

Lend Lease: July 1943

*C.F.*  
*Lend Lease*

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*file*

JUL 9 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to enclose our July progress report to you on the subject of Supplies For The U.S.S.R.

As requested, a copy of this report has been forwarded directly to Major General J. H. Burns, Executive of The President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry R. ...*  
Petroleum Administrator for War.  
*x4435*

The President,

The White House.

*x220.*  
*x4193*  
*x56*

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

WASHINGTON

SUPPLIES FOR THE U.S.S.R.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

The following tabulation summarizes the petroleum product shipments that have been made to the U.S.S.R. during the period June 22, 1941 (the date of the German invasion of Russia) to June 30, 1943:

Aviation Gasoline and Blending Agents	2,679,131 Bbls.
Motor Gasoline	733,206 "
Miscellaneous Naphtha and Kerosene	33,942 "
Gas Oil	173,691 "
Fuel Oil	27,831 "
Lubricating Oil	150,338 "
Grease	5,644 "
Tetraethyl Lead	16,279 "
Lubricating Oil Additives	25,938 "
Total -	<u>3,846,060</u>

Ceresine and Paraffin Wax 3,357 Short Tons.

(Shipments diverted to the United Kingdom while en route to North Russia have been eliminated from these figures, and replacement shipments from the United Kingdom to North Russia have been included.)

It is interesting to note that during the first year following the Nazi invasion, that is to June 30, 1942, aviation gasoline and blending agents constituted 63.2 per cent of all of the petroleum products shipped to Russia. During the next year they constituted 77.1 per cent of the total, and for the Third Protocol year (ending June 30, 1944) the Soviet Purchasing Commission has indicated that the requirement of these products will amount to 98.5 per cent of the total products desired.

Although at the time our last report was compiled it had been expected that six tankers of aviation gasoline and blending agents would sail in June, it is understood that only three actually departed, owing to delays in arrival of the ships or in their readiness to load. One of these was a former United States tanker, which was turned over to the Russians under Lend-Lease to load a cargo previously laid out for another ship which was expected to be delayed. This brings to eight the number of United States tankers turned over to Soviet registry, and makes the Russians' total fleet of full-size ocean-going tankers eleven vessels, according to our best knowledge.




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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Interior Dept Hx, 11-3-72



We understand that the quantities of blending agents and 100 octane aviation gasoline to be allocated to the Soviet Purchasing Commission are to be as large as possible in view of other demands and commitments.

#### PETROLEUM REFINING PLANTS

Progress on the refining plant program under the Second Protocol continues to be satisfactory. Treasury Procurement, which is responsible to Lend-Lease for the engineering contract and for the purchasing of the equipment, considers that the attainments to June 15, the date of the last report on the subject available at this time, are sufficient generally to assure accomplishment of the August 31 ship-side goal which was set many months ago. It is understood that the Russians recently expressed a strong desire for delivery of Plants I and II to ship-side in July. It is not expected that this will be possible, despite the fact that the program has had first priority over all other projects in the United States since December of last year.

In a recent letter addressed by a Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission to General Burns, it was stated that this office had requested various manufacturers to stop work on certain Russian equipment during July in order that they might be able to concentrate upon work for the Petroleum Administration for War. This accusation was entirely incorrect, as no such instructions were given by either PAW or any other agency.

Although we recommended to the Soviet Purchasing Commission as long ago as last November that it should submit an estimate of its requirements of refining equipment as early as possible for the Third Protocol period (the year beginning July 1, 1943), the following list of plants and units desired has been received only within the past month:

- 1 - Toluene Plant.
- 1 - Sulphuric Acid Alkylation Plant.
- 2 - Houdry Catalytic Cracking Units to produce base stock with supplementary facilities to produce liquid Butane Butylene.
- 1 - Catalyst Manufacturing Plant.
- 3 - Desalting and Dehydrogenation Plants.
- 1 - Thermoform Catalytic Cracking Unit for production of base stock.
- 2 - Plants for dehydrogenation of butanes to butenes.
- 1 - Cumene Plant, with supplementary facilities to produce liquid propane.
- 1 - Dewaxing Plant for neutral oils.
- 1 - Ceresine Plant.
- 1 - Dewaxing Plant for lubricating oil.
- 1 - Plant for production of methyl ethyl ketone solvent.
- 1 - Plant for production of acetone solvent.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (K)

All of these plants are requested with complete utilities and facilities such as steam power plant, electrical generating stations, water pumping stations, laboratories, warehouses, etc.

Details have not yet been received on this program, so it is not possible to estimate the cost, the amount of strategic materials involved, and the effects upon other projects of furnishing this equipment. However, it is a considerably larger program than the one under the Second Protocol, and its material cost would probably exceed \$100,000,000 and the quantity of strategic material would probably be over 200,000 tons. By way of comparison, the equipment in the six plants and units being furnished under the Second Protocol is worth about \$39,000,000, and the material involved is about 110,000 tons. Before Lend-Lease determines to what extent this program will be met, a considerable amount of technical analysis will have to be undertaken to evaluate it. The Soviet Commission has advised that it will soon be able to provide the data which will allow this preliminary technical work to be started. In the meantime discussions on the program are being carried on with the Russian technologists and with United States engineering firms.

We suggested some time ago to Lend-Lease that it would be advisable for a competent American technologist to be sent to Russia to assist in the preparation of the requirements under the Third Protocol. This recommendation was presented to a Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Commission but was strongly opposed by him. It will not be pressed at this time.

#### OILFIELD EQUIPMENT

Under Protocols I and II, that is up to the end of June of this year, requisitions were entered by the Soviet Purchasing Commission for oilfield equipment (excluding tubular goods) to a value of about \$22,000,000. The value of the material shipped during this period is estimated to have been about \$6,000,000. This office is constantly engaged in assisting in the procurement of this material, in determining with the Russians the equipment best suited to meet their needs, and with Lend-Lease, Treasury Procurement, and the War Production Board in expediting the manufacturing and shipping orders.

We do not yet have advice as to how much oilfield equipment will be requested under the Third Protocol, but from indications received in various conversations with the Commission representatives it is believed that it will have a value in the neighborhood of \$12,000,000.

About the middle of March the Russians requested preparation of drilling and production equipment to a value of about \$750,000, to be shipped from the West Coast to North Siberian ports for their Arctic exploration and exploitation program. By dint of very intensive and resourceful work on the part of Lend-Lease, Treasury Procurement, the War Production Board, and this office it was possible to obtain all of this equipment for shipment as desired. Since shipment to the Arctic ports can be undertaken only during a very short period, on account of ice conditions, fulfillment of the time limit was of the utmost importance.

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At the present time we are assisting in the obtaining of certain spare parts for oilfield equipment now in operation in Russia which are stated to be of the utmost urgency. This requirement is so pressing that the Russians are making arrangements to have it flown to its destination from the United States, although the tonnage involved is very considerable for such a manner of shipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We have no further recommendations to make at this time.

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WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON

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*C. F.  
Lend Lease*

July 10, 1943

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Commerce Dept It, 11-15-72

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

*no records in file*

Last month we reported that three of our May sailings to the Persian Gulf were routed through the Mediterranean. It was estimated this route would require about 56 days, but from reports received so far of this convoy it looks as though the elapsed time would be nearer 48 days.

The availability of this route with its substantial savings in voyage days, together with the cargo backlog still on hand in the Persian Gulf, permitted us to reduce our June sailings to the small number of three, (see exhibit A attached). Our calculations as of July 7, 1943, indicates congestion will be serious in July and August but that in September and October the backlog will be reduced close to the working level of approximately 60,000 tons.

Our monthly requirements under the Third Protocol, commencing July 1, 1943, calls for ships to lift 150,000 short tons through this gateway. We do not anticipate any difficulty in making this target, and with the Persian Gulf capacities increasing slowly but surely, this volume of traffic should not result in any congestion. In fact, if we accept the estimates just received from this area there will be some excess capacity in the fall. We still recommend a conservative approach until performance is more in line

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with estimates. Our July program is shown in exhibit B attached. You will note that in addition to the 18 ships presenting in July that there will be six carry-overs from June which will sail in July.

On the Pacific Coast our June results were highly satisfactory. A total of 244,189 tons cleared, divided as follows:

Arctic: 5 ships, dry cargo and tankers, 14,649 long tons

Soviet Far East: 53 ships - 229,540 long tons.

This is a high mark for this route. When you consider all the handicaps we are working under in this operation, this performance is most credible. To mention a few of the disabilities there is, first, the difficulty in determining where the ships are and when they will be available. The Russian information is meager at best and is usually late. We are doing everything possible to improve this condition and hope before long to secure regular and reliable reports of ship movements at all ports. Until we have this and know what the ships do after they reach Russian territory we cannot, with any accuracy or confidence, determine what a proper turnaround should be. So far, our hope of a 75-day performance is far from realization. The figure is nearer 100.

Another problem has been the tendency of the Russians on the Pacific Coast to change their loading programs after the ships come on berth. This has resulted in some dock congestion as well

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as delays in loading. However, this condition is now being corrected as a result of General Belyaev's recent visit to the Pacific Coast. <sup>and the help of head team.</sup> Changes in priorities have added to the confusion and have caused some accumulation of cargo in excess of normal requirements. However, with the monthly target under the Third Protocol of 225,000 short tons, a substantial bank of cargo is a prerequisite to efficient operation.

Closer scrutiny of the Russian programs and better controls over the cargo releases, both of which are now under way, should reduce surplus stocks in a comparatively short time. Any cargo which is now in storage on the Coast and on which the Russians are not prepared to give clearance instructions should be recaptured or repossessed under direction of the Lend-Lease Agency.

There has been no change in the North Russia route since our last report.

Delivery of our second group of twenty Liberties has been completed. Just a few days ago we agreed to give the Russians three additional Liberties in July to help them fill the void because of the late arrival of their ships. These three extra ships will load at Portland and will help reduce the surplus cargo on hand there. Our total deliveries when these last three ships are transferred will reach sixty-five.

Respectfully submitted,

*E. S. Land*  
E. S. Land  
Administrator

*L. W. Douglas*  
L. W. Douglas  
Deputy Administrator

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( Exhibit A )

PERSIAN GULF - RUSSIAN - JUNE 1943

	<u>Deadweight</u>	<u>Cubic</u>	<u>Loaded</u>	<u>Sailed</u>	<u>From</u>
1. Raphael Semmes	9,750	530,000	7,982	June 3	Phila
2. Stevenson Taylor	10,500	500,245	7,287	June 3	Phila
3. Stephen F. Austin	10,500	500,245	7,608	June 5	New York
	<u>30,750</u>	<u>1,530,490</u>	<u>22,877</u>		

ARMY

1. Philip Doddridge	10,500	500,245	6,513	June 3	Charleston
2. Waigstill Avery	10,500	500,245	5,868	June 6	Hampton Roads
3. Cape Henlopen	7,485	450,000	4,831	June 12	Charleston
4. Chas. D. McIver	10,500	500,245	4,731	June 12	Charleston
	<u>38,985</u>	<u>1,950,735</u>	<u>21,943</u>		

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(Exhibit B)

PERSIAN GULF - RUSSIAN - JULY 1943

	<u>Deadweight</u>	<u>Cubic</u>	<u>Availability Date</u>
* 1. Alexander H. Stevens	10,500	500,245	Sailed July 10
* 2. Charles Bullfinch	10,500	500,245	" July 10
* 3. Edward L. Grant	10,500	500,245	" July 10
* 4. Oliver Wolcott	10,500	500,245	" July 10
* 5. Edwin Booth	10,500	500,245	" July 10
* 6. Nathaniel Alexander	10,500	500,245	" July 10
7. George E. Pickett	10,500	500,245	July 11
8. Robert Fulton	10,500	500,245	July 9
9. Washington Irving	10,500	500,245	July 13
10. William Grayson	10,500	500,245	July 11
11. George M. Cohan	10,500	500,245	July 19
12. John A. Dix	10,500	500,245	July 19
13. John Bell	10,500	500,245	July 17
14. Joseph Leidy	10,500	500,245	July 17
15. Richard Henderson	10,500	500,245	July 19
16. William Tilghman	10,500	500,245	July 19
17. American Packer	9,116	432,606	July 21
18. Cape Cod	9,316	452,420	July 20
** 19. Cape Lookout	7,416	446,100	July 11
** 20. China Mail	9,500	530,110	July 7
21. Exhibitor	9,902	555,111	July 10
22. James Lykes	9,400	440,000	July 19
23. Talissee	10,275	418,660	July 28
24. Tosari	9,750	450,000	July 22-27
	<u>242,675</u>	<u>11,728,927</u>	

\* June Allocations

\*\* Load cargo at New York and Philadelphia

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PSF

*B.F.*  
*Lend Lease*

(SC)L11-7/EF 61  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

10 JUL 1943

*file*

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your memorandum of October 2, 1942, there is enclosed herewith a report as of July 1, 1943 showing the progress made by the Navy Department in supplying material to the Soviet Government under the Second Protocol covering the period July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943.

There is also enclosed a report on certain material requested by the Soviets, but not included in the Second Protocol.

Respectfully submitted

*James Forrestal*

JAMES FORRESTAL  
Acting

*x18*

The President  
The White House

*x220*  
*x493*

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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8 (1) 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- JAN 25 1972

Signature- *AKP*

STATUS OF DELIVERY OF MATERIALS REQUISITIONED  
BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT  
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 2ND PROTOCOL

ITEM	AMOUNT REQUESTED	DELIVERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, '42	DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1942 JUNE 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR JULY 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR AUG. 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SEPT. 1943	BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED	SCHEDULE TIME OF DELIVERIES OF BALANCE
20 MM AA Guns, Complete	500	0	400	50	50	0	0	
Rounds 20 MM AA Ammunition	3,000,000	0	1,100,120	100,000	100,000	100,000	1,599,820	100,000 Rounds Per Month
50 Cal. Twin (Hand Operated) Mounts, MK 17, Complete with Cradle and Spare Parts	200	0	30	50	50	50	20	Oct. 1943
50 Cal. Guns, complete with Spare Parts	450	0	60	100	100	100	90	Oct. 1943
Petroleum Products (Short Tons)	312,815	49,650	181,115	26,882	25,112	24,013	6,043	Oct. 1943
Minesweepers	10	0	0	3	3	4	0	
Motor Torpedo Boat Water and Oil Coolers	810 each	0	692 each	118 each	0	0	0	
Marine Diesel Engines (1100- 1600 H.P.)	150	0	134	0	0	0	16	Oct. 1943 to Feb. 1944
Marine Diesel Engines (170-1100 H.P.)	248	0	47	83	48	37	33	Oct. 1943
Marine Diesel Engines (75-170 H.P.)	343	0	78	50	50	50	115	Oct. 1943 to Dec. 1943
Marine Diesel Engines (Below 75 H.P.)	1,310	2	259	116	122	61	750	Oct. 1943 to Dec. 1943
Marine Gasoline Engines	2,507	260	1,628	327	192	0	100	Nov. 1943
Turbo-Generators	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	
Mechanical and Electrical Equipment for Tugs	3 sets	0	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial (Complete)	0	
Storage Batteries for Submarines	15 sets	0	15	0	0	0	0	
Ship and Shore Radio Stations	26	0	26	0	0	0	0	
Radio Direction Finders	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	
Sound Measuring and Testing Equipment	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	
Electric Steering Gear	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	
Depth Sounders	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	
Electrical Spare Parts for Diesel Engines	243 items	2%	98%	0	0	0	0	

STATUS OF DELIVERY OF MATERIALS REQUISITIONED  
 BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT  
 UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 2ND PROTOCOL

ITEM	AMOUNT REQUESTED	DELIVERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, '42	DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1942 JUNE 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR JULY 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR AUG. 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SEPT. 1943	BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED	SCHEDULE TIME OF DELIVERIES OF BALANCE
Chain Hoists	309	1	308	0	0	0	0	
Turbo-Ventilators	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	
Pneumatic Hammers	200	0	200	0	0	0	0	
Stadimeters	150	0	150	0	0	0	0	
Micrometers, Sextants and Binoculars	40 each	0	40 each	0	0	0	0	
Stationary Compressors	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	

STATUS OF DELIVERY OF MATERIALS REQUISITIONED BY THE  
SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT  
(NON PROTOCOL ITEMS)

ITEM	AMOUNT REQUESTED	DELIVERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, '42	DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1942 JUNE 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR JULY 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR AUG. 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SEPT. 1943	BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED	SCHEDULE TIME OF DELIVERIES OF BALANCE
Marine Gasoline Engines	2395	0	0	0	175	165	2055	Unscheduled
Marine Pumps	420	0	38	29	35	91	227	Oct. 1943 to Jan. 1944
Radio Receivers	173	0	82	7	4	0	80	Oct--Nov. 1943
Electric Motors	1220	0	0	0	0	0	1220	Oct--Nov. 1943
Turbo-Generators	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	
Storage Batteries for Submarines	50	0	1	2	3	6	38	Oct. 1943 to June 1944
Wooden Sub-Chasers	92	0	0	16	10	11	55	Oct. 1943 to April 1944
Wooden Motor Boats	80	0	12	0	0	6	62	Oct. 1943 to July 1944
Landing Boats - LCM (3)	30	0	30	0	0	0	0	
Electric Ventilating Sets	649	0	0	649	0	0	0	
Bearings for Packard Engines	100	0	50	50	0	0	0	
Telegraph Indicators	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	
Scripps Engines	66	0	0	0	0	0	66	Nov. 1943 to Jan. 1944
Air Compressors	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	
Air Tanks	30	0	0	20	10	0	0	
Electric Steering Gear	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	
Fathometer Recorders	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	
Rotary and Changeover Switches	4365	0	4365	0	0	0	0	
Potassium Tetraoxide	1,120,000 lbs.	0	490,000	186,200	130,000	101,200	212,600	Oct. 1943 to Dec. 1943
Linoleum	20,000 meters	0	20,000	0	0	0	0	
Turbo-Ventilators	24	0	18	6	0	0	0	
Exhaust Mufflers for 900 HP Engines	2 sets	0	2	0	0	0	0	
Windlasses	5	0	0	0	4	0	1	Oct. 1943
Weatherproof Sirens	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	
Radio and Telephone Transmitters	9	0	8	0	1	0	0	

STATUS OF DELIVERY OF MATERIALS REQUISITIONED BY THE  
SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT  
(NON PROTOCOL ITEMS)

