact that the War Department is well aware of the importance of furnishing munitions to the U. S. S. R. and is making every effort to meet the requirements called for by the Protocol.

 Faithfully yours,

Secretary of War

[Signature]

Incl:
2 cys sched.
WD assign. to
USSR, 4/15/42.

Date- 1-31-42

Signature- Rhp
AVAILABILITIES of military items under Moscow Protocol, April 1 to June 30, 1942

**AVAILABILITIES** as used herein designate completed products in U. S. centers of production assigned to U. S. S. R.

**DELIVERIES** to be made to ports of export within 30 days after production.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantities Made Available Oct. 1, '41 to March 31, '42</th>
<th>To Be Made Available April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total to be Made Available by June 30, '42</th>
<th>Required Availability June 30, '42</th>
<th>Balance Due After Protocol June 30, '42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>Medium bombers with armament and ammunition, B-25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>900</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Light bombers with armament and ammunition, A-20</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>900</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pursuits with armament and ammunition, P-40</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>900</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observation with armament and ammunition</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Medium with armament and ammunition</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>2,275</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Light with armament and ammunition</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft Guns complete w/fire control equipment 90mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anti-tank Guns 37mm</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment**
- April availability on light bombers includes 56 signed but not delivered as of 3-31-42.
- Inclusion against Protocol in dispute.
- Twenty-five tanks over Protocol due to increased efforts and production by the Ordnance Dept., thereby permitting the Munitions Assignments Board to assign to U.S.S.R. an excess.
- None available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol Number</th>
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<th>To Be Made Available April</th>
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<th>Total to be Made Available by June 30, '42</th>
<th>Required Availability Under Protocol June 30, '42</th>
<th>Balance Due After June 30, '42</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Truck, 1/2 ton 4x4</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>5,360</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>6,827</td>
<td>22,185</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Deliveries dependent upon Munitions Assignments Board</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>38,657</td>
<td>20,503</td>
<td>12,120</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>85,600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Franklin D. Roosevelt Library</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Telephones, Field</td>
<td>34,223</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>11,777</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Field Telephone Wire (single strand) (mile)</td>
<td>247,464</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>523,464</td>
<td>562,000</td>
<td>38,536</td>
<td>Date- 1-31-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Armor Plate</td>
<td>3,776</td>
<td>2,224</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Signature- RMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Toluol (long ton)</td>
<td>8,320</td>
<td>3,226.6</td>
<td>3,226.6</td>
<td>3,226.8</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>May and June allocation dependent upon WFB. Total shown as &quot;To Be Made Available&quot; is amount planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TNT, (1b.)</td>
<td>10,672,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>24,672,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>960 tons all requested by U.S.S.R. at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Phenol (1b.)</td>
<td>5,847,917</td>
<td>2,088,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,976,000</td>
<td>10,976,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>April, May, and June availability in part dependent on obtaining additional production. This problem no under consideration by WFB and WD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Ethylene Glycol (ton)</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Sodium Bromide (1b)</td>
<td>985,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>2,005,000</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Phosphorus (1b.)</td>
<td>2,912,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,912,000</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Number</td>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Quantities Made Available Oct. 1, '41 to March 31, '42</td>
<td>To Be Made Available</td>
<td>Total to be Made Available by June 30, '42</td>
<td>Required Availability June 30, '42 Under Protocol</td>
<td>Balance Due After June 30, '42</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>Dibutyl-Phthalate (lb.)</td>
<td>2,791,494</td>
<td>1,232,000</td>
<td>560,000 336,000 4,919,000</td>
<td>4,927,506</td>
<td>8,506</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Dimethylaniline (lb.)</td>
<td>912,000</td>
<td>592,000 592,000 592,000 2,688,000</td>
<td>2,688,000</td>
<td>2,688,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>Diphenylamine (lb.)</td>
<td>1,120,000</td>
<td>224,000 336,000 336,000 2,016,000</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Colloxylin (lb.)</td>
<td>5,878,000</td>
<td>1,700,000 1,500,000 180,000 9,258,000</td>
<td>6,048,000</td>
<td>6,048,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>Machine Tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Delivered to continue as rapidly as possible to meet unfulfilled U.S.S.R. requests up to Protocol commitments.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Forging and Pressing Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>Leather (metric ton)</td>
<td>5,064</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,064</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>6,436</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.</td>
<td>Army Shoes (pr.)</td>
<td>1,011,298</td>
<td>326,501 262,201 - 1,600,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>Army Cloth (yds.)</td>
<td>1,395,126</td>
<td>160,250 161,750 183,000 1,900,126</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item No.</td>
<td>Item Description</td>
<td>Quantities Made Available Oct. 1, '41 to March 31, '42</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Total to be Made Available by June 30, '42</td>
<td>Required Availability Under Protocol</td>
<td>Balance Due After June 30, '42</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cars, Scout, M3Al w/o armament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Truck, personnel carrier, M2, w/o armament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sub-machine Gun, Cal. .45</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,109</td>
<td>26,010</td>
<td>24,010</td>
<td>29,010</td>
<td>94,139</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Float, rubber, 6-ton capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>479</td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I approve the enclosed charts and plans but with the distinct proviso that the protocol agreement with Russia be lived up to. Also, the total supplies to be sent to Russia between July first and January first must be at least as great as today and actually increased as much as possible. This does not mean that the total of each item must be the same, so long as the total of all items is greater.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 9 1972

