Secretary of State,
Washington.

904, May 8, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Bonnet said to me today that he had no information as to the reason which had impelled Germany and Italy to transform their entente into an alliance at this moment. He did not consider the decision of particular importance. He did not believe that the Italians would honor any promises they might make to the Germans any more than he believed that any promises the Russians should make to the British and the French would be carried out. It was true that the King of Italy would make a state visit to Berlin the end of this month.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated May 8, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 4:28 p.m. May 8, 1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

904, May 8, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Bonnet said that since his final conversation with the Papal Nuncio referred to in my No. 897, May 6, 4 p.m. he had had no further information with regard to the Pope's desire to call a conference of representatives of England, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland. He added that in responding to the Pope's desire to call such a conference the Papal Nuncio had said to him that the Pope had information which he regarded as positive that Hitler would attack Poland in the near future.

The Nuncio had added that the Pope had not consulted Mussolini nor had he been inspired by Mussolini. Since he believed that general European war was imminent he had felt that it was his duty to attempt to do something to stop such a war. That had been the sole motive which had moved him.
I asked Bonnet if he now regarded the Pope's proposal as dead. He replied that since the Papal Nuncio had been out of town he had been unable to discover whether or not the Pope had abandoned his project.

(END SECTION TWO)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated May 8, 1939
Rec'd 4:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

904, May 8, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Bonnet volunteered the information that relations between France and Spain at the moment were giving him a great deal of trouble. Berard had signed an agreement promising to return possessions of the Spanish Government now in France. Berard has not specified anything with regard to Spanish refugees in France. The Spaniards were furious because the French were insisting on the readmission of Spanish refugees to Spain before the return of Spanish money in France. He was now convinced that the number of Phalangistas in Spain who really desired to make war on the side of Germany and Italy had been greatly exaggerated. He thought that it was out of the question now for Spain to give active assistance to Germany and Italy. He would like to get rid of the refugees but he did not know whether or not he could persuade the Spaniards to permit their return until France should have turned over
over the property of the Spanish Government now in France.

Bonnet said he did not expect an immediate German attack on Poland.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

920, May 10, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Bonnet informed me today that the Papal Secretary of State Naglione had said last night to Charles Roux, French Ambassador to the Vatican that in view of the replies the Pope had received which seemed to indicate that there was no immediate danger of war the Pope had decided to withdraw his suggestion. Bonnet said that Roux had added that the Vatican now desired to let the proposal die quietly and preferred to have the Pope's action described not as a proposal but as a mere inquiry to test the ground.

The Papal Nuncio in Paris this afternoon confirmed to me that this was the attitude of the Vatican saying that the Pope would take no further action and that after all he had been merely taking soundings.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL:JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated May 10, 1939
Rec'd 5:12 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

920, May 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Bonnet said that he was delighted by this conclusion of the affair as he considered it most important not to offend the Pope, and he felt that the Pope had not had his feelings hurt in any way.

The British Ambassador, however, said to me this afternoon that he believed that although the Pope had dropped his project of mediating between France and Italy he had not dropped his project of mediation between Germany and Poland. The British Ambassador added that he did not believe that Poland would accept such mediation. Bonnet said to me that the news from Moscow was most encouraging. It appeared certain that Molotov was most anxious to arrive at an agreement with France and England. When the British Ambassador had presented the British proposal, Molotov had countered by saying that he preferred the French proposal. The British Ambassador had then stated that the French had adhered to the British proposal and that the French proposal could not come up for consideration.
consideration so long as the British proposal was under consideration. Bonnet said to me that on the contrary any French proposal could and would be maintained whether the British liked it or not. He expressed the opinion that the British eventually would be obliged to adhere to the French proposal.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL:JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Paris
Dated May 10, 1939
Rec'd 4:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

920, May 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Sir Eric Phipps said to me that the British Ambassador in Moscow had found Molotov most cordial but that Molotov had bombarded him with questions about British policy which he had found difficult to answer. The British had not yet received a definite reply to their proposal.

Both Bonnet and the British Ambassador are optimistic with regard to the future. They both believe that the inclusion of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Rumania and Poland in the front against German aggression, plus the increasing in military strength of England and France, plus the growing economic and financial difficulties in Germany and Italy, will make it evident in another two months that the balance of force is definitely against Germany and Italy. They believe that Germany and Italy are already so uncertain about the balance of force that they will not dare to make war.

They both expect a number of crises in the coming month; but
-2- #920, May 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris.

but believe that in the end Germany and Italy will be compelled to negotiate on approximately the basis proposed by the President in his message to Hitler and Mussolini.

Incidentally the British Ambassador said to me today, as he has said to me twice recently, that his Government had only one fear at the present moment.

