

France 2/5/37-12/23/37

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated May 5, 1937

Rec'd 4 p.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

575, May 5, 11 a. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Osusky, Minister of Czechoslovakia, who has just returned to Paris yesterday afternoon confirmed the report which I had already had from Delbos ~~that~~ <sup>to the fact that</sup> the German Government had rejected Czech overtures for reconciliation. He said that the Czechs had gone so far as to invite the German Military Attache in Praha to make a full inspection of their aeroplane fields; and their military preparations of all sorts. He added that the Czechs had invited the German Government to send anyone that they might wish to investigate the situation of the Germans in Bohemia. The German Government had refused these proposals.

Osusky went on to say that the Government of Czechoslovakia during the past few months had made the most intense efforts possible to work out rapprochement with Austria; that Schuschnigg has become convinced that this was desirable and has gone to Venice in an enthusiastic mood to ask Mussolini's blessing for the proposed rapprochement. He said that Mussolini had flatly vetoed any such rapprochement.

explanation

760F.62/74

Confidential File

GH

LMS 2-No. 575, May 5, 11 a. m., from Paris.

762.65  
explanation was that Mussolini felt his situation in the Mediterranean was so insecure that he could not afford to displease Germany in any way. / <sup>Osusky</sup> ~~Mussolini~~ stated that Benes and Schuschnigg were determined to work for closer relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria in spite of Mussolini's objections.

BULLITT

CSB

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated May 5, 1937

Rec'd 3 p

DIVISION OF WESTERN  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MAY 6 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

576, May 5, 11 a. m.

Continuing my 575, May 5, 11 a. m.

Osusky went on to say that he was still confident that  
France would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia at once  
if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia but he did not know  
if this would continue to be the case after the French public  
had realized fully the consequences of Belgium's new status  
(see my telegram No. 556, April 30, 5 p. m.).

He concluded by saying that in his opinion the situa-  
tion of all the states of Central and Eastern Europe vis-a-  
vis Germany would become desperate unless Great Britain  
should decide shortly to assist France in maintaining by  
force the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. He  
believed that Austria was in far more danger than Czecho-  
slovakia. He did not believe that the Germans would dare  
to attack Czechoslovakia until next spring but they might  
decide to take over Austria at any time. (End)

BULLITT

CSB

not  
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WE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM

Dated May 12, 1937

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

620, May 12, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



Francois-Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin, whose judgment with regard to events in Germany is often remarkably accurate, stated to me yesterday that he had never been so pessimistic with regard to ~~Germany's~~ intentions as he was at the present moment.

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He said that he believed Schacht was now without any real influence on Hitler. He believed that the Germans would continue to talk about their desire to enter into economic collaboration with the rest of the world; but would ask a price for their abandonment of economic Autarchy which the world could not accept, I added they had already indicated that a part of the price would be the return of all the colonies that were taken from them by the Treaty of Versailles.

He believed that Schacht's conversations would be reality a smoke screen behind which Hitler would await the propitious

740.00/169

CONFIDENTIAL  
Confidential File

JR #620, May 12, 1 p.m., from Paris.

propitious moment to lay hands on Austria and Czechoslovakia. He felt certain that the status quo in Central Europe would not remain intact for another twelve months. If the Germans should take over Austria it might not mean general war. If they should attack Czechoslovakia, France would march at once; England would be compelled to mobilize and within a few weeks the entire Continent would be at war. He added that he had never known the Nazis to be so confident or so difficult to deal with.

BULLITT

KLP

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (d)

PARIS

FROM

Dated May 20, 1937

Received 6:17 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington



652, May 20, 7 p.m. SECTION ONE.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I lunched with Blum today. He expressed the opinion that the net result of all the recent political conversations in London and Paris would be very small.

He said that Eden and Chamberlain had assured the French, the Austrians, and the Czechs that they were not disinterested in the fate of Czechoslovakia and Austria but that Eden had made it entirely clear to Guido Schmidt, Austrian Foreign Minister, that it would be very difficult to persuade the British public to go to war on behalf of Austria.

Blum said that Schmidt in his conversations in both London and Paris had been most reserved. He had said that Austria's position was based on maintaining close contact with Italy and on developing friendly relations with Germany. He intended to continue to push as hard as he could for closer relations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia but he could not take any position which would lead to an open

break

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1937

761.63  
763.64



EDA -2- #652, May 20, 7 p.m. from Paris Section one

break with Germany or Italy.

Blum said that Hodza, Czech Foreign Minister, was doing everything that he could to bring about close relations between Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and that he did not despair that the negotiations in progress might produce some result.

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v  
Blum said that Litvinov had assured him categorically that if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia and if France should go to war with Germany to defend Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would make war on Germany at once.

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I commented that I did not see how the aid of the Soviet Union could be very effective in view of the condition of Soviet roads and railroads leading to the west and in view of the fact that Soviet planes and armies could not cross Poland or Rumania. Blum said that he felt Rumania was so closely bound to Czechoslovakia and had such a keen sense that Rumania would be a tempting morsel for Germany if Czechoslovakia should succumb that the Rumanians would cooperate with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in case of German attack on Czechoslovakia.

BULLITT

SMS:NPL



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (d)

PARIS

Dated May 20, 1937

FROM

Received 7:05 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

653, May 20, 7 p.m.

Continuing my 652, Section Two.

741.61  
Blum agreed that Hitler had the political initiative on the continent of Europe at the moment and he did not see any way to take this initiative out of the hands of Germany. It was tragic but true that at the present time the situation was beginning to resemble more and more the situation before 1914. He could see nothing better to do than to recreate the close entente between England, France, and Russia which had existed before 1914. Litvinov had requested him to do his utmost to bring about a rapprochement between England and the Soviet Union. He believed that the single chance of preserving peace in Europe would lie in such a rapprochement and therefore he favored it.

I suggested that it would not be easy to convince the present British Government to have close relations with the Soviet Union especially in view of the recent wholesale exilings and shootings. Blum said that he did not believe it would be any more difficult for the British Government to work with the present Russian Government than it had

been

EDA - 2 - #653, May 20, 7 p.m. Paris Section Two.

been before the war for the French Left Governments to work with Czarist Governments. In any case he felt that there was no other alternative and he intended to try to bring about closer relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

BULLITT

SMS:NPL

EDA

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated May 20, 1937

FROM

Received 7 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

654, May 20, 7 p.m.

Continuing my 653, Section Three.

741.65  
762.65

All the information that he had received recently led him to believe that relations between Italy and England were bound to grow worse. He was convinced that the basis of the recent conversations between Germany and Italy had been that Mussolini had agreed not to oppose Hitler's ambitions in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in return for German support in the Mediterranean. He thought that Mussolini now intended to attempt to establish himself with increased strength in the eastern Mediterranean and would need Germany's support and therefore could not oppose Germany in Central Europe.

I commented that in all this I could see nothing very constructive. Blum replied that the tragedy of his position at the present moment was that with the greatest will in the world on his part and on the part of the entire French people to achieve peace, there seemed to be nothing constructive to be done.

Blum asked me if Mr. Norman Davis had left for the United States and I replied that he had. He said that he

regretted



EDA - 2 - #654, May 20, 7 p.m. from Paris Section 3.

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Steering  
Committee

regretted this as the French Government after consultation with the British Government last night had decided to invite both Germany and Italy to send representatives to the impending Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Whatever the replies might be from Germany and Italy this would at least put them up against the problem of making some reply.

