Communications from France

Telegram No. 1590, September 26, 1938, (76OF.62/1118)
Telegram No. 1601, September 26, 1938, (76OF.62/1125)
Telegram No. 1602, September 26, 1938, (76OF.62/1124)
Telegram No. 1607, September 27, 1938, (76OF.62/1114)
Telegram No. 1619, September 27, 1938, (76OF.62/1171)
Telegram No. 1620, September 27, 1938, (76OF.62/1175)
Telegram No. 1636, September 28, 1938, (76OF.62/1270)
Telegram No. 1678, October 3, 1938, (76OF.62/1429)
Despatch No. 3117, October 13, 1938, (76OF.62/769)
Telegram No. 1798, October 21, 1938, (751.62/490)
Telegram No. 1994, November 25, 1938, (741.51/312)
Telegram No. 2120, December 16, 1938, (751.65/448)
Telegram No. 86, January 14, 1939, (741.65/690)
Telegram No. 94, January 16, 1939, (740.00/546)
Telegram No. 145, January 24, 1939, (751.65/507)
Telegram No. 146, January 24, 1939, (751.65/508)
Telegram No. 148, January 25, 1939, (751.65/509)
Telegram No. 164, January 30, 1939, (751.65/518)
Telegram No. 245, February 8, 1939, (751.65/524)
Telegram No. 276, February 13, 1939, (851.248/139)
Telegram No. 301, February 16, 1939, (751.65/538)
Telegram No. 340, February 22, 1939, (751.65/553)
Telegram No. 387, March 1, 1939, (751.65/566)
Telegram No. 401, March 3, 1939, (751.65/570)
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1590, September 26, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Massigli, who is at the head of the Foreign Office in the absence of Bonnet and Léger, said to Wilson this morning that he thought the President's peace message had been very helpful. He expressed the hope it might be possible to have Hugh Wilson transmit some personal message from the President direct to Hitler.

Massigli said that after the discussion in London last night he had been informed that the British might make a "suggestion" for consideration this morning presumably for a further approach to Hitler. He had no news whether such a "suggestion" had in fact been made by the British. (I learn subsequently that Chamberlain in fact sent another personal appeal to Hitler this morning). Massigli added that General Gamelin had flown to London early this morning.

Referring
Referring to Hitler's speech to be made tonight, Massigli said that he had little hope that it would be conciliatory. He felt that as concerns the political side of the question Hitler had taken his position and would find it more difficult to withdraw. On the military side there were certain indications which led him to believe that the German army leaders might be waverering. For instance work had been suspended since two days on certain uncompleted fortifications, and in some places it appeared that the German forces had fallen back from the Czech frontier. It has been known all along that the German high command was doubtful of the wisdom of risking a general war. Whether they can now, however, influence Hitler to recede from his position seems a fairly forlorn hope.

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated September 26, 1938

From

Rec'd 1:10 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1590, September 26, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Massigli said that the tragic part of it was that Hitler apparently did not yet believe the truth which was that France and England were prepared to fight. He had said to the German Charge d'Affaires repeatedly of late that the latter should not listen to the French politicians or even certain members of the French Government who might tell him that the French would not fight. He should understand that the French people today are miles out in front of their Government and that they are determined after having made every reasonable effort for a peaceful solution not to yield any further. He felt that the German Charge d'Affaires had remained unconvinced.

Massigli said that Hitler's second memorandum and map had all the earmarks of having been prepared by the German army. He believes that it was originally prepared by the army as a basis for an armistice with the Czechs following a few days of warfare and that it was hastily revamped for Hitler to hand to Chamberlain.

Massigli
2-No. 1590, September 26, 1 p.m. from Paris

Massigli confirmed the report that the Czech Government had advised the Polish Government of its readiness to enter into negotiations concerning Polish claims in the Teschen District. The Czech Government had made no proposal to Hungary regarding the Hungarian claim.

(END MESSAGE)

KLP

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

1601, September 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I have just talked with Bonnet. He said that the conversations with the British had been most satisfactory. The French had taken the line that if German troops should cross the Czechoslovak border France would fulfill her obligations. The British had not attempted to combat this position and had indicated that they would support France immediately with their fleet and air force.

The British, however, had expressed a reluctance to introduce conscription even in case of a war in which they were involved. I expressed the opinion that there were depths to which even English gentlemen could not descend and that I did not believe the British could take the position for more than twenty-four hours that they would leave the French to die alone in the trenches.

Bonnet then said that the communication that I had made
made to Léger yesterday with regard to my conversation with the Polish Ambassador in Paris reported in my No. 1580, September 25, 2 p.m. had been most important and asked me if I had had any further conversations with the Polish Ambassador. I repeated to him the conversation which I had had today with the Polish Ambassador reported in my No. 1595, September 26, 6 p.m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM

PARIS

Dated September 26, 1938

Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1601, September 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

To my amazement when I referred to the Polish Ambassador's statement that closing of the Czechoslovak frontiers had placed Czechoslovakia in a bottle in which she would be asphyxiated, since neither Germany, Poland, nor Hungary would open the frontier until Czechoslovakia should agree to the demands of all the three countries, Bonnet replied "that would be perhaps the best solution. It would not entail war". We then discussed the position of Hungary with which Bonnet expressed sympathy.