BULLITT

RR:DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated May 10, 1939
Rec'd 4:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

920, May 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Ribbentrop, to the certain knowledge of the British Government, was engaged in attempting to prove to Hitler that Germany could make war on France and England with impunity since it was certain that England and France could not even obtain military supplies from the United States. The recent debates on the Neutrality Act were being cited Ribbentrop as proof that the United States in case of war would sell no military supplies or airplanes to France and England. The British Government therefore considered it of the highest importance that the modification of the Neutrality Act should if possible be brought about in the near future. Such a modification of the Neutrality Act would end all chance that Ribbentrop might persuade Hitler to risk immediate war. Bonnet said the same thing to me last night.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

RR: DDM
REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (O)

PARIS

Dated May 15, 1939

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

946, May 15, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Van Zeeland, former Belgian Prime Minister, called on me today. He said he had not yet decided definitely to undertake the mission to Spain referred to in my No. 931 of May 12, 4 p. m. He expected to see this afternoon Léger, Paul Reynaud, the British Ambassador and the Spanish Ambassador. He intended to state to the Spanish Ambassador that he would not undertake this mission unless he should receive three positive assurances from the Spanish Government: (one) that the Spanish Government had not decided to adopt a totalitarian regime or a totalitarian system of economy, (two) that no commitments had been made to Germany and Italy binding Spain to economic measures which would make it impossible to build up a free system of economy, (three) that he should be accorded full access to all documents and information that
REB

2-#946, From Paris, May 15, 7p.m.

that he might need to obtain a complete and thorough view of the Spanish economic and financial situation.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS
Dated May 15, 1939
Rec'd 2:57 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

946, May 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Van Zeeland went on to say that the project had been conceived originally by Mannheimer who in reality controlled completely Mendelssohn of Amsterdam. Mannheimer would do nothing without approval of the French and Dutch Governments.

The French and the Dutch were eager to go ahead and then the British were somewhat reluctant and had stated that they felt an inquiry by him at the present time might be premature. Nevertheless he believed that the British Ambassador would inform him this afternoon that the British Government would approve his making the investigation in Spain.

Van Zeeland said that Mannheimer had been able to interest an extremely strong group of banks in France, England, Holland and Switzerland. He had been told that at least twenty million pounds would be available in case
he could work out a satisfactory agreement with the Spanish Government.

No Belgian banks would be represented owing to the fact that the Belgian financial position at the present time would not permit Belgian participation.

After his conversations today and tomorrow in Paris Van Zeeland expects to return to Brussels and if all goes well to leave for Spain about the 25th of May.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS
Dated May 15, 1939
Received 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

946, May 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Van Zeeland said that he had gathered recently all the information he could on the Spanish situation. He believed that the hot heads of the Phalangista movement were now having their ardor cooled by the cold realities of Spain's economic, financial and social difficulties and that his task would be to try to work out a plan for the orderly development of Spain on lines of free economy and then to have the plan put into operation when it became clearly evident that common sense and not Fascist ideology was dominant in Spain.

Incidentally Van Zeeland said that he totally disapproved of the economic and financial policies of the present Belgian Government. He believed that there would be no immediate or spectacular crash but that the national economy would sink slowly until the present policies should be altered.

Van
-2- #946, May 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE), from Paris

Van Zeeland is extremely apprehensive with regard to the possibility that war may develop over the question of Danzig.

Please repeat to Treasury. (END MESSAGE),

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated May 16, 1939
Rec'd 6 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

953, May 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Daladier gave me this evening the text of the Soviet Government's note rejecting the British proposals.

The Soviet Government took the position that the British proposals could not even serve as the basis for discussion since they offered no reciprocal guarantees whatsoever to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government pointed out that owing to this lack of reciprocal guarantees and owing to the limitation of the British and French obligations to Poland and Rumania, German aggression might be turned against the Soviet Union by way of the Baltic states. The Soviet Government proposed as the only basis for agreement: full mutual guarantees between the Soviet Union, England, and France; a guarantee for Finland, Estonia, and Latvia as well as Poland and Rumania, and military conversations and agreements between England, France, and the Soviet Union to make the assistance thus promised a reality.

BULLITT

EMB ROW
In commenting on this Russian note, Daladier said that he had ordered Corbin French Ambassador in London yesterday (as reported in my No. 948 of May 16, 4 p.m.) to state at once to Halifax that the French Government must insist on its thoughts being made the basis for discussions between England, France, and the Soviet Union.

Daladier added that he was no longer certain that the Soviet Union would accept the French proposal. The Soviet Union had been ready to accept it and there had been no question of adding the Baltic States to the guarantees for Poland and Rumania. He felt that all the British had accomplished by their dilatory and half-hearted proposals was to make the Russian terms stiffer.

So far as he was concerned he could not see much objection to guaranteeing the Baltic states. It was clear that if Germany should invade the Baltic states Poland would be obliged to go to their assistance. A guarantee of
of the Baltic states would add therefore little or nothing to the obligations of France. He was inclined to feel that the Russian proposal should be accepted although he would prefer to obtain Russian acceptance as well as British French for the original proposal.

BULLITT

EMB ROW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

From PARIS

Dated May 16, 1939

RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAY 18 1939

SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

953, May 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Daladier went on to say that now that the policy of resistance to German aggression in the east had been adopted it was essential to means necessary to make such a line of policy effective and successful. He had as few illusions as I had with regard to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had done everything it could to overthrow his ministry. Nevertheless he believed that it was essential to have Russia in the combination. Only thus could a sufficient combination of force be built up to deter Hitler from plunging into war.

