DOROTHY:

I HAVE COPIES OF THESE LETTERS IN MY FILES AND THE COPY OF THE NOTE TO THE PRESIDENT. DO YOU WANT THESE?

LOIS
Mr. Satta
For your send
Lease Corp. Files
Hyde Park, N.Y.
November 3, 1941.

Dear Henry:

I wish you would take the initiative and make a quick study of the strategic use of machine tools being manufactured in the United States. I think the study should be confined to the use of existing or contemplated production of machine tools, rather than an inquiry into how our production can be increased, because the latter point is now under consideration by the Office of Production Management.

I have a feeling that we are permitting machine tools to leave the country which we need urgently in our munitions factories and which would contribute more to building up increased munitions production than would their export at this time. I am particularly anxious for you to explore the disposition of machine tools required for those particular items on the munitions list such as tanks, airplanes, ammunition, antiaircraft guns and anti-tank guns which are so urgently needed, and whose production could be immediately accelerated if machine tools were available.

I am asking the Secretary of the Navy to join you in this study. Bear in mind that I do not want a detailed analysis, but rather an early strategic opinion as to whether certain machine tools now being shipped abroad should be withheld from export and instead made available to the munitions factories.

I understand the machine tool coordinator of England will be here in a day or two, which would give you an opportunity of talking the whole matter over with him, as well as with Mr. Stettinius. I think Mr. Biggers probably has some recent information on this subject, which should be made available to you and Frank.

I think you should exclude from your consideration the source of payment of these tools, because we can find a way of getting them transferred, irrespective of who may have made the original purchase.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

cc to Frank Knox
Hyde Park, N.Y.,
November 3, 1941.

Dear Frank:

I am enclosing copy of letter I wrote
today to Secretary Stimson, which is self-explanatory.

I am anxious that this study be prosecuted
as quickly as possible, in order that some of these
machine tools may be better utilized in our factories
and arsenals in the immediate future.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Frank Knox

Secretary of the Navy.

1 enclosure.
De...

Hyde Park, N.Y.
November 3, 1941.

Dear Bill:

I know the efforts that have been made in increasing the quantity of machine tools. I know, too, that the machine tool industry still has some plausible alibis. But the truth of the matter seems to be that the shortage of machine tools, no matter what the reason, is holding back early production more than anything else.

I am wondering if you would not think it wise, in order to lift the machine tool production to the necessary level, to get some hard-hitting fellow with a national reputation for achievement and quick action, to take charge of a national campaign under the O.P.M., to increase the production of machine tools. My thought would be a short-time job on his part and would include the corralling of funds for the placing of immediate orders, as well as exploring every possible avenue for the actual increasing of machine tool production.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable William Knudsen,
Office of Production Management,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Dear Mr. President:

I am attaching two letters which I suggest be sent to Stimson and Knox. From some preliminary reports that have been made, we are quite sure that a large number of machine tools which are now going to England, Canada and some other foreign countries, could be better used in the interest of quick production, particularly of tanks and airplanes in this country, rather than abroad. Almost every shortage we have finally comes down to machine tools.

Harry Hopkins
November 4, 1941

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of November 3 on the subject of machine tool production. We may need additional help in the department and your suggestion shall have careful attention. In the meantime, both W. H. Harrison, who is director of the section, and myself have been in direct contact with the machine tool industry during the last month in order to still further increase the production which has risen from an average of $25,000,000 per month in 1939 to $35,000,000 per month in 1940, and to $70,000,000 per month this year. We hope to raise this through longer hours, some plant expansion, and subcontracting to $100,000,000 per month in 1942.

Our main problem is the twenty-one plants making the large tools. These are being constantly surveyed by men sent out for that specific purpose, and we are also surveying railroad and machine shops for additional tools which can be had now that the Requisitioning Bill is signed. I am confident that in a reasonably short time we will have the critical items under control.

Respectfully yours,

William S. Knudsen
My dear Mr. Stettinius:

On November 7, 1941, I addressed a letter to His Excellency President Kalinin in which I congratulated him upon the national anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and expressed the admiration of the people of the United States for the "valiant and determined resistance of the army and people of the Soviet Union" and the determination of the United States that the "sacrifices and sufferings of those who have the courage to struggle against aggression will not have been in vain".

In that letter I assured President Kalinin "of the desire of the Government and people of the United States to do everything possible to assist your country in this critical hour."

In accordance with that pledge and pursuant to the power conferred upon me by the Lend-Lease Act, I have today found that the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is vital to the defense of the United States. I therefore authorize and direct you to take immediate action to transfer defense supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Lend-Lease Act and to carry out the terms of my letter of October 30, 1941 to Premier Stalin.

I should appreciate it if you would work out as quickly as possible details of this program with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
The President today addressed to Honorable Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, a letter of which the text is as follows:

"On November 7, 1941, I addressed a letter to His Excellency President Kalinin in which I congratulated him upon the national anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and expressed the admiration of the people of the United States for the 'valiant and determined resistance of the army and people of the Soviet Union' and the determination of the United States that the sacrifices and sufferings of those who have the courage to struggle against aggression will not have been in vain'.

"In that letter I assured President Kalinin 'of the desire of the Government and people of the United States to do everything possible to assist your country in this critical hour.'

"In accordance with that pledge and pursuant to the power conferred upon me by the Lend-Lease Act, I have today found that the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is vital to the defense of the United States. I therefore authorize and direct you to take immediate action to transfer defense supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Lend-Lease Act and to carry out the terms of my letter of October 30, 1941 to Premier Stalin.

"I should appreciate it if you would work out as quickly as possible details of this program with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

---
My dear Mr. Secretary:

Some time ago when we were estimating the light tanks for export, it was on a basis of a total production of 290 light tanks for October. The Army made the excellent record of producing 405 light tanks in October.

You will recall that we cut down the number of light tanks going to the British in the Middle East quite extensively last month and I think the excess of production should go to the Middle East immediately to take part in the forthcoming battle.

Obviously we cannot send more to Russia because we haven't got the ammunition to go with the tanks. If we had, I believe I would suggest sending them there.

I wish that every possible speed would be used to get these tanks on shipboard to move to the Middle East.

I notice in the agreement with Russia we plan to send them 375 Tommy guns in November and many thousands in December. I am wondering if our ammunition situation isn't such that we can send more Tommy guns immediately to Russia where they are desperately needed. Do you think you could get off three or four thousand guns with an adequate amount of ammunition? I think it is very important not to send the guns unless we can send the ammunition that is needed to handle these guns in battle.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable

The Secretary of War.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Our light tank production in October was 405 as against an estimate of 290.

Inasmuch as the tank allotment for the Middle East was markedly cut down for the month of October, it seems to me all of this excess should be sent to the Middle East immediately.

The reason that they could not go to Russia is because 37 mm ammunition is not available to send with the tanks, but the British have ammunition and these tanks will be desperately needed there in the coming battle.