I then asked Bonnet what actual business had been done in London. He said that aside from general discussions of the situation and discussion of military collaboration in case of war there had been little concrete result.

I asked if the French Ministers and the British Cabinet had agreed to make counterproposals to Hitler. Bonnet replied that a most peculiar thing had happened...
in this regard, Chamberlain had said to the French Ministers that he desired to send a personal communication to Hitler suggesting alterations in the demands contained in the note which Hitler had presented to him at Godesberg. He requested permission of the French Government to send this letter as a personal message to Hitler without revealing its contents to the French Ministers.

BULLITT

EMB

ROW
EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS
FROM Dated September 26, 1938
Received 5:35 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1601, September 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Bonnet asserted that he and Daladier had agreed to this procedure. Three times I returned to this point and each time Bonnet insisted that he had no knowledge whatsoever of the actual contents of the personal letter which Chamberlain had sent by the hand of Horace Wilson today to Hitler. He said that Chamberlain had felt that he had established a personal relationship with Hitler and it would be better for all concerned if he should continue to handle the matter on the basis of personal and confidential communications and the French Government had accepted blindly Chamberlain's leadership.

In conclusion, Bonnet said to me that in spite of the firmness of feeling in the French population he had just received the visit of one hundred Deputies of the Center parties who had asserted that they did not wish France to go to war. I ventured to doubt the accuracy of this statement.

Bonnet
EDA - 2 - #1601, September 26, 8 p.m., from Paris
Section three

Bonnet in spite of the firm line which he has been compelled to take by Daladier is readier for peace at any price.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB:ROW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated September 26, 1938
Rec’d 9:10 p.m.

SECRET AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Just after seeing Bonnet this evening I saw Daladier. If Bonnet was devious and weak Daladier was sure of himself and strong.

He said that he had been delighted by the President's message and hoped that the President had been pleased with his reply. Since I had spoken with the Undersecretary over the telephone I was able to assure him that the President had been most pleased by his answer.

Daladier went on to say that shortly after his arrival in London Chamberlain had said to him that he wished to speak to him alone without Bonnet or anyone else. Chamberlain had then read to him a personal letter which he had prepared to send to Hitler. This letter suggested that there should be a series of modifications in the demands in the note which Hitler had handed to him at Godesberg and had contained the statement that Hitler's
demands were totally impossible of acceptance by the British Government. It had also contained assurances to Hitler that there would be no delay in handing over the Sudeten regions to Hitler.

In addition to this communication Chamberlain had sent a handwritten letter to Hitler. At this point Daladier hesitated and finally said, "I will show you this as a personal friend, not as an Ambassador." He then drew from his wallet a handwritten copy of Chamberlain's second letter to Hitler.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM Dated September 26, 1938

Rec'd 7:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1602, September 26, 10 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

In this letter Chamberlain stated that he had just been informed by Daladier that if German troops should cross the frontier of Czechoslovakia the French Army would attack Germany at once. He was certain that this was true. He desired to state to Hitler that in case this should occur Great Britain would enter the war at once on the side of France with all her forces.

Daladier asked that the existence of this Note be kept as a complete secret and I trust that you will be careful to avoid any possible leakage.

Daladier commented that his impression of Chamberlain was that in spite of his being a cold and limited man when he shook hands with you and said he was with you you could count on him.

Daladier went on to say that he did not know what Hitler would say in his speech tonight. If Hitler should order general German mobilization he would order general French
French mobilization at 10 o'clock this evening. If Hitler should send one soldier across the Czechoslovak frontier he would attack Germany at once. Hitler's latest note to Chamberlain had been an attempt not simply to achieve the aims of Germany in Czechoslovakia but also to humiliate England and France. To fight and die was better than to submit to such an humiliation.

People had doubted the spirit of France for the past few years. The spirit of France during the past few days had shown itself to be the same old spirit which had meant so much to the world. The war would be long and terrible but whatever the cost in the end France would win.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated September 26, 1938
Rec'd 8:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1602, September 26, 10 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

We then referred to the general position and especially that of Poland. Daladier said that he considered that Poland was playing the part of a vulture. I referred to the demands of Poland for a common undertaking with Hungary. Daladier said that so long as he was Prime Minister he would never assent to any such dismemberment of Czechoslovakia; and finally with a twinkle in his eye said that he hoped to live long enough to pay Poland for her combative attitude in the present crisis by proposing a new partition of Poland to Czechoslovakia.

In the course of the conversation a member of Daladier's cabinet, whose voice I recognized as that of Patenotre, telephoned and referred to the activities of Malvy and others, attempting to prove that Daladier was trying to drive France into war. Daladier replied, "Please"
LMS 2-No. 1602, September 26, 10 p.m., Sec. 3, from Paris.

