Communications from France

Telegram No. 74, January 14, 1938, (793.94/12089)
Telegram No. 125, January 24, 1938, (740.00/275)
Telegram No. 194, February 4, 1938, (862.00/3722)
Telegram No. 214, February 9, 1938, (762.00/159)
Telegram No. 240, February 15, 1938, (762.63/429)
Telegram No. 241, February 15, 1938, (762.63/430)
Despatch No. 1819, February 16, 1938, (762.63/518)
Telegram No. 249, February 16, 1938, (762.63/437)
Telegram No. 255, February 16, 1938, (762.63/438)
Telegram No. 261, February 17, 1938, (762.63/443)
Telegram No. 269, February 18, 1938, (740.00/298)
Despatch No. 1821, February 26, 1938, (760F.62/133)
Telegram No. 374, March 11, 1938, (762.63/519)
Telegram No. 418, March 16, 1938, (852.00/7512)
Telegram No. 420, March 17, 1938, (760F.62/148)
Telegram No. 445, March 23, 1938, (852.00/7586)
Telegram No. 481, March 28, 1938, (760F.62/182)
Telegram No. 677, April 30, 1938, (741.51/279)
Telegram No. 728, May 7, 1938, (751.65/395)
Telegram No. 745, May 11, 1938, (760F.62/248)
Despatch No. 2242, May 11, 1938, (761.94/1045)
Telegram No. 777, May 17, 1938, (760F.62/265)
Telegram No. 807, May 21, 1938, (760F.62/277)
Telegram No. 808, May 21, 1938, (760F.62/278)
Telegram No. 809, May 22, 1938, (760F.62/279)
Telegram No. 810, May 22, 1938, (760F.62/280)
Communications from France

Telegram No. 811, May 22, 1938, (760F.62/281)
Telegram No. 850, May 30, 1938, (760F.62/369)
Telegram No. 899, June 8, 1938, (760F.62/401)
Telegram No. 934, June 14, 1938, (760F.62/417)
Telegram No. 987, June 23, 1938, (760F.62/442)
Telegram No. 1076, July 7, 1938, (760F.62/464)
Despatch No. 2573, July 8, 1938, (760F.62/486)
Telegram No. 1125, July 18, 1938, (760F.62/482)
Telegram No. 1146, July 22, 1938, (741.51/297)
Telegram No. 1156, July 25, 1938, (760F.62/508)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

74, January 14, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Blum remarked to me last night that Litvinov had said to Delbos, and Souritz, Soviet Ambassador in Paris, had repeated to Delbos, that Litvinov had stated definitely to Norman Davis in Brussels that if the United States should become involved in war with Japan, the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan at once. I replied that I felt certain that Litvinov had never made such a statement to Norman Davis.

I should be obliged if the Department would let me know if Litvinov ever made such a statement to Davis.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Read 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

125, January 24, 2 p.m.

SECRET OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

In the course of a conversation this morning Delbos said to me that Eden would arrive in Paris tomorrow afternoon in time to have a comprehensive conversation before departure for Geneva tomorrow evening.

The British and French Governments were agreed that they should do everything possible to prevent any attempt by the smaller nations to eliminate Article 16 from the Covenant at the Geneva meeting this week. He said that neither he nor Eden was sure, however, that they could prevent the smaller nations from bringing up the question. If it should be brought up England and France were determined to have consideration of it adjourned.

He would also discuss with Eden the question of the recognition of the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. The French Government was opposed to such recognition at the present time. There was a dispute with regard to this question in the British Cabinet. He could tell me very privately
-2- 3125, January 24, 2 p.m. from Paris

privately and confidentially that Chamberlain favored recognition and Eden was opposed to it. They were both supported by strong elements in the Cabinet and he had received very privately a word from Eden that the British Government had decided to be guided for the moment in this matter by the position of the French Government and that he Eden would welcome greatly a decided negative from the French Government.

(End Section One)

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated January 24, 1938
Rec'd 3:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

125, January 24, 2 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Delbos said that the French Government were carrying on no negotiations whatsoever with the Italian Government looking toward a rapprochement but that the British Government was engaged in feeling out the ground as usual.

Delbos said that he had prepared the speech referred to in my 56 of January 12, 7 p. m., holding out a hand to Germany. The Government crisis had prevented its delivery and he would be unable to deliver it until after his return from Geneva. He and Chautemps were however still determined to go ahead on this line in spite of the objections of the French Communists.

The French Communists, Delbos said, had indicated to Chautemps that they were opposed to his retaining the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs because he favored the policy of rapprochement with Germany and he, Delbos, had offered to withdraw from the new governmental combination. He said that Chautemps, however, was absolutely determined
LMS 2-No. 125, January 24, 2 p.m., Sec. 2, from Paris.

determined to go ahead on this line and drive the Communists into bitter opposition if necessary.

Delbos said that news from Austria was bad and he was apprehensive that Germany might make some sort of a move against Austria in the near future. With the Rumanian Government following its present line a German annexation of Austria would make the situation in Central and Eastern Europe tragic; Czechoslovakia would be completely isolated.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

Paris

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM Dated February 4, 1938. Rec'd 3:05 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

194, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The only explanation that Delbos had of the resignation of Blomberg is on all fours with current newspaper reports. He stated, however, that in case Reichenau should replace Blomberg he would be most comprehensive with regard to an early move against Austria.

