

Lend Lease: Dec. 1942

(283)

*File
Confidential*

PSF

C.F.

Lend Lease

December 7, 1942

My dear Mr. Stettinius:

For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lend-Lease Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941, and in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to the Government of Ethiopia, I hereby find that the defense of Ethiopia is vital to the defense of the United States. x547

Very truly yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Esq. x4559

Lend-Lease Administrator

x4193

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Administrator

December 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins x #117
FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
SUBJECT: Ethiopia

1. As you probably know, Ethiopia became a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on October 9, 1942.

2. In view of this fact, you may wish to consider the desirability of having the President declare that the defense of the Government of Ethiopia is vital to the defense of the United States.

3. Also, although a difference of opinion exists, there is a possibility that the recognition of Ethiopia under the Lend-Lease Act would indicate in a concrete way the interest of the United States in the stake which Negroes have in this war. Whether supplies should be lend-leased is a question which need not be considered now.

4. If you agree, you may want to pass along to the President for his signature the attached draft of a letter finding the defense of the Government of Ethiopia vital to the defense of the United States. We have consulted the State Department on the subject and they approve the proposal.

FOR DEFENSE



Ed

FOR THE PRESS

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DECEMBER 10, 1942

The President has addressed to E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, a letter the text of which follows:

For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lend-Lease Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941, and in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to the Government of Ethiopia, I hereby find that the defense of Ethiopia is vital to the defense of the United States.

- - - -

~~White House~~

~~December 7, 1942~~

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E.R. Stettinius, Jr., Esq.

Lend-Lease Administrator.

PSF
b. F.
Lend Lease

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Administrator

December 8, 1942

Mr. Rudolph Forster
Executive Clerk
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Forster:

In accordance with conversation with Mr. Hassett, I am transmitting herewith a draft of a suggested letter of transmittal for the President's forthcoming report on lend-lease operations, to be submitted to Congress Friday, December 11th.

Will you please clear this with Mr. Hopkins and the President as soon as possible and advise me of any desired changes.

We are planning to deliver the reports at 5 p.m. Thursday, December 10th, as requested by you, rather than Friday morning, to give you more time for the necessary arrangements.

The reports will bear the usual "Confidential" label indicating that no portion is to be used until the reading of the President's message in Congress, which is scheduled for Friday, December 11th. There will be the usual 1,000 copies for the Congress and 200 copies for the Press.

There will also be delivered to you the six specially printed copies, which do not contain the President's printed signature to his letter of transmittal.

If this procedure is not correct or if we can be of any further assistance, please call on me.

Yours very truly,

John D. East

John D. East
Assistant to Administrator

FOR DEFENSE



BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

x4559
x358
x4193

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF
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Lend Lease

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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

I am transmitting herewith the Seventh Quarterly Report on operations under the Lend-Lease Act.

Since the last report, the war has entered a new phase. United Nations forces attacking from Egypt and North Africa are contesting with the Axis for control of the African coastline of the Mediterranean. The Soviet Army, having held with stubborn bravery at Stalingrad, has now ~~gone over to~~ ^{Assumed} the offensive. The Japanese have been recklessly expending ships and men in the Solomons, a battleground of our own choosing.

The Axis Powers have, temporarily at least, lost the initiative. We must do all we can to keep them from regaining it.


We must bring the full strength of all the United Nations to bear directly against the enemy. We must bring together our joint productive capacity and our material resources, our finished munitions and our fighting manpower; and we must do this in accordance with a single world strategy. That we are making good progress in this direction I think is shown by recent developments, and by this report on the part played by lend-lease.

We also have another task, which will grow in magnitude as our striking power grows, and as new territories are liberated from the enemy's crushing grip. That task is to supply medicines, food, clothing and other ~~necessities to~~ ^{like needs of} those peoples who have been plundered, ~~and~~ despoiled ~~and starved.~~

The Nazis and Japanese have butchered innocent men and women in a

campaign of organized terror. They have stripped the lands they hold of food and other resources. They have used hunger as an instrument of the slavery they seek to impose.

Our policy is the direct opposite. United Nations' forces will bring food for the starving and medicine for the sick. Every aid possible will be given to restore each of the liberated countries to soundness and strength, so that each may make its full contribution to United Nations victory, and to the peace which follows.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to be "Franklin D. Roosevelt". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed text.

The White House

December 11th, 1942

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FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE

December 11, 1942

SEVENTH REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS

For the Period Ended December 11, 1942

SEVENTH REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS

For the Period Ended December 11, 1942

"The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose."

[From Section 5, subsection b of "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States"(Public Law No. 11, 77th Congress, 1st Session).]

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PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

I am transmitting herewith the seventh quarterly report on operations under the Lend-Lease Act.

Since the last report, the war has entered a new phase. United Nations' forces attacking from Egypt and North Africa are contesting with the Axis for control of the African coast line of the Mediterranean. The Soviet Army, having held with stubborn bravery at Stalingrad, has now assumed the offensive. The Japanese have been recklessly expending ships and men in the Solomons, a battleground of our own choosing.

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THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 11, 1942.

Chapter 1

LEND-LEASE PROGRESS

Lend-lease assistance to our allies in the past three months totaled \$2,367,000,000. This is more than a third higher than the figure for the previous quarter, and four times the total for the three months immediately preceding our entrance into the war a year ago.

