This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG. 6 1938

Secretary of State
Washington.

1228, August 5, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Bonnet said to me today he believed that so long as Runciman should remain in Praha there would be no dangerous flare up in the dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany. He had had a number of indications recently that Germany was inclined to establish better relations with France. The Germans had been most cordial to Alphand, Director of Commercial Accords, who had visited Berlin last week and had been most conciliatory throughout the negotiations.

Bonnet added that he felt the Germans had given France a better settlement of the Austrian debt than England had been able to obtain and they had added many complimentary remarks about the present French regime saying that they felt it was really French and practical and not Jewish and doctrinaire.

(END SECTION ONE).

GW:PEC BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1228, August 5, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Alphand had derived the impression from his conversations in Berlin that the Germans were beginning to realize that they could not stand the pace of rearmament any better than any other nation and that if rearmament should go on at the present rate general ruin would be produced which could benefit only the Bolsheviks. He felt therefore that the Germans might be about ready to discuss disarmament seriously.

I asked Bonnet if he had undertaken any direct negotiations with Germany on the subject of disarmament. He replied that he had not. It was most difficult to deal with Hitler because Hitler refused consistently to receive Ambassadors and in addition was not friendly to Francois-Poncet. For the moment therefore there was a definite improvement in the atmosphere but nothing concrete of a constructive nature. Bonnet said that he had just been informed that within the next two or three days the Franco-Government
No. 1228, August 5, from Paris.

Government would accept the proposal of the London committee for nonintervention with regard to withdrawal of volunteers and if his information should prove to be correct this would be an additional step in the direction of peace. He had also been informed by the French representative in the Franco portion of Spain, that the civilian population in the Franco areas was beginning to be thoroughly tired of war. He hoped that a moment might arrive in the comparatively near future when it might be possible to propose mediation and have the proposal accepted.

BULLITT

KLP:
MBo
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1228, August 5, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Bonnet said that the Soviet Ambassador had called on him this morning and had read him a lecture from Moscow on the subject of Runciman's visit to Czechoslovakia, saying that the Soviet Government disapproved heartily of the French Government's endorsement of Runciman's visit.

Bonnet said that he had replied that there could be three possible developments of Runciman's visit.

First, Runciman could achieve an agreement between Beneš and the Sudeten. In that case the Soviet Government would be satisfied. To this Souritz assented.

The second possible result might be that the Czechs would accept Runciman's proposals and the Sudeten would refuse them in which case the full weight of England's influence would be brought to bear against the Sudeten and Germany.

The third hypothesis was that the Sudeten might accept Runciman's proposals but that Beneš might reject them. He
2- No. 1228, August 5, from Paris.

did not wish to conceal from the Soviet Government that this would place the Czechs in a very bad position not only vis à vis world opinion but particularly vis à vis both England and France. In conclusion he reminded the Soviet Ambassador that the Soviet Government was conducting itself with extreme discretion in repelling a Japanese invasion of what the Soviet Government insisted was Soviet soil.

BULLITT

GW: KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML 1-1938 FROM Païrs

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated August 5, 1938

DIVISION 9:50 a.m. 4th

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1228, August 5, 11 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Bonnet then went on to develop his views with regard to the Far East. He does not expect a conflict to arise from the present dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan as he feels that the Japanese are afraid to engage in war with the Soviet Union because the greater part of their army is bogged down in China and he feels that the Soviet Government is afraid to engage in war against Japan because of fear of Germany and fear that a successful general of the Red Army might turn on Stalin and destroy him.

Bonnet expects therefore that the present dispute will result in very large and angry words on both sides but no major war. He sees a possibility, however, that a Japanese commander on the spot might act violently against the wishes of his Government and that a Russian general on the spot might prefer to die at the front in battle rather than be shot by the OGPU. With regard to the general situation
situation in China Bonnet said that he felt that assistance to China in the forms of loans or credits could be given by England, France and the United States without the slightest danger of hostile action by Japan. Japan was now so thoroughly engaged in China that she could not risk hostilities with England, France or the United States with Russia waiting to pounce. Bonnet reiterated his hope that it might be possible for England, France and the United States simultaneously, though not jointly, to extend credits to the Chinese Government. See my telegram No. 1077 of July 7, noon. (END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D).

Secretary of State
Washington

1304, August 18, 8 p.m.

SECRETARY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Bonnet said to me today that he had no definite conclusions with regard to the development of the German-Czechoslovak dispute. Hitler had received General Vuillemin accompanied by Francois Poncet for a conversation of an hour and a half today. The Quai d'Orsay had not yet received a report on the conversation but it was unquestionable that the Germans were doing everything they could to produce the most favorable impression on Vuillemin.

On the other hand the figures of the French General Staff of this morning showed that one and a half million Germans were now under arms. Furthermore a very large quantity of Canadian wheat had just been bought by Germany one half for delivery on September 15th and one half for delivery on October 1st. Moreover motor trucks and even flocks had been requisitioned in many parts of Germany.