The agreement with the Russians provides for sending some 375 Tommy guns to Russia this month, but many more in December. Bob Patterson tells me confidentially that the 45 caliber ammunition situation has improved and I think it is extremely important to ship as many Tommy guns as we have ammunition for to Russia at once because it is one of the most valuable guns they can use. The gun is not used extensively in our Army.

I am therefore enclosing a suggested draft of a letter to Secretary Stimson for your approval.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

THIS DOES NOT REQUIRE AN ANSWER.

H.L.H.

x4117
Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of November 7th suggesting that we make our recent excess in production of light tanks available to the British for use in the Middle East came just after General Marshall and I had acceded to a request coming from General Dill for three hundred fifty medium tanks. Dill sent this request direct to Marshall and his letter set out such a situation that we felt his request should be granted at once and we took the responsibility of so doing. But this meant turning over to the British the entire November and December production of medium tanks and, unless we retain this unexpected excess of the light tanks to which your letter refers to use with our own units for training in the place of the medium tanks which we have thus given to Dill, we will be faced with a very unfortunate situation with our own troops.

Furthermore we will have exhausted all our possible excess of ammunition to go with the medium tanks I have just mentioned and we would have none for use with the light tanks if we gave them.

The present transfer schedule to Russia, calling for 376 Thompson sub-machine guns in November, and 19,000 in December can be reversed. However, the two million rounds of ammunition scheduled for transfer to Russia in November was taken from the British allotment and is all that can be transferred without further impairing the British schedule. Since the British have transferred to Russia from Great Britain 23,000 of these guns with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun, it is believed that no further inroads should be made on the amount now scheduled for the British.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry l. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
Dear Harry:

You have undoubtedly seen the attached wire from the Middle East. Is there any chance of anything being done in regard to this?

If it were possible to send all or any part of these P-40E’s to the fighting front I think it would be a desirable thing to do.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/1mb
11/8/41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This sounds very urgent to me and I gather it reflects their anxiety to have an adequate number of planes if the battle begins. I wonder if you think it wise to send the attached letter to the War Department.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

x249 official
November 8, 1941

Dear Miss Tully:

At Mr. Stettinius' suggestion, I am sending you herewith a set of photostatic copies of the documents which the President signed and initialed yesterday afternoon.

Sincerely yours,

OscC

Oscar S. Cox

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From:    E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Subject: Lend-Lease Aid to Russia

Attached is a proposed letter for your signature finding the defense of Russia vital to the defense of the United States. This finding is necessary to carry out the policy of lend-lease aid to Russia as announced yesterday.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.

[Signature]

4659
November 7, 1941

My dear Mr. Stettinius:

On November 7, 1941, I addressed a letter to His Excellency President Kalinin in which I congratulated him upon the national anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and expressed the admiration of the people of the United States for the "valiant and determined resistance of the army and people of the Soviet Union" and the determination of the United States that the "sacrifices and sufferings of those who have the courage to struggle against aggression will not have been in vain".

In that letter I assured President Kalinin "of the desire of the Government and people of the United States to do everything possible to assist your country in this critical hour."

In accordance with that pledge and pursuant to the power conferred upon me by the Lend-Lease Act, I have today found that the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is vital to the defense of the United States. I therefore authorize and direct you to take immediate action to transfer defense supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Lend-Lease Act and to carry out the terms of my letter of October 30, 1941 to Premier Stalin.

I should appreciate it if you would work out as quickly as possible details of this program with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Lend-Lease Administrator
November 7, 1941

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Executive Order of October 28, 1941 and the President's letter of November 7, 1941, finding the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics vital to the defense of the United States, I respectfully request you to effect the transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of those defense articles set forth in the annexed schedule which are in the possession of or on order by the War Department with Lend-Lease funds.

Consultation having been had with the Chief of Staff of the Army, I respectfully request you to effect such transfers, whenever possible, from articles procured from funds appropriated prior to March 11, 1941.

In the event that any items can not be filled by the transfer of defense articles procured from funds appropriated prior to March 11, 1941, I respectfully request you, after consultation with me to effect the transfers from defense articles being procured with Lend-Lease funds.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Land-Lease Administrator

The Honorable

The Secretary of War
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**Automatic Weapon**

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- Will be supplied to match tanks
- 19/614
### MILITARY ITEMS - ENCLOSURE "A"

**November 7, 1941**

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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Shell, HE 90 mm. M58</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Shell, HE Mark I, 75 mm. w/M46 Fuse</td>
<td>45,400</td>
<td>152,100</td>
<td>Monthly schedules for these items will be provided on a weapon basis of allocations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Link, Metallic, Cal. 50</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>1,932,308</td>
<td>Monthly schedules for these items will be provided on a weapon basis of allocations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BOMBS, AIRCRAFT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bomb, Demolition, 500#, M33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bomb, Demolition, 300#, M31</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bomb, Demolition, 100#, M30</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bomb, Fragmentation, 20#</td>
<td>1,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P 40 E</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P 40 E</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALLOCATION OF AIRCRAFT
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Trucks, Jeeps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Field Telephone Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Field Telephone Cable (7 Strands Type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Underwater Telegraph Cable (gutta-percha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Submarine Cable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Aluminum Duraluminum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nickel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Molybdenum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Rolled Brass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Electrolytic Zinc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Copper Goods (tubes, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Ferrosilicon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ferrochrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Armor Plate for Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Hard Alloys and Cutting tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. High Speed Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Tool Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Hot-rolled Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Steel Billets, Chrome-silicon-manganese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Cold-rolled Steel Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Cold-rolled Steel Sheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Tin Plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Steel Wire in Accordance with Specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Steel Wire Ropes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Steel Alloy Tubes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Steel Wire, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Armor Plate for Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Stainless Steel Wire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Nickel Chrome Wire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Barbed Wire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Toluol TNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Nitroglycerine Powder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Phenol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Petroleum Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Ethylene Glycol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Sodium Bromide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Phosphorous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Dibutil-Phtalate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Dimethylaniline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Diphenylamine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Colloxylin Nitrocellulose Varnish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Metal Cutting Machine Tools in accordance with Specifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Electric Furnaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Forging and Press Equipment according to Specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. Various Industrial Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Abrasives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. Graphitized Electrodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. Sole Leather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66. Army Boots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. Army Cloth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Subject: Lend-Lease Aid to Turkey

1. There is no outstanding finding by you that the defense of the Government of Turkey is vital to the defense of the United States.

2. Although you can personally authorize the retransfer of Lend-Lease articles to the Government of Turkey without a finding that its defense is vital to our own, under the Executive Order setting up the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the powers of the Administrator to authorize transfers or retransfers can be exercised only "with respect to any nation whose defense the President shall have found to be vital to the defense of the United States". Therefore, in order for the Lend-Lease Administrator to authorize either the transfer or retransfer of Lend-Lease articles to Turkey, the President should find its defense vital to the defense of the United States. Once this has been done, I can take the necessary steps to see that Lend-Lease aid
is given to Turkey.