At the same time, the United States has equipped and supplied rapidly growing numbers of American forces overseas, who will number more than 1,000,000 by the end of this month. And, in combination with the British, we launched the North African offensive, which involved the greatest single overseas expeditionary force in history.

We have used the rapidly rising output of American factories both to equip our own forces and to send more to the other peoples who fight our enemies. But there is still not enough. Many more American ships, planes, tanks, and guns will be required before the United Nations can wage the great offensives that will bring victory. Meanwhile, within the limits of available production, we have sought to carry out the strategic principle embodied in the lend-lease idea: This is one war; it can be won only by all the United Nations together, combining their resources in such a way as to meet the enemy with the maximum force at the chosen times and places.

Total Lend-Lease Aid

From the beginning of the lend-lease program on March 11, 1941, to November 30, 1942, the dollar value of goods transferred and services rendered is \$7,496,000,000. This compares with \$5,129,000,000 reported in the Sixth Report to Congress three months ago.

For the 12 months ending November 30, the first year of our participation in the war, lend-lease aid totaled

recorded as the goods are loaded and the figures for goods transferred will hereafter approximate lend-lease exports.

Chart 2 shows the monthly value of lend-lease goods exported, by category. Exports of military items have risen much more rapidly than exports of non-military items. For the month of September 1941 total lend-lease exports were




Chart 2

\$85,000,000. Only 25 percent of that amount was for arms, the balance consisting of foodstuffs and industrial materials. For the month of October 1942 (the last month for which export figures are available) lend-lease exports were \$537,000,000, of which military items comprised 56 percent.

While total monthly lend-lease exports increased over six times, lend-lease exports of military items increased fourteen times. Although the percentages of food and industrial materials to total exports have declined, the actual amounts shipped increased greatly as shown in Chart 2.

The export figures do not include the great quantities of supplies sent to our forces abroad.

Services Rendered

Services rendered total \$1,642,000,000; this constitutes about one-fifth of total lend-lease aid. In terms of making our aid effective, the relative importance of these services is considerably greater than the dollar amount indicates.

Lend-lease supplies are of no use to our allies until they reach the places where they are needed. About 50 percent of expenditures for services is for shipping and supply services—mostly for the rental and charter of ships to carry the goods, and the balance for the development and operation of air ferry routes and supply bases abroad.

We have supply lines extending over many thousands of miles of submarine-infested oceans, and across jungles, deserts and hitherto inaccessible mountain ranges. We have to go around to the far places, where transport facilities are generally primitive. Lend-lease has played a large part in keeping these lines open and in increasing the volume of shipments over them.

At the receiving ends of many of these routes, it has been necessary to develop harbors, build and equip docks, warehouses, assembly plants, and supply depots. Camel trails have been made over into truck highways and railroad facilities have been either created or enlarged. Scores of newly developed airfields are way-stations on the bomber-ferry routes. American participation with the Russians, the British, and other allies in this development program has been carried out in important measure through lend-lease.

Another 15 percent of the funds spent for services has been used to repair in our yards hundreds of allied merchant and naval vessels damaged by enemy action. Similar repair services are being rendered for damaged American warships and merchant vessels abroad, under reciprocal lend-lease.

The balance of 35 percent of services rendered represents expenditures for production facilities—factories and shipyards—built in the United States to manufacture certain types of lend-lease articles.

Where Lend-Lease Supplies Are Going

Chart 3 shows exports of lend-lease goods by area of destination. In October 1942 approximately 40 percent of lend-lease exports went to the United Kingdom, 39 percent to the Middle and Far East and other areas, and 21 percent to U. S. S. R.




Chart 3

The chart also shows the higher proportion of lend-lease shipments to the Middle and Far East and U. S. S. R. during 1942. Since January 1942, monthly exports to the United Kingdom and to the Middle and Far East have more than doubled. October shipments to U. S. S. R. were nine times those in January, when goods were first exported to Russia under lend-lease (as distinct from direct purchase exports).

Part of the military equipment exported to the United Kingdom has been sent by the British to U. S. S. R., Egypt, India and other areas of the Middle East. In addition, Great Britain has sent a major share of its own production of war supplies to these fronts.

The United States and Great Britain have between them shipped (not delivered) to U. S. S. R. during the past year, over

the northern route alone, more than 3,000 planes, more than 4,000 tanks, more than 30,000 trucks, jeeps and other vehicles and hundreds of thousands of tons of food, industrial raw materials, medical supplies and other products. Not all of these supplies have arrived. Convoys over the North Atlantic route have been subjected to heavy punishment by Nazi air, surface and undersea raiders.

Shipments by the southern route to the Red Sea-Persian Gulf area have had to travel ocean distances of 10,000 to 13,000 miles and there are long additional overland distances to be covered before our supplies reach bases and front lines in the U. S. S. R. In the Red Sea-Persian Gulf area, ports, unloading and assembly facilities, roads and railroads were either inadequate or non-existent. They have been greatly improved with the aid of lend-lease funds.

Supplies aggregating nearly 2,500,000 tons have been shipped over all routes from the United States to U. S. S. R. in the past year under lend-lease and direct purchase. Although transportation to U. S. S. R. continues to present extraordinary difficulties, we are succeeding in delivering the great majority of our shipments.

