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This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION ONE OF SEVEN) Bonnet spent a part of this afternoon with me and I invited Ambassador Kennedy to join us. Before the Ambassador arrived Bonnet said to me that he had sent a note to the British Government today replying in extremely stiff terms to the British note referred to in my numbers 401 March 3, and 430 March 8.

Ambassador Kennedy asked Bonnet to explain to him the position of the French Government vis-a-vis Italy. Bonnet said that last spring he had inaugurated conversations with the Italian Government for the restoration of really friendly relations between France and Italy through Blondel, French Charge d'Affaires in Rome. These conversations had been interrupted somewhat rudely by Mussolini's Genoa speech in which he had stated that it would not be possible to achieve any good relations between France and Italy so long as the two countries stood on opposite sides of the trenches in the Spanish war.

BULLITT
EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Undated
Rec'd 9:55 a.m. March 11, 1939

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION TWO).

Bonnet went on to say that after this episode there had been a division of opinion in France in spite of relations with Italy. Many of the Center and Right argued that Mussolini could reasonably be angry with France because the French Government had refused to recognize the King as Emperor of Ethiopia and had refused to send an Ambassador to Italy. Last autumn the French Government had recognized the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia and had sent Francois Poncelet to Rome and Poncelet had announced to the Italian Government that he was ready to take up the conversations which Blondel had inaugurated last Spring. The Italian reply had been to stage the scene in the Italian Chamber of Deputies with screaming demands for Nice, Corsica, Tunis, Djibouti, et cetera, and Poncelet had been denied access either to Mussolini or to Ciano.

The
The Italians apparently had miscalculated the domestic situation in France. They had believed that the general strike of November 30 was the prelude to complete disintegration. At that time Ciano had stated to all and sundry that France was only a facade which required merely a kick to demolish it completely.

BULLITT

HPD
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Undated
Rec'd 10:25 a.m.
March 11, 1939

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION THREE).

The result of this Italian attitude had been to consolidate French opinion from the extreme right to the extreme left in united opposition to Italy and to all Italian demands. It would be extremely difficult for the French Government in the face of public opinion at the present time to make any concessions of any kind whatsoever to Italy. Up to the present time in spite of demands formulated by the Italian press the French Government had received no demands whatever from the Italian Government.

Bonnet asked Ambassador Kennedy if to his knowledge the Italian Government had presented any demands against France to the British Government. The Ambassador replied that he had discussed this subject with Chamberlain and Halifax and he was certain that the Italians had not presented any concrete demands either to Lord Perth or
or in London. He went on to say that the British attitude today was entirely different from the British attitude in September. He had never believed that the British Government would fight last September. He believed now that the British Government was fully prepared to fight and that Hore-Belisha's speech was of the utmost importance as an indication of British policy.

BULLITT

GW: T.C
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION FOUR). Chamberlain had told him a week before Beilisha's speech that he had told Beilisha to make such a speech although he knew that it would be the most severe blow that the British public had had to receive for years. It would not be easy for the British to swallow the idea that they must send soldiers to France. He considered this speech a positive indication that the British would bring no pressure whatsoever on the French to make concessions to Japan.

Bonnet said that he was extremely glad to hear this and the discussion then turned to the problem which would be presented if on the one hand the French and British should go on increasing their defensive strength and desire war and on the other hand the Germans and Italians should go on increasing their armed strength but be afraid to begin war. Security against attack would increase on both sides but ruin would approach with each gain in security.

Bonnet said that the French Government was fully aware of this dilemma.
Alphand, Director of Commercial Accords, had been sent to Berlin today to present precisely this question to the Germans. He had been authorized to sign an agreement with the Germans for an exchange of French agricultural products for German manufactures which would increase direct trade between the two nations by about three hundred million francs per annum.

BULLITT

GW: HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Undated
Rec'd March 11, 1939
11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION FIVE). He had also been authorized to propose to the Germans a Franco-German collaboration in the development of the French Colonial Empire in Central Africa not (repeat not) North Africa and he had been instructed to say that so long as the French should be compelled to put into armaments almost every penny that they could spare, they would have very little capital to put into this mutual exploitation of Central Africa. Any limitation of armaments would increase the amount of capital which could be used for productive purposes in Central Africa. The essence of economic and financial problems today was the question of limitation of armaments.

At this point Ambassador Kennedy was obliged to leave for Rome.

Bonnet then said that he had been much surprised to read today a despatch from Washington by Roussy de Sales stating that public opinion in the United States would be against a conference for limitation of armaments at the present...
present time and asked me if our Government would be opposed to such a conference.

I replied that the President's speeches and yours indicated clearly that the United States always would be ready to participate in a conference for the limitation of armaments; but added that in my opinion we would not desire to abandon the program of rearmament which we had just inaugurated.

BULLITT

GW:WNC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION SIX).

Donath then said that he certainly hoped we would not interrupt this program and that in his opinion nothing could be more disastrous than to summon another conference either for limitation of armaments or for economic appeasement until the ground had been so carefully prepared that we knew we could achieve a positive result. We should not risk a repetition of the abortive disarmament conferences of the past or of the economic conference of 1933. He then went on to say that while it would be impossible to make any concessions with regard to Tunisia at the present time there were questions with regard to a free port in Djibouti and the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railroad which might be discussed provided the Italians should show a disposition to behave reasonably and politely.

His impression was that Italy would not dare to risk war at the present moment and that Germany was thoroughly
thoroughly disinclined to support an Italian war in the Mediterranean. When Ribbentrop had visited Paris he had said to Ribbentrop that it was all very well to have signed an agreement by which Germany promised not to attack France in order to recover Alsace-Lorraine but that this agreement would be of very little value if Germany should attack France in order to support Italian claims in the Mediterranean. (END SECTION SIX).

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris
Undated

Rec'd March 11, 1939
12:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

457, (SECTION SEVEN).