In this connection I venture to report from certain information which we have just received from a member of the Austrian Legation in Paris who is reputed to be closest to Schusnigg: he states that that there are serious reasons to fear a German move against Austria this spring, perhaps even next month. This official has heretofore in conversation with us been confident of Austria's ability to defend her independence but now his attitude has completely changed and he is pessimistic in the extreme.
He states that in addition to such motives as racial unity, et cetera, which have influenced Germany in the past to work for the incorporation of Austria into the Reich there are now important economic reasons. A few weeks ago the Austrian Government, dissatisfied at the way commercial exchanges with Germany were building up a mass of frozen marks in Germany, reduced by 60% Austrian exports of iron ore and wood to Germany. Goering has recently let it be known that continued deliveries of these commodities are essential to the four year plan and that if by spring Austria has not resumed them in full Germany will take steps to assure that she gets them.

BULLITT

KLP:C3B
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

24, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Austria could, of course, agree to resume these deliveries but our informant thinks that Schusnigg, having taken a firm position in this matter, may feel that rather than yield to German pressure he would do better to step out. This would mean a new government including probably Nazi sympathizers. If Austria stands firm against this German pressure then what is feared is not so much an attempt from the inside by Austrian Nazis but a move of 8,000 troops across the frontier with support by the German Government if there should not be immediate reaction from France and Great Britain.

What is thoroughly discouraging to the Austrian Government is the lack of interest shown by the British and French Governments in doing anything to aid Austria to resist Germany. All that would be necessary would be an expression of interest at Berlin in continued Austrian independence, but Great Britain does not wish to do anything that might offend the Germans thereby prejudicing the chances of reaching an understanding with them and the French will do nothing without the British.

BULLITT

SMS NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

194, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Mussolini wants to support the independence of Austria but cannot afford to part company with Germany. Mussolini had made repeated efforts to begin conversations with Great Britain for a settlement of their differences but had received no encouragement. He was now thoroughly alarmed about British intentions vis-a-vis Italy and felt that he must cling to Germany.

Among the principal causes of the present tension in Germany between the Reichswehr and the party has been, according to our informant, the difference of opinion regarding policy towards Austria. The Reichswehr with Von Blomberg favored a conciliatory policy with the maintenance of at least a facade of Austrian independence. The party, however, was impatient and wanted immediate action. If Von Blomberg's retirement should be followed by that of Von Fritsch, the appointment of the new chief-of-staff to succeed the latter may have great significance as revealing future German policy towards Austria. If Von Reichenschau, an extremist, is appointed it will mean, according to our Austrian friend, that a move against Austria is not far in the offing.

BULLITT

SMS NPL
Secretary of State, Washington.

1941, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

In discussing today the question of German purchases of iron ore with Bonnet and Alphand, Director of Commercial Accords, I was informed that the German Government had notified the French Government two days ago that it would make no iron ore purchases in France during the month of February. Both Bonnet and Alphand stated that this would mean the immediate unemployment of 20,000 French workmen. Bonnet therefore had ordered Alphand to go to Berlin tomorrow to attempt to persuade the Germans to continue the regular orders of iron ore during the month of February.

Both Bonnet and Alphand stated that they believed that the Germans had announced their intention of making no purchases of French iron ore during February because they had no money with which to pay for this ore. Bonnet said that his information indicated that the Germans expected to receive all the iron ore they needed during the month of February from Sweden on credit and he expected the Germans to resume their purchase of iron ore from France in the month of March.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1938

FROM

Paris

Dated February 9, 1938.

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

214, February 9, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

CONFIDENTIAL. The German Ambassador, who has just returned from Berlin, made a number of statements to me last night which may possibly be of interest to the Department.

He said that in spite of his own antipathy to the Nazis, which was well known, he was delighted by the appointment of Ribbentrop as Minister for Foreign Affairs. For the past two years he had been attempting to persuade Nehrath to introduce Nazis into the Foreign Office. Nehrath had refused. As a result the Nazis had acquired a complete distrust of German career diplomats and had built up their own Foreign Office under Ribbentrop. He believed that Ribbentrop would soon discover that the career men in the portfolios and the field were much able and more devoted to the interests of Germany than his former associates and that he would soon fall under their influence.
The German Ambassador added that he expected no spectacular development in German foreign policy. He pointed out that whereas in the past Hitler had made his large decisions in foreign policy on the advice of whatever old Nazi comrade happened to be visiting him at Berchtesgaden, he would in future make such decisions after consultation with the new Privy Council under Neurath which contained in addition to Neurath four other men who were entirely reasonable and devoted to the idea of working out the problems of Europe peacefully: Keitel, Brauchitsch, Admiral Raeder and Lammoers.

BULLITT

RR

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

Dated February 9, 1938

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

214, February 9, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Welczek added that he knew intimately Keitel and Brauchitsch, and that they represented together with Beck the finest intelligence and the greatest moderation to be found in the Reichswehr.

Welczek said he was convinced that the year 1938 would be a year of peace. He did not consider it possible to achieve any real rapprochement between France and Germany, however, until the Spanish conflict should have been settled.