ITEM	AMOUNT REQUESTED	DELIVERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, '42	DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1942 JUNE 1943	delivery SCHEDULE FOR JULY 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR AUG. 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SEPT. 1943	BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED	SCHEDULE TIME OF DELIVERIES OF BALANCE
Voltmeters, Ammeters, Circuit Breakers, Switches	16-Voltmeters 20-Ammeters 8-Circuit Breakers 1320-Switches	0	100%	0	0	0	0	
Auxiliary Equipment for Ships	10 sets	0	0	0	0	0	10	Oct.--Nov. 1943
Vertical Steam Boilers	11	0	1	0	0	10	0	
Marine Diesel Engines (1100- 1600 HP)	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	
Marine Diesel Engines (170- 1100 HP)	198	0	4	9	7	9	169	Unscheduled
Marine Diesel Engines (75-170 HP)	594	0	36	12	12	12	522	Unscheduled
Marine Diesel Engines (Below 75 HP)	32	0	32	0	0	0	0	
Marine Diesel Generators	482	0	8	4	43	26	401	Unscheduled
Desk Clocks 4	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	
Chronometers	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	
Marine Steam Dynamo	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	
Jetting Equipment for Salvage Operations	20 sets	0	0	0	0	20	0	
Submarine Rescue Chamber	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Towing Winches	10	0	0	0	0	0	10	Unscheduled
Outboard Motors	500	0	0	100	0	0	400	Jan. 1944
Diving Stations	83	0	0	0	20	20	43	Oct. 1943 to Feb. 1944
Flexible Periscope Rope	50,000 ft.	0	50,000	0	0	0	0	
Lanterns and Flashers	982	0	0	150	150	150	532	Oct. 1943 to Dec. 1943
Forgings for Propellor Shafts and Couplings	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	March 1944

STATUS OF DELIVERY OF MATERIALS REQUISITIONED BY THE  
SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT  
(NON PROTOCOL ITEMS)

ITEM	AMOUNT REQUESTED	DELIVERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, '42	DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1942 JUNE 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR JULY 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR AUG. 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SEPT. 1943	BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED	SCHEDULE TIME OF DELIVERIES OF BALANCE
Gasoline-Oil Filters	2400-800	0	0	0	0	2400-800	0	
Thermostats and Pressure Indicators	200	0	0	0	0	100	100	Oct. 1943
Electrical Tachometers	201	0	0	0	0	0	201	Oct.--Nov. 1943
Diving Equipment	100	0	0	0	0	20	80	Oct. 1943
Reflectors for Projectors	10	0	0	10	0	0	0	
Electric Crane	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	Unscheduled
Air Valves	194	0	0	0	0	0	194	Unscheduled
Pressure Indicators	200	0	0	0	100	100	0	
Centrifugal Fans	47	0	0	0	0	0	47	Unscheduled
Lighting Fixtures	1 lot	0	0	0	0	0	1 lot	Unscheduled
Electrical Equipment	6 lots	0	0	0	0	0	6 lots	Unscheduled
Radio Tubes	580	0	580	0	0	0	0	
Water-Tight Junction Boxes	240	0	0	0	0	240	0	
Buoys	100	0	0	0	0	0	100	Oct. 1943
Acetylene Gas Accumulators	700	0	0	0	0	0	700	Oct. 1943
Water Distilling Units for Submarines	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	Oct. 1943
Searchlight Projectors	20	0	0	10	10	0	0	
Steering Gear	35	0	0	0	0	0	35	Unscheduled
Binoculars	55	0	0	55	0	0	0	
Diving Compressors	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	Unscheduled
Shaftlines-Propellers	100-200	0	0	0	0	0	100-200	Unscheduled
Transmitting Tubes	1 lot	0	0	0	0	0	1 lot	Unscheduled
5"/38 D.R. Equipments, Guns Mk 30 Handwheel Brackets and no Power Drives	150	0	8	117	25	0	0	
5"/38 Cal. Single Loading Machine Mk 14-Mod 4 and Spare Parts	64	0	3	51	10	0	0	

STATUS OF DELIVERY OF MATERIALS REQUISITIONED BY THE  
SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT  
(NON PROTOCOL ITEMS)

ITEM	AMOUNT REQUESTED	DELIVERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, '42	DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1942 JUNE 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR JULY 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR AUG. 1943	DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SEPT. 1943	BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED	SCHEDULE TIME OF DELIVERIES OF BALANCE
5"/38 AA Ammunition	66,000	0	7,880	47,310	10,810	0	0	
5"/38 Common Ammunition	15,000	0	1,500	3,500	0	0	10,000	Oct. - Dec. 1943
5"/38 Illuminating Ammunition	3,000	0	300	2,200	500	0	0	
3"/50 D.P. Equipments	300	0	93	157	50	0	0	
3"/50 Cal. Loading Machines Mk 7 Mod. 1	100	0	0	84	16	0	0	
3"/50 AA Ammunition	283,500	0	74,481	161,769	47,250	0	0	
3"/50 Illuminating Ammunition	15,000	0	4,650	7,850	2,500	0	0	
20 MM AA Guns, Complete	1,000	0	388	212	0	0	400	Unscheduled
Rounds 20 MM AA Ammunition	5,000,000	0	2,326,660	673,340	0	0	2,000,000	Unscheduled
F.S. Mixture for Smoke Screen Generators	19,200 gal.	0	7,700	0	0	0	11,500	Unscheduled
Sets of Equipment for filling Smoke Screen Generators	5	0	2	0	0	0	3	Unscheduled
Torp edo Tube Testing Sets Mk1, Mod 3	10	0	0	0	0	0	10	Unscheduled

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION  
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file*  
*PSF*

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.  
Administrator

*C. F.*  
*Lend Lease*

July 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President  
FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.  
SUBJECT: Soviet Supply Program

In accordance with your directive to me dated October 2, 1942, I have prepared a brief statement of the major current factors in the Soviet supply situation.

The regular monthly statistical report on the entire program will follow in due course as soon as the information has been gathered and correlated.

*E. R. Stettinius, Jr.*  
*x4559*

*x4193*  
*x220*



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THE SOVIET SUPPLY PROGRAM

I. Second Protocol

2,907,100 long tons of cargo were shipped during the 12 months of the Second Protocol. This represents 72% of the tonnage originally expected for the period. June shipments were 273,700 long tons against May clearances of 350,100 long tons. The primary reason for the reduction in clearances during June is found in the fact that only four vessels cleared for the Persian Gulf instead of the 15 or more which have departed in recent months.

A reduction in Persian Gulf sailings was ordered because of changes to the Mediterranean routing which reduces the vessel turn-around time from 7 to 5 months and makes it necessary to reduce June departures, so as not to cause the arrival of two months' quotas at the Persian Gulf during the same month.

Failure to meet Second Protocol shipping expectancies was caused primarily by the inability to use the Northern Route for a large part of the past year. Cargoes have always been available in sufficient quantities to meet shipping possibilities and some goods have been diverted to other uses to prevent waste. Soviet representatives have never, apparently, accepted these difficulties as reason for our failure to meet original shipping expectations.

Increased loadings from the West Coast for the Soviet Far East made up in some measure for reductions in capacity of the Northern Route. Increase of clearances through the Persian Gulf in the latter half of the Protocol period was also a factor. Material made available but unshipped under the Second Protocol has been offered under the Third Protocol.

July shipping expectancies are up to normal schedule for the Persian Gulf and the West Coast. A portion of the West Coast shipments represents the Arctic Movement, which will reach its peak in July.

II. Airplanes

Deliveries of airplanes over the Alaskan-Siberian Route accounted for 88% of total June shipments. 366 planes cleared during the month against May clearances of 468. June clearances included 43 planes for British account and the balance for U. S. account. Reduction in the number of vessels departing for the Persian Gulf was in considerable measure responsible for the poor showing, as deliveries from factories were held to Protocol levels.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. [unclear] Date FEB

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- 2 -

### III. Third Protocol

Deliveries of materials are now proceeding under Third Protocol schedules. The Soviet Government has not yet made its selection of tonnage from the offerings presented. In spite of this fact, limited production is being continued in accordance with the experience of Second Protocol shipping programs and loadings are also being made from stocks carried over from the Second Protocol period.

Requests are now being filed for military items, including anti-aircraft guns and self-propelled artillery, which were not included in the original Third Protocol requests. These items are being met by the War Department to the extent possible and requests for other items will be reduced proportionately to make room for this added shipping tonnage.

### IV. Inland Transportation

Traffic experts from the Administration accompanied representatives from the Division for Soviet Supply on an examination of West Coast ports and holding and reassignment depots. Port and railroad congestion and the loss and inefficiency resulting therefrom were found to be caused in part by frequent changes of allocations to ships by Soviet shipping personnel.

Recommendations were presented to Major General Belyaev, Chief of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, who has given orders to avoid changes in allocation of cargo after primary programs are laid out. Efforts are also being made to ship from accumulated West Coast stocks before additional supplies are moved from Central and East Coast production centers. In following this policy, it is anticipated that the movement of Soviet freight will shortly become less irregular and port areas less congested.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date \_\_\_\_\_

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

*C. F. Lend Lease*

JUL 13 1943

My dear Mr. President:

There is attached a report of Lend-Lease purchases made by the Treasury Procurement Division for the Soviet government indicating the availability of cargo for July.

The inventory of materials in storage as of July 1st was 569,070 tons or 67,306 tons less than the June 1st inventory. Production scheduled for July also shows a decrease of 64,647 tons as compared with June.

Yours sincerely,

*H. M. ...*

x21

x21-2

x228

x4193

The President

The White House

FOR DEFENSE



BUY  
UNITED STATES  
SAVINGS  
BONDS  
AND STAMPS

TREASURY DEPARTMENT - U. S. S. R.  
MATERIALS AVAILABLE FROM STORAGE AND PRODUCTION DURING JULY, 1943

<u>COMMODITY</u>	<u>STORAGE</u> <u>JULY 1, 1943</u>	<u>PRODUCTION</u> <u>DURING JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL AVAILABLE</u>	<u>PRIORITY CARGOES</u> <u>TO PORT AREAS</u> <u>SPECIFIED TO</u> <u>DATE FOR JULY</u>
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY AND IMPLEMENTS		1	1	
ALUMINUM	274	3,280	3,554	3,500
AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT AND PARTS		7	7	
BEARINGS	99	940	1,039	
BRASS AND BRONZE	17,471	621	18,092	
CHEMICALS	5,952	1,604	7,556	3,500
CLOTHING AND TEXTILES		195	195	
CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY		1,877	1,877	
COPPER IN VARIOUS FORMS	47,253	9,126	56,379	500
FERRO-ALLOYS	4,362	53	4,415	
FURNITURE AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT		29	29	
GRAPHITE PRODUCTS	861	244	1,105	
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT	122,129	34,044	156,173	500*
LEAD AND LEAD ALLOYS	35		35	
MEDICAL SUPPLIES		14	14	
NICKEL AND NICKEL PRODUCTS	196	576	772	450
NON-FERROUS METALS, OTHER	154	176	330	330
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS	2,471	164	2,635	500
PLASTICS	6,190		6,190	

SHEET NO. 2

<u>COMMODITY</u>	<u>STORAGE</u>	<u>PRODUCTION</u>	<u>TOTAL AVAILABLE</u>	<u>PRIORITY CARGOES</u>
	<u>JULY 1, 1943</u>	<u>DURING JULY</u>		<u>TO PORT AREAS</u>
				<u>SPECIFIED TO</u>
				<u>DATE FOR JULY</u>
RUBBER	6,818	11,276	18,094	1,500
STEEL, ALLOY & SPECIAL	176,395	5,399	181,794	2,685
STEEL, CARBON	76,701	12,207	88,908	5,210
STEEL, PIPE AND TUBING	82,879	7,691	90,570	1,540
STEEL, RAILS	17,801		17,801	17,801
TIN PLATE	1,029		1,029	
ZINC		<u>1.120</u>	<u>1.120</u>	<u>1.120</u>
TOTAL	569,070	90,644	659,714	39,136

\* In addition, all available tonnage applicable to the Oil Refinery Program is classed as priority cargo for prompt shipment to ports.

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*C. F. Leub-Hease*

OFFICE OF  
DONALD M. NELSON  
CHAIRMAN

July 20, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Attached hereto is the final monthly tabulation showing progress made toward fulfillment of materials and equipment production programs for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Second Protocol. Attached also is a summary review of the major problems and developments which have marked production aspects of the program during the past fiscal year.

x 220  
x 4193  
x 773

You will note that the performance record achieved is an impressive one. Not only were Protocol commitments fulfilled in the vast majority of cases, but, more important, American industry succeeded in making available more of practically every type of equipment than vessels bound for the USSR could transport.

As the accompanying reports show, the status of the raw materials and industrial equipment program is now such that it can be said that, with minor exceptions, production and materials limitations no longer present an obstacle to the complete fulfillment of the Soviet aid program inaugurated in 1941. Altogether, during the Second Protocol year, almost a million tons of raw materials and industrial equipment were produced for the USSR which could not be exported. Shipping space, therefore, and not production appears so far to have been the principal overall factor limiting the flow of supplies to the USSR.

x 99

Respectfully yours,

*Donald M. Nelson*  
Donald M. Nelson

x 4731

The President  
The White House

x C. F. War Production Board

Attachments



REVIEW OF PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL  
EQUIPMENT ON USSR ACCOUNT  
UNDER THE SECOND RUSSIAN PROTOCOL

In contrast to the situation under the First Protocol, production of raw materials and industrial equipment during the Second Protocol period far exceeded, in the case of every major category, shipping availabilities of the USSR.

Month after month, American mills, plants and factories poured forth a volume of goods for export to the Soviet Union which exceeded by thousands of tons the lifting capacity of vessels available for Soviet Service. With the exception of a few extremely critical items which were promised only in limited quantities (e.g. aluminum, nickel, alloy steel tubes, etc.), more of every type raw material and industrial equipment was available for shipment to the USSR at any given moment during the past twelve months than could possibly be loaded upon available vessels.

The truth of this is amply demonstrated by the stocks situation which prevailed at the close of the Second Protocol period. By June 30, 1943, almost a million tons of raw materials (i.e. metals and chemicals) and industrial equipment were held in warehouses and at sea side on USSR account. Against this, an average of only about one hundred thousand tons of shipping space was available per month for supplies of these types. Stocks of raw materials and industrial equipment, when viewed from the overall standpoint, equaled, then, nine to ten months shipping requirements. Moreover, these stocks were growing rather than decreasing. Into the Pacific Northwest were passing each month a total of more than 300,000 tons of supplies, a large part of which were raw materials and industrial equipment, while only some 125,000 tons were being lifted. A like condition existed on the East Coast.

Measured by the realistic standard of the extent to which actual requirements, as determined by shipping possibilities, were met, the Soviet raw materials and industrial equipment production program was, then, one of the most successful supply programs undertaken by this Government during the past year.

Measured by the more artificial standard of the extent to which production promises, as set forth in the Second Protocol, were fulfilled, the program was also eminently successful. Except for items deliberately curtailed because of unwieldy stocks, and except for a few relatively minor items, production in the case of virtually all Protocol categories was up to, or in excess of, commitments.

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## I. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

Because of the difficulties involved, this success was most striking in the case of industrial equipment.

When the Second Protocol supply program was first offered the USSR, US authorities felt that delivery of not more than \$162,300,000 of industrial equipment of all types could be promised. (\$9,000,000 hard alloys and cutting tools; \$3,600,000 abrasives; and \$150,000,000 machine tools, forging presses and hammers, electric furnaces, and various industrial equipment). Subsequently, after great pressure was exerted by Soviet representatives, this amount was increased to \$176,000,000. In addition, the US undertook to get under way programs to supply oil well drilling equipment, refinery equipment, and power generating equipment estimated (at that time) to total some \$75,000,000 in value.

Against the original promise of \$162,300,000 of equipment, and the later promise of between \$176,404,000 and \$251,404,000, actual deliveries during the Second Protocol period totaled \$263,718,000. These deliveries so exceeded shipping possibilities that almost half remained unexported as of June 30, 1943. Altogether, on June 30th more than 100,000 tons of industrial equipment were held in warehouses alone. Large additional quantities were at seaside, or in transit to seaside.

In evaluating this performance, however, emphasis should not be placed solely, or even primarily, on the dollar value of completed items. The Soviet industrial equipment program was far more complex and difficult than the dollar value involved would indicate. Many of the items included were not standard American items. For these, special tools, special engineering developments, and, in some cases, special materials were required. Further, a disproportionately large part of the program was for restricted types of equipment. Orders did not range over the entire field of the industrial equipment industry. Thus, while the total dollar value of the Russian program represented only a fraction of total US productive capacity, in particular categories it represented a very appreciable percentage. The program, therefore, presented problems to American industry of an exceedingly difficult nature. The fact that these problems were overcome would seem to be a better indication of the progress made than dollar value figures.

Sight should also not be lost of the fact that along with the delivery of \$263,000,000 of equipment during the Second Protocol period, very substantial progress was made toward the completion of

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additional industrial equipment items on order for the USSR. Altogether, on June 30th, fabrication was under way on more than \$500,000,000 of equipment over and above the amount actually made available. And, in the case of this, fabrication was so far advanced that most of it, despite its long-run character, was scheduled to be shipped from plant in less than six months time. If the materials, labor, and fabricating facilities which were used for this equipment during the Second Protocol period were added to the labor, materials and facilities which were used for the \$263,000,000 of equipment delivered, it would be found that the drain of the Russian equipment program on the US during the Second Protocol period amounted to well over a half billion dollars.

While it is not possible in a report of this nature to present full details as to the industrial equipment program, the general nature of the problems involved and the methods employed can be indicated through a review of the more important particular programs included.

#### A. MACHINE TOOLS

Machine tools were the most important single item in the equipment program.

Under the Second Protocol, the USSR requested a total of 21,000 machine tools with an estimated value of \$175,000,000. Against this, the US was able to offer delivery of only 6,000 tools with an approximate value of \$53,000,000.

In keeping with the general spirit of the Protocol, however, the WPB considered the number of tools promised as the minimum quantity which was actually to be supplied. Every effort was made to produce as many tools on Russian account as possible, regardless of the exact commitment. Soon after the signing of the Second Protocol, all Russian orders were given AA-1 ratings. Subsequently, AAA ratings were assigned to many especially difficult cases and to critical components. In a number of instances, domestic or British orders were set aside to expedite completion of important Russian orders.