2. Attached hereto is a proposed Presidential directive finding that the defense of Turkey is vital to the defense of the United States. It has been approved by the State Department.
November 7, 1941

My dear Mr. Stettinius:

I have today found that the defense of the Government of Turkey is vital to the defense of the United States. I therefore desire you to take immediate action to transfer to the Government of Turkey under the Lend-Lease Act all feasible material aid.

I should appreciate it if you and Secretary Hull would work out the details of this program with representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Lend-Lease Administrator
MEMORANDUM

TO: The President
FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

1 - Do you want me to work out with Secretary Hull the question of Lend-Lease aid to Czechoslovakia?

2 - Do you want me to scout out with Secretary Stimson and Assistant Secretary Lovett the feasibility of having the Army Ferrying Command make flight delivery of aircraft to the British across the North Atlantic?

Yes

No

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1941

My dear Mr. Stettinius:

For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lend-Lease Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941, and in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to the French Volunteer Forces (Free French) by way of retransfer from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or their allies, I hereby find that the defense of any French territory under the control of the French Volunteer Forces (Free French) is vital to the defense of the United States.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Lend-Lease Administrator
My dear Mr. Stettinius:

For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lend-Lease Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941 and in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to all nations already receiving aid in such manner as I shall have directed, whether directly or by way of retransfer, I hereby find that the defense of the following countries is vital to the defense of the United States:

1. India, Burma, the Dominions of Australia.
   Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, (including mandated territories under Dominion mandate) Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and the British colonial dependencies (including mandated territories under British mandate).

2. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

3. The Kingdom of Egypt.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Lend-Lease Administrator
OFICE OF THE
LEND LEASE ADMINISTRATOR
Washington, D.C.
515 22d Street NW.

November 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Attached hereto are two letters intended to take care of the point you made yesterday about the Free French. You will note that the authority given to me in regard to the Free French is now limited to retransfers through the British and their allies.

E.R. Stettinius Jr.
The President wrote to Mr. Stettinius saying that in order that Lend-Lease aid to the French National Committee (now Fighting France) may be more effectively rendered, his letter to Mr. Stettinius of Nov. 11, 1941, is hereby amended to remove the provision that such aid be arranged for "by way of retransfer from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or their allies", and Mr. Stettinius is hereby authorised to arrange for Lend-Lease aid directly to the authorities of the French National Committee (Fighting France). — President's letter is as per draft supplied by Under Secretary of State Welles, Oct. 5, 1942, with letter to the President, even date. Mr. Welles discussed arrangements and said that it is understood as a practical matter that except for the formality of signature the Fighting French will continue in large part to utilize the machinery of the British Supply Council.

SEE C.F. LEND LEASE
FILE MEMO:

This confidential memo on lend-lease aid was given to Mr. Hassett in Nov. 14, 1941. I don't remember now what it was to be used for or who sent it to us.

UNCLASSIFIED

Regarded

5-12-43
LEND-LEASE PROGRESS

1. Total Lend-Lease aid as of today has passed the billion dollar mark.

2. To the end of October the amount of aid, including articles and services transferred and in process, was approximately 919 million dollars. Increases since then have brought the figure to more than a billion dollars.

3. The steady increase in Lend-Lease aid is shown by the following monthly amounts in millions of dollars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total to Oct. 31, 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. As of today all of the 7 billion dollars originally appropriated has been allocated by the Lend-Lease Administration to the War, Navy, Agriculture and Treasury Departments and to the Maritime Commission, for the procurement of arms, ships, food and other defense articles and services.

5. Contracts have been let for more than 70 per cent of the 7 billion dollars allocated and the remainder will be obligated as rapidly as possible.

6. Lend-Lease aid alone is only a part of our total aid to those fighting the aggressors. Thus, since the beginning of the war, our exports to the British alone have amounted to approximately 5-1/4 billion dollars. In October, augmented by Lend-Lease aid, exports to the British amounted to a high of 330 million dollars.

7. Speed in providing Lend-Lease aid is of vital importance. Recent changes in the administration of the program have materially accelerated the rendering of Lend-Lease aid. The figures on the monthly increases of Lend-Lease aid speak for themselves.

November 14, 1941
### TOTAL LEND-LEASE AID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AID</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE TO OCTOBER 31, 1941</th>
<th>MONTH OF OCTOBER 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Defense Articles Transferred</td>
<td>$554,676,407</td>
<td>$133,258,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Servicing and Repair of Ships</td>
<td>55,282,728</td>
<td>9,247,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rental and Charter of Ships, etc.</td>
<td>60,751,529</td>
<td>22,869,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Articles on Hand and in Process</td>
<td>184,073,755</td>
<td>44,084,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Production Facilities</td>
<td>63,559,051</td>
<td>15,385,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Miscellaneous Expenses</td>
<td>1,036,695</td>
<td>360,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Lend-Lease Aid</strong></td>
<td><strong>$919,380,165</strong></td>
<td><strong>$225,205,448</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ALLOCATIONS AND OBLIGATIONS OF LEND-LEASE FUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BILLIONS OF DOLLARS - CUMULATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIRST APPROPRIATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECOND APPROPRIATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLOCATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBLIGATIONS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EXPORTS TO BRITISH EMPIRE AND EGYPT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILLIONS OF DOLLARS - MONTHLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT PURCHASE EXPORTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXPORTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEND-LEASE EXPORTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cap. Prof. in your tent tents.
Nov. 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

To investigate and prepare reply.

F.D.R.

Letter signed by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, 11/13/41, to the President, in reference to the President's letter of 11/3/41 in re export of machine tools. Copy of letter retained for our files.

x4404
13 November 1941

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your letter of November 3 with regard to export of machine tools:

1. This matter has been giving us great concern for many months. Our productive effort has felt the impact of the demand for machine tools from England - the total export of machine tools in the fourteen months ending August 31, 1941, had reached $252,000,000, against the total production in this country in the year 1939 of $275,000,000. Last summer, Lord Beaverbrook secured an agreement to export about 13,000 machine tools for Britain, which were on order here but not shipped, before the end of this calendar year. The Services vigorously protested that agreement and secured some relaxation.

2. We believe that in many instances greater productive use can be made of a substantial number of critical tools in this country than by shipment abroad. Certain types are sorely needed to increase production here and it is these critical items rather than the total amount of exports that is causing us concern.