Welczek stated that the proposals of Van Zeeland were being taken most seriously in Berlin. I had no opportunity to pursue this question further.

Delbos two days ago stated to me that Welczek, in conversation with him, had expressed himself in terms on all fours with those he used in talking with me last night.

Both Chaumont and Delbos who in the past have considered Welczek timid, and ill-informed said that they now considered...
-2- #214, February 9, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

considered him well informed and an excellent Ambassador who spoke with authority. Inasmuch as Welczek represents the old Imperial diplomatic group it appears that unless he is entirely deceived the recent changes in Germany may produce no very spectacular changes in foreign policy.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

KLP:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

E18A
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PARIS
FROM: Dated February 15, 1938

Secretary of State
Washington

240, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

I have just discussed with Léger the situation created by Schuschnigg’s visit to Berchtesgaden.

Léger said that Schuschnigg had informed the French Minister in Vienna very privately and confidentially that he had been received with the utmost brutality. Hitler had had three generals including Reichenaü standing behind him throughout the conversation and had made the following four demands: (one) that the Austrian Government should declare an amnesty for all Nazis and permit those now in Germany to return to Austria; (two) that those Nazis who had been deprived of their pensions and positions because of their political affiliations should be restored to their pensions and positions; (three) that Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Minister of the Interior and given control of the entire Austrian police force; (four) that Austria should agree to take no action with regard to foreign affairs without previous consultation with the German Government.

Léger
EDA - 2 - #240, February 15, 3 p.m. from Paris Section 1.

Leger went on to say that Schuschnigg had returned to Vienna intensely depressed and that Guido Schmidt was doing his best to persuade Schuschnigg to accept these demands of Germany.

Leger made the obvious comment that the acceptance of these demands would mean the end of Austrian independence.
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON,

240, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I asked if the French Government had taken any action in Vienna or given Schuschnigg definite advice. Leger replied that there had been no formal contact whatsoever between Schuschnigg and the French Minister since the former's visit to Berchtesgaden. The information which Schuschnigg had given the French Minister had been given most privately and Schuschnigg had not asked for advice nor had any been given him.

Leger went on to say that he did not know whether or not the French Government would decide to urge Schuschnigg to reject these demands. The question would have to be decided by Chautemps and Delbos after consultation with Chamberlain and Eden. The decision would in his opinion rest on the interpretation of recent events in Germany.

A message had been received from Francois Poncet giving what he, Leger, believed to be an accurate account of the genesis of the Berchtesgaden visit. Hitler's old Nazi friends had been urging him to give up the idea that he could acquire Austria by peaceful evolutions and to turn to the method of force. Hitler was most loath to use force because the generals of the Reichswehr had convinced him that the
army would not be in condition to fight a major war against France and England for approximately another year. Hitler therefore had wished to make a last attempt to gain his objective by overwhelming Schuschnigg's will to resist.

BULLITT

EMB NPL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

240, February 15, 1938 (SECTION THREE)

He had had the three generals present in order to make it clear to Schuschnigg that if necessary there would be force behind his words.

An additional reason for Hitler's reluctance to use force or threat of force was the fact that during the present period of preparation of the German army he wished to avoid any act which might produce a strong government of national defense in France and an intensification of British war preparations and incidentally an increase in American hostility to Germany.

Leger went on to say that both he and Francois Poncet were entirely convinced that if Schuschnigg should accept the first two demands of Hitler but reject the final two demands Hitler would not dare to use force, He would employ every means short of mobilization to make life uncomfortable and impossible for the Austrian Government but would not mobilize. Leger said that he was not sure that Chautemps and Delbos would agree with him in this diagnosis. It was possible to believe that Hitler would mobilize three or four divisions on the Austrian frontier and that Schuschnigg would be forced to give way at a moment of great European crisis.

BULLITT

EMB NPL
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM Paris
Dated February 15, 1938
Rec'd 3:01 p.m.

240, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

If one adopted the latter interpretation, it would obviously be less dangerous to have Schuschnigg submit now rather than later. Leger said that there were indications that the latter interpretation might be the interpretation of the British Government. In that case France would do nothing.

Schuschnigg would have to be assured of at least moral support from France and England and perhaps also Italy in order to be in a position to resist.

Leger said that the French and British Governments would discuss the problem this morning. He added that Hitler had not delivered an ultimatum with a time limit to Schuschnigg and he believed that Schuschnigg would attempt to gain time by standing on his dignity for a brief space.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

WWW: HPD
SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

241, February 15, 4 p.m.

Reference my 194, February 4, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

The same informant in the Austrian Legation advised us today that for the past few weeks Italy has assured Austria that in the event of German aggression against Austria Italy will mobilize. Italy has, however, at the same time urged Austria to temporize as much as possible with Germany in order to gain time and not put Italy in the position of having to take such action.

Our informant likewise stated that he had talked over the telephone to Vienna this morning and that it was his impression that Chancellor Schuschnigg would probably appoint Seiss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and head of public security but would have the control of the government police taken away from the latter department and put under the Prefect of Police in Vienna; thus outwardly acceeding to Hitler's demands but actually not doing so in that the latter's real desire was to have a Nazi sympathizer control the police.