Daladier added that he had received reports today of disquieting movements of German troops toward the Polish frontier. He did not know whether this might presage an early attack. He was inclined to guess that Germany by threats would attempt to disintegrate Polish morale for at least a few weeks and that there would probably be peace until the end of June; but on the whole he was not optimistic.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

(#) apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D) Dated May 17, 1939

PARIS

Record 2:02 p.m.

MAY 18 1939

Washington.

961, May 17, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Polish Ambassador stated to me this morning that General Kasprzycki, Minister of National Defense of Poland, had been delighted by his conversations with General Gamelin and other members of the French General Staff. Plans had been prepared for immediate and complete collaboration in time of war. These plans included a French attack on the German Siegfried Line.

The Polish Ambassador added that the expense of keeping the Polish Army mobilized was so great that Poland was in need of financial assistance. He had therefore requested an immediate loan by France of approximately two billion francs, one billion of which would be spent in France for war material.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated May 17, 1939

FROM
Rec'd 1:57 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

861, May 17, 6 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

At the same time the Polish Ambassador in London had requested the British Government to give Poland a loan of sixty million pounds.

The Polish Ambassador emphasized that these loans would be for the purpose of protecting the stability of the Polish zloty and preventing inflation in Poland and at the same time providing essential instruments of war and raw materials.

In connection with the question of raw materials the Polish Ambassador said that the Polish Minister of Commerce, Roman, who was now on his way to open the Polish pavilion at the New York Exposition had been instructed to request the American Government to extend credits of as long term as possible to enable the Polish Government to establish depots of American cotton and copper in Poland.

BULLITT

DDM
KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated May 17, 1939
Rec'd 2:07 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

961, May 17, 1 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The idea of the Polish Government was that it would be most difficult to obtain these raw materials in time of war; and that a sufficient supply should be kept on hand in Poland to cover the peace time needs of Poland for one year.

In the case of cotton future supplies would be used to replace any bales withdrawn from the depots so that the amount in the depots would remain constant.

The Polish Ambassador said that his Government hoped profoundly that the American Government would look with approval on this proposal.

In conclusion the Polish Ambassador added that his government at the moment did not expect an immediate attack by Germany. (END MESSAGE)
SECRETARY OF STATE

MAY 23, 1939

NOTED

979, May 22, 2 p.m.

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

On Saturday night Daladier, Bonnet, Léger and Halifax discussed at length the negotiations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Léger stated to me this morning that Halifax had finally agreed to adopt the original French proposal and indeed had expressed willingness to go further than the original French proposal since he was prepared to propose to the Soviet Union the following formula: that in case the Soviet Union should become engaged in war because of an appeal for assistance by either Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland or Rumania in case any one of these states should be attacked by Germany, Great Britain would bring full and immediate military assistance to the Soviet Union. Vice versa in case Great Britain is involved in war because of an attack on
REB

2-9#979, From Paris, May 22, 2 p. m.

on one of these states and an appeal to Great Britain for assistance, the Soviet Union would render immediate military assistance to Great Britain.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB

(r) Apparent omission
979, May 22, 2 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Léger commented that if the British had been prepared to accept this formula three weeks ago the Russians would have accepted it but at the present moment the Soviet Union was insisting that it would not negotiate on any other basis than the full Soviet formula reported in my No. 953 of May 16, 8 p. m.

Léger said that the French Government had received some disquieting information with regard to offers that the German Government was making to the Soviet Government and in view of the urgent need to have full Soviet support for the states of eastern Europe the French Government had urged the British Government to accept the Soviet proposal in toto.

Halifax had replied that it would be extremely difficult for the Prime Minister to carry public opinion
LMS 2-No. 979, May 22, 2 p.m., Sec. 2, from Paris.

opinion with him to the lengths demanded by the Soviet proposal. In the end, however, he had said that he was convinced personally that if the Russians should refuse to accept the proposal he was now ready to make, the Soviet proposal should be accepted.

BULLITT

EMB.ROW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
FROM Dated May 22, 1939
Rec'd 5 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

979, May 22, 2 p. m. (SECTION THREE)
He did not, however, hold out much hope that Chamberlain would agree with this point of view. Legger added that Maisky was on a very high horse indeed and said he feared that at this late date nothing short of full acceptance of the Soviet proposal would persuade the Soviet Government to participate in the resistance to Germany. The Soviet Government had explained privately to the French Government that it felt so uncertain of the situation in Rumania which might be reversed in one night by the assassination of the King of Rumania that it desired a direct alliance with France and England. The Soviet Government must consider within the bounds of possibility the eventuality that Rumania would not resist German attack and would not call on the Soviet Government for assistance. In that case if German troops should cross Rumania to attack the Soviet Union Great Britain would not be obliged to assist the Soviet
LMS 2-No. 979, May 22, 2 p. m., Sec. 3, from Paris.

the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union desired to be confident of British support no matter what might be the future action of the Rumanian Government.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB:ROW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated May 23, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 1:52 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

985, May 23, 1 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Leger said to me this morning that he was more hopeful than he had been that an agreement might soon be reached between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The announcement of the German-Italian alliance, which was frankly offensive in character, had impressed both Halifax and Maisky greatly. Halifax had stated last evening in Geneva that he felt the terms of this alliance were such that they excluded all possibility of carrying further the policy of "appeasing" either Germany or Italy. Maisky also seemed to feel that the danger of war had been greatly increased by the German-Italian alliance and had begun to talk more spiteful.