Ribbentrop had replied "If we do not desire to make war in order to attempt to recover provinces which after all belonged to us for many years you can imagine how much less we desire to make war in order to obtain for the Italians in the Mediterranean." Bonnet added that he was convinced that Germany's eyes were still turned eastward and that Germany desired a period of quiet in which to attempt to achieve control of central and eastern Europe--with the possible prospect of an attack on the Soviet Union in the future.

In conclusion Bonnet said to me that he could not help reflecting during our conversation on the immense improvement in the situation from the point of view of the democracies since last September. This was due in part to the evolution of public opinion in Great Britain, the progress of the rearmament program in Great Britain and to the greatly improved situation in France, but in major part
-2- #457, (SECTION SEVEN) from Paris.

part it was due to the policy which had been followed by the Government of the United States since last October.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

NPL
REGARDING: Great consternation in Poland over Hitler's advance but it is believed the Poles will fight back if Hitler should make a direct attack against Polish territory.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

PARIS

Dated March 17, 1939

Rec'd 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

498, March 17, 4 p.m.

The shock of Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia stunned not only the members of the Government but all Frenchmen. Thought as to the future has, however, already begun to crystallize in the following manner:

The invasion of Czechoslovakia ends definitely all possibility of diplomatic negotiations. Seven specific promises by Hitler that he would not invade Czechoslovakia were broken by his action and it is no longer possible to have confidence in any promises he may make.

Mussolini is considered as unscrupulous as Hitler and it is believed with equal force that no confidence can be had in any promises by Mussolini. The practice of diplomacy therefore becomes impossible. Nothing remains but to develop as much armed force as possible, as rapidly as possible, to await the day when Germany and Italy will strike against France and England.

(END SECTION ONE)

Bullen
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

498, March 17, 4 p.m. (SECTION TDC)

It is believed that this day may arrive as early as the 26th of the month. Reports from Italy indicate that Mussolini's prestige with his own people has been diminished so seriously by Hitler's advance in Central Europe that he must attempt to make amends for Italy. It is thought that he may first seize Albania but it is also thought that he may consider his present control over Albania sufficient and may first act by an advance on Djibouti. The French troops at Djibouti will resist and war will result not only in Africa but also in Europe.

It is believed that Hitler has promised Mussolini his support in such a war but would like to have Mussolini adjourn action until after he Hitler should have reduced Hungary and Rumania to the position of vassal states. It is not believed that Mussolini will
LMS 2-No. 498, March 17, 4 p.m., Sec. 2, from Paris

will wait for this new advance by Hitler even though
Hitler may predict confidently that he will have both
Hungary and Rumania in hand within a month.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

PARIS
Dated March 17, 1939
Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

498, March 17, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Reports indicate that extreme fear of Hitler is now prevalent throughout Eastern Europe especially in Lithuania and the other Baltic states, in Rumania and in Hungary. There is consternation in Poland; but it is believed that the Poles will have the courage to fight if Hitler makes any direct attack on Polish territory. No assistance is expected from the Soviet Union against Germany unless Soviet territory is attacked.

The French are making every effort to persuade the British to introduce conscription and to prepare for immediate war.

There is no excitement in Paris or in France. There is only regret that Hitler's action has ended the period when it was still possible to hope that constructive diplomatic action might maintain peace.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated March 18, 1939

Rec'd 3:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He had given orders that Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, should continue to be recognized as Minister of Czechoslovakia and had posted policemen at the Legation to prevent the entry of Germans. He did not know, however, how long Osusky would be able to continue to hold out because the Germans had already informed all officers of the Legation and the staff that reprisals would be taken against their families and relatives in Czechoslovakia if they should continue to work at the Legation.

Daladier said that he felt certain that he would receive the full powers which he had asked. He expected to use them in the first instance to mobilize at once two classes. The Germans had quietly drawn into their fifty-four active divisions 20% more men to bring them up to war strength. He felt that under the circumstances he must mobilize at least two classes.

EMB

BULLITT
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Daladier then went on to say that he had a number of intimate personal questions he would like to ask me which he would ask as a close personal friend and not as a Prime Minister to the Ambassador of the United States. He had said to his children (he is a widower) that he expected war in the near future. He might soon be killed by a bomb or otherwise. In case of his death he advised them to consult me and take my advice as to their future. He asked me if I would object to giving them such advice and looking out for them. I replied that of course I should be most honored to do so.

Daladier then said that his next question was equally intimate. A member of the Montalembert family resident in Rome had come to see him yesterday stating that he had had conversations recently with Mussolini and Ciano and that both Mussolini and Ciano as well as the King and all other members of the Italian royal family were intensely disturbed by the increasing German powers.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

March 18, 1939

TO: Secretary of State

FROM: [Name]

SUBJECT: Telegram Received

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated March 18, 1939

Rec'd 3:38 p.m.

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

They desired sincerely to come to an understanding with France. They had authorized Stefani, of the Italian agency Stefani in Paris, to call on him, Daladier to let him know exactly the terms which Mussolini was ready to accept for a complete reconciliation with France. They had added that if this preliminary conversation should result in negotiations they felt that it would be advisable to send to Rome to conduct such negotiations Pierre Laval, in whom both Mussolini and Ciano had the greatest confidence.

Daladier then said that he had no confidence whatsoever in Bonnet and did not wish to consult him with regard to this communication. He desired to consult me as an individual and not as American Ambassador and asked me to give him my personal opinion. I replied that I could give no opinion as American Ambassador; but that if a similar proposal...
proposal had been made to me and I were in his place I should reply that there was an Italian Ambassador in Paris, that I would be glad to receive at any time, and if the Italian Government had any communication to make it should be made through this official and authorized channel.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated March 18, 1939

Rec'd 3:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

I felt personally that the sending of Laval to Rome would destroy the confidence in his, Daladier's, will to resist absolutely all demands against France which was the basis of his strength throughout the country. It might destroy French morale. A proposal which did not come through the Italian Ambassador must be regarded as a ruse and not as a serious act in the direction of rapprochement between France and Italy.