The part played in the Egyptian campaign by the increased lend-lease exports to that area is described in Chapter 3. In addition, considerable shipments have gone to India and other strategic points in the Middle East, to Australia and New Zealand.

Lend-lease exports to China have always been limited by a transportation bottleneck that was made still tighter when the Japanese took Burma. Until that time, we were able to move a thin but steady stream of supplies over the Burma Road. With lend-lease funds we had considerably increased the capacity of the road, supplied thousands of trucks, and assisted China in building a railroad which would have provided, when completed, a supplementary supply line from Lashio to Kunming.

Since the loss of Burma, air transport across the Himalayas from India has been the only direct means of bringing lend-

lease supplies into China. United States Army and China National Airways cargo planes are plying this dangerous route regularly but the quantities they have been able to carry so far have been small. We shall find ways to send more.

Lend-Lease Exports and Direct Cash Purchases

In addition to lend-lease aid, the United States has supplied the other United Nations with weapons and other materials




Chart 4

purchased by them for cash, just as they have supplied us, both by direct purchase and reciprocal lend-lease.

From the point of view of effective pooling of United States resources with those of other United Nations, the distinction between lend-lease and cash exports has little significance. For in the winning of the war, what counts is that our supplies—by whatever method they are provided—reach the hands of those who need them in order to fight our enemies. This is equally true of the supplies we receive from our allies.

From March 1941 through October 1942, cash purchase exports to our allies totaled \$6,450,000,000, compared to lend-lease exports of \$4,685,000,000. The proportion of lend-lease

exports to total U. S. exports has risen from 1 percent in March 1941 to 70 percent in October 1942 as shown by Chart 4.

Other Forms of Aid

The entire story of the aid rendered by the United Nations to one another cannot be told in statistical terms alone. It would be impossible to attempt a mathematical appraisal of many of the respective contributions of the allied nations or to evaluate the role each is playing in encompassing the defeat of the Axis. The principle followed is one of mutual assistance in waging a coalition war.

Our own contribution is of course not limited to the proportion of the output of our farms and workshops which is exported to our allies. American troops fight side by side with those of the other United Nations; our navies engage in joint as well as independent operations. Supplies, equipment, and ammunition are fully shared on the battlefield. An American tanker, during combat, will service any allied destroyer requiring fuel. Our aircraft carriers have brought sorely needed planes to posts exclusively manned by our allies. We have assumed the responsibility for defending some of the distant outposts of the world to relieve veteran allied troops for more active theaters. We have been the recipient of similar aid from our allies. The United Nations are not engaged in a series of separate wars; ours is a joint enterprise with one goal.

NOTE.—Previous reports have carried figures for lend-lease "goods in process." These were expenditures made for completed equipment that had not yet been transferred and for equipment still in process of manufacture. In the Sixth Report to Congress the dollar volume of such goods was estimated at \$1,360,000,000. This figure, however, included only expenditures made from lend-lease funds appropriated directly to the President. It did not include expenditures made by the War and Navy Departments from funds appropriated to them. Military items procured by these departments are not generally separated as between those for our own forces and those for lend-lease purposes until manufacture is completed and final assignments are made by the Combined Munitions Assignments Board. This Board assigns all military items produced in the United States. It is therefore impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy the lend-lease proportion of expenditures made on goods in process by the War and Navy Departments. Since any figure on lend-lease goods in process which does not include these amounts fails to give a complete picture of such expenditures, the category of goods in process will no longer be included in these reports.

Chapter 2

U. S. PRODUCTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Combining United Nations Resources

All available resources of the United Nations are dedicated to the common end of winning the war. It is in the joint interest of the United Nations to equip and supply all their armed forces, to maintain the flow of industrial materials to war factories everywhere, and to meet the essential war-time civilian needs of all anti-Axis peoples. In this task they are, within the limits of their resources, supplying both their own needs and the needs of each other.

We are dependent upon each other in many ways. Although the United States has the greatest resources for the production of war materials and civilian supplies, many of our own vital requirements are being obtained by purchase from our allies. Certain raw materials, essential to making planes and tanks, come from many parts of the British Empire, Latin America and other United Nations. For example, ninety-five percent of our nickel comes from Canada and our mica from India and Brazil. We are still getting precious supplies of tungsten from China.

Our troops overseas are receiving many important supplies and services from Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Fighting France under reciprocal lend-lease.

Up to six months ago, Great Britain and Russia were producing more arms than we were. Great Britain has supplied the larger part of its own needs and has furnished quantities of certain types of equipment to the fighting forces of Russia and of the governments in exile. Great Britain has also provided most of the merchant ships and transports which carry United Nations supplies and troops overseas.

Plainly Russia is able to send few supplies to its allies, but the greatest land fighting of the war has been carried on for two years principally with Russian equipment. Russian planes and bombs and tanks have destroyed many times the number of enemy troops killed in all the other war theatres combined.

Our principal allies have reached the maximum rate of their war production. American war production—already the greatest in the world—will rise much higher still before reaching its peak. Supplies from the United States have had an important part in the war effort of the United Nations. From now on, our production will play an increasingly decisive role. But only by a vast increase in our output can we obtain the overwhelming superiority over the Axis which is needed for victory.