An additional element in the situation was a new attitude on the part of the Rumanian Government. The Rumanian Ambassador in Paris had called on him yesterday and had stated to him officially on behalf of his Government
Government that Rumania now considered the present situation so serious that it no longer would have any objection whatsoever to arrangements being made at once for Russian support of Rumania in case of attack by Germany.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY
Paris
FROM dated May 23, 1939
Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

232, May 23, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

POPULAIRES' commentators on foreign affairs expressed
the opinion this morning that Hitler and Mussolini had
used the afterglow of publicity on their newly signed
alliance in the hope of further intimidating their
adversaries. If such was indeed the intention, a supposi-
tion which is given substance by the taciturn nature of
Ribbentrop's remarks and Gayda's expansiveness on the
subject of "confidential conventions of far-reaching
importance", the plans of the Dictators have miscarried
so far as the Paris press is concerned.

While this morning's newspapers do not attempt to
mince in any way the completeness of the alliance,
the commentators in general persist in the view that
has been current since Ribbentrop and Ciano met at Milan
that a formal alliance could hardly change matters either
for the better or for the worse. It is generally agreed
that
2-992: From Paris, May 23, 4 p.m.
(See One)

that the treaty is aggressive in nature, but even the
fact is not new as the two Dictators have long been
collaborating in a brigandage of "your money or your
life" type.

BULITT
SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

292, May 23, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

In the opinion of most commentators the true aim of the Dictatorate is made clear by the emphasis given in the presentation of the treaty to "vital space" and by the fact that Hitler and Mussolini have set out to "consolidate" their military alliances. Obviously the immediate step is to orient their armies and the expectations will be justified in their victory by their own activity; yesterday's signature should clear the final veto on a mutual guarantee agreement which will either preserve peace or assure victory for the democracies.

There are, of course, all references in the press to the fact that Italy's signature did not oblige her to full fight with the Central Powers. Likewise, the president overlooked the discreetly which Hitler has himself made upon his own signature. But when we consider that this is to be the climax to a long series of events, we cannot help but wonder at the boldness of his move.
-S- 1935, May 23, 4 p.m., from Paris.

...drawn is, therefore, similar to the view expressed by the Berlin correspondent of the LONDON TIMES that revision has now reached a most dangerous stage. It is also the general view that henceforth the clerks will have neither an independent army nor an autonomous diplomacy that in fact Italy's vassalage is now complete.

Copy to London, Rome, Berlin. (END.)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

PARIS
FROM Dated May 23, 1939

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

994, May 23, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

The chief of the Far Eastern Division at the Foreign Office read to us this morning a telegram received on May 21 from the French Ambassador at Tokyo reporting that the Japanese Government had definitely decided not (repeat not) to enter into a military alliance with the axis powers. The Ambassador reported that on either May 11 or 12 Hiranuma and Arita, incensed at the attitude of the Extremists, had tendered their resignation to the Emperor. The Emperor had refused the resignations and had requested them to remain in office and to continue their policy. (END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

KLP
HRE

This message should be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (br)

PARIS

Dated May 23, 1939

Rec'd 4:18 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

994, May 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

On May 15 the Ambassador under instructions from Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Paris had called on the and had referred to reports published in Japan that the Franco-British negotiations with Soviet Russia envisaged action in the East.

The Ambassador denied these reports stating that the arrangements under negotiation with Russia contemplated action only in the west. He added that the reason for this was that it was inconceivable to the French Government that it could ever go to war against Japan. At the same time he took occasion to refer to reports that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy and stated that of course if such an allegiance should be concluded this would mean that Japan might go to war against France and therefore the French Government would be obliged to reconsider its views regarding the Soviet arrangement.

BULLITT

JRL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

Paris

Dated May 23, 1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

994, May 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

The Ambassador reported that the Japanese Foreign Office had given publicity to only the first part of his statement of May 15 which had produced an excellent effect. The second part of his statement had not been given publicity but had undoubtedly influenced the Japanese Government in its decision not to enter the military alliance. The Ambassador concluded by reporting his conviction that for the time being at least there would be no question of a military alliance or of a Cabinet crisis.

Reference my 976, May 20, 2 p.m.