3. Our views were borne out by the report of O.P.M. management engineers who recently returned from England on a mission to determine British requirements and to obtain a formula of evaluation of these requirements with our own. The British Controller General of Machine Tools accompanied them on their return here and staff officers in the Army and Navy specializing on machine tools have been conferring during the last ten days with these O.P.M. engineers and the British Controller General. As a result of such conferences we expect an agreement early next week on exactly the tools that should be exported to Great Britain during the next four months. There will be a sharp reduction in the amount shipped to England, and a formula will be worked out whereby, with the British, we can evaluate their requirements and export to them only the tools that will best serve our joint purposes.
4. The situation in regard to Russian exports in some respects parallels exports to Great Britain. In general, they ask for a great variety of tools including some that are most critical to our own industry and in some items amounts greater than our total capacity of production. We feel that their requirements, in many cases, are made without any definite objective as to use and, for this reason, believe it desirable to send engineers to Russia to make a survey paralleling that made in England. This is now being explored with O.P.W.

Summarizing the above, it may be stated that the question of the export of tools to Great Britain and the Dominions - in the light of the greatest maximum use in the over-all effort - is in process of early solution and that there will be marked reduction in tools so exported. In the case of Russia a similar formula should be developed, and we believe can be, before any substantial amount of tools are shipped. The few machine tools exported to other countries are not of a critical nature nor do they affect the over-all situation.

We agree with the implication in your letter that the rapid prosecution of our own production program on tanks, airplanes, guns, AA guns, anti-tank guns, etc. requires the closest examination of all machine tool exports, and a substantial reduction in the immediate months in the shipment of critical tools.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
The Secretary of War

(Handwritten)
FRANK KINCAID
The Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable
The President

The White House
October 29, 1941

THIS WAS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT TODAY.

L. Berney
November 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

THIS DOES NOT REQUIRE A REPLY.

AS A RESULT OF YOUR LETTER THE ARMY AND NAVY HAVE HELD CONFERENCES WITH THE BRITISH AND HAVE SECURED ABOUT 2900 MACHINE TOOLS WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE GONE TO ENGLAND. THESE ARE VERY CRITICAL TOOLS AND SHOULD HELP OUR PRODUCTION SUBSTANTIALLY.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your letter of November 3 with regard to export of machine tools:

1. This matter has been giving us great concern for many months. Our productive effort has felt the impact of the demand for machine tools from England - the total export of machine tools in the fourteen months ending August 31, 1941, had reached $252,000,000, against the total production in this country in the year 1939 of $375,000,000. Last summer, Lord Beaverbrook secured an agreement to export about 13,000 machine tools for Britain, which were on order here but not shipped, before the end of this calendar year. The Services vigorously protested that agreement and secured some relaxation.

2. We believe that in many instances greater productive use can be made of a substantial number of critical tools in this country than by shipment abroad. Certain types are sorely needed to increase production here and it is these critical items rather than the total amount of exports that is causing us concern.

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Summarizing the above, it may be stated that the question of the export of tools to Great Britain and the Dominions - in the light of the greatest maximum use in the over-all effort - is in process of early solution and that there will be marked reduction in tools so exported. In the case of Russia a similar formula should be developed, and we believe can be, before any substantial amount of tools are shipped. The few machine tools exported to other countries are not of a critical nature nor do they affect the over-all situation.

We agree with the implication in your letter that the rapid prosecution of our own production program on tanks, airplanes, guns, AA guns, anti-tank guns, etc. requires the closest examination of all machine tool exports, and a substantial reduction in the immediate months in the shipment of critical tools.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
The Secretary of War

Frank Knox
The Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable
The President
The White House
November 19, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your consideration a redraft of a Preliminary Lease-Lend Agreement with Great Britain.

Last July the Department, with your approval, informally gave to the British a draft of temporary lease-lend agreement, a copy of which is attached. Its purpose was to carry out your instructions that decision regarding the quid pro quo was to be deferred to a final settlement and that it should then be framed within certain broad principles relating to world peace and international economic relations. These principles were stated in Article VII.

The British have informally handed us a redraft which made no changes of substance except in Article VII, a copy of which is attached. The changes in Article VII grew out of their fear, expressed in the memorandum of conversation with Mr. Keynes attached, that our draft would commit the British to a specific commercial policy which they could not.

The President,

The White House.
not carry out in the absence of action by this country and others to make possible the payment for imports which Great Britain would need in the reconstruction period and after.

There is some difference of view among the British as to their post war commercial policy in relation to this country. The Foreign Office and the Board of Trade are in favor of harmonizing their commercial policy with that of the United States, having in mind, among other things, that only in this way can there be full cooperation with the United States. The Treasury, or some persons there, insist upon the necessity for independence of action which may be designed to force British exports, the need for which will be very great in order to finance British import requirements.

The British draft was so vague as to be largely meaningless and was not satisfactory to this Department.

A new draft of Article VII has been made which recognizes the necessity for agreed action between the nations, by international and domestic measures, to expand production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods. It also states the necessity for international agreement to eliminate all forms of discriminatory treatment in commerce and the reduction
of tariffs and trade barriers. The objectives are summarized as those stated in the Atlantic Charter.

Provision is made for the commencement of joint discussions to find ways and means of accomplishing the objectives and of enlisting the participation of other nations.

If you approve, the Department proposes to hand the draft informally to the British Ambassador and urge the necessity of early agreement upon it.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Redraft of Preliminary Lease-Lend Agreement.
2. Draft of Temporary Lease-Lend Agreement.
3. Redraft of Article VII.
4. Memorandum of conversation of July 28, 1941 between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Keynes.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM:

Please let us have copies of the attached for the White House files.

Attached are copies in accordance with your request.

[Stamp: Assistant Secretary of State
NOV 21 1941
MR. ACHESON]
Enclosure No. 1.

Redraft of Preliminary Lease-Lend Agreement with Great Britain, prepared by the Department of State.
Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression.

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding
concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the
providing of defense aid and in regard to certain considera-
tions which shall be taken into account in determining such
terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement
has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts,
conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary
to perform, fulfill or execute prior to the making of such
an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the
United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been
performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respec-
tive Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I.

The Government of the United States of America will
continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom
with such defense articles, defense services, and defense
information as the President shall authorize to be trans-
ferred or provided.

ARTICLE II.

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to
contribute to the defense of the United States of America
and the strengthening thereof and, should circumstances
arise in which the United States of America in its own de-
fense or the defense of the Americas may require articles,
services, or information, will provide such articles, ser-
vices, or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III.
ARTICLE III.

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV.

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President.

ARTICLE V.

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.
ARTICLE VI.

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII.

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory
discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to
the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in
general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives
set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941,
by the President of the United States of America and the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be
begun between the two Governments with a view to determin­
ing, in the light of governing economic conditions, the
best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by
their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of
other like-minded Governments.

ARTICLE VIII.

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's
date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed
upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this
day of , 1941.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Signature]

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

[Signature]
Enclosure No. 2.