'(END SECTION ONE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS
Dated August 18, 1938
Rec'd 6:05 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1304, August 18, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Germans were continuing to say to French officials in Germany that these were not warlike preparations. The truth was they were merely preparations for war.

Runciman had not as yet got to grips with the Czecho-slovak problem; and he felt that the most important thing now was that Runciman should not be permitted to leave Praha without making some definite recommendations. He still felt that an extremely critical moment would come in the month of September but at bottom he did not believe that Germany would risk war this summer or autumn.

Bonnet asked me if I had any information with regard to a serious difference of opinion between Chamberlain and Halifax. He added that he did not believe the report.

In conclusion Bonnet said that a factor of the greatest importance in Germany's hesitation to strike was apprehension that the United States might be drawn into war. The utterances and private conversations of the President, the Secretary of State and other leading members of our government were of vital importance at the present time.

Bonnet
HRE 2-#1304 From Paris August 18, 8 p.m.

Bonnet said that the British representative had not yet furnished him with a copy of Franco's reply to the proposal of the London committee for non-intervention. He had been informed merely that the reply was very long, very confused, and contained many reservations.

END OF MESSAGE.

BULLITT

NPL: EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

From
Paris
Dated August 26, 1938
Rec'd 2:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1350, August 26, 4 p.m.

Massigli said to us this morning that developments in the Czechoslovak situation were of a disquieting nature. A few days ago the German Ministers at Bucharest and at Bled had stated categorically to the Rumanian and Yugoslav Governments that if the Czechoslovak problem was not solved one hundred per cent in accordance with demands of the Sudeten Germans the German Government would intervene. These declarations coupled with the furious attitude of Goering when informed by Vuillemin that France would go to Czechoslovakia's aid in case the latter were attacked by Germany, as well as Goering's efforts to persuade Vuillemin that if a conflict should take place it would be the Czechoslovaks who had provoked it and therefore the French promise of aid would not have to be fulfilled, make it appear that the German Government may have decided to settle the Czechoslovak question by
by force at an early date. Certainly the German Government is attempting to produce that impression.

Massigli said that the new difficulties which had arisen regarding the Spanish problem as a result of Franco's reply were closely linked with the Czechoslovak situation. (END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

PEG

WWC
This telegram... being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 26, 1938
Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1350, August 26, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The French Government had authentic information that Franco's original intention had been to reply in a more favorable sense but that his reply had been altered upon the insistence of the German and Italian Governments.

The Foreign Office's information is that while the army leaders in Germany are opposed to risking armed intervention in Czechoslovakia the party heads are strongly in favor of such a move professing to believe that Great Britain and France are bluffing and that when it comes to a showdown they will not go to the support of Czechoslovakia. Hitler is hesitating and reserving his decision. Nassigli said that the problem of European peace depends upon Great Britain and France being able to convince Hitler that they are in deadly earnest and will in fact go at once to the assistance of Czechoslovakia if the latter should be attacked. The French Government does not as yet know what Simon will say in his speech tomorrow.
tomorrow but Hassigl states that it is not so much what is said in public addresses which must necessarily be of a general character as what can be said directly by the British Government to Hitler that may be decisive in deterring the latter from casting Europe into war next month.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

VWC

GW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1355, August 26, midnight. (SECTION ONE)

Strictly Confidential for the Secretary.

I discussed the general situation with Bonnet this afternoon. He had been most impressed by the conversations of the German Ministers in Bucharest and Bled with the Rumanian and Yugoslav Governments (reported in my 1350, August 26, 4 p.m.) and said that they seemed to indicate that Germany really intended to use force against Czechoslovakia in the near future.

I asked him if he did not feel that a contrary interpretation was possible, to wit: that the German Government desired to convince the governments of Europe that they would use force against Czechoslovakia in order that they might get from Czechoslovakia all the concessions they desired without fighting. He said that this also was a possible interpretation but that he feared that if Germany should begin to take active measures which looked like preparations for immediate war against Czechoslovakia the Czechs would strike. He said that the
FS 2-No. 1355, August 26, midnight from Paris

Czechs were in a very excited state of mind and that it would not take great provocation from Germany to set Czech airplanes in motion.

END SECTION ONE OF SIX.

HFD BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1--3293

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From

Paris

Dated August 26, 1938

Rec'd 9:20 a.m. 27th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1355, August 26, midnight (SECTION TWO)

He said that the Czech Government had informed the French Government that it intended to introduce at once three year military service. He added that he had advised the Czech Government not to do this; but merely to keep under arms the present class which would be released from the army normally in the month of September. He said that he believed the Czechs would follow his advice.

He read to me the report which he received today on Runciman's latest negotiations in Praha. This dealt especially with Runciman's conversation with Henlein. Runciman reported that Henlein had been amiable but adamant. Henlein had said that he was entirely prepared to accept a settlement of the Sudeten question within the bounds of the Czechoslovak State. But had insisted that unless the Czech Government should restore to Sudeten Germans at once all posts which have been taken away from Sudeten Germans and should withdraw the Czech gendarmerie.
gendarmes from the Sudeten areas he would not be able to restrain the mounting anger and excitement of the Sudeten populations. Henlein added that a solution satisfactory to the Sudeten must be found before the cold weather set in. The economic misery of the Sudeten populations owing to unemployment was so great and would be so augmented by the onset of winter that a revolt of the Sudeten would be certain.