Chauvel said that yesterday the Foreign Office had instructed the French Ambassador in Tokyo to send a brief note to the Japanese Government referring to the International Settlement of Shanghai.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This message should be closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM Dated May 23, 1939 to anyone (br)

Rec'd 4:23 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

994, May 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

The note would point out that the French Government because of the fact that it was represented by the French Consul on the governing body of the International Settlement was interested in the status of the International Settlement and of course could not disinterest itself in any proposed changes affecting The Settlement. The note would then invite attention to the recent American aide-memoire and state that the French Government associated itself with the point of view expressed therein.

Reference my 874, May 3, 5 p.m. last paragraph.

Chauvel said that the French Government had been informed by the British Government that the latter considered it inopportune at present to go forward with the idea of embargoing iron ore exports from British and French Far Eastern possessions to Japan.

BULLITT

LMS: EMB
This message should be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated May 23, 1939

Secretary of State
Washington

994, May 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

The British Government had stated that perhaps at some later time this proposal could be considered in connection with some comprehensive plan to bring pressure to bear upon Japan if such a plan should seem advisable. Chauvel said that the French Government therefore had decided to remove the embargo on the export of iron ore from French Indo China to Japan. This would not be done immediately because the French Government was using the embargo as a bargaining point in an effort to conclude the negotiations with Japan for a commercial agreement.

BULLITT

EMB: JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Dated May 23, 1939.
Rec'd, 3:55 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

994, May 23, 5 p. m. (SECTION SIX)

Referring to the requests made of the French Government in the aide memoire presented by the Chinese Ambassador on April 13 (see my 766, April 18, 2 p. m.) Chauvel stated the following: (one) a group of French banks is prepared to extend a loan to support the Chinese currency subject to receiving a guarantee from the French Treasury. The matter is now in Reynaud's hands. (Reynaud told me last night that the French Government had decided to guarantee this loan to the amount of 200,000,000 francs); (two) the competent French technical services have reported favorably a proposal to extend export credit guarantees to cover the purchase of railway equipment in particular for the construction of a railway between Yunnan and Chungking (the amount involved is about 300,000,000 francs); (three) the French Government has gone further than requested by the Chinese Government in that it has removed entirely the transit duties on supplies of material destined for the Chinese Government passing through Indo-China.

(END OF MESSAGE)

EMB:ROW

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS
FROM Dated May 30, 1939
Rec’d 4:55 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington
1032, May 30, 7 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bonnet told me this evening that he had heard nothing from the Polish Ambassador during the past four days because the Polish Ambassador had been out of town. Bonnet added that he expected to have from the British a text for a political agreement with Poland within a week and he expected both France and Great Britain to sign simultaneously identical political agreements with Poland in about ten days.

Bonnet said that he was optimistic with regard to the general situation. He did not (repeat not) believe that Hitler would dare to try to annex Danzig at the present time. The Poles would fight and Hitler knew it and of course the French and British would fight with the Poles. He believed that the remainder of June would be comparatively tranquil. He thought that the next serious crisis would come about the end of July.

BULLITT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (BR)

PARIS
FROM Dated May 30, 1939
Received 7:55 a.m. 31st

Secretary of State
Washington

1034, May 30, 9 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL

The Counselor of the German Embassy who returned to Paris a few days ago from Berlin said to Wilson this noon that his Government had determined to settle definitively the question of Danzig before the summer was over. He remarked that it was a pity that Beck had refused the proposal made to him by Hitler when he visited Berchtesgaden last January for the reincorporation of Danzig in the Reich and a "narrow" corridor across the corridor.

The German Counselor said that he was at a loss to understand why Beck had turned down this offer. Wilson remarked that it was doubtless because the Poles had no desire to have the same fate befall them as had befallen the Czechs. The German Counselor said that this was absurd and that Hitler's offer had been made in good faith in an effort to settle the last serious problem affecting Germany in Europe. Wilson said that what might have seemed a reasonable proposal last December, of course, would
EDA - 2 - #1034, May 30, 9 p.m., from Paris

would seem something quite different after the event of March 15. The Counselor said that he must admit that this was undoubtedly the view generally held in other countries.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

WWC: RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Paris

Dated May 30, 1930

Rec'd 7:50 p.m., Docket European Affairs—May 31, 1930

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1034, May 30, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Upon inquiry as to exactly how Hitler intended to settle the Danzig problem before the summer was over, the German Counselor professed ignorance. Wilson remarked that it was generally believed that the German plan was about as follows: a vote by the Danzig Senate for incorporation in the Reich which would be followed by the entry of Polish troops into Danzig. Germany would then go to the defense of Danzig and would make war upon Poland believing that Great Britain and France would fail to fulfill their pledges of assistance to Poland on the ground that Poland had committed the act of aggression. The German Counselor said that it was a fact that his government was convinced that if events should take place in the matter outlined Great Britain and France would refuse to assist Poland and Germany would be left to deal with Poland alone.

At
-2- #1034, May 30, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

At the close of the conversation the German Counselor reiterated his statement that the Fuhrer would "settle" Danzig before the end of the summer.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITI

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

DATED June 5, 1939

RECD 4:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1071, June 5, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Bonnet gave me to read this afternoon the note of the Soviet Government containing its latest proposals to the French Government.