Because of the size of the Russian machine tool program and the generally difficult situation which existed in the industry, deliveries during the first months of the Protocol period were slow despite all efforts to expedite them. Beginning in December, 1942, however, a marked acceleration began. This continued throughout the last half of the period, and, as a result, by June 30th more than twice the amount of machine tools promised had actually been made available. Altogether, 12,577 tools with all necessary parts

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and accessories were delivered. These totaled in value approximately \$110,833,000. Specific deliveries were as follows:

MACHINE TOOLS MADE AVAILABLE ON ACCOUNT USSR

July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943

	<u>Units</u>	<u>Value</u> (000 Dollars)
Boring Machines	623	10,511
Broaching Machines	69	785
Out-Off Machines	121	829
Drilling Machines	623	6,311
Gear Cutting & Finishing Machines	264	2,532
Grinding Machines	2,736	19,851
Honing & Lapping Machines	96	832
Lathes	5,306	41,281
Milling Machines	3,189	23,256
Planers	58	1,552
Shapers & Slotters	329	1,574
Threading Machines	<u>373</u>	<u>1,519</u>
TOTAL	13,787	110,833

It should be noted that in the case of machine tools as in the case of other materials, domestic deliveries far outran overseas shipments. As of June 20th, some 3,906 complete tools, with parts and accessories, were held in Ordnance warehouses on USSR account. These totaled 30,000 short tons in weight and approximately \$49,000,000 in value.

B. FORGING PRESSES AND HAMMERS

The production record achieved in the case of forging presses and hammers was comparable to that achieved in the case of machine tools. For the Second Protocol period, the USSR requested a total of \$48,000,000 of this equipment. Against this, the US felt itself unable to promise delivery of more than 800 units with a total value of approximately \$18,000,000. Altogether, however, 1136 units were made available. The total value of these amounted to approximately \$25,400,000. Specific deliveries were as follows:

FORGING PRESSES AND HAMMERS

July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943

	<u>Units</u>	<u>Value</u> (000 Dollars)
Bending Machines	61	583

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	<u>Units</u>	<u>Value</u> (000 Dollars)
Forging Machines	230	7,606
Presses	855	16,669
Shearing & Punching Machines	<u>77</u>	<u>536</u>
TOTAL	1,223	25,393

C. REFINERY PROGRAM

The Soviet Refinery Program was conceived as early as June, 1941. In July, 1941, Soviet representatives made inquiries to a number of US engineering and contracting firms specializing in petroleum refining equipment as to the possibility of USSR requirements being met. The companies contacted lacked adequate information as to the type of crude which was to be processed and as to the likely location of the plants. The plants which they offered to produce, therefore, were not suitable for use in the USSR.

For several months after these preliminary inquiries, no progress was made in getting the project definitely under way. In April, 1942, however, petroleum technologists, sent especially from the USSR for the purpose, consulted with the Office of the Petroleum Administration for War and presented more exact information as to the facilities which their Government wanted. While the information supplied was not as complete as needed, it was sufficient to enable a beginning to be made. The PAW, in cooperation with the WFB, Treasury Procurement, and the OLLA, was consequently able to work out a program which seemed likely to meet USSR requirements and which at the same time would fall within US productive capabilities. This program was formally offered the Soviet Government by the President's Soviet Protocol Committee under the Second Protocol.

The program as finally worked out consisted of four refinery plants and two desalting and dehydrating plants. The four refinery plants were capable of processing approximately 40,000 barrels of crude and gas oil per day. Worked at capacity, they would produce per day 5,900 barrels of high octane (100 octane) aviation gasoline, 750 barrels of aviation lube oil, 16,500 barrels of motor gasoline, 12,500 barrels of bunker fuel, and ten tons of oil-free wax. The total capacity of the plants exceeded appreciably, in terms of equivalents, the capacity of the larger number of plants originally requested by the USSR. The two desalting and dehydrating units were to be capable of processing 40,000 barrels of crude per day. The cost of the entire lot of equipment was to be approximately \$39,000,000.

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The program was placed under requisition on September 23, 1942. A prime contract for the whole program was given to one company, the E. B. Badger and Sons Company, who were made responsible for coordinating the over-all engineering and procuring work.

Immediately after approval of the requisition, the entire project was assigned an AA-1 priority rating by the WPB. Under this rating, substantial progress was made in getting the basic, heavy equipment on a satisfactory production schedule. It was found, however, that because of conflict with other extremely urgent domestic programs, a great many of the critical components necessary for the completion of the program were likely to be greatly delayed. The WPB, therefore, decided to give the project a super priority rating. In December, 1942, a Special Direction was issued. This Direction, which was given urgency number five, gave the project an over-riding priority vis-a-vis all domestic programs, including the domestic aviation gasoline and synthetic rubber programs, with the exception of four plants which were close to completion. On the completion of these four plants, the Russian program enjoyed the highest priority rating in the country.

Under the Special Direction, it was specified that the entire project should be completed during the month of August, 1943. Considering the scope of the undertaking and the difficult nature of much of the equipment involved, fulfillment of this schedule, even with the over-riding priority assistance granted, offered very great difficulties. The program as originally set up was by no means simple; as production progressed, it was further complicated by Soviet requests for refinements and improvements. Because of changes in design, new requisitions for very critical components were, until a short time ago, constantly being submitted. (As a matter of fact, some requisitions have been filed so recently that contracts against them still remain to be placed.)

Nevertheless, every effort was made to adhere to the schedule; lead factors specified on the Special Direction were repeatedly revised; the entire program was exempted from compliance with WPB's War Construction Standards; many supplementary items which were not to be physically incorporated in the projects and therefore could not be covered by the Special Direction were given AAA ratings; and extraordinary arrangements were made to facilitate transportation and assembling of components. Repeatedly, WPB Industry Divisions and manufacturers were informed in the strongest terms that nothing was to be permitted to interfere with completion of the program.

As a result of these varied efforts, the program was well on the way toward completion by the end of the Second Protocol period.

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On June 15, 1943, of a total of 110,000 short tons of equipment involved, 68,861 tons had been shipped from the plants of fabricators. In the case of the remaining 41,000 tons, 33,000 were scheduled for July, 7,000 for August and only 1,000 for after August. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the entire project will be completed by August, less than eleven months after it was placed under requisition.

#### D. POWER PROGRAM

The Second Protocol power program was initiated in May, 1942. It was only in August and September, however, that negotiations in regard to it were completed and requisitions accepted. The program, as finally worked out, consisted of equipment totaling more than \$50,000,000 contracted value. Included were steam generating equipment, Diesel generating equipment, and industrial boilers, together with numerous accessories.

From the inception of the program it was apparent that very great obstacles would be encountered in meeting production schedules desired by the USSR. All projects were consequently immediately granted AA-1 priority ratings. In many instances it was found that even this rating, which was superior to the rating granted most comparable domestic programs, was not adequate. Assignment of AAA ratings, or issuance of special directives to break particular bottlenecks, was therefore frequently found necessary.

To secure expeditious action in these cases, arrangements were worked out between the Power Division and the Special Rating Branch of WPB whereby requests for up-ratings could be handled on an hour-to-hour basis. As a result, hundreds of AAA requests were taken care of with a minimum of delay. As a further means of coping with obstacles, the Power Division set up a special section to deal with the program, and manufacturers, especially turbine manufacturers, were requested to supply members of their staffs, on a full-time basis, to the Power Division to assist in the coordination of the whole program with the parts being carried out by their companies.

Of the several parts of the program, greatest difficulty was offered by the Diesel equipment.

Included in the Diesel program were 1644 units. These totaled 263,866 h.p. in capacity and \$24,786,065 in value.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to divert Diesel units intended for domestic consumption to fill Russian requirements.

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Sets intended for domestic use were designed for sixty cycle current and, generally speaking, the engines could not be modified to operate fifty cycle generators, the type required by the USSR. However, the equivalent of diversions was achieved in many instances through replacing domestic orders with Russian orders. Very frequently, domestic schedules were drastically delayed or curtailed to allow Russian items to move ahead. A careful study was made by the Power Division of the facilities of all Diesel engine manufacturers, and orders were distributed among manufacturers in accordance with their capabilities despite the pressure of domestic orders. In three instances, entire facilities of manufacturers were turned over to Russian items.

Although it was not possible to complete all of the Diesel equipment before the end of the Second Protocol period, the program was put on such a satisfactory basis that it is anticipated that it will be completed during the first few weeks of the Third Protocol period. As of June 30th, more than half of the total units had been shipped from plants of manufacturers. The remainder are scheduled to be shipped by early August, 1943.

The steam program originally totaled some 240,000 k.w. in capacity and \$16,000,000 in value. It included units ranging from 250 k.w. to 35,000 k.w. To this original program were later added units for the Russian tire factory project, oil refineries, etc. These units varied in size from 800 k.w. to 25,000 k.w., with the bulk in the 3000-6000 k.w. class.

In large part, the turbines necessary for the steam plants were procured through diversions from domestic or foreign projects. Of a requirement of six 1000 k.w. package type units, three were procured through taking parts of nine partially complete units intended for shipment to China. Sixteen larger units intended for domestic use were also secured through diversions. Eleven of these were originally built for utilities and the remainder for industrial concerns. In addition, two 35,000 k.w. units which had been installed for a number of years were remodeled and made available to the USSR. Of the supplementary plants needed for the tire factory, oil refineries, etc., virtually all were secured from other programs. Thirteen units were diverted from utilities or industries, two 1000 k.w. units were obtained from a newspaper plant and one unit was secured from a Navy Yard.

Twenty-six boiler units were required for the steam plants. These varied in size from 30,000 pounds of steam per hour, to 500,000 pounds per hour and ranged in design pressure from 225 pounds to 975 pounds. As in the case of turbines, diversions were extensively relied upon in the procurement of these.

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The industrial boiler part of the program amounted to \$5,450,000 in value. It consisted of 59 units ranging in size from 26,000 pounds per hour to 450,000 pounds per hour. The pressure range was from 250 to 550 pounds. The total steam generating capacity equaled more than 7,000,000 pounds per hour.

It was not possible to divert any of the boiler units from domestic or other foreign programs. However, these programs were in numerous cases delayed or curtailed in order to make possible acceleration of Russian schedules. As a result, most of the units were completed, or nearing completion at the end of the Second Protocol period.

A disturbing feature in regard to the present status of the Power Program is the fact that most of the equipment which has been made available over the past six or eight months has not been exported to the USSR. As indicated in the above discussion, extraordinary measures, which in a great many cases were very costly to domestic programs, had to be applied to achieve production at the rate requested by Soviet representatives. In spite of this, most of the items procured through these efforts have not gone to the USSR, but have gone into warehouses in the Pacific Northwest and other areas. Included are plants which Soviet representatives greatly desired and which were secured only with the utmost difficulty. For example, turbine generators which were released by a domestic consumer in November in order that over-seas shipment might be made by December 15, 1942 are apparently still awaiting export. The same is true of the three package units which were diverted from the Chinese Program in October, 1942.

Altogether only a fraction of the equipment which has been made available has been lifted. Further, it appears that unless shipping conditions materially improve, the situation will get worse rather than better. Plant shipments against the old program are currently greater than ever before, and in a few weeks deliveries against the Third Protocol program are scheduled to begin. A stockpile of from forty to fifty thousand tons of power equipment therefore seems likely within the near future.

#### E. TIRE PLANT PROJECT

The supply of a complete tire plant was requested by the USSR as early as August, 1941. At that time, the President agreed that a plant would be made available as soon as production conditions would permit.

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After thus receiving approval of their request, Soviet representatives did not present details as to the type of plant desired. Instead, with the assistance of engineers of the Armstrong Rubber Company, they worked out themselves details of a plant and submitted at various times a series of requisitions which together called for a complete plant. As these requisitions were received by the U. S. Government piecemeal, neither the OLLA, the WPB, nor Treasury Procurement was aware that all belonged to a single program. Consequently, the various items included could not be scheduled in such a way as to make possible completion of the plant within a reasonable period of time.

Several months after the submission of the first of the requisitions, it came to the attention of the OLLA that a complete tire plant was being ordered. OLLA, WPB, and Treasury Procurement engineers then reviewed the requisitions and the contracts which had been placed. This review revealed that the project as it was then being carried out faced obstacles which made it impracticable. It was consequently suggested to Soviet representatives that they abandon the idea of securing new equipment and take a plant which could be secured from existing establishments in this country. After considerable negotiation, Soviet representatives agreed to this. They felt, however, that a used plant would have to be modernized in a number of ways if it were to meet the requirements of their country. U. S. authorities recognized and accepted the correctness of this position.

It was consequently decided to supply a complete plant made up of a combination of new and used equipment. At first, it was planned to survey the tire making industry and see what parts from different existing plants could be secured. It was soon learned, however, that the Ford Company was willing to dispose of an entire plant which it owned. Russian engineers agreed to accept the proffered Ford Plant.

On an examination of the Ford equipment it was found that very considerable changes would be necessary. Besides the need for modernization, it was necessary to arrange for shifting the plant from the production of passenger car tires to truck tires.

As the project was worked out, it was found that the total cost of the equipment involved would be approximately \$8,000,000. Of this, \$3,000,000 was required for purchase of the Ford equipment and \$5,000,000 for the purchase of new supplementary equipment. The capacity of the plant was to be one and one-half million tires per year.

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The new program was decided upon in September, 1942. WPB, Treasury Procurement and OLLA representatives immediately gave every assistance to the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in preparing requisitions. Contracts against these were placed as expeditiously as possible and the project was fully under way by October, 1942. It was originally hoped that most of the required equipment, including all of the Ford equipment, would be ready for shipment by December, 1942. Because of frequent changes in Russian specifications, however, and other factors, appreciable shipments could not begin before April, 1943.

From that time on, shipments were rapid. All of the Ford equipment was shipped in May. Of the remaining \$5,000,000 of equipment, \$3,000,000 had been completed and shipped from vendor's plants by the end of June. Present schedules call for the shipment of all of the remaining essential items before September, 1943.

Use of the plant by the USSR will not have to await receipt of all items, however. In arranging schedules, U. S. authorities established a production program according to which the parts necessary for operation of the plant at one-third capacity (i.e. at the rate of 500,000 tires per year) could be shipped two to three months before the whole project was completed. All of these parts are scheduled to be completed and ready for export before the end of July.

#### F. MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS AND ITEMS

In addition to the major programs above referred to, the USSR had a number of smaller industrial equipment programs under order during the Second Protocol Period. Included among these were hard alloys and small cutting tools, electric furnaces, precision measuring tools, various electrical equipment, cranes, excavators, an aluminum mill, smelting and refining equipment, various industrial plants, a signal system, bearings, etc.

The hard alloys and small cutting tool program, though relatively small in dollar value, was of considerable importance to the over-all Soviet program in that it consisted of replacement attachments for machine tools (i.e., drills, reamers, milling cutters, tungsten-carbide tips and blanks, etc.).

The Second Protocol provided that a total of \$22,404,000 of these items would be supplied during the period July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943. Soviet representatives, however, did not submit requisitions for the full amount allotted. Altogether, only about \$19,000,000 was placed on order. Against this, deliveries totaled

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\$17,230,000, leaving less than \$2,000,000 to be completed after June 30, 1943. Considering the fact that many requisitions were placed late during the Second Protocol Period, and the fact that numerous fabrication problems were involved, this performance is considered generally satisfactory. Judging the requirement of the USSR for equipment of this type by the general machine tool situation of the USSR as presented by Russian representatives, shipments should have been adequate to meet replacement needs.

Electric furnaces requested by the USSR under the Second Protocol totaled 600 units with an approximate value of \$24,000,000. However, because of pressure of the metallurgical expansion program in this country, the United States was unable to agree to a definite promise as to the quantity which could be made available. It undertook to make "a best effort" to produce as many of the approximately \$5,000,000 worth on order as possible, but an exact commitment was felt unwise.

Actually, during the Second Protocol Period, a total of \$3,695,000 of electric furnaces, including spare parts and accessories, were produced on USSR account. In addition, production was well advanced on an additional \$1,400,000.

In the Third Protocol Period, it is anticipated that the electric furnace situation of the US will be very much improved. The War Production Board has felt, therefore, that under the new Protocol, as much as \$12,000,000 of furnaces, the amount requested by the USSR can be supplied. Requisitions for most of this amount have already been received and are in process of being worked into fabricators' schedules.

The most unsuccessful phase of the Second Protocol equipment program was in the field of gauges and precision measuring tools. While there was no definite commitment for equipment of this type, the USSR had on order during the Second Protocol Period approximately \$1,750,000. It was anticipated that most of this could be supplied by June 30, 1943. However, performance fell far below expectations. The reasons for this were:

1. The fact that Soviet orders were not spread over the entire range of such equipment, but were confined to a relatively few types;
2. In keeping with the wishes of the Soviet representatives, orders were placed with only a few of the many fabricators in the field;

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3. The industry expansion program of the United States, Canada and Great Britain caused requirements for precision tools to be extremely heavy; and
4. Priority ratings assigned Russian orders were, for a period of several months, too low to insure rapid delivery.

War Production Board officials in March, 1943, became concerned over the slowness with which precision tools were being shipped. A careful survey was consequently made of the entire situation, the exact status of every contract being examined and reasons for delays explored. Manufacturers were then individually requested to readjust their schedules in such a way as to insure an immediate improvement. As a result of these efforts, it was possible to establish a satisfactory delivery program for the last two months of the Protocol Period. In those two months, shipments nearly equaled the total of the previous nineteen months of Protocol assistance to the USSR. And by June 30, 1943, the still uncompleted orders were under a schedule which would insure their completion within a few months.

Electrical equipment of various types (i.e. motors, transformers, distributors, and miscellaneous) which the USSR had on order during the Second Protocol Period totaled some \$13,000,000. Most of these orders were confined to relatively few manufacturers, and were concentrated in a narrow field insofar as type was concerned. They consequently offered production problems far out of proportion to their number and value. Nevertheless, deliveries were substantial, a total of more than \$5,000,000 having been made available by June 30th.

The crane and excavator programs of the USSR naturally ran into severe competition with US and British military programs as well as with the requirements of the United States industrial expansion programs. In addition, as in the case of other items, Soviet orders were limited to a few types and were placed only with the largest and best known fabricators. Production progress was consequently extremely slow for many months. Towards the end of the Protocol Period, however, the situation eased considerably. Deliveries during the three months immediately preceding June 30, 1943 exceeded the previous total. Further, schedules were so re-arranged that fulfillment of most orders uncompleted as of June 30, 1943, within a few months after the beginning of the Third Protocol Period appeared likely.

Soviet bearings, like precision measuring tools, offered innumerable problems and only indifferent production results were

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achieved. Russian orders, for the most part, were for either very large or very small bearings, both of which were extremely tight because of domestic tank and aviation requirements. Moreover, a great many orders were for specialty bearings of types not previously produced in this country. Intensive efforts were made by the Tools Division of the War Production Board to overcome these difficulties. Generally speaking, however, this could not be done with complete success. In the restricted field to which orders were confined, the jam of Russian items was so great that nothing that could be done was capable of bringing about a substantial improvement. In many instances, a Russian contract with a particular fabricator exceeded by many times the annual capacity of that fabricator for the type of bearing in question. Under the best of conditions, a number of Russian bearing orders could not be completed in less than a half dozen or more years.

