War Production Board - General

CONTINUED

RECLAIMED RUBBER

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date











War Production Board
Statistics Division
Materials Branch

Data as of Oct. 2, 1942
Chart Issued Oct. 9, 1942
Revision Due: Oct. 30, 1942

RECLAIMED RUBBER
(All figures in thousands of long tons)

BACKGROUND: Reclaimed rubber is manufactured in the United States by two processes: the alkali digestion process and the pan method. The latter process accounts for approximately 100 thousand tons of total reclaiming capacity of 350 thousand tons, and yields high-grade reclaim suitable for tires only when the scrap is free from fabric. Certain products (heels, matting, garden hose, toys, etc.) yield low-grade reclaim by either process, and hence are unsuitable for use in tires. The ratio of reclaimed to crude rubber will be increased for military and civilian uses. Reclaimed will be substituted for crude wherever feasible. The available supplies of reclaim depend upon the flow of scrap rubber for processing and upon reclaiming capacity. Stocks on hand have been augmented greatly by the government-sponsored scrap collection campaign. No additions to reclaiming capacity have been authorized, although such plans are under consideration.

STOCKS:

	1942 Actual				
	Jan. 1	Mar 1	July 1	Aug. 1 1/	Sept. 1 2/
Scrap Rubber					
Rubber Reserve Company			52.8	133.9	246.8
Petroleum companies				294.1	148.7
Dealers	67.0	43.9	42.1	38.6	28.1
Manufacturers	174.6	140.3	147.8	158.5	166.1 3/
Total	241.6	184.2	242.7	625.1	589.7
Reclaimed Rubber	41.7	41.7	48.0	50.0	56.5

1/ Includes estimated collections during President's drive. 2/ Preliminary. 3/ Additional 12.7 thousand tons in transit August 31, 1942.

Source: Dealers, Bureau of Census; Manufacturers, Rubber Branch, WPB; Rubber Reserve Company; Petroleum Companies, estimate of the Department of Commerce.

NEW SUPPLY:

	1940	1941	1942 (Est.)	1943 (Est.)	1942 Actual Jan.-June	July	August 1/	Total
Production	208.1	274.2	310.0	360.0	144.3	23.4	25.8	193.5

1/ Preliminary.

Source: Actual, Rubber Branch, WPB; estimates, Rubber Staff, Department of Commerce, and Rubber Branch, WPB.

CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS

	1940	1941	1942 Actual Jan.-June	July	August 1/	Total
Consumption	190.2	251.2	121.9	19.6	18.3	159.8
Exports	11.4	13.9	16.0	1.9	1.0	18.9
Total	201.6	265.1	137.9	21.5	19.3	178.7

1/ Preliminary.

REQUIREMENTS:

	1942 Consumption and Exports 1/ January - June	1942 Estimated Requirements 2/ July - December	1942 Year	1943 Estimated Requirements 2/
Army	16.0	32.2	48.2	72.1
Navy	5.6	5.3	10.9	11.5
Lend-Lease	7.5	18.3 3/	25.8	38.5 3/
Canada, Other Export	16.1 3/	8.0	24.1	12.0
B.E.W.	1.9	2.5	4.4	5.0
Civilian	91.3	87.2	178.5	164.0
Total	138.4	153.5	291.9	303.1

1/ Breakdown - estimated by Rubber Branch, WPB. 2/ Estimated requirements as submitted to the Materials Requirements Section.
3/ Includes exports 7.3 thousand tons to Canada. 4/ Estimates do not include requirements for passenger cars. Estimated reclaim requirements for passenger cars, July, 1942 - Dec., 1944, vary from 275 - 375 thousand tons.
5/ 1942, includes 8.2 in products, 10.1 as such. 1943, includes 18.4 in products, 20.3 as such. In products calculated as 20% of estimated crude requirements.

USES:

	Percentage Use of Reclaim Oct. 1 - Dec. 31, 1941 1/	Estimated Percentage Use of Reclaim May 1 - Dec. 31, 1942 2/
Tires & Tubes	30.04	45.10
Mechanical Goods	30.53	24.41
Wire & Cable	4.58	7.35
Footwear	16.98	17.02
Druggists' Sundries	.07	.89
All Other	17.80	5.23
	100.00	100.00

1/ Reported consumption for all orders by end products - PD-231 October 1 - December 31, 1941.
2/ Unweighted arithmetic average of estimated war order use and proposed civilian allocations. Based upon analysis of war orders (PD-330) for all delivery months, Rubber Branch, WPB; and proposed allocations among indirect military and civilian uses, Division of Civilian Supply.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL: Supplementary Order M-15-b, as amended August 24, 1942, provides that scrap and reclaimed rubber may be consumed only: (1) to fill war orders (2) to manufacture specified products where special authorization has been obtained for the consumption of crude rubber and latex (3) to manufacture other products upon specific authorization by the Director. In addition, scrap rubber may be used to manufacture reclaimed rubber. Any of the products whose manufacture is permitted must be manufactured in conformity with specifications as set forth in the order. Inventories of scrap and reclaimed rubber and products manufactured therefrom are limited to 60 days' supply. No person other than Rubber Reserve Company may purchase or accept delivery of scrap or reclaim except for consumption under the provisions of the order or upon direct authorization of the Director of Industry Operations. Scrap dealers may acquire scrap rubber for the purpose of selling the same to another scrap dealer or to the Rubber Reserve Company.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS: (1) Establish 1943 reclaim requirements for civilian passenger cars; (2) provide a planned scrap collection program for the duration of the war, to assure capacity operation of existing reclaim plants; (3) restrict the use of grades of reclaim suitable for tires in products for which lower grades would be satisfactory; (4) substitute reclaim for crude rubber wherever feasible in military and essential civilian uses.

SUMMARY:

	1942	1943		1942 Actual Jan.-Aug.
Estimated New Supply	310	360	New Supply	194
Estimated Requirements	292	303	Consumption & Exports	179

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-78
By RHP, Date

SHEARLINGS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-72
By RHP, Date

SUPPLY AND DEMAND

MILLIONS OF SKINS



STOCKS

MILLIONS OF SKINS



IMPORTS

BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

PER CENT



WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Statistics Division
Materials Branch

Data of as Oct. 1, 1942
Chart Issued Oct 9, 1942
Revision Due: Oct.30,1942

SHEARLINGS
(All figures in thousand skins)

BACKGROUND: Sheep or lamb skins tanned with the wool on, or 'shearlings', are in great demand by the military for use in the manufacture of suits, boots, mittens, helmets, etc., for aviators. Since shearlings consist largely of sheep and lamb skins having a wool length of one inch or less, the volume of shearlings in total sheep and lamb slaughter is limited. Domestic shearling production in the pre-war years 1938, 1939, and 1940 averaged about 10 percent of Federal Inspected sheep and lamb slaughter of approximately 17.5 million head annually. Normally, the number of sheep and lamb slaughtered with a shearling wool length depends upon the interrelation of such factors as the price of meat, the price of wool, the price of shearlings, the price of pickled sheep skins, and the cost of feed-lot operations, as well as climatic conditions which may prevent shearing, and whether the animals are shorn before slaughter.

STOCKS:

Stocks on Hand	Jan. 1	1942 April 1	July 1	August 1
Raw:				
Tanners'	1,865	898	2,396	2,992
Packers' and merchants'	163	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Total Raw	2,028	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
In Process	650	760	802	910
Finished-tanners' only	286	295	520	417
Total Stocks	2,964	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

Source: Jan.-July, 1942, Tanners Council of America, except for packers' and merchants' raw stocks; the latter were reported by the Bureau of the Census; August 1, 1942, industry reports to WPB on PD-421.

NEW SUPPLY:

	1941	1942 (Est.)	1943 (Est.) 3/
Domestic Production	2,750	4,200 1/	4,200
Imports	4,560	4,865 2/	4,865
Total	7,310	9,065	9,065

1/ Estimated minimum supply from domestic sources, 3,000 thousand skins. No historic basis for estimating domestic supplies resulting from clipping and other programs fostered by WPB and OPA to stimulate supply. It is believed, however that the programs may yield about 1,200 thousand skins, and these are included in the domestic production estimates.
2/ Based on tonnage allocations.
3/ 1942 totals carried forward.

Source: Leather and Shoe Unit, Statistics Section, Textile, Clothing, & Leather Branch, WPB.

Imports by Country of Origin 1/

	1942 Jan.-June Amount	Jan.-June Percent	July Amount	July Percent	Jan.-July Amount	Jan.-July Percent
Australia and N.Z.	1,008	51.1	669	70.2	1,677	57.3
British Africa	513	26.0	78	8.2	591	20.2
South America	425	21.5	185	19.4	610	20.8
All Other	28	1.4	21	2.2	49	1.7
	1,974	100.0	953	100.0	2,927	100.0

1/ Source: Department of Commerce. Data not available prior to 1942.