"Please say to Halvy and the rest of his friends that I have only two sons who will go to the front at once when war breaks out. I am of course hoping to prevent the butchery of French youth. I am hoping that war will begin at once as that will give me the opportunity to place him and his associates in a concentration camp where they will have outlet for their venom in breaking rocks."

EMB: ROW

(*) Apparent omission.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

1602, September 26, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Daladier went on to say that he still hoped a moment might come soon when it might be possible to call a conference to organize genuine peace in Europe. He felt that such a call must come from President Roosevelt. It was obvious that European peace must be organized on a new basis but it was also obvious that France could not submit to the infliction of gross injustices on small countries because of a threat of war. France must and would remain worthy of herself.

In my opinion Daladier represents today the genuine reaction of France to the present crisis. It is perhaps because he is a baker's boy who spent a poverty stricken youth delivering bread. This country has never been more magnificent in spirit than today and I am glad that at least the President du Conseil represents it so well.

I was unable to determine whether Bonnet in asserting that he had no knowledge of the contents of Chamberlain's communications to Hitler (see my 1601 of September 26, 8 p.m.)
LMS 2-No. 1602, September 26, 10 p. m., Sec. 4, from Paris.

8 p. m.) was lying or whether Daladier admitted him to his confidence. I am inclined to believe that Daladier had informed him of the contents of Chamberlain’s second and secret note to Hitler but under such pledge of secrecy that he did not dare tell me.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

ROW: EMB
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH.

1607, September 27, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Chautemps has just informed me that since the French Cabinet this morning had no knowledge of the nature of Hitler's reply to the messages from Chamberlain transmitted yesterday by Sir Horace Wilson it had been impossible to come to any definite conclusions as to what policy should be followed. Daladier and Bonnet had been instructed to maintain firmly the French point of view but to attempt to continue negotiations.

Members of the French Government are thinking about some sort of statement to Hitler giving further assurances as to the determination of France and England to see to it that the Czechoslovak Government gives effect immediately to the promise it has made to turn over the Sudeten territory.
#1607, September 27, 1 p.m. from Paris

Chautemps said that every member of the French Cabinet had expressed gratitude to the President for his appeal of yesterday. They felt that the President's appeal coupled with Chamberlain's personal letter to Hitler and the flat statement by the British Government that in case of German attack on Czechoslovakia, France, England and Russia would march at once to the support of Czechoslovakia had produced the "comparatively moderate" tone of Hitler's speech.

BULLITT

GW:KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM PARIS

Dated September 27, 1938

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1619, September 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Wilson had a long talk this afternoon with the German Charge d' Affaires. The latter said that in his opinion the only way of saving peace was to get the Germans and the Czechs together in a conference on the basis of acceptance of Hitler's memorandum of September 23. He asserted that in the message from Chamberlain to Hitler, conveyed by Horace Wilson yesterday, Chamberlain had proposed negotiations between Germany and Czechoslovakia with the good offices of the British. Horace Wilson had seen Hitler before the latter's speech last evening and had later received a written reply from Hitler. He had seen Hitler again this morning presumably after receiving cabled instructions from London and was flying back to London today.

The Charge d' Affaires reiterated that he saw no hope of a settlement except upon the basis of complete acceptance.
acceptance of Hitler’s memorandum. He asserted that the Anglo-French plan accepted by Beneš, which Chamberlain presented to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, had withdrawn from the Sudeten areas to be ceded to Germany certain sections which include important Czech fortifications. He stated that Hitler was convinced that nothing could be expected from Beneš but trickery and bad faith, that Beneš was infinitely more clever than Chamberlain, Daladier or Bonnet and that despite the protection of guarantee of the British and French Governments that the areas of German majority population would be turned over to Germany, Beneš would find ways of defeating this purpose in important respects.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM
PARIS
Dated September 27, 1938
Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1619, September 27, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

This would mean that the basic cause of misunderstandings between Germany and Czechoslovakia would live on into the future. Czechoslovakia under Benes was an ulcer which had to be lanced and cleaned up once and for all. Furthermore, if there is to be peace in Central Europe there will have to be a guarantee of the new frontiers of the Czech state and Germany will not participate in such a guarantee unless the minorities problem is satisfactorily settled.

Wilson stated that he personally thought there was a tragic misunderstanding going on in Berlin. It seemed to him that the belief existed there that Great Britain and France were willing to concede everything without a fight and would stand by passively if Germany invades Czechoslovakia on October 1. He said that on the contrary he believed that France and Britain would immediately go to war if such invasion took place.

BULLITT

EMB-ROW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM PARIS

Dated September 27, 1938

Rec'd 5:44 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1619, September 27, 1 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

The Charge d'Affaires remarked that if this was the case and France and Britain preferred to fight to support Benes in Czechoslovakia rather than to recognize Germany's vital interests in Central Europe then it was better that the war should come now when Germany enjoyed marked military superiority. He said that the war would be a very short one and that the superior strength of the German aviation would force the other countries to sue for peace at an early date.

The Charge d'Affaires gave impression that he still expects the French and British Governments to cave in and bring pressure to bear on the Czechoslovak Government to accept unconditionally Hitler's memorandum.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB

ROW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

P. R. I. S.

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D).