THIS INFORMATION IS HIGHLY SECRET. SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ITS BEING DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS.
### PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Light</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Heavy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Tanks: 45,000

### Anti-Aircraft Guns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90 mm</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 &amp; 40 mm</td>
<td>14,600 (a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total AA and AT Guns: 40,700

### Anti-Tank Guns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 mm</td>
<td>17,000 (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; or 57 mm</td>
<td>8,300 (c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total AA and AT Guns: 42,700

### Self-Propelled Mounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(37 &amp; 40 mm AA Guns S.P.)</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For (37 mm AT Guns S.P.)</td>
<td>2,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3&quot; or 57 mm AT Guns S.P.)</td>
<td>7,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Tanks and Tank Type: 16,523

### Modification Recommended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Light</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Heavy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>10,588</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Tanks: 24,703

### Armored Cars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Tanks: 8,940

### Self-Propelled Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75 mm HOW PK and S.P.</td>
<td>3,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 mm HOW WH and S.P.</td>
<td>5,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm HOW and 4.5&quot; Gun</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Guns: 9,682

---

(a) Includes 3,100 mounted on self-propelled vehicles.
(b) Includes 2,539 mounted on self-propelled vehicles.
(c) Includes 7,241 mounted on self-propelled vehicles.
## REQUIREMENTS 1942 and 1943

TANKS, ARMORED CARS, SELF-PROPELLED MOUNTS

Embodies Recommendations of U.S. and U.K. Tank Committees

Adjusted for Balanced Production Possibilities

### CHART NO. 2

The information in highly secret. Special precautions will be taken to prevent its being disclosed to unauthorized persons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>4,002</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, Aero T-9</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4,038</td>
<td>5,777</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tanks</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,038</td>
<td>5,777</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Production depends on use of light and medium tank chassis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Tanks</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Production depends on use of medium tank chassis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Car, Heavy</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Car, Medium</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Car, Light (Sub-Tank T-9)</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,576</td>
<td>13,576</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Propelled Mount 37mm AT</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>6,906</td>
<td>8,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Propelled Mount 40mm</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Propelled Mount 3rd and 57mm</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>7,241</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>8,009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Propelled Mount 105 mm</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>2,782</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>4,477</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Production depends on use of light and medium tank chassis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>EXPECTED 1942</th>
<th>EXPECTED 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks, Air</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks, Other</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers, Medium</td>
<td>4,795</td>
<td>9,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Includes 450 MK VIII)</td>
<td>(Includes 2,217 MK VII)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Tanks</td>
<td>6,170</td>
<td>6,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Includes Only 1,458 Heavy MK VIII)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Armored Cars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Armored Cars</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Armored Cars</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Propelled at Guns 6 PDR or 57mm</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 PDR on T 32 or Equivalent</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; Gun on Motor Carriage T 35</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I have been hearing some complaints from the Hill and from New York about General Drum's statement creating a "military area" along the East Coast. From what I hear, the German and Italian people up there are in a state of confusion and believe this means another evacuation like that on the West Coast. American citizens with German and Italian names are also worried. I am inclined to think this may have a bad effect on morale.

As I remember the discussion in Cabinet, the Order was intended primarily to give General Drum authority over the dimming of lights along the Eastern seaboard and not ever alien enemies. The control of alien enemies seems to me to be primarily a civilian matter except of course in the case of the Japanese mass evacuation on the Pacific Coast.

Will you make sure that no action is taken by General Drum under this Executive Order in relation to alien enemies without your talking to me first?