The first paragraph contains a mutual promise of the French, British and Soviet Governments to give military assistance to each other in case of a direct attack by any power.

The next paragraph obliges the three powers to take military action in case of "aggression" against Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Greece or Belgium.

A later paragraph of the note stipulates that this political agreement shall come into effect only after the signature by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union of a military accord to be negotiated at some future date.

(END OF SECTION ONE).

BULLITT
Bonnet said that both he and Daladier felt that the Russian proposal in its present form was unacceptable for two reasons:

(One) The Russians had eliminated the provision in the French-British draft which provided that assistance should be brought to a state only in case that state should have been attacked and should have requested assistance.

At this point he handed me a copy of a note which the Soviet Government had sent to the Estonian Government and a copy of the reply which the Estonian Government had sent to the Soviet Government. The Soviet note to Estonia stated that it was a vital interest of the Soviet Union to prevent any power obtaining special privileges of either a political, military or economic nature in Estonia and that if either "freely or under duress" the Estonian Government should accord such privileges to any other power the Soviet Government would be obliged to defend Estonia against such "aggression" whether the Estonian Government had asked for such assistance or not.

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1071, June 5, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(The note of the Estonian Government in reply stated that the Government of Estonia insisted on retaining the sole right to judge whether there was any aggression against Estonia.)

Bonnet went on to say that in view of this note of the Soviet Government to Estonia the word "aggression" in the Soviet Government's proposal to France and Great Britain wore a sinister aspect. It could be interpreted to mean that at any time that the Soviet Government should decide to march troops into Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland or Turkey because of some event which it chose to consider aggression although the state concerned might not consider it aggression, the French and British Governments would be obliged to support a Soviet invasion of the state that the Soviet Union chose to invade. In other words the Soviet proposal meant carte blanche for the Soviet
-2- #1071, June 5, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris.

Soviet Union to invade the states named in the Soviet note with French and British consent and support.

BULLITT

DDM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated June 5, 1939
Rec'd 4:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1071, June 5, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

France and England could certainly not consent to giving the Soviet Union support for an extension of bolshevism in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, the entire moral position of France and Great Britain was based on their defense of the freedom of peoples. Acceptance of the Soviet proposal would mean consent to the establishment of a Soviet protectorate over the states named in the note.

Two. The second objection was that contrary to all diplomatic practice the political accord was subjected to and made dependent upon the signature of a military accord, the terms of which were totally unspecified. If France and England should sign the political accord proposed by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government might, and doubtless would, make demands for military assistance from France and England of a nature that it would be totally impossible to accord.

BULLET

RR
PARIS, June 5, 1939

To sign the proposed political accord as a document subjected to the conclusion of a future military accord therefore would be to sign a blank check that the Russians could fill in or not fill in as they might choose.

While I was with Bonnet he telephoned to Corbin, the French Ambassador in London, to obtain the British view of the Soviet proposal.

Corbin replied that he had seen Halifax this morning; but that Halifax had not yet shown the Russian proposal to Chamberlain and had only read it hurriedly himself and had not yet received reports from his experts on it and therefore could say nothing of a decisive nature.

Bonnet stated that Daladier had seen Souritz, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, and had told him that although the French Government was still studying the Soviet note and had not prepared a formal reply to it France would not agree to make the political accord subject
- 2 - #1071, June 5, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Paris

subject to the conclusion of a future military accord
and also would not agree to the paragraph permitting
invasion of states by Soviet armies under the guise of
protecting them against "aggression".

BULLITT

GW: RR
Secretary of State
Washington

1071, June 5, 7 p.m. (SECTION SIX)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bonnet said that no progress had yet been made in the matter of the political agreement between France, Great Britain and Poland because the Poles had not yet requested the British to discuss the immediate conclusion of a political agreement. He said that he could not understand this and that he was notified today to attempt to clarify this situation and hoped that he could persuade the British to conclude political, military and financial accords with the Poles in the immediate future, which would permit the signature of similar French-Polish accords.

In conclusion Bonnet said that in spite of the present difficulties he still believed that an accord between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union would be achieved.

He added that his information from Germany indicated that the Germans had made no progress in their efforts to achieve rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Further
- 2 - #1071, June 5, 7 p.m. (SECTION SIX) from Paris

Further information indicated that the Germans were not contemplating an attack on Poland or any other state this month. (END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

RR
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1072, June 5, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Daladier said to me this evening that he had stated to the Soviet Ambassador that he considered the Soviet proposal a ridiculous document. It would be absurd to conclude a political accord subject to the conclusion of a future military accord, and the enumeration of states in the Soviet proposal seemed to him thoroughly undesirable. What was necessary was to make a simple agreement between France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, providing that the three states should go to war if any one of the three were menaced by an aggression direct or indirect.