Distribution of American Production

Most of our production is used to supply our own armed forces and civilian population. The proportion of war weapons that goes to our Army and Navy and the proportion that goes to our allies is determined by the strategic decisions of global warfare. United Nations war production strategy determines how much we should send abroad of our supply of industrial materials. The food we produce—and food is a weapon of war—is allocated to meet the needs of American armed forces and civilians, and, so far as possible, the essential food requirements of our allies.

Military Supplies

About 15 percent of our present total production of military items is being exported to the other United Nations under lend-lease and direct purchase. These items include ordnance, ammunition, aircraft, tanks, motor vehicles, and spare parts, but do not include merchant and naval vessels.

The proportion of some combat weapons going to our allies is considerably higher than the over-all average. Thus, we are sending them about 30 percent of our production of combat planes and 35 percent of our production of tanks. On the

other hand, there are many articles which we make entirely for our own forces.

Although exports of military items have greatly increased during the past year, our rate of munitions production has increased still more rapidly. Consequently, a smaller percentage of our total military output is now being exported. Chart 5 shows how the percentage of exports has declined from 30




Chart 5

percent of total output in March 1941 to approximately 15 percent in the past five months.

A large part of the munitions retained for our own forces has been transported with our troops to bases abroad for use in recent campaigns and in battles now being waged. These shipments are not included in the export figures in Chart 5.

Industrial Materials

The United States is exporting industrial materials to our allies, particularly the United Kingdom, Canada and Russia. The quantities which we send them are necessary to maintain

their production of weapons and ships, but are relatively small in relation to our own total production of these materials.

The following percentages show the relationship of our lend-lease and direct purchase exports of the more important materials to total United States new supply of the indicated industrial materials during the first six months of this year:

EXPORTS IN PERCENT OF U. S. NEW SUPPLY

First 6 Months of 1942

	Percent		Percent
Aluminum.....	2.7	Petroleum Products.....	5.3
Copper.....	12.2	Steel.....	11.0
Cotton.....	5.0	Tin.....	1.2
Nickel.....	3.5	Zinc.....	16.1

These are percentages of United States production plus imports during the period. If our stock piles were taken into account the export percentages would be smaller.

The percentages shown are for exports of these materials in a form ready for use in the production of war equipment. Thus in the case of steel, exports were 11 percent of our total new supply of shapes, plates, bars, sheets, etc. They were considerably less than 11 percent of our new supply of steel in the form of ingots. On the other hand, the export percentages do not include the steel and other materials in finished products such as tanks and guns.

Foodstuffs

United States exports of food, nearly all of which are under lend-lease, have been particularly important to the United Kingdom and to Russia. Yet our exports have been small in relation both to their total food supply and to ours. The United Kingdom, for example, now produces about 60 percent of its own food as the result of an intensive three-year farm program, and the major share of its food imports comes from sources

other than the United States. Nevertheless, the part of Great Britain's food that comes from the United States has meant the difference between enough to sustain the British people's intensive war effort and too little with which to carry on. Likewise, American food supplies are saving thousands from starvation in Russia and the Middle East.

The following percentages show the relationship of exports to the total United States supply of important foodstuffs for the year ended June 30, 1942:

EXPORTS IN PERCENT OF SUPPLY

Year Ended June 30, 1942

	Percent		Percent
Beef and Veal.....	0.5	All Milk Products (expressed in terms of fluid milk equivalent) ..	3.9
Lamb and Mutton.....	0.0	Corn and Corn Products..	0.5
Pork.....	13.0	Wheat and Wheat Products.....	1.0
Canned Fish.....	21.0	Sugar.....	1.0
Eggs.....	8.1		
Cheese.....	23.1		

Of the five meats now under voluntary rationing, we have retained for our own armed forces and civilians more than 99 percent of all but pork, in which case the percentage retained is 87 percent. And pork production has increased enough to cover our exports and still leave a normal supply for our own uses. Civilian shortages of these meats are due primarily to the needs of our soldiers and sailors and to increased civilian consumption.

We have exported under lend-lease 1,263,882,000 pounds of evaporated milk, powdered milk and cheese. However, in terms of fluid milk equivalent, this is approximately 4 percent of our record-breaking milk supply. All the rest is going to United States armed forces and civilians. Our exports provide two out of every five ounces of the cheese which Britons eat

and almost all their powdered milk. Dried skim milk is rationed at the rate of one ounce a week and supplements the often slim British fluid milk ration (now $2\frac{1}{4}$ pints per week per adult).

Of our total egg production, we have retained 92 percent for our own needs. Our exports have been almost entirely in the form of dried eggs in order to save shipping space. The English ration of dried eggs, nearly all of which come from the United States, is the equivalent of one fresh egg per person per week, and supplements the ration of fresh eggs, which varies seasonally from one to a maximum of five eggs a month.

Our exports of sugar, wheat, flour, and cereals, although extremely small in relation to total U. S. supply, have been particularly important to Russia, which has lost most of its sugar-beet and its richest wheat-producing areas to the Nazi invaders. So far we have not been able to find the shipping space to send nearly as much food to U. S. S. R. as the Russian people need.

We have exported a considerable percentage of our total production of canned fish to supplement the restricted meat rations of our allies' armed forces and civilians. Two-thirds of Britain's canned fish supply comes from the United States and most of the balance from Canada.

Record United States food production in 1942 has more than offset our lend-lease food exports. To meet the greater demands next year, Secretary of Agriculture Wickard has set 1943 production goals ranging up to 28 percent higher than 1942 totals for some commodities. United States civilians will have less of some foods, in order that supplies may go where they will contribute most to our victory. Even so, Americans will still have more to eat than the overwhelming majority of people elsewhere.