Daladier said that he would reply in this sense.

He then went on to say that he wished to ask me as a friend for my advice on another proposal. Herriot had talked with Litvinov and was very anxious to be empowered to go to Moscow to negotiate a firm and absolute military understanding with the Soviet Union. He asked me again as a friend and not as American Ambassador to say what I thought of this proposal.

BULLITT

EMB

ARL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated March 18, 1939
Rec'd 3:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

I replied that it had been our experience that no promises made by the Soviet Union could be relied on. Nevertheless in the present situation I felt that no stone should be left untorned even though one might expect to find vermin under it. I felt, however, that Herriot whose amiable and generous qualities were deeply appreciated in the United States was too honest and sincere a person to be able to deal successfully with the Bolsheviks. I believed that if he should be sent to Moscow he should be accompanied by some one who would examine every Russian proposal with a microscope and was as unscrupulous as the Bolsheviks themselves.

Daladier replied that there were only two Frenchmen he could think of who fitted this description. He thought that his Minister of Colonies Mandel was the most unscrupulous
unscrupulous crook he knew and that a close second who
even exceeded Mandel in his ability to lie was Jules Henry.
He had been thinking of dismissing Mandel from his cabinet
because he knew that Mandel was intriguing against him.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

513, March 18, 3 p. m. (SECTION SEVEN)
He could not therefore very well attach him to Herriot.
He might, however, attach Jules Henry to Herriot and send them both to Moscow.

He then asked me if I had any advice to give as to how they should conduct themselves. Again as a private individual and not as American Ambassador I replied that I felt that the French Government should insist before any such mission should be sent to Moscow that their conversations should be with Stalin personally; that it should be absolutely understood before their departure that one interview with Stalin was not sufficient but that all their negotiations should be conducted with Stalin. I added that if the Russians were really serious in desiring to act with military force to resist the encroachments of Germany on Eastern Europe they would be glad to accept this condition;
LMS 2-No. 513, March 18, 3 p. m., Sec. 7, from Paris.

whereas if they did not accept this condition it would be certain that the statements which had been made recently by the Ambassador to Herricot to this effect were merely traps for larks.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated March 18, 1939

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

Daladier then asked me if I felt that there was much chance of obtaining real Russian support for Rumania and Poland.

I replied that before the question should be taken up with the Russians it would be advisable to obtain the consent of the Polish and Rumanian Governments to accept such support. At the present moment I was certain that if the foot of a Red soldier should cross the frontier of either Poland or Rumania the Poles or the Rumanians, as the case might be, would go to war at once with the Soviet Union. I felt certain that neither the Poles nor the Rumanians would permit the Red Army under any condition to cross their frontiers. It might, however, be possible to arrange for a supply of Soviet arms, munitions and airplanes to both Poland and Rumania in case of war.

I then
2-#513, From Paris, Mar. 18, 3 p.m.  
(See: Eight)

I then asked Daladier if there were any truth in the report which I had received today from a source which is often well informed in the effect that Bonnet was preparing a plan of concessions to Italy which he intended to communicate to Halifax when he accompanied Lebrun to London next week.

BULLITT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D).

FROM Dated March 18, 1939

Recorded 4:22 pm

Secretary of State
Washington

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION NINE)

Daladier replied "I know nothing about it. If he is doing that, I should dismiss him as Minister for Foreign Affairs at once". He went on to say that he had absolutely no confidence in Bonnet. He would like to replace him as Minister for Foreign Affairs but it was not easy to find someone to replace him. He then asked me if he could once more ask my personal and unofficial opinion of this question.

I replied that I felt that if Bonnet should be replaced his successor should be some one who represented the sound qualities of the provincial population of France and not the Paris drawing rooms. Daladier answered that this was his view also but that unfortunately he could think of no one who met this description. He had thought of replacing Bonnet by Pietri but this probably would not inspire confidence in the country. At the moment he had absolute confidence in Léger and he might ask Léger to take the portfolio of Foreign Affairs but he feared that Léger would refuse it.

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated March 18, 1939
Rec'd 3:53 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

513, March 18, 3 p.m. (SECTION TEN)

The only remaining possibility was Paul Reynaud who had made a great success at the Ministry of Finance and represented not only the will to resist but also intelligence of the first order. It might be possible to transfer Bonnet to the Ministry of Finance and put Reynaud in the Quai d'Orsay. The present situation was extraordinarily difficult for him. He could not be sure of the good faith of his own Minister for Foreign Affairs, as I could see from the fact that he was consulting me as his closest friend with regard to the most intimate problems on foreign affairs.

Daladier then went on to say that he would like to ask my opinion with regard to the Polish position. I stated that I believed that in case of any German attack on Poland the Poles would fight at once. Daladier said that
that he was not at all sure of this. He still believed that Beek was completely in the hands of the Germans.

BULLITT

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

513, March 18, 3 p. m. (SECTION ELEVEN)

I replied that I did not believe this and then pointed out that if the Germans should move against Poland the move would not be in the obvious form of an attack by German troops on the Polish frontier but would be in the form of a demand by the Danzig Senate that Danzig should be incorporated in the German Reich and that its foreign affairs and military protection should be placed in the hands of Germany instead of Poland and that the customs barriers now dividing Danzig from Germany and the free passage of goods from Poland to Danzig should be abolished. I said to Daladier that the Polish Ambassador had stated to me that since the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Beck had been occupied in attempting to determine the exact position of Poland in Europe. The Polish Ambassador had asked me if I was certain that in case of a German
LMS 2-No. 513, March 18, 3 p. m., Sec. 11, from Paris.

German attack on Poland France would declare war on Germany. I had replied that I had felt certain that the French would march against Germany at once, Daladier replied that I had been absolutely correct in this statement. If German troops should cross the Polish frontier and he should be Président du Conseil France would declare war on Germany immediately.