In view of this situation, it was decided before the close of the Second Protocol Period to request Soviet representatives to re-work their bearing program in such a way as to put it on a realistic basis. It was felt that if this were done, noteworthy improvement in deliveries could be effected.

During the Second Protocol Period, a vast amount of machinery, including complete plants, for particular Soviet industries was completed, or brought near completion. Included was machinery for chemical plants, textile mills, pulp and paper mills, glass plants, aluminum mills, steel mills, etc.

Particularly worthy of mention among these was an aluminum rolling mill. This mill, which totaled \$6,727,000 in value, was requisitioned in December, 1941. It was considered of the utmost importance by both this Government and the Soviet Government. Because of the loss of Soviet aluminum fabrication facilities in the vicinity of Leningrad and Dnepropetrovsk, together with the incapacitation of facilities located at Stupino, the USSR lacked sufficient capacity to process the relatively large amounts of ingots available from imports from the United States and Canada, and from production in the Urals.

Every effort was consequently made to expedite fabrication. Most of the items required for the mill proper were completed and shipped from plant during the first seven months of the Second Protocol Period, and the necessary electrical equipment was placed on a schedule which made possible its completion by early May, 1943. However, unavoidable delays in the requisitioning of furnaces and accessories, together with interference of domestic orders, caused delivery

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of these items to fall behind the remainder of the program. After an extensive survey of the situation, the War Production Board decided, therefore, to give these items an over-riding priority rating. Following this, schedules were stepped up and all of the essential equipment was made ready for export before June 30, 1943.

Also to be noted among these smaller programs were the steel rolling mill project, an extensive metallurgical program, a 3,000 kilometer signal equipment program, a group of dry cleaning plants, and an oil well drilling equipment program. While of these only the dry cleaning plants were completed before the end of the Second Protocol Period, substantial progress was made on all. Within the next few months, each is expected to be completed.

## II. RAW AND SEMI-FINISHED MATERIALS

Problems involved in the materials part of the Second Protocol program were of a different nature than industrial equipment problems. Except in minor cases, the items included were standard and no serious fabrication problems had to be overcome. To meet Soviet requirements, all that was necessary was to allocate part of total US capacity or production to USSR account.

A very tight domestic supply-requirements situation made the Russian program difficult, however. Each material included was in extremely short supply, and every ton furnished was secured only through cutting some other program. Nevertheless, with rare exceptions, full Russian requirements were met.

### A. ALUMINUM

Aluminum shipments during the twelve-month period exceeded by a wide margin the amount envisaged when the Second Protocol was drafted. Soviet representatives requested the supply of 66,000 short tons of aluminum ingots and fabricated aluminum (duraluminum) combined. Against this, the United States was able to offer only 33,600 short tons in addition to small quantities which had been ordered but not produced before the end of the First Protocol period.

During the course of the Second Protocol year, however, the USSR repeatedly presented additional requirements. Insofar as possible, the US met these despite the stringent domestic situation. In the first six months, extra allotments of approximately 4,000 short tons were made. It was originally anticipated that these would be offset by under-allotments during the second half of the Protocol

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period. However, in February, the Soviet Government reported that, due to the cessation of U.K. shipments, the USSR faced a dangerous shortage of aluminum. It was decided, therefore, that not only should the over-allotments of the first six months not be made up, but that an extra 7,280 short tons should be furnished.

The result was that total shipments of aluminum during the Second Protocol period, which amounted to 47,886 short tons, exceeded the commitment by more than 11,000 short tons. These shipments together with shipments from Canada approached the average annual total aluminum production of the USSR prior to the beginning of the war. That this quantity was needed, however, was evidenced by the fact that Russian aluminum was exported as soon as made available. Stocks were negligible both during and at the end of the Second Protocol period.

Although the Protocol provided that only one-fifth of the aluminum shipped was to consist of fabricated aluminum, about one-half actually was in this form. Because during most of the year, US fabricating capacity exceeded the supply of ingot, this did not result in any particular hardship. An exception, however, was hard alloy tubing. Limited drawing capacity made even partial fulfillment of USSR requirements for hard tubing, which were unexpectedly presented in October, relatively very costly to the domestic aircraft program.

#### B. NICKEL

The situation in regard to nickel during the Second Protocol period was similar to that of aluminum. Soviet production was far inadequate to meet pressing requirements and the country was dependent on US-Canadian supplies for the maintenance of its alloy steel program. In addition, the USSR needed a number of products (e.g., alloy steel, nichrome wire, cupre-nickel, etc.) which required large quantities of nickel for fabrication.

The USSR requested nickel metal at the rate of 800 short tons per month, plus the nickel needed for alloy steel and other nickel containing products being produced on its account. At that time, the nickel position of the US and Canada was such that a commitment for only six months could be offered.

This half year commitment was for 600 short tons per month, 400 of which were expected to be supplied as contained nickel and 200 as pig nickel. Shipments were made at this rate until October, 1942. At that time, Soviet representatives insisted that larger quantities of pig nickel were necessary for their steel industry. In consequence, it was decided to increase shipments during October, November and

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December by 100 short tons per month. Subsequently, arrangements were made to further increase December shipments by an additional 100 short tons. Thus, during the first half of the Protocol year, 1,600 short tons of pig nickel were furnished instead of the 1,200 short tons originally intended. At the same time, the nickel delivered to US mills for use in the fabrication of steel and other products on USSR account exceeded by a wide margin the 2,400 short tons set aside for this purpose.

For the last six months of the Protocol period, the nickel allotment was increased to 700 short tons per month - 350 contained and 350 metal. But once again, there were appreciable over-shipments. The result was that the over-all Second Protocol nickel commitment was exceeded by 1496 short tons, total shipments coming to 9,296 short tons.

### C. COPPER

The principal copper requirement of the USSR was for copper in copper base alloys, particularly cartridge brass.

Although the Protocol commitment for copper base alloys was 109,411 short tons (the full amount requested) a production schedule was established which called for delivery of approximately 120,000 short tons. By March, 1943, however, mill shipments had exceeded overseas shipments to such an extent (stocks then totaling more than 40,000 tons) that it was decided, with Soviet consent, to divert to the Armed Services 12,500 tons of capacity previously allocated to USSR account. Because of this diversion, deliveries during the Second Protocol period came to 106,000 short tons, slightly less than the commitment, instead of the 120,000 tons for which arrangements were originally made. Specific types of copper base alloys supplied were as follows:

	(Short Tons)
Copper Alloy Sheet, Strip and Discs	88,547
Copper Alloy Rods	12,130
Copper Alloy Tubes	3,451
Copper Alloy, Other	<u>2,060</u>
Total	106,188

Practically all of the requisitions for copper base alloys which the USSR submitted were completed before June 30. The only notable exceptions to this were requisitions for aluminum bronze tubing. Much of the aluminum bronze tubing ordered by the USSR was of a considerably larger size than US fabricators were equipped to

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produce. Special facilities consequently had to be provided before production could begin. As a result, several contracts had to be carried over from the Second Protocol period to the Third Protocol period.

The supply of pure copper products required by the USSR, primarily copper radiator tubing, offered no great difficulty. All requisitions were completed and the commitment was met in full.

In regard to the over-all commitment for copper (i.e. copper in all forms), it should be noted that against a scheduled 134,400 short tons, a total of 121,700 short tons were made available. This under-shipment was due to: first, the above-mentioned diversion of 12,500 short tons of copper base alloy capacity in the second quarter, 1943; second, failure to complete all cable contracts; and third, less copper was required for manufactured products than was anticipated.

#### D. ZINC

The zinc requirement under the Second Protocol was originally 1,500 short tons per month. Because of the loss or incapacitation of zinc facilities in the Northern Caucasus, however, the USSR requested that shipments be increased to 3,500 short tons per month. This request was met despite a relatively tight domestic supply situation, particularly insofar as high grade slab -- the shape required by the USSR -- was concerned.

#### E. MINOR NON-FERROUS METALS


Few problems were offered by the various minor non-ferrous metals required by the USSR. To meet spot requests, shipments of mercury, cadmium, tin and cobalt considerably in excess of Protocol commitments were arranged. Supply of magnesium, which United States authorities felt unable to promise when the Protocol was negotiated, was begun in January; from January through June, an average of 336 short tons per month were made available.

#### F. FERRO-ALLOYS

During the first six months of the Second Protocol period, ferrosilicon and ferrochrome were allocated at the rate called for by the Protocol (i.e., 784 short tons of ferrosilicon and 448 short tons of ferrochrome per month). However, virtually no overseas shipments of either material were made, and excessive stockpiles accumulated. (More than 4,000 short tons of ferrosilicon and 2,000 short tons of ferrochrome were in storage as of January 1, 1942). It was consequently decided to suspend allocations until liftings should increase. As no improvement took place, the suspension was continued until the close of the Second Protocol period.

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G. STEEL

The most ambitious part of the Second Protocol materials schedule was the steel program. Altogether 1,443,000 short tons of steel, in addition to an estimated 240,000 short tons on hand as of July 1, 1942, were scheduled to be supplied during the Second Protocol period. The 1,443,000 short tons of new production were to consist of 268,000 alloy steel, 792,000 carbon steel and 383,000 railway materials.

During the first months of the Second Protocol period, production was at approximately this scheduled rate. There was considerable doubt on the part of many within the War Production Board as to whether overseas shipments could keep pace with mill shipments of this size, but because of the possibility that shipping conditions might improve, it was felt that for the time being there should be no cut-back.

Early in the fourth quarter, 1942, however, it became apparent that an improvement was not going to take place. Steel stocks were already close to 500,000 short tons, and they were growing at an alarming rate. It was consequently decided that production had to be curtailed. In keeping with this decision, railway materials, especially rails and accessories, carbon pipe and tubing, and cold rolled sheets were gradually eliminated from mill schedules. Despite this, however, stocks continued to mount, reaching eventually a total of more than 700,000 tons. As a result, curtailment of production in the case of other carbon items was put into effect. In the end, only alloy steel and carbon specialties, such as carbon tool steel, open hearth bullet core, 1015-1050 cold finished bars, special carbon wires, wire rope, hot rolled sheets, and bar mill shapes continued to be produced. Altogether, average monthly mill shipments of steel were reduced from over a hundred thousand short tons to thirty odd thousand.

For some time, the curtailment program was not extended to alloy items. Alloy stocks were appreciable, but it was felt that the need of the USSR for alloy steel was so great that it would be better to let stocks become temporarily excessive than to risk not having sufficient inventories in case shipping should improve. However, toward the last of the first quarter, 1943, it became apparent that alloy stocks were following the course of carbon stocks. In several alloy categories, therefore, reductions in production schedules were finally put into effect.

Because of these curtailments, total production of steel during the Second Protocol period came to little more than half

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(789,000 short tons) of the 1,443,000 short tons called for by the Protocol. Specific types produced were:

	(Short Tons)
Alloy Steel	203,000
Carbon Specialties	141,000
Other Carbon Products	286,000
Railway Materials	<u>167,000</u>
Total	789,000

It should be noted that due to new urgent requirements of the USSR for rails and accessories, production of these items was renewed in the last month of the Protocol period. Soviet representatives stated that all existing stocks as well as all new production would be transported to the USSR regardless.

#### H. CHEMICALS

Chemicals promised under the Second Protocol totaled 119,000 short tons, exclusive of toluol and TNT for which the War Department was directly responsible. Of the twenty-three major items included, full commitments were met or exceeded in every case except two. Altogether, 137,000 short tons were made available against the total commitment for 119,000.


Chemical stocks, like steel stocks, grew to very large proportions during the Protocol period because of shipping limitations. By June, 1943, they amounted to more than 70,000 short tons. Because of this, the possibility of suspending allocations was seriously considered, but except in one or two cases, no action was taken prior to June 30, 1943. For the Third Protocol period, however, it is felt that stocks must be reduced either through diversions or increased liftings before allocations at the full rate called for by the new Protocol should be made.

#### I. CABLE

The Second Protocol cable program was one of the most difficult undertaken. Not only were very large quantities (more than 110,000 short tons) called for, but the types and sizes involved were in many cases extremely difficult. Further, many requisitions were not cleared until December and January. Through energetic measures on the part of the Copper Division and Treasury Procurement, however, the difficulties resulting from these factors were largely overcome. Total

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commitments were not fulfilled by an appreciable margin, but schedules were worked out which insured completion of all contracts within a few weeks after the close of the Second Protocol period.

Despite the failure to deliver as much cable as had been promised, far more was made available than the USSR was able to lift. As of June 30, 1943, more than 43,000 short tons of the approximately 72,000 short tons which had been shipped from plant were held in warehouses alone. Additional quantities were at seaside or in transit to seaside.

J. OTHER MATERIALS

In the case of the various miscellaneous materials included in the Second Protocol schedule, production was more than ample to meet shipping requirements. In some cases, full commitments were not met, but with one or two exceptions, this was because of excessive stocks or the failure of Soviet representatives to submit requisitions sufficiently early to make possible production of the promised quantities. In several instances, the full quantity called for by the Protocol was never requisitioned.

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STATUS OF MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION PROGRAMS UNDER THE SECOND RUSSIAN PROTOCOL, AS OF JULY 1, 1943  
(JUNE DELIVERY DATA SUBJECT TO REVISION)

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Protocol Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
			1/	2/	2/	1/		
<b>NON-FERROUS METALS</b>								
3 & 3A	Aluminum (Ingot and Duraluminum)	S.T.	36,690	4,480	47,886	131	(11,196 Excess)	
4	Nickel (Metal and Contained)	S.T.	7,800	716	9,296	119	(1,496 Excess)	} Nickel made available includes 3,650 s.t. of nickel metal and 5,646 s.t. of nickel contained in steel and various non-ferrous metals.
5	Molybdenum	S.T.	4,000	1	4,217	105	(217 Excess)	
6	Copper (Metal and Contained)	S.T.	(134,400)	(5,638)	(121,720)	(91)	(12,680)	} Deliveries are under the Protocol commitment because (1) in the second quarter, 1943, 25,000,000 pounds of copper base alloy allotments were diverted from U.S.S.R. account due to excessive stocks, and (2) cable deliveries were behind schedule.
7	Rolled Copper (Copper Base Alloys Only)	S.T.	109,411	2,708	106,188	97	3,223	
8	Magnesium	S.T.	0	336	2,016	-	(2,016 Excess)	} 25,000,000 pounds of copper base alloy allotments were diverted from U.S.S.R. account because of excessive stocks
9	Zinc	S.T.	29,000	3,500	38,118	131	(9,118 Excess)	
11	Copper Goods and Tubes	S.T.	15,148	325	15,738	104	(590 Excess)	
30	Nickel-Chrome Wire	S.T.	538	53	558	104	(20 Excess)	
49	Mercury	S.T.	300	0	896	299	(596 Excess)	
89	Lead	S.T.	8	0	41	513	(33 Excess)	

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Pro- tocol Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<u>NON-FERROUS METALS</u> (Continued)								
90	Tin	S.T.	2	8	10	500	(8 Excess)	
91	Foil							
A	Aluminum	S.T.	95	0	93	98	2	
B	Tin	S.T.	52	0	52	100	0	
C	Nickel	S.T.	1	0	2	200	(1 Excess)	
92	Babbitt Metal	S.T.	4	0	105	2,625	(101 Excess)	
93	Cadmium	S.T.	100	12.5	200	200	(100 Excess)	
94	Cobalt	S.T.	144	0	168	117	(24 Excess)	
	Total Non-Ferrous Metals Excluding Item 6 (Copper)	S.T.	203,293	12,139.5	225,584	111	(22,291 Excess)	
<u>FERRO-ALLOYS</u>								
12	Ferrosilicon	S.T.	9,408	0	5,062	54	4,346	} Deliveries of ferrosilicon and ferrochrome were suspended in February, with Soviet consent, because of excessive seaboard stocks. Shipments of other ferro-alloys were to meet spot requirements.
13	Ferrochrome	S.T.	5,376	0	2,618	49	2,758	
85	Ferrophosphorus	S.T.	4	0	4	100	0	
86	Ferrovandium	S.T.	2	0	2	100	0	
87	Ferrotungsten	S.T.	2	0	2	100	0	
	Total Ferro-Alloys	S.T.	14,792	0	7,688	52	7,104	

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Pro- to- col Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<b>HIGH PRIORITY ALLOY STEEL</b>								
16	Polished Drill Rods							
B	High Speed	S.T.	60	0	63	105	(3 Excess)	
C	Other Alloy	S.T.	45	0	49	109	(4 Excess)	
17	High Speed Tool Steel	S.T.	3,400	185	3,428	101	(28 Excess)	
18	Tool Steel							
B	Alloy X12	S.T.	700	1	649	93	51	
C	Alloy X12M	S.T.	650	48	654	101	(4 Excess)	
D	Alloy - Other	S.T.	6,700	303	6,201	93	499	
19	Cold Finished Bars Electric Furnace or O.H. Alloy	S.T.	10,635	648	10,026	94	609	
20	Hot Rolled Alloy Bars and Billets	S.T.	95,000	5,559	93,622	99	1,378	Overseas shipments of several items included in this category have fallen considerably behind production. As a result, sea-board stocks of these items have become excessive. Nevertheless, because of insistence of Soviet representatives, production has not been suspended.
23	Stainless Steel							
A	Sheets	S.T.	2,200	256	2,238	102	(38 Excess)	
B	Strip	S.T.	350	55	342	98	8	
C	Hot Rolled Bars	S.T.	800	55	468	59	332	
25	Steel Wire							
A	Ball Wire (Alloy)	S.T.	1,344	266	1,155	86	189	
B	Alloy ASTM 232	S.T.	2,400	227	2,329	97	71	
C	Alloy 4140	S.T.	1,200	293	1,285	107	(85 Excess)	
27	Steel Alloy Tubes							
A	Stainless 18-8	S.T.	2,200	113	780	35	1,420	
B	4-6% Chrome	S.T.	15,500	1,258	9,692	63	5,808	
C-E	Carbon .5% Moly.	S.T.	6,300	31	3,916	62	2,384	
F	H.R. Ball Bearing Tubes	S.T.	5,400	219	1,017	19	4,383	
28	Stainless Wire	S.T.	2,000	5	1,936	97	64	
29B	Other Alloy Wire	S.T.	2,600	132	2,900	112	(300 Excess)	
	<b>Total High Priority Alloy Steel</b>	S.T.	<b>159,484</b>	<b>9,654</b>	<b>142,750</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>16,734</b>	