Bonnet added that he was continuing to say to the English that he considered that Runciman should not hurry his work. It was most valuable to have him in Praha for the purpose of information.

(END SECTION TWO)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1355

FROM

FS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated August 26, 1938
Rec'd 9:45 a.m., 27th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1355, August 26, midnight (SECTION THREE)
It was most valuable to have him in Praha in order to negotiate between the Sudeten and the Czechoslovak Government. If he should be able to bring about a settlement by negotiation so much the better. If not, it was absolutely essential that he should declare publicly his opinion with regard to a just settlement of this dispute.

Bonnet said that if Runciman should declare his opinion the French Government would be guided in its actions by his opinion, whatever the opinion might be. If Runciman's opinion should be rejected by the Czechoslovak Government the French and British Governments would refuse to support the Czechoslovak Government by force of arms. If on the other hand Runciman's opinion should be rejected by the Sudeten the British and French Governments would support the Czechoslovak Government by force of arms. In case Runciman should express no opinion and simply go home with the statement that his mission
mission had been a failure war could be expected almost at once.

Bonnet then said to me that he was much disturbed by the position which the Poles were taking at the present time. They were acting as if they desired nothing better than the disintegration of Czechoslovakia which would enable them to regain the Teschen district.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 26, 1938

Rec'd 10 a.m. 27th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1355, August 26, midnight. (SECTION FOUR)

He said that he had tried to point out to the Polish Ambassador in Paris how dangerous the disintegration of Czechoslovakia would be for Poland but had been able to make no impression.

From the source, which when I was Ambassador in Moscow I always found to be the most accurate and the best informed, I received word a few days ago that the Soviet Government had prepared to the last detail a plan to march to the aid of Czechoslovakia across Poland. This source alleged that the Soviet Government had gone so far as to inquire officially of the French Government whether the French Government would be obliged to support the Polish Government in case the Russian Army should cross Polish soil to support Czechoslovakia.
I asked Bonnet if it were true that the Soviet Government had approached him with any such request for information. He replied that the Soviet Government had. I then said that the exact statement made to me was that the Russian Government had put the question in this way: that in case Germany should invade Czechoslovakia and France should then attack Germany and Polish troops should occupy the Teschen district, would France be obliged to support Poland? Bonnet replied that this was exactly the form in which the inquiry had come to him and he had replied that clearly the French Government would have no obligation whatsoever to support Poland.

(END SECTION FOUR)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1355, August 26, midnight (SECTION FIVE)

Bonnet went further and said that recent conversations between the French and Russian Governments led him to believe that if Germany should enter Czechoslovakia the first additional war to start would be war between the Soviet Union and Poland.

He said that this of course filled him with immense disquiet. He was not at all sure that in such an eventuality Rumania would not support Poland and declare war on the Soviet Union. The result would be that France's three allies would be fighting each other and France and England would be left alone to face the attack of Germany and Italy.

I said that under these circumstances it seemed to me that a certain hesitation on the part of the Poles was comprehensible.

I then asked Bonnet if he had any information with regard to the situation in Hungary. He said that he had much information as to the development of the Nazi movement
movement in Hungary but none indicating any danger of an immediate installation of a Nazi Government in Hungary. It was possible of course that if Hitler felt certain he would soon have Hungary in the Nazi camp he would not attack Czechoslovakia in September.

KLP

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 26, 1938

Rec'd 10:15 a.m. 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1355, August 26, midnight. (SECTION SIX)

The crisis which he expected for September might therefore be averted temporarily but if Hitler's hopes with regard to Hungary should prove to be true the position of Czechoslovakia would become totally impossible in the latter months of this year.

Bonnet said that the French and British Governments had decided to treat Franco's reply calmly and to attempt to continue negotiations with him. It was obvious that Hitler wanted the conflict of the powers over Spain to be at fever heat during the month of September. The Soviet Government had informed the British and French Governments that it desired to break off all contact with Franco and end the work of the Committee of Nonintervention. The British and the French felt that it was wiser to temporize until the Czech crisis should have reached one or another solution.

Bonnet
2-#1355, From Paris, Aug. 26, midnight.

Bonnet added that there had been no improvement whatsoever in the relations between France and Italy.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

GW
KLP
Subject: German Ambassador's view of the Czech situation and anti-Nazi feeling in the United States.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report hereinafter, as of possible interest, statements made to the Counselor of the Embassy by the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires relating to a conversation between the latter and the German Ambassador in Paris:

Count von Welczeck had said to M. de Lukács that he was greatly concerned over the Czechoslovak situation; that he was convinced that if trouble broke out there it would not stop at the Czechoslovak frontier.
government, and was continuing to report to it in this sense. What added to the Ambassador's concern, so he said, was the fact that in Germany there are people of influence who do not believe that France would march and believe that France and England are, in the last analysis, bluffing.