CONSUMPTION:

	1941	1942 Actual Jan.-June	July	Jan.-July
Tanners' Wettings	6,159	4,119	998	5,117

Source: Jan.-June, 1942, Tanners Council of America; beginning July, 1942, industry reports to WPB.

REQUIREMENTS: 1/

	1942	1943
Army	7,604	6,806
Navy	1,407	3,399
Total	9,011	10,205

1/ Represent the gross number of skins required, including rejects and unsuitable skins, which amount to approximately 25 percent of the total. These may be released for civilian usage. An attempt is being made, however, to broaden the usage by the armed forces so as to use part of the rejects.

Source: Materials Requirements Section.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL: The entire supply of shearlings has been set aside for military usage, except that skins found to be unsuitable for military purposes may be released for civilian usage (M-94, issued February 16, 1942). As amended July 30, 1942, M-94 provides that shearlings, as defined therein, may be processed only by tanners having Army Air Forces contracts, and that no other tanners may buy such shearlings. In addition, it specifies that any person engaged in processing shearlings to fill orders placed by the Army Air Forces must submit his entire production and inventory of processed shearlings for inspection and classification by an Army Air Forces inspector, and further, that skins thus classified shall be set aside for specified uses. The amended Order also contains a provision designed to augment the supply of domestic shearlings by specifying that, upon receiving tanners' or contractors' stated requirements of domestic wool skins, the producer of such skins must fill these orders, up to 50 percent of his estimated monthly production, at a price not exceeding the value of such skins for pulling or other purposes.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS: To increase domestic production. To protect foreign sources of supply and the requisite shipping.

SUMMARY:

	1942	1943	1942 Actual Jan.-July	
Estimated New Supply	9,065	9,065	New Supply	N.A.
Estimated Requirements	9,011	10,205	Consumption	5,117

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Statistics Division
Materials Branch

Data as of October 1, 1942
Revised abstract issued October 9, 1942
Next revision due: October 30, 1942

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WOOL - RAW

APPAREL WOOL (SCOURED BASIS)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-71
By RHP, Date

SUPPLY AND DEMAND

MILLIONS OF POUNDS



STOCKS
1942
MILLIONS OF POUNDS



IMPORTS
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
PER CENT



WOOL - RAW
(Apparel Wool)
(All figures in million pounds, scoured basis)

BACKGROUND: Commercial grades of wool are based primarily on fineness or diameter of fiber. Medium to fine grades of wools commonly are designated "apparel wool", as distinguished from coarse to low-medium grades, or "carpet wool". Practically all wool produced in the U. S. is of apparel grades. As the term implies, such wool is utilized primarily for clothing. Apparel grades of wool have various specialized non-apparel household and industrial uses, but the latter are quantitatively small.

STOCKS:

	1942			
	Jan. 1.	April 1	July 1	Sept. 1
Commercial 1/	262	255	358	412 3/
Government Stockpile 2/	100	159	274	330
Total	362	414	632	742

1/ Source: Bureau of the Census.
2/ Source: WPB Stockpile Reports.
3/ Estimated by Statistics Section, Textile, Clothing & Leather Branch, WPB.

NEW SUPPLY:

	1941	1942 (Est.)	1943 (Est.)
Domestic Production	212	218	218
Imports	428 1/	555 2/	490 2/
Total	640	773	708

1/ General imports. Source: Department of Commerce.
2/ General imports, as estimated by Statistics Section.

Wool Imports, by Country of Origin

	1941		1942 (Est.)		1942 Actual 1/ Jan.-Aug.	
From:	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Australia & New Zealand	212	50	326	59	311	63
South Africa	27	6	80	14	75	15
Argentina & Uruguay	177	41	138	25	99	20
All Other	12	3	11	2	10	2
Total	428	100	555	100	495	100

1/ Commercial arrivals, as compiled by the Tariff Commission from official statistics of the Department of Commerce, plus strategic reserve arrivals as derived from DSC stockpile reports.

CONSUMPTION:

	1940	1941	1942 Jan.-June	1942 July	1942 Jan.-July
Domestic Mill Consumption 1/	309	514	282	46	328

1/ Source: Bureau of the Census.

REQUIREMENTS: Estimated requirements for 1942 and 1943 as compiled by the Statistics Section and Materials Requirements Section, WPB, are shown below:

	1942 (Est.)	1943 (Est.)
Direct Military	362	353
Foreign 1/	19	47
Non-Military 2/	135	151
Total	536	551

1/ Chiefly wool for uniform and overcoat cloth for the U.S.S.R. This material has been or probably will be requisitioned by the Army, and hence may be included in some estimates of direct military requirements. Does not include 4.6 million pounds of Canadian-owned wool which may be processed and reexported.
2/ Anticipated consumption. The total for 1942 was based in part on actual consumption and in part on civilian allotment rates; the 1943 total was projected on the basis of the rate of civilian allotments for the six months beginning August 3, 1942.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL: Restrictions on the processing of wool for civilian use have been in effect since January 3, 1942, when the original wool conservation order (M-73) was issued. On July 1, M-73 was amended for the period August 3, 1942, to January 31, 1943. The new order is designed to increase the amount of woolen cloth to be manufactured for civilians out of the limited quantity of new wool available. This is to be accomplished by "Bonus Blending" provisions whereby manufacturers can obtain additional allocations of new wool for use in the production of yarns and fabrics containing not more than 65% wool and not less than 20% wool, wool waste, noils, reused and reprocessed wool. As in the preceding amendment, bonuses are provided to encourage the use of lower grade wool. The amount of new wool to be used for military purposes continues unrestricted.

SUBSTITUTION: Owing to its singular properties, wool does not have completely satisfactory nor extensive substitutes for most of its uses. However, cotton, rayon staple fiber, mohair, and other animal hairs are used in combination with new wool on both and woolen and the worsted systems. In addition, substantial quantities of used wools, noils and wastes of wool, mohair, cotton, rayon, and other fibers are utilized on the woolen system.

SUMMARY:

	1942	1943
Estimated New Supply	773	708
Estimated Requirements	536	551

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Statistics Division
Materials Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

Data as of October 5, 1942
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By RHP, Date

DELIVERIES, RELEASES AND BALANCES IN STOCKPILES
THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1942

Percent of purchases to deliveries

Table 1 shows the percent of purchases to deliveries of 101 strategic and critical materials. In several instances, various classes of the same material (ore, concentrates, and metal) are shown as separate stockpiles because the procurement, shipping, and other supply problems frequently are different. Deliveries of 56 materials have been less than 50 percent of the purchases, but the entire amounts purchased have been delivered in the case of several materials. In two - wool and optical glass - more has been delivered than reported as purchased. The wool deliveries have included some British wool stored in the United States, subject to final settlement as to ownership. The objective of the wool stockpile, however, is substantially greater than the reported deliveries. In the case of optical glass, there is some question as to the suitability of the quality of part of the supply. In some commodities, deliveries already made represent about the maximum accumulation to be expected because of the loss of accessibility to producing areas. Such materials include crude rubber, manila fiber, silk, tin, quinine, tungsten, and others where practically the entire supply originally came from abroad. The shutting off of the principal sources of such materials has voided contracts and made the stockpile objectives impossible of attainment. Owing to shipping and other difficulties, stocks of a few materials are being accumulated in foreign countries.

Percent of deliveries to releases

Some quantities of 69 listed materials have been released to industry; releases of 19 equal the deliveries, and 12 others have exceeded 50 percent of total deliveries. Purchases of a number of materials were made primarily for immediate delivery to industry rather than as a stockpile, and a 100 percent release does not necessarily mean that reserves are being dissipated unduly. Demand for several materials is so urgent that deliveries to industry usually are made immediately upon arrival of imports - an important source of various stockpile materials. While there are relative shortages of numerous raw materials, the release of nearly 50 percent of the rubber stockpile (particularly in view of the loss of sources and the slow progress of the synthetic program) is a more serious matter than a 100 percent release of some other critical material. About 20,000 tons of rubber were released from the stockpile during September.

Balance on hand as related to objectives

The balance on hand of only 4 listed materials - ergot of rye, optical glass, santonin, and quartz crystals - at the end of September equaled or exceeded the stockpile objectives. The balance in the stockpiles of only a few other materials - agar, kapok, rutile ore, vanadium, quinine, tung oil, and wool - exceed 50 percent of the objectives. Substantial balances have been built up, however, (including tin ore, lead bullion and ore, molasses, platinum, and other materials) without formalized objectives. New objectives were established for strontium ores and sunn hemp during September, and considerable additions to existing objectives have been made recently in arsenic, asbestos, coconut oil, linseed oil, nitrate of soda, and tung oil.

An important point in the relationship of the balance in stockpiles to the objectives is whether or not materials have been, or will be, sufficient to keep industry operating during the war emergency. In the case of materials which were purchased primarily for current needs of industry, the lack of a substantial balance may not be serious.