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 Commerce Dept. Letter 1114-78  
 By RHP, Date MAR 21 1973

Protocol Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<b>OTHER ALLOY STEEL</b>								
14	Armor Plate	S.T.	13,440	0	839	6	12,601	The commitment for armor plate was cancelled at the request of the U.S.S.R. Production of shot steel (cr-si-mn billets) was suspended, with Soviet consent, because of excessive seaboard stocks.
21	Cr-Si-Mn Billets	S.T.	95,000	0	59,494	63	35,506	
	Total Other Alloy Steel	S.T.	108,440	0	60,333	56	48,107	
<b>HIGH PRIORITY CARBON STEEL</b>								
10	Bimetal (Copper Clad Strip)	S.T.	20,000	1,231	19,722	99	278	Total deliveries of high priority carbon steel exceeded Protocol requirements. Several particular shapes fell behind, however, because of difficulties involved in fabrication.
16 A	Polished Drill Rods Plain Carbon	S.T.	125	6	120	96	5	
18 A	Tool Steel Plain Carbon	S.T.	3,400	434	3,328	98	72	
19 D	Cold Finished Bars B.O.H. Bullet Core	S.T.	10,000	3,574	10,305	103	(305 Excess)	
19 F	S.A.E. 1015-1050 and Other Plain Carbon	S.T.	20,000	2,271	14,559	73	5,441	
25 D	Steel Wire Music Wire	S.T.	12,000	412	9,823	82	2,177	
25 E	Spring Wire	S.T.	12,000	68	8,948	75	3,052	
25 G	Card Wire	S.T.	350	4	336	96	14	
25 K	Square Wire	S.T.	270	50	246	91	24	
25 L	Tinned Wire	S.T.	700	34	440	63	260	
25 M	Misc. Wire Products	S.T.	300	2	267	89	33	
26 A	Wire Rope Aircraft	S.T.	3,000	117	2,516	84	484	
26 B	Other Wire Rope	S.T.	20,000	1,679	19,858	99	142	
33A	Hot Rolled Sheets	S.T.	20,000	3,524	40,986	205	(20,896 Excess)	
33D	Hot Rolled Bars and Bar Mill Shapes	S.T.	6,500	1,139	9,889	152	(3,389 Excess)	
	Total High Priority Carbon Steel	S.T.	128,645	14,545	141,343	110	(12,698 Excess)	

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Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-14-72  
By RHP, Date

MAR 21 1973

Pro toool Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<b>OTHER CARBON STEEL</b>								
19	Cold Finished Bars							
A	Bessemer 3/8"-2"	S.T.	60,000	0	25,350	42	34,650	
22	Cold Rolled Sheets	S.T.	75,000	0	11,417	15	63,583	
A	Cold Rolled Strip	S.T.	60,000	1,174	32,440	54	27,560	
24	Timplate	S.T.	67,200	1,257	36,029	54	31,171	
25	Steel Wire							
F	Rope Wire	S.T.	20,000	70	14,217	71	5,783	
H	Electric Welding Wire	S.T.	4,000	0	1,175	29	2,825	
I	Galvanized Tel. & Tel. Wire	S.T.	20,000	0	13,696	68	6,304	
J	Low Carbon	S.T.	8,000	23	5,915	74	2,085	
31A	Barbed Wire	S.T.	40,000	0	22,857	57	17,143	
B	Staples	S.T.	2,600	0	1,755	68	845	
32	Pipe and Tubing							
A	Welding Press and Mechanical	S.T.	6,000	224	4,502	75	1,498	
B	Seamless Press and Mechanical	S.T.	12,000	11	2,642	22	9,358	
C	Cold Drawn Press and Mechanical	S.T.	6,000	4	3,715	62	2,285	
D	H.F.Press and Mechanical	S.T.	24,000	0	14,571	61	9,429	
E	Electric Weld Casing	S.T.	15,000	0	0	0	15,000	
F	Electric Weld Line Pipe	S.T.	35,000	160	918	3	34,082	
G	Seamless Casing	S.T.	15,000	0	12,364	82	2,636	
H	Seamless Line Pipe	S.T.	40,000	53	12,705	32	27,295	
I	Seamless Drill Pipe	S.T.	15,000	39	2,357	16	12,643	
J	Seamless Oil Well Tubing	S.T.	15,000	0	0	0	15,000	
K	Tool Joints	S.T.	3,000	5	1,346	45	1,654	
33	Hot Rolled							
B	Galvanized Roofing Sheets	S.T.	5,000	5	2,695	53	2,345	
C	Plates	S.T.	75,000	771	30,045	40	44,955	
E	Structural Shapes	S.T.	13,000	178	5,105	39	7,895	
F	Strip	S.T.	11,000	176	15,252	139	(4,252 Excess)	
G	Terne Plate and Long Terne	S.T.	4,000	0	3,955	99	45	
34A	Bolts, Nuts, Rivets, Chains and Screws	S.T.	6,000	1,196	4,169	69	1,831	
B	Nails	S.T.	7,000	133	5,343	76	1,657	
	<b>Total Other Carbon Steel</b>	S.T.	<b>663,800</b>	<b>5,479</b>	<b>286,495</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>377,305</b>	

Except for a few specialty orders, deliveries of items included in this category were suspended because of excessive seaboard stocks.

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Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-72  
By RHP, Date MAR 21 1973

Protocol Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
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RAILROAD MATERIALS

101	Rails	S.T.	175,000	11,594	71,598	41	103,402
101A	Accessories	S.T.	80,000	2,093	17,589	22	62,411
102	Mounted Sets of Wheels and Axles	S.T.	36,000	675	24,146	67	11,854
103	Car Axles	S.T.	60,000	0	33,155	55	26,845
104	Locomotive Car Wheel Tires	S.T.	13,500	0	12,787	95	713
105	Rolled Steel Car Wheels	S.T.	18,000	0	7,738	43	10,262
107	Steel Locomotive Axles	S.T.	255	0	253	99	2
108	Electric Locomotive Axles	S.T.	300	0	222	74	78
	Total Railroad Materials	S.T.	383,055	14,362	167,488	44	215,567

Except for a few specialties, production of items in this category was suspended in January because of excessive seaboard stocks. Due to a shift in Soviet shipping policy, production of rails and accessories was renewed in June.

CHEMICALS

36	Phenol	S.T.	12,000	1,000	13,440	112	(1,440 Excess)
38	Ethylene Glycol	S.T.	2,400	0	2,400	100	0
39	Sodium Bromide	S.T.	1,800	0	1,804	100	(4 Excess)

Additional quantities of ethylene glycol made available are included with Item 61A "Other Chemicals".

Of the total quantity made available, 129 s.t. have been diverted to the U.K. because of excessive seaboard stocks.

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Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72  
By RHP, Date **MAR 21 1973**

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Pro- to- col Item No.	Item	Unit	2nd Protocol Production Program	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. June 1, 1943 - June 30, 1943	Made Available at Mill in U.S.A. July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943	Percent of 2nd Prot. Program Completed as of July 1, 1943	Balance Against Protocol Commitment as of July 1, 1943	Comments
			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<b>CHEMICALS (Continued)</b>								
40	Phosphorus	S.T.	2,400	0	2,461	103	(61 Excess)	} Of the total quantity made avail- able, 300 s.t. have been diverted to the U.K. because of excessive seaboard stocks.
41	Dibutyl Phthalate	S.T.	3,600	0	3,229	90	371	
42	Dimethylaniline	S.T.	3,000	0	3,076	103	(76 Excess)	
43	Diphenylamine	S.T.	1,800	50	1,685	94	115	
44	Colloxylin	S.T.	3,762	0	3,762	100	0	
45	Methanol	S.T.	12,000	1,717	13,065	109	(1,065 Excess)	
46	Urotropine	S.T.	4,600	0	7,354	160	(2,754 Excess)	
48	Ammonia Chloride	S.T.	4,800	0	4,800	100	0	
50	Potassium Nitrate	S.T.	3,600	0	3,600	100	0	
51	Ammonium Cyanide	S.T.	3	0	3	100	0	
52	Centralite	S.T.	600	47	692	115	(92 Excess)	
53	Resarin (Resorcinol)	S.T.	120	0	120	100	0	
54	Barium Peroxide	S.T.	300	25	300	100	0	
55	Strontium (S. Oxalate)	S.T.	96	0	96	100	0	
56	Rodalite (Rhodamine B)	S.T.	6	0	6	100	0	
57	Torium (T. Nitrate)	S.T.	3	0	3	100	0	

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			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<u>CHEMICALS (Continued)</u>								
58	Cerium	S.T.	18	0	18	100	0	
60	Potassium Sulphate	S.T.	1,800	0	1,800	100	0	
61	Anthracene	S.T.	0	0	9	-	(9 Excess)	
61A	Other Chemicals	S.T.	60,000	15,562	73,551	123	(13,551 Excess)	
	Total Chemicals	S.T.	118,708	18,401	137,274	115	(18,566 Excess)	
<u>INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT</u>								
15	Hard Alloys and Small Cutting Tools	\$	22,404,000	963,038	17,230,261	77	5,173,739	
62	Machine Tools	\$	150,000,000	21,835,211	222,084,301	148	(72,084,301 Excess)	
63	Electric Furnaces							
64	Forging Presses and Hammers							
65	Various Industrial Equipment							
67	Abrasives	\$	4,000,000	206,370	4,071,000	102	(71,000 Excess)	
	Total Industrial Equipment	\$	176,404,000	23,004,619	243,385,562	138	(66,981,562 Excess)	

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			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<u>POWER PROGRAM</u>								
140A	Power Generating Equipment	\$	-	4,795,254	19,322,506	-	-	
140B	Industrial Boilers	\$	-	462,923	1,010,277	-	-	
	Total Power Program	\$	-	5,258,177	20,332,783	-	-	
<u>MARINE AND SUBMARINE CABLE</u>								
1	Marine Cable	Km.	1,421	112	1,283	90	138	
2	Submarine Cable	Km.	780	120	960	123	(180 Excess)	
	Total Marine and Submarine Cable	Km.	2,201	232	2,243	102	(42 Excess)	
<u>POWER AND OTHER CABLE</u>								
74	Electric Power Cable	S.T.	52,666	5,636	33,481	64	19,185	
74A	Misc. Copper Cable and Wire	S.T.	52,386	3,790	35,547	68	16,839	
	Total Power and Other Cable	S.T.	105,052	9,426	69,028	66	36,024	
<u>CLOTHING</u>								
71	Shoe Leather	S.T.	18,670	4,157	13,831	74	4,839	
72	Army Boots	Prs.	2,400,000	25,055	2,432,468	101	(32,468 Excess)	
73	Army Cloth	Yds.	18,000,000	1,096,823	17,191,737	96	808,263	

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 Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-11-78  
 By RHP, Date MAR 21 1973

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			<u>1/</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>3/</u>		
<u>MISCELLANEOUS MATERIALS ITEMS</u>								
37	Petroleum Products	S.T.	240,000	50,232	241,828	101	(1,828 Excess)	
75	Webbing	Yds.	36,000,000	5,376,068	36,002,958	100	(2,958 Excess)	
76	Tarpaulin	Yds.	8,000,000	0	6,385,620	80	1,614,380	
80	Sheet Fiber	S.T.	4,361	205	1,887	43	2,474	
83	Condenser Paper	S.T.	240	0	92	38	148	
83A	Cigarette Paper	S.T.	908	0	747	82	161	
83B	Parchment Paper	S.T.	2,090	89	2,440	117	(350 Excess)	
<u>MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ITEMS</u>								
68	Graphite Electrodes	S.T.	5,840	654	7,327	125	(1,487 Excess)	
69	Bearings	\$	-	359,304	3,918,866	-	-	
70	Balls and Rollers	\$	-	74,958	575,212	-	-	
78	Tires, Tubes, Other Rubber Products (Rubber Content)	S.T.	40,320	2,294	25,069	62	15,251	
79	High Pressure Hose	S.T.	-	71	323	-	-	

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(c) and 5(d) or (6)  
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			1/	2/	2/	3/		
<b>MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ITEMS</b>								
(Continued)								
81	Shock Absorber Cord	S.T.	64	4	45	70	19	
82	Metallic Cloth and Screen	\$	1,000,000	86,581	1,343,247	134	(343,247 Excess)	

- 1/ Second Protocol production programs have been adjusted (a) to take account of the modification of steel requirements under the 2nd Protocol worked out by the Steel Division, W.P.B., and representatives of Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, and approved by the Requirements Committee, W.P.B., in Program Determination No. 230; (b) to take account of the portion of ferrosilicon and ferrochrome commitments which are being supplied by the U.K., and (c) through translating some commitments from short tons into the units of measure commonly used in connection with the items in question.
- 2/ Made available data in the case of all items except steel, railway materials, "other chemicals", machine tools, electric furnaces, forging presses and hammers, various industrial equipment, tires, tubes and other rubber products, electric power cable, miscellaneous copper cable and wire, tarpaulin, shock absorber cord, sheet fiber and metallic cloth and screen include stocks which were on hand as of June 30, 1942, and which were available for shipment against 2nd Protocol commitments. Stocks of steel items which were on hand as of June 30, 1942 were taken into account in the adjustment of steel requirements under 2nd Protocol commitments mentioned in Note 1 above.
- 3/ The 2nd Protocol calls for deliveries in "Equal Monthly Installments". Thus 100% of each commitment should have been delivered by June 30, 1943, if Protocol schedules were to be maintained.

War Production Board  
Foreign Division  
Review and Analysis Branch  
July 16, 1943

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 6(D) or (G)  
Comanche Dept. Letter, 11-16-78  
By RHP, Date **MAR 21 1973**

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WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON

PSF

C. F.  
Lend Lease

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

July 20, 1943

~~SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President  
The White House

fill

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your request of October 8 for information on our progress in meeting the Second Soviet Protocol, I am glad to report that we supplied the USSR with approximately 900,000 tons of agricultural products during the period covered by that agreement. This was distributed among Protocol and non-Protocol commodities as follows:

x 270  
x 493  
x 773

Commodity	:Protocol :		:	Commodity	:Protocol:	
	:Require- :ment	:Clearances: : 1942/43			:Require- :ment	:Clearances: : 1942/43
Flour	:2,400,000	:161,278	:	Butter	: -	: 10,206
Sugar	: 840,000	:106,998	:	Dried Skim Milk	: -	: 14,044
Canned Meat	: 120,000	:170,329	:	Dried Whole Milk	: -	: 19,282
Meat	: 180,000	: 81,671.25	:	Dried Beans	: -	: 80,161
Lard	: 144,000	: 42,889	:	Rice	: -	: 20,124
Soap Stock	: 60,000	: 4,151	:	Oat Cereal	: -	: 12,407
Vegetable Oil	: 120,000	:103,122	:	Miscellaneous	: -	: 72,687
				<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,864,000</b>	<b>899,314</b>

Only in the case of canned meats did the Russians actually succeed in lifting more than the quantity stipulated in the Protocol. With the permission of the Soviet Protocol Committee, the increased amount of canned meat was substituted for part of the requirements of other types of meat. The cured pork shipped also included a large quantity of fat cuts which the Russians consider applicable in most respects to their lard requirements.

These short-falls may be explained partly by changes in Russian requirements, with a larger proportion of dairy products, cereals, and high-protein vegetables than was contemplated a year ago. The most important factor, however, is the shortage of shipping space available to the USSR, since the monthly requirements established in the Protocol total 322,000 tons whereas the actual shipments have averaged less than 100,000 tons.

We are planning on making available 375,000 tons of foodstuffs for shipment during the three-month period of July through September, 1943. This is the amount of shipping space which, we understand, has been allotted to food.

Respectfully,

*Marvin Jones*  
Administrator

Enclosures - 2

x C. F. War Food Admin.

x 1-HA

Table 1

Commodity Accountability Section  
 Transportation & Warehousing Branch  
 Food Distribution Administration  
 July 10, 1943

REGRADED  
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SHIPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES  
 TO THE USSR  
 July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943

COMMODITY	: Monthly : Requirements : Per Protocol							: Total July 1, '42 : to June 30, '43	: Requested : For July <sup>△</sup> : Delivery
		: July, 1942 to : Dec. 31, 1942	: January 1, 1943 : to Mar. 31, 1943	: April : 1943	: May : 1943	: June : 1943			
I. PROTOCOL									
Flour and Wheat	: 200,000	: 60,864	: 32,528	: 32,882	: 34,172	: 827	: 161,273	: 11,732	
Sugar	: 70,000	: 31,735	: 44,715	: 12,118	: 3,700	: 14,730	: 106,998	: 25,000	
Canned Meat	: 10,000	: 60,016	: 66,624	: 21,110	: 14,892	: 7,687	: 170,329	: 25,054	
Meat <sup>△</sup>	: 15,000	: 39,545.5	: 14,140.5	: 4,208.5	: 15,606.25	: 8,170.5	: 81,671.25	: 10,877.5	
Lard	: 12,000	: 14,148	: 18,918	: 1,577	: 5,345	: 2,901	: 42,889	: 8,844	
Vegetable Oil	: 10,000	: 30,739	: 33,184	: 8,496	: 20,278	: 10,425	: 103,122	: 19,732	
Soap Stock	: 5,000	: 2,326	: 795	: 447	: 362	: 201	: 4,131	: 179	
II. OTHER FOODS	: -	: 82,183.8	: 79,477.6	: 28,491.7	: 28,846.3	: 9,901.75	: 228,901.15	: 40,856.23	
TOTAL	: 322,000	: 321,557.3	: 290,382.1	: 109,330.2	: 123,201.55	: 54,843.25	: 899,314.40	: 142,274.73	

<sup>△</sup> Includes 600.5 long tons dressed weight equivalent of dehydrated pork and beef converted at 4.5 times the dehydrated weight.