I hear the evacuation program on the West Coast is working well.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War.
The President

The White House

My dear Mr. President:

The Secretary of the Navy, by letter of April 25, 1942, informs me that certain Canadian war vessels have been operating under the direction of the United States Navy in the Atlantic and are treated as if they were units of the United States Navy as a part of the Task Forces. The Secretary of the Navy points out that from time to time in the course of their assignments it is found necessary for these vessels to pass through the Panama Canal, and he considers it desirable that the vessels be treated and considered as United States men-of-war so far as the transit is concerned and that Canal tolls be waived. The Secretary requests that I take such action as may be necessary to effect the free passage of these vessels through the Panama Canal.

Since the authority to regulate tolls is vested in the President of the United States, it appears that all that is required is for you to authorize the Governor of the Panama Canal to exempt vessels of allied nations from the payment of tolls when such vessels are operating with the United States forces or under the direction of the United States Navy. Indication of your approval hereon would confer the necessary authority for the passage of such vessels without the payment

MAY 11 1942
of tolls. Approval is recommended.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Robert P. Patterson

Acting Secretary of War

APPROVED:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

May 16, 1943
May 21, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding to you with this letter a memorandum addressed to you and signed by General Marshall and Admiral King.

As you will see, General Marshall and Admiral King recommend the deferral of the completion of the Third set of Locks.

I concur in the recommendations of General Marshall and Admiral King and I recommend that you approve their memorandum.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

The President
The White House

Encl.
Memo-5/21/42-Marshall and King to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Deferment of Completion of Third Locks Project for the Panama Canal.

In view of a recent decision to defer indefinitely the construction of the 60,000 ton battleships, it is believed desirable to consider deferring completion of the Third Locks Project for the Panama Canal. The purposes of this project, which was authorized by the Act approved August 11, 1937, were to provide additional security against complete interruption of traffic, locks of adequate dimensions for the new naval units contemplated, increased traffic capacity to meet estimated commercial requirements and for ultimate conversion of the Canal to the sea-level type without the necessity for closing it to traffic during the conversion period.

This project, now scheduled for completion by 1946, requires high priority for all facilities connected with it, notably shipping space, construction equipment, materials, and skilled labor. Deferment of the construction would permit conservation of effort for more immediate war needs.

Inasmuch as large contracts are pending, decision should be reached as promptly as possible.

The Governor of the Panama Canal should be directed to modify the construction program for the Third Locks Project so as to defer its completion indefinitely, but to continue parts of the Project already commenced which in his judgment should be completed now, or which may be carried to completion without the diversion of critical facilities from more immediate war needs.

Approval of the course of action outlined above is recommended.

(Signed) E. J. KING
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief

Date- 2-24-59

Signature- Carl S. SPOER
June 19, 1942

SPJGE

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deem it necessary that there be established with the United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma, a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and a board of review therein. Pursuant to Article of War 50½ I direct The Judge Advocate General, at such time as you may deem advisable, to establish with the United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma, a branch office under an Assistant Judge Advocate General and to establish in that branch office a board of review.

Upon their establishment such Assistant Judge Advocate General and board of review shall be empowered to perform for the United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma, the United States Military North African Mission, and for such other United States Army Forces in foreign countries as you may from time to time specify, under the general supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the duties which The Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable,

The Secretary of War.
The President,

The White House,

Dear Mr. President:

The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma (Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell), by radiogram dated May 25, 1942, recommends the immediate establishment of a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and a board of review in India.

The Commanding General, Services of Supply, United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma (Major General Raymond A. Wheeler), by radiogram dated May 25, 1942, indorses General Stilwell's request that a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office be established in India, stating that mail facilities and available cooperative assistance on legal matters with the deputy judge advocate's office of the British GHQ and officials of the Central Indian Government make New Delhi, India, the logical central point for courts-martial review.

The Commanding General, United States Military North African Mission (Major General Russell L. Maxwell), by radiogram dated June 5, 1942, recommends the establishment of a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and board of review in Eritrea stating that as a prospective stop on the ferry command route and prospective site of a powerful radio station to be operated by his command, Asmara, Eritrea, is well situated to serve as rear echelon for activities in the Middle East and Far East.

The authority for establishing a branch office is contained in Article of War 502, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Whenever the President deems such action necessary, he may direct the Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant command, and to establish in such branch office a board of review, or more than one. Such Assistant Judge Advocate General and such board or boards of review shall be empowered to perform for that command, under the general supervision of the Judge Advocate General, the duties which the Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President."
The establishment of a branch office and the board of review in India or Eritrea is made necessary because of the existence of these distant, independent commands. Communication with such commands is difficult or liable to interruption because of poor transportation and the long sea voyage, which under unfavorable conditions might become impossible. It is clear that Congress in enacting Article of War 50½ had such a situation in contemplation.