BULLITT

SMS:EMB



# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

Dated May 20, 1937

Rec'd 7:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



655, May 20, 7 p.m.

Continuing my 654, Section Four.

Schacht would be coming to Paris next week. He did not know what Schacht would have to suggest but in view of the fact that Schacht had ended all his recent conversations with a demand for the return of all the former German colonies taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, he did not hope for ideal results. Delbos in London had discussed the question of return of German colonies with the British. The British had taken the position that they would not be ready to return German colonies to Germany merely to have Germany make further demands after the colonies were returned. If, however, the question of the return of some portion of the former German colonies to Germany should be the only capstone needed to complete a structure of peace for the world, it would refuse to discuss the question.

I suggested to Blum that this was precisely what the British had said to Van Zeeland with regard to reduction of barriers to international commerce and the rehabilitation

of

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Confidential File

#655, May 20, 7 p.m., from Paris.

of the economic life of the world and that the British seemed to be reserving a large number of capstones.

He agreed that this was so and our conversation concluded with some remarks on the tragedy of a man who ardently desires peace and is at the head of a nation which ardently desires peace yet is overcome in any attempt to devise a method to achieve peace by the force of existing circumstances.

(End of Message)

BULLITT

KLP:HPD

*File*  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (CODAT)

*PM*  
CODAT

FROM

Paris *9-8-37*

Dated September 8, 1937

Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1257, September 8, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY:

*mtg 761.65*  
Chautemps stated to me last night that the French Government had had no previous information whatsoever with regard to the Soviet protest to Italy. He felt that the moment was exceedingly ill-chosen for such a protest; but the Soviet Government apparently had an unassailable case. He was informed that members of the crew of the TIMIRYAZEV had been able to take photographs of the submarine which proved indisputably that it was Italian.

He did not yet know whether or not the Italians would attend the conference at Nyon. Yesterday afternoon the Italian Government had stated to the French Government that it would not be represented at the conference unless France and England could obtain categorical assurances from the Soviet Government that the Soviet Government would not bring up the cases of the TIMIRYAZEV and the BLAGOEV at the conference, and would refrain from accusations against Italy.

Chautemps

852.00/6401

Confidential File

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SEP 9 - 1937

GE



FS —2—No 1257, September 8, noon from Paris

740.00  
Chautemps was more pessimistic than ever with regard to the prospect of preserving peace in Europe. He repeated the phrase which one now hears daily: "Peace is at the mercy of an incident". He went on to say that he believed it would be impossible to preserve peace unless the United States should take the position that it would give all possible aid of an economic and financial nature to any country attacked. I replied that he must know as well as I did that it was out of the question for the United States to take such a position. I had told him and Delbos countless times that the people of the United States as well as the government were one hundred per cent against any action which might involve the United States in another European war. The terms of the Neutrality Act were an expression of the unanimous desire of Americans to stay out of war. He could be sure that the United States would make every effort to remain aloof from European conflict. I added that he must have had the same information from his Embassy in Washington. Chautemps answered that he knew this was the attitude of the United States at the present time; but he felt that if the war should be prolonged, and it might go on for years, there would be such complications that the United States would be dragged in. I replied that at any rate he could  
count



FS 3-No. 1257, September 8, noon from Paris

count on the United States to struggle to stay out of  
war no matter how long the war might be.

RR:KLP

BULLITT

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED



RB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM

Paris



Dated November 8, 1937

Re'd 3:35 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

1572, November 8, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



In conversation this morning an official of the Foreign Office said to us apropos of Italian adherence to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern Pact that the Foreign Office saw in this enlarged agreement two possibilities which furnished cause for worry. First, it could be used as a pretext by the Fascist states for provoking civil war in any country on the ground that the "defense measures" contemplated by the pact had become necessary to prevent the spread of Communism. Second, it could have a far reaching influence on internal developments in many countries for instance in Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Yesterday the semiofficial newspaper at Belgrade had praised the anti-Communist Pact as saving civilization and social order. There might be temptation for Stoyadinovitch who finds himself in difficulties

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RB -2- No. 1572, November 8, 4 p. m. from Paris

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difficulties to try to make use of the Pact by saying that  
if agitation against him did not cease there would be inter-  
vention by Mussolini to preserve order in Yugoslavia. There  
might be temptation to make use of the Pact in a similarly  
dangerous manner in Poland and Czechoslovakia (END SECTION  
ONE)

BULLITT

RGC

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NOV 8 1941  
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

RECEIVED  
NOV 8 1941



# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
NOV 9 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM

Paris

Dated November 8, 1937

Rec'd 3:47 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

1572, November 8, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

There is no question, said our informant, that the enlarged pact is an instrument which can become extremely dangerous. The whole question is whether the three signatories intend to use it as a means for the achievement of political ends, or whether they will be content to let it stand as a spectacular gesture to impress the world with their solidarity. Future developments in relation to the pact will, therefore, bear careful watching.

Our informant went on to say that the new pact is bound to reinforce everywhere governments of dictatorial tendency and remarked that he supposed that this aspect of the question would in its relationship to certain Latin American countries be of interest to Washington. In this connection he said that the Foreign Office had this morning received a cable from the French Embassy at Tokyo stating that according to the Japanese press Bolivia had announced readiness to adhere to the anti-Communist pact. In short

our



RB -2- No. 1572, November 8, 4 p. m. SECTION TWO from Paris

our informant added the pact contains possibilities for disturbing the whole world.

Copies to Berlin, Rome, London, Belgrade. (END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

CSB



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1267

Paris, November 23, 1937.

1937 NOV 30 PM 2 51

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Bullitt to  
Warsaw.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY



*On Secretary's Instructions  
Cites shown to C1  
A-W. & A-M (Lead &  
these files only)  
C. H. G.*

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in accordance with my telegram No. 1557 of November 4, 2 P.M., to the Department and the Department's telegram No. 563 of November 4, 3 P.M., to me, I left Paris, to visit Ambassador Biddle, on Saturday evening, November 13th at 6:15 P.M., arriving in Warsaw at 4:32 P.M., on November 14th. I left Warsaw at 10:20 P.M., November 17th, arriving in Berlin at 8:00 A.M., November 18th. I departed from Berlin on November 19th at 9:30 P.M., arriving in Paris at 9:55 A.M., on Saturday, November 20th.

In the course of this trip I talked with a  
number

123 BULLITT, WM. C./382

Confidential File

number of statesmen and diplomats, and it has occurred to me that the Department might be interested in having more than a formal report of the dates of my journey.

I append, therefore, memoranda recording portions of conversations with the following:

- 1/ The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Joseph Beck, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, and other members of the Polish Government;
- 2/ The Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw,
- 3/ Shuichi Sakoh;
- 3/ The Italian Ambassador in Berlin,
- 4/ Bernardo Attolico;
- 4/ Baron Konstantin von Neurath;
- 5/ 6/ 5. Doctor Hjalmar Schacht; 6. General Hermann Goering.

Respectfully yours,

*OK*  
*W.C.* William C. Bullitt  
William C. Bullitt.

List of Enclosures: *OK*

1. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Colonel Beck, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, and other members of the Polish Government.
2. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw.
3. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin.
4. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Baron Konstantin von Neurath.
5. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Doctor Hjalmar Schacht.
6. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering.



MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT  
AND THE POLISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COLONEL  
JOSEPH BECK, MARSHAL SMIGLY-RYDZ, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF  
THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.