Draft of Preliminary Lease Lend Agreement with Great Britain handed to Mr. Keynes, July 28, 1941.
Whereas the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that, with self-restraint and sober purpose, they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefore should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the providing of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations
considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions, and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfil or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The United States of America will continue to supply the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

ARTICLE II

The United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and, should circumstances arise in which the United States of America in its own defense or the defense of the Americas may require articles, services, or information, will provide such articles, services, or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof
thereof by anyone not an officer, employee or agent of
the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government
of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense
information, it becomes necessary for that Government
to take any action or make any payment in order fully to
protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United
States of America who has patent rights in and to any
such defense article or information, the Government of
the United Kingdom will take such action or make such
payment when requested to do so by the President.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to
the United States of America at the end of the present
emergency, as determined by the President, such defense
articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not
have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be
determined by the President to be useful in the defense
of the United States of America or of the Western
Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States
of America.

ARTICLE VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be
provided to the United States of America full cognizance
shall be taken of all property, services, information,
facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided
by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to
March 11, 1941 and accepted or acknowledged by the

President
President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII

The terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives defense aid from the United States of America and the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, as finally determined, shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations; they shall provide against discrimination in either the United States of America or the United Kingdom against the importation of any product originating in the other country; and they shall provide for the formulation of measures for the achievement of these ends.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall continue in force from the date on which it is signed until a date agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this day of , 1941

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

(Title)

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

(Title)
Enclosure No. 3

Redraft of Preliminary Lease-Lend Agreement Prepared by the British Government and handed informally to Mr. Acheson, October 17, 1941, together with the Draft of Proposed Accompanying Letter.
Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that, with self-restraint and sober purpose, they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the providing of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such
such terms and conditions, and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfil or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I.

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

ARTICLE II.

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and, should circumstances arise in which the United States of America in its own defense or the defense of the Americas may require articles, services, or information, will provide such articles, services, or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III.

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or
or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV.

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President.

ARTICLE V.

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI.

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941 and accepted
accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII.

The terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives defense aid from the Government of the United States of America and the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, as finally determined, shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them; they shall provide for joint and agreed action by the United States and United Kingdom, each working within the limits of their governing economic conditions, directed to securing as part of a general plan the progressive attainment of a balanced international economy, the avoidance of harmful discriminations, and generally the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on August 12th 1941.

And furthermore it is agreed that at an early convenient date conversations should be begun between the two Governments with a view to discussing the best means of attaining the above objects and generally the better ordering of economic intercourse between nations in future conditions of settled peace.

ARTICLE VIII.

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date.
date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this day of 1941.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Title]

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Title]
Verbal changes referred to in paragraph 3 of Draft letter to Mr. Dean Acheson

1. First paragraph of preamble. First line: insert "Governments of the" before "United States".

2. Paragraph 4 preamble. First line: insert "it is expedient that" after "whereas". Second line insert "Government of the" before "United Kingdom".

3. Paragraph 6 preamble. Insert "by their respective Governments" after "authorized".

4. Article I. First line: insert "Government of the" before "United States". Second line: insert "Government of the" before "United Kingdom".

5. Article II. First line: insert "Government of the" before "United Kingdom".

6. Article III. Second line: insert "of the United States" after "President".

7. Article VI. Second line: insert "by the Government of the United Kingdom" after "United States".

8. Article VIII. Read "This agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments".

9. The words "Government of the" should be inserted before "United States" and "United Kingdom" above the signatures.
Dear Mr. Acheson,

My Government have taken advantage of my presence in London to instruct me in the light of careful thought which they have given to the draft proposals under Section 3 (b) of the Lend-Lease Act which you handed to Mr. Keynes on July 28, 1941.

2. They are very sensible of the generosity of the terms of these proposals and are anxious to accept them in spirit and in substance with the least possible amendment of the form of words proposed. They are no less keenly alive to the magnitude of the question and are most anxious to respond to the broad manner in which the United States Government have invited their collaboration.

3. They are therefore glad to say that apart from some verbal changes of no significance which are set out in a separate paper, no question arises except in regard to Article VII. My Government believe that their intentions and their hopes for the economic organisation of the post-war world are closely in line with those of the President. They have found that it is not easy to refer to these in precise terms until the two Governments have defined them in their own minds in more detail than is yet possible. Meanwhile H.N. Government are anxious in all candour not to subscribe to phrases which might be interpreted hereafter in more than one sense. They also think it better, and in this they feel sure the President will agree, to emphasise that what both Governments have in view is part of a general plan and that the escape from restrictions on one
one side will only be practicable by their relaxation on all sides.

4. My Government suggest therefore, below, a form of words which better serves - so they feel - the common desire to collaborate. And since, admittedly and inevitably, the bare words themselves carry insufficient content with them, they have added a clause, which is, I think, in conformity with a suggestion you made to Mr. Keynes and which will, my Government hope, commend itself to the President, providing for the initiation of conversations at an early date with a view to giving substance and clarity to the preceding phrases.

5. The Departments chiefly concerned are now at work trying to clear up their own minds, which is none too easy when we know so little about the sort of world we shall have to deal with when the struggle is over; and to prepare concrete proposals. Progress is not so rapid as it would be if our time were less taken up with more immediate preoccupations. But we should be glad to make a start as early as may be found mutually convenient in company with those whom the President may designate to represent him with a view to formulating measures for the achievement of the ends which both Governments have in mind.
December 28, 1941

Confidential

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I desire that the Soviet aid program as provided in the Protocol Agreement be re-established beginning January 1.

Existing deficits are to be made up and shipped from this country not later than April 1.

I realize that some amendments such as relate to anti-aircraft guns and their ammunition must be made as to times of delivery but I wish if possible when such amendments must be made you would give consideration to increasing the Protocol in other items essential to the Russians.

The whole Russian program is so vital to our interests I know that only the gravest consideration will lead you to recommend our withholding longer the munitions our Government has promised the U.S.S.R.

I wish, therefore, that all items go forward promptly after January 1, unless I authorize the specific amendment.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury.
December 28, 1941

Confidential

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I desire that the Soviet aid program as provided in the Protocol Agreement be re-established beginning January 1.

Existing deficits are to be made up and shipped from this country not later than April 1.

I realize that some amendments such as relate to anti-aircraft guns and their ammunition must be made as to times of delivery but I wish if possible when such amendments must be made you would give consideration to increasing the Protocol in other items essential to the Russians.

The whole Russian program is so vital to our interests I know that only the gravest consideration will lead you to recommend our withholding longer the munitions our Government has promised the U.S.S.R.

I wish, therefore, that all items go forward promptly after January 1, unless I authorize the specific amendment.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Secretary,

I desire that the secret aid program as provided in the Protocol agreements be re-established beginning January 1.

I realize that some amendments will be required to the Protocol, and that the military assistance made available to the U.S.S.R. must be made available to the U.S. Forces.