BULLETT.

MFL END
No. 1819

Strictly Confidential

Subject: Statements of Austrian Press Attaché

Division of European Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram No. 241 of February 15, 4 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a strictly confidential memorandum of conversation between a member of the Embassy staff and Dr. Martin Fuchs, Press Attaché of the Austrian Legation, concerning the recent visit of Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria to Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum dated February 16, 1938.

File 700.
In quintuplicate.
SH/hhp cc - Embassy, Berlin and Legation, Vienna.

Edwin C. Wilson
Counselor of Embassy
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1819 of February 16, 1938, from the Embassy at Paris.

COPY--FULL TEXT


MEMORANDUM

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

For: The Ambassador.
From: Mr. Hawks.
Subject: Conversation with Press Attaché of Austrian Legation.

***

The following is the substance of information given me this morning by Dr. Martin Fuchs, Press Attaché of the Austrian Legation, concerning the recent visit which Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria paid to Fuehrer Hitler at Berchtesgaden:

This visit was made at the invitation of Hitler and was arranged by Von Papen. After the recent arrest in Vienna of Tava and the seizure of incriminating documents in connection therewith, and also after the recent shake-up in Germany, Chancellor Schuschnigg desired to have clarified the Austro-German situation. Von Papen also felt that this would be a good thing and took up the matter with Hitler, who was willing and who gave indications to the effect that a meeting between himself and Schuschnigg might possibly have a favorable result. Chancellor Schuschnigg informed the French, English, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian Governments of his acceptance of this invitation prior to his departure for Berchtesgaden.

Most of the conversation took place between Hitler and Schuschnigg alone, and Assistant Foreign Minister Schmidt, Ambassador Von Papen, and Von Neureth were only called in to explain technical details. Hitler immediately started complaining that Austria had not fulfilled its obligations under the Accord of July 11, 1936. These complaints covered two fields: first, that of Austrian foreign policy, and second, that of Austrian internal policy. In the first field, which is covered by Article 3 of the agreement of July 11, 1936, which states that "the Austrian Federal Government will always base its policy in general ... on those fundamental principles which are in accordance with the fact that Austria considers itself a German state," Hitler claimed that Austria should have followed Germany's lead in (1) resigning from the League of Nations, (2) joining the anti-Comintern pact, and (3) pulling away from Czechoslovakia.

With regard to these complaints, Schuschnigg replied that Austria is a German state, but that
it is up to the Austrian Government to decide what it is best for Austria as a German state to do with regard to foreign policy; that the Austrian Government felt that it was not to the best interests of the country to do any of these three above-mentioned things and that it would not do so.

With regard to internal affairs, Hitler claimed that Austria had promised to take account of the National-Socialist Party in Austria and to bring some of its members into the Government. This had not been done and, quite to the contrary, the Austrian Government had persecuted the National-Socialist Party in Austria and taken severe measures against it. To this Schuschnigg replied that, under the 1934 Constitution, all political parties were abolished and the Patriotic Front was formed taking in many elements but as a political party. With regard to pro-German representation, he pointed out that the Ministry of the Interior had been given to Gleise-Horstenau, who is pro-German, and also that the Assistant Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, was favorably inclined toward Germany. He likewise stated that for some time past the question had been before the Austrian Government of appointing Herr Seiss-Inquart, who has definite pro-German leanings, as Minister of the Interior to replace Gleise-Horstenau. Under the Constitution, the Government could not legally recognize the National-Socialist Party, even as an entity of the Patriotic Front.

Schuschnigg then called Hitler's attention to Germany's frequent violations of the 1936 agreement in that she interfered in the internal affairs of Austria by aiding and abetting the efforts of the Austrian National-Socialist Party against the Government even to the extent of sending into Austria anti-government propaganda in the diplomatic pouches. He also brought up the recent arrest of Tavs and the documents discovered at that time, which proved the complicity of the German National-Socialist Party in interference in Austrian internal affairs. Hitler stated that the persecutions being carried on against the National-Socialist Party in Austria must cease. He demanded that Seiss-Inquart be named Minister of the Interior and also head of the Department of Public Security. He said that if this were not done he (Hitler) could not be held accountable for what the National-Socialists might do.

Hitler was positively brutal in his talk and Schuschnigg returned to Vienna very worried and in a bad temper.

Public opinion in Austria is very excited over this matter as, since no official statement in regard thereto has yet been issued, all sorts of rumors are circulating.
France and England have not stated what their position would be in the event of a German aggression against Austria, but it is felt that in such an event they would not take direct action. Austria has not asked either France or England for support if Germany takes any aggressive action, and Dr. Fuchs feels that it is much wiser not to make such a request, since Austria would run the risk of being refused, in which case Hitler would be bound to know it and would then have an absolutely free hand. In his opinion, it is much better to keep the French and English position uncertain, since this may act as a brake against possible German aggression.

Italy, during the past few weeks, has on several occasions stated that in the event of aggression by Germany against Austria, Italy will mobilize (he used the word "mobilize" and repeated it). Italy, however, has impressed upon Austria her desire that the latter temporize as much as possible with Germany in order to gain time and also in order that Italy will not be put in the position of having to take such action.