FROM

Dated September 27, 1938

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

RE: FRENCH RELATIONS

SEP 20 1938

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO THE SECRETARY.

1620, September 27, 11 p.m.

In accordance with the instructions by telephone of the Undersecretary I called on Daladier this evening the delay in my seeing him being due to the fact that he was asleep in bed when I received my instructions.

Daladier expressed the greatest gratitude for the President's continued efforts to preserve peace. He said "the United States of all the countries in the world is the only one that has a deep and sincere interest in the peace of Europe and whatever may happen it will go down in history to the eternal credit of the President that he is continuing to strive for peace to the last moment".

Daladier was delighted by all the ideas I submitted to him. He said that he felt that although Hitler might not respond favorably to another appeal of the President's his very refusal would place him in a position which some day would weaken the support that he would have from the common people of
MB -2- 1620, September 27, 11 a.m. from Paris

people of Germany. If he should respond favorably to the appeal the President would have saved the peace of the world.

Daladier said that of course he would be glad to receive an appeal to continue negotiations and to attempt to work out the transfer of Czech territory to Germany in peace.

Bullitt

RGC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From Paris

Dated September 27, 1938

Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1620, September 27, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He said that some time ago Benes had communicated to him that he would be ready to hand over at once to Germany those portions of the Sudeten regions lying outside the Czechoslovak Maginot line. He had therefore suggested to Benes this afternoon at 3 o'clock and the British had made the same suggestion at 6 or 7 o'clock that the Czechoslovak army should be withdrawn as far as the vital line of the Czechoslovak fortifications and that the German army should be permitted to enter that portion of the Sudeten regions which lies outside the Czech Maginot line leaving a no-man's land between the two armies. He had not yet heard from Benes; but he believed that Benes would accept this proposal tomorrow morning.

Daladier said that he felt it would be most valuable to have a conference at once in a neutral capital of the
LMS 2-No. 1620, September 27, 11 p. m., Sec. 2 from Paris.

states immediately interested in the problem of Czechoslovakia and that France would of course be glad to send a representative.

I asked him what states he thought should be included and he gave the list, France, England, Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. I asked him if he would object to the inclusion of Hungary. He said that he would object most emphatically because he had absolute information that the Poles, Germans, and Hungarians had agreed that Poland and Hungary should divide the whole of Slovakia. He would never permit this and would prefer to go to war rather than accept it. He did not believe therefore that it would be helpful to have Hungary at the conference although Hungary was obviously one of the states most interested and must receive reasonable satisfaction.

BULLITT

EMB:ROW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Paris
Dated September 27, 1938
Rec'd 10:20 p.m.

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

RUSH.
1620, September 27, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

He went on to say that when Rydz-Smigly, the Polish dictator had been in Paris last year, he had told him (Daladier) that Poland positively never would attach Czechoslovakia. At that time he (Daladier) had said to Rydz-Smigly that he personally believed that the Teschen district should be returned to Poland. In accord with this belief, he had urged Beneš for some time to return the Teschen district to Poland and Beneš had now at last made this proposal. While we were talking on this subject he received a telegram from the French Military Attaché in Warsaw in which it was stated that the Polish reply to the Czechoslovak proposals would go forward this evening and that it would be conciliatory. Daladier said that he would not believe that the Poles would act in a conciliatory manner until they had done so as he felt they were determined to have a common frontier with Hungary by the

division
division of Slovakia.

Daladier went on to say in explaining why he would be opposed to Hungary being admitted to the conference that the Rumanians would be terribly upset if Hungary should be included and Rumania should not. At the moment Rumania was taking a strong position friendly to France and he hoped emphatically the President would not include Hungary in a call for any such conference.

BULLITT

ROW:RGC
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1620, September 27, 11 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Daladier then said that he felt a conference composed of England, France, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia might really work out the basis for peace in Eastern Europe. His basic thought, however, was that Hitler at the present time would accept nothing except the absolute humiliation of every nation on earth. He desired by such humiliation to make his wish law in Europe. In spite of every effort that he (Daladier) and the President might make he believed that the chance today of preserving peace in the world was not more than one in a thousand. He went on to say that Hitler's present attitude was perhaps the greatest example of folly in modern history. Germany would be defeated in the war. France would win; but the only gainers would be the Bolsheviks as there would be social revolutions in every country of Europe and Communist regimes. The prediction which Napoleon had made at St. Helena
St. Helena was about to come true "Cossacks will rule Europe".

Before I left Daladier again expressed to me in very moving terms his gratitude to the President for his efforts. He said that he knew that the President was ahead of American public opinion and that it was difficult for him from the point of view of domestic politics to play the great role as the champion of the interests of humanity which he was playing. He asked me to convey his profoundest thanks.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

RR:
HR
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (D)

Secretary of State, Oct 1938
Washington.

FROM
Paris
Dated September 28, 1938
Rec'd 4:09 p.m.

1636, September 28, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I have just discussed with Bonnet Hitler's invitation to Mussolini, Daladier and Chamberlain to meet him at Munich at two o'clock tomorrow.