(See other side for table)

Table 1 — DELIVERIES, RELEASES AND BALANCES IN STOCKPILES
THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1942

MATERIALS	Percent of Purchases Delivered	Percent of Deliveries Released	Balance in Stockpile		
			Amount	Unit	Percentage of Objective
Agar	100.0	0	297,940	Lbs.	59.6
Alcohol, Ethyl	75.5	1.0	19,628	Th. Gal.	26.2
Alumina	28.4	100.0	0	-	1/
Alumina, Hydrate	33.3	100.0	0	-	1/
Aluminum, Reclaimed	96.7	20.0	4,418	Th. Lbs.	1/
Aluminum, Refined	11.7	100.0	0	-	1/
Antimony, Metallic	30.7	6.9	10,273	S. T.	38.0
Antimony, Ore	6.7	99.5	8	S. T.	1/
Asbestos, (Critical Grades)	21.4	31.0	1,471	S. T.	2.9
Aviation Gas	.1	11.8	298	Bbls.	1/
Babassu Kernels	5.4	100.0	0	-	-
Babassu Oil	81.8	0	693	Lbs.	2.8
Bauxite	5.6	7.8	159,132	L. T.	15.9
Benzene	98.0	10.0	19,455	Th. Gal.	38.9
Bismuth	47.8	0	210,062	Lbs.	42.0
Buckthorn Bark	82.7	0	67,431	Lbs.	1/
Burlap	6.5	0	1,300	Th. Yds.	.3
Beryllium Ore	79.4	0	104	M. T.	3.5
Cadmium	87.5	44.6	149,911	Lbs.	1.2
Calcium Carbide	42.8	4.3	4,505	S. T.	4.5
Casings (Sheep)	33.3	0	500	Th. Rings	1/
Castor Oil	2.0	0	61	S. T.	.2
Chrome Ore	30.9	3.9	549,062	L. T.	28.2
Cobalt	14.8	9.5	1,072	S. T.	42.9
Cocoa Beans	11.5	32.3	3,360	S. T.	20.0
Coconut Oil	14.6	4.4	2,715	L. T.	1.8
Copper, Matte	100.0	71.8	1,006	S. T.	1/
Copper, Ore	33.0	27.7	79,313	S. T.	1/
Copper, Refined	78.0	85.8	130,840	S. T.	21.8
Copra	13.2	96.7	112	S. T.	1/
Cork	88.4	6.6	34,066	M. T.	48.7
Cotton Linters	79.8	76.1	1,950	M. T.	11.5
Cotton Osnaburg	38.2	19.7	22,887	Th. Yds.	11.4
Cotton Sheeting	37.6	5.5	13,964	Th. Yds.	14.0
Cashew Nut Shell Oil	25.4	0	370	S. T.	7.3
Diamond Dies	74.9	44.7	8,927	Number	38.8
Diamonds, Ind.	26.7	0	1,566,064	Carats	7.1
Ergot of Rye	99.8	30.0	201,863	Lbs.	100.9
Feathers and Down	8.1	0	40	Th. Lbs.	.9
Goat and Kid Skins	1.0	100.0	0	-	-
Graphite	24.0	44.5	3,830	S. T.	11.3
High Wines	63.7	100.0	0	-	1/
Hog Bristles	23.9	7.7	199,305	Lbs.	19.9
Horse Hair	43.4	0	208,152	Lbs.	20.8
Iridium	100.0	0	761	Tr. Oz.	9.8
Iron (Carbonyl)	35.0	0	105,000	Lbs.	35.0
Jute	2.7	100.0	0	-	-
Kapok	100.0	0	11,760	Th. Lbs.	75.0
Khaki Cal.	100.0	100.0	0	-	-
Lead, Bullion	99.3	100.0	0	-	1/
Lead Ore	44.3	81.1	20,581	S. T.	1/
Lead, Refined	54.9	63.1	176,557	S. T.	29.4
Linseed Oil	24.2	0	3,524	S. T.	27.1
Lumber	2.3	100.0	0	-	1/
Magnesite	3.3	100.0	0	-	1/
Manganese Ore	27.9	5.6	989,847	L. T.	30.0
Manila Fiber	90.9	35.9	163,944	Bales	8.0
Manila Fiber (Panama)	78.5	100.0	0	-	1/
Menhaden, Herring & Sardine Oil	1.1	0	220	S. T.	1.0
Mercury	64.2	31.7	31,967	Flasks	37.6
Mica, Block	41.4	37.2	786,505	Lbs.	25.4
Mica, Splittings	56.8	5.8	10,540,094	Lbs.	42.8
Molasses	95.1	30.3	220,840	Gal.	1/
Molybdenite	44.0	0	198	M. T.	8.7
Muru Muru Nuts & Kernels	87.1	0	444	S. T.	13.2

Table continued on other side

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-78
By RHP, Date

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date

Table I (Concluded)

DELIVERIES, RELEASES AND BALANCES IN STOCKPILES
THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1942

MATERIALS	Percent of Purchases Delivered	Percent of Deliveries Released	Balance in Stockpile		
			Amount	Unit	Percentage of Objective
Nickel	77.0	100.0	0	-	-
Nickel, Refined	98.3	97.2	171	S. T.	1/
Nickel, Matte-Cont.	4.3	0	194	L. T.	1/
Nitrate of Soda	19.2	100.0	0	-	-
Oiticica Oil	33.0	0	1,351	Th. Lbs.	4.2
Opium	26.7	0	178,000	Lbs.	27.8
Optical Glass	268.8	6.3	28,722	Lbs.	251.9
Ouricury Nuts	47.4	100.0	0	-	-
Palm Oil	5.7	48.6	2,912	S. T.	2.9
Platinum	43.3	0	32,941	Tr. Oz.	1/
Quartz Crystals	96.2	6.1	3,308,161	Lbs.	220.5
Quinine	74.2	0	8,694,900	Avoir. Oz.	96.2
Rapeseed Oil	46.7	0	4,632	Th. Lbs.	43.7
Rubber	87.5	45.4	380,795	L. T.	20.0
Rutile Ore	42.2	0	2,355	S. T.	58.9
Santonin	71.3	19.3	2,536	Lbs.	126.8
Sesame Seed Oil	100.0	0	25	Lbs.	1/
Shellac	74.9	100.0	0	-	-
Silk	100.0	74.8	16,274	Bales	21.7
Sisal	20.1	100.0	0	-	-
Sugar	36.2	99.9	150	S. T.	1/
Sunflower Seed Oil, etc.	33.9	0	3,589	Th. Lbs.	4.3
Tallow, animal	13.9	100.0	0	-	-
Tantalite	90.6	4.6	599,293	Lbs.	38.8
Tin, Cast Metal	100.0	82.5	132,117	Lbs.	1/
Tin, Ore	32.7	12.5	85,317	L. T.	1/
Tin, Refined	48.3	18.2	55,159	L. T.	17.9
Tung Oil	97.9	0	27,203	Th. Lbs.	57.9
Tungsten Ore	11.1	41.7	11,510	S. T.	37.7
Vanadium	54.7	0	2,743	Th. Lbs.	54.9
Vanadium (lead Van. Ores)	84.7	28.2	852	S. T.	77.5
Wool, Apparel	164.7	.2	636,829	Th. Lbs.	63.7
Zinc, Concentrates (Dom.)	14.1	0	8,859	S. T.	8.9
Zinc, Concentrates (For.)	42.5	58.1	162,901	S. T.	27.2
Zinc, Metal	16.2	68.5	8,114	S. T.	10.2
Zirconium Bearing Ores	22.6	0	8,146	S. T.	43.7

1/ No formalized objective.

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Statistics Division
Materials Branch

Data as of Oct. 1, 1942
Revised Study Issued Oct. 9, 1942
Next Revision Due: Nov. 13, 1942

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date

STOCKPILE AND PUBLIC PURCHASE RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHICH NO DELIVERIES WERE REPORTED THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1942

Table 2 shows some 69 stockpile and public purchase materials on which no deliveries were reported through September, 1942. Contracts were reported on only 16 of these materials. Several of the recommendations for stockpiles were made during the past two months; a few of them, however, were initiated more than a year ago. In four instances - cresols, cryolite ore, iron ore, and rotenone roots - the contracts equal or exceed the objectives. Contracts for iron ore amount to some 15 times the indicated objectives; the objective is on an annual basis, while the contracts cover several years. Contracts for about two-thirds of the iron ore represent long-term arrangements with Brazil. This iron ore is not expected to be transported to the United States while ocean shipping remains stringent. The attainment of the scrap iron stockpile objective is more important to the steel industry than the delivery of Brazillian iron ore.