Chapter 3

THE AFRICAN OFFENSIVES

The present campaigns in Egypt and North Africa illustrate how United Nations resources can be pooled in the execution of an offensive strategy. For both offensives, supplies and shipping services were provided on a great scale in accordance with the principles of lend-lease and reciprocal aid.

Egyptian Campaign

In the Egyptian campaign, British and American equipment was used and troops from the United Kingdom, the Dominions, Greece, Poland, France, and the United States took part, but British troops, planes, and ships did the bulk of the fighting, under British command. It was in the field of transportation and supplies that United States assistance played its major role.

German and Italian forces could be supplied from their home bases by shipping or flying their equipment a few hundred miles across the Mediterranean. Supplies from the United Kingdom or this country, on the other hand, had to travel 12,000 miles by water, around the Cape of Good Hope and up the Red Sea, before reaching the fighting zone. Even if sent by air from the United States, a bomber or a cargo of urgently needed materials must be flown over 9,000 miles via Brazil across the Atlantic and over the jungles and deserts of Africa.

Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties of weather, terrain, and enemy action, our supply lines functioned so well that at the crucial moment United Nations forces were able to take the field with clear superiority in armored strength, artillery, and air power.

This was possible because of action taken many months before the offensive began, when it was decided that these supply lines must be bolstered and improved in every way possible.

United States and British funds, engineering skill and labor have been used to build, reconstruct or enlarge supply bases,

docks and naval facilities, air fields, and repair and assembling shops in the Red Sea area and in Egypt. Work done under this program has made it possible to unload cargoes and repair damaged ships more quickly. And the facilities for assembling of trucks, tanks, and planes have speeded the flow of weapons to the fighting front.

Air ferry routes have been created across Africa. In places where a few years ago no planes were ever seen, huge bombers and transports now land daily, are fueled, and continue to their destinations.

Together with the British and Fighting French, we have built or improved air fields all the way from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Red Sea. These fields have been used by planes on their way to Egypt, to Iran and Russia, and to India.

The United States funds spent in these enterprises, and for the necessary shipping, have come from lend-lease appropriations and funds appropriated to the War Department for its own use.

Over these improved supply lines, the United States exported to Egypt during the period from February to November over 1,000 planes, many hundreds of tanks, of which more than 500 were mediums, 20,000 trucks and hundreds of pieces of artillery. Our British allies have emphasized the importance of these weapons in the success of the campaign. In addition to the American planes furnished the British, hundreds of planes were sent to Egypt for the use of our own air forces. One out of every five United Nations planes operating during the desert offensives was flown by American crews or pilots.

American technicians have also been instructing the British, South Africans and Australians in the maintenance and repair of American equipment, and an increasing number of American mechanics have been assisting in this work.

North African Campaign

The invasion of North Africa, even more than the campaign in Egypt, has been a combined operation in the fullest sense of the word. Neither the United States nor Great Britain

could alone have carried out at this time a task requiring the greatest single overseas expeditionary force in history.

Hundreds of British and American cargo, transport and naval vessels were pooled for the enterprise. The ground forces include many British as well as American troops. The United States Army Air Force and the Royal Air Force are both taking part in this offensive, and each nation's air force has been using, to some extent, planes manufactured by the other, provided either under lend-lease or reciprocal lend-lease. Most of the equipment of our troops was American-made, but large quantities of miscellaneous supplies were lend-leased to us by Great Britain.

In all phases of the campaign—in the careful work of preparation as well as in the more spectacular moments of battle—the United States and Great Britain have shared their resources and operated under unified command.

Chapter 4

LIBERATED AREAS

Less than a week after our landings in North Africa, the Lend-Lease Administrator was instructed, in cooperation with General Eisenhower and the State Department, to extend aid to those areas in French Africa occupied by United Nations forces.

The policy of the United States, already announced, is to provide food, medicines, and other necessities to alleviate the hunger and suffering of the people in any territory occupied by our forces, so far as it is humanly within our power to do so. Weapons will be furnished to the armed forces of these territories to hasten the defeat of the Axis.

Methods of carrying out this policy will differ between areas, and different methods may be necessary within the same area. Where commercial channels of supply have been cut off, lend-lease can be the instrument for renewing them. Where relief distribution is necessary, lend-lease can supply the materials of relief.

Steps have already been taken with respect to North Africa in execution of this policy. About \$5,000,000 worth of civilian goods have been purchased for shipment to that area. Many times that amount will be procured during the coming months, to be sent as shipping space becomes available. So long as military operations continue in this area, the amount of available shipping space cannot accurately be predicted. Cargoes necessary to maintain our armies in the field will have top priority on shipping, but civilian supply will come next on the list.

Items purchased, or to be purchased, under this program include: Medical and hospital supplies ranging from anaesthetics to operating knives, sulfa drugs and antitoxins; sugar,

powdered and evaporated milk, and cheese, to meet the most urgent food needs; cotton textiles, ready-made new and used clothing, and shoes; copper sulphate to increase the production of vegetables and fruits for the consumption of our troops as well as the inhabitants; coal for transportation and kerosene for lighting. The United Kingdom will participate in this program with the United States.