<sup>△</sup> Preliminary Shipping figures.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

Table 2

Commodity Accountability Section  
Transportation & Warehousing Branch  
Food Distribution Administration  
July 10, 1943STATUS OF USSR PROGRAM  
As of June 30, 1943  
(Net Long Tons)

COMMODITY	Cumulative Action Requisitions	Cum. to June 30, 1942	CLEARANCES						Cumulative to June 30, 1943	Requested ** For July Delivery
			July 1, 1942	January, 1943	April	May	June *			
			Dec. 31, 1942	Mar. 31, 1943	1943	1943	1943			
B utter, Salted	34,494.1	2,054	6,152	1,290	342	895	1,527	12,260	1,823	
Whole Milk, Dry	5,417.2	-	323	-	27	134	-	484	1,000	
Skim Milk, Dry	28,000	-	2,754	6,722	1,856	1,380	1,332	14,044	4,085	
Sweetened Condensed Milk	8,091.2	-	782	516	315	1,231	1,833	4,677	2,085	
Cheese	9,203	-	3,424	-	59	45	-	3,528	-	
Processed Cheese	2,741	-	-	-	-	486	126	612	375	
Whole Eggs, Dried	55,160.6	8,001	7,007	7,614	1,565	2,028	1,068	27,283	2,905	
Oleomargarine, Tropical	10,000	-	-	793	2,111	1,093	264	4,261	1,500	
Meat and Ration, Canned	292,601.3	38,953	59,619	62,291	20,017	14,282	7,687	202,849	25,054	
Soya Links, Canned	15,000	-	397	4,333	1,093	610	-	6,433	-	
Cured Pork /a	97,858.5	7,945	39,451	13,407	3,871	14,182	8,058	86,914	10,765	
Edible Fats /b	208,195	28,920	14,148	18,918	1,577	5,345	2,901	71,809	8,844	
Pork, Dehydrated	1,250	-	21	163	75	316	25	600	25	
Beef, Dehydrated	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Beef Extract	240	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Beef Sets, Dry	105	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Concentrated Meats	.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Concentrated Foods	59	-	59	-	-	-	-	59	-	
Soya Flour and Grits	45,005.7	-	-	-	71	1,475	469	2,015	6,245	
Hard Smoked Salami	73	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Army Ration - C	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Fish: Salmon	20.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pilchards	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vegetable Oil	161,771.1	16,585	29,714	27,041	3,756	17,954	9,925	104,975	16,040	
Shortening	23,026.1	-	1,025	5,350	2,629	1,231	236	10,471	2,192	
Linseed Oil, Drying	561	-	24	-	-	-	-	24	39	



COMMODITY	CLEARANCES								Requested ** For July Delivery
	Cumulative	Cum. to	July 1, 1942	January, 1943	April	May	June *	Cumulative	
	Action	June 30,	July 1, 1942	January, 1943	1943	1943	1943	to	
	Requisitions	1942	Dec. 31, 1942	Mar. 31, 1943				June 30, 1943	
Mixed Fruit, Dried	904	-	383	-	36	-	-	419	-
Fresh Lemons and Oranges	120.3	-	5 <sup>d</sup>	-	-	-	-	5	-
Concentrated Lemon Juice	2,295.5	-	-	-	114	-	.25	114.25	540
Concentrated Orange Juice	600	-	-	-	283	-	221	504	1,530
Concentrated Grapefruit Juice	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60
Shelled Walnuts	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-
Kola Nuts	51	51	-	-	-	-	-	51	-
Dried Soup Powder	3,701	-	277	-	22	-	-	299	-
Dry Soup, Concentrate	751	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	680
Dehydrated Soups	1,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	260
Soups, Dehydrated, Vegetable:	750	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Onions, Dehydrated	168	-	-	-	12	-	-	12	24
Garlic, Dehydrated	164	-	-	8	8	-	-	16	200
Beets, Dehydrated	147	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Irish Potatoes, Dehydrated	1,844.2	-	-	-	42	-	-	42	275
Carrots, Dehydrated	411	-	-	-	31	-	-	31	-
Cabbage, Dehydrated	62	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Vegetables, Dehy.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vegetable and Soups, Cnd.	1,191	-	778	13	-	-	-	791	50
Potatoes, Fresh	1,215	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Onions, Fresh	139.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Garlic, Fresh	12.5	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-
Tomato Paste	2,363.3	-	-	-	155	19	-	174	-
Sugar	269,398	76,006	31,193	44,715	12,118	3,586	14,730	182,348	25,000
Tablet Sugar	38,643.3	-	542	-	-	114	-	656	-
Tea	917	-	199.2	199	68	26	89	541.2	131
Coffee	2,323.2	-	446	1,988	-	-	-	2,434	-
Cocoa	2,392	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ascorbic Acid (Vit. C)	24	-	.6	5.89	10.7	-	-	17.19	-
Ascorbic Acid Tablets	2,126,200 Tab.	-	500,000 Tab.	-	-	-	-	500,000 Tabs	-
Carotene	450 BIU	-	-	190 BIU	193 BIU	-	-	343 BIU	107 BIU
Citric Acid	765.6	76	19	81	167	96	21	460	99



COMMODITY	CLEARANCES								
	Cumulative	Cum. to	July 1, 1942	January, 1943	April	May	June *	Cumulative	Requested **
	Action	June 30,	Dec. 31, 1942	Mar. 31, 1943	1943	1943	1943	to	For July
	Requisitions	1942						June 30, 1943	Delivery
Alcohol	.816	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Almonds	432#	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	2,105,760.3	276,205	321,483.8	289,811.62	109,068	122,094	54,756	1,173,418.76	142,187.23
				7.45 m/m	5.17 m/m			12.62 m/m	
				150 BIU	193 BIU			343 BIU	107 BIU
				25.2#	11#	11#		32.2#	
					2.9 m/Tab			2.9 m/Tab.	4 m/Tab.
			500,000 Tab.					500,000 Tab.	

\* Based on Transportation and Warehousing Branch Shipping Report dated July 5, 1943.

\*\* Preliminary Shipping figures.

/a Includes salted fatbacks.

/b Lard, tallow, oleo oil and rendered pork fat.

/d Includes 5 tons of fruit juice.

/e Other spices include cinnamon, mustard, allspice, coriander, cumin, ginger, laurel leaves, mustard seed and poppy seed.

~~SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President  
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your request of October 8 for information on our progress in meeting the Second Soviet Protocol, I am glad to report that we supplied the USSR with approximately 900,000 tons of agricultural products during the period covered by that agreement. This was distributed among Protocol and non-Protocol commodities as follows:

Commodity	Protocol Requirements ment	Clearances 1942/43	Commodity	Protocol Requirements ment	Clearances 1942/43
Flour	2,400,000	161,273	Butter	-	10,206
Sugar	840,000	106,998	Dried Skim Milk	-	14,044
Canned Meat	120,000	170,329	Dried Whole Milk	-	19,282
Meat	180,000	81,671.25	Dried Beans	-	80,151
Lard	144,000	42,889	Rice	-	20,124
Soap Stock	60,000	4,131	Oat Cereal	-	12,407
Vegetable Oil	120,000	103,122	Miscellaneous	-	72,687
			TOTAL	3,864,000	899,314

Only in the case of canned meats did the Russians actually succeed in lifting more than the quantity stipulated in the Protocol. With the permission of the Soviet Protocol Committee, the increased amount of canned meat was substituted for part of the requirements of other types of meat. The cured pork shipped also included a large quantity of fat cuts which the Russians consider applicable in most respects to their lard requirements.

These short-falls may be explained partly by changes in Russian requirements, with a larger proportion of dairy products, cereals, and high-protein vegetables than was contemplated a year ago. The most important factor, however, is the shortage of shipping space available to the USSR, since the monthly requirements established in the Protocol total 322,000 tons whereas the actual shipments have averaged less than 100,000 tons.

We are planning on making available 375,000 tons of foodstuffs for shipment during the three-month period of July through September, 1943. This is the amount of shipping space which, we understand, has been allotted to food.

Respectfully,

Enclosures - 2

Administrator

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION  
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF

C. F.  
Lend Lease

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.  
ADMINISTRATOR

file

July 21, 1943

JUL 22 9 45 AM '43

RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.  
Subject: Report to the President

I am transmitting herewith the usual high spot report of Lend-Lease operations to the end of June, 1943.

x 4193

You will note from the summary appearing on page one that for the first time in any one month since the enactment of Lend-Lease, total aid rendered exceeded a billion dollars.

*E. R. Stettinius, Jr.*  
x 4559

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON LEND-LEASE PROGRESS

AS OF JUNE 30, 1943

Office of Lend-Lease Administration

### SUMMARY OF LEND-LEASE PROGRESS

1. Lend-lease aid rendered in the month of June exceeded a billion dollars for the first time in any month. Total aid in June amounted to \$1,030,000,000, compared with \$790,000,000 in May and \$548,000,000 in June 1942.
2. Value of lend-lease goods transferred in the single month was greater than in all of 1941.
3. Total aid to the end of June amounted to \$12,923,000,000.
4. The following table shows the proportion of our supply of various foods exported under lend-lease in 1942 and in the first five months of 1943.


	Year 1942	Jan-May 1943
Beef	0.3%	0.6%
Pork	9.7	14.0
Butter	0.7	0.6
Cheese	23.1	6.2
Eggs	10.0	13.6
Canned Vegetables	0.8	0.7
Canned Fruits & Juices	1.7	1.8
Dried Beans	5.0	17.1
Dried Fruits	15.7	23.7

Month of June 1943

AMOUNT OF FOOD EXPORTED UNDER LEND-LEASE  
 PER CAPITA OF U. S. POPULATION  
 JANUARY - MAY 1943


**MONTHLY FLASH SUMMARY**  
**LEND-LEASE AID**  
**MILLIONS OF DOLLARS**

	Monthly			Cumulative to June 30, 1943
	June 1943	May 1943	June 1942	
<b>Goods Transferred</b>				
Munitions	570	463	232	6,197
Industrial Items	237	163	112	2,820
Foodstuffs, Etc.	147	90	115	1,867
<b>Total Transfers</b>	<b>954</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>459</b>	<b>10,884</b>
<b>Services Rendered</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>2,039</b>
<b>Total Aid</b>	<b>1,030</b>	<b>790</b>	<b>548</b>	<b>12,923</b>




## AMOUNT OF FOOD EXPORTED UNDER LEND-LEASE PER CAPITA OF U.S. POPULATION

JANUARY - MAY 1943



## LEND-LEASE FOOD EXPORTS IN PER CENT OF SUPPLY

JANUARY - MAY 1943



OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION

FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.  
ADMINISTRATOR

PSF  
July 22, 1943

*file*

*C. F.  
Lend-Lease*

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.  
Subject: Status of the Soviet Aid Program

I am transmitting herewith the secret report on the status of the Soviet Aid Program, as of June 30, 1943.

This report gives a complete picture of aid furnished to the Soviet Union to the end of June. In addition, it shows what was accomplished under the Second Protocol.

As noted in the summary on the first page, supplies made available during the Second Protocol period were practically equivalent to commitments.

Attachment

*E. R. Stettinius, Jr.*  
x 45-5-9

x 4193  
x 240

PSF  
C.F

STATUS OF THE SOVIET AID PROGRAM  
AS OF JUNE 30, 1943



DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

~~FEB~~

2 1972

Office of Lend-Lease Administration  
Washington, D. C.

## SECOND PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE

The Second Soviet Protocol which went into effect on July 1, 1942 terminated on June 30, 1943. Although production of many items was curtailed, the United States made available both protocol and non-protocol supplies estimated at 100% of the tonnage promised and planned for shipment.

During the 12 month period the United States dispatched to the U.S.S.R. a total of 2,923,000 gross long tons of cargo representing 72% of the 4,018,500 gross long tons planned. This left approximately 1,100,000 gross long tons on hand at the end of the period.

Continued changing of shipping priorities and variation from original selections resulted in the production of many items which ultimately could not be shipped. Items were made available to meet Soviet shipping selections in most instances. The exceptions were radio equipment, critical naval supplies and certain types of industrial equipment.

Highlights of United States performance under the Protocol included the shipment to the Soviet Union of 2,484 aircraft, 76,340 trucks and 968,000 short tons of food-stuffs.

Aid to the Soviet Union is continuing under schedules formulated for a proposed Third Protocol to run from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schaubig Date EEB

2 1972


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Office of Lend-Lease Administration

July 21, 1943

# SHIPMENTS TO U. S. S. R.

(FIGURES SHOW GROSS LONG TONS SHIPPED TO JUN. 30, 1943)



NOTE: SHIPMENTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF ARE MADE BY SEVERAL ROUTES. THE TONNAGE SHOWN IS THE TOTAL FOR ALL ROUTES.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date **EER** 2 1972

**SECRET**


2 1972

~~SECRET~~


# SHIPMENTS TO U. S. S. R.

## SHIPMENTS, ARRIVALS AND LOSSES

CUMULATIVE IN MILLIONS OF GROSS LONG TONS




## NUMBER OF SHIPS SAILING EACH MONTH



## SECOND PROTOCOL CLEARANCES FROM U. S. PORTS


CUMULATIVE IN MILLIONS OF GROSS LONG TONS




# EXPORTS AND AVAILABILITY OF MATERIALS FOR U.S.S.R. CUMULATIVE SINCE OCTOBER 1, 1941

Exported — Lost  
 En Route Arrived  
 — Quantity made available at  
 U.S. centers of production


## BOMBERS




## PURSUIT PLANES




## MEDIUM TANKS




## LIGHT TANKS



## ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS 90mm



## TRUCKS




# EXPORTS AND AVAILABILITY OF MATERIALS FOR U.S.S.R.

CUMULATIVE SINCE OCTOBER 1, 1941


Exported  
 Lost  
 En Route  
 Arrived

Quantity made available at  
 U.S. centers of production


FIELD TELEPHONES




ARMY BOOTS




STEEL AND STEEL PRODUCTS




ALUMINUM AND DURALUMINUM



CHEMICALS AND EXPLOSIVES



FOODS



CUMULATIVE TO JUNE 30, 1943  
 Made Available 351,805  
 Exported 244,459

CUMULATIVE TO JUNE 30, 1943  
 Made Available 1,472,000  
 Exported 911,000

## EXPORTS AND AVAILABILITY

As of June 30, 1943

Ref.	Item	Second Protocol Performance July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943			Exported During June 1943	Cumulative Performance First and Second Protocols October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943						
		Made Available	Exported	Offered		Made Available	Exported	Arrived a/	Lost	Diverted To Others After Export	In U.K. Awaiting Forwarding b/	Balance Enroute
<b>Military Items</b>												
<b>Aircraft</b>												
I 1a	Pursuit Planes P-39, P-40	1,200	1,132	1,200	38	1,947	1,879	1,307	292	1	0	279
I 1b	Light Bombers A-20, B-7	1,199	1,105	1,200	262	1,821	1,727	1,547	148	(41) 1g/	0	31
I 1c	Medium Bombers B-25	154	131	144	5	230	207	202	5	0	0	0
I 1d	Heavy Bombers B-24	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
I 1e	Cargo Planes C-47	87	86	0	18	87	86	86	0	0	0	0
I 1f	Advanced Trainers AT6C	30	29	0	0	30	29	24	0	0	2	3
I 1g	Observation Planes O-52	0	0	0	0	30	30	19	11	0	0	0
<b>Tanks</b>												
I 2a	Light Tanks	499	499	g/	0	1,680	1,680	1,232	443	0	0	5
I 2b	Medium Tanks	455	455	g/	0	1,536	1,536	1,174	356	0	0	6
<b>Guns</b>												
I 3a	AA 90 mm.	100	80	g/	0	104	84	48	8	0	20	8
I 4a	AA 40 mm.	1,175	75	0	0	1,175	75	0	0	0	0	75
I 4b	AA 37 mm.	500	424	3,360g/	0	500	424	276	16	0	68	64
I 4c	AA 50 cal. Twin Machine Gun		800	0	0		-800	100	0	0	400	300
I 5a	AT 57 mm.	0	0	g/	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I 5b	AT 37 mm.	0	0	0	0	63	63	35	28	0	0	0
I 5c	Submachine Guns 45 cal.	67,106	51,586	g/	0	148,319	132,799	109,609	23,190	0	0	0
I 8b	Rocket Launchers	3,000	3,000	0	0	3,000	3,000	3,000	0	0	0	0
I 8c	Mortars 81 mm.	0	0	0	0	30	30	30	0	0	0	0
<b>Vehicles</b>												
I 9a	Armored Scout Cars	527	514	g/	0	927	914	708	168	0	0	38
I 9b	Jeeps (2 Ton 4x4)	20,444	15,703	18,000	244	27,189	22,448	16,085	3,248	334	1,044	1,737
I 9c	Personnel Carriers (1/2 Truck)	0	110	0	0	0	329	280	49	0	0	0
I 10a	Weapon Carriers (3/4 Ton)		4,648		764		4,648	2,418	0	0	598	1,632
I 10b	Trucks (1 1/2 Ton)		26,386		1,628		54,484	39,269	5,799	1,826	1,446	6,144
I 10c	Trucks (2 1/2 Ton)	92,842	45,180	120,000	1,768	131,168	55,404	39,482	4,076	704	3,418	7,724
I 10d	Trucks (5 Ton & Over)		50		30		54	54	0	0	0	0
I 10e	Tank Transporters (20 & 40 Ton)		76		57		76	0	16	0	0	60
I 34	Field Repair Trucks	1,090	279	1,206	0	1,115	304	200	3	0	0	101
I 17	Motorcycles	12,200	9,400	10,500	0	14,200	11,400	7,400	1,340	0	1,100	1,560
I 18	Prime Movers for Artillery	2,545	1,506	2,400	11	2,930	1,891	1,426	195	0	155	115
<b>Signal Equipment</b>												
I 20	Radio Sets	15,980		11,500								
I 21	Radio Tubes (1000 Units)	1,937		2,000								
I 23	Radio Direction Finding Sets			150								
I 31a	Dry Cells for Radios	f/	25,000	f/	0	f/	25,000	25,000	0	0	0	0
I 38	Radio Measuring & Test Equip. (\$1000)	304		1,000								
I 32	Radio Parts & Accessories (\$1000)	438		500								
I 11	Field Telephones	157,400	115,151	144,000	0	231,324	189,075	130,243	31,432	600	11,600	15,200
I 12	Field Telephone Wire (Miles)	351,047	210,005	298,254	600	819,396	678,354	527,039	124,007	0	12,604	14,704
I 30	Dry Cells for Field Telephones			Batteries being delivered with telephones.								
I 24	Gas Driven Generators	12,605	10,081	10,000	201	13,562	11,038	10,111	78	0	0	849
<b>Explosives</b>												
I 14a	Powder (Tons)	44,690	35,865	0	0	47,423	38,598	22,104	3,549	0	5,369	7,576
I 13a	Toluol (Tons)	24,903	18,376	24,000	1,943	42,304	35,777	28,474	2,874	359	1,810	2,260
I 13b	T.N.T. (Tons)	45,500	22,007	24,000	2,197	57,361	33,868	25,390	3,549	250	2,452	2,227
<b>Other Military Items</b>												
I 35a	Pneumatic Hoists	1,262	1,262	0	0	3,000	3,000	2,398	552	0	50	0
I 35c	Barbed Wire Cutters (\$1000)		300	0	52		300	195	0	0	0	105
I 35e	Smoke Pots		5,000	0	0		5,000	0	0	0	0	5,000
<b>Quartermaster Items</b>												
II 71a	Leather (Tons)	15,632	9,581	18,670	1,256	29,237	23,206	15,697	4,615	0	666	2,228
II 72a	Army Boots (1000 pr.)	3,412	2,295	2,400	1	5,068	3,951	2,937	555	0	256	203
II 72b	Ski Boots (1000 pr.)	125	57	0	4	125	57	13	0	0	4	40
II 73a	Woolen Cloth (1000 yds.)	17,192		18,000								
II 75	Webbing (1000 yds.)	37,915	15,952	36,000	520	43,650	21,687	16,568	2,207	0	2,027	885
<b>Medical Supplies</b>												
V	Drugs, Instruments, Equipment etc. (\$1000)	13,824		12,000								
<b>Materials</b>												
<b>Non-Ferrous Metals &amp; Products</b>												
II 3	Aluminum Ingots (Tons)	22,484	22,484	47,890	1,689	38,015	38,015	31,236	4,532	0	0	2,247
II 3a	Duraluminum (Tons)	26,741	26,033		4,079	33,125	32,417	25,707	2,392	0	14	4,304
II 4a	Pig Nickel (Tons)	3,003	3,003	g/	302		4,483	3,038	811	0	0	634
II 4b	Nickel Products (Pure) (Tons)	63	63	g/	0	114	114	100	14	0	0	0
II 5	Molybdenum Concentrates (Tons)	3,970	3,970	4,000	0	8,365	8,365	6,847	1,430	0	0	88
II 6	Copper, Electrolytic (Tons)	1,145	1,002	g/	0	1,146	1,003	1,003	0	0	0	0

Notes: All tons are 2000 lbs. net weight

a/ Shipments via the Persian Gulf are considered as arrived when vessels are reported safely at ports.

b/ 1943 reloadings not yet reported except aircraft which are enroute.

c/ All planes diverted to British after arrival in Middle East.

d/ Request cancelled by U.S.S.R.

e/ Request for 37 mm. cancelled and requirement for 40 mm. submitted.

f/ Shipped mostly with radios and other items.

g/ Offering represents maximum amount of contained material in all items except military.