In Warsaw I had five conversations with Colonel Joseph Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs and talks with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, Count Szembek, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wszelaki, Economic Adviser of the Polish Foreign Office, several other members of the Polish Government and a number of ambassadors and ministers. Ambassador Biddle, who was with me throughout nearly all these conversations, informed me that he would report them, and I wish merely to call attention to some of the statements which seem to me of particular importance.

Colonel Beck stated to me that he believed that Germany in the near future would take some action against Czechoslovakia. He did not believe that there would be a frank invasion of Czechoslovakia; but felt that the German Government would provoke some sort of an uprising on the part of the Germans of Bohemia and would then support such an uprising by arms, ammunition, and men from Germany. He and Marshal Smigly-Rydz both expressed the opinion that France would not intervene to save Czechoslovakia. They both stated that they believed the French

Government

Government, before taking any action, would consult the British Government and that the British Government would suggest that the French Government should refer the matter to the League of Nations before acting, and that before the League of Nations had acted, Czechoslovakia would have been conquered.

75-402. I disagree with this opinion as I believe that at the present moment the French would mobilize at once in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, either direct or through the Germans of Bohemia. I do not know how long this state of mind on the part of the French Government will prevail and I can not guarantee that it will exist next month or the month after.

I asked Beck what Poland would do in case France should become involved in war with Germany because of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Beck replied that in the hypothetical case I had presented, the casus foederis between France and Poland clearly would not arise. Poland positively would not march. He went on to explain that Poland would fulfill the direct obligations of her alliance with France completely and in case of German aggression against France, Poland would march at once; but that under no circumstances would Poland become involved in protecting French satellites in Central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia.

I asked Beck if he did not feel that there was some possibility that the German attack on Czechoslovakia which he anticipated might be forestalled by the Czechs granting a certain degree of autonomy to the Germans of Bohemia. He replied that he did not believe that Benes would have sense enough to make this concession. He

then

✓ 760000  
then added, speaking with a passionate intensity, that if Czechoslovakia should grant autonomy to the Germans of Bohemia, Poland would demand at once autonomy for the three hundred thousand Poles of the Teschen district. The latter statement seemed to me of particular importance.

✓ 760000  
✓ 860000  
In discussing the question of Danzig, Beck said that Hitler personally had given Lipsky, Polish Ambassador in Berlin, the most absolute assurances that he cared too much about Germany's present good relations with Poland to permit the Germans of Danzig to do anything which would be totally unacceptable to Poland. Beck went on to say that he was confident, therefore, that although the situation in Danzig might remain difficult, it would not lead to any intensely unpleasant incidents.

✓ 560000  
✓ 510000  
I stated to both Beck and Smigly-Rydz that I had been informed from French sources in Brussels that Potemkin, former Soviet Ambassador to France who is now Under Secretary at the Soviet Foreign Office, had said that the Soviet Government had decided to give up all preparations for a possible military offensive on the European frontier of Russia and had decided to create on the European frontier of Russia a zone of virtual devastation approximately two hundred kilometers deep for defensive purposes, except along the railroad lines.

Both Smigly-Rydz and Beck said that they had had no information to this effect. Smigly-Rydz went on to say, however, that he was convinced from his



✓ 861.20  
his military intelligence reports that the Red Army along the European frontier was totally incapable at the present time of taking the offensive; the staffs of the armies on the Polish and Rumanian frontiers of the Soviet Union had been so destroyed by the recent executions and so shaken in self-confidence that any offensive operations were out of the question. He felt, therefore, that the position of Poland vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was today much safer than it had ever been.

✓ 1602.00  
I discussed briefly with Beck the recent tension between President Mościcki and Marshal Śmigły-Rydz. He said that he had been able to bring about a reconciliation by calling on both men to remember that the international interests of Poland must be regarded as superior to any personal or internal interest whatsoever. It had been agreed that final authority should rest in the hands of Marshal Śmigły-Rydz. In this connection, Beck went out of his way to say to me that he hoped I had noticed what excellent personal relations existed between him and Śmigły-Rydz when we had been together. I had, on the contrary, noticed that, while Śmigły-Rydz seemed completely at ease, Beck was the polite and somewhat fearful subordinate in his relations with Śmigły-Rydz.

✓ 1602.50  
I am inclined to believe that the difficulties in Poland which arose from the personal ambitions of Mościcki and Śmigły-Rydz and their respective followers may be regarded as settled for the moment; but the underlying economic situation in Poland is so bad that

it

it is impossible to predict a long period of political stability.

✓ 8600 50  
✓ 8600 4316  
✓ 5100 50  
✓ 8100 55 600  
In this connection, both Beck and Count Michael Lubinski, Beck's Chef de Cabinet, spoke to me of their hope that Mr. Bernard Baruch might follow up the conversations he had had with the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Jules Lukasiewicz, by some action to revive the economic life of Poland and thereby assist the Jews along with the whole Polish population. Beck also said to me that he was extremely grateful that the President, in a conversation which he had had with Count George Potocki, Polish Ambassador in Washington, had said that he would be glad at some future time to use his good offices to promote the immigration of Polish Jews to Central and South America.

✓ 8400 40  
In connection with our discussion of the possibility of preserving peace in Europe, Beck said that he hoped I might use my influence with the French Government to obtain the inclusion of Poland in any negotiations for a new Locarno. I replied that, as he knew, the Government of the United States was most careful not to intervene in political arrangements in Europe. He replied that he did not mean official intervention or advice by the American Government. He happened to know that the members of the French Government were often in the habit of discussing their problems with me in an intimate and friendly manner and asked me if I could not take the line of advising the inclusion of Poland in the negotiations for a new Locarno in any such

conversations

conversations I might have. I replied that I could not do so without authorization from my Government. He then asked me what my own opinion was with regard to the matter and I told him that I believed (which I do) that the inclusion of Poland would be highly desirable.

I gathered from my conversations with Beck and from statements made to me by various ambassadors and ministers in Warsaw that the influence of the British Government in Poland has increased greatly during recent months. The French Ambassador, Noël, for example, said to me that he was able to get little done in Warsaw if he acted alone but that in every case in which he had been supported by his British colleague, the Poles had complied with his requests.



MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBAS-  
SADOR BULLITT AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN  
- WARSAW, SHUICHI SAKOH.

✓ 793.94  
✓ 894.00

I had an extremely interesting conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw, Sakoh, who was Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow when I was at that post. Sakoh, in the past, has often talked to me with surprising frankness but I am not altogether sure that his frankness in this case was not on orders from Tokyo. Sakoh said that no one in the Japanese Government today knew what was Japan's policy with regard to China. He hoped and all the members of the Government, including Prince Konoye, hoped that the Japanese military men would be content to get out of Central and Southern China and agree to make peace on the basis of the granting of autonomy to the five Northern Provinces and their demilitarisation. He went on to say that he himself was most fearful with

regard

✓ 594.50  
regard to a continuance of the war. Japan's  
economic and financial condition was growing  
worse rapidly and if the war should go on for four ✓ 92.51  
to six months longer, he feared economic collapse.  
On top of this, he feared that when Japan should  
be exhausted to the utmost degree, Russia might  
✓ 761.42  
attack and attack successfully.

I should have taken this "confidence" more  
seriously except for the fact that the Italian  
Ambassador in Warsaw, who also was a colleague  
of mine in Moscow, recounted to me an exactly  
similar conversation that he had had with Sakoh.

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBAS-  
SADOR BULLITT AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN  
BERLIN, BERNARDO ATTOLICO.