The United Nations will help the victims of war in liberated territories, not only out of common humanity, but for the most urgent political and military reasons. Expansion of the agricultural production of the reoccupied regions and the improvement of their transportation facilities will be of great value to our military forces. Increased food production on the spot will enable us, after meeting the requirements of the civilian population, to supply our forces with some foodstuffs, thus saving valuable shipping space. Similarly any aid that we can furnish North Africa in maintaining and increasing its exportable production of certain strategic materials, such as phosphate rock, manganese, and high-grade iron ore will be of great value to the United Nations war effort.

The program of reoccupation will require the joint efforts of many agencies of this government, and the fullest cooperation with the other United Nations. Relief and rehabilitation of the reoccupied areas will be the common responsibility of all the United Nations, and must be a combined operation in the same sense as the military operations themselves. Success in restoring the countries we free will be a powerful factor in shortening the war, giving the liberated peoples their chance to share in the victory.

The United Nations have shown that they are capable of military teamwork of a high degree. In the field of relief and rehabilitation, they have an opportunity to develop a constructive program that will have a most direct bearing on the problems of the peace.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

LEND-LEASE ACT

Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States."

Section 2.

As used in this Act—

(a) The term "defense article" means—

- (1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;
- (2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;
- (3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;
- (4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense.

Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.

Section 3.

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

- (1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed \$1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or, contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

Section 4.

All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 3 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.

Section 5.

(a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.

(b) The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.

Section 6.

(a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.

(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year; but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1946.

Section 7.

The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and holders of such patents.

Section 8.

The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.

Section 9.

The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

Section 10.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated in this Act.

Section 11.

If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

APPROVED, March 11, 1941.

Appendix II

LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATIONS AND TRANSFER AUTHORIZATIONS

Lend-lease aid is provided from: (a) funds appropriated directly to the President for lend-lease purposes; (b) appropriations to the War Department, Navy Department, and Maritime Commission which contain authorization for maximum amounts that may be used for lend-lease purposes.

Detailed information on the maximum amount of lend-lease aid which can be provided by existing legislation is given in the following table.

Appropriations to the President

First Lend-Lease Appropriation.....	\$7,000,000,000
Second Lend-Lease Appropriation.....	5,985,000,000
Third Lend-Lease Appropriation.....	5,425,000,000

\$18,410,000,000

Transfers Authorized from Other Appropriations

War Department—Third Supplemental, 1942.....	\$2,000,000,000
War Department—Fourth Supplemental, 1942.....	4,000,000,000
War Department—Fifth Supplemental, 1942.....	11,250,000,000
War Department—Sixth Supplemental, 1942.....	2,220,000,000
War Department—Military Appropriation Act, 1943.....	12,700,000,000
Navy Department—Second Supplemental, 1943.....	*3,000,000,000
Maritime Commission—First Supplemental, 1942.....	†1,296,650,000
Maritime Commission—Fifth Suppl. (Approp. Funds), '42.	†1,500,000,000
Maritime Commission—Fifth Suppl. (Contr. Auth.), 1942.	†2,350,000,000
Departments other than War—Third Supplemental, 1942..	800,000,000

\$41,116,650,000

MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF AID THAT CAN BE PROVIDED..... \$59,526,650,000

*Does not include the value of ships which may be leased by the Navy for the duration of the emergency.

†Value of ships which may be leased.

Appendix III

STATUS OF NATIONS

Twenty-nine nations have signed the United Nations Declaration, pledging their full resources to the fight against the Axis powers, and agreeing not to make a separate peace with the enemies. Of the 42 nations which have been declared eligible for lend-lease aid by the President, 30 have signed lend-lease agreements. Formal agreements providing for reciprocal lend-lease aid have been entered into by four of these nations with the United States. Full information concerning the status of the various nations is shown by the following chart.

The Declaration by United Nations, together with the original signatories, is printed in Appendix IV. The Master Agreement signed with the United Kingdom is contained in Appendix V. Lend-lease agreements with the following countries are identical with the British agreement: China, U. S. S. R., Belgium, Poland, Netherlands, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Norway and Yugoslavia. In addition, Australia and New Zealand have accepted the same principles. Canada agreed to the principles set forth in Article VII of the Master Agreements in an exchange of notes with the United States, dated November 30, 1942.

STATUS OF NATIONS		(LEND-LEASE COUNTRIES AND UNITED NATIONS)	
	UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION SIGNED		LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT SIGNED
	ELIGIBLE FOR LEND-LEASE AID		RECIPROCAL LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT IN EFFECT
ARGENTINA			
AUSTRALIA			
BELGIUM			
BOLIVIA			
BRAZIL			
CANADA			
CHILE			
CHINA			
COLOMBIA			
COSTA RICA			
CUBA			
CZECHOSLOVAKIA			
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC			
ECUADOR			
EGYPT			
EL SALVADOR			
ETHIOPIA			
FIGHTING FRANCE			
GREECE			
GUATEMALA			
HAITI			
HONDURAS			
ICELAND			
INDIA			
IRAN			
IRAQ			
LUXEMBOURG			
MEXICO			
NETHERLANDS			
NEW ZEALAND			
NICARAGUA			
NORWAY			
PANAMA			
PARAGUAY			
PERU			
PHILIPPINES			
POLAND			
SOUTH AFRICA			
TURKEY			
UNITED KINGDOM			
UNITED STATES			
U. S. S. R.			
URUGUAY			
VENEZUELA			
YUGOSLAVIA			