Records of trial by general courts-martial are now forwarded from the United States Army Forces in China, India, Burma and the United States Military North African Mission to The Judge Advocate General's Office in Washington subject to long delay and risk of loss. The establishment of a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and a board of review with the United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma, having authority to function also for the command of General Maxwell will make the administration of military justice within those commands individually self-contained and will permit the execution of certain sentences which may not now be carried into effect until approved by the board of review in The Judge Advocate General's Office and by The Judge Advocate General himself. The maintenance of discipline in these commands requires the prompt execution of sentences imposed by general courts-martial.

Article of War 50½ contemplates a direction by the President to The Judge Advocate General to establish such an office whenever he shall deem such action necessary. I concur in the request of The Judge Advocate General that a branch office be established with the command of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, India and Burma, and that such branch office also be empowered to perform the functions of a branch office for the command of the Commanding General, United States Military North African Mission, Cairo, Egypt, and such other United States Army Forces in foreign countries as I may from time to time specify.

The required personnel of The Judge Advocate General's Department will be detailed to and ordered to General Stilwell's command when the directive above outlined shall have been received.

A draft of letter authorizing the necessary action, pursuant to the provisions of the Article of War 50½ is submitted herewith, which I recommend receive your signature.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-10-14-44

Signature- Carl L. Sperry

1 Ind. Draft of letter.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1942

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deem it necessary that there be established with the United States Army Forces under the command of the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and a board of review therein. Pursuant to Article of War 50.5 I direct The Judge Advocate General, at such time as you deem advisable, to establish such branch office under an Assistant Judge Advocate General and to establish in that branch office a board of review. Upon their establishment such Assistant Judge Advocate General and board of review shall be empowered to perform for the United States Army Forces under the command of the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and for such other United States Army Forces in foreign countries as you may from time to time specify, under the general supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the duties which The Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable,

The Secretary of War.

(SECRET)
The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

General MacArthur recommends immediate establishment of a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and a board of review in Australia.

The authority for establishing a branch office is contained in Article of War 50 which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Whenever the President deems such action necessary, he may direct the Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant command, and to establish in such branch office a board of review, or more than one. Such Assistant Judge Advocate General and such board or boards of review shall be empowered to perform for that command, under the general supervision of the Judge Advocate General, the duties which the Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President."

The establishment of a branch office and the board of review is made necessary because of the existence of a distant command. Communication with such command is difficult or liable to interruption because of poor transportation and the long sea voyage, which under unfavorable conditions might become impossible. It is clear that Congress in enacting Article of War 50 had such a situation in contemplation.

Records of trial by general courts-martial are now forwarded from the United States Army forces in the Southwest Pacific Area to The Judge Advocate General's Office in Washington subject to long delay and risk of loss. The establishment of a branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office and a board of review in Australia will make the administration of military justice as pertains to the United States Army Forces within General MacArthur's command self-contained and will permit the execution of certain sentences which may not now be carried into effect until approved by a board of review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General and by The Judge Advocate General himself. The maintenance of discipline in General MacArthur's command requires the prompt execution of sentences imposed by general courts-martial.
Article of War 50½ contemplates a direction by the President to The Judge Advocate General to establish such an office whenever he shall deem such action necessary. I concur in the request of The Judge Advocate General.

The required personnel of the Judge Advocate General's Department will be detailed and ordered to General MacArthur's command when the direction above outlined shall have been received.

A draft of letter authorizing the necessary action, pursuant to the provisions of Article of War 50½, is submitted herewith, which I recommend receive your signature.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War

1 Incl.
Draft of letter.
MEMORANDUM TO MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Attached hereto is a draft of a proposed letter of instructions to General Bradley who is to represent us in Russia. This letter of instructions probably should be issued by the Secretary of War unless the President desires to issue it himself.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

Original of the memorandum, together with letter of Instructions to Major General Follett Bradley, U.S.A. handed to Col. Sexton.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I think this is all right and if the President will put his initials on it it should be sent to General Marshall for the Secretary's approval.

H.L.H.
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUMNER WELLES:

July 20, 1942.

Please let me have your confidential slant on James Grafton Rogers. My impression is to say no. I have a dim recollection that he did not do anything except to block the initiation of state and federal control over the St. Lawrence River when I was Governor.