✓ 815.00  
✓ 8650.01  
✓ 701.5165  
My first conversation in Berlin on November 18th, after seeing Ambassador Dodd, was with Bernardo Attolico, Italian Ambassador in Berlin, who is a close friend of mine. The theme of Attolico's remarks was that Mussolini desired peace ardently and would be ready to support peace everywhere in return for recognition of the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. He made the curious suggestion that if the French should object to accrediting an Ambassador to the King of Italy as the Emperor of Ethiopia, they might accredit an ambassador to "The King of Italy and Emperor," leaving out any definition as to what he was Emperor of! I asked him if he really believed that this somewhat fantastic formula would be acceptable to Mussolini and he said that it would be.

✓ 432  
Attolico said that his brother-in-law is in charge of all Italian policy with regard to Spain and that he is, therefore, completely informed on Italian policy with respect to Spain. He said that he could swear to me on his life that the Italian Government had no intention whatsoever of retaining possession of the Balearic Islands or of Ceuta. He said that as soon as Franco had triumphed and danger of Bolshevism in Spain

had .



857.0114 ✓  
had been eliminated, all Italian troops would be withdrawn. He also swore that Italy had no designs on Tunis.

8632.01 ✓  
740.00.11  
m. 25.8 ✓  
Attolico then launched into a description of his hopes with regard to the future. He said that he believed that if Ethiopia should be recognized as an Italian possession, it would be possible for Italy to begin conversations for a new Locarno and expressed the belief that the German Government would be ready to begin such conversations. I asked him how Italy would view the inclusion of Poland in such conversations. He said that the Italian Government had already informed the Polish Government that Italy would view with favor the inclusion of Poland and went on to say that he felt Germany would favor the inclusion of Poland, provided that the French should be willing to include as "exceptions" their alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia but to omit as an "exception" the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. At the close of our conversation, Attolico said that he was most anxious for me while in Berlin to have conversations with some of the Nazi leaders. He had, therefore, without consulting me, ventured to communicate with Neurath and Goering to tell them that I was coming through town, and that both had expressed the wish to see me. He had gone so far as to arrange an appointment with Goering.

I replied that I had known Neurath well for many years and invariably saw him as a friend on my way through

Berlin

Berlin but that I was extremely hesitant about having an interview with Goering. He said that he had arranged it, however, and hoped most ardently that I would carry it through. As he was obviously in an embarrassing position, I left the matter indefinite until I had had an opportunity to return to the American Embassy and consult Ambassador Dodd. I said to the Ambassador that I left the question entirely to him and should be glad to develop a severe cold or a diplomatic ptomaine poisoning, if he should consider that wise. He said, on the contrary, that he thought it was all right for me to ask Goering some questions.

I therefore saw not only Baron Konstantin von Neurath but also General Hermann Goering.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1267 of November 23,  
1937, from the Embassy at Paris.

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION

BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT AND

BARON KONSTANTIN VON NEURATH.

My conversation with Neurath on November 18th was less interesting from the point of view of what was said than from the manner in which it was said. As I have seen Neurath many times since the war, he is to me a good barometer of the state of mind of official Germany. I have known him in moods of the greatest pessimism and at other times in the mood almost of a suppliant. I found him on this visit to Berlin supremely self-confident and I found the atmosphere of the Wilhelmstrasse again as cocky as before the war.

I said to Neurath that I seemed to feel from one end of Europe to the other at the present time a

genuine



genuine desire to end the present discord and to establish a real peace and asked him if he had any similar feeling.

Neurath replied that Germany certainly desired peace. So far as France was concerned, there was absolutely no outstanding question whatsoever between Germany and France. Alsace-Lorraine had been abandoned by Germany definitely and forever. The national economies of the two countries supplemented each other perfectly and there was no reason why their trade should conflict. On the contrary, it should increase yearly. Furthermore, the French had made it clear that they were ready to return the German colonies that they had been given by the Treaty of Versailles, provided England should take a similar course. Such conflicts as existed between France and Germany were entirely indirect. For example, three million and one-half Germans on the southern border of Germany were being treated as an inferior race by the Czechs, and France was supporting the Czechs. It was exactly as if there were three million and one-half Americans living in a solid block in Mexican territory on the border of Texas, who were being maltreated in every way by the Mexican Government. There would be a constant irritation in the United States and constant bad relations with Mexico until those Americans were being treated in a decent way. The United States could not have close or really friendly relations with any country which was encouraging the Mexican Government to treat those Americans unfairly.

Neurath

740.00 ✓  
751.62 ✓  
857.01 ✓

763.72 ✓  
862.01 ✓

862.40 ✓

7607.6 ✓

862.01 ✓

Neurath said that he did not expect this question to lead to war; but he believed that the Government of Czechoslovakia must be brought to grant the Germans of Bohemia a wide degree of autonomy so that they could live their own lives in their own way. The Czechs must learn to be as reasonable as the Poles had been in their recent agreement with Germany in respect of the German minorities in Poland.

Neurath then said that on the whole he was more optimistic about the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between Germany and France than he was about the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between England and Germany. He had had only a brief talk with Halifax and it appeared that Halifax had brought no concrete proposals but had come to listen. He feared that the British were going to be extremely stiff-necked on the subject of the German colonies. So far as Germany was concerned, she felt she had a right only to demand the return of the colonies which had belonged to her before the war. If the British should wish to retain any of those colonies they were quite at liberty to make a deal with the Portuguese or the Belgians and give equally valuable Portuguese or Belgian colonies to Germany.

751.62 ✓  
741.62 ✓  
862.011 ✓

I asked Neurath to explain to me the position of Germany vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese conflict. He said that Germany desired just one thing, which was the most rapid end possible of the conflict. He feared that if the war should go on and Japan should become seriously weakened, the Soviet Union might

attack

793.04 ✓

893.00 ✓  
762.94 ✓  
723.94 ✓  
attack Japan successfully. He hoped that the Japanese would be content with the establishment of an autonomous régime in North China and that the Chinese would accept this solution. I asked him if Germany's relations with Japan were sufficiently close for the German Government to exercise any restraining influence on the Japanese Government. He said that they were not, and added that the Anti-Comintern Pact was a large facade behind which there was no building. He could assure me that there were no secret clauses attached to it. (Incidentally, Attolico, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, made exactly the same statement to me with regard to Italy's relations with Japan.).

813.00 Perinard ✓

1 57.62 ✓  
In conclusion, Neurath said to me, "Tell your French friends that we are quite ready to establish the best possible relations with them." He made it clear, however, that the German Government, so far as peace is concerned, intends to take no initiative.



MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBAS-  
SADOR BULLITT AND DOCTOR HJALMAR SCHACHT.

I had a conversation with Doctor Hjalmar Schacht which was not altogether without interest. Schacht began by saying that he regretted greatly that nothing had come of his two visits to Paris in the course of which he had attempted to establish the basis for a Franco-German rapprochement. He said that he had found Blum extremely reasonable with regard to the colonial question. He then went on to speak of the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe before the outbreak of war toward which the Continent was drifting. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he himself today was "completely without influence on that man," meaning Hitler. He seemed to regard himself as politically dead and to have small respect for "that man." He said that the one way he could see to peace was through direct negotiations between France and Germany. He did not believe that the conversations which Halifax was about to have with Hitler would lead to any considerable results. Hitler was furious with the British because he had made his one great gesture of political generosity toward the British and the British had not responded by any similar gesture. He had offered to limit the German fleet and the British had quietly pocketed this concession and

had

had then made none of the corresponding gestures toward Germany that Hitler had anticipated.