Various factors, such as loss of access to sources, nature of contracts, and shipping difficulties, have forestalled the signing of contracts and subsequent deliveries of numerous materials. Contracts for stockpile materials from foreign countries, made under preclusive buying arrangements or for financial aid to those countries, would not necessarily be followed by firm contracts or immediate deliveries. Moreover, recommendations for purchases of some materials were made to command exportable surpluses in threatened areas which subsequently became inaccessible, so that even reported contracts may have little significance. Some imports, however, are still recorded as arriving from areas which no longer are accessible; such imports were transported to safety zones and are being imported into the United States as shipping space becomes available. Slow progress in such a large number of materials is a matter of some concern, in spite of plausible explanations for lack of activity in individual cases.

Table 2 — STOCKPILE AND PUBLIC PURCHASE RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHICH NO DELIVERIES WERE REPORTED THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1942

MATERIALS	DATE OF RECOMMENDATION	UNIT	OBJECTIVE	CONTRACTS ON PURCHASES
Belladonna Leaves	June 1941	Pounds	200,000	0
Belladonna Roots	" "	Pounds	60,000	0
Hides, Cattle	" "	Thousand Pieces	6,000	0
Red Squill	" "	Pounds	675,000	0
Silk Noils & Waste	" "	Pounds	3,000,000	0
Iron, Scrap	Sept. 1941	Long Tons	1,500,000	0
Mangrove Extract	" "	Short Tons	7,500	0
Flax & Flax Tow	Oct. 1941 1/	Long Tons	14,000	0
Polyisobutylene	" "	Short Tons	750	0
Castor Beans	Nov. 1941	Thousand Pounds	400,000	3,425
Flaxseed	" "	Bushels	30,000,000	0
Ipecac	" "	Pounds	2/	0
Rotenone Roots	" "	Long Tons	2,000	2,726
Teak	" "	Board Feet	5,000,000	0
Kyanite	Dec. 1941	Short Tons	3,000	0
Quebracho Extract	Jan. 1942	Short Tons	53,000	0
Cotton (Sea Island)	Feb. 1942	Bales	1,000	0
Balsa Wood	Mar. 1942	Thousand Board Feet	20,000	36
Columbite	" "	Short Tons	1,200	0
Ixtle Fiber	" "	Thousand Pounds	10,000	0

(Table continued on other side)

TABLE II (Concluded)

STOCKPILE AND PUBLIC PURCHASE RECOMMENDATIONS
ON WHICH NO DELIVERIES WERE REPORTED THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1942

MATERIALS	Date OF RECOMMENDATION	UNIT	OBJECTIVE	CONTRACTS OR PURCHASES
Cinchona Bark	May 1942	Long Tons	6,000	0
Cotton-Egyptian & Sudan	" "	Bales	50,000	0
Cryolite Ore	" "	Long Tons	55,000	55,000
Iron Ore	" "	Long Tons	250,000	3,790,000
Neatsfoot Oil	" "	Thousand Pounds	4,480	228
Palm Kernel Oil	" "	Thousand Pounds	56,000	0
Palm Nuts & Kernels	" "	Thousand Pounds	112,000	0
Sperm Oil	" "	Short Tons	15,000	815
Tucum Nuts & Kernels	" "	Thousand Pounds	13,440	1,433
Zinc Ore	" "	Short Tons	50,000	0
Arsenic	June 1942 3/	Short Tons	36,000	0
Balata	" "	Long Tons	2,800	0
Diamond Material	" "	Carats	5,000	0
Pyrethrum Flowers	" "	Long Tons	15,600	0
Rubber Thread	" "	Pounds	2,500,000	0
Vitamin A Oil	" "	Trillion Units	15	0
Cabrettas	July 1942	Long Tons	3,950	0
Cashew Nuts	" "	Long Tons	500	0
Cattle Tail Hair	" "	-	N. A.	0
Corundum, Grain	" "	Short Tons	2,000	0
Corundum, Ore	" "	Long Tons	18,000	12,000
Glycerin, Crude	" "	Thousand Pounds	14,000	0
Glycerin, Refined	" "	Thousand Pounds	30,000	0
Hull Fiber	" "	Short Tons	8,000	55
Jewel Bearings	" "	Number	6,400,000	0
Mahogany Logs	" "	Long Tons	132,000	0
Polyvinyl Chloride	" "	Short Tons	3,000	0
Rubber, Scrap	" "	Long Tons	200,000	0
Sapphire, (Montana)	" "	Av. Ounces	12,000	0
Silk, Reclaimed	" "	Pounds	5,000,000	0
Silver, Foreign	" "	Ounces	10,000,000	0
Sponges (Loofa)	" "	Thousand Units	6,000	0
Whale Oil	" "	Long Tons	10,000	850
Arsenic, Crude	Aug. 1942	Short Tons	N. A.	15,000
Beryllium Oxide	" "	Pounds	500,000	0
Benzol (British)	" "	Thousand Gallons	30,000	0
Carbons (Brazilian)	" "	Carats	40,000	0
Cinchonidine, Cinchonine & Quinodine	" "	Ounces	1,500,000	4,000
Clay (English China)	" "	Short Tons	5,000	0
Cresols	" "	Pounds	600,000	600,000
Hemp & Hemp Tow	" "	Thousand Pounds	2,500	0
Rubber Cement	" "	Gallons	500,000	0
Totaquine	" "	Ounces	500,000	0
Sisal Rope	" "	-	4/	0
Strontium Ore	" "	Short Tons	5,000	0
Cobalt Oxide	Sept. 1942	Pounds	4/	60,000
Ferrovanadium	" "	Pounds	4/	170,000
Sunn hemp	" "	Thousand Pounds	15,000	0

1/ An addition made later.
2/ General underwriting agreement to buy all Ipecac necessary to prevent flow into "undesirable channels."
3/ An addition made later.
4/ Indeterminate amount.

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Statistics Division
Materials Branch

Data as of Oct. 1, 1942
Revised Study Issued Oct. 9, 1942
Next Revision due: Nov. 13, 1942

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date MAR 14 1973

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

7 10/7/42

C. F.

War Production Board

[redacted]

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR x25
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY x18
HON. DONALD M. NELSON x4735

SUBJECT: AIRPLANE PRODUCTION

I am concerned by the figures on production of combat planes.

1. I am not definitely certain of the following figures but believe them to be right. Under the schedule of last December 12,695 combat planes were called for between January 1st and July 31, 1942. Actual production seems to have been only 12,293 -- or a deficit of 402 combat planes under last year's program.

2. The production in July appears to have been 4,095 planes of all types, against the total of 4,501 called for -- a deficit of 406 planes under the revised schedule. This July total does pass the 4,000 mark but I think it is a larger monthly deficit than any deficit in the past few months.

3. The bomber deficit in July seems to be the most serious -- 368.

4. The principal excess of production over scheduled figures seems to have been in the category of small communication planes -- "puddle-jumpers" or "hedgehoppers". In other words, the least important planes seem to be going well and the most important planes very badly.

I think you should hold a clinic on this patient. Then you can let me know what disease he is suffering from and how he can be cured!

x C. F. Navy
x C. F. War

F. D. R.

x249 Official

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By E. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

OFFICE OF
W. L. BATT
VICE CHAIRMAN

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

August 14, 1942

THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 15 11 08 AM '42
RECEIVED

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

In answer to your letter of August 12 addressed to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Nelson, you have received from the two Services, after consultation with us, the specific facts and figures requested in your letter.

As you know, Mr. Nelson will be back one of the first days of next week, and it would seem to me desirable that we do not attempt to reply to your letter until his return. The last sentence of your letter suggests the desirability of a joint judgment of the three parties on the whole aircraft picture, and I am sure Mr. Nelson would want to prepare that resume himself after such discussion with the Services as may be necessary.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Batt.

W. L. Batt

FOR VICTORY
BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1942

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: MISS TULLY

FROM: MR. LUBIN x4529

The attached is terribly important, and I should appreciate it if you would get it to the President.

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1942

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MR. LUBIN

The aircraft production figures during the last few months have been far from expectations. As compared to schedules, they have been getting progressively worse.

In view of what appears to me to be a very serious situation, I am sending you the attached for your personal and confidential use.

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

SECRET
[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: AIRPLANE PRODUCTION IN JULY

The airplane production situation appears to be getting progressively worse.

The total output of combat planes during the first seven months of this year failed to equal the number scheduled for production in that period under schedules that were made before Pearl Harbor. The schedules of the old OPM, made in early December 1941, called for 12,695 combat planes to be produced between January 1 and July 31. Actual production in that period was 12,293, or a deficit of 402 combat planes.

Not only have we failed to meet your directive as announced in January, but we have failed even to realize the schedules that had been laid out before we entered the war.

PRODUCTION IN JULY

It is the policy of those responsible for aircraft production to revise their production schedules at given intervals, so as to adjust them to the latest facts available. The revised production schedule for the month of July was made in June. This schedule called for 4,501 planes (combat, transport, communication, and trainers). Actual production in July was only 4095. We failed to meet the revised production schedule in July by 406 planes. This is the largest deficiency that has occurred this year. The deficiency has been continuous for the last four months and progressively larger.