Count von Welczeck went on to say that his government was greatly worried over the extent of anti-Nazi sentiment in the United States. If the extent and depth of anti-Nazi feeling in foreign countries could be represented by figures, said the Ambassador, and the figure 1 were taken for France, in Great Britain the figure would be 2, and in the United States 4.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Edwin C. Wilson
Counselor of Embassy

In triplicate.

ECW/FP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 30, 1938
Rec'd 1:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1368, August 30, 5 p.m.

Conversations this morning with Foreign Office officials indicate a somewhat less pessimistic feeling than last week regarding the Czechoslovak situation. The reason for this is the belief that Simon's speech has had a wholesome effect on the German authorities and the hope that Henderson's instructions when he returns to Berlin will place him in a position to reinforce this effect.

It is interesting to note that French opinion has been quite calm of late in the face of the many alarming reports that have come out of central Europe. Hitler's visit to the bridge head at Kehl yesterday failed to cause any commotion. If as is believed in many quarters one of the reasons for the warlike preparations across the Rhine has been to intimidate the French and break their nerve this purpose has signally failed of achievement.
We were told at the Foreign Office that in addition to the soundings which the German Government had made at Bled and Bucharest regarding possible German intervention in Czechoslovakia a similar démarche was made at Moscow. Our informant said that Litvinoff replied to the German representative by suggesting that it would be well for Germany to proceed cautiously: that if Germany intervened in Czechoslovakia France would immediately march and would be supported by Great Britain and that Russia would also immediately go to the assistance of Czechoslovakia.

Copies to Berlin, Praha, Moscow.

BULLITT

WWC

DDN
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1638

FROM

Paris

Date August 30, 1938

Received 1:35 p.m.

The Department has undoubtedly already been informed by our Legation in Prague with regard to the latest proposal of the Czech Government to the Sudeten. This proposal I am informed by Osusky, Czech Minister in Paris and by members of the French Government provides for the division of Czechoslovakia into twenty-three separate cantons. There would be at least three Sudeten cantons adjacent to the German frontier and another Sudeten Canton elsewhere. The Czech Government has further proposed that the prefects of these cantons should not be appointed by the central Government but should be elected by the electors of the canton concerned.

The Sudeten leaders have accepted this proposal as a basis for discussion. Osusky informed me today that discussions of it would begin today in Prague and that the Czech Government believed that the definite reply...
-2- #1370, August 30, 5 p.m., from Paris.

reply of the Sudeten would be forthcoming within a week.

End Section One.

BULLITT

WWC: DDM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 30, 1938
Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1370, August 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
Osusky said that the view of the Czechoslovak Government with regard to the German mobilization and with regard to the démarche of the German Ambassador in Moscow and the German Ministers in Bled and Bucharest was that these acts did not indicate a decision of the German Government to go to war but were to be regarded rather as attempts to intimidate the friends of Czechoslovakia. He went on to say -- and the same view has been expressed to me by several members of the French Cabinet and by Blum -- that the danger was that Germany would carry her indications of an intention to start war so far that the German people would become unbearably excited and that an intense excitement would seize the Czechoslovak army as well.

Osusky as well as all members of the French Government with whom I have talked recently consider that the Hungarian factor alluded to in my telegrams numbers 1349
2-#1370, From Paris, Aug. 30, 6 p.m.
(See: Two)
of August 26, 3 p.m., and 1355 of August 26, midnight continues to bulk in Hitler's calculations. The present French view seems to be therefore that while the German mobilization and attendant gestures do not indicate definite intention to begin war at once it is wise in the circumstances to act as if war were about to begin.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

372, August 31, 3 p.m.

I talked with Bonnet last night. He said that the British Government had decided yesterday afternoon to give Henderson, British Ambassador to Berlin, an instruction to be read to the German Government in which it would be made entirely clear that if German troops should cross the Czechoslovak frontier and France should go to war against Germany England would go to war on the side of France.

Bonnet is still inclined to believe that the present German preparations for war and demonstrations of a readiness to go to war are to be regarded as part of an effort to intimidate the friends of Czechoslovakia and to obtain a settlement of the Sudeten question satisfactory to Hitler by a gigantic bluff rather than by war.

Guy
Guy la Chambre Minister for Air who was with us pointed out however that the present mobilization in Germany of one million eight hundred thousand men is so expensive that it is hard to believe that Germany is making such a colossal expenditure simply for the purpose of backing up a diplomatic maneuver.