862.5 ✓  
Schacht said that in his opinion the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussions but through economic discussions. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as "filth." It was, therefore, possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathies and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military fields in which he was intensely interested.

862.5 ✓  
Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment, 762.62 ✓  
762.62 ✓  
he was not vitally concerned about the Polish corridor and in his (Schacht's) opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT  
AND GENERAL HERMANN GOERING

I said to General Goering as soon as I met him that I should be extremely glad to have his ideas on the prospects of peace and war in Europe and that I wished he would begin by telling me what he thought of Germany's relations with France.

75.1.62  
862.000  
Goering said that there was no direct conflict whatsoever today between Germany and France. Germany had given up entirely and forever the idea of regaining Alsace-Lorraine. Germany had learned through long experience that the people of Alsace and Lorraine would inevitably be against whichever of the two countries happened to have the sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine at the moment and would be permanently a source of discord within the country to which they were attached. Germany did not desire to have any half-loyal citizens and, therefore, had not the slightest desire for a return of Alsace-Lorraine to the German Reich.

In addition, the economic systems of France and Germany were completely complementary. It should be possible to develop to a much greater extent the exchange of all sorts of products between France and Germany.

Furthermore, the French had contributed so much to the culture of Germany and the Germans had contributed so much to the culture of France that as two civilized peoples who lived side by side they had a deep underlying

85.027.02



underlying esteem for each other. Furthermore, the French and the Germans respected each other as brave soldiers and courageous peoples who were ready to die for their respective countries. In addition, the French Government had indicated that it was prepared insofar as it was concerned, to return the German colonies which had been transferred to France by the Treaty of Versailles. There was, unfortunately, the proviso that France would only take this action if Great Britain were prepared to make a similar concession.

862.014 ✓

751.62 ✓ There was, therefore, no cause of discord whatsoever in the direct relations between France and Germany to prevent the closest sort of friendship between the two countries. So far as Germany was concerned, he could say with authority that Germany today was prepared to conclude at once an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

751.6211 ✓

The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities. If France, instead of accepting a collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.

I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied, "We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the

German

German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles."

I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, "There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli. (Goering used the Latin expression casus belli. It is not a translation from the German, in which our conversation was carried on.)

762.63

I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich.

762.62

I asked if the German Government might not be content if the Czech Government should accord to the  
Germans

Germans of Bohemia a large measure of local autonomy while keeping them under Czech sovereignty. Goering replied that such a concession on the part of the Czechoslovak Government would lead to a temporary appeasement of the situation; but the autonomy would have to be real autonomy and such a solution would not be a final solution. There could be no final solution but the inclusion of these Germans within the Reich.

I asked Goering how he viewed the case of the Germans in other portions of Europe; notably the Germans of Transylvania. He replied that these racial groups were cut off from the main body of the German people and could not, therefore, be joined to it. All that Germany would insist upon would be that they should be treated as equals with equal rights and be permitted to retain their cultural life. The situation of the Germans in Transylvania was extremely unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs had treated the Germans within their borders with such conspicuous intelligence and fairness that the leaders of the Germans of Yugoslavia had informed him recently that they had no real grievances and that they would resist to the utmost any arrangements in Europe which might envisage their return to Hungary.

862-4016

Goering then added that the only other two considerable German racial groups which would lie outside the borders of the German Reich, after the Germans of Austria and Bohemia had been included, would be the Germans of the South Tyrol who were now in the hands of Italy and the Germans in Poland. He did not feel that there was a sufficient number of Germans in Italy to warrant a major war for their attachment

to



to the Reich. Similarly the Germans of Poland would have to stay where they were because there were a considerable number of Poles in Germany and all that either Poland or Germany could expect would be that these minorities should be treated on each side of the border with the greatest human consideration.

Goering went on to say that the idea that Germany had any ambitions to annex the Ukraine was pure nonsense. I suggested that one of the reasons it was nonsense was that it would involve first the conquest of Poland and then the conquest of the whole of Central Europe before it could become realizable.

Goering replied that this was so and that in addition Germany had no desire to have territory in Europe except territory inhabited by Germans.

I thanked Goering for giving me such a clear expression of Germany's intentions with regard to the Continent and asked him if he would pass on to the colonial field.

Goering said that Germany's demands in the colonial field were well known. They were for a return of the German colonies which had been taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had no right to demand anything but these colonies. On the other hand, Germany had no desire to be stiff-necked about this matter. If England should not wish to return German East Africa or German Southwest Africa, for military and other reasons, Germany would make no objection if England could make an arrangement, financial or otherwise, with Portugal and Belgium for the

the

the giving to Germany of Portuguese and Belgian colonies in West Africa which would compensate Germany for the loss of her East African possessions. It was idle to say that Germany could not get raw materials of great value from African colonies; for example, the Cameroons. It was entirely true that today the Cameroons had been very little developed and were producing very little, but with German intelligence and energy applied to them, they could be made to produce materials of the greatest value to Germany. The same was true of many other areas in Africa which today were undeveloped or under-developed. The essential problem for Germany was to feed and maintain her people at a decent standard of living. It was entirely clear that with the increase of population in Germany the soil now in the hands of Germany would be insufficient to maintain this increasing German population. Before the war, when barriers to international trade had been low, it had been possible for Germany to maintain herself by her great international trade. Today barriers were so high that this would soon become impossible. He hoped that there might be a reduction of such barriers and that Germany could find increasing markets for her products but she could not feel safe unless she had a colonial domain which would give her access to her own raw materials. ✓ 50 86

611.62 ✓  
662.11 ✓

Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance 611.6231

which

644.62 ✓  
662.11 ✓

which was contrary to all reason. Indeed, Germany was almost isolated from the United States. There were certain countries with which Germany had good relations; and certain countries with which Germany had bad relations; but with the United States, Germany had no relations at all. He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States. 644.6231 ✓

I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There had been a democratic government in Germany, or at least the semblance of a democratic government, which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship. Any governing group which destroyed democracy to replace it by dictatorship would always be unpopular in the United States. Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. The reaction in America among Protestants, Catholics and Jews had, therefore, been natural, immediate, and intense.

Goering then protested, saying that he was informed that people in the United States believed that the National Socialist Government was attempting to set up a heathen church in Germany. I replied that this was so. He said that it was true that within the Nazi Government there was a small group of people who desired to see a return to the Norse gods, but he could assure me that this movement was completely without importance and did not include more than one percent of the Nazi Party. So far as he, himself, was concerned, he was

644.6231 ✓



a Protestant and still attended church services. He had been to church recently on the occasion of the confirmation of his nephew. He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural, but that it was not only the Jews but all Americans who were shocked and horrified by the treatment of the Jews in Germany and that the attacks on the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church and on democracy and human freedom were factors of equal importance.

I then added that there was an additional element which was playing a certain role at the moment. It appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group or other group directed by any foreign country. We could not permit Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or any other dictator to organize groups of agents in the United States. If we should do so, we would soon cease to be a nation and become a mere battleground for the conflicting ambitions of foreign dictators.

Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable and if he were an American would certainly not tolerate the slightest interference by any foreign agency in the life of the United States. The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. He believed that I would find that such groups were formed by American citizens of German origin. I replied that I felt quite certain

that

711.62 ✓  
that such groups would not be formed without the approval and desire of the German Government. Goering then said: "It is true that certain persons in our Government here believe that we should attempt to organize the Germans, especially of the Middle West, because they feel that if Germany should again become involved in war with France and England, there would come a moment when the United States might again consider entering such a war against Germany and they believe that such groups of organized Germans in the United States might throw their influence decisively against a declaration of war and might prevent the United States entering such a conflict.