BULLITT

KLP
From

Paris

Dated March 18, 1939

Rec'd 4:28 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

513, March 18, 3 p. m. (SECTION TWELVE)

I then said to Daladier that the Polish Ambassa-
dor had asked me for my opinion in the case that the
Danzig Senate should vote to incorporate Danzig in the
German Reich and that the Polish Ambassador had added
that such a vote would be the signal for the immediate
entry of Polish troops into Danzig and that the Polish
Ambassador had further put to me the hypothetical
question that if German troops should attempt to eject
the Polish troops from Danzig and the Poles should
resist would France march to the assistance of Poland.
Daladier replied that France definitely would march
to the assistance of Poland in this case also.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated March 18, 1939

Rec'd 4:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

513, March 18, 3 p. m. (SECTION THIRTEEN)

He went on to say, however, that if the Poles put this question to him he would like to ask a similar question of the Poles. The Poles had an alliance with Rumania. If the Germans in cooperation with the Hungarians should attack Rumania would Poland make war to assist Rumania. I replied that I did not know the answer to this question but it probably would depend on the degree to which Poland should feel certain of support from France and England.

I asked Daladier if he wished me to state to the Polish Ambassador precisely what he had said to me. He said that he hoped I would do so at once. (I have already done so. The Polish Ambassador replied that the Polish-Rumanian alliance applied only vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and that Poland had no obligations whatsoever to assist Rumania in case of an attack by Hungary or Germany or both.)

BULLITT

EMB: JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be FROM closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated March 18, 1939
Rec'd 4:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

513, March 18, 3 p. m. (SECTION FOURTEEN)

In conclusion Daladier said that he felt that unless France could organize immediately closer relations with Poland, the Soviet Union and Rumania, Germany first would confront the Teleki Government in Hungary with the alternative of forming a military alliance with Germany and participating in a joint attack on Rumania in which case Hungary would receive Transylvania or of having Germany foment a National Socialist movement in Hungary which would overthrow the Teleki Government and produce complete cooperation with Germany. He believed that in one of these ways or the other Germany would obtain Hungarian cooperation against Rumania. King Carol would be overthrown and a National Socialist regime installed in Rumania. Next it would be Poland's turn to receive German pressure but before that moment had arrived Mussolini he believed would present unacceptable demands against
LMS 2-No. 513, March 18, 3 p. m., Sec. 14, from Paris.

against France.

In any case her view was that war was approaching at terrible speed. Diplomacy had almost ceased to exist. We were now in the period of a search for armaments and allies.

With this I entirely agree.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Paris
Dated March 25, 1939
Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington
566, March 25, 2 P.M.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Military Attache has been informed in strict confidence by the War Department that their information indicates that Germany is sending additional troops and munitions into the fortified area along the Rhine and into the Palatinate. Germany is calling up additional reservists, the exact number of which is not known.

France has called up approximately 130,000 men individually from among those who completed their military training within the past two years.

BULLITT

EMB:ROW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Paris

Dated March 29, 1939

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

590, March 29, 1 r.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

The Polish Ambassador called on me this morning to say that he had just received from Beck a personal letter containing official instructions which he was to communicate to Daladier and also the explanation why he had received no telegram of importance recently from Warsaw.

Beck had stated in his letter that he had absolutely reliable information to the effect that the Germans were decoding successfully all the Polish Confidential codes. His present negotiations with the British were too delicate and important for him to desire to keep the German Government fully informed with regard to them. He was therefore obliged to communicate by letter.

BULLITT

RR: EC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated March 29, 1939

FROM

Received 11:38 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

590, March 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The letter was written in Warsaw on the evening of March 27. The Polish Ambassador read me his instructions and added that just before visiting me he had called on Daladier and read him his instructions and made certain supplementary statements.

The instructions ran as follows: The Polish Government was engaged in most serious negotiations designed to create a bilateral pact between Poland and Great Britain similar to the Franco Polish pact. The Polish Government would regard this pact if concluded as a parallel to and reinforcement of the Franco-Polish pact. The Polish Government did not desire to enter into any conversations looking toward wider agreements until the conclusion of this pact.

BULLITT

CSB
The Polish Ambassador went on to say that he had stated to Daladier that he interpreted these words to mean that Poland,—provided Great Britain was prepared to act,—would enter a full defensive alliance with Great Britain similar to the Franco-Polish alliance. If Beck should leave Warsaw for London that would be the signal that it had been possible to agree to make such an alliance. Beck certainly would not leave Warsaw for London unless and until all difficulties had been eliminated and the signature of the alliance was in prospect. Beck wished to maintain this alliance independent of the Franco-Polish alliance for the simple reason that he felt that direct agreements between two nations were much more likely to be effective than agreements in which more than two nations were involved.

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

Dated March 29, 1939

Rec'd 1:51 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

590, March 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

The Polish Ambassador said that Daladier had stated to him that he had received this morning from the British Government a statement that the British Government was fully prepared to conclude a defensive alliance with Poland and was fully prepared to go to war at once if Poland should be attacked. The Polish Ambassador said that he had been unable to explore this question further because he had managed to slip into Daladier's office at a moment when the entire French Cabinet was waiting in an adjoining room and a member of the Cabinet had intruded before he could get any more detailed information on this point. He was under the impression, however, that the British were at last prepared to take the responsibilities in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Poland which they had taken in Western Europe vis-à-vis France at the time of the Locarno Pact and had refused at that time to take vis-à-vis Poland.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

590, March 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).
He added he had stressed to Daladier another point contained in his instructions. Beck in his letter had expressed the opinion that the conclusion of an alliance between Poland and Great Britain would not be regarded by Germany as a provocation and would not produce a German attack on Poland. On the contrary he believed that the conclusion of the Anglo-Polish alliance would tend to deter Germany from moving against Poland. Beck expressed the opinion, however, that an alliance between England and the Soviet Union at the present time would be regarded by Hitler as a provocation.