Schuschnigg is in a very difficult position and it is not certain what will be done. This is particularly true since he had practically offered to name Seiss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior before Hitler demanded that he do so, and that he be named also head of the Department of Public Security, and accompanied that demand with what literally amounted to an ultimatum. What will probably take place is that Seiss-Inquart will be named Minister of the Interior and Chief of the Department of Public Security, but that the Government police will be put under the Prefect of Police in Vienna. Thus Hitler's demand will in appearance have been acceded to, but actually he will not have gotten what he wished, namely, the police under the control of a National-Socialist sympathizer. The decision in this matter will probably be taken at a meeting of the Council of Ministers scheduled to take place this evening.

S. H.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated February 16, 1938

Rec'd 3:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

249, February 16, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

The Austrian Minister has just read to me a telegram which he received this morning from Schuschnigg. It indicated that Schuschnigg has by no means given up hope of maintaining Austrian independence.

Schuschnigg had confidence that Seyss-Inquart, although a pan-German, would not work in an underhand manner for the introduction of Nazis into the regime.

Amnesty would be extended at once not only to Nazis but also to Social Democrats. This amnesty would, however, not include those who had emigrated from Austria thus excluding from the country all those Austrian Nazis who are now in Germany.

The right to conduct political propaganda would be extended not only to the Nazis but also to the Monarchists and Social Democrats. Those Nazis who had been excluded from office and pensions because of their political opinions would have their pensions restored but would not...
2-#249, From Paris, Feb. 16, 5 p.m.

not be given their former offices.

The position of Schuschnigg was, I gathered, the following: that he would continue to struggle for Austrian independence; that he believed this independence could be maintained in the long run only if there should be reconciliation between England, France, and Italy; that he considered recognition of Ethiopia essential for any such reconciliation since the Italians were genuinely convinced that the British at some future date would attempt to drive the Italians out of Ethiopia which would mean the collapse of the Fascist regime in Italy.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

WWC-NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated February 16, 1938

Rec'd 4:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

249, February 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Schuschnigg felt that the actions which he was about to take would produce a temporary breathing period but, in the end, would prove to be just as unsatisfactory to Hitler as his actions which followed the accord of July 1936. He expected therefore that at some future date Germany would attempt again to repeat the Berchtesgaden coup and would mobilize if necessary on the Austrian frontier. He would make no further concessions. He could not attempt to fight Germany alone and if faced by German mobilization would have to resign.

The question of Austrian existence as an independent state therefore depended on the possibility that before Hitler again should become sufficiently irritated to mobilize on the Austrian frontier there might be reconciliation between England, France and Italy and an agreement between those states to support Austrian
Austrian independence.

The Austrian Minister added that he believed the extension of amnesty to the Social Democrats would add greatly to the strength of Schuschnigg's regime as the Social Democrats would be the strongest opponents of a gradual Nazification of Austria.

In contradiction of the opinions expressed above with regard to Seyss-Inquart I was told this morning by a gentleman who says he knows Seyss-Inquart intimately that the latter is a hundred percent Nazi by conviction although a devout Catholic and that he will insert Nazis gradually into all vital posts and strike for a decision in a few months.

END MESSAGE.

BULLITT

NPL
EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PARIS
Dated February 16, 1938
Rec'd 4:34 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

255, February 16, 9 p.m.

In conversation today the Belgian Ambassador who served in Berlin before coming to Paris said that in his opinion the Austrian situation might easily have found a worse solution than the temporary one actually reached. Everyone knew that in the absence of a determined stand by Great Britain and France Hitler could seize Austria whenever he wanted to. As a matter of fact he had not seized Austria but had come to an agreement with Schuschnigg by brutal methods, it is true, under which Austria would be allowed to continue as an independent state for the time being at least. Kedehove attached great importance to the fact that Skull as Undersecretary of the Department of Security is apparently to continue in control of the Austrian police and felt that this as well as other points which Schuschnigg is reported to have obtained indicate that there has not by any means been complete abdication in the face of Hitler's demands.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM PARIS

Dated February 17, 1938

Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

261

February 17, 8 p.m.

The Foreign Office states that François Poncet is seeing Ribbentrop at five o'clock this afternoon. The appointment was asked for the day before yesterday but Ribbentrop was unable to set an hour before this afternoon. François will request information concerning the exact significance of the meeting at Berchtesgaden on February 12 and will state that the French Government has a deep interest in whatever takes place in Central Europe.

The British Ambassador in Berlin saw Ribbentrop on the 15th and made a démarche along the lines of the foregoing. He was told that the discussion at Berchtesgaden with Schuschnigg had been concerned only with removing the causes of difficulties which had arisen from the working of the Austro-German agreement of July 1936 and that a communiqué would be issued shortly giving all pertinent information (this was before the final decision of the Austrian Government had become known).
2-#269, From Paris, Feb. 17, 8p.m.

The French do not expect to receive any more satisfactory or enlightening response from Ribbentrop than was given to the British. They state however that the fact that this step has been taken in Berlin by both the French and British Governments has some importance as manifesting the interest of both Governments in what transpires in Central Europe.