Bonnet said that the invitation was issued at three fifteen this afternoon. Daladier had of course accepted at once. He would fly tomorrow morning to Munich and on arrival there would be met by Francois Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin. He, Bonnet, had not been invited to go. Bonnet said that the source of this invitation of Hitler's was in his opinion manifold. Chamberlain had sent Hitler another message saying that the difference between the proposals brought back by Horace Wilson from Berlin and the proposals of the French and British was so small that it would not only be horrible but utterly ridiculous to have war. He, Chamberlain, therefore intended
HR  -2- 1636, September 28, 6 p.m. from Paris.

intended to go to Germany again tomorrow to talk with Hitler and clear up the difference.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS

Dated September 28, 1938
Rec'd 4:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1636, September 28, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Bonnet went on to say that after Hitler received this message from Chamberlain he received the President's second message which had affected him greatly.

François Poncet called on Hitler shortly after his receipt of the President's message. He found a completely deflated gentleman who talked in the most reasonable manner for an hour and a half. Poncet had verified that Hitler had said "I don't want war in Europe and the only reason I want to walk into Czechoslovakia is because of this." He then pointed to a huge pile of letters on his desk and said that each one contained horrible stories from Sudeten Germans and added that the Czechs were using their last few days of rule to inflict every form of suffering possible on the Sudeten.

Poncet then proposed to Hitler that German troops should occupy the regions outside the Czechoslovak fortifications.
fortifications immediately and had stated that the French and British Governments were entirely ready to have French and British troops accompany the German troops and arrange the evacuation of the Czechoslovak army. Hitler had been most impressed by this idea.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HR
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated September 28, 1938
Rec’d 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
1636, September 28, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Bonnet said that an additional element in the situation was that Halifax had sent a message to Mussolini asking him to join in the efforts of France and England to preserve peace and that Mussolini had responded.

Bonnet was absolutely confident that this conference would bring a settlement of the question of Czechoslovakia without war.

I pointed out to Bonnet that the Poles would be furious because they had been omitted from Hitler's invitation and suggested to him that it was an excellent opportunity for him to renew relations with the Polish Ambassador in Paris who has refused to speak to him for about ten days. He said that he would do so at once.

The feeling of relief in Paris tonight is comparable to the feeling of relief when the news came that the armistice had been signed. (End message)

GW:CSB

BULLITT
Daladier lunched with me today. He described in detail the conversations in Munich saying that Hitler had commenced the meeting by a tremendous discourse: that he, Daladier, had then stated that after all the question before them was extremely simple: all four countries represented were prepared to make war at once; the question was whether Czechoslovakia was to be attacked and invaded and destroyed or whether there was to be a reasonable settlement. He suggested that they address themselves to that at once.

Daladier said that after this statement of his Hitler calmed down and that the discussion proceeded in an extremely orderly manner until he, Daladier, announced that certain terms of the German ultimatum were entirely inacceptable to him and that he was prepared to make war rather than accept them. I gathered that these terms concerned the demand that the Czechs should leave in the Sudeten region all foodstuffs
foodstuffs, cattle, et cetera, et cetera. He said that Hitler began to explode at this point and that he, Daladier, left the room and walked up and down in an anteroom smoking cigarettes until about an hour later when Hitler appeared and said to him "what you ask is entirely unjust and unfair; nevertheless in the interests of peace in Europe I shall concede it."

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated October 3, 1938

Rec'd 4:48 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1678, October 3, 5 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Daladier said that after this the conversations were relatively amicable and that Goering especially had devoted a great deal of attention and personal flattery to him saying that he had given France her old warlike spirit. Goering had invited him to spend an extra two days in Munich to visit the "sausage sociology" which amused him intensely. Goering had embarrassed him by saying that he would like to make an immediate trip to Paris which he had never visited. Daladier said that this had been the only moment of embarrassment that he had had during the negotiations and that he had replied that he hoped to invite Goering later.

He said that Mussolini throughout had been most amicable with everyone and had tried to persuade him, Daladier, that Hitler would have no further territorial ambitions after the annexation of the Sudeten, arguing that Hitler's entire interest now would be concentrated on
the rebuilding of Germany.

Daladier said that he did not believe a word of this. He thought that within six months France and England would be face to face with new German demands probably in the colonial field and that there might also be most serious Italian demands supported by Germany for Tunis and Syria.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated October 3, 1938
Rec'd 4:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1678, October 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Daladier said that in his opinion the single thing which counted today was not diplomatic negotiations but strengthening of the military forces of France especially in the field of air armament. He felt that if France could do something to strengthen her position in the field of aviation the discussions which inevitably would come during the next twelve months might be carried on in an atmosphere of give and take. Otherwise France would be confronted with ultimatums.

We then discussed for an hour and a half the aviation position and ways and means of remedying it. I believe that it is more discreet for me to report this portion of our discussion by word of mouth when I reach Washington at the end of this week rather than by cable.