Bonnét laid great stress on the factor of Poland in the present situation. He said that if any responsible statesman in Poland should express himself in such terms as you and the President had expressed yourselves he believed there would be no risk of Germany starting war. He said that his chief nightmare at the moment was the prospect that if the Soviet Union should attempt to send an army to the support of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Poland would both declare war on the Soviet Union. He went on to say that he felt certain from his most recent conversations with the Russians that the Soviet Union not only would give a pledge to Poland not to attempt to cross Polish territory under any circumstances but also would be prepared to supply arms and ammunition and other war materials to Poland if Poland would support Czechoslovakia actively. (END SECTION ONE).
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 31, 1938
Rec'd 3:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1372, August 31, 3 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

He said that he realized that the Poles would be entirely justified in considering worthless any promises made by the Soviet Union not to enter Polish territory but hoped something might be done if the Soviet Union should actually hand over war materials. At the present time it was clear that Poland and Rumania would do everything possible to remain neutral as long as possible. This meant that aid from the Soviet Union could not reach Czechoslovakia except in the form of airplanes.

The opinion of the French Minister for Air with regard to the Soviet air force was that the ablest Soviet designers and constructors of planes as well as shop foremen had been killed in the recent "purges" and that the quality of the Soviet planes was decreasing.

Bonnet said that he considered the latest Czech proposals
proposals reported in my No. 1370 of August 30, 6 p. m.
to divide Czechoslovakia into 23 cantons and permit
each canton to elect its own prefect was a most
important concession. He did not have much hope that
it would be accepted by the Sudeten but felt that it
would afford Runciman a good basis on which to continue
his negotiations.

In conclusion Bonnet said that if it should be
possible to get through the month of September without
war as a result of some sort of a temporary compromise
on the Sudeten question he intended to inaugurate in
October an intense effort to reach agreement between
France and Germany.

In general France remains calm and unconvinced that
war is inevitable. Members of the Government and the
military are alert and ready for any eventuality. The
people of France outside Government circles are still
enjoying happily the summer holidays.

(END MESSAGE)

BÜLLITT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 31, 1938

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1374, August 31, 5 p.m.

I talked with Bonnet this afternoon. He was somewhat optimistic because the German Government has invited both Herriot and Pietri to attend the Nuremberg Congress. Bonnet said that he could not imagine that the German Government would have invited these two prominent French politicians to Nuremberg if it were the intention of the Germans to launch an attack on Czechoslovakia while the congress was in progress or immediately thereafter.

BULLITT

KLP
Conradental Five

16CP, 62166-6

1938

THEIR TELEGRAMS RECEIVED

DIVISION OF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAD

FROM

M. H. SMITH TO SECURITIES, 1938

PHILIPS, who returned from

London last night, cabled on 94, this morning, and intimated

that Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, had been

instructed to inform the German Government that the British

Government hoped the German Government would be under no

illusory impression as to the hardening of British public opinion

Henderson, undersecretary of the German Foreign Office,

attended the meeting denouncing the British Government's

policy. He wished to make it clear to Henderson that the

British Government would not enter into negotiations to

avoid fighting with Germany unless it could be clearly

understood that Germany withdraws from the Memorandum of

July 24, 1935, which has been clearly peremptory before it

is communicated to anyone.

Dated September 2, 1938.
MJD -2- No. 1334, September 2, 2 p.m. from Paris

would not go to war on the issue of Czechoslovakia. Henderson
had seen Ribbentrop at the latter's country place yesterday
and had unquestionably repeated to Ribbentrop what he had said
to Weizaecker.

(End Section One)

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated September 2, 1938

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1384, September 2, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The British Ambassador went on to say that it was Henderson's opinion that some agreement must be reached before the Nuremberg Congress and that the Czechs must be compelled to offer a compromise acceptable to the Sudeten and the Germans.

I inquired if Henderson and Runciman did not consider the latest proposal for division of Czechoslovakia into twenty-three cantons, each canton to have the right to elect its own prefect, an acceptable settlement. The British Ambassador replied that on the contrary Runciman had been most disappointed by the proposal. Runciman was finding it extremely difficult to deal with Benes. Benes would make him promises of concessions in general terms which would be nullified by the wording of the proposals.

The British and French Governments today were making intense efforts to persuade Benes to make further
further concessions. If it should be impossible to get
Benes to do this it was conceivable that before the
Nazi Congress Runciman himself would put forward
publicly a proposal for settlement of the dispute.

The British Ambassador said that Chamberlain
and the other members of the British Government took
an extremely grave view of the present situation.
The chances of preserving peace seemed to be about
fifty fifty. If France should go to war on behalf of
Czechoslovakia after the Czechs had accepted what appeared
to British and world public opinion a just proposal it was
inconceivable that Great Britain should remain out of
the war. (END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM: Dated September 6, 1938
Rec'd 3:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
1401, September 6, 6 p.m.

STATUTORY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I have just returned to Paris from Bordeaux and have been informed by the Quai d'Orsay that while they have no official information as to the details of Binges' latest proposals they believe that he is going to the absolute limit of concessions compatible with Czech sovereignty and they are feeling hopeful.

I had long conversation with Bonnet after the ceremonies at the Pointe de Grave. He was definitely optimistic. He stated that he had sent for the German Ambassador in Paris Count Von Weizsaeckl and had asked him to repeat a message from the French Government to Hitler personally. The German Ambassador said that he would do so at the Nuremberg Congress.