It seems clear, however, that the French and British action in Berlin has been taken mainly for the sake of the record out of a feeling that they could hardly afford to pass by recent events in complete silence.

Copies to Berlin, Vienna.

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated February 18, 1938

Recd 5:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

269, February 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

I asked Delbos for his views with regard to the present situation in Europe. "There is nothing to say" he replied with a gesture of weary discouragement. I asked if he could imagine any action that could be taken to prevent Austria from falling definitely and irrevocably into the hands of Germany and he replied "there is nothing to do."

I stated to him that three reliable persons had asserted to me last night that Vansittart had stated yesterday in London that the British Government would be glad to follow France in any action that the French Government might decide to take and was only waiting for the French Government to suggest something. Delbos agreed that this was simply a maneuver on the part of the British to throw the onus of doing nothing on France.

I asked Delbos if he had heard the report that Hitler in his speech on the twentieth would announce the quid pro quo for Italy's abandonment of Austria to wit a military alliance between Germany and Italy. Delbos replied that he had not heard the report but that if it should prove to be true
true the only fitting reply would be a military alliance between Great Britain and France. I asked if he believed seriously that such an alliance was within the realm of political possibility. He replied that so far as defense was concerned an alliance had existed since the 17th of April 1936. He knew of course that a formal military alliance was out of the question.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram was closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Dated Feb. 18, 1938)

FROM

7:04 P.M.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

260, February 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I asked Delbœuf if François-Foncette the French Ambassador in Berlin had not reported this morning that when the Czech Minister had talked recently with Neurath and Ribbentrop they had said to him with a certain air that they trusted Germany's relations with Czechoslovakia in the near future would become as satisfactory as Germany's relations with Austria had now become. Delbœuf said that he had not seen any such report. I believe this was an accurate statement but merely because he had not yet read the telegram which I have been informed on absolute authority was received this morning by the Quai d'Orsay.

I reminded Delbœuf that in all our conversations for the past two months I had suggested to him that if he should delay making his proposal for "humanization of warfare" the opportunity to engage Germany in an amicable conversation would be killed by an action of Germany against Austria. He replied that he recalled this much too clearly. I asked him if he felt now that it would be possible for him to make the statement with regard to reconciliation with Germany and humanization of warfare which he had expected.
expected to make. He said that under present circumstances he did not see how he could make any such statement.

You will perceive from the foregoing that the attitude of absolute negation which has characterized the policy of the permanent officials of the Quai d'Orsay has now borne another fruit and that Delbos is for the moment as completely negative as his subordinates.

There is another important factor to note. Flandin in his speech at Bordeaux February 13 and in his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies called attention to the fact that the great position of France in Central and Eastern Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries had been based on the largest population of any European state and the greatest national unity whereas today the population of France was comparatively small and national unity was conspicuously less than in certain other states, Flandin produced the impression that he thought France would have to adopt a purely defensive attitude for the moment and abandon support of friends and allies in Central and Eastern Europe. This opinion has been spreading with great rapidity during the last few days.

BULLITT
269, February 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

There may be a rapid reversal but at the present moment, for the first time since I have served at this post, it is questionable that France would support Czechoslovakia, except in case of direct and flagrant German invasion.

Those who desire to see France attempt to maintain her traditional position in Europe are entirely in disagreement as to the means to produce a national unity and revival of will. The Socialists, Communists and Left Wing of the Radical Socialists believe that a ministry containing Communist representatives might rally the country and persuade the workmen to abandon the forty hour week and devote all their energies to strengthening the military position of France. The Right Wing of the Radical Socialists and all the parties to the Right believe that only a Centre Government, excluding the Communists and ruling with an iron hand can bring a revival of the national will.

The course of French politics will be determined by the pressure of events; but at the moment there is small sign of a desire to sacrifice present well being and ease for the maintenance of French influence beyond the Rhine.
In this connection, I may add, ultra confidentially, that Chautemps in our last conversation before the meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden expressed the opinion that it was inevitable that Austria should fall into the hands of Germany and inevitable that France would do nothing to prevent this calamity. He also foreboded clearly that Germany's control of Austria would mean eventual German control of Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

It appears, therefore, that peace may be maintained temporarily in Europe by repeated acquiescences in German triumphs. If the Germans should follow a policy of *fortiter in re, suaviter in modo*, there may be no war because there may be no resistance.

END MESSAGE

BULLITT
Paris, France, February 26, 1938.

No. 1821

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Statements of Prince Max Hohenlohe on the Sudeten problem.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of a strictly confidential memorandum of conversation between a member of the Embassy staff and Prince Max Hohenlohe with regard to the Sudeten problem in Czechoslovakia.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin C. Wilson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum dated February 24, 1938.

File 800.
In quintuplicate.
SH/hhp
cc - American Embassy, Berlin.
American Legation, Paris.
Enclousure No. 1 to despatch No. 21821
of February 24, 1938,
from the Embassy at Paris.

COPY--FULL TEXT

MEMORANDUM

Paris, February 24, 1938.

For: The Ambassador.

From: Mr. Hawks.

Subject: Statements of Prince Max Hohenlohe on the
Sudeten problem.

The following is the substance of statements made
to me by Prince Max Hohenlohe.