The growing deficiency each month raises the question as to whether there is any hope of even approaching your directive on aircraft production. During the next five months, the step-up in production would have to be sufficiently great, not only to produce the additional planes that would be necessary to meet your objective, but also to make up the deficiencies that have accrued during the last seven months.

BOMBERS

We failed to meet our schedule for every type of bomber in July. The total bomber deficit was 368.

SECRET
[redacted]
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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

	ACCEPTANCES		
	Scheduled	Actual	Difference
Heavy Bombers	228	210	- 18
Medium Bombers	380	330	- 50
Light Bombers (2-engine)	407	158	- 249
Light Bombers (1-engine)	327	282	- 45
Patrol Bomber (4 & 2 eng.)	77	71	- 6
TOTAL BOMBERS	1,419	1,051	- 368

The production of 2-engine flying boats in July was only five greater than in February.

The production of 2-engine light bombers was smaller than any month this year. We accepted 158 2-engine light bombers in July, as contrasted with 314 in January.

FIGHTERS

Although deliveries of fighter planes were relatively better than those of bombers, we barely met our schedule. Total fighter plane deliveries were 1008 as compared with a schedule of 1014. Were it not for the fact that there was a large increase in the deliveries of 2-engine fighters (Lockheeds), the situation would have been much worse. We failed to meet the schedule of 1-engine fighters by 34 planes and navy fighter deliveries were 39 below schedule. Indeed, deliveries of 1-engine navy fighters were below those of any month since March.

	ACCEPTANCES		
	Scheduled	Actual	Difference
Fighters (2-engine)	120	187	+ 67
Fighters (1-engine)	754	720	- 34
Navy Fighters	140	101	- 39
TOTAL FIGHTERS	1,014	1,008	- 6

TRANSPORTS

We just made our schedule for transport planes. The total accepted was 193. It should be pointed out, however, that only one 4-engine heavy transport was accepted in July as compared with four in June. Although 173 medium transports (2-engine) were accepted, it should be remembered that this figure is only 55 greater than our acceptances for this type of plane in April.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
[redacted] By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

	ACCEPTANCES		
	Scheduled	Actual	Difference
Heavy Transport (4 & 2-eng.)	6	5	- 1
Medium Transport (2-engine)	146	173	+ 27
Light Transport (2-engine)	41	15	- 26
TOTAL TRANSPORTS	193	193	———

SUMMARY OF AIRPLANE ACCEPTANCES

January 1 - July 31

We have exceeded the pre-Pearl Harbor schedule for the first seven months of 1942 by 2,196 planes. However, this apparently fine accomplishment is accounted for primarily by excess production of communication planes ("puddle-jumpers"). Of the total excess of production over schedule of 2,196 planes, 1,981 come within the category of small communication planes.

We barely met the pre-Pearl Harbor schedule for the seven-month period for bombers and fighters. There was a deficit of 379 naval reconnaissance planes and 165 transports. Indeed, the only type of transport for which acceptances during the last seven-month period exceeded the pre-Pearl Harbor schedule, was the 2-engine heavy transport. We produced 5 and the schedule only called for three.

I am attaching herewith a detailed table showing the picture of actual acceptances as compared with the schedule of production that was made in December 1941, before you issued your aircraft production directive.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

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[redacted]

ACCEPTANCES

January 1, 1942 - July 31, 1942

	Actual	Scheduled 8-H - Amended December 30, 1941
BOMBERS		
Total Bombers	5,701	5,710
Heavy Bomber, 4-engine	1,131	1,052
Medium Bomber, 2-engine	1,534	1,418
Light Bomber, 2-engine	1,753	1,794
Light Bomber, 1-engine	858	1,041
Flying Boat, 4-engine	4	11
Flying Boat, 2-engine	421	394
FIGHTERS		
Total Fighters	5,846	5,860
Army Fighter, 2-Engine	849	1,147
Army Fighter, 1-Engine	4,307	4,189
Navy Fighter, 1-Engine	690	524
NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE	746	1,125
TOTAL COMBAT	12,293	12,695
TRANSPORTS		
Total Transports	722	887
Heavy Transport, 4-engine	11	14
Heavy Transport, 2-engine	5	3
Medium Transport, 2-engine	626	780
Light Transport, 2-engine	80	90
COMMUNICATIONS	2,264	283
TOTAL SERVICE COMBAT	2,986	1,170
TOTAL TACTICAL	15,279	13,865
TRAINERS		
Total Trainers	9,454	8,672
Advanced Trainer, 2-engine	1,847	1,776
Advanced Trainer, 1-engine	2,045	1,763
Basic Trainer, 1-engine	2,289	1,813
Primary Trainer	3,273	3,320
GRAND TOTAL	24,733	22,537

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By I. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

[redacted]

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The attached table shows actual production of each type of military plane by month from January 1 to July 31.

Heavy Bombers (4-engine)

It will be noted that production of heavy bombers (4-engine) was only 14 greater than in June. June production was 18 greater than in May and March production was 22 greater than in February. In other words, the rate of increase per month is not being maintained.

Flying Boats (2-engine)

The production of 2-engine flying boats has remained virtually static since April.

Medium Bombers (2-engine)

July showed a decline in the rate of increase for medium 2-engine bombers.

Light Bombers (2-engine)

July production is the lowest for any month thus far in 1942.

One-engine Pursuits

July production is only 68 greater than in January.

Navy Fighters (1-engine)

July production is the lowest since April and only 10 greater than in March.

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By N. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

[redacted]

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Naval Reconnaissance

July production is only 18 greater than in March.

Heavy Transports (4-engine)

July production is at the same level as in March.

Light Transports (2-engine)

Production in July was back to the March levels.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

[redacted]

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

MILITARY TYPE AIRPLANES

Actual Acceptances by Months

Type	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	Total
TOTAL Military Types	2972	3085	3472	3495	3920	3704	4095	24743
TOTAL Combat	1430	1498	1672	1571	1888	2064	2193	12316
Heavy Bomber (4 eng.)	86	134	156	171	178	196	210	1131
Flying Boat (4 eng.)	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	4
Flying Boat (2 eng.)	52	63	50	62	62	64	68	421
Medium Bomber (2 eng.)	31	108	266	222	261	316	330	1534
Light Bomber (2 eng.)	314	310	255	159	350	207	158	1753
Light Bomber (1 eng.)	9	14	53	107	170	223	282	858
Pursuit (2 eng.)	117	127	100	101	100	138	187	870
Pursuit (1 eng.)	652	561	585	539	566	684	720	4307
Navy Fighter (1 eng.)	74	80	91	107	107	132	101	692
Naval Reconnaissance	95	101	116	103	94	103	134	746
TOTAL Service Combat	211	430	443	511	414	406	557	2972
Heavy Transport (4 eng.)	0	0	1	2	4	4	1	12
Heavy Transport (2 eng.)	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	5
Medium Transport (2 eng.)	39	49	68	118	92	87	173	626
Light Transport (2 eng.)	14	13	15	8	8	7	15	80
Communication (2 & 1 eng.)	158	368	359	383	310	307	364	2249
TOTAL Trainer	1331	1157	1357	1413	1618	1234	1345	9455
Advance Trainer (2 eng.)	206	260	297	278	346	208	252	1847
Advance Trainer (1 eng.)	329	184	212	259	310	344	408	2046
Basic Trainer	328	351	325	338	325	306	316	2289
Primary Trainer	468	362	523	538	637	376	369	3273

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

August 6, 1942

[redacted]

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

7 10/26/42

C.F. War Production Board

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS: x4117

Will you be ready for something on this when I get back?

F.D.R.

THIS CAN BE FILED.

H.L.H.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

x249 Official

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

The President

The White House

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of August 12th to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to myself ~~on the subject of~~ aircraft production has received our most careful attention. It is desirable now to re-appraise our position from the standpoint of past deliveries, retarding factors and remedial measures necessary to secure the more rapid acceleration we all desire.

The replies to your letter from Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox were prepared in cooperation with representatives of the Aircraft Production Division of the War Production Board and, I believe, give you a correct picture of deliveries compared to schedules during the first seven months of 1942 and, in addition, list the main factors that have contributed to the prevention of greater accelerations.

There are a number of matters pertaining to the aircraft program of such vital importance that I am taking the liberty of presenting them here, since they were discussed and agreed upon at the "clinic" which you requested be held by representatives of the several agencies involved.

1942 Program

On January 3rd of this year you announced an aircraft program objective of 60,000 planes for 1942. This has subsequently served as our directive, toward the attainment of which every effort has been made. Although many of our associates have from the first indicated that they considered it unlikely that we could reach this figure, I have, nevertheless, felt it would be unwise to advise you of their doubts until the time had arrived when we could give you convincing evidence of what within closer limits the final figure would be. That time has now arrived.