I asked Daladier how he intended to define aggression in view of the Soviet note to Estonia (see my telegram No. 1071, June 5, 7 p.m.). He replied that the definition of aggression would have to be prepared with the utmost care. The Soviet note to Estonia was one of the most shocking documents
documents he had ever read. It meant simply that the Soviet Union reserved the right to enter Estonia on any pretext convenient to the Soviet Government. He was inclined to think that the simplest test of aggression was the crossing of a frontier by an armed force.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

HPD
EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He felt that it was necessary to have the Soviet Union in the front of resistance to Hitler. He also believed that the negotiations could be brought to a successful conclusion; but he thought that before the end of the negotiations, it would be necessary for him to adopt a position of take it or leave it. He had done this once before with the Soviet Union when he had forced the Soviet Union to enter the League of Nations by informing the Soviet Ambassador in Paris that he intended to come to an agreement with Hitler.

Daladier said he had no indication as to Chamberlain's attitude and, since Chamberlain had been driven by others to make his proposals to the Soviet Union, he felt that there was a possibility that Chamberlain would refuse to argue any further. He had said this to the Soviet Ambassador and had told the Soviet Ambassador that he was convinced
-2- #1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris convinced that Chamberlain would not agree to guarantee the Baltic states. He added that he had no information which indicated that there were serious conversations with regard to a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Daladier then stated that he had no information indicating that Hitler was likely to attack Poland or any other country this month. He believed that the next great moment of danger would come at the end of July after the German harvest.

(END OF SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

PEG:KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

J R
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

Dated June 5, 1939

Rec'd 8:30 a.m., 6th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He thought that Hitler was now most hesitant to begin a war. The military position of France and England was much stronger than last September. The production of airplanes in both France and England was now satisfactory and anti-aircraft guns were now beginning to be produced in sufficient quantity. Germany and Italy could no longer bombard the industrial centers of France and England with impunity.

In his opinion another vital factor which was restraining Hitler from making war was the attitude of the Government of the United States. He was absolutely certain that if the President had not taken the attitude that he had taken from last October onward Hitler long since would have attacked France and England. He could never express adequately his gratitude to the President for his policy during these months. The fact that the United States had become an enormous question mark in Hitler's mind had been sufficient to prevent the war which otherwise
-2- #1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris.
otherwise would have been inevitable. He was deeply
grateful to the President and was certain that his
position in history would be that of a very great
statesman.

(END OF SECTION THREE).

BULLITT

WJC: PEG
1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

I asked Daladier if he had any criticism to make of American policy. He said that he had none. The Government of the United States had done everything possible to prevent war in Europe with a clarity and ability that were astonishing. If he should meet the President in Washington tomorrow he would have nothing to say except to thank him for his offers.

He had asked Alphand, Director of Commercial Accords, to speak to me about the possibility of acquiring a very large quantity of American cotton to be stocked at the earliest possible moment in France and he assumed that Alphand had already discussed this matter with me. I replied that Alphand had informed me that he would call on me today to make a formal proposal with regard to American cotton. Daladier said that aside from this proposal he did not have a single request to make.

Relations between nations should be always of the sort that now existed between France and the United States.
1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

I asked Daladier how he explained Mussolini's present policy. He said that he felt Mussolini had aged rapidly during the past year and had begun to lose his grip and was influenced greatly by Ciano who was unpopular in Italy and could not see any way of becoming Mussolini's successor except by German support. He felt that the present policy had been invented by Ciano and foisted on Mussolini by him and was designed to obtain German support for Ciano's succession to the Duke's post.

Daladier said that he felt confident that if war should break out during the month of July, Spain would not become an ally of Germany or Italy; but he felt almost certain that Spain would provide submarine bases for Germany and Italy.

WWC: HPD

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

Daladier said that the Japanese had been intensely angry because of his action in sending a military mission to assist the Chinese. They were threatening to attack French Indo-China almost daily. He did not believe that the Japanese would attack Indo-China and he was now sending arms and ammunition to the Chinese Government. He believed that it was of the utmost importance that China should be supported at the present time by all the democratic countries. (I spoke to him at this point about Chinese exports of tung oil to the United States. See your No. 396 of June 2, 7 p.m.).

Daladier said that he was continuing to attempt to get under way the conversations between Great Britain and Poland for the rapid conclusion of a political agreement. He believed that it would have an excellent effect on the negotiations with the Soviet Union if France and England should conclude political, military and financial agreements with Poland before replying formally.
#1072, June 5, 10 p.m. (SECTION SIX) from Paris.

formally to the Soviet Union's proposals.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

RR:DDH
Telegram Received

MJD 1939

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From Paris

Dated June 6, 1939.

Rec'd. 4:51 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1080, June 6, 6 p.m.

Léger said to me today that he felt the negotiations with the Soviet Union had been bungled horribly by the British and French.

If the British had agreed to the proposal which the Russians had indicated they would accept more than a month ago, there would have been no trouble. The Russians now realized that they were almost indispensable.