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Confidential letter from the Secretary of War, 7/16/42, to the President, recommending appt. of James Grafton Rogers to handle the project of bacteriological warfare, about which the Secretary of War and Paul McNutt talked with the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

After further consideration of the name of James Grafton Rogers as the head of the Bacteriological Warfare procedure, I wish you would submit to me one or two other names. I want to find a liberal minded man of ability and experience who could fulfill the responsibilities involved adequately and I should like to have somebody who might be said to be in real sympathy with the present Administration.

You might speak again with Paul McNutt on this matter.

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War.

RECLASSIFIED
By Department of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart late JAN 6 1976
My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the confidential inquiry contained in your memorandum of July 20 concerning James Grafton Rogers, I have made a full investigation of the Department's files covering the St. Lawrence River question during the time that Professor Rogers was Assistant Secretary of State.

For the most part, the files contain nothing of any significance. There are in the files very few of the intra-departmental memorandums which normally would be included in the files on a subject such as this and I cannot escape the conclusion that such memorandums of this character as may have existed were destroyed prior to March 1933.

I enclose a copy of a letter sent by Castle to President Hoover on June 23, 1931 which seems to make it clear that Castle and Rogers were the two officials of the Department who personally handled the St. Lawrence

The President,

The White House.
waterway question.

I am also sending you a copy of the telegram sent to you by Mr. Hoover under date of July 10, 1932 which, as I recollect it, constituted, together with the letter addressed to you by Castle, the most objectionable documents sent to you by the Hoover Administration on this subject. The records show that this telegram was drafted by Rogers in conjunction with Mr. Hoover himself.

From what I can learn from the permanent officials of the Department, Rogers was more responsible than any other official of the Department of State for the attitude of the State Department at that time with regard to the St. Lawrence River question.

Since you have asked my opinion in the matter, I may say that I agree emphatically with your own reaction to the suggestion made to you by Secretary Stimson.

With regard to the particular position mentioned in Secretary Stimson's letter, it would seem to me that there must be available many liberal minded men of ability and of experience who could fulfill the responsibilities involved adequately, and in greater sympathy with the present Administration than Professor Rogers.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President

The White House

Encs.
June 23, 1931

Dear Mr. President:

MacNider has been talking with me about the St. Lawrence. If the Canadians want to carry on at the moment by way of private negotiations, I want to assure you that we here in the Department shall be very glad to take on the work with Mr. Herridge. As you probably know, Mr. Rogers, Assistant Secretary, has for years had much to do with waterway questions and we have here in the Department a very full file on the St. Lawrence, which will give him the necessary documentation. I naturally know a good deal about the matter also, and if we went to work on it I think we should have to trouble you very seldom.

The important thing is that Canada is willing really to go ahead. The method is less important than the spirit. What we want is accomplishment, which will be a great thing for the Administration and I am writing this to pledge the earnest cooperation of this Department during the Secretary's absence.

Faithfully yours,

W. R. CASTLE, JR.

The President,

The White House.
July 10, 1932.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Governor of New York,
Albany, New York.

I am in receipt of your telegram of July 9th. I am glad to assure you that the negotiations between the United States and the Dominion of Canada in respect to the Great Lakes Waterway are making progress and that it will not be necessary to interrupt your cruise by a visit to Washington.

These negotiations, as you know, involving a score of intricate problems, have been under way for nearly three years, and have now reached a hopeful aspect. While under our Constitution international treaties fall within the sole jurisdiction of the Federal Government, nevertheless the representatives appointed by you and leaders in other states primarily concerned have been consulted during the course of the negotiations. I am in hopes an agreement can be reached between the two governments, but it has not yet been concluded, and I shall be glad to have you advised when this occurs.

The question of the disposal of the byproduct of power which will result from the works which border the State of New York, like all domestic questions of this character affecting the two countries, is reserved by the proposed treaty for purely domestic action by each country. This proposal is not the subject of international agreement. If a treaty is concluded and is ratified by the Senate, then the domestic questions which may arise must be settled through the action of both the Senate and House of Representatives in accordance with federal and state law and in accord with the interest of all the states of the Union.

You will realize that neither you nor I have authority to enter upon agreements in respect to these domestic questions, but if the treaty is consummated and ratified I shall be glad to consult with you and other governors.
I have no doubt that we can make such recommendations to the Congress as will be helpful to them in solving the particular domestic problems relating to each state.

Having ardently advocated for over ten years the great work of completing this shipway from Duluth and Chicago to the sea, I am glad to know that it will meet with your support.

HERBERT HOOVER
July 16, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

After several disappointments, Paul McNutt and I think we have gotten a good man to handle the project of bacteriological warfare about which we have told you. You will remember we tried to get Walter Stewart, Isaiah Bowman, and Edmund E. Day, but they were all tied up with other war activities from which they could not release themselves.