The Polish Ambassador said that he had discussed with Daladier the line which Daladier would take in his speech of tonight. He gave me the same information with regard to this speech which was contained in my No. 588 of March 28, 5 p.m.

BULLITT

CSB
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

590, March 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

The Polish Ambassador added that Bonnet had said to him that the French Government believed that France and Great Britain should take no action vis-a-vis Rumania or the Soviet Union without the consent and advice of Poland. The Polish Ambassador was delighted by this statement as well as by the development of Anglo-Polish relations. He finally made the extremely optimistic statement that if nothing should occur to prevent Beck's trip to London and the signature of an Anglo-Polish alliance he believed that there would be at least seventy chances in a hundred of preserving peace in Europe. (END MESSAGE)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From Paris

Dated March 30, 1939

Rec'd 10:33 a.m.

395, March 30, noon (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I discussed the general situation with Bonnet this morning.

He said that he felt certain that on Tuesday next Beck in London would sign a treaty of mutual assistance with Great Britain. He believed that there was not the slightest chance that the negotiations might fail. The Poles quite rightly were pushing the British to define clearly what in particular Poland might expect in case of German attack and were also asking for financial aid for military purposes. He believed that the British would make specific promises with regard to military aid and would also grant financial assistance to Poland.

Bullitt

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE

MARCH 30, 1939

NOTEED

595, March 30, noon. (SECTION TWO)

Beck would not come to Paris either before or after visiting London. The French and Polish Governments would announce, however, on Saturday the date in the neighborhood of the first of May when Beck would visit Paris.

Demet said that it was extraordinarily difficult for him to make up his mind with regard to the present attitude of Rumania; but he was compelled to believe that Rumania in the last analysis would fight for its independence rather than submit without fighting. He was exploring both the suggestions of the Rumanian Ambassador. (See my telegrams No. 580, March 27, 8 p.m., and 583, March 27, 11 p.m.)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated March 30, 1939
Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

595, March 30, noon. (SECTION THREE)

It might be possible to extend later the small Polish-French trade agreement which would be signed in Paris in the course of the next few days. He was exploring in Moscow the possibility of obtaining Soviet assistance for Rumania in case of German attack. He added that he would be extremely careful not to discuss Soviet assistance to Poland since the Poles would resent any discussion of this sort by the French and Soviet Governments at the present time.

The British had reverted to the proposal he had made when he had gone to London, see my telegram 199, March 25, 8 p.m. Agreement would first be made with Poland then if possible with Rumania and the Soviet Union would then be brought in if possible after the conclusion of these two agreements.

BULLITT

KLP
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From Paris

Dated March 30, 1939

Receiv'd 11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

595, March 30, noon. (SECTION FOUR)

Bonnet said that from all his Embassies and Legations he had this morning the same sort of news with regard to the reactions of the people of Italy. He gave me to read a telegram which he had just received from the French Ambassador in Warsaw which recounted a conversation with Count Szemek, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, who had just returned from Rome. Count Szemek expressed the opinion that hostility to Germany and fear of German domination of Italy had become so great in almost all circles in Italy, including the army, that it would be impossible for Mussolini to get the Italian people to make war on France and indeed it might not be impossible to persuade Italy to make war on Germany.

Bonnet said that reports he had received this morning from Francois Poncet, the French Ambassador to the Quirinal, and Charles Roux, French Ambassador to the Vatican, who had just talked with the papal Secretary...
-2- #595, March 30, noon, (SECTION FOUR) from Paris Secretary of State Maglione, were of the same tenor as the telegram from Warsaw which I had read.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated March 30, 1939
Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State Washington
595, March 30, noon. (SECTION FIVE).

Bonnet said that he felt that Daladier's speech would produce a most excellent effect in Italy and that the conclusion of the British-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance would further strengthen the feeling in Italy against making war on the side of Hitler.

Bonnet was confident that no event would intervene to prevent Beck's trip to London. I am not so sure.

The Polish Ambassador has just informed me that he was in communication by telephone with Warsaw a few minutes ago and that the tension between Berlin and Warsaw is greater than ever; that no progress whatsoever has been made in the conversations between Berlin and Warsaw and that the Polish Government believes it to be possible that Hitler will attack Poland tomorrow or Saturday in order to attempt to finish Poland before Beck can have time to sign a definite alliance with Great Britain.

BULLET

RR
Secretary of State,

Washington.

595, March 30, noon. (SECTION SIX)

It is becoming increasingly evident that Hitler's annihilation of the independence of Czechoslovakia has turned against him the spirit of nationality of every state in Europe. This spirit which has dominated Europe since the French Revolution and was the fatal obstacle to all attempts to organize Europe in a genuine league of peace, remains as strong today as it ever was. The passion for independence of the peoples of Europe is now aroused against Hitler; and in the end his triumphal entry into the Hradacin at Praha may prove to be as fatal a victory as the triumphal entry of Napoleon into the Kremlin at Moscow.

(END MESSAGE).

BULLITT

RR:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated March 31, 1939
Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

604, March 31, 1 p.m.,

CONFIDENTIAL. The Polish Ambassador informed me this morning that while his Government was prepared for a German attack at any moment there was less apprehension in Warsaw this morning than yesterday.

Beginning yesterday noon the Germans had gotten out in all the political centers of the world rumors to the effect that they intended to attack Poland at once. The Polish Government believed that if it were really the intention of the Germans to attack, these rumors would not have been started so industriously.

This conclusion was drawn that Germany was not prepared to strike at Poland at once and that the rumors were a last minute attempt to stave off the conclusion of the British-Polish alliance by making the British believe that they would be signing merely their agreement to enter into immediate war.

The Polish Ambassador added that his information from London indicated that the conversations between Great Britain and Poland were proceeding most satisfactorily.
and expressed the opinion that Great Britain would grant Poland an immediate loan of ten million pounds.

Telegram reaching the French Foreign Office this morning support the opinions of the Polish Ambassador recorded above.