In a final comment on the conversations in Munich Daladier said that he felt that Chamberlain had been taken in a bit by Hitler who had persuaded him to remain after the
REB 2-#1678, From Paris, Oct. 3, 5p.m. (Sec. Three)

the others had left and had convinced Chamberlain that Germany was ready for peace. he said that he felt that Chamberlain was an admirable old gentleman, like a high minded Quaker who had fallen among bandits, and he did not think that Chamberlain's last conversations with Hitler had been helpful.

(END OF SECTION THREE)

BULLITT

NPL

ROW

(#) Apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 3, 1938
Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1679, October 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

We then discussed at considerable length the domestic situation in France. Daladier said that tomorrow he would go before the Chamber of Deputies and state that it must be recognized that nothing had been settled in Munich; that the accord reached was merely a respite; that unless the French people could pull themselves together and make every possible sacrifice for the reinforcement of French military strength, especially air strength, France speedily would meet destruction.

Daladier then discussed at considerable length the political tactics he might use. He said he felt absolutely convinced that it was necessary to have a new Chamber of Deputies at once. He wished to have general elections at the earliest possible moment. He was debating with himself the question whether it would be better to ask for a dissolution of Parliament and new elections on the basis simply of a call to the country for national unity in the face of grave danger or whether it would be better to ask for full financial powers without explanation and on refusal of this demand to ask for dissolution of Parliament. He was inclined to believe that the latter ground would be the better on which
which to ask for new elections but had not made up his mind when he left me.

(END SECTION FOUR)

BULLITT

NPL ROW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated October 3, 1938
Received 4:53 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1678, October 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Daladier sees the situation entirely, clearly, realizes fully that the meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic defeat for France and England and recognizes that unless France can recover a united national spirit to confront the future a fatal situation will arise within the next year.

Inasmuch as it appears to be likely that there will be no general war in Europe in the immediate future I request your permission to leave France on Wednesday October 5 by the steamship NORMANDIE for home leave.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL R6/1
Confidential - For Staff Use Only

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, whose leaders "achieved" the Munich Accord, and who have since given their respective estimates of the international situation, either in the course of Parliamentary procedure, as in the case of Messrs. Daladier and Chamberlain, or in the manner of dictators, as with Messrs. Hitler and Mussolini, are patently of the opinion that only a truce has been declared to permit the burial of the remains of the Europe of Versailles. As for the reconstruction, that is to be worked out through a diplomacy based squarely upon force, or by actual conflict.
conflict. In other words, Europe is now entering a new period of intensive armament.

"How is France to meet this situation? The Prime Minister's formula, as outlined in Parliament ten days ago, "starts from the premise that questions of vital interest can be discussed between man and man, or country and country, only on the basis of mutual esteem, and that such esteem, as far as Germany is concerned, can be gained only by a show of force. In the Prime Minister's opinion, the negotiations at Munich succeeded only because France made it clear that she could not be intimidated.

"In consequence, M. Daladier has appealed to every Frenchman to respond to the new conditions by considering himself permanently mobilized for the cause of peace and country. He has defined the first duty of every citizen to be that of working with all his might. According to him, peace can be maintained only if French output enables France to speak on equal terms with her neighbors, and if French finances are sound, if her budget is balanced and if all the resources of the country are united in a common effort.

"There are many factors in the situation confronting the French Government which do not promise well for the realization of this program. As the Department knows, the French Treasury is in a precarious situation, rendered worse by the cost of the recent partial mobilization. Pressure on the franc also reveals the widespread fear of inflation and is indicative of the general distrust of the investing public..."
public which must provide the funds if there is to be any extensive reorganization and "rationalization" of French industry."

"In the political and politico-social spheres deep-seated weaknesses are also apparent." The ranks of the Popular Front had already been broken by the vote of the Communists against the Munich Accord. This hostility of the Communists to the Four Power collaboration and the weakening of French ties with Moscow is also a cause for dissension within the ranks of organized labor.

This dissension was clearly evident in the proceedings of the National Committee of the Confédération Générale du Travail, which came to an end yesterday morning. The Communists, and the other elements within the Confédération which would subordinate the Syndicalist movement in France to party doctrine, sought a resolution condemning the Munich Accord as a retreat before the onslaught of Fascism, for which, in their opinion, France and England must ultimately pay a heavy price. Opposed, were those who wish to maintain the French Syndicalist movement free from party strifes and who, although disliking the Munich Accord, hold that war should be avoided at all costs.

M. Jouhaux, the Secretary General of the Confédération, while urging that the French Syndicalist movement should be kept free from political party influence, nevertheless, still further troubled the waters of unity in France by the statement that the "tragedy of
the whole international situation is that we have been lied to and are being lied to still. According to him, M. Daladier had revealed to him some time ago that General Gamelin had concluded that despite admitted shortcomings with respect to French preparedness, France should go to the aid of Czechoslovakia. What M. Jouhaux apparently had in mind when he referred to "lies" was that the Government has stressed the shortcomings and not the General's conclusion.