The message was the following: The French Government had the most profound desire not only to achieve a peaceful
peaceful settlement of the Sudeten dispute but also to establish really cordial and friendly relations with Germany. Nevertheless the French Government had decided that if the foot of a German soldier should cross the Czechoslovak frontier France would go to war at once with Germany.

BULLITT

NFL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated September 6, 1938
Rec'd 5:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1401, September 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

There was reason to believe that Great Britain also would go to war with Germany. Both France and England were bringing the greatest possible pressure to bear on Czechoslovakia with a view to compelling the Czechs to offer concessions to the absolute limit compatible with Czech sovereignty. If it should be impossible to reach a settlement by agreement and if Runciman then should state publicly his opinion with regard to a just settlement of the dispute, his decision whatever it might be would be supported by the French Government. If his judgment should be rejected by the Czechoslovak Government the French and British Governments would inform the Czechoslovak Government that they could not accord it further support. If on the other hand his judgment should be rejected by the Sudeten, France and England would be prepared to march at once in support of the Czechoslovak Government.
-2- #1401, September 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

Government. In view of these facts the French Government felt that it would be a gesture of the greatest value if Hitler could agree in advance to accept the judgment of Runciman. It was the desire of the French Government as soon as the present dispute with regard to the Sudeten should be settled to enter into conversations with the German Government looking into a settlement of all outstanding questions and the reestablishment of genuine peace in Europe.

Incidentally Bonnet has been informed by the French Embassy at London that Runciman said to Henlein before the latter visited Hitler that if it should be impossible to reach a settlement by agreement between the Sudeten and the Czechoslovak Government he definitely would issue an ex cathedra pronouncement. (END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

EMB: NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Paris
FROM Dated September 7, 1938

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1404, September 7, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Counselor of the Czechoslovak Legation has just informed us that while the Sudeten leaders have not yet replied to Beneš' new proposals it is confidently believed that they will accept them as a basis for discussion. Negotiations will be long drawn out and may extend over several weeks. While his Government expects Hitler to exert pressure in possibly dramatic fashion during this period it is confident that agreement will be reached and that there will be no war.

He said that the new proposals afford almost complete satisfaction to the Sudeten on the first seven points of the Carlsbad demands. The eighth point concerning full liberty to profess Nazi philosophy of course cannot be granted as a right. However, the concessions made on the first seven points will mean as a round matter that the Sudeten will have obtained much of what they were demanding under point eight.
The new proposals are very far-reaching and are not only "definite" but "definitive" in the sense that they are final. Public opinion somewhat uneasily and unwillingly has gone along with Beneš as far as these latest proposals are concerned; it would repudiate any further concessions.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM Paris
Dated September 8, 1938
Rec'd 3:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1414, September 8, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Daladier said to me this afternoon that he had sent for the German Charge d'Affaires last evening (the German Ambassador to France is now at the Nuremberg Congress) and had said to him that he hoped he would make it clear to his government that whatever course England or any other nation might take the French Government would order immediate mobilization and attack Germany at once if the foot of a German soldier should cross the Czechoslovak frontier.

Daladier said that he had done this in order to make it clear to the German Government that however England might wobble or vacillate there would be no vacillation on the part of France. It was his conviction that if Hitler should be permitted to settle the Sudeten question by a stroke of force there would be no more public law in Europe.

Daladier added that he had said to the German Charge d'Affaires
-2- #1414, September 8, 5 p.m., from Paris.

Charge d'Affaires that he knew the Sudeten had a genuine grievance. They had been badly treated by the Czechs. Moreover the French people believed deeply and sincerely in the principle of self-determination. If the Sudeten desired autonomy they should have autonomy. He was even prepared to say that if the Sudeten should desire to join Germany the French Government, respecting the principle of self-determination, would have no basic objection to this solution. (END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

NPL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated September 8, 1938
Rec'd 3:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1414, September 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
What he could not permit was that Hitler should attempt to settle the matter by force.

Daladier went on to say to me that as I knew he had fought the Versailles Treaty to the utmost. We were now on the verge of reaping one of the wars the seeds of which had been sown in the treaty. The matter was aggravated by the fact that the Czechs had been most brutal in their treatment of the Sudeten. It was true that the Czechs had suffered from the brutality of the Germans for many centuries and that the stick was simply in the other hand now. He was certain that neither Henlein nor Kundt desired confederation Germany at the present time. Henlein desired to be the leader of the Sudeten of Czechoslovakia for life; Kundt to occupy the next most prominent position. He was equally certain, however, that there was an enormous and growing desire among the Sudeten themselves to be annexed to Germany and the question was whether or not Henlein
LMS 2-No. 1414, September 8, 5 p. m., Sec. 2, from Paris.

and Kundt could hold their followers in line for a settlement on the basis of genuine autonomy.