Prince Hohenlohe is an old friend of mine whom I
have known for the past ten years. He owns a very large
property in the Sudeten part of Czechoslovakia and has
just returned from Prague where he had a talk with
President Beneš concerning the minority question in
Czechoslovakia. He also saw Herr von Ribbentrop in
Berlin. He has no official position, but, due to his
large property holdings in Czechoslovakia, has a certain
amount of influence.

President Beneš is now ready to discuss with
Germany the problems which exist between the two
countries. He does not feel that Germany, at
least for the present, will take any action against
Czechoslovakia. What Germany really desires from
Czechoslovakia is more economic than political,
since it needs to import certain raw materials
from Czechoslovakia. There are now before the
Czech parliament proposals for alleviating the
position of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia
through making them certain concessions with regard
to education, etc. If these are passed, and it is
the intention of the Government that they or similar
bills be passed, Germany will be satisfied and
there will be no question, at least for the present,
of setting up any autonomous state. Germany does not
desire to take any aggressive action against Czechos-
lovakia at this time as it is not as strong as it
would like to have people believe.

The attitude of the Czech Government towards
the Sudeten had changed radically in the last two
weeks. Henlein, the head of the Sudeten group, is
now no longer persecuted by the Government, his
paper is allowed to be published—It formerly was
suppressed by the Government—and he is evidently
in Government favor. He is a strong man, independent,
has absolute control of his party, but is a patriot
and is not Hitler's tool. If the Government gives

his
his party certain privileges he will be satisfied with that and will not work towards setting up an autonomous state. Two members of the Sudeten party who have been in prison for the past six weeks have been suddenly released, no reason being given for the action.

The situation between Czechoslovakia and Germany is much less critical than it was and their problems will be ironed out, at least for the moment, without any drastic steps being taken.

The general feeling in Prague and Berlin is that Schuschnigg cannot remain in office more than two or three months longer.

(Sgd) STANLEY HAWKS

SR/hhp
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated March 11, 1938

FROM Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

774, March 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Massigli told me at noon that the report was true that Nazi storm troops have been mobilized on the Austrian frontier and that railway communications between Austria and Germany have been interrupted.

He said that Schuschnigg made a great mistake in underestimating Hitler's reactions to the announcement of the plebiscite. Also that it had been a mistake to hold the plebiscite on only three days notice. The shortness of the period had caused surprise everywhere and was bound to provoke a strong reaction in Germany.

He said that it was impossible to tell as yet whether Hitler intended by intimidation merely to influence the result of the plebiscite or whether he intended to prevent the plebiscite and force out Schuschnigg. If there is any bloodshed it seems likely that Hitler will intervene directly in Austria.

WILSON

KLP:HPD

(* Apparent omission.*
RUSH.

374, March 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I inquired if there had been any consultation between the British and French and if the two Governments intended to take any steps. He said that Halifax and Chamberlain had spoken with Ribbentrop yesterday about Austria and Delbos had seen Welteck this morning. However, "these were merely words and it is only actions which count today".

I have never seen Massigli so dejected. He said that the course of events in Austria is entirely in Hitler's hands. Neither England nor France nor any other country is willing or able to lift a finger to restrain Hitler. France has no Government and when one is formed it will not be able to act with authority. The essential problem is to find somehow, sometime, a way of conciliating a regime of liberty with a spirit of discipline and order. Until that can be done, France will be unable to take any effective action.

WILSON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

J.R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
374, March 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I have also spoken today with the new German Counselor. He tells me that he is of "the new school of diplomacy" and believes in speaking sincerely. I asked him about Austria. He said: "We will never allow any foreign country to intervene as between Austria and Germany. That is a German question and we will settle it ourselves." I asked him about Czechoslovakia. He said that Germany admitted that other countries had a right to be heard regarding Czechoslovakia but that so far as the three and one-half million Germans in Czechoslovakia are concerned Germany will see that treatment which she regards as satisfactory is accorded them by the Czechoslovak Government taking whatever steps may be necessary to accomplish this "without regard to frontiers". He added that the Czechs were showing "comprehension".

(END MESSAGE)

WILSON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From: Paris, March 16, 1938

Secretary of State,
Washington,

416, March 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I have just seen Massigli. He said that the succession of victories gained by the Nationalists over the government forces in Spain after the first battle of Teruel has been due entirely to their superiority in aviation and artillery all of which has been furnished by Italy and Germany. He said that beginning with the end of December and continuing through January there have been a marked increase in the number of Italian and German airplanes observed in Spain. He said that while the French Government had no absolute proof that the Germans and Italians had shipped planes to Spain in the past few days there were indications that this had in fact taken place.

Massigli read me a telegram just received from the French Charge d'Affaires at Rome. This telegram reported reliable information to the effect that at the last meeting
-2- #418, March 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Paris.

meeting of the Fascisti Grand Council Mussolini had declared that he had been given definite assurances by Hitler of complete support for the achievement of Italian objectives. The telegram went on to say that there were unmistakable indications that Mussolini had been deeply impressed by Hitler's success in Austria and that he would attempt to follow Hitler's tactics in achieving Italian aims.