I then said that I could merely remind him of two things: The first, that the organization of German groups in the United States during the late war had aroused hostility throughout the entire country against Germany. The second, a conversation which had taken place during the World War between our Ambassador to Germany, Mr. James Gerard and Zimmerman, who was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Reich at that time. Zimmerman had stated to Gerard that the United States could not enter the war because there were five million Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action. Mr. Gerard had replied that if there were five million Germans in the United States, there were five million and one lamp posts. Goering did not seem to get the point with absolute clarity. I, therefore, added, "and you will understand

understand that, if, as you have said, there are six million Germans in the United States today, who could be organized to influence the action of the United States Government, there are a great many more than six million tree limbs on which to hang them." 711.62

Goering seemed to find this remark entirely reasonable and in a more friendly and intimate tone asked, "What then can we do to improve our relations with the United States?" I replied that he had an excellent ambassador in Washington at the moment who could doubtless inform him better than I could on this subject.

✓ 594-20  
761.94  
I then asked Goering for his views with regard to the Far East. He said that he believed the Japanese would win the war and succeed in imposing on China precisely what they should desire to impose. I asked Goering if he knew precisely what that was. He said that he believed that the Japanese aim was to organize the Northern Provinces of China thoroughly as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union, since it was obvious that Japan would be compelled to attack the Soviet Union owing to the geographical position of Vladivostok. The Japanese desired to have Central and South China in relative chaos and impotence until they had finished with the Soviet Union.

At this point, Goering asked me why the United States had begun to build battleships for the Soviet Union. I replied that I had no information to the effect that the American Government was building battleships for the Soviet Union and I considered such a report highly improbable.



improbable. Goering said that his information indeed was rather vague on this point.

✓ 861.20  
852.00  
I asked him what his views were with regard to the Soviet Union at the present time. He said that in his opinion the Red Army on the European frontier had ceased to be a serious fighting force if indeed it had ever been one. He said that the reports of the prowess of Soviet aviation in Spain were extraordinarily misleading. German officers in Spain had analyzed in detail the débris of all Soviet planes that had been shot down behind Franco's lines. They had discovered that every Soviet plane which had flown with conspicuous success in Spain had been of American manufacture. I asked him if he meant manufactured in Russia on American models. He replied in the negative, and said that the Russians had actually sent to Spain not planes manufactured in Russia on American models but planes every part of which had been manufactured in America. That explained the excellent performance of those particular planes. All his information was to the effect that planes actually manufactured in Russia copying American models were of such inferior workmanship that they could not compare with planes actually built in America. Furthermore, this was true with regard to all Soviet industrial products. They might turn out five thousand tractors in a year but it was extremely improbable that a single one of those tractors would be running two years after it had been put in use. Furthermore, the service of supply of the Russian Army today was in as lamentable condition

✓ 861.20  
861.208  
✓ 861.208

as

as it had been in the time of the Czar. In the time of the Czar the Russian Armies at the front were frequently without food or munitions. The service of supply then had been controlled largely by Jews. It was still controlled largely by Jews and, if the Soviet Union should attempt to make war on the European frontier, he would expect a complete collapse of the Soviet Armies because of bad organization. He did not think that today there was the faintest chance of the Soviet Union attempting any offensive operations on the European frontier.

Goering said that he believed the Soviet Army in the Far East was better organized than the Soviet Army on the European frontier; but he felt confident that in spite of the increasing weakness of Japan, the Soviet Union would not dare to intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He then said that the Japanese Army had shown itself to be considerably weaker than expected and that the Chinese, with totally inadequate weapons, had made a very fine defense due in part, he felt, to the presence of German staff officers with the Chinese armies.

Goering then said that he was surprised to learn that the United States was building battleships which could not possibly pass through the Panama Canal. I replied that I believed his statement was entirely erroneous. He said that he could not admit this; that his information was positive. The newest American battleships could not possibly go through the Panama Canal. I told him that we would have to disagree

disagree on this point. He then said that no matter whether we could put our new battleships through the Canal or not, we could do nothing in the Far East to interfere in any way with Japan.

I was indiscreet enough to remark that the combined American and British fleets might be powerful enough to do something although neither Great Britain nor the United States had any desire for any conflict with Japan. Goering replied, "You know that the British Fleet can not operate anywhere at the present time. It is completely pinned down by ourselves in the North Sea and by the Italians in the Mediterranean."

7/11.62 ✓  
Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States and on this note, pleasantly, our conversation ended.



# TELEGRAM RECEIVED



JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased, before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM 17 51 19 5 300 728  
Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 7:25 a.m., 2nd.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



1886, December 1, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY, MR. WILSON

I had a long talk this evening with Leger, (\*)  
impressions of the conversations in London I consider  
valuable, as his knowledge of English is perfect and he  
was able to catch nuances which necessarily escaped  
Delbos and Chautemps. He was even happier than Delbos,  
as the conclusions reached in London represent the  
triumph of his personal policy.

Leger said that Halifax had merely reported on his  
conversation with Hitler and left the room, taking no  
part in the general political discussions. Halifax had  
appeared direct, simple, honest and naive, and it had  
been evident that his inability to talk to any of the  
Germans except through an interpreter had rendered his  
conversations entirely superficial.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

W.C.G.

(\*) Apparent omission

741.62/206

DEC 3 - 1937

FILED

Confidential File

S

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Paris  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated **FROM** Dated December 1, 1937  
to anyone. (D)

Rec'd 9:50 a.m., 2nd.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1686, December 1, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

*sent  
841.002*

Leger added that he had watched Chamberlain and Eden most closely throughout the two days that he had spent with them and by a hundred small indications was convinced that they were extremely close friends and that Chamberlain was in complete agreement with Eden's point of view. The opposition to Eden in the British Cabinet was, he believed, confined to Hoare and Simon. He thought that Hoare and Simon had done their utmost to persuade Chamberlain to support their point of view which was that Germany should be given a free hand in Central Europe and a colonial domain at the expense of other countries than England. He believed that Chamberlain had weighed this line of policy with extreme care but had decided definitely against it. The entire German maneuver of the past two years which was based on the assumption that it might be possible to separate England and France had therefore been defeated.

Leger

741.62/206

FP

-2- #1686, December 1, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

Leger went on to say that it was of the utmost importance that the British Government had authorized Delbos to say on his trip through Eastern and Central Europe that the British Government was as interested as the French Government in the problems of that portion of the world.

I asked Leger if this meant the British Government had promised that if France should have to go to war because of her alliance with Czechoslovakia Great Britain would go to war also. Leger said that neither he nor Chautemps nor Delbos had been so indiscreet as to put this question to the British in concrete form. They all knew how deeply the British disliked having to answer hypothetical questions with regard to future action. They had left London, however, convinced that they could count on Great Britain under reasonable circumstances. This obviously strengthened the hands of France immensely in Central and Eastern Europe.

I asked Leger how he envisaged the future. He said that he believed that for a considerable period there would be no serious discussions between the French and British on the one hand and the Germans on the other.

BULLITT

CSB



S

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 12:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1686, December 2, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

751.62  
The French Government had positive information  
that the leaders of the Reichswehr had assured Hitler  
recently that war against France today would be national  
suicide, basing their conclusion on the fact that Germany  
could hope to be successful only in a brief war and that  
France was too strong today to be overcome by a brief  
attack.