Under the existing conditions of aircraft priority assignments, manufacturing facilities, and material supplies available to aircraft, it is probable that our 1942 deliveries will not exceed 48,000 planes.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or [redacted]
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-78
By RHP, Date MAR 14 1973

The flow time of materials in the aircraft industry is from five to seven months, so that it is not now possible greatly to accelerate output during the remainder of 1942. Every additional plane that can be turned out will be, so as to add as many possible to this number. I suggest a "green light" for the whole aircraft program, except primary trainers. With a stimulus, for instance, such as would be given by extending special preference to every item required for aircraft whether tool, material, or equipment, I believe our 1942 total airplane deliveries can be raised to something over 50,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be tactical airplanes (56% combat and 10% cargo and communications). The remaining 34% will be trainers.

1943 Program

Your announced directive for 1943 was 125,000 airplanes. Although little can be done to improve 1942 output, drastic steps taken now will substantially increase 1943 production. There are, however, several factors involved of which we feel you should be cognizant, and these together with attainable objectives, will be briefly touched upon in following paragraphs.

Weight Increase

As our program progresses, the percentage of heavy bombers will increase and training airplanes diminish. The disparity of weight is so great that, whereas the average airframe weight was about 4,000 lbs. at the beginning of 1942, it will be almost 9,000 lbs. at the end of 1943. For 1942, the average weight will be approximately 5,600 lbs., which will increase to an average of 8,000 lbs. for 1943. A 108% increase in number of airplanes produced (60,000 to 125,000) would represent almost a 200% increase in terms of airframe weight, and an increase of the same general order in the productive effort required. It is also important to note that, with an increasing proportion of bombers, the number of engines used will increase more than in proportion to the number of airframes.

Spares

The global war in which we are engaged makes necessary the establishment of great numbers of bases, widely separated. To keep our airplanes flying at these bases under war conditions, it has been necessary continually to increase percentages of spares. The latest directive for spares requirements for 1943 as established by the Services calls for very greatly increased percentages compared to those scheduled or actually being received in 1942. The manufacturing load is increased proportionately, with attendant reduction in the program of completed airplanes.

Engines

One of the major limiting factors in the aircraft program is the production of high horsepower engines. Facilities for the manufacture of these are being rapidly expanded. In addition to the engines which are being manufactured for original installation in planes, it is necessary for us to manufacture an additional fifty percent which are to be used as spares.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-78
By HEP, Date MAR 1 1979

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

Gliders

The glider program, introduced subsequently to the announcement of your program, is competitive with the aircraft schedules in instruments and in some equipment and materials. Its importance has given it a high priority position.

Changes

Combat experience makes changes necessary although it is always the aim to incorporate alterations at a stage of production which will cause the least possible interruption of manufacturing flow. This postponement of the time when changes are incorporated is not always a wise or practicable policy from the standpoint of military effectiveness. Changes will remain always an uncertain element in production forecasts.

The Program

Under the existing priority position for the aircraft program, and indications of the material supplies available, and with due consideration for the above factors, our forecast of probable 1943 deliveries is 92,000 airplanes. Although your directive of 125,000 airplanes for 1943 has remained as our ultimate objective and is being used as the basis of planning expansion of facilities, nevertheless, our target schedule for materials and equipment allocations is 107,111 (about 16% higher than our forecast so as to permit maximum possible delivery increase consistent with proper allocation policy, but 14% less than the ultimate objective). To attain this quantity, 107,111 will require that the unqualified "green light" signal for aircraft in all of its components including facilities, machine tools, basic materials and all other factors entering into the completed airplane, described above in the discussion of 1942 problems, be continued through 1943. I suggest that the aircraft program as a whole be preferred over all other production and that great caution be taken to avoid the giving of highest priority to special projects believed to be of an emergency character. Only in this way can there be any reasonable assurance of obtaining the target objective.

We fully appreciate the need of aircraft in ever-increasing quantities and assure you of the continuing best efforts of us all in getting the largest possible number, yet I urge that you accept our judgment that the figure 107,111, which represents about what we are likely to deliver even with the "green light", is the maximum realistic target figure and should be adopted both for allocation and expansion purposes, on the premise that a target set too high above a feasible goal may result in establishment of more facilities than can effectively be used, and this would be to the detriment of the scheduled program. Materials and labor expended in obtaining such facilities will not only cause us to get less planes than we otherwise would have produced, but unnecessarily detract from other vital parts of the program.

However, it is important for you to know that by the end of 1943 our target schedule of 107,111 airplanes provides for an annual rate of production of just over your directive figure of 125,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be combat types.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date MAR 14 1979

[redacted]

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

Remedies

We have ordered a listing of all items of tools, materials and equipment, the lack of delivery of which is in any way retarding the aircraft program. Our "clinic" considers the aircraft part of our war production effort as so outstandingly important that we feel justified in giving every such item a priority position so high as to assure its delivery when required. Your approval of the program as outlined is requested.

Respectfully yours,

Donald M. Nelson

x4735

Approved:

For the Army: Acting Secretary.

x25

Acting For the Navy:

x18

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-78
By RHP, Date MAR 14 1973

[redacted]

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

[redacted]

C. F.

Sent out 10/6/42

// War Production Board

October 1, 1942

My dear Mr. Nelson:

I am enclosing a memorandum I have today sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I see no reason for amending my judgment and instructions of January 3, 1942 relative to the production of tactical aircraft in 1943. Our production schedules in 1942 were disappointing and we simply must make the number of planes which I have indicated in 1943, and I wish you would make the appropriate allocations of the raw materials and machine tools to make certain that this objective will be carried out. x4404

You will note that I have requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend any changes in types of planes they think best within the total indicated for 1943.

At some early date I should like to have a conference with you and with Mr. Charles Wilson, whom, I understand, you have asked to take this particular matter in hand.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Enclosure. "N.B. I mean 100,000 delivered during 1943"

F.D.R."

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board.

x4735

HLH/lmb

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

x249 official

Copy was a revised decision.

Sent 10/6/42

[redacted]

October 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: x5014

I have before me the recommendation of the Air Corps of the Army and the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy in which they recommend that our strategic requirements necessitate the building of 63,068 tactical planes for the Army and 24,800 for the Navy, plus an additional 19,000 for our Allies, which adds up to approximately 107,000 combat planes. I realize that this recommendation was made irrespective of production possibilities and that these recommendations do not carry the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am seriously disturbed about the present rate of production of combat aircraft and I think the production schedule for 1943 outlined to me in Mr. Donald Nelson's recent letter is totally inadequate to meet our obvious requirements. I know, too, that any further delay in taking the steps that are necessary to increase production will only mean that we will not get the planes that we need in 1943.

After considering the various proposals and alternatives, I am determined that my original instructions covering the year 1943, which provide for 100,000 tactical aircraft, should remain our goal for 1943. I am convinced that this is not an impossible production requirement and can and should be carried out.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff may naturally wish, for strategic reasons, to modify the figures for the different types of planes required within this total.

I am informed that the major contributing factors which have retarded production are conflict of priorities and inadequate supply and distribution of materials.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By E. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

x25-U
x18-I
x25
x18

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

I have today requested Mr. Nelson to take such steps as may be necessary to insure that this aircraft program, including the adequate allocation of materials, facilities, machine tools and manpower, be realized.

I wish that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would send me a statement showing how the total of 100,000 planes should be broken down by tactical types, together with monthly production schedules which they feel should be maintained in order to meet the needs of our own military forces and the needs of our Allies.

"I mean 100,000 tactical (combat) planes

delivered during the calendar year

1943 - not 100,000 rate of delivery

at end of that year."

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

HLH/lmb

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

For files
Pres has seen this
[redacted] HLH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

RE: Airplane production in 1943.

The Army Air Corps has in their report to you recommended that, without consideration of production possibilities, they require for strategic purposes 63,068 tactical planes. The Navy in a similar report state that they require 24,800, making a total of 87,868 tactical planes for the United States forces. In addition 19,540 planes are required for our Allies, making the total requirements for tactical planes 107,408.

You will remember that Don Nelson wrote you that the probable output of tactical planes in 1943 will be 70,364. He further added if given a "green light" he could possibly step up the total to 82,000.

I have no doubt the War Production Board, the Army and the Navy will tell you that 107,408 tactical planes cannot possibly be built in 1943 without such serious repercussions on escort vessels, ammunition and anti-aircraft guns as to make the proposal an untenable one.

After making some pretty thorough inquiries around town, I am convinced that we will get an inordinate delay in getting this aircraft program increased by any further inquiries and my recommendation is that you return to your original proposal when you issued instructions that they were to build 100,000 tactical aircraft in 1943.

HLH

HARRY L. HOPKINS
x4117

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

C. F.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON War Production Board

October 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

x4735

Letter from Donald Nelson (secret) Oct. 3 in response to Pres. letter of Sept. 17th listing number of airplanes which Pres. regards as essential to be produced in 1943, with attached report.

x25
x25-U
x249 Official

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

DOROTHY:

This was sent to Nelson Sept. 17. I sent a carbon over with the original but you will find that the letter was dated August 17. I have asked Nelson's secretary to change the original to September and this is an extra carbon with the right date on it.