The whole Russian program is so vital to our interests, that I plan to make all necessary provisions. I wish, therefore, that all these amendments be made as soon as possible, and that they be made available to the U.S. Forces.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

December 23, 1941

Unclassified

RECLASSIFIED
December 28, 1941

Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NELSON:

I am enclosing copy of a letter which is self-explanatory.

F.D.R.

Copy of letter to Seely, Navy re establishing the Soviet aid program June 1st

HLH/1mb
December 28, 1941

Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STETTINIUS:

I am enclosing copy of a letter which is self-explanatory.

FDR.

Copy of letter to the Secretary of the Treasury re Spending and Revenue program to be re-established Jan 1st.

HLH/1mb
Enclosure No. 4.

Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Keynes, July 28, 1941.
Mr. Keynes called at my request in accordance with the instructions of the Acting Secretary. I handed Mr. Keynes a copy of the draft proposal for a temporary lease-lend agreement which had been approved by the President and told Mr. Keynes that the President saw no reason why he should change his plans, which contemplated flying to England on Tuesday, July 29. I also told him that the President did not regard the draft as final on his part, but that he had given his approval for a discussion of it with the British Government as a basis for a temporary lease-lend agreement.

Mr. Keynes, after reading the draft, inquired whether Article II meant that the United States might require the British to furnish articles, such as tin, rubber, etc., without payment. I replied that Article II was inserted to provide for reciprocal action on the part of Great Britain to the extent that Great Britain might be in a position to take such reciprocal action and in the event that the necessities of our national defense might require us to ask for it; that it did not imply any present intention on the part of this Government to alter existing arrangements, but that no one could foresee
foresee the future and that, if the necessities of the future required us to request action by the British comparable to our own lease-lend procedure, Article II meant that the British would take such action, just as we were now taking it so far as they were in a position to do so.

Mr. Keynes then turned to Article V which requires the United Kingdom to return at the end of the emergency such articles as have not been destroyed, lost, or consumed, and which the President may request to be returned. He pointed out that in his draft the obligation to return had been "so far as practicable", and stated that this phrase had been inserted to cover the situation in which the United Kingdom, with the permission of the President, might have transferred to another Government lease-lend articles, thus placing them beyond the control of the British Government. I replied that this situation might be taken care of at the time of such transfer in one of two ways. Either the President's permission might exempt such articles from the provisions of Article V, or the terms of the transfer might provide that the transferee Government should return them to the United States under the same conditions as provided in Article V. He seemed satisfied with this.

Mr. Keynes then raised Article VII, and stated that very serious considerations were raised by the provision that the final settlement should provide against discrimination in either the United Kingdom or the United States against the importation of any product originating in the other country. He asked whether this provision raised the question of imperial preferences and exchange and other trade controls in the post-war period. I said that it did raise these questions, but that the Article was drawn so as not to impose unilateral obligations, but rather to require the two countries in the final settlement to review all such questions and to work out to the best of their ability provisions which would obviate discriminatory and nationalistic practices and would lead instead to cooperative action in preventing such practices.

Mr. Keynes then spoke for some time quite strongly about this provision. He said that he did not see how the British could make such a commitment in good faith; that it would require an imperial conference and that it saddled upon the future an ironclad formula from the Nineteenth Century. He said that it contemplated the impossible and hopeless task of returning to a gold standard where international trade was controlled by mechanical monetary devices and which had proved completely futile. He said that the only hope of the future was to maintain economies in balance without great excesses.
excesses of either exports or imports, and that this could be only through exchange controls, which Article VII seemed to ban.

He went on to say that the language used in Article VII had a long history; that it permitted all sorts of cunningly devised tariffs, which were in fact discriminatory and prohibited sound economic monetary controls. Finally, he said that at the end of the war we will probably have a great excess of exports, the British would require a considerable excess of imports, and that the formula provided in Article VII was wholly impossible.

I replied to Mr. Keynes that I thought he was taking an extreme and unjustified position and that it must be clear to him that no one would be less likely to impose a rigid and unworkable formula upon future developments than the President.

I said, and Mr. Keynes agreed, that the proposal made by him had been wholly impossible, inasmuch as it provided merely that lease-lend aid should be extended; that the British should return what was practicable for them to return; that no obligation should be created; and that they would be glad to talk about other matters. I pointed out to him that such a proposal could not possibly be defended in this country. To this he did not demur.

I then said that the purpose of Article VII was to provide a commitment which it should not be hard for the British to give that, after the emergency was over and after they had received vast aid from this country, they would not regard themselves as free to take any measures they chose directed against trade of this country but would work out in cooperation with this country measures which would eliminate discrimination and would provide for mutually fair and advantageous relations. I added that there was nothing narrow or technical about the provisions of Article VII, but that the British should realize that an effort of the magnitude of the lease-lend program on our part imposed upon them the obligation of continuing good will in working out plans for the future and that they must consider our position as well as their own during that future period.

After some further discussion along these lines, Mr. Keynes stated that he would take the proposal back to London and would discuss it there, and said that the British Government might propose some alteration in the language or might wish to have some further clarification on the Article.
He then said that there was considerable difference of opinion in London about future courses. There were some who believed that Great Britain should return to a free trade policy; there was a middle group, among whom he classified himself, who believed in the use of control mechanisms; and there was a third group who leaned toward imperial policies. I said that I realized this and that we hoped that in his discussion of the Article he would not take a narrow or technical view regarding the language as a draftsman's product, to be carefully analyzed in order to see what might or might not be done under it, but would try to direct attention to its major purpose and attempt to get agreement in order that the major purpose should be achieved.

At the end of our talk he seemed more reconciled to the Article, but by no means wholly so. He insisted that he agreed with the broad purpose and believed that it could be worked out.

Dean Acheson
November 19, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You are hereby authorized and directed to take any and all measures necessary to establish an assembly depot, or depots, in Basra or other suitable points, for the assembly of aircraft and components which this Government has agreed to provide for Soviet use. You are also authorized and directed to provide necessary personnel, supplies and other assistance, to acquire land and to lease or construct necessary installations, to assemble, flight test, and otherwise place in good working order, and to deliver aircraft to Tehran or other agreed transfer points, by use of Army personnel or otherwise.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have this day sent to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission directing him to make available the ships necessary to carry out the program of aid to the Soviet Union.

I would appreciate it if you would work out with Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius the details and financing of this plan.

Very sincerely yours,

(Handwritten) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of War

[Signature]

Copy of President's letter of 11/12/41 to lend lend lend lent
November 19, 1941

My dear Admiral Land:

It is desired that every effort be made to provide adequate shipping to fulfill the program of aid to the Soviet Union which this Government is committed to accomplish. Only insurmountable physical difficulties should be allowed to interfere with the program.