862.20  
862.248  
(Leger went on to say that the German army was  
extremely deficient in trained personnel of certain sorts.  
Germany's greatest strength today lay (\*) her air force  
and her airplanes. The latest French figures indicated  
that last month Germany had produced 325 first rate  
fighting planes. Chamberlain's latest information indicated  
that this figure might be below the truth and that the  
production of planes might now be 400 a month. The British  
last month had produced 300 planes of the highest quality.  
Leger said he was not certain that this could be maintained  
as an average but at any rate this figure had been achieved  
last

741.62/206

Confidential File

FP

-2- #1686, December 2, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris.

last month. The French production of planes was somewhat less than fifty a month but the productive capacity of the French factories was much greater than this and more were not being produced simply because the General Staff had not asked for them. The French General Staff had (of?) regarded the role to the airplane in war as important but not of overwhelming importance. He could tell me very confidentially however, that it had just been decided to (French?) increase greatly the production of France planes and he believed that the rate of production would surprise many people).

Since Hitler would not dare to risk war at the present time he would have to accept the failure of his hopes of acquiring domination in Central Europe and colonies without reacting in any violent manner. Leger said that he was absolutely certain that Hitler would not reply to the French-British agreement in London by aggression against either Austria or Czechoslovakia. He felt that, on the contrary, Germany would wait and leave open the possibility of choosing either peace or war.

BULLITT

KLP:CSB

(\*) Apparent omission.

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

IMS

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Paris  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (D)

FROM Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p. m., 2nd

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DEC 3-1937

NOTED

1686, December 1, 10 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)

I asked Leger if he did not feel that it was essential in order that Austria should continue to have an independent existence that there should be a rapprochement between France and Italy and agreement between them to defend the independence of Austria. Leger said that he believed this was so but that at the present time it was totally impossible to envisage serious conversations with Italy. It had been decided in London by the French and the British that they should treat Mussolini as a sort of minor parasite. It had been agreed that his word was not to be trusted on any subject and that it was quite useless to come to any understanding with him because no promise of his was worth having. Mussolini's screams through his press and radio against France and England today were the greatest evidence of his weakness and the defeat of his whole diplomatic program.

The French Government now had positive information as to the reasons which led Mussolini to the policy of giving

Confidential File

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LMS 2-No. 1686, Dec. 1, 10 p. m. (Sec. 4) from Paris.

giving Germany a free hand in Central Europe and conducting his war in Spain. Mussolini had been convinced when Blum had first come into power that France was about to disintegrate into Bolshevism. The opportunity had seemed to him superb to use the war in Spain to provoke a conflict at a time when France was extremely weak. Hitler had also been convinced that France was about to disintegrate into Bolshevism and had considered the moment equally propitious. Mussolini had carried the burden of the Spanish war and had given Hitler his permission to advance in Central Europe on the return promise from Hitler that, if events should come to war and if Germany and Italy should be victorious, Mussolini could have Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco, to say nothing of Syria and could thus recreate the Roman Empire of his dreams.

When the Germans had become convinced that France was not about to disintegrate, they had lost all enthusiasm for war with France, hence for the war in Spain, and had left Mussolini to spend his money, men and supplies in Spain without the slightest chance of acquiring the colonial domain in the Mediterranean to which he looked forward. Mussolini was also obsessed by the idea that as soon as the British should have become strong enough they would  
destroy

IMS 3-No. 1686, Dec. 1, 10 p. m. (Sec. 4) from Paris.

destroy him because he had humiliated them in the  
Ethiopian affair. This was a portion of his megalomania.  
It was quite impossible for him to believe that the  
British really did not care whether a country as unim-  
portant as Italy had Ethiopia or not. The British now  
agreed with the French that the entire problem was the  
problem of relations with Germany and that Mussolini  
must be regarded as a mere pestiferous louse.

BULLITT

KLP

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Paris  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (D)

FROM Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m., 2nd

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1686, December 1, 10 p. m. (SECTION FIVE)

The final comedy of Mussolini's present position was that seeing that he was not going to get the colonial domain in North Africa which he had anticipated he was now beginning to try to welsh on the free hand that he had given Hitler in Central Europe. The Italian diplomats in all five of the Danubian countries for the past two weeks had been urging violently that the five Danubian countries should unite to stand together against German pressure. This was of course the policy which France had advocated consistently for many years and the policy which Mussolini had fought always. The French would be very glad to support Mussolini's efforts in this direction but unfortunately had little hope that even the joint efforts of themselves and the Italians could bring about a reconciliation and unity in the Danubian basin.

LEGER

741.62/206

Confidential File

FP



LMS 2-No. 1686, December 1, 10 p. m., Sec. 5, from Paris.

Leger added that there was one point to which he would like to call my attention which had been misrepresented in the press. It had been made to appear that the French and British were about to say to the Germans that if they would give certain assurances which might make it appear that there was to be peace in Europe, France and England would make concessions to them in the colonial field. This was not true. All that the French and British had agreed was that they would study the colonial problem to see if it might be feasible to do something. He thought that it would take the British an exceedingly long time to study the problem of colonies. Moreover, the British and French would do nothing unless Germany should be prepared to come into a general settlement which would involve among other things limitation of armaments. He did not believe that the Germans would be prepared to make any such settlement. He did not anticipate, therefore, any negotiations for a very extended period.

I again expressed my apprehension that Germany was not likely to sit quiet and wait for England to build up an overwhelming armament. Leger reiterated his conviction, which he said was shared by all those who had participated in the

LMS 3-No. 1686, December 1, 10 p. m., Sec. 5, from Paris.


in the conference in London, that Germany at the moment  
would not dare to do anything.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

GW:JWC

# TELEGRAM



LMS

1-1236

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated December 16, 1937

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



1737, December 16, 11 a. m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Yesterday Leger gave me the following account of

Delbos' visits to Berlin, Warsaw, Bucharest and Belgrade.

The Germans had been intensely disappointed by the attitude which Chamberlain had taken in the conversations in London with Chautemps and Delbos. The German disappointment had manifested itself inter alia in a conversation which Neurath had had with Poncet on the eve of Delbos' arrival in Berlin. Neurath had gone so far as to say that Germany would positively make no concession whatsoever with regard to peace in Europe in order to obtain her colonies, and when Poncet had asked if Germany meant to regain her colonies under threat of force, Neurath replied "perhaps".

It was Delbos' impression that Neurath's gesture in coming to the railroad station in Berlin to meet him



DEC 23 1937

FILED

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LMS 2-No. 1737, December 16, 11 a. m., Sec. 1, from  
Paris.

him had been made because Neurath had feared that he had gone too far in his conversation with Poncet and had desired to rectify somewhat the effects of his intemperate remarks to Poncet. Neurath had proposed to Delbos that the French and German Governments should do everything that they could to improve the tone of the press on both sides of the frontier, and to stop other verbal attacks by citizens of one country on the other. Delbos had indicated that he felt this was highly desirable and this subject was now being taken up seriously.

7-62 Leger added that although Hitler in his conversations with Halifax had alluded to his willingness to agree to the elimination of bombing in the air, Germany had made no formal proposition with regard to this question and Hitler's remark had not been followed up by either Great Britain or France.

BULLITT

NPL:CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

Dated December 16, 1937

Rec'd 3:03 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1737, December 16, 11 a. m. (SECTION THREE)

Leger said that Delbos' task in Praha was a delicate one but not unpleasant. The British Government had asked Delbos to say in Praha that if the Czechoslovak Government should desire to make some gesture of appeasement toward the German minority in Bohemia the British Government would be glad to make joint representations with the French Government in Berlin requesting the German Government to place its relations with Czechoslovakia on a more amicable basis. Delbos therefore today in Praha would say to Benes that while the initiative was entirely in the hands of the Czechoslovak Government an opportunity was presented of interesting Great Britain to a greater degree than ever before in the fate of Czechoslovakia.