Now we have agreed upon James Grafton Rogers, recently the Head Master of Timothy Dwight College at Yale, formerly Assistant Secretary of State under me twelve years ago, and before that Dean of the Law School at the University of Colorado. He lives in Colorado, has medical antecedents and connections and tastes. He is a fine public-spirited man of great ability, energy and tact. Frank Jewett, the head of the National Academy of Science who has initiated this bacteriological project, approves of him highly. I know him very well from his past service under me, and Paul McNutt knows him very favorably. I think he is a very good selection to get these delicate projects under way which involve, as you may remember, working harmoniously and tactfully with the Canadians in respect to at least one of them.

So, if you approve, we will go right ahead getting them under way. We have lost so much time that it is important that we should now make speed. In fact I have already started the rinderpest investigation under the Chemical Warfare Bureau of my Department. Rogers, if cleared by you, will supervise the several investigations and I believe will push them at all practicable speed. I hope this is agreeable to you.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
July 27, 1942.

Private and [redacted]

Memorandum for the President:

I have your memorandum in respect to James Grafton Rogers and the bacteriological warfare matter. I have asked Mr. McNutt to suggest to you several other names and he has kindly consented to do so.

I have returned Dr. Rogers to Col. Donovan's organization from which I had borrowed him for the purpose of bacteriological warfare. During his brief service here he had prepared an admirable analysis and program of the work to be done, which will be of service to whoever finally succeeds him and which, unless I am much mistaken, will be of great value.

In the light of your mention of "liberal-mindedness", justice to Dr. Rogers requires that I should record with you the fact that twelve years ago I selected Dr. Rogers for the post of Assistant Secretary of State mainly upon his distinguished reputation as a liberal in the State of Colorado where he was the Dean of the University Law School, as well as in the American Bar Association where for many years he had been a prominent and active member. The reputation which I then relied upon was amply borne out by his subsequent services under me in the State Department as well as his subsequent career as Headmaster of Timothy Dwight College, at Yale.
AUG 11 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by law I hereby allocate from the appropriation entitled "Emergency Fund for the President, National Defense, 1942 and 1943,"

To

War Department

Amount

$922,666

to be expended by said War Department in connection with emergencies affecting the national security and defense for special projects.

The funds hereby allocated shall be available for objects of a confidential nature, and shall be charged against the limitation for such purpose under said appropriation, and shall be accounted for solely upon the certificate of the Secretary of War as authorized in said Appropriation Act.

Please arrange for the necessary transfer of funds and advise the agency accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Treasury

Copy For White House Files
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There is returned herewith the letter addressed to you under date of July 16, 1942, by the Secretary of War, recommending an allotment to the War Department of $922,666.00, from the "Emergency Fund for the President", for the liquidation of certain claims of the Pan American Airways. This letter was referred by you to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget by your memorandum of July 18, 1942, for preparation of reply.

A hearing was held in this office with respect to the subject matter of the letter of the Secretary of War and from the facts deduced I am of the opinion that this Government is morally bound to reimburse the Pan American Airways, Incorporated, and its affiliate, Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia (or Avianca), for the agreed amount of the costs incurred by them in the de-Germanization of certain air lines in South America, particularly Colombia.

A letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, prepared for your signature, is submitted herewith, making an allotment of $922,666.00 to the War Department, as recommended by the Secretary of War.

Wayne Coy
Acting Director

Enclosures:
Letter of Sec. of War, 7-16-42
Letter to Sec. of Treasury
July 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Secret letter from the Secretary of War, 7/16/42, recommending that the President allocate the sum of $922,666.06 to the War Dept. from the Emergency Fund provided by the Military Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1942, to be used to reimburse Pan American Airways and AVIANCA, of Colombia, for expenditures in carrying out the Government's program of replacing German operating personnel in these airlines.
Dear Mr. President:

After the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 the presence of German aviation in South America, and particularly in Colombia, became of extreme concern in connection with the defense of the Panama Canal. Various airfields of the SCADTA airline in Colombia (later called Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, or AVIANCA, an affiliate of Pan American Airways) were within a very short flying distance of the Canal, and other fields in the interior provided a series of steps leading from the Amazon River Valley and beyond. Further, Germany had infiltrated Army pilots within the network of commercial airlines throughout South America, and a considerable number of these were discovered to have been placed in SCADTA at various times.

After conferences the War and Navy Departments, and also the State Department, concluded that the de-Germanization of the SCADTA line was essential in order to provide for adequate National Defense and the security of the Panama Canal.