Lois

cf

[redacted]

b. 7.

War Production Board

September 17, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Donald:

I have just received from General Arnold the appended statement of our aircraft requirements for 1943. Although they have not yet been confirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I am of the opinion that these requirements are essential if we are to secure and maintain unquestioned air superiority over the Axis Powers in 1943. Slight adjustments in these figures may no doubt have to be made as time goes on, but such investigation as I have made convinces me that they represent what we must have during 1943.

x4774

AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS FOR 1943

All Types	139,190
Tactical	107,408
Heavy Bombers	12,202
Medium Bombers, 2-Eng.	12,065
Light Bombers, 2-Eng.	9,957
Dive Bombers, 1-Eng.	16,815
Fighters, 2-and 1-Eng.	43,382
Photographic, 2-Eng.	2,678
Transport, 4-and 2-Eng.	10,309
Other Types	31,782
Liaison, 1-Eng.	1,366
Trainers	22,132
Gliders	8,284

x249 Official
x25- U
x.b. 7. War
x25

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

FINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

FINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

I am informally bringing these figures to your attention at this time so that you can assess their significance in terms of production facilities and material requirements.

I will appreciate your letting me know as quickly as possible which arrangements will be required to realize this program.

I know this is a tough assignment but I believe the war may well be won much earlier if we can do this. Something, of course, must give way.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson, x4735
Chairman, War Production Board.

HLH/lmb

x4765

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By N. J. Stewart Date JAN 28 1972

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

C. F.
War Production Board

October 30, 1942

My dear Mr. Nelson:

All plans for offensive operations in progress and proposed are hampered and limited by the critical shortage of escort vessels. We must greatly increase our production of ocean-going escort vessels during 1943.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are very disturbed about this situation and I agree with them that everything possible be done to expedite the materials that are required to make certain that our 1943 objectives are reached. Even though this requires additional facilities, and particularly the conversion of machine tool manufacturing facilities into the production of main and auxiliary machinery and armament for the escort vessels, I think it should be done. x5014 x4404

I wish you would discuss this with Secretary Knox and let me know whether there are any difficulties in the way of accomplishing this program.

I am anxious that we get the 260 escort destroyers scheduled by the Navy for 1943, as well as the 50 to 70 Corvettes now being scheduled in existing facilities by the Maritime Commission. The materials necessary for both of these programs must be provided. x1905

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) F. D. R.

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board. x4735

Copies to: Sec. Knox.
Adm. Leahy,
Adm. King,
Gen. Marshall

Sent 10/31/42.

x18-R
x25-T

AL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I have rewritten the Chiefs of Staff proposed draft of the letter. I do not think it requires in Executive Order. I think it would be a great mistake for the President to sign the letter they prepared for his signature.

H.L.H.

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
WASHINGTON.

file

October 19, 1942

[redacted]

(SC)L11-1/QS1
(045900A)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2-26-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

My dear Mr. President:

Naturally, I am gratified over the action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on my recommendation for an increase in the number of escort vessels to be built in the immediate future. I call your attention to the fact, however, that of the 310 escort vessels which the Joint Planning Committee recommends being built in 1943, 200 of these were already acheduled for construction in that year so that the net increase in the production of this type of vessel is only 110, this in the face of an estimated shortage of 981.

This means that at the end of 1943, counting the escort vessels already in commission and with 310 included in this recommendation, we will have in service at the end of next year, approximately one-half of the vessels we now estimate to be necessary. This does not take into account the certainty that some of these vessels will be destroyed by the enemy or by the hazards of the sea. Our increasing need for escort vessels, as our forces overseas expand, is obvious. It is only fair to assume that our enemies will recognize that the submarine is their best weapon against our offensive overseas operations. I confidently expect that operations we contemplate in the near future will call forth a demonstration of submarine power that will require of us the very maximum of effort to provide adequate escort protection. This will mean further diversion from existing activities of our already inadequate escort facilities.

I believe there are other elements in our production program that might wisely be curtailed temporarily, if that is necessary, to get the material and the facilities and the skilled labor to produce at least double the number of escort vessels now contemplated for production in 1943. It seems to me of little avail to build more tanks than we can safely transport, to build more planes than those for which we can transport the necessary amount of gasoline and oil, and to build more cargo ships than we can send to sea safely with the reasonable hope that they will arrive at their destination. We cannot even continue to make enough aluminum for the proposed expanded airplane program unless we can provide adequate protection for the ships carrying bauxite ore from South America.

[redacted]
SECRET
(SC)L11-1/QS1
(045900A)

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

It is, of course, true that the success of our entire military program depends upon our ability to get the things we make and the men we train overseas to the scene of fighting. It is equally a truism that the ships we build to meet this necessity cannot fulfill their function successfully unless they are provided with a sufficiently strong escort to maintain that bridge of ships to the scene of combat.

Frankly, Mr. President, I think this subject should be restudied in the light of the realities of the whole situation. I feel so strongly on this subject that I would feel myself derelict in my duty to you if I did not write thus frankly.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

x18

The President

The White House

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

October 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of the Navy's letter of September 1, 1942, to you on the subject of escort vessels was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for recommendation as to corrective action.

In June the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that action be taken to bring into balance available escort vessels and the shipping which they must protect. This recommendation resulted in no effective action. Merchant vessels are still being destroyed faster than they are being built. Enemy submarines are still being built faster than they can be destroyed. Delivery of German submarines is now about one per day. It is estimated that the United States and the United Kingdom will have a combined shortage of 1,000 escort vessels on April 1, 1943.

All plans for offensive operations in progress and proposed are hampered and limited by the critical shortage of escort vessels. The essential result to be attained is the delivery of the maximum war-making power to the active theaters of the war. To accomplish this we must greatly increase our production of ocean-going escort vessels during 1943 by making very drastic adjustments in our production plans. Even though this must be accomplished in part by some reduction in the number of merchant ships constructed, it will result in a continuing increase in the number of merchant ships, with cargoes, arriving at destination:- not only because of ships kept afloat, but because the increased number of escorts will cause more expeditious turn around of convoys.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHT, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

[redacted]

x C. F. Navy
x C. F. Joint Chiefs of Staff
x 18- Misc. Naval Bkd Folder

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

[redacted]

To this end the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you promulgate the enclosed order.

For the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

x4189

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

[redacted]

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

EXECUTIVE ORDER

To: The Secretary of the Navy.
The Secretary of War.
The Administrator, War Shipping Administration.
The Chairman of the War Production Board.
The Chairman of the Combined Munitions Assignments Board.
The Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board.
The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.
Director of the Selective Service System.
Director, Bureau of the Budget.
The Administrator, Office of Lend Lease Administration.

In order to accelerate production of ocean-going escort vessels, there shall be completed during 1943 a minimum total of 310 of this type of vessel. This task shall be accomplished as outlined hereinafter.

(a) The Navy shall complete 260 Destroyer-escort vessels in 1943.

(b) The Maritime Commission shall, as soon as practicable, undertake the construction of 70 escort vessels of the British twin-screw corvette type, shall complete as many of this number as practicable but not less than fifty of these vessels in 1943.

(c) In the production of its 70 vessels with propulsion and other machinery, the Maritime Commission will employ insofar as can be made applicable, manufacturing capacity, facilities, and materials already scheduled for use in its own present program, but shall not utilize facilities now engaged in naval production.

(d) The Navy will provide armament, radar, gyro compasses, sound devices, and other equipment as is normally furnished as government furnished material, for both the Maritime Commission's corvettes and its own Destroyer-escort vessels.

(e) The specifications for equipment and material shall be liberalized as practicable in order to effect earliest delivery of the maximum number of ocean-going escort vessels with the minimum tactical requirements essential to the anti-submarine task in the protection of trans-oceanic convoys.

x161
x99
x6. F.-U.S. Maritime Commission

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-10-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
DEC 4 1973

NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

[redacted]

(f) The major elements of our existing war program with which the priorities, allocations and diversion of plant for the acceleration of the program must not interfere are:

(1) Aircraft.

(2) Aircraft carriers now scheduled for completion in 1943 and 1944.

(3) All other escort vessels including destroyers.

(4) Cruisers of all types now scheduled for completion in 1943 and 1944.

(5) Landing craft necessary to complete in order to clear their facilities for escort vessels as may be required.

(6) Tankers.

(7) Submarines completed prior to December 31, 1943.

(g) The dry cargo ships program, lend-lease munitions, and all other elements of the present planned production must contribute as necessary to the prosecution of the escort vessel program.

(h) The following conditions shall be imposed in order to accomplish the combined accelerated 1943 program:

(1) All skilled labor in manufacturing and shipbuilding plants involved in the escort vessel program shall be deferred from draft.

(2) War Production Board shall take necessary action so that materials and additional facilities will be provided when and if needed.