An additional bit of information reached the Quai d'Orsay yesterday which Leger considered important. Flandin, former Prime Minister, had had a conversation with Goering which seemed to indicate that the British declaration

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DEC 23 1937

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LMS 2-No. 1737, December 16, 11 a. m., Sec. 3, from  
Paris.

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declaration of interest in the fate of Czechoslovakia  
had made the Germans consider that any kind of move  
against Czechoslovakia at the moment was too dangerous.  
Goerring had indicated however that Germany might act  
soon against Austria. The French Government was con-  
vinced that Mussolini had definitely washed his hands  
of responsibility for Austria. Neither the French  
nor the British was committed to a policy of maintain-  
ing Austria's independence at all costs. The Germans  
knew this and some sort of a drive against Austrian  
independence seemed a possibility in the near future.

BULLITT

CSB



DIVISION  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 29 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

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PARIS

FROM Dated December 23, 1937

Rec'd 7:29 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 27 1937  
NOTED

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. DUNN  
DEC 28 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1771, December 23, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

I had brief conversations today with Delbos and Chautemps. Both expressed themselves as pleased by the results of Delbos' trip but added little to the information already conveyed to the Department in my number 1737, December 16, 11 a.m.

Delbos said that he had stated to Neurath that France would be glad to enter into conversations immediately for the "humanization of warfare," notably the elimination of bombing. Neurath had said that in principle the German Government also favored this. There had been no further conversations on this subject.

Delbos stated that his conversations in Poland had been most satisfactory from the point of view of the Franco-Polish alliance. There was now the fullest and most cordial cooperation between the French and Polish general staffs. He hoped that he has been able to do something to ameliorate relations between Poland and (point?) Czechoslovakia but could not pointed to any specific progress.

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Confidential File

DEC 30 1937

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PAID  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 27 1937  
MR. WILSON

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From Paris #1771.

progress.

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With regard to Rumania, Delbos said that the situation was still somewhat obscure as the results of the elections were not known definitely. In any event he felt certain that the King would continue to dominate the situation. He added that the King had been most profuse in his expressions of friendship for France and in his promises of / <sup>future</sup> collaboration.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

NPL EMB

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closely paraphrased be-  
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to anyone (D)

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PARIS

Dated December 23, 1937

Rec'd 7 p.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

1771, December 23, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

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Delbos stated that while he was in Bucharest the Italian Minister to Bucharest had come to see him on orders from Mussolini and had requested him to use the influence of France to persuade Rumania to collaborate with Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in steps to produce economic and financial cooperation between all the Danubian countries. He said that he had a very slight hope that some progress might be made along this line. The only point of agreement between France and Italy at the moment was their mutual desire to see a Danubian bloc built up to resist German pressure. Mussolini was behaving in such a wild manner, however, insulting France daily through his press and radio, that it was extremely difficult for France to cooperate with him. The French asked nothing better than good relations with Italy, but could not get on their knees to Mussolini in order to obtain good relations.

I then asked if it were true that St. Quentin would be sent to Washington instead of Rome. Delbos said that

he

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Confidential File



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Paris #1771, Sec two.

he was not yet certain, as any such alteration in St. Quentin's destination must be handled delicately in order not to give Mussolini a pretext for saying that France in this way was breaking all bridges with Italy. For obvious reasons I did not follow up my casual question but gathered the impression that St. Quentin probably will be appointed Ambassador to Washington.

BULLITT

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EMB.

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

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PARIS

Dated December 23, 1937

Rec'd 7:21 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

1771, December 23, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Delbos said that on his way through Budapest at 6 o'clock in the morning the Secretary General of the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had come to see him at the train and had said that the Hungarian Government was intensely desirous of pushing the project for a Danubian economic and financial bloc. He had also had messages from Schuschnigg indicating Austria's desire for such a bloc. Benes of course favored it.

Delbos repeated that Prince Paul of Yugoslavia had given him the most categorical assurances that Yugoslavia would march with France in case of war and asserted that Stoyadinovitch had expressed himself in the same sense.

With regard to his visit to Czechoslovakia Delbos said that he had been successful in persuading Benes to make certain small concessions to the Germans of Bohemia. They would be given an increased number of German schools and in future all officials appointed to the German sections of Bohemia would be men who spoke German. He

hoped

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From Paris, #1771, Sec Three.

hoped that these concessions on the part of the Czechs would be sufficient to enable the British to make the demarche referred to in my 1737, December 16, 11 a.m.

BULLITT

NPL EMB



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# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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municated to anyone (D) FROM

PARIS

Dated December 23, 1937

Rec'd 8:58 p.m.

DEC 29 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

1771, December 23, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

751.62

In general Delbos said that he was well satisfied by the results of his trip. He had been able to ascertain by personal contact that the Little Entente and Poland (WERE?) well determined to continue to occupy their positions within the orb of French policy. He had found the Germans not unpleasant, and while he could see no prospect of any serious negotiations in the immediate future with Germany, the visit of Comert, Chief of the Press Section of the French Foreign Office, to Berlin had resulted in an agreement that journalists on both sides of the frontier should not be ejected except after three preliminary warnings and that the two governments should do what they could to improve the tone of the press vis a vis each other.

743.94

I spoke to both Chautemps and Delbos with regard to the situation in the Far East. They both said that France, unfortunately could do virtually nothing in the Far East and I gathered the Distinct impression that they are both

much

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Confidential File

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From Paris, #1771, Sec Four.

much opposed to any military action by England in the Far East, fearing that the sending of a British fleet to the Far East would leave France in a relatively defenseless position vis a vis Germany and Italy. Delbos denied categorically that the British Government had asked the French Government to takeover defense of British interests in the Medeterranean.

I gathered from both Chauteamps and Delbos that the attitude of France toward the conflict in the Far East remains as reported in my number 1732, of December 15, 11 a.m.

BULLITT

NPL RGC

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated December 23, 1937

Rec'd 7:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

1771, December 23, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

In commenting on the general situation Delbos said that the great difficulty was that Great Britain's interests in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Far East could not be defended at one and the same time by the force now at the disposal of the British Government. The engagement of that force in any one of the three areas might lead to fatal attack in one of the other. The British were still paralyzed, and without the British, the French could not act. In the immediate future he feared two things. First, a German movement against Austria, which would meet with little resistance either within Austria or from outside powers. Second, an Italian reinforcement of Franco on a great scale. He had no constructive plans for the future but felt compelled to follow a policy of wait and see.

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Chautemps said that he was considerably disturbed by the internal situation. He had used the police to eject some sitdown strikers and as a result he had on  
his

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G-J Confidential File



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From Paris #1771. Sec Five.

his hands a large and increasing number of sitdown strikes. He intended to continue to use a firm hand and felt that while there might be considerable trouble in the immediate future his Government was not in anyway menaced.

*451667-8 same info*

I also participated in a conversation between Chautemps and Caillaux on the subject of the reopening of the exposition. Chautemps did his utmost to persuade Caillaux to permit the exposition to reopen and Caillaux remained adamant in his opposition. Chautemps said to me that he was certain that he would get the bill for the reopening of the exposition through the Chamber of Deputies but feared that Caillaux would have enough influence to kill it in the Senate. (END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

E'B MPL