Pan American Airways was requested to execute this program for the Government, and it was carried out by them under the direct supervision of the American Ambassador to Colombia. It was not a simple task. The Colombian Government was reluctant to permit the de-Germanization. The line had been founded by the Germans and had been operated by them for 20 years. Most of the German officials were already naturalized citizens of Colombia, and a few had married into Colombian families.
SCADTA had played a prominent part in assisting the Colombian Government on various occasions, and had a reputation for loyalty to that Government.

However, after delays which it is not necessary to discuss here, appropriate action was taken by Pan American, in close coordination with our Embassy in Colombia. In the early part of 1940 certain key personnel were replaced, and on June 11, 1940, without warning, 102 of the German operating personnel were released and replaced without the interruption of schedules. Permission to do this was finally secured from the Colombian Government after it was assured by a representative of the United States Embassy, who acted upon instructions from Ambassador Braden, that the costs of the de-Germanization would not be placed on AVIANCA, and that the affair would be conducted so that there were no repercussions on the Colombian Government. Since then a few Germans who were not removed in 1940 have been replaced, and our representatives advise the entire operation has now been completed.

Claims for reimbursement of costs involved have been made by Pan American Airways in the total amount of $1,300,000. As a result of an investigation and survey conducted by this Department, it has been determined that these costs should be allowed to the extent of $922,666.06. The State Department concurs in the conclusion that Pan American and AVIANCA should be reimbursed.

If the payment is made, Pan American will contemporaneously make an agreement with the War Department to the effect that United States public aircraft, and aircraft operated for the United States Government, shall have free access to, and use of, all airfields, weather reporting, radio and navigational facilities owned in Colombia by Pan American Airways...
or by its affiliate, AVIANCA. This will be supported by an agreement between Pan American Airways and AVIANCA providing that AVIANCA subscribes to and implements the terms of the above-mentioned agreement between Pan American Airways and the War Department, but this agreement between Pan American and AVIANCA will last for the duration of the present emergency only. The State Department has advised that they believe it to be politically inexpedient and unwise, if not impossible, to obtain such an agreement from AVIANCA on a longer basis.

I respectfully request that you allocate the above-mentioned sum of $922,666.06 to the War Department from the Emergency Fund provided by the Military Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1942. The Judge Advocate General of the Army has advised that this fund may be used for this purpose if the President so desires. The funds requested will be used to reimburse Pan American Airways and AVIANCA for expenditures in carrying out the Government's program.

Respectfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

The President
The White House
Washington

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
B000.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 10-17-66
Signature- Earl L. Seibert
CONFIDENTIAL


I think that the attached draft is excellent, except for the last paragraph on the first page. That paragraph, in my opinion, weakens the entire statement and will take away a good deal of the force of the statement as a deterrent. I suggest that in lieu of that paragraph the following sentence be inserted:

"A disloyal worker will not be permitted to parade under the false colors of an occupational deferment after he has refused to do the work for which he was deferred."

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Under Secretary of War.

Encl.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2-24-59
Signature- (Bill S. Speer)
The strike of the employees at the plant, located at ___________, is in defiance of the National War Labor Board, and in defiance of organized labor's solemn pledge not to strike in war industries.

The National War Labor Board was established to adjust industrial disputes. Both labor and management must abide by its decisions. Both have done so except in rare instances. We can no longer tolerate or afford even these rare exceptions.

Several millions of men who were inducted into the Army under the Selective Service Act are now fighting for the survival of their country and of civilization itself. We on the home front must provide a continuous flow of arms and equipment for these soldiers. Occupational deferment from service has been granted only as long as may be necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose. It is the solemn obligation of every worker to carry out in full measure the important tasks for which he received occupational deferment. The reason for deferment ceases the moment he fails in his duty to produce war materials.

The workers at this plant, by striking in defiance of the National War Labor Board, have jeopardized the continuous flow of material to the fighting front. They have failed in the performance of those tasks for which deferment was granted them under the Selective Service Law. Accordingly I have instructed the Director of the Selective Service System to terminate the occupational deferment of all workers at that plant who fail to report for work at their regular shifts beginning tomorrow; and to reclassify them accordingly.

Other legitimate grounds for deferment are not to be disturbed. Therefore, it is not a case of "work or fight" but merely a case of preventing a disloyal worker from parading under the false colors of an occupational deferment after he has refused to continue in the occupation which made it advisable in the national interest to grant him the deferment.
All employees of this plant who are good Americans will promptly resume their positions on the production front. If they fail to do so within the time provided above, steps will also be taken to prevent them from obtaining employment in any plant or factory or yard engaged in war work.