In his opinion the Russians were indispensable. The French Secret Service had just received a report which he was compelled to consider completely authentic with regard to a conference that Hitler had held a few days ago with the five leading generals of the Reichswehr. Hitler had asked the generals for their opinion as to the result of war in case the Soviet Union should fight on the side of France and England. The five generals were unanimous in the opinion that Germany would lose such a war. Hitler had then asked the generals for their opinion as to the result.
RESULT OF A WAR IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD STAND ALOOF. ONE OF THE GENERALS HAD STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT GERMANY WOULD LOSE SUCH A WAR BUT THE OTHER FOUR HAD STATED THAT IN THEIR OPINION A GERMAN VICTORY COULD NOT BE PREDICTED WITH CERTAINTY BUT THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT CHANCES OF SUCCESS TO RISK WAR.

(END SECTION ONE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This message should be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated June 6, 1939
Rec'd 4:57 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1080, June 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Léger went on to say that owing to the divergent opinions of members of the British Government with regard to the method of handling the negotiations with the Russians and similar differences in the French Government and the difficulty of obtaining real collaboration between the two governments it was extraordinarily hard to have the negotiations conducted in an orderly manner. Nevertheless he believed that an accord would eventually be reached.

Léger added that he felt it might be desirable to conclude the political, military, and financial accords with Poland before making any formal reply to the Soviet Union. He repeated what Bonnet had said to me yesterday to the effect that Halifax had said to Corbin that the Poles had not yet asked the British to make any written agreements.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL:JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

1-1836
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM
PARIS

Dated June 6, 1939
Rec’d 5:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1080, June 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Leger said that in his opinion the Germans would probably not attack this month. He expected, however, that in the latter part of July the Germans would start an intense campaign of propaganda and military threats directed against Poland.

Germany would do this in the hope that at the last moment when war seemed inevitable Chamberlain would revert to his Berchtesgaden and Munich technique and Bonnet with the support of Flandin would do the same. In his opinion the course to take if Hitler and Mussolini should propose another conference like the Munich conference would be for France and England and the Soviet Union to state that they would be glad to attend such a conference after Germany had restored complete liberty to Czechoslovakia. If the alliances between the Soviet Union, France, and England should have been concluded before Hitler should create this new crisis he believed that Hitler would not dare to make war but in any event he anticipated a test of nerves of the most
2-#1080 From Paris June 6, 6 p.m. (Sec 3)

most harrowing character in the latter part of July.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

JRL:NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated June 10, 1939
Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1106, June 10, 1 P.M.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I had a talk with the Polish Ambassador this morning. He believes that the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Government will drag on for a long time. The Soviet Government has little interest in coming to an early agreement and the British Government is extremely wary of undertaking too extensive obligations.

Lukasiewicz who knows the Soviet mentality thoroughly states that the only real interest the Soviet Union has in reaching agreement with Britain and France is to be able to prevent them from making a second Munich with Germany at the expense of Soviet Russia. This obsession of the Soviets that they might be left alone in a tete-a-tete with Hitler is illustrated by one of the demands in their note replying to the Anglo-French proposal that the three powers should agree that in case of war none will make a separate peace. (The British Government is strongly opposed to any such clause.)

(End Section One)

WILSON

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated June 10, 1939
Rec'd 10:54 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1106, June 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Ambassador said that the most effective way of obtaining the Soviet Government's acceptance of the proposed pact would be to impress the Soviet Government with the possibility that Britain and France might make a settlement with Hitler. Lukasiewicz interprets the recent Halifax and Chamberlain "appeasement" speeches as a maneuver in this sense and believes that they have had some effect. For instance the first reaction in Moscow to the report of Strang's mission was distinctly unfavorable; twelve hours later there was a change and Moscow let it be known that they were pleased. The Polish Ambassador believes that in the long run an agreement with the Soviet Union will be reached.

I inquired whether negotiations had yet begun in London for the definitive political agreement between Britain and Poland. The Ambassador replied in strict confidence that they had in fact begun and he would not
be surprised if the agreement were concluded next week. I remarked that this would doubtless permit the conclusion of the political agreement with France. The Ambassador said that it was possible that the political agreement with France might be signed first and that this might take place early next week. He had heard from his Polish colleague in London that the British Government had given its "approval" to the signature of the Franco Polish political agreement.

WILSON

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

PARIS

Dated June 10, 1939

Rec'd 11:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1106, June 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

The conclusion of this agreement would have the effect of immediately bringing into force the Franco-Polish military accord which has already been signed.

The Polish Ambassador said that he attached considerably less importance to the political and military accords than he did to arrangements for providing financial assistance and supplying arms to Poland. If war should break out in Europe, Britain and France would be obliged to support Poland whether or not political and military accords existed. He has been disappointed by the unwillingness of the French Government so far to give the necessary financial assistance to Poland for the purchase of stocks of raw materials as well as by their unwillingness furnish immediately tanks and airplanes. He argues that given the advanced state of French military preparation it would be in France's interest to furnish Poland immediately with much needed tanks and airplanes;
The French apparently are not convinced.

The Ambassador said that Danzig was surprisingly quiet. It had been expected that the SA games and activities in Danzig would bring a vast number of Nazis there and probably cause incidents. The number of Nazis who had gone to Danzig was considerably less than expected.

The Ambassador expects the next three or four weeks to be relatively quiet with a first class crisis in August or September. (END OF MESSAGE).

WILSON

CSB