The report of Mussolini's speech of this morning has just reached the Foreign Office where it is regarded as an indication that Mussolini feels that he must adjourn realization of his ambitions.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From
Paris
Dated March 31, 1939
Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

605, March 31, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I had a brief talk with Daladier this morning. He was most pleased by the reception of his speech throughout the world and was somewhat more optimistic with regard to the possibility of maintaining peace than he has been recently.

He said that he was especially delighted by the strong and courageous stand that the Poles had taken and added that he had been wrong in his opinion of Beck and I had been right. He felt certain now that the Anglo-Polish agreement would go through and that there would be at least one point of resistance to Germany in Eastern Europe.

BULLITT

DDM:RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated April 4, 1939
Rec’d 5:20 p.m.

REB

632, April 4, 5 p.m.

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I lunched with Daladier and Paul Reynaud today. Daladier had received news that Italian troops had already landed in Albania. He was under the impression that King Zog would not dare to resist and that Yugoslavia would not dare help Albania.

He felt that if the Albanians should resist the Yugoslavs might assist them with arms, munitions, and "volunteers" and that general European war might result.

Daladier went on to say that he was convinced that Germany would begin a general European war about the first of May of this year or shortly thereafter. He said that he did not believe that Hitler would wait until the British should have formed a coalition against him. He thought that Hitler would hold his grand review of German troops on the 20th of April that it would take from
from ten days to two weeks to get those troops in position to strike and that Germany would strike before the 15th of May. We had a considerable discussion of this prediction and Daladier remained firm in his conviction that general European war would be loosed by the Germans during the first half of May.

Daladier expressed the opinion that even though it seemed certain that Poland would sign an alliance with England during Beck's visit to London the Poles would find one excuse or another to wriggle out of their obligation to fight on the side of France and England. I emphatically disagree with this prediction.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated April 4, 1939
Rec'd 5:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

G32, April 4, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Daladier said that in his opinion it was lamentable that Great Britain had not yet introduced conscription. He felt that Chamberlain was far behind British opinion on this subject. The burden which France would have to bear in case war should begin in a month would be terrible. He believed that it would be borne successfully; but there would be no real assistance from England except on the sea.

Daladier added that he was not at all sure that Spain would not enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy. Marshal Pétain had had a most cordial conversation with Franco, and Franco had stated that in case of war Spain would remain neutral. Franco, however, was surrounded by Phalangistas who desired to bring Spain into war against France or at the very least to furnish bases and supplies to Germany and Italy.

Daladier
Daladier said that he was not at all pleased by the reception accorded to Marshal Petain and might recall him. I do not believe that he will.

(Incidentally I asked Daladier if he would request Petain to talk with the utmost frankness to Freeman Matthews, First Secretary of this mission who will go to Spain as Charge d'Affaires. He said that he would).

Daladier said that in case of war he would form a Spanish legion from the Spanish refugees in France and believed that he could gather at least 50,000 experienced Spanish soldiers who would be glad to fight against Italy. In addition there were at least 50,000 Italians in France who would be glad to fight against Italy in an Italian legion. He would not send them to fight against Italy, but would send them to the Spanish frontier of France.

Daladier said that in case of war he had no doubts whatsoever about the ability of the French troops now in Tunis to withstand any Italian attack.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
646, April 5, 9 p. m.

The Polish Ambassador has just telephoned to me that Beck and representatives of the British Government this afternoon signed a treaty of alliance, and also an economic and financial agreement. He stated that the Poles are completely satisfied.

The Polish Ambassador added that he had received tonight reports that Germany was preparing to attack Poland on the 7th or 8th of this month while Beck was travelling through Germany to Poland. He believed that these reports emanated from the German propaganda agencies and were designed to produce panic in the world markets; but he was not sure.

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

PARIS
FROM
Dated April 6, 1939
Rec'd 5:17 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

661, April 6, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.
The military attaché has been informed in confidence at the Ministry of War as follows:

The Italians are continuing to call reservists from the classes of 1901 through 1914 and have today about 1,000,000 men under arms. Italian troops and heavy fortress cannon have been moved recently towards the French frontier in the area lying back of Vintimille. There are a large number of German staff officers in Italy and practically every large Italian military unit from a division upwards has several German staff officers attached to it.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL
EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM    Paris
Dated April 6, 1939
Rec'd 5:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

661, April 6, 7 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

A large number of former Czech airplanes have recently been flown to Italy by German aviators and the aviators are remaining in Italy with their planes. German Gestapo agents are now found everywhere in Italy, in every town and village.

It is the opinion of the French military intelligence officer with whom the Military Attaché spoke that Germany has determined to make war on Poland by the end of this month and in the meanwhile is doing everything possible to strengthen the Italian armed forces.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

JRL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM
Paris
Dated April 8, 1939
Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

684, April 8, 3 p.m.

Rochat says that the Foreign Office was not surprised at announcement that the Spanish Government had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. This had been suspected and it was thought that announcement would be made only when the other partners judged it would have the most effect.

He insisted that there was good reason to believe or at least hope that in case of general war Spain would remain neutral. (This might conceivably be regarded as whistling in the dark).

BULLITT

EMB: JRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

686, April 9, 10, 11, 1939.

NOTED

SECRETARY OF STATE

APR 12 1939

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

APR 10 1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I talked with Bonnet briefly tonight. He asked me to inform my Government that "it was five minutes before twelve". There might be war at any moment.

He could not predict where the first blow would be struck. Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece or the French and British Possessions in North Africa might be the scene of the first attack. It was clear, however, that Germany and Italy had decided to rush their attacks and it was now merely a question of where and when general war would begin.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from Paris, dated April 9, 1939, to anyone. (D)

April 9:25 a.m., 10th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

686, April 9, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Today's consultations between the French and British Governments as well as the meeting of the French Permanent Committee of National Defense had been concerned with the question of Albania and Italian threat to Greece. The French and British had anticipated an Italian attack on Corfu and both the French and British Admiralties had given orders to their fleets with a view to meeting this eventuality.