The French Government had now received the text of Benes' latest proposals. He had read them and had not been able to make head or tail of them. Mental germs like physical increased as one went eastward in Europe.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated September 8, 1938
Rec’d 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1414, September 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He had been told, however, that the proposals would give the Sudeten a very large measure of autonomy and he hoped that they might be the basis for settlement. He considered (as does everyone in Paris) the editorial in the LONDON TIMES yesterday suggesting that the Czechs might hand over the Sudeten area to Germany extraordinarily ill-timed.

I asked Daladier if he believed that Hitler in his speech on September 12 would demand a plebiscite. He replied that he had no idea. I asked what would be the reaction of the French Government if Hitler should demand such a plebiscite and the Czechoslovak Government should refuse it and the British Government should support the idea of a plebiscite. He replied that this eventuality would raise a most crucial and difficult question and he had not yet decided what his position would be. If in Europe each nationality were to be accorded a plebiscite,
plebiscite, the map of Europe would undergo some astonishing changes. For example the Poles now in Germany would unquestionably demand union with Poland and the Germans in Poland would demand union with Germany.

I asked what the position of the French Government would be if the Sudeten leaders should demand a plebiscite. Daladier replied that he was certain that the Sudeten leaders would not demand a plebiscite on the issue of annexation to Germany because he was sure that they did not desire to be swallowed up by Germany and replaced, as the leaders of the Austrian Nazi movement had been replaced by Germans from the Reich.

BULLITT

NPL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Dated September 8, 1938
Rec'd 5:08 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1414, September 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

I asked what the position of the French Government would be if the Sudeten should demand a plebiscite on the issue of full autonomy with territorial provisions. Daladier replied that he did not see how the French Government could object to such a plebiscite.

Daladier said that he had taken no further measures with regard to calling reservists to the colors. The number called to date did not amount to much more than 90,000. He had taken other measures to insure the defense of the frontier. The orders for mobilization and immediate attack on Germany were ready to be issued at a moment's notice.

I expressed to Daladier my personal pleasure on his nomination today of my old friend General Requin as member of the Supreme War Council. He said that the burden of the attack against Germany if it should have to be made would fall on Requin.

Daladier said that he was fully aware that a French
French attack on the German line would be very costly and would not get very far. Nevertheless France was bound in the interests of honor and public decency in Europe to make such an attack. No matter what position the British might take such an attack would be made if German troops should cross the Czechoslovak frontier.

I asked Daladier if there were any truth in the rumor that the Italians had mobilized several divisions on the Italian-French frontier.

BULLITT

NPL: EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (DI)

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1414, September 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

He said that there was no truth in this report. The Italians had taken no military measures directed toward an attack against France.

I asked if it were true that the Russians were concentrating large forces on the borders of Rumania. He said that that was true and that Voroshilov himself had gone to the area to direct the concentration.

I asked if he expected the Russian troops to attempt to march through Rumania in case of German attack on Czechoslovakia. He said that they well might and that the Rumanians could put up no real resistance. I said that in my opinion such action would be followed by immediate declarations of war by both Rumania and Poland against the Soviet Union. He said that he considered this highly probable; then laughed and remarked that the world was indeed insane.

Daladier
Daladier was completely poised and calm as are all Frenchmen and joked me about our being blown simultaneously into the air from opposite sides of the Seine. It is difficult to exaggerate the complete self-control and poise of the French people and the French Government. The spirit of the country today is far superior to the spirit in 1914. Everyone in the country ardently desires peace. Everyone realizes that war means the destruction of every city in northern and eastern France including Paris. Everyone is ready to leave his normal occupation for the trenches tomorrow. There is no fuss, lamentation or hysteria; simply a sense that the honor of France is engaged and that the moment may soon come when it may be necessary again to march.

END MESSAGE.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Paris
Dated September 8, 1938
Rec'd 7:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1415, September 8, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Bonnet said to me today he had spoken to Halifax last night by telephone with regard to the editorial in yesterday's LONDON TIMES suggesting that the Czechs might hand over the Sudeten area to Germany. He said that Halifax had assured him that he had had nothing to do with this editorial. Bonnet said that nevertheless it was his impression that this editorial showed how profound was the desire of the British Government to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Sudeten dispute.

He felt that it might be possible that Runciman himself should propose it if it should be impossible to reach a settlement on the basis of Runciman's latest proposals. He said that in case Runciman should propose a plebiscite and should be supported in this proposal by the British Government the French Government would be obliged to support the British Government and the
-2- #1415, September 8, 6 p.m., from Paris.

proposal. France could not go to war alone against Germany on this issue.

I asked Bonnet if he had read the text of Beneš' latest proposals. He said that he had attempted to read the text but that it covered seventy pages and was so complicated that although Léger and two jurists had been studying it since early this morning they had been unable as yet to give him any report. He telephoned to ascertain if the report were ready and found that it was not.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

NPL: EMB

(*) Apparent omission.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Paris
Dated September 8, 1938
Rec'd 7:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1415, September 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Bonnet said that he believed that we were now entering a period of intense crisis which would probably last about two weeks.