Appendix IV

DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS

A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at Washington

January First 1942

The Republic of Costa Rica

by Luis Fernandez

The Republic of Cuba

by Aurelio F. Concheso

Czechoslovak Republic

by V. S. Hurban

The Dominican Republic

by J. M. Troncoso

The Republic of El Salvador

by C. A. Alfaro

The Kingdom of Greece

by Cimon P. Diamantopoulos

The Republic of Guatemala

by Enrique Lopez-Herrarte

The United States of America

by Franklin D. Roosevelt

The United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

by Winston Churchill

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics <i>by Maxim Litvinoff,</i> <i>Ambassador</i>	The Republic of Nicaragua <i>by Leon DeBayle</i>
National Government of the Republic of China Tse Vung Soong, <i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	The Kingdom of Norway <i>by W. Munthe de Morgen-</i> <i>stierne</i>
The Commonwealth of Australia <i>by R. G. Casey</i>	The Republic of Panama <i>by Jaen Guardia</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium <i>by Cte. R. v. d. Straten</i>	The Republic of Poland <i>by Jan Ciechanowski</i>
Canada <i>by Leighton Mc Carthy</i>	La Republique d'Haiti <i>par Fernand Dennis</i>
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg <i>by Hugues Le Gallais</i>	The Republic of Honduras <i>by Julian R. Caceres</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands A. Loudon	India Girja Shankar Bajpai
Signed on behalf of the Govt. of the Dominion of New Zealand <i>by Frank Langstone</i>	The Union of South Africa <i>by Ralph W. Close</i>
	The Kingdom of Yugoslavia <i>by Constantin A. Fotitch</i>

NOTE: Mexico, The Commonwealth of the Philippines and Ethiopia have since adhered to the Declaration by United Nations.

Appendix V

BRITISH MASTER AGREEMENT

Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Authorized and Provided for by the Act of March 11, 1941.

Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace.

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfill or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

Article II

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply.

Article III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.

Article V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

Article VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

Article VII

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objec-

tives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.

Article VIII

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this 23d day of February, 1942.

For the Government of the United States of America:

[SEAL]

SUMNER WELLES,
Acting Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

For the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

[SEAL]

HALIFAX
His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary at Washington.

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

PSF
L. F.
Lend Lease

December 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The principal development in our aid to Russia this month is the resumption of convoys via the Archangel-Murmansk supply route. The convoys will be divided into two sections each of which will consist of sixteen ships. The first section is scheduled to sail from the United Kingdom about December 15th, and a few days later the second section will follow. It is expected this rotation will continue in monthly cycles. Our contribution to the first convoy is twenty-two ships all of which are presently available in the United Kingdom.

x220
x4193

The first section of the second convoy will leave the United Kingdom about the middle of January and our quota from the United States is four ships. These vessels are now being defended and specially prepared for this route and will commence loading next Saturday, December 12th. The vessels selected are all Liberty ships (EC-2s): viz.,

	<u>DWT</u>	<u>Cubic</u>
NICHOLAS GILMAN	10500	500245
ANDREW MOORE	10500	500245
ISRAEL PUTNAM	10500	500245
CORNELIUS HARNETT	10500	500245

The number of ships we will supply for the second section is still under discussion, but it will be at least five.

Our regular November allotment of ten ships to the Persian Gulf did not become available for loading until December. However, they will all

x99
L. F. War Shipping Administration

clear in December plus one special truck ship for Karachi, and in addition thereto the December allotment of ten ships will also go on berth during the month. In Exhibit A attached we are listing the November and December ships together with all available data.

The delay in dispatching the November ships will not prove any penalty to the Russians because the Persian Corridor is very badly congested now, resulting in severe delays to all shipping. There has been a gradual improvement each month, and General Connelly, commanding the Persian Gulf Service Command, estimates that in March next year the capacity of the port will be nearly double over what it is today. As practically all of our November and December allocations will sail in December and arrive in the Persian Gulf during March next year, the expanded facilities of the port should help substantially in absorbing this extra tonnage.

The remaining supply route to Russia is via the West Coast. All this tonnage is transported in Russian flag ships. The volume of tonnage moving through this gateway has increased monthly, and in December the total is expected to reach 150,000 tons.

We have experienced some difficulty in port congestion on the Pacific Coast due to late arrivals and marine casualties; but this situation is being carefully watched and corrective measures applied where necessary.

In our November report we mentioned the names of the first five vessels selected for delivery, against our commitment to provide twenty at the rate of five per month commencing November, 1942.

It is a pleasure to report we have anticipated these requirements, and barring any unusual misfortune, expect to transfer the entire lot to the Russians not later than January 10, 1942 -- in fact seventeen will be delivered before January 1st. The vessels involved in this transaction, together with their transfer date, are shown in Appendix B attached hereto.

Finally, we have received word from the Russians that the tankers SS FITZSIMMONS, delivered to them early in October, and the SS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, which was also delivered that month, arrived respectively at Vladivostok November 18th and Nagaevvo November 23rd. This is most significant and very good news.