He had just heard from Rome that Ciano had assured Lord Perth that Italy would not attempt to seize Corfu and would not attack Greece.

In view of the assurances that Ciano has given Perth during the past week this assurance reassures Perth but no one in Paris.

I venture to suggest that in your calculations for the future you should not exclude the possibility that decay in resistance to Germany and Italy among the smaller states of Europe may continue and that England, France and Poland may in the near future face war under desperate circumstances. (END MESSAGE).

KLP:PEG

BULLITT
RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

730, April 14, 3 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

General Requin of the Superior War Council stated to me this morning that the latest information of the French General Staff with regard to German troop movements seemed to indicate that the Germans did not intend to make any attack on any nation within the next few days.

BULLITT

HTM:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PARIS

FROM Dated April 19, 1939

Rec'd 8:50 a.m., 20th.

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH.

784, April 19, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Bonnet and Léger both said to me this evening that they were engaged in thanking God that Stalin had refused to make the public statement with regard to Poland and Rumania which the British Government had asked him to make.

Stalin had suggested instead that Great Britain and the Soviet Union and France and the Soviet Union should conclude accords for immediate military support in case of aggression similar to the pact recently concluded between Great Britain and Poland.

Both Bonnet and Léger said that they believed such pacts should be concluded at once provided the Soviet Union should indicate that it was ready to support Rumania in case of German attack.

Both Bonnet and Léger said to me that they were doing everything possible to bring about the alliance against Germany between Poland and Rumania before Hitler's speech.
-2-#784, April 19, 11 p.m., from Paris.
speech. They feared however that Beck would delay the conclusion of this alliance.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) FROM

Paris Dated April 19, 1939
Rec'd 7:40 a.m., 20th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

784, April 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

I had a long talk with the Yugoslav Minister today who said that his Government did not expect any immediate German or Italian attack. He added that the position of Yugoslavia in any war would be determined solely by the control of the Mediterranean. If the British and French should be able to wipe out the Italian fleet and control the Mediterranean he would guarantee that his country would be in war on the side of France and England within sixty days. If on the other hand the Italians should control the Mediterranean and it should be impossible for supplies from England, France or the Soviet Union to reach Yugoslavia it would be impossible for Yugoslavia to do anything but remain neutral.

BULLITT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Dated April 19, 1939

Secretary of State

764, April 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I discussed the position of Yugoslavia with Leger this evening and he entirely agreed with this diagnosis. He added, however, that the Rumanians felt that a German attack on them would not come by way of Hungary which at the moment was prepared to resist the transit of German troops; but would come by way of Yugoslavia which was in a state of such emotional uncertainty that there might be no resistance to the passage of German troops.

Leger went on to say that he was certain that in spite of German threats to Poland the only country which was most menaced today by Germany was Rumania. The Germans had their eyes on the Rumanian oil fields. If the Rumanians had taken a decisive anti-German line Hitler already would have attacked Rumania by one route or another. King Carol was playing an extremely clever game. He was being very polite to the Germans and had convinced them that they might be able to obtain Rumania's support with Rumania's consent. The reality was that the King knew perfectly well that he was fighting for his own existence and the existence of his dynasty and although he would be very polite to the Germans so long as it was clearly understood he would never
PAP -2- 784, April 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris
go over to their side. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

DDM:CSB
RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington

859, April 29, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Bonnet showed me this morning the text of the latest proposal that he had made to the Soviet Union.

The document consisted of three brief paragraphs the first of which stated that if France should become engaged in war because of military assistance given to Poland or Rumania the Soviet Union would support France immediately with all her military forces.

The second paragraph provided that if the Soviet Union should become involved in war because of assistance given to Poland or Rumania France would support the Soviet Union immediately with all her military forces.

The third paragraph contained an agreement that conversations should take place at once for the purpose of concerted measures to make the assistance envisaged effective—in other words, that there should be immediate military conversations between the general staffs of France and the Soviet Union.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RPP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated April 29, 1939
Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington
859, April 29, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Bonnet said that Suritz, the Soviet Ambassador had informed him this morning that this text would be entirely acceptable to the Soviet Union provided that Great Britain should agree to sign a similar agreement with the Soviet Union.

I asked Bonnet why he had mentioned Poland and Rumania. He said that he had done so because he wanted to make it clear that the states envisaged were Poland and Rumania and no others.

He added that he had proposed an alternative text to cover the same but omitting the names of Poland and Rumania. This text provided that if France should become involved in war because of support given to states in eastern Europe or the Balkans the Soviet Union would come to the assistance of France; and mutatis mutandis that France would come to the assistance of the Soviet Union.

Bonnet said that until this morning the British Government had refused to accept this French proposal and had continued to insist that the Soviet Union should make a unilateral
RFP -2- #859, April 29, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris unilateral declaration guaranteeing by name Poland and Rumania.

BULLITT

HTM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated April 29, 1939
Rec'd 1:53 P.M.

SECRETARY OF STATE
MAY 1 1939
NOTED

Secretary of State,
Washington,

MAY 1, 1939

859, April 29, 1939 (SECTION THREE)

I lunched with Sir Eric C. Phipps today who said to me that this was indeed the position of his Government but that he had just received a long telegram before luncheon on this subject. Only the first two sentences of the telegram had been decoded and he did not know whether or not the British Government was now prepared to accept the French proposal.

Incidentally, the British Ambassador informed me that he felt that the British Government should and would support Poland to the utmost in refusing any German claim for Danzig or roadways across the Corridor. He added that it was obvious that if Great Britain should not support Poland at this moment Polish resistance to Germany might disintegrate and the entire edifice of resistance to Germany which was being built up might crumble.

Incidentally,
Incidentally, the British Ambassador said to me twice that he felt as did his Government that the most effective measure which could be taken at the present time to build up resistance to Germany and Italy would be an early change in our neutrality act.