(3) Machine tool manufacturing facilities shall be converted as necessary for the production of main and auxiliary machinery and armament for the escort vessels.

x249 Official

[redacted]

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JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
DEC 4 1973

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FORM GA-90 (8-42)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

COURIER SERVICE CONTROL RECORD

NO. 07230

FROM: D. M. Nelson
NAME

Chairman WPB
TITLE

1166 ROOM NUMBER
SSB BUILDING

TO: The President
NAME

TITLE

ROOM NUMBER
White House BUILDING

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

ltr 11/26/42 re ltr 11/26/42 from Leahy re program

COPY 3
Addressee's Copy

THE SERIAL NUMBER IN THE UPPER RIGHT HAND CORNER SHOULD BE IDENTICAL TO NUMBER ON SENDER'S RECEIPT

RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file confidential

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

November 26, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In answer to Admiral Leahy's letter of November 26, I have just sent the attached.

Respectfully yours,

Donald M. Nelson

x4735

The President

The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date MAR 14 1973

[redacted]

RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

C. F.

November 26, 1942

[redacted]

War Production Board

Dear Admiral Leahy:

I have received your letter of November 26 in which you transmit the President's request that I state categorically whether or not the program you have outlined is possible of accomplishment.

I am making a complete review of this and will state to you on Monday whether or not the program is possible of accomplishment, and if not what portions are capable of accomplishment. I am including in this review such necessary programs as rubber, oil, aluminum expansion, and other expansions of material necessary to accomplish the program.

x510
x56
x1050

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) D. M. Nelson

Donald M. Nelson

Admiral William B. Leahy x4189
U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

DMN:it

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or [redacted]
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-78
By RHP, Date MAR 14 1973

x C. F. Joint Chiefs of Staff

[redacted]

RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

[redacted]

COPY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

November 26, 1942.

[redacted]

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board,
Room 5055 Social Security Building.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Nelson:

The President has directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to you the list of items which they consider to be what he terms a "No. 1 Group" and which must be produced in 1943 in order to produce a balanced war program. He further directed that you be requested to state categorically whether or not this program is possible of accomplishment.

x5014

FOR COMPLETION IN 1943

(a) 82,000 combat aircraft
25,000 training aircraft
The necessary equipment, armament, ammunition, and accessories for aircraft in the amounts to be used in active theaters within the succeeding 6 months.

(b) Munitions and miscellaneous and expendable supplies in amounts equivalent to the amounts required to be used in active combat theaters within the succeeding 6 months and included in Sections I and III of the Army Supply Program.

(c) The following ships for the Navy:

Battleships.....	2
Large Cruisers.....	0
Heavy Cruisers.....	4

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

x18-Misc. Naval Bldg. Folder
x249 official
x18
x178

[redacted]

RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

COPY

[redacted]

Light Cruisers.....	9
Aircraft Carriers.....	13
Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers.....	18
Destroyers.....	119
Destroyer Escort Vessels (Navy Contracts).....	260
Submarines.....	59

The necessary equipment and accessories to make the above ships "ready to fight."

(d) The following ships to be constructed by the Maritime Commission:- Transoceanic vessels, seagoing tankers, seagoing oil barges and appurtenant tugs, and escort vessels and auxiliary carriers to be constructed for the Navy, all with necessary arms and equipment, to be commissioned within 12 months.

x1705
x99

FOR COMPLETION IN 1944

The 1943 production program to provide for the completion in 1944 of the following naval vessels:

Battleships.....	1
Large Cruisers.....	2
Heavy Cruisers.....	6
Light Cruisers.....	14
Aircraft Carriers.....	11
Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers.....	18
Destroyers.....	107
Destroyer Escort Vessels (Navy Contracts).....	420
Submarines.....	92

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Copy made in DMNelson's office 11/26/42

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

[redacted]

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

C. F.
War Production Board file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1943.

PSF

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CRIM:

The President is seeing Hon. Donald Nelson and Hon. Leland Olds, re the attached confidential communication, at 12.30 P. M., Sunday (tomorrow) January 3rd. He wishes to have this correspondence in front of him when he talks to these gentlemen. Will you, therefore be good enough to see that this is done.

x235

Thank you.

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President.

RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

Jan. 2

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

December 24, 1942

[redacted]

My dear Mr. President:

x284

I should like to have an opportunity to talk to you about the work of our Power Division in the War Production Board, and its importance to and interrelations with the rest of the war program.

Power is the one basic and inseparable element in all phases of war production. In my opinion, efficient war production, to say nothing of the protection of the civilian economy, cannot be maintained unless the programming, supervision, and control of the use of power is invested in the same agency that controls production planning and distribution of materials.

The experience of the past two years has demonstrated that if maximum results are to be achieved, the operation of the various power systems, public and private, must be coordinated and brought into willing cooperation with each other. Simply as a result of the measures which the War Production Board has sponsored, the power capabilities of the Nation have been increased several million kilowatts above the estimates based on statistics. This increase partly reflects reduction in reserves made possible by pooling the facilities of neighboring systems. But in addition to the amounts made available by reducing the reserves, approximately 1,250,000 kilowatts of additional power have been made available without touching normal reserves. These figures are accepted as reliable, not only by the War Production Board engineers who developed them, but also by operating engineers all over the country in the public and private systems which are participating in the pools.

The most important items of war production, electrochemical and electro-metallurgical products, are the heaviest users of power in the entire economy. But all other war production is also importantly dependent upon power. The planning of war production and the operation of the war production plants must go hand in hand at every step with the planning of power supply, the operation of the power plants, and the allocation of electricity. We cannot meet our war production goals unless this unified form

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of administration is preserved. Under present conditions of scarcity, affecting as they do all critical materials and all basic commodities, our only hope of filling quotas is to schedule our planning and our operations in such a way as to obtain the maximum effective use of all of our resources. In no other field is this so essential as in that of electric power. The only reason that war production has never yet been hampered by lack of power is because from the outset our administration in the power field has recognized these essential principles.

The reasons for the peculiar inseparability of all phases of administration in the field of power and administration of overall war production can be made concretely clear. Power is not only a basic element of all war production but it is also the element which requires planning longer in advance than any other and which requires the highest degree of coordination in the operation of plants and facilities in order to make power available wherever it is needed without an investment of critical materials beyond our capacity to produce.

Outside the Army and the Navy, utilities are the largest single consumer of copper. The utilities also require enormous quantities of steel, particularly alloy steel, large castings and forgings--items which are among the principal limiting factors in our most important war production operations. The generating equipment and heavy auxiliaries and other materials required by utilities make them the most serious competitors of the ammunition, war ship, merchant ship, bomber, rubber and high octane programs.

The necessity for programming all of our critical materials such as copper, steel, aluminum, and so forth, and facilities for fabrication, so that they may be put to the best use in war production is at once apparent. The programs involving the uses of these materials conflict with each other in fields where at first glance there would appear to be no conflict. For instance, generating equipment and turbines are two items on which the strictest allocations have already been made due to the vital needs of the Navy for these two items, and any shift in programming facilities will affect seriously the urgent demands of the Navy for escort vessels and other combat ships.

The effects of underbuilding in the power field could be disastrous. But the consequences of overbuilding power facilities would likewise be fatal to the war effort. Overbuilding in the

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power field, more than any other, means a direct and unmistakable reduction in bullets, bombs, bombers, rubber, aviation gasoline, war ships and merchant marine. The only solution is to assure a balanced, coordinated program for power supply. Such a program cannot be provided unless the planning, the operation, and the allocation of supplies are in the hands of the overall war production agency.

It has been alleged by some that we in the War Production Board are prejudiced in favor of private power and that your public power policies have been sacrificed. I can assure you most emphatically that this is not true. As a result of the War Production Board program, additions to capacity from January, 1942, through 1944 will total approximately 7,000,000 kilowatts. Of this amount not quite 4,000,000 is private, mostly steam, and slightly more than 3,000,000 is public, mostly hydro. This result is being achieved despite the fact that of the power presently available throughout the country 85% comes from private sources and only 15% from public projects. This whole question of the War Production Board's ability to allocate power in conformity with demands is vital to the proper functioning of the Board.

I should like to recommend most strongly that before any decision is arrived at to change the agreement of April 24, 1942, made by us with the Federal Power Commission, I be given an opportunity to explain to you in detail just what disastrous effect this will have on the war program as now under way.

Respectfully,

Donald M. Nelson

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The President

The White House

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War Production Board

WALSH, A. J.
Deputy Director of Procurement
Treasury Department
June 8, 1944

Letter to Director of Budget enclosing letter dated 6/5/44 from Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of War Production Board addressed to the President together with proposed Executive Order covering release of metallic cadmium for the use of the Army.--Letter sent to Attorney General, 6/14/44 and the Attorney General transmitted to the President revised draft of this proposed Executive Order with approval. Executive order signed 6/21/44 and returned to Bureau of the Budget, 6/22/44.

SEE - C.F. TREASURY

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