I would appreciate it if you would work out with Land-Lease Administrator Stettinius the details of the plan.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Rear Admiral Emory S. Land
Chairman, Maritime Commission

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
November 19, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter which I have this day sent to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission with reference to the provision of adequate shipping to fulfill the program of aid to the Soviet Union which this Government is committed to accomplish.

Very sincerely yours,

(Dated) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Inclosure

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy

Copy of President's letter of 11/19/41 to Ad Lard sent today Navy.

JHS:rd
November 19, 1941

My dear General Burns:

The President has signed the three letters you submitted with your memorandum of November nineteenth, in reference to expediting the aid program to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Very sincerely yours,

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

Major General J. H. Burns.
Office of Lend-Lease Administration,
515 Twenty-second Street, Northwest,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached are three letters for signature which have as their objective the expediting of our aid program to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They conform to the ideas of Mr. Hopkins. He feels that America is not doing everything possible to expedite shipments to Russia and that this should be done, even though some other part of our shipping program has to suffer. At the present time some goods for Russia are being piled up on docks for lack of shipping space.

J. H. BURNS
Major General, U.S. Army

Attachments (3)
November 23, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter, dated November 19, 1941, enclosing a letter to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission in regard to providing adequate shipping to fulfill the program of aid to the Soviet Union.

Please be assured that the Navy Department will cooperate with the Maritime Commission in every possible way to effectuate your desires in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. Secretary:

By my letters of May 28, June 30, October 3 and October 29, 1941, I authorized you to deliver aircraft to certain places named in those letters upon behalf of any nation receiving Lend-Lease aid.

I hereby authorize you to extend such delivery service to such other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the Lend-Lease program.

You will please arrange with the Lend-Lease Administrator for obtaining such additional Defense Aid funds as may be required to carry out the authority contained in this letter.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

The Secretary of War

orig. mailed "1/27

x249 official
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Subject: The Air Corps Ferrying Command

The authority of the Air Corps Ferrying Command to deliver aircraft on behalf of countries receiving Lend-Lease aid has been extended several times within the past six months and now covers much of the Lend-Lease area.

The Ferrying Command now finds it necessary to improve existing routes and to prepare for such extensions of its present delivery service as it may eventually be called upon to make. In order to accomplish these two objectives the Ferrying Command requests a further extension of its authority.

The attached letter for your signature would give the Ferrying Command the necessary authority. The letter contains a sufficiently broad grant of authority to enable the Ferrying Command to improve its present routes and make preparations for the future without coming to you from time to time for further piece-meal extensions of its authority.

It is understood, of course, that the authority granted in the attached letter would be employed only within the limits of
such general policies as you already have or will later decide upon.

Assistant Secretary Lovett and General Arnold approve this extension.

[Signature]

E. P. Statton
December 19, 1941

Mr. J. Van Den Broek, Chairman
Netherlands Purchasing Commission
10 Rockefeller Plaza
New York City

Dear Mr. Van Den Broek,

I have your letter of December 15th.

I sympathize completely with your position and hope some means can be found to expedite shipments of vital war materials to the Dutch East Indies. I know you realize, however, that we have undertaken to supply the sinews of war to all the ABCD countries resisting Axis aggression out of a present supply which is greatly inadequate for all needs. The problem is difficult.

In specific response to your request, I am today asking the Lend-Lease Administrator to confer immediately with the armed services and to determine what, if anything, in addition to what we are now doing can be done to assist you.

I suggest that you keep in close touch with the Lend-Lease Administration and they at all times will be able to advise you of the current supply situation as it affects the Dutch East Indies.

May I again express my sympathy for your position and assure you that all steps which are possible will be taken to assist the Dutch East Indies in their courageous fight.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please do what you can
on this?

F. D. R.

Transmitting copy of President's letter of
December 19, 1941, to Mr. J. Van Den Broek,
Chairman, Netherlands Purchasing Commission,
10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y., in reply
to his letter of 12/15/41, in re finding some
means to expedite shipments of vital war
materials to the Dutch East Indies.
December 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
SUBJECT: Aid to Dutch East Indies, Van Den Broek letter to the President

My sympathies are all with the Dutch East Indies. The attached proposed reply for the President to make to Mr. Van Den Broek's letter is written on the presumption that it will be our policy to assist them in every possible way at this time.

By the "grapevine", however, my information is that the War Department may not feel this way about it. In fact, if the Dutch are to get anything quickly, I think considerable "blasting" in that direction may be necessary.

To assist in that process it would be helpful if you could get the President to send copies of his reply to Van Den Broek to the Secretaries of War and Navy with a written comment on the side along the line of, "Do what you can".

I will then promptly get in touch with both Departments and see what can be done.
December 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you be good enough to prepare reply for my signature and let me have this back by Friday, as I want to use it?

F.D.R.
His Excellency
The President of the United States of America
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

On account of the very serious developments of the past week, we take the liberty to address you directly as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

Since the invasion of Holland, the Netherlands Purchasing Commission has been engaged in this country in the buying of the necessary material for the armed forces in the Netherlands East Indies. This Commission was established for that purpose by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Although we could acquire and ship certain quantities of material already during the past year, we deem it of the utmost importance to bring our actual present position to your personal attention.

Our Army, Navy and Air Forces are ready to fight and have already given evidence of the spirit with which they will combat aggression. However the supplies shipped so far are still inadequate. We fully understand that there were reasons why so far we could not obtain the supplies for which we applied. But supplying the most urgently needed war material within the shortest possible time - in other words, now - may prove of almost immeasurable value in the next few months.

We have no doubt that soon a Joint Board will be constituted in the Far East to advise Washington on quantities and specifications of material for the carrying on of the war in that part of the world, but we take it that some time will elapse before such a Board is organized and in full operation.

We have in our Commission full details of material which, supposing it will arrive soon, would complete the equipment of our forces in such a way that they could do their part of the fighting with full confidence.
We would have liked to have been given an opportunity to explain our position fully to you verbally. We understand, however, that your time will be completely occupied and therefore permit ourselves to suggest that the Army and Navy Munitions Board be directed to release to the Netherlands East Indies the comparatively small quantities of war material immediately required to adequately equip our Army, Navy and Air Forces.

A list of this material is enclosed herewith and has already been sent to the Lend-Lease Administrator.