To enable management to resume production and to protect loyal workers, I have also directed the Secretary of War to take whatever steps may be necessary. These steps may include the use of troops to protect the plant and its loyal workers from the lawless acts of any disloyal minority who may seek to prevent the resumption of production. They may include the occupation, possession, and operation of the plant. The intervention of Federal troops is to be construed merely as an incident of the resumption of work and will continue only so long as may be necessary to reopen the plant and resume full operation. Whatever action is being taken has been made necessary by the wrongful conduct of the strikers.

This is the policy which will be followed where strikes or stoppage have been occasioned solely by the refusal of the workers to abide by the regular decisions of the National War Labor Board.
MEMORANDUM FOR

WAYNE COY:

To speak to me about this when we take up the general subject.

F.D.R.

Transmitting memorandum which the President received from Hon. Wayne Coy, 8/12/42, together with carbon of memorandum the President received from Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, 8/5/42, in re steel and copper requirements of the St. Lawrence Waterway Project. Copy of Mr. Coy's memorandum of 8/12/42 and original of Mr. Patterson's memorandum of 8/5/42 retained for our files.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum is in reply to your request of August 8th asking me to check on the steel and copper requirements of the St. Lawrence Waterway Project, and attaching a copy of a memorandum to you from Under Secretary of War Patterson on the subject.

There is attached hereto a table showing the requirements, in tons, of steel and of copper for the power features alone, for the navigation features, and for the total project, broken down by years. It is to be noted that the figures contained in Under Secretary Patterson's letter agree substantially with those of the table.

This estimate assumes initiation of construction by October 1, 1942; output of power from three units by September 1, 1945; and completion of the remaining 15 power units thereafter at the rate of six per year. The estimate is based on a schedule deferring initiation of the navigation works until as late a date as is possible, but still providing for concurrent completion of both power and navigation features. It is possible to defer construction of the navigation features indefinitely, and, if this is done, the materials needed in the years shown would be limited to those required for the power features only.

The estimate includes all steel and copper estimated to be needed for construction of the United States portion of the International Rapids Section. This includes transformers, but does not include any estimate of materials which would be needed for protection of two Canadian villages, for construction equipment, or for the distribution system. As to the first of these omissions, it is believed that any materials required for the rehabilitation of the two villages would be negligible. As to the second, it is known that considerable new construction equipment would be necessary to build the project, but while an estimate of such equipment is available, this has not been translated into raw materials. Finally, as to the third, it is believed that it is too early to determine in detail the distribution system which would be required. It is estimated that 100 tons of copper would be needed, over and above the quantities shown in the table, for lines to carry power, to be available in 1945, to industries located in the immediate vicinity of the project. Additional power could be distributed southward, if that
were desirable, over the Messina-Taylorsville transmission line which is just being completed. Construction of additional distribution facilities would not be needed until 1946 at the earliest. The estimate of time is based on removal of the raw materials from stock piles and general availability for other work, and not on delivery of finished items to the project.

(Signed) Wayne Coy

Acting Director

Attachment
### STEEL & COPPER REQUIREMENTS, IN TONS, FOR
### INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION, ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY PROJECT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. WAYNE COX

Will you check on the steel and copper requirements?

F. D. R.
August 5th, 1942.

Memorandum for the President:

The Secretary of War has been asked to send you a letter on the power features of the St. Lawrence project.

The War Department has taken the position that the project is a meritorious one. It still adheres to that position, as a general proposition. But the building of the St. Lawrence project at this time is not recommended.

It will be three years before any advantages can be realized from the project. If construction were started at once and the project were given sufficient priority over other urgent needs to insure speed in progress of the work, it is estimated that the first delivery of power would be made in September 1945. Full power delivery would not be forthcoming until 1947.

While the advantages would thus be three to five years off, the demands in materials and equipment would be immediate. In steel the power features of the project would call for a minimum of 144,000 tons, 32,000 tons of which would be required in 1942 and 1943. In copper the requirements are substantial. In equipment the demands are heavy, and a substantial part of the equipment would be of new manufacture.

The policy of the War Department as to new projects is to defer those projects which consume large amounts of critical materials and which cannot contribute to the prosecution of the war in 1942 or in 1943. This is true even as to projects for direct production of weapons. It is in line with the objective laid down by you in your letter of May 1st concerning priorities for production of weapons in 1942 and in 1943. The situation of shortages which you foresaw in your letter has already come about.