"In the politico-social sphere is the deep distrust by the Left elements of M. Daladier with respect to the forty-hour week. The Prime Minister has made it abundantly clear that he does not believe that in the emergency France can afford the luxury of such short working hours, particularly in the industries vital to French security." The less moderate-minded of the Left groups feel that, supported by "capital", the Prime Minister would require sacrifices only of labor; that, in fact, he seeks by an appeal on the grounds of French security to dupe labor into a return to its former "servitude".

"Discordant events are also transpiring at the other extreme of the political semi-circle. Former Prime Minister Flandin has not only aroused numerous of his colleagues in the Alliance of Left Republicans and Independent Radicals and sympathizers further to the Right by a telegram to Chancellor Hitler congratulating him on his efforts in behalf of peace, but he has, by this gaucherie, brought to the surface much latent opposition in moderate circles to compromise with Germany. A temperate policy has thus been rendered..."
rendered far more difficult of accomplishment.

Turning again to the Left, the Socialists, although they voted with the Government on the Munich Accord, are by no means entirely happy with M. Daladier, especially in connection with the full powers recently voted by Parliament, with the Socialists abstaining; and the Radical Socialists are, according to a resolution adopted yesterday by the bureau of the party, quite as discontented with those who "seek to create social disturbance, to weaken governmental initiative and action by exaggeration and lies" as they are with "irresponsible persons who, as a former President of the Council, have been and remain in direct contact with foreign governments and who try by all forms of propaganda to undermine national defense measures at a time when difficult negotiations are under way by the Government for the defense of French interests".

In the same resolution the Radical Socialists recalled their repeated avowals in favor of "national union calculated to give proof of the material and moral force of the country to assure the maintenance of peace". This part of the resolution seeks, perhaps, to take such advantage as may be possible of the manifesto issued day before yesterday by M. Henri Fichot, "in the name of 6,000,000 French war veterans", calling for a "government of public safety" which would not be based upon party considerations and which would be granted plenary powers until the 1940 elections. Failing this, says M. Fichot, Parliament should be dissolved at once and new elections called.

This ...
This manifesto of the Right wing ex-service organizations has been received with deep mistrust by the Left.

"LE TEMPS, and numerous other important journals, are campaigning for immediate elections. The Communists, now that they appear to have burned their bridges by the vote on the Munich accord and their disapproval of full powers for the Prime Minister, have also come out for immediate elections." Their somewhat lukewarm partners, the Socialists, who seem not to wish elections, threaten an agreement with the Communists whereby they would not contest seats held by the latter in exchange for similar concessions on the part of the Communists. The Socialists hope, no doubt, by this move to dampen whatever ardor might otherwise develop in Radical quarters for elections.

LE TEMPS also advocates a new foreign policy calculated to appeal, in the circumstances, to moderate-minded opinion, but which is in conflict with an extensive current of opinion on the Left. According to LE TEMPS, it should not be forgotten that France is the originator of the idea of a European union and that it has not renounced this initiative. In this connection, LE TEMPS recalls Under Secretary Welles' remark that "today, more than at any other moment in the course of the last twenty years, the occasion is offered to the nations to establish a new world order". LE TEMPS realizes that the wounds from the recent crisis are still so open as not to warrant "adventuring into such vast unexplored fields without prudence". However, in the opinion of this journal, a gradual ap...
proach might be made such as dealing in an objective manner at this time with the Spanish situation. To this end it recommends a course that the Government is now launched upon of the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Italy. Leftist hatred of Fascism, of course, opposes any agreement which would leave Franco dominant. Also, there are many Frenchmen, not belonging to the Left, who have an honest fear of a Franco victory on the score that this would create a third potentially hostile frontier for France.

"As for the public in general, quite aside from party currents, the realization is dawning that France has suffered an immense moral and material defeat, and that if France is to continue to play an important rôle in European affairs, the country must be rebuilt so that politically and socially it represents a unified whole, not a maze of conflicting interests." As the Deputy, Mérillfle, writing in EPOQUE puts it, an immense military effort must be made at once - France must adopt the three-year military service period; it must double or even triple the Maginot line; it must acquire an immense air fleet - one or two thousand bombardment planes might be purchased immediately from America for spring delivery (?); it should increase tank and artillery production without delay; and, above all, it should at once decentralize the war industry concentrated around Paris. In the opinion of Mérillis, and his opinion deserves consideration, if for no other reason than because it has been largely borne out by events, France has lost Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Russia, and there is imminent danger that it will soon lose Poland and Yugoslavia.

Notwithstanding...
Notwithstanding these opinions, no one can doubt that when M. Daladier returned from Munich, "like the Little Corporal returning from Austerlitz", with cheering throngs impeding his way from the door of his plane at Le Bourget to the court of the Ministry of War, the vast majority of French rejoiced over "the escape from war". When M. Daladier acknowledged the demand of the clamoring crowd and appeared for a moment on the balcony of the War Ministry, the emotions revealed by his features were certainly expressive of the feeling of virtually all France.

However, Frenchmen are today taking stock of the true implications of the Munich Accord and they are neither pleased by what they estimate the international situation to be, nor are they confident that with their social and financial ills and the political maneuverings of their leaders, the future is assured. The truth probably is that France is today ripe for fundamental political change, but there is no potential "leader" in evidence to whom the country might turn in its uncertainty.