Respectfully yours,

NETHERLANDS PURCHASING COMMISSION

[Signature]

J. VAN DEN BROEK
Chairman.
## MOST URGENTLY WANTED ITEMS FOR THE IMMEDIATE STRENGTHENING OF THE FIGHTING POWER OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST-INDIES
### ARMY AND NAVY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NR.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT WANTED</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vought Sikorsky U.S. 310 seaplanes Navy Model O S 2 U 1 with Wasp Engine, complete; 6 spare engines; 6 spare Hamilton propellers; 20% spare parts</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Standard Colt machineguns, Model MG 52-A, caliber .50, with sights and regular equipment, as specified in Colt's catalogue, page 41</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Depth Charges loaded</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20 m.m. Anti-aircraft guns and belonging ammunition</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pyro cannon powder U.S. pamphlet No. 450, dated March 14, 1917 or its equivalent</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVIATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>North American Bombers, Model B-25C Order placed June 24, 1941</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the present time, American monthly, deliveries of these items equipped with the regular quantities, with the Army Air Corps. The quantities these ships have been able to complete.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NR.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT WANTED</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hawker Hurricane fighters&lt;br&gt;Order placed by telegram to Canadian Government November 27th, 1941</td>
<td>72 pieces</td>
<td>kaar</td>
<td>would have to be flown over assistance of the Ferry F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Brewster Dive Bombers&lt;br&gt;Order placed June 6, 1940</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MUNITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NR.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT WANTED</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Enfield rifles cal. .30-06</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Johnson S.A. rifles, cal. 30-06</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Johnson Light machineguns, cal. .30-06</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Thompson submachineguns, cal. .45</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These fighters can probably be delivered to England by November 27th. It is not likely that assistance of the Ferry F would have to be flown over.

Delivery of the Brewster Dive Bombers will be deferred several months due to the limited pilots available, so the order placed June 6th will be delivered no earlier than April of next year. The earlier deliveries, starting in March, April and May, will be delivered to the East Indies. The fact is hereby stressed that the British pilots available will be used for these aircraft.

20,000 Enfield rifles already have been delivered to the East Indies. The balance should be delivered by June 2nd, 1941.

These rifles are in production and are expected to reach the battle line in the near future. It was learned that an order of 700 Johnson Light machineguns was placed and that they are expected to arrive in short order.

These machineguns are essential that every member of the crews for the United Defense Supply Corps will be armed and in combat-ready condition.

The United Defense Supply Corps will be armed with 5000 Thompson submachineguns and 5000 United Defense Supply Corps rifles, cal. 9 m.m. first choice. These arms will be supplied by the U.S. stocks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NR.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT WANTED</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMUNITION</td>
<td>Ammunition cal. .30-06 A.P.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ammunition cal. .30-06 Ball</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ammunition cal. .30-06 Tracer</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ammunition cal. .50 A.P.</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ammunition cal. .50 Tracer</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>T.N.T.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft guns, cal. 40 m.m. (field-mount), complete with fire-control and ammunition</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>B.C. telescopes, French with tripod and mount</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Rangefinders 80 c.m. with tripod and mount (coincidence type)</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGINEERING</td>
<td>White Scout Cars, Model M3Al, complete with 400 radio sets, all-wheel driven, each equipped with two machine guns .30 cal. and one machine gun cal. .50, with regular spare parts, spare tires and tubes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Light combat tanks, Model M-3, as made by American Car and Foundry, each complete with 37 m.m. cal. anti-tank gun and each equipped with four cal. 130 machineguns, each equipped with radio sets. Ammunition for these tanks: 400,000 rounds 37 m.m tracer amm.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM NR.</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>AMOUNT WANTED</td>
<td>UNIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Also regular spare parts and 200% spare tracks</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>K.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Electric Telephone Cable, especially for tropical conditions and for which order has been placed with the International Standard Electric Corporation (Western Electric) in May 1941.</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>K.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Searchlights, each 24&quot; diameter, if possible General Electric, each with normal spare parts, including 8 spare mirrors, each with 500 sets of spare carbons, Twenty-four power plants for these searchlights, each with 220 yards of power cable and spare parts 24 pieces</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Harley-Davidson Solo Motorcycles, 45 cubic inch, normal Army Model, with regular spare parts, spare tires and tubes 800 pieces</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Fire-Fighting trucks, complete, all wheel-drive, to be used for air field protection, as delivered to the Canadian and United States air forces. If possible equipped with either Walter Kidde or American La France firefighting equipment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1/2 ton, 80&quot; wheel base, 4-wheel driven Light Reconnaissance Cars 600 pieces</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>60&quot; Anti-aircraft searchlights, with power plants, each with 500 sets of carbons, with spare parts and 32 spare mirrors, with power cable and remote control 136 pieces</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Portable 10&quot; Incandescent searchlights with Edison batteries and spare parts and 300% spare bulbs, 12 Volt, 72 Watt 200 pieces</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM NR.</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>AMOUNT WANTED</td>
<td>UNIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Portable flame throwers, Model EIRI, each with five sets of spare bottles and regular spare parts, as made by Kincaid Company Inc., 17 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y.</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Various kinds of radio equipment (mostly mobile)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

SUBJECT: Reimbursement of the Billion Three

(1) It has been your general policy up to now to avoid reimbursing the War and Navy Departments from the Lend-Lease appropriations for transfers made out of the "billion three." The reason is that each such reimbursement reduced the total funds available for lend-lease purposes.

(2) Considerable resistance to filling requisitions out of pre-March 11th appropriations has been encountered because of the refusal to reimburse the War and Navy Departments out of the billion three for the supplies they give up. In certain cases it may well be easier to obtain further funds from Congress than to obtain pre-March 11th supplies from the Army and Navy without reimbursement.

(3) Under the new Executive Order, the authority to authorize reimbursement is delegated to the Lend-Lease Administrator subject to policies laid down by the President.

(4) Mr. Hopkins and I both think the policy should be something like this:

(a) In the case of large transfers out of the billion three, such as the transfers to the Russians, no reimbursement should be made.

(b) In cases where the amounts are small, reimbursement may be made upon a showing by the War or Navy Departments to the Lend-Lease Administrator that reimbursement is necessary for them to carry out their own necessary program.

(c) In all cases, the presumption should be against reimbursement and no large amounts should be reimbursed without your approval.

(5) Is this policy satisfactory to you?

Yes "O.K."

No

(Signed) E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
December 30, 1941

AMBASSADOR,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

Your 543, December 29, noon.

Please convey immediately to General Chiang Kai-shek a message from the President along lines as follows:

The President has given his personal attention to reports of the recent incident involving the question of disposal to the British authorities in Burma of Lend-Lease materials consigned to China and awaiting onward shipment in Burma to their destination. The President wishes to assure General Chiang Kai-shek that the action taken was contrary to the policy of the Government of the United States which is directed toward furnishing all possible aid to China. The President wishes to give General Chiang Kai-shek further assurances that it is not policy of the Government of the United States to transfer materials consigned to China under the Lend-Lease program except upon the basis of prior conference and consultation with the Chinese Government. In sending General Chiang these assurances, the President desires at the same time to express his deep
appreciation of the statesmanlike and unselfish attitude of the Generalissimo in agreeing, in the interests of the common cause to which all of us are dedicated, to the release to the apparently British in Burma of certain items/much needed for defense in that area.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I THINK THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD GO.

H.L.H. x 4117