Respectfully submitted,

E. S. Lend

E. S. Lend
Administrator

L. W. Douglas

L. W. Douglas
Deputy Administrator

x4772

(Exhibit A)

November Allocations - Persian Gulf

	<u>DWT</u>	<u>Cubic</u>					
1. COLLIS P. HUNTINGTON	10500	500245	Sailed New York	Dec. 10	Loaded	8030	Tons
2. JONATHAN GRAUF	10500	500245	Expected sail N.Y.	Dec. 14	Loading	8300	Tons
3. TIMOTHY PICKERING	10500	500245	" " "	Dec. 14	"	8400	"
4. PHILIP LIVINGSTON	10500	500245	" " "	Dec. 22	"	8400	"
5. SANTA CRUZ	9344	447790	" " "	Dec. 22	"	7500	"
6. WILL ROGERS	10500	500245	Sailed Phila.	Dec. 8	Loaded	8433	"
7. DANIEL CHESTER FRENCH	10500	500245	Expected sail Phila.	Dec. 11	Loading	8700	"
8. PORLAU ROBLAH	10914	557000	" " "	Dec. 13	"	8400	"
9. HENRY BACON	10500	500245	" " "	Dec. 15	"	8400	"
10. ABNER WASH	10500	500245	" " "	Dec. 17	"	8400	"
11. DANIEL WILLARD	10500	500245	" " "	Dec. 19	"	8400	"
	<u>114758</u>	<u>5506995</u>				<u>91363</u>	<u>Tons</u>

* Karachi Truck Ship.

December Allocations - Persian Gulf

	<u>DWT</u>	<u>Cubic</u>	<u>Availability</u>
1. JOSEPH ALSTON	10500	500245	December 10
2. DANIEL BOONE	10500	500245	December 13
3. WILLIAM P. FESSENDEN	10500	500245	December 14
4. MONTANAN	9500	433937	December 21
5. THOMPSON LYKES	9271	447000	December 22
6. THOMAS HARTLEY	10500	500245	December 25
7. NATHANIEL BACON	10500	500245	December 25
8. WILLARD HALL	10500	500245	December 30
9. POCARONTAS	10500	500245	December 30
10. ROBERT TREAT PAINE	10500	500245	December 30
	<u>82271</u>	<u>4882897</u>	

(Appendix B)

Vessels Selected for West Coast Delivery to Russia

	<u>DWT</u>	<u>Cubic</u>	
* 1. KAILUA	7900	384198	Delivered San Francisco Nov. 6
* 2. JANE CHRISTENSEN	8616	443000	Delivered San Francisco Nov. 12
* 3. VERMAR	8600	424913	Delivered Tacoma Nov. 20
* 4. WEST CELERON	8500	442873	Delivered Seattle Nov. 18
5. WEST MODUS	8670	443000	Delivered Olympia Nov. 20
6. MANOA	8084	374727	Delivered Tacoma Dec. 1
7. SARTARTIA	8580	373000	Delivered Seattle Dec. 7
8. NEBRASKAN	10860	584408	Delivered San Francisco Dec. 8
9. SAN CLEMENTE	8366	409888	To be delivered Seattle Dec. 10
10. SILETZ	8610	445000	To be delivered Seattle Dec. 12
11. DAKOTAN	10175	492519	To be delivered San Francisco Dec. 12
12. EWA	9822	493917	To be delivered San Francisco Dec. 12
13. KLAMATH	9400	438792	To be delivered Seattle Dec. 15
14. IOWAN	8950	462000	To be delivered San Francisco Dec. 22
15. DE SOTO	8635	454936	To be delivered Seattle Dec. 25
* 16. WEST CRESSY	8500	360414	To be delivered San Francisco Dec. 28
17. STEEL EXPORTER	9400	478629	To be delivered San Francisco Dec. 30
18. PACIFIC OAK	8570	440000	To be delivered Seattle Jan. 2
19. WEST CAMARGO	8584	401416	To be delivered Seattle Jan. 5
20. NEVADAN	9950	559974	To be delivered San Francisco Jan. 10
	<u>358772</u>	<u>8913823</u>	

* Mention made of these five in last report.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FEBRUARY 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS BACHELDER:

THANKS FOR SENDING THESE OVER. W.S.A.
MEMORANDUM OF DEC. 10th IS THE ONE GENERAL
BURNS HAS BEEN LOOKING FOR. WHILE HE IS NOT
TOO MUCH INVOLVED IN U.K. SHIPPING, HE NOTED
MEMOS OF JAN. 30th & 19th. *Filed B.F. Lease
Send Lease.*

GEN. BURNS ALSO RETURNED THROUGH THIS
OFFICE THE ATTACHED LETTERS FROM AGRICULTURE
AND WAR PRODUCTION BOARD ON SOVIET PROTOCOL
COMMITMENTS.

R.D.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mrs. Daggett

I need a little advice on this one, especially in view of Mr. Hopkins memo of Feb. 2.

Since War Shipping had to take action on Jan. 27th without consulting the President, in view of his absence, don't you imagine Gen. Burns knows of the transaction by now?

I hesitate to send this out before checking carefully, so, if necessary, will you ask Mr. Hopkins?

TOI B.

LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
ADMINISTRATOR

file
PSF
December 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Confidential

To: The President
From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Subject: Seventh Report to Congress

Herewith is the finale of the Seventh Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations.

I am sorry that it was not possible to hand you this copy yesterday but it has just come off the press this morning.

Attachment

Ed
x 4559

x4193