M. Daladier will undoubtedly make an effort commensurate with his capacity, but his stewardship since last April does not inspire confidence, and his failure to date to go to the people in national elections and to ask for a firm parliamentary basis for a government which would eliminate the constant need for compromise, indicates that he may also be so steeped in the school of political maneuvering as to place party interests too high."

Yesterday, Mérillie suggested by inference that the country should turn in its distress to General Gamelin.
Gamelin. Today he returns to the suggestion with the peroration: "Public safety! Public safety! Yes. But once again, quickly, quickly! But under the direction of a soldier. In the shadow of the flag, in a new atmosphere, under the symbol of discipline, of work, of confidence, of hope and of honor."

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Edwin C. Wilson
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

In quintuplicate

MBB/hfc
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D).

Secretary of State
Washington
1798, October 21, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Bonnat told me this morning that when Francois Poncet went to Berchtesgaden to say goodbye to Hitler, the latter without making any definite proposal or going into details indicated clearly his desire to bring about an improvement in Franco-German relations. I asked if there was a possibility of Franco-German declaration mutually renouncing war along the lines of the Chamberlain-Hitler declaration at Munich. Bonnat said that this was "in the air" but that there was absolutely nothing definite as yet. He expects Hitler to make definite proposals later. He said that the French Government for its part would not neglect any opportunity to improve relations with Germany and he had genuine hopes that something might be accomplished. He believes that France can make greater progress in this direction with Germany than with Italy. Incidentally he told me that the agreement of the German Government for Cournon as French Ambassador at Berlin had been received this morning.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM PARIS

Dated October 21, 1938
Rec'd 4:52 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1798, October 21, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Bonnet said that contrary to what is generally believed Hitler's position had not (repeat not) been strengthened in Germany by his success in the recent crisis. I expressed some skepticism. Bonnet insisted, however, that the German people were aware of how closely they had been led to the brink of war and that their disapproval of the risks involved in Hitler's policy outweighed satisfaction at the results obtained. He stated that it might be difficult for Hitler to embark the German people on another risky adventure and that Hitler realized this.

Bonnet said that France had lived too long shut off from normal contact with Germany, Italy, and Spain. It is essential for France to re-establish reasonable relations with these countries and the William grant now affords an opportunity to make the effort. He said that of course to talk effectively with Hitler, it would be necessary for France to have given unmistakable proof that she has learned her lesson from the recent crisis. He has gone too
work with a will to improve the economy and finances of the country and strengthen armaments. I asked whether this effort had really gotten under way as yet. Bonnet said that he believed so.

WILSON

EMB. ROW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW FROM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated October 21, 1938
Reg'd 5:02 P.M. Div. 9

Secretary of Statte,
Washington.

1798, October 21, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Much will, of course, depend upon the nature of the decree laws. Bonnet said that frankly he knew very little of what Daladier intended to include in these decree laws (another member of the Cabinet remarked to me at lunchon today that Daladier had evidently been impressed by Hitler's method of working because since returning from Munich Daladier had shut himself up about as completely as Hitler is accustomed to do at Berchtesgaden and had not consulted members of the Cabinet regarding the preparation of the decree laws).

I asked Bonnet if he thought there was a possibility of successful mediation in Spain. He said that with the withdrawal of Italian troops which has already taken place and with further withdrawals expected it should be possible to declare the Anglo-Italian agreement in effect next month. Under these conditions he believes that there will be a potential opportunity for mediation. He said that the French Government is not (repeat not) considering sending a Diplomatic Agent to Burgos at this time.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MY 1-3956
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated October 21, 1938
Rec'd 5:09 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1798, October 21, 6 p.m., (Section Four)

Bonnet said that he had no idea how the dispute concerning the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia would be settled. He said that Beck had gone to Rumania with the definite purpose of obtaining Rumanian consent to the establishment of a common frontier between Poland and Hungary. The Rumanian Government had informed the French Government that they had disapproved this proposal. Bonnet said that as far as he knew direct diplomatic negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia had not yet been resumed. He said that delay, of course, made Imredy's position increasingly more difficult.

Speaking of the Far East Bonnet stated that while the Japanese invasion of South China was a cause for worry he believed that the danger was much greater for the British with Hong Kong than for the French with Indo-China.

WILSON

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 5:19 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1798, October 21, 6 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

He remarked that nothing could be done regarding this situation without the active cooperation of the United States and added that he intended to have Saint-Quentin discuss the matter with Secretary of State.

I asked Bonnet about the domestic situation. He said dissolution that there will be no (repeat no) immediate \&\#39;\&\#39; of the Chamber. Daladier will wait to see the effect produced by the decree laws. If the effect is favorable and he believes that he can obtain a further grant of full powers then the idea of new elections will be abandoned. If on the other hand there should be opposition to the decree laws and it should appear that there would be difficulty in obtaining further full powers from the present Chamber then Daladier might demand dissolution and go to the country on his program for rehabilitating France.

END OF MESSAGE

WILSON

HRB RON