Ref.	Item	Second Protocol Performance July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943			Exported During June 1943	Cumulative Performance First and Second Protocols October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943						
		Made Available	Exported	Offered		Made Available	Exported	Arrived g/ b/	Lost	Diverted To Others After Export	In U.S. Awaiting Forwarding b/	Balance Enroute
<b>Non-Ferrous Metals &amp; Products Cont'd</b>												
II 7	Brass, Bronze & Other Copper Base Alloys (Tons)	108,013	88,208	109,411	7,449	152,923	133,118	90,099	13,997	0	5,209	23,813
II 11	Copper Goods and Tubes (Tons)	15,224	11,437	15,148	788	18,129	14,342	10,957	1,193	35	283	1,874
II 9	Zinc (Tons)	32,509	32,509	28,000	2,632	39,260	39,260	32,500	2,323	0	0	4,637
II 8	Magnesium Metal (Tons)	2,017	1,517	0	916	2,017	1,517	701	0	0	0	816
II 88	Manganese Metal (Tons)	11	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
II 58	Caesium Metal (Tons)	18	11	18	0	18	11	9	0	0	0	2
II 30a	Nichrome Wire (Tons)	507	490	538	120	728	711	455	92	0	0	164
II 30b	Other Nichrome Products (Tons)	495	417	g/	0	495	417	325	0	0	25	67
II 29	Special Wires (Tons)	373	246	269	11	390	263	203	2	0	0	58
II 49	Mercury (Tons)	895	865	600	0	895	865	855	0	0	0	10
II 89	Lead (Tons)	33.5	0	8	0	42.8	9.3	9.3	0	0	0	0
II 90	Tin (Tons)	7.9	0	2	0	10.1	2.2	2.2	0	0	0	0
II 91	Aluminum, Tin & Nickel Foil (Tons)	98	98	148	0	150	150	146	4	0	0	0
II 92	Babbitt Metal (Tons)	102	96	4	36	106	101	45	20	0	0	36
II 93	Cadmium (Tons)	201	201	100	25	201	201	176	0	0	0	25
II 94	Cobalt (Tons)	168	146	134	0	168	146	146	0	0	0	0
II 82	Metallic Cloth & Screen (\$1000)	960	802	0	41	995	837	616	7	0	0	214
II 61A13	Metallic Sodium (Tons)	0	0	0	0	1,103	1,103	827	258	0	0	18
II 35B	Other Non-Ferrous Metals & Prods. (Tons)	10	10	0	7	10	10	2	0	0	0	8
<b>Ferro Alloys</b>												
II 12	Ferrosilicon (Tons)	4,727	438	13,440	0	8,246	3,957	2,880	1,049	0	28	0
II 13	Ferro Chrome (Tons)	2,394	266	8,064	0	4,113	1,985	1,491	494	0	0	0
II 85	Ferro Phosphorus (Tons)	0	0	4	0	4.5	4.5	4.5	0	0	0	0
II 86	Ferro Vanadium (Tons)	0	0	2	0	2.2	2.2	2.2	0	0	0	0
II 87	Ferro Tungsten (Tons)	0	0	2	0	1.7	1.7	1.7	0	0	0	0
<b>Steel and Steel Products</b>												
II 10	Bimetal (Copper Clad Strip Carbon) (Tons)	19,290	5,541	20,160	465	19,290	5,541	4,752	60	0	288	441
II 14	Armor Plate (Tons)	453	453	d/	0	8,951	8,951	5,787	2,852	267	0	45
II 16	Polished Drill Rods (Tons)	251	184	134	2	257	190	178	2	0	10	0
II 17	High Speed Tool Steel (Tons)	3,888	3,860	3,360	249	4,970	4,942	4,161	386	0	83	312
II 18	Tool Steel (Tons)	11,889	10,037	11,424	1,016	14,889	13,037	9,569	883	25	447	2,113
II 19	Gold Finished Bars (Tons)	91,523	56,105	116,928	2,862	105,806	70,388	55,060	6,433	280	3,024	5,591
II 20	H.R. Aircraft Steel (Tons)	110,960	58,766	107,520	1,829	113,609	61,415	43,777	1,375	0	657	15,606
II 21	Cr. St. Mn Billets (Tons)	87,920	52,054	113,120	101	114,930	79,064	55,583	9,081	431	3,214	10,755
II 22	C.R. Sheets (Tons)	15,237 <sup>b/</sup>	9,549	94,080	0	86,699 <sup>b/</sup>	80,971	48,669	29,653	1,709	699	241
II 22A	C.R. Strip (Tons)	28,373	30,275	94,080	0	102,656	64,558	50,885	11,266	797	1,089	521
II 23	Stainless Steel (Tons)	5,500	3,722	3,360	315	5,514	3,736	3,118	70	0	1	547
II 24	Timplate (Tons)	38,120	34,850	66,554 <sup>d/</sup>	1,367	78,962	75,692	59,449	10,622	970	1,902	2,559
II 25	Steel Wire (Tons)	95,805	38,628	73,999	1,530	112,934	55,757	42,854	4,948	672	968	6,515
II 26	Wire Rope (Tons)	24,772	14,001	17,248	596	25,451	14,880	11,933	789	0	34	1,814
II 27	Steel Alloy Tubes (Tons)	20,637	6,264	24,016	611	21,653	7,280	5,291	41	0	105	1,643
II 28	Stainless Steel Wire (Tons)	2,413	2,176	403	740	2,416	2,189	1,737	94	13	44	301
II 31	Barbed Wire & Staples (Tons)	26,179	5,965	56,448	0	65,979	45,765	34,705	10,538	203	99	220
II 32	Pipe & Tubing (Tons)	119,237 <sup>d/</sup>	15,985	257,600	3,576	163,875 <sup>d/</sup>	60,623	38,444	15,839	1,571	288	4,481
II 33	H.R. Sheets & Plates (Tons)	123,289 <sup>b/</sup>	56,295	127,680	5,931	178,656 <sup>b/</sup>	111,662	76,368	18,642	1,533	4,383	10,736
II 34	Bolts, Nuts, Rivets, Angles, & Channels (Tons)	9,794	3,550	13,440	891	10,125	3,881	2,428	0	0	0	1,453
II 101	H.R. Balls & Accessories (Tons)	106,603	64,952	286,916	8,382	152,728	111,077	60,893	17,318	0	618	32,248
II 102	Mounted Sets of Wheels & Axles (Tons)	23,260	1,869	36,657	0	23,513	2,122	740	90	0	911	381
II 103	Car Axles (Tons)	35,502	19,686	60,480	100	35,551	19,735	13,402	927	0	4,050	1,356
II 104	Locomotive Car Wheel Tires (Tons)	12,999	5,584	13,440	786	12,999	5,584	4,068	53	0	484	979
II 105	Roller Steel Car Wheels (Tons)	8,766	1,834	17,752	0	8,766	1,834	546	0	0	512	776
II 107	Steel Locomotive Axles (Tons)	255	42	414	0	255	42	42	0	0	0	0
II 108	Electric Locomotive Axles (Tons)	300	222	297	0	300	222	0	0	0	0	222
II 37	Petroleum Products (Tons)	m/	218,599	240,000	53,185	m/	398,484	281,072	9,071	14,872	41,539	51,930
<b>Chemicals</b>												
II 36	Phenol (Tons)	13,627	10,224	12,000	1,167	17,879	14,476	10,745	1,576	170	448	1,537
II 38	Ethylene Glycol (Tons)	6,972	3,406	2,400	208	8,097	4,531	3,762	189	0	358	222
II 38a	Ethyl Alcohol (Tons)	20,244	19,998	0	10,056	20,392	20,146	5,666	160	0	0	14,320
II 39	Sodium Bromide (Tons)	1,675	836	1,800	0	2,508	1,669	1,262	334	0	58	15
II 40	Phosphorus (Tons)	2,211	508	2,400	0	3,668	1,965	1,480	485	0	0	0
II 41	Dibutylphthalate (Tons)	3,229	1,316	3,600	185	5,240	3,327	2,051	899	70	0	347
II 42	Dimethylaniline (Tons)	3,076	1,474	3,000	74	3,878	2,275	1,550	420	0	19	286
II 43	Diphenylamine (Tons)	1,685	581	1,800	46	2,590	1,486	1,062	256	0	0	168
II 44	Colloxylin (Tons) (Wet Weight)	3,762	372	7,385	0	8,156	4,766	3,231	1,339	86	110	0
II 45	Methanol (Tons)	13,065	3,539	12,000	0	22,545	13,019	8,770	2,963	371	683	232

Notes: All tons are 2000 lbs. net weight

a/ Shipments via the Persian Gulf are considered as arrived when vessels are reported safely at ports.

b/ 1943 reloadings not yet reported except aircraft which are enroute.

c/ Request cancelled by U.S.S.R.

d/ Offering represents maximum amount of contained material in all items except military.

e/ Reflects 2043 S.T. diverted from stocks.

f/ Offering reduced by 646 tons furnished in other items.

g/ Reflects 36,375 S.T. diverted from stocks. 39,663 S.T. authorized but not yet diverted.

h/ Reflects 15,419 S.T. diverted from stocks.

i/ Petroleum products made available according to shipping schedules.

Ref.	Items	Second Protocol Performance July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943			Exported During June 1943	Cumulative Performance First and Second Protocols October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943						
		Made Available	Exported	Offered		Made Available	Exported	Arrived #	Lost	Diverted To Others After Export	In U.S. Awaiting Forwarding #	Balance Enroute
<b>Chemicals Cont'd</b>												
II 46	Urotropine (Tons)	7,513	4,945	4,600	472	8,076	5,508	4,155	358	25	201	769
II 48	Ammonium Chloride (Tons)	4,800	651	4,800	0	4,800	650	550	0	0	0	100
II 50	Potassium Nitrate (Tons)	3,600	1,165	3,600	0	3,600	1,165	937	0	0	138	90
II 51	Ammonium Cyanide (Tons)	3	2.6	3	-2	3	2.6	2.2	0	0	0	-4
II 52	Centrolite (Tons)	692	530	600	0	692	530	530	0	0	0	0
II 53	Nasorein (Tons)	120	60	120	0	120	60	30	0	0	10	20
II 54	Berium Peroxide (Tons)	300	75	300	0	331	106	106	0	0	0	0
II 55	Strontium Oxalate (Tons)	96	28	96	0	96	28	20	0	0	0	8
II 56	Rhodaxine (Tons)	6	5.0	6	2.5	6	5.0	1.5	0	0	0	3.5
II 57	Torium Nitrate (Tons)	3	3	3	0	12	12	6	6	0	0	0
II 59	Cresol (Tons)	321	172	1,200	0	441	292	231	61	0	0	0
II 60	Potassium Sulphate (Tons)	1,800	405	1,800	0	1,800	405	360	0	0	45	0
II 61	Anthracene (Tons)	9	9	0	0	9	9	9	0	0	0	0
II 77	Vistanax (Tons)	324	175	0	25	356	207	151	5	0	25	26
II61A1	Phenol Formaldehyde (Tons)	262	140	g/	0	1,008	886	745	141	0	0	0
II61A2	Ammonite (Tons)	9,459	5,942		6	9,828	6,311	5,105	0	0	0	1,206
II61A3	Caustic Soda (Tons)	26,459	22,786		5,866	27,519	23,846	19,639	0	0	0	4,207
II61A4	Phoric Acid (Tons)	789	356		0	789	356	95	0	0	147	114
II61A5	Acetone (Tons)	1,659	907		704	1,659	907	369	0	0	0	538
II61A6	Soda Ash (Tons)	1,377	1,025		788	1,389	1,037	1,037	0	0	0	0
II61A7	Boric Acid (Tons)	235	235		0	459	459	292	167	0	0	0
II61A8	Calcium Carbide (Tons)	256	168		51	256	168	117	0	0	0	51
II61A9	Aniline Oil (Tons)	3,990	1,799		88	5,724	3,521	2,466	927	16	112	0
II61A0	Ethylene Dithiocarbamate (Tons)	4,614	1,499		0	4,614	1,449	1,403	0	0	0	46
II61A11	Glycerine (Tons)	9,665	7,167		571	9,665	7,167	5,497	122	0	0	1,548
II61A4	Neosone (Tons)	504	470		0	504	470	470	0	0	0	0
II61A5	Petrow or Tritobell Reagent (Tons)	507	217		0	507	217	164	0	0	0	53
II61A6	Ethylene Chlorohydrin (Tons)	31	0		0	31	0	0	0	0	0	0
II61A7	Diethylene Glycol (Tons)	552	174		75	552	174	100	0	0	0	0
II61A8	Potassium Chlorate (Tons)	1,123	444		0	1,123	444	404	0	0	40	0
II61A9	Crystalline Saccharin (Tons)	197	165		12	197	185	150	10	0	2	25
II61A0	Sodium Dichromate (Tons)	600	326		0	600	326	276	0	0	0	50
II61A2	Black Flys (Tons)	752	159		35	752	159	57	0	0	0	102
II61A3	Benzoic Acid (Tons)	600	0		0	600	0	0	0	0	0	0
II61A4	Ammonium Nitrate (Tons)	5,800	3,353		0	5,800	3,353	2,376	0	0	0	638
II61A5	Carbon Black & Lamp Black (Tons)	13 89828	225	225	0	2,251	2,238	2,238	0	0	0	0
II61A6	Potassium Tetraoxide (Tons)	245	1-0		0	245	8	8	0	0	0	0
II61A9	Other Misc. Chemicals (Tons)	6,374	377,389		775	7,591	4,989	4,060	116	0	23	790
<b>Copper Cables &amp; Wire</b>												
II 1	Marine Cable (Miles)	914	537	1,001	32	1,281	904	610	127	0	92	75
II 2	Submarine Cable (Miles)	574	448	506	0	704	598	472	31	0	0	0
II 74	Other Insulated Copper Cable (\$1000)	23,551	9,816	-	1,186	23,665	9,930	6,461	218	0	866	2,385
II 74a	Bare Copper Cable & Wire (\$1000)	1,255	930	-	70	1,300	975	747	0	0	80	148
<b>Other Materials &amp; Products</b>												
II 35a	Misc. Ferrous Metals & Prods. (\$1000)	-	701	0	115	-	725	596	25	0	0	104
II 35a1	Chains & Anchors (\$1000)	-	122	0	0	-	147	144	0	0	0	3
II 35a	Non-Metallic Minerals (\$1000)	-	131	0	7	-	131	123	0	0	0	8
II 35	Misc. Materials & Products (\$1000)	-	2	0	0	-	2	2	0	0	0	0
II67A	Abrasive Grain (Tons)	2,641	1,377	0	113	2,641	1,377	355	50	0	200	772
II67B	Abrasive Products (\$1000)	3,763	4,000	33	6,774	6,107	4,232	956	33	344	542	
II68A	Graphite Electrodes (Tons)	6,985	5,697	5,840	57	9,440	8,152	5,372	1,295	25	403	857
II68B	Graphite Products (\$1000)	570	453	0	9	867	507	507	100	0	4	99
II68C	Graphite Powder (Tons)	73 4988	430	0	50	1,035	731	513	126	0	0	92
II 80	Sheet Fibre (Tons)	219 1,779	1,710	342	2,951	1,539	722	488	3	147	179	
II 81	Shock Absorber Cord (Yards)	-	117,818	0	90	-	117,818	105,694	0	0	0	12,123
II 83	Condenser Paper (Tons)	143	106	240	0	156	119	118	0	0	0	1
II 83a	Cigarette Paper (Tons)	940	290	908	1	1,042	392	323	68	0	0	1
II 83b	Parachute Paper (Tons)	2,417	557	2,090	162	2,647	787	712	0	0	0	75
II 78	Tires	1,154,834	911,143	g/	93,147	1,397,626	1,153,935	799,873	72,204	0	43,938	237,920
II 78	Tubes	1,233,491	872,829	g/	92,052	1,468,335	1,107,673	750,795	68,810	0	46,222	241,846
<b>Industrial Equipment</b>												
II 15a	Cemented Carbide Tips & Blanks (\$1000)	1,228	862		105	1,288	902	807	10	0	0	105
II15B1	Metal Cutting Tools (\$1000)	15,111	13,873	22,404	1,002	15,269	14,031	12,510	42	0	3	1,476
II15B2	Portable Metal Cutting Tools (\$1000)	20	4		0	107	91	87	4	0	0	0
II15B3	Other Cutting & Boring Tools (\$1000)	2,241	1,680		46	3,271	2,710	2,580	54	0	0	76
II15C	Precision Measuring Tools and Instruments (\$1000)	405	213	E/	48	405	213	162	0	0	0	51
II 62	Machine Tools (Units)	9,103			694		12,036	9,214	969	0	514	1,339
	(\$1000)	65,850	E/		6,312		84,195	61,794	6,798	0	3,946	11,657
II 63	Electric Furnaces (Units)	227			39		298	234	37	0	5	22
	(\$1000)	4,101	E/		985		4,975	3,364	595	0	97	919
II 64B	Presses, Forges, Hammers, etc. (Units)	662			31		996	734	96	4	70	92
	(\$1000)	11,504	E/		288		14,622	11,500	828	26	1,121	1,147
II69,70	Ball & Roller Bearings (\$1000)	4,056	3,007		408	4,770	3,721	3,085	150	0	-	486

Notes: All tons are 2000 lbs. net weight

A/ Shipments via the Persian Gulf are considered as arrived when vessels are reported safely at ports.