TILSON

NPL: E16
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

418, March 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The Charge reported that before long it could be expected that Mussolini would proclaim himself the protector of Italians living outside of Italian frontiers this being aimed particularly at Tunis. The Charge reported his conviction that Mussolini would use the British negotiations as a means of gaining time. The victory of the Nationalists in Spain was completed and the establishment of Italian forces in Spain and the Balsarics made secure with the deliberate intention of provoking war in the Mediterranean when circumstances were most favorable.

Mussolini said that the Charge d’Affaires on the basis of observation made on the ground in Italy had thus arrived at the same conclusion which the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had reached sometime ago as being the correct interpretation of the significance of the Rome-Berlin axis as applied to Italian objectives. See my 403, March 14, 7 p.m. reporting conversations with Leger.

There
2- No. 419, March 16, from Paris.

There were people in the government who believed that if war was now inevitable with Italy it would be better to cease immediately the force of non-intervention and to eject the Italians from Spain and the Balearics rather than to have the war take place a short time hence when Italy had firmly established her forces in these places. He said, however, that as yet there had been no decision to abandon the non-intervention policy. The British were urging caution and he spoke bitterly of the facility with which the British allow themselves to be duped when it is a matter concerning the essential interests of France.

He stated that the situation was very serious.

END OF MESSAGE.

WILSON

NPL: EHE
From Paris
Dated March 17, 1938
Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

420, March 17, noon.

Strictly Confidential.

The Military Attaché has had talks with high officers of the General Staff and tells me his impressions as follows: The General Staff is opposed to intervention by France in Spain. General Staff believes that Germany will force the issue in Czechoslovakia before long. General Staff is of the opinion that in case of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, France will be unable to take effective action against Germany unless Great Britain supports France. This does not mean that France would refuse to go to Czechoslovakia's aid immediately; the army will carry out the orders of the Government; but it does mean that the General Staff believes that action by France against Germany without Great Britain's support would be hopeless.

WILSON

WVC:RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated March 23, 1938
Recipient 9:57 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

445, March 23, 10 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

A Communist Party leader has told us that he considers the outlook for Republican Spain very dark. The Government, he believes, could defend itself if it could receive 300 planes with well trained pilots and some heavy artillery immediately but while it is possible to get munitions in quantity across the frontier big guns are too conspicuous to smuggle even through the lax French control there. He has little hope of being able to get the Government to abandon nonintervention.

Aid from Russia has been curtailed much more than is realized he said by pirate sinkings but the crucial difficulty is that the funds of the Spanish Government are now exhausted. The Government's emissaries are begging for food, clothing, fats, medical supplies, anything from the Communists here but they state very definitely they cannot pay for them.
The outlook at present is no less discouraging. His party contrary to their previous pretentions and belief, has lately been forced to the conclusion that the French people cannot be induced to go to war at present without the certainty of full and immediate British participation.

In greatest confidence he stated unequivocally that the Soviet Union also will not (repeat not) now fight for Czechoslovakia. Heretofore the Communists have invariably declared that Russia would not only send air forces immediately but would drive a relief army through Rumania. He expects therefore that Germany will be able to gain mastery of Czechoslovakia without provoking a general war.

He does not believe that a National Union Government will be formed in France until the external menace becomes both very acute and apparent but says that in the present grave state of affairs the Communists are disposed to support most any government without fussing about cabinet posts for themselves or other conditions.

WILSON

KLP:CSB
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

481, March 28, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Counselor of the German Embassy said to me today that he believed Ambassador Kennedy was entirely safe in offering ten to one against war. He said that there would be no direct action by Germany against Czechoslovakia unless the Czechoslovak Government should "oppress" the German minority. If the Czechoslovak Government would make reasonable concessions there would be no difficulty. He said that during the past two weeks the Czechoslovak Government had shown itself very conciliatory in dealing with the German minority problem. He said that the only future he could see for an artificial patchwork sort of state like Czechoslovakia was to become a federal state such as Switzerland or else if the process of disintegration goes further, Bohemia might remain as a small independent state, the Sudeten country be incorporated in Germany, and Slovakia returned to Hungary.
EDA - 2 - #401, March 22, 7 p.m. from Paris Section one

He said that the end of the Spanish conflict would probably come within a few days. The German Government would make no difficulty about withdrawing their people from Spain. While Germany had definite commercial interests in Spain their only direct interest in the Spanish civil war had been to ensure that there would be no Bolshevism in that country.

WILSON

NPL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS

FROM Dated March 28, 1938

Rec'd 6:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

481, March 28, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

There might be a little difficulty regarding the complete withdrawal of the Italians from Spain and particularly from the Balearics but he assumed that the British would take care of this point before concluding negotiations with the Italians. He said that in any case Franco's essential need would be money to finance the reconstruction of Spain and neither Germany nor Italy had any money to lend. Furthermore, he said that there had already been indications that Franco's people had a short memory concerning assistance they had received in the past and it might be expected that once they have gained a complete military victory they will be anxious themselves to get the Italians out of Spain and Spanish possessions as quickly as possible.

He said that a few days ago his Government had been disturbed over the possibility that the extreme Left and the labor unions in France might force Blum to intervene directly in Spain. He now felt that this danger was past. Copies to London, Berlin,

(END OF MESSAGE)

EMB-NPL

WILSON