He said there were two ways in which he felt the Government of the United States might be helpful in preserving peace. First, if in private conversation the line should be maintained which had been established by your speech over the radio on August 16, the President's speech at Kingston, Ontario on August 18, and my speech at Pointe de Grave on September 4. Second, he hoped that if there should be a settlement of the Sudeten dispute by agreement, the President might find it possible to say that he was most happy that an accord had been reached and that he hoped this accord might be the beginning of the establishment of real peace in Europe.

Bonnet asked me if in case of dire necessity the President might be willing to act as arbitrator in the Sudeten dispute.
dispute. I replied evasively saying I considered it impossible that the President should be invited to arbitrate by the Germans.

Bonnet said that in spite of the unfavorable incidents of yesterday in the Sudeten area which had been most unfortunate he still remained optimistic. He had just received word that the Sudeten leaders had agreed to continue conversations with Beneš on the basis of Beneš' latest proposals.

BULLITT

NPL: EMB

(1) apparent omission.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM Paris
Dated September 8, 1938
Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1415, September 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE).
He was convinced that the Sudeten leaders did not desire an incorporation of the Sudeten area in Germany but desired only full autonomy. He felt that Benes had been very foolish in not working closely with the Sudeten leaders. He hoped that it might be possible for the Sudeten and Benes to get together now on at least a temporary settlement.

In his opinion the truth was that in the long run no power on earth could keep the three and one-half million Germans in Czechoslovakia from joining the German Reich. The Treaty of Versailles itself had provided for revision and this was clearly one of the points on which revision was necessary. The main point therefore was that this particular revision, and the transition of the Sudeten from Czechoslovakia to German sovereignty should take place gradually and without use of force. This was the most profound desire of the British Government and it was also his desire.

Both
Both the British and French Governments were primarily interested today not in seeing that the Sudeten should remain under Czech sovereignty but that there should be no war on this issue and that the honor and prestige of Great Britain and France should remain relatively intact.

Bonnet repeated, however, that if during the course of the negotiations between the Sudeten leaders and Beneš,Cuiller should march troops into Czechoslovakia France would have to go to war on the point of honor involved. He seemed certain, however, that if the worse should approach the worst,Runciman would propose a plebiscite to stave off military action.

In conclusion Bonnet said that all his information from Italy indicate that the Italians were military measures directed against France and that they desired not to become involved in the Sudeten dispute.

(END OF MESSAGE)
Communications from France

Telegram No. 1228, August 5, 1938, (76OF.62/544)
Telegram No. 1304, August 18, 1938, (76OF.62/583)
Telegram No. 1350, August 26, 1938, (76OF.62/605)
Telegram No. 1355, August 26, 1938, (76OF.62/607)
Despatch No. 2869, August 27, 1938, (76OF.62/670)
Telegram No. 1368, August 30, 1938, (76OF.62/625)
Telegram No. 1370, August 30, 1938, (76OF.62/626)
Telegram No. 1372, August 31, 1938, (76OF.62/633)
Telegram No. 1374, August 31, 1938, (76OF.62/638)
Telegram No. 1384, September 2, 1938, (76OF.62/645)
Telegram No. 1401, September 6, 1938, (76OF.62/668)
Telegram No. 1404, September 7, 1938, (76OF.62/665)
Telegram No. 1414, September 8, 1938, (76OF.62/703)
Telegram No. 1415, September 8, 1938, (76OF.62/702)
Telegram No. 1425, September 12, 1938, (76OF.62/739)
Telegram No. 1436, September 15, 1938, (76OF.62/778)
Telegram No. 1437, September 15, 1938, (76OF.62/781)
Telegram No. 1443, September 15, 1938, (76OF.62/779)
Telegram No. 1450, September 14, 1938, (123Bulletin,W.C./445)
Telegram No. 1451, September 14, 1938, (76OF.62/790)
Telegram No. 1454, September 14, 1938, (76OF.62/799)
Telegram No. 1463, September 14, 1938, (76OF.62/814)
Telegram No. 1465, September 15, 1938, (76OF.62/827)
Telegram No. 1482, September 16, 1938, (76OF.62/858)
Telegram No. 1490, September 16, 1938, (76OF.62/861)
Communications from France

Telegram No. 1503, September 19, 1938, (760F.62/903)
Telegram No. 1509, September 19, 1938, (760F.62/916)
Telegram No. 1510, September 19, 1938, (760F.62/915)
Telegram No. 1514, September 20, 1938, (760F.62/917)
Telegram No. 1518, September 20, 1938, (760F.62/923)
Telegram No. 1528, September 21, 1938, (760F.62/946)
Telegram No. 1540, September 22, 1938, (760F.62/987)
Telegram No. 1541, September 22, 1938, (760F.62/990)
Telegram No. 1569, September 24, 1938, (760F.62/1052)
Telegram No. 1576, September 24, 1938, (760F.62/1060)
Telegram No. 1577, September 25, 1938, (760F.62/1061)