B/ 1943 reloadings not yet reported, except aircraft which are enroute.

C/ Offering represents maximum amount of contained material in all items except military.

D/ Balance of U.S. commitment made available in United Kingdom.

E/ II 61A unlisted chemicals - U.S. offering of 60,000 tons included excesses in listed items.

F/ Offering included in blanket offering for Industrial Equipment. Tabulation of remaining Industrial Equipment performance continues with the majority of items still unreported.

Ref.	Item	Second Protocol Performance July 1, 1942 - June 30, 1943			Exported During June 1943	Cumulative Performance First and Second Protocols October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943					
		Made Available	Exported	Offered		Made Available	Exported	Arrived #	Lost	Diverted To Others After Export	In U.K. Awaiting Forwarding #
<b>Foodstuffs</b>											
IV1	Wheat & Flour (Tons)	M/ 192,216	2,400,000		14,196	M/ 291,226	239,654	1,726	275	5,062	44,509
IV2	Sugar (Tons)	106,581	840,000		13,543	190,080	153,278	15,236	504	11,217	9,815
IV3	Canned Meat Products (Tons)	185,217	120,000		12,994	228,285	162,815	16,112	4,429	10,413	34,516
IV4	Wheat (Tons)	100,646	180,000		9,072	115,402	96,813	3,391	573	5,179	9,446
IV5	Lard (Tons)	35,428	144,000		2,884	69,134	42,458	6,202	5,917	10,929	3,628
IV6	Vegetable Oil (Tons)	111,654	120,000		12,775	131,594	100,319	355	0	2,274	28,646
IV7	Soap (Tons)	4,278	60,000		583	4,804	3,872	111	0	0	821
SP100	Miscellaneous Foods (Tons)	514	0		79	1,146	1,106	3	0	0	37
SP101	Cereals & Prod. Other than Wheat (Tons)	48,896	0		5,688	61,439	49,811	1,065	253	0	10,310
SP102	Fodder (Tons)	1,776	0		93	1,880	1,788	0	0	0	92
SP103	Canned Fruits & Vegetables (Tons)	1,054	0		98	1,672	1,498	75	0	0	99
SP104	Dried Fruits & Vegetables (Tons)	99,807	0		2,588	112,889	67,552	6,558	3,999	18,534	16,646
SP105	Whole Fruits & Vegetables (Tons)	74	0		2	74	72	0	0	0	2
SP106	Cheese (Tons)	3,721	0		0	3,721	2,952	294	0	0	475
SP107	Butter (Tons)	8,812	0		1,298	11,707	9,117	365	415	320	1,490
SP109	Condensed & Evaporated Milk (Tons)	5,264	0		2,602	5,286	2,194	188	0	0	2,904
SP110	Salt (Tons)	522	0		136	1,536	1,398	0	0	0	138
SP111	Dried Eggs (Tons)	22,629	0		2,380	31,260	19,158	4,058	1,131	4,165	2,748
SP112	Concentrated Foods (Tons)	1,140	0		360	1,140	840	0	0	0	300
SP113	Vitamin Tablets (Tons)	267	0		0	267	231	0	0	36	0
SP114	Dried Milk & Milk Powder (Tons)	16,700	0		1,598	16,782	8,890	424	0	4,394	3,074
SP115	Citric Acids & Concentrates (Tons)	1,174	0		272	1,246	916	56	0	0	274
SP116	Veg. Pastes & Dehyd. Soups (Tons)	220	0		22	222	222	0	0	0	0
SP117	Tea (Tons)	578	0		140	622	482	0	0	0	140
SP118	Coffee (Tons)	2,759	0		2	2,764	2,202	0	0	560	2
SP119	Dehydrated Meats (Tons)	711	0		65	711	491	0	0	0	220
SP120	Seeds (Tons)	10,012	0		1	10,012	9,504	18	0	0	490
SP122	Isaats	286	0		6	286	84	0	0	112	90
SP123	Oleomargarine (Tons)	4,762	0		284	4,762	1,657	0	0	0	3,105
SP124	Dehyd. Fruits & Vegetables (Tons)	493	0		31	493	394	0	0	0	99
<b>Naval Stores</b>											
VI1	Marine Diesel Engines	462	346	506	27	478	362	322	9	0	31
VI2	Marine Gasoline Engines	1,599	984	2,170	130	1,853	1,238	997	46	0	130
VI4	Outboard Motors	200	200	0	0	200	200	200	0	0	0
VI5	Dry Cargo Vessels Transferred	53	0	0	5	53	53	0	0	0	0
VI6	Tankers Transferred	7	0	0	2	7	7	0	0	0	0
VI7	Minesweepers	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VI10	Landing Boats	30	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	0
VI11	Motor Torpedo Boats	12	12	0	0	12	12	2	3	0	7
VI17	Cerlikon Guns	1,000	780	0	0	1,000	780	256	61	0	313
VI19	Storage Batteries for Submarines	16	15	12	0	16	15	12	0	0	1
VI20	Diesel Gen. & Gen. Compressors	246	161	0	11	246	161	150	0	0	11
VI22	Marine Turbo Generators	14	4	0	0	14	4	4	0	0	0
VI24	Portable Water Pumps	6	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
VI25	Marine Pumps, Non-Portable	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
VI25A	Marine Turbo-Pumps	31	0	0	0	31	0	0	0	0	0
VI28	Diving Salvage Stations	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
VI30	Electrical & Pneumatic Underwater Tools	200	50	0	0	200	50	50	0	0	0
VI31	Portable Electric Stations	33	0	0	0	33	0	0	0	0	0
VI33	Vertical Steam Boilers	3	2	0	0	3	2	2	0	0	0
VI37	Marine Turbo-Ventilators	24	0	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	0
VI40	Rotary & Changeover Switches	4,365	0	0	0	4,365	0	0	0	0	0
VI43	Electric Instruments & Fixtures	172	40	0	0	172	40	40	0	0	0
VI99A	Misc. Stores, Services, Supplies, etc. (\$1000)		1,128	0	380		1,128	509	0	0	619
VI99B	Other Marine Machinery & Equip. (\$1000)		211	0	48		211	145	0	13	53
VI99C	Other Elec. Machinery & Equip. (\$1000)		40	0	36		40	4	0	0	36
VI99D	Optical & Navigational Instruments & Accessories (\$1000)		15	0	15		17	2	0	0	15
VI99E	Radio, Radar & Related Equip. (\$1000)		456	0	60		456	392	0	0	64
VI99F	Torpedo Tubes & Related Equip. (\$1000)		137	0	17		137	0	0	121	16
Naval Armament, Vessel Repairs											
Soviet Merchant Ships and Icebreakers have been armed and repaired as they arrived at U.S. Ports.											

Notes: All tons are 2000 lbs. net weight

M/ Shipments via the Persian Gulf are considered as arrived when vessels are reported safely at ports.

N/ 1943 reloadings not yet reported except aircraft which are enroute.

P/ Petroleum products made available according to shipping schedules.

~~SECRET~~

PROGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS FOR THE U.S.S.R.

As of June 30, 1943

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date ~~PER~~

2 1972

Aluminum Rolling Mill

This \$6,000,000 project is for production of aluminum sheet for the U.S.S.R. aircraft indust  
The entire mill has been made available for shipment to the U.S.S.R.

Petroleum Refinery Program

This project is being developed to produce aviation gas, motor gas and lubricating oils to replace Soviet production destroyed or isolated by the German Army. As procurement has proceeded, it has become evident that the overall cost will be somewhat less than the \$60,000,000 originally estimated.

Process engineering is 99% complete; detail engineering and drafting are 80% complete; orders have been placed for 99% of the equipment involved; 55% of the equipment has been shipped from factory. The whole refinery program including power equipment is scheduled for completion by the end of this summer, 1943, although certain specialties such as valves, instruments and tank cars will not be delivered until late fall.

Tire Production Program

This \$6,000,000 project is to permit the Soviet Government to produce a minimum of 1,000,000 military tires per year from their own supplies of synthetic rubber and natural rubber obtained from shrubs. To utilize idle American equipment, the tire plant of the Ford Motor Company has been purchased; all of this equipment has been exported to the U.S.S.R. 65% of the new equipment being furnished has been shipped to port; the remaining 35% will be made available from production by September 1943.

Shipments of power equipment commenced in May and will be completed in July.

Power Plants

This project, calling for a total of 250,000 kw steam generating capacity and 217,000 H.P. of diesel generating equipment and industrial steam boilers, is planned to provide power for munitions plants. The engineering design work has been completed. Equipment from stand-by United States plants is being used to reduce the requirements for new production.

Engineering and purchase of equipment for these plants are completed. Several of these plants have been completely shipped to port while others have been partially shipped. A considerable portion of all remaining equipment will be made available from factories during July. Difficulties have been encountered in obtaining such essential equipment as piping and valves.

Hydro-Electric Power Program

A request has been filed for hydro-electric equipment for 16 projects, including hydraulic turbines, electric generators, power house and switchyard auxiliary equipment. It is expected that the projects will develop approximately 268,000 kw of electric power in the Ural Mountain region for rapidly expanding munition plants.

Performance specifications are being reviewed by the War Production Board. The consulting engineers have been authorized to prepare excavation drawings on each of the projects. No commitment has yet been made to procure the necessary equipment.

Automatic Block Signal System

This \$13,000,000 project is to permit automatic signal operation of a portion of the U.S.S.R. railroad system. The equipment when installed will permit greater carrying capacity on existing rail facilities without increase of rolling stock. The system will consist of signal and signal operating equipment for 3000 km of track: 455 km single track alternating current supply, 1162 km single track storage battery supply, 800 km single track primary battery supply and 583 km double track storage battery supply. Contracts have been awarded and layout designs completed. Most of the engineering problems have been settled and 75% of the drawings approved. Fabrication has commenced.

~~SECRET~~

**STATEMENT OF VESSELS SAILED TO U.S.S.R.**  
As of June 30, 1943

Date of Sailing	Number of Ships Sailing					Arrived	En Route as of June 30	Cargo Disch. in U.K.	Lost	Losses by Month
	For North Russia	For Persian Gulf	For Soviet Arctic	For Soviet Far East	Total					
1941 Oct	10	-	-	5	15	14	-	-	1	-
Nov	9	1	-	3	13	12	-	-	1	-
Dec	14	7	-	4	25	22	-	-	3	1
1942 Jan	20	-	-	4	24	19	-	1	4	3
Feb	13	2	-	4	19	16	-	-	3	1
Mar	31	6	-	6	43	32	-	4	7	9
Apr	62	6	-	10	78	46	-	13	19	-
May	14	10	-	7	31	21	-	4	6	6
Jun	8	11	6	9	34	27	-	-	7	6
Jul	2	5	16	12	35	34	-	-	1	16
Aug	11	5	1	19	36	33	-	-	3	1
Sep	4	8	-	17	29	29	-	-	-	10
Oct	-	13	-	19	32	32	-	-	-	-
Nov	-	8	-	26	34	32	-	-	2	3
Dec	4	11	-	24	39	38	-	1	-	-
1943 Jan	12	12	-	22	46	38	-	8	-	-
Feb	22	7	-	28	57	35	-	20	2	1
Mar	1	19	-	26	46	44	-	1	1	2
Apr	-	18	-	37	55	37	17	-	1	1
May	-	15	4	44	63	34	28	-	1	-
Jun	-	4	5	45	54	11	43	-	-	2
Total Oct. 1941 to June 30, 1943	237	168	32	371	808	606	88	52*	62	62

\* 22 vessels discharged in 1942. All but 11,000 tons of cargo have been forwarded or diverted to others. 30 vessels discharged in April, 1943. Cargo is being on-carried, stored, or diverted.

Of the 808 sailings from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943, 369 were made by American vessels, 324 by Soviet vessels, 97 by American vessels transferred to Soviet registry, 17 by British vessels and 1 by a Swedish vessel. The sailings were made by 541 vessels, 70 having sailed twice, 24 three times, 21 four times, 12 five times, 4 six times and 3 seven times. In addition to the 808 sailings, there were 89 ships that loaded partial cargoes in the U. S. for the U.S.S.R. In addition to the 62 ships shown above as lost, several ships have been sunk on their return voyages.


DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date            FEB 2 1972

**STATEMENT OF CARGO SHIPPED TO U.S.S.R.**  
**As of June 30, 1943**  
(Thousands of Gross Long Tons)

Month	For North Russia	For Persian Gulf		For Soviet Arctic	For Soviet Far East		Total	Arrived	En Route as of June 30	Cargo On Hand Or Diverted In U. K.	Lost	Losses By Month
		Full Cargoes	Partial Cargoes		Full Cargoes	Partial Cargoes						
1941 - Oct	48	-	-	-	17	-	65	62	-	-	3	-
Nov	41	3	-	-	14	-	58	55	-	-	3	-
Dec	50	10	-	-	11	-	71	63	-	-	8	3
1942 - Jan	63	-	-	-	26	-	89	72	-	1	16	9
Feb	66	4	1	-	20	-	91	76	-	-	15	5
Mar	171	17	1	-	25	-	214	163	-	6	45	42
Apr	376	21	-	-	38	-	435	262	-	46	127	-
May	92	79	8	-	33	-	212	143	-	20	49	38
Jun	55	84	7	18	31	-	195	139	-	-	56	55
Jul	13	39	25	46	59	1	183	174	-	-	9	114
Aug	69	39	25	3	83	-	219	197	-	-	22	7
Sep	28	63	9	-	79	-	179	179	-	-	-	65
Oct	-	109	12	-	108	-	229	229	-	-	-	2
Nov	-	66	6	-	106	1	179	166	-	-	13	17
Dec	29	83	8	-	123	-	243	236	-	7	-	-
1943 - Jan	73	83	4	-	98	-	258	210	-	48	-	-
Feb	164	40	-	-	129	-	333	168	-	150	15	8
Mar	9	131	-	-	123	-	263	246	-	9	8	16
Apr	-	139	6	-	193	-	338	201	130	-	7	7
May	-	112	9	12	217	-	350	155	188	-	7	-
Jun	-	25	4	16	228	1	274	47	227	-	-	15
Total Oct. 1941 to June 30, 1943	1,347	1,147	125	95	1,761	3	4,478	3,243	545	287*	403	403

\* 62,000 tons discharged in 1942 diverted to U. S. Army or British use.  
11,000 tons discharged in 1942 awaiting forwarding to U.S.S.R.  
214,000 tons discharged in 1943. Information on disposition not yet received.

**DISTRIBUTION OF TONNAGE SHIPPED TO JUNE 30, 1943  
BY REGISTRY OF SHIPS**



DATA ARE GROSS LONG TONS

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date **FEB**

2 1972

COPY

PSF

*(Circled)* C. F.

*Send Lease*

July 30, 1943

*7/31/43  
no memo  
a file to  
man in this*

*Copy for files*

Dear Doctor Evatt:

I have your note of 13 July and thank you for your expression of warm appreciation of our efforts to provide aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force.

*x48-10*

I am glad to learn that the allotment of aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force for 1943, with the exception of heavy bombers, is satisfactory to you both as to numbers and types of aircraft. To give the Royal Australian Air Force greater striking power, heavy bombers are needed, and I can understand your disappointment in not securing an allotment. My military advisers tell me that, because of pressing prior commitments, no heavy bombers can be made available to Australia during 1943. Nevertheless, it is my wish that heavy bombers be supplied to the Royal Australian Air Force in order that they can carry the war deep into Japanese territory, and I hope to make some available in 1944.

*SKP  
- Klaus*

*x4675  
x197*

I cannot promise this definitely now. However, by the last of November our production schedules of heavy bombers for 1944 can be forecast more accurately and our plane losses by attrition and in battle will be known more definitely. Not until then can a definite commitment be made. I can assure you that I will then give this matter my personal supervision.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Right Honourable  
Dr. H. V. Evatt, K.C., M.P. *x PP75707*  
The Australian Legation  
3117 Woodland Drive, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

*x249 official  
x4193*

*LEFT*

War Department  
Office of the Chief of Staff

*Conf*

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Harry Hopkins, The White House:

Attached is a proposed letter to Dr. Evatt which has been approved by General Marshall and concurred in by General Arnold and General McNarney.

*Mr. President:*

*W. T. Sexton*

W. T. SEXTON  
Colonel, General Staff Corps  
Secretary, General Staff

*I think this is P.K.*

*H. H. x 4117*

x 25-7

Date + make copy for  
our files + send to Dr.  
Watt by messenger

CCW



AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 13th, 1943

Dear Mr. President,

Following our discussion of this morning I desire to send you this personal and unofficial note.


Your recent decision to give to Australia - in addition to all other previous commitments - organisation equipment for the purpose of developing the Royal Australian Air Force has already had a most beneficial effect. Your exchange of messages with Mr. Curtin shows this very clearly. I had only been in Washington for a few hours when I discovered that in the proposed allotments of aircraft to implement your gift your decision was hardly being interpreted or applied in the broad and generous spirit of your special contribution. In particular your object was to give the Royal Australian Air Force a greater striking power. In spite of this, no provision has yet been made for a single heavy bomber unit. I believe that the allotment for 1943, with the notable exception of bombers, is in reasonable compliance with my request and will be a valuable contribution. The allotment in other types made for this year seems also satisfactory. But it is respectfully requested that you direct that the remainder of the special allotment be reviewed and that the appropriate authorities be asked to consult the Royal Australian Air Force Representative in Washington, Air Marshal R. Williams.

I am confident that if this is done necessary amendments and improvements could be affected and your noble intention more faithfully carried out. It is your personal supervision of your contribution that seems to me to be so requisite.

- 2 -

I desire to thank you most sincerely, not only for your attitude in this matter, but for your constant help to Australia during the long period of crisis since Pearl Harbor.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "W. S. Wood", with a horizontal line underneath.

The Honourable Franklin Delano Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.