(End Section Three) BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated April 29, 1939
Rec'd 3:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Bonnet said to me that he felt that no concessions should be made to Germany at the present time but that every effort should be made to push resistance to Germany and added that he felt that with a week or so the President would have an opportunity for a magnificent reply to Hitler.

Both Bonnet and the British Ambassador and also the Polish Ambassador expressed the opinion to me that Hitler's speech showed that he did not dare to make war at the present time. They all felt that if resistance to Germany should be increased the disinclination of Germany to risk war would be increased also and that Hitler in the end would be compelled to negotiate on a reasonable basis.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

862, May 1, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

The following is from a reliable Czech source:
Recently groups of Nazi workers have been visiting villages in Bohemia and putting up posters in Czech enumerating the blessings conferred upon the population by the protectorate.

In one village a mistake occurred: A few posters in the Polish language were put up calling upon the people to cooperate with the German troops who were entering Poland not as invaders but as friends and liberators, et cetera, a short time later the mistake was discovered and the posters hastily removed.

The Polish Ambassador said to me this morning that his latest information from Poland indicated that there was a very real chance that Germany would provoke war with Poland in the near future.

BULLITT

CSB:HPD
AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated May 6, 1939
Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.
Daladier said to me today that the Papal Nuncio had called on Bonnet yesterday and had said to him that the Pope had decided to summon immediately a peace conference to consist of representatives of France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and Poland. As soon as Bonnet had transmitted this information to him he, Daladier had sent for the Papal Nuncio and had stated to the Papal Nuncio that France would not participate in any conference held under threat of German guns. He had added that such a conference would be foredoomed to failure.

END SECTION ONE.

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated May 6, 1939
Rec'd 12:28 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Papal Nuncio had replied that he regretted to inform him, Daladier, that the Pope had already decided to make an appeal for such a conference and that it was too late to change this project. Daladier said that he had answered that he regretted this; that France would refuse to participate; and that he felt the Pope would destroy by such action the immense influence in the world which had been obtained for the church by the last Pope since it would be clear to everyone that the Pope would be engaged merely in pulling Italian chestnuts out of the fire and preparing a new Munich.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC  This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

After some hours the Papal Nuncio had again seen Bonnet and had informed him that he had been mistaken. The decision of the Pope was not irrevocable and the opinion of the French Government would have great weight in the Papal decision.

Daladier went on to say that he believed this action of the Pope had been inspired by Mussolini whose position was becoming more and more difficult due to the opposition of the King, the Prince of Piedmont, Badoglio, Balbo and a large portion of the army, and a large section of the population of Italy. It might be possible that Poland had inspired this move by the Pope but no intimation to this effect had reached him.

BULLITT

WWC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (Section Four)

We discussed at great length the Russian position and Daladier repeated to me the information that I transmitted in my telegram No. 893 of May 5 last night to the effect that he had telephoned to Corbin and given him orders to make the strongest representations possible to the British Government with a view to obtaining assent to the French proposal.

In conclusion, he said that he would this afternoon have instructions sent to the French Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, Payart, in order to make certain that the Soviet Government was still prepared to accept the French proposal.

(END SECTION FOUR)

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
(D)

Paris
Dated May 6, 1939
Rec’d 12:38 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In this connection Daladier once again expressed his distrust of Bonnet and said that he might replace him in the immediate future by Champetier de Ribes, Minister of Pensions, in whose integrity and loyalty he had complete confidence.

In commenting on the general situation Daladier said that he had considered Beck's speech admirable and that if the Soviet Union could now be brought into the circuit he believed there was a considerable chance of preserving peace. If on the other hand the Russians should withdraw into complete isolation the situation would become tragic and untenable since all resistance to Hitler in eastern Europe would collapse.

BULLITT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This message must be closely paraphrased before FROM Paris being communicated to anyone. Dated May 6, 1939

Rec'd 12:53 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

Daladier went on to say that this morning in ministerial council before Lebrun at the Elysees he had put the question of French policy very flatly. He had stated that the alternative policies for France today were the following: (one) to withdraw behind the Maginot Line and to disregard all events to the east of the Maginot Line. Such a policy would certainly purchase for France at least a year of peace. The alternative policy was (two) to go to war at once in case Hitler should attack Poland or any other state in eastern Europe. This policy might bring war at once and if any one in the cabinet should be convinced that this policy, which was his own, was unwise, and that Hitler, having swallowed the states of eastern Europe would not turn against France he wished he would speak out immediately. He added that at this moment he had looked pointedly at Lebrun, at Bonnet, and at Chautemps.

No
Paris May 6, 1939 12:53 p.m. #897 Sec. 6

No one raised his voice in favor of the policy of permitting Hitler to swallow the states of eastern Europe and the Balkans.

BULLITT

EMB
J
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From
Paris
Dated May 6, 1939

Secretary of State,
Washington,

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

The question of Italy was also discussed. Daladier stated that he had said that, if any man in the cabinet believed that by giving Mussolini a free port in Djibouti and a seat on the Suez Canal, and the 1896 statute in Tunis, Mussolini could be persuaded to abandon the axis he wished he would speak out. No one spoke.

Daladier then said that he believed that it was never good policy to pay blackmail to a bandit. He was certain that Mussolini in spite of minor concessions would cling to the Axis and would demand further concessions specially with regard to Tunis.

BULLITT

EMB:ROW

(*) Apparent omission.
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. Dated May 6, 1939
Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

897, May 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT).
He therefore was opposed to making any concessions to Mussolini at the moment. He said that the cabinet had supported him unanimously in taking this position.

Daladier went on to say that he was convinced that Mussolini was in serious difficulties and that the reason why so many prominent German officers and members of the German Government to say nothing of members of the Gestapo were in Italy at the present moment was because of the fear in Germany that Mussolini might be set aside by the opponents of the Axis policy. (END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB