COMMUNICATIONS FROM FRANCE

Telegram No. 1142, June 16, 1939, (741.61/704)
Telegram No. 1174, June 21, 1939, (741.61/718)
Despatch No. 4573, June 24, 1939, (760C.62/686)
Telegram No. 1217, June 28, 1939, (740.00/1822)
Telegram No. 1231, June 30, 1939, (760C.62/709)
Telegram No. 1232, June 30, 1939, (740.00/1840)
Telegram No. 1238, July 1, 1939, (760C.62/667)
Telegram No. 1241, July 1, 1939, (760C.62/668)
Telegram No. 1249, July 3, 1939, (760C.62/671)
Telegram No. 1253, July 5, 1939, (741.61/755)
Telegram No. 1270, July 7, 1939, (741.61/762)
Telegram No. 1322, July 18, 1939, (741.61/777)
Telegram No. 1360, July 24, 1939, (741.61/784)
Telegram No. 1368, July 25, 1939, (741.61/786)
Telegram No. 1382, July 26, 1939, (740.00/1955)
Telegram No. 1414, July 31, 1939, (893.51/6948)
Telegram No. 1415, July 31, 1939, (741.61/799)
Telegram No. 1429, August 3, 1939, (760C.62/758)
Telegram No. 1461, August 8, 1939, (760C.62/773)
Telegram No. 1491, August 12, 1939, (760C.62/803)
Telegram No. 1492, August 12, 1939, (760C.62/804)
Telegram No. 1494, August 15, 1939, (760C.62/818)
Telegram No. 1495, August 15, 1939, (760C.62/824)
Telegram No. 1500, August 16, 1939, (760C.62/842)
Telegram No. 1501, August 16, 1939, (760C.62/837)
Communications from France

Telegram No. 1517, August 18, 1939, (760C.62/864)
Telegram No. 1520, August 18, 1939, (760C.62/870)
Telegram No. 1521, August 18, 1939, (760C.62/871)
Telegram No. 1524, August 19, 1939, (760C.62/884)
Telegram No. 1529, August 19, 1939, (760C.62/886)
Telegram No. 1532, August 21, 1939, (760C.62/902)
Telegram No. 1535, August 21, 1939, (760C.62/903)
Telegram No. 1536, August 21, 1939, (760C.62/904)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated June 16, 1939

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

1142, June 16, 10 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I called on Bonnet yesterday afternoon. Referring to the negotiations with the Soviet Union he stated his belief that they would come to a successful conclusion. He said that the British had gone so far in an effort to meet the point of view of the Soviet Union (much farther than anyone had expected they would go) that it was inconceivable that agreement should fail. The only reason for failure would be a desire for failure on the part of the Soviet Government, and he would not admit that hypothesis.

As regards the request to subordinate the political agreement to the military agreement Bonnet said that the French Government would agree to open military conversations with Moscow immediately after the conclusion of the political agreement and he looks for no difficulties on this point.

(END SECTION ONE).

CS3

WILSON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From
Dated June 16, 1939
Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1142, June 16, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

He also professes to believe that the conversations now taking place in Moscow will convince the Soviet Government that no rigid guarantee by the Soviet Government is necessary so far as the Baltic states are concerned since if there should in fact be a German move against one of the Baltic states which threatened the security of the Soviet Union, Britain and France would be at the side of the Soviet Union.

I asked Bonnet whether in addition to the written instructions Strang had received oral and secret instructions giving more latitude. Bonnet said that this was in fact so and that if the early talks in Moscow convinced the British that the Soviet Government meant business the British would find a way of reaching agreement with the Soviet Government. He added that Naggiar, French Ambassador at Moscow, had telegraphed that after conferring with Seeds and Strang he was convinced that agreement would be reached. Bonnet said that he was deeply disturbed over the situation at Tientsin.

CSB

WILSON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Paris
FROM
Dated June 16, 1939
Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1142, June 16, 10 a.m. (SECTION THREE).

He had not yet heard whether the Japanese Government had officially refused, as the Japanese local authorities had refused, the offer of the British Government to have a three party committee discuss the Japanese demand for the surrender of the four Chinese. He expressed his belief that Japanese action at Tientsin will be found to have had a close relationship with plans of the axis powers in Europe.

Bonnet stated that he hoped intensely that the United States might find it possible to express an interest in this situation in such manner as to impress the Japanese with the risks of going too far. He stated that he was instructing Saint Quentin to discuss the matter with the State Department. He said that he had just been advised of statements which President Roosevelt had made to Jean Zey regarding the necessity of assisting the Chinese by financial and other support. Bonnet said that
#1142, June 16, 10 a.m. (3rd) from Paris

said that he was heartily in favor of this but that the burden which France was being asked to carry was becoming overwhelming.

WILSON

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated June 16, 1939
Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1142, June 16, 10 a.m. (SECTION FOUR).

The French and the British have a terrible responsibility in Europe and they alone cannot carry the brunt of checking Japanese aggression in the Far East. If the Japanese are to be checked the United States must play an important part therein.

Bonnet said that he was working hard on ways and means to satisfy the Polish request for financial assistance from France for armaments and raw materials in the amount of two billion francs. He was in favor of furnishing arms and airplanes to Poland because the ability of Poland to resist Germany was an essential factor for European peace. But in addition to the Polish request there were demands from Rumania, Greece and Turkey for arms and financial aid which would bring the total aid asked of France to some seven or eight billion francs. On top of this was the terrific cost of French rearmament. France was a nation of only forty million people and there was a limit to what could be expected of her.

Bonnet
BONNET went on to say that if war should break out it was clear that Japan would seize Indo China and Singapore. It would be impossible for Britain and France to send adequate forces to the Far East to protect their possessions there.

WILSON

RR; KL; P
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated June 16, 1939

Rec'd. 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1142, June 16, 10 a.m. (SECTION FIVE).

He was confident that ultimate victory would be with Britain and France and that they would regain their Far Eastern possessions. But the encouragement which the Axis powers and Japan would receive from the capture of these territories at the outset of the war would be tremendous. The only way he saw to prevent this taking place would be for the United States to loom up as such a potentially dangerous factor that Japan would not dare attack Britain and France in the Far East.

Bonnet said that he felt that the Far East and Spain were the two crucial points today. As regards Spain his information indicates that Serrano Suner has as yet undertaken no commitments for a military alliance with the Axis powers. Bonnet believes that in the event of war Spain would desire to remain neutral but he is not sure that Spain would in fact be able...
#1142, June 16, 10 a.m. (Sec. 5) from Paris

be able to do so.

I asked whether there were any developments re-
garding Van Zeeland's contemplated trip to Spain.
Bonnet said that there were none and that Van Zeeland
had been unable to obtain the assurances he had sought
from the Spanish Government.

I inquired whether progress is being made in the
negotiations for a political agreement with Poland.
Bonnet said that it might be a matter of only two or
three days before the agreement was signed. He said
that he wished to make sure that the terms of the
French agreement with Poland were exactly similar to
those of the British agreement with Poland adding that
the negotiations between Great Britain and Poland were
progressing most satisfactorily.

Bonnet stated that he did not look for any aggres-
sive act on Germany's part in the immediate future but
that he was certain that there would be a major crisis
before the summer was out. (END MESSAGE.)

WILSON

WWC
KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated June 21, 1939

Rec'd 4:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1174, June 21, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I had a talk with Léger this afternoon. Referring to the negotiations with the Soviet Government he said that he believed agreement would be reached within a week or ten days. The only serious problem unsettled is that concerning the Baltic states. The British are now prepared to go further than before to meet the Soviet point of view. Two or three alternative formulas have been drawn up and one of these should prove acceptable to the Soviet Government. The discussions with Molotov are being resumed today.

Léger said that from the beginning of the negotiations the Soviet Government had been extremely distrustful of the intentions of the British and French. The manner in which the negotiations had been conducted had enhanced their suspicions. (END OF SECTION ONE).

WILSON

EMB: JRL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The Soviet Government did not forget that they had had a mutual assistance pact with the French Government for a number of years; time and again the Soviet Government had attempted to begin staff talks in order that the assistance might be rendered effective; the French Government had always refused. The French Government on the other hand had carried on military conversations with a number of other countries, e.g., Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Government of course had known this. Frequently there had been open criticism in France of the Soviet pact and demands from political groups that the pact be denounced. The Soviet Government consequently had been doubtful of the value which France attached to the pact or of the extent to which France might go in fulfilling its obligations under the pact.

When the present Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union had begun the British had proposed not a treaty
-2- #1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris

treaty of mutual assistance but only that in case Poland
or Rumania were attacked then the Soviet Union should
join with Britain and France in giving assistance to
Poland or Rumania.

WILSON

EMB:NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated June 21, 1939.
Rec'd 5:56 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

The lack of reciprocity in the proposal and the fear on the part of the Soviet Union that if Poland or Rumania failed to defend itself against Germany then the Soviet Union would be left alone to bear the brunt of an attack by Germany without receiving assistance from Britain and France, had fanned the suspicions and resentment of the Soviet Union. Leger said that it would be unjust to blame the British for their conduct of the negotiations. The British Government had been obliged to go through an evolution in its political thinking. There had at one time been a danger that the British Government would become discouraged and drop the Soviet negotiations. That danger fortunately was past.

Leger said that at no time had the Soviet Government proposed that the mutual assistance accord should cover the Far East. If the Soviet Government had desired to obstruct the conclusion of an agreement they might well have
-2- #1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris

have made such a proposal.

Legér said that the situation in the Far East was
extremely disquieting. He had just received information
that there was now little if any possibility of the
British reaching a local solution of the Tientsin inci-
dent with the Japanese. (END SECTION THREE).

WILSON

NPL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated June 21, 1939

Rec'd 6:12 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

The central Government in Tokyo doubtless desired a local solution but the army was in the saddle and determined to force a settlement of far wider issues. The Japanese army had been unable for some time to make further headway in central and southern China and in order to gain decisive military decisions in majority of areas it would be necessary to send there Japanese troops from northern China. This the Japanese did not dare do for fear of the Soviet Union. The aim of the Japanese army therefore was to break down the British policy of support for Chiang Kai Shek, to make British policy subservient to Japanese policy in China and thereby destroy the spirit of resistance of the Chinese.

Leger said that measures/economic reprisal by the British alone or even in cooperation with the French would not force the Japanese Army to modify its policy. The British would either have to resist the Japanese which would mean war in the Far East or they would have to submit to the Japanese demands which would mean not only the destruction
of the rights of the western powers in China but would also so encourage Hitler and Mussolini with the evidence of British weakness that they would at once precipitate a situation in Europe which would develop into war.

(END SECTION FOUR)

WILSON

NFL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated June 21, 1939

Rec'd 6:17 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Leger said that there was just one factor which could prevent the worst from happening. He did not wish what he was going to say to be considered as a special plea or as an attempt to influence the United States Government. The French Government believed it understood the position of the United States Government and was trying to be discreet and not make any suggestion which might prove embarrassing to the United States. But his personal view was that the only factor which could influence the Japanese to accept a local solution of the Tientsin incident would be the attitude of the United States Government. The Japanese army asserted that the United States Government regarded the Tientsin affair as of no interest to it and that nothing was to be feared on that score from the United States. If, however, the United States Government informed the Japanese Government that it was in fact interested in these developments in China this would strengthen the hands of those members of the Japanese Government who have been arguing with the army that if they persisted in their policy they would eventually run foul of
HRE 2-1174 From Paris June 21, 8 p.m. (Sec 5)
of the United States.

(END SECTION FIVE)

WILSON

EBM:NPL
TELEGRAMA RECEIVED

HRE

1939

FROM

PARIS

Dated June 21, 1939

Rec'd 7:25 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1174, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

I inquired of Léger in this connection what he thought of Secretary Hull's statement of June 19. Léger said that it was excellent but it was a statement made only to the press in Washington, whether a statement of this character would produce an effect upon the Japanese Government was uncertain but a similar statement communicated through diplomatic channels to the Japanese Government would be a different matter. Léger repeated that he was not asking anything or assuming to suggest anything. He was convinced that if war should come in the Far East the United States would be drawn into it in defense of principles and rights which the United States has always defended. His hope is that the tremendous influence of the United States may be exerted as a preventive force to avert war.

I remarked that I had heard that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris had conveyed yesterday a reassuring statement to the French Government regarding the attitude of Spain in the event of a European war. Léger said that
HRE 2-#1174 From Paris June 21, 8 p.m. (Sec 6)

all that Lequerica had stated to Bonnet was that in the event of war the Spanish Government would remain neutral.

(END SECTION SIX)

WILSON

NPL: EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

1974, June 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

This statement after all was not so reassuring.

He believed that the Spanish Government in fact would not wish to go to war. On the other hand it was evident that Spanish neutrality would be a benevolent neutrality in favor of Germany and Italy: Spanish ports and air bases would be placed at the disposal of Germany and Italy. Léger said that the French military and naval general staffs frankly would prefer Spain as an enemy to Spain extending the favors of benevolent neutrality to Germany and Italy. If Spain entered the war France and Britain could destroy in short order the Spanish ports and airfields and capture Spanish Morocco; a so-called neutral Spain would present a dangerous problem.

In this connection Léger said that he was concerned over the number of troops Spain has sent to Spanish Morocco; where there used to be only 20,000 troopes in Spanish Morocco there are today over 90,000. The purpose of course, is to set up a threat to French security in North Africa.
EDA - 2 - #1174, June 21, 2 p.m. from Paris Section seven
Africa preventing France in case of war from sending
troops from Morocco to the continent and to Tunis.

(End of message).

Wilson

XLP:DDM
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the impression that a second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland, may be in the making. The position of Daladier and the official position of the French Government remain, of course, that France will support Poland if the latter resists aggression against Polish vital interests. It is, furthermore, possible that Germany will try to settle the Danzig question with such a heavy hand as to leave no way open for the French and British to attempt further "appeasement." Nevertheless my impression grows that many of the influences ...
influences which were at work in France and England last September are coming to life again, and have determined that a trial of strength with Germany must again be avoided, and that if necessary Danzig must go the way the Sudetenland went.

Among the factors which contribute to the foregoing impression are:

(1) The appearance of a sense of weariness over the continued tension in Europe. This comes out at times in conversation with French people. Recently inquiries were made of Daladier by members of parliament, who had received complaints from constituents, as to how much longer reservists who had been called to the colors would be kept on active duty. Daladier has announced that he intends to liberate by September 1st the reservists serving in the Maginot Line, and by October 1st other reservists, adding that if the situation permitted he might advance these dates.

(2) One hears it said at times by French people that France must not allow itself to be dragged into war over Danzig. Such opinions were not expressed a few weeks ago. There is criticism that Poland intends to force France into war.

(3) A feeling, probably widespread, that after all the present set-up of Danzig and the Corridor is unsound and not worth a war in order to perpetuate it.

(4) A deep-seated dislike and distrust of Beck in French governmental circles.

(5) ...
(5) Failure of the British and French Governments, after weeks of discussion, to give any effective financial assistance or to furnish arms to Poland. Failure of the British and French Governments to conclude the definitive political accords with Poland.

(6) The possibility that the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union will fail. Failure to reach agreement with the Soviet Union would give a further argument to the "appeasers", namely, that France and Britain cannot go to war for Poland unless the Soviet Union comes in.

(7) Impossibility, in the case of war, of rendering effective military assistance to Poland. France would be obliged alone to attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. It is doubtful whether the British could get ships into the Baltic. Of course, in the long run France and Britain would win - but would it be worth it? (One hears such statements).

(8) Concern in France over the role which Spain might play in case of a general war.

(9) The terrible cost of continuing rearmament and the burden of financing the rearmament of Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Greece, etc.

(10) Demoralizing effect of developments in the Far East: weakening of British prestige; realization that if war breaks out France's Far Eastern Empire would, for the time being at least, be lost. If British fears over the Far East should limit British assistance...
assistance to Poland in case of war to economic measures, such as an attempted blockade of Germany, that would strengthen the "appeasers" in France.

(11) Persistence of the feeling in influential circles that after all France should abandon central and eastern Europe to Germany, trusting that eventually Germany will come into conflict with the Soviet Union, and that France can remain secure behind the Maginot Line. This feeling went under cover on March 15th last. It continues to exist, however.

Yours respectfully,

Edwin C. Wilson
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

ECW/jgh
710

In triplicate.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

1217, June 28, midnight.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I talked with Daladier this evening. He said that he personally was convinced that Hitler intended to make this summer begin war by an attack on Danzig. The information of the French General Staff indicated that Germany would have enough men mobilized to strike at any time after July 15. Some of the reports indicated that the Germans would not strike until about August 15. In any event he felt that some time between July 15 and August 15 a crisis of the gravest sort was inevitable.

He added that he felt Hitler might fear to strike if the negotiations of France and England with the Soviet Union should be concluded successfully before July 15 and if the neutrality act in the United States should be altered to permit shipments of arms, munitions and implements of war and if the Germans should become convinced that France and England were absolutely determined to fight by the side of Poland. If any one of these three elements should be missing he thought that Hitler would risk war.

END SECTION ONE.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated June 28, 1939
Rec'd 10:30 a.m., 29th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1217, June 28, midnight (SECTION TWO).

Daladier said that the British were now falling over themselves to accord to the Russian demands. Two texts for submission to the Soviet Government had been prepared today. The first contained no specific mention of the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland but would be accompanied by a secret agreement covering them. The second contained a complete acceptance of the Russian demands. Strang in Moscow would be instructed tonight or tomorrow to present these two texts to the Soviet Government and to state that the British and French preferred the first text but were ready to accept the second if the Russians should insist.

I asked Daladier if he believed that this would conclude the negotiations or if he believed the Russians would insist on subjecting this political accord to the conclusion of a future military agreement. He said that he had urged the British to take up the question of
-2- #1217, June 28, midnight (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

of military agreement with the Russians before taking up the matter of the political agreement but the British had refused to do this. He was by no means certain that the Russians would surrender this demand and feared that the negotiations might be dragged out indefinitely. The proposal of the British now was that military conversations should begin within a week after the signature of the political agreement.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-

fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)  FROM Paris

Dated June 28, 1939
Rec'd 9:55 a.m., 29th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1217, June 28, midnight (SECTION THREE).

He added that the Soviet Government had repeatedly

assured the French and British Governments that it

was not negotiating in any way with the German Government.

I expressed doubt and Daladier said that of course he

knew he could not trust any Russian assurances but that

neither the French nor British Embassies nor secret

services had been able to unearth any information

indicating that the Russians were negotiating with the

Germans.

Daladier said that in order to convince the Germans

that the French support of Poland was certain he had

just ordered 42 tanks and a considerable quantity of

heavy artillery shipped to Poland. In case Poland and

Germany should become involved in war it was absolutely

certain that France would declare war on Germany.

Daladier said that the Spanish Government was

continuing to refuse to permit the refugees in France

to return to Spain. Recently, however, he had informed
-2- #1217, June 28, midnight (SECTION THREE) from Paris.

the Spanish Government that he would no longer keep the refugees in concentration camps but would attempt to integrate them in the life of France with the exception of about 10,000 who had extremely bad records as criminals or defectives of one sort or another.

BULLITT

WFC
EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1217, June 28, midnight. (SECTION FOUR).

After this statement the Spanish Government had indicated that if France would turn over to Spain the gold of the Bank of Spain the Spanish Government would receive 50,000 refugees a month. He expected agreement to be reached soon on the question of the refugees and the gold. Daladier said that Marechal Pétain was convinced that in case of war Spain would remain neutral but would persevere a malevolent neutrality with respect to France and England and would give bases and supplies to Italian and German submarines. He went on to say that he did not know how long it would be possible for Germany and Italy to maintain submarines. In the April 17 accord the French and British war plans included an air attack on the Italian fleet and the Italian coast line by the French and British Fleets.

(END SECTION FOUR).

BULLITT

DDM:RR
1217, June 28, midnight (SECTION FIVE).

He believed that if Germany and Poland should become involved in war Italy would not strike at once but would march with Germany as soon as France and England should declare war on Germany. Daladier said that he felt the improvement in the situation at Tientsin was due to the fact that the Japanese were aware that the Government of the United States was interested. It was obvious at the moment that neither France nor Great Britain could send adequate armed forces to the Orient and any restraint the Japanese might show would be dependent entirely on fear of eventual action by the United States.

In this connection Daladier said that he had scolded Bonnet for making the public statements about the United States which had been attributed to him at Arcachon last Sunday and that Bonnet had denied that he had ever made those statements (see my telegram No. 1214, June 28, 9 p.m.). (END OF MESSAGE).

RR

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH
1231, June 30, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Leger said to me today in strict confidence that about a week ago one of the most trusted agents of Hitler and Ribbentrop had arrived in Paris and had displayed immense activity in getting in touch with French politicians and journalists who were opposed to France supporting Poland.

During the past three or four days this man had been saying to all the French with whom he had come in contact that Danzig would be annexed to Germany on July first. The French Government was not sure whether he was making these remarks in order to stir up opposition to assistance to Poland by France or was merely trying to create intense nervousness or was speaking the truth.

WWC

BULLITT
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

RUSH

1231, June 30, 8 P.M. (Section T.5)

In any event Daladier had decided last night that he should be requested to return to Germany to remain there and that if he should refuse he should be expelled from France.

Leger said that while he did not believe that Germany would attempt a coup at Danzig tomorrow it was certainly within the bounds of possibility that such a coup would be attempted.

The best information of the General Staff continued to indicate that Germany would not move against Poland until the period between the fifteenth of July and the fifteenth of August.

(END OF MESSAGE).
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington,
1232, June 30, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Leger said to me today that he still believed there were eighty chances in a hundred that the negotiations between the Soviet Union and France and England would be concluded successfully in the near future.

He thought that the negotiations between the Soviet Government and Germany had broken down during the past week.

The Soviet Government had indicated that it would not seriously consider the political agreement with France and England being invalid until the conclusion of a subsequent military agreement. The formula which had now been devised to cover the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland involved no direct guarantee of those states but only mutual assistance between France, England and the Soviet Union provided an attack directed against
MJB - 2 - No. 1232, June 30, 8 p.m. (Sec. One) from Paris

against any of the three should be begun by a march through one of the small states named.

Leger said that relations between Poland and France had again become extraordinarily unpleasant. At a moment when it was absolutely essential for the French Government to know the exact thoughts of the Polish Government with regard to Danzig, the Polish Ambassador in Paris was so nervous and irritable that it was impossible to have any really intimate conversation with him.

(END SECTION ONE)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM: Dated June 30, 1939
Recorded 3 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

1232, June 30, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He had insulted both Daladier and Bonnet so grossly that Daladier would no longer see him and Bonnet could get nothing out of him. Similarly Beck in Warsaw had no relations of an intimate nature with the French Ambassador. As a result all the French Ministers from Daladier down were reluctant to do anything of a concrete nature for Poland. Mr. Leger, believed that both France and England should give loans to Poland and send airplanes to Poland at once in order to convince the Germans that France and England were determined to support Poland if Poland should become involved in war with Germany. The Polish Ambassador was entirely right in his demands for such assistance; but his manner of presentation of his demands was such that he killed his own case.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB
MJB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

Dated June 30, 1939

Rec'd. 3:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1232, June 30, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Leger said that a crisis of the gravest nature at some time before the fifteenth of August was in his opinion inevitable. Such a crisis might develop any day. The news that the House of Representatives was about to pass the Bloom proposals for alterations in the Neutrality Act had just reached him. The passage of these changes undoubtedly would be a large factor in deterring Hitler from making war. The conclusion of the alliances with the Soviet Union would be another such factor.

Leger said that he hoped that the Government of the United States had made clear through diplomatic channels, the interest of the United States in a peaceful and reasonable settlement of the Tientsin incident and the opposition of the United States to the exclusion by Japan of all foreign interests from China. He added that he felt that it was much easier to prevent the Japanese from taking action than to get them to reverse action.
action after it had once been taken. The moment the question of "face" was involved the Japanese were apt to become immovable.

(END SECTION THREE)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before from being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated June 30, 1939
Rec'd. 3:25 p. m.

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 1 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1232, June 30, 8 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)

Leger said that he would not be in the least surprised if the signature of the alliance between England, France, and the Soviet Union should lead to the announcement that Spain had joined in the anti-Comintern Pact. He had reason to believe that the Spaniards had already committed themselves to enter the pact. He did not know whether they had merely made a verbal promise or whether they had initialized some document. In case of an outbreak of general war in Europe he believed that Spain would declare her neutrality but that Spanish ports would be opened as bases to the Germans and Italians. Under such circumstances France and England might have to take military action against Spain.

In discussing the possibility that Hitler might risk war Leger expressed the opinion that the Reichswehr was now inclined to have war for the peculiar reason that the Reichswehr had become convinced that Hitler's
regime was intolerable and desired to establish its
its authority in the country and throw out Hitler.
(End section four)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB
THELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D).

Dated June 30, 1939

FROM Rec'd. 3:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1232, June 30, 8 p. m. (SECTION FIVE)

His own opinion was that in case of an early outbreak of war Hitler would soon be ousted by the Reichswehr which would then attempt to make peace. This might seem to be highly specious reasoning but he was convinced that the Reichswehr which had been against war until recently was now withdrawing its opposition to war.

I have received a peculiar but authoritative bit of information about Hitler's present state of mind. To a man that he is in the habit of receiving once or twice a year, to whom last May he expressed the absolute conviction that war was not in his destiny, he said recently that now he realized that war was in his destiny.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

1238, July 1, 2 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Rochat said to us this morning that telegrams just received from Warsaw and Danzig reveal no particularly alarming developments. The French Ambassador to Poland arrived in Paris yesterday on leave of absence and reported that while the Polish Government was fully alive to the danger of the situation it had no reason to believe that a coup was imminent. The French Consul at Danzig who is considered an unusually able officer also fails to find any indication of an immediate move.

Rochat said that the feverish atmosphere of expectation of immediate action by Germany against Danzig has certainly not emanated from the Quai d'Orsay.

(END SECTION ONE).

DDM: WIC
BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

Paris

Dated July 1, 1939

Rec'd 12:26 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1238, July 1, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

, nor could it be based upon reports received by the Quai. Rochat said that of course there was no reason for optimism: military preparations are taking place in Danzig; a free corps is being formed there; artillery is being transported to Danzig from Germany; it is in fact possible that a coup may take place tonight or tomorrow or a week or two weeks hence; the situation is being most closely observed and all necessary plans have been made to deal with any developments; but on the basis of present information there is nothing specific to point to an immediate German attempt. (END MESSAGE).

BULLITT

WWC; DDM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C).

Secretary of State
Washington

1241, July 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

I talked at luncheon today with the British Ambassador and Lord De la Warr, British Minister of Education, who arrived in Paris this morning. Both said in terms which were convincing that if Germany by any maneuver whatever should attempt to take Danzig and Poland should resist, Great Britain would declare war on Germany at once.

Both said that the information of the British Government from Germany indicated that Ribbentrop had convinced Hitler that England and France would not fight in support of Poland. They both believed therefore that it was essential that Great Britain and France by some act or acts should place their determination to support Poland beyond doubt at once. The British Government would give a loan to Poland for this purpose in the immediate future of approximately 15,000,000 pounds.

They also had under consideration other measures which might possibly involve the sending of certain French and British military forces to Poland. (END SECTION ONE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA 1-1939

FROM

PARIS

DATED July 1, 1939

RECEIVED 4:20 p.m.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

JUL 5 1939

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1201, July 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

(In this connection Léger said to me yesterday that
Daladier wished to send a small fleet of French and British
ships to Gdynia but that he, Léger, considered that such
an act would provoke the sending of the German fleet to
Danzig in overwhelming force and might precipitate imme-
diate war).

De la Warr also said that the British were considering
sending British troops to France for maneuvers. He assured
me that both Chamberlain and Halifax felt that the only
chance of saving peace was to convince Germany that any
attack on Poland would be followed by instant declarations
of war on Germany by France and England.

The British Ambassador said that his Government con-
tinued to believe that it might be possible to use Mussolini
to restrain Hitler from an attack on if France would make
the concession to Italy which Ciano had suggested to
Francois
Francois Poncet (see my telegram 1214 June 28, 9 p.m.) indeed he could tell me confidentially that if the present Danzig crisis should be followed by a period of calm he expected to receive immediate instructions from his Government to try to persuade the French to take action in this sense. He expected, however, to find Daladier still adamantine.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB ROW

(*) Apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (E)

FROM
PARIS
Dated July 3, 1939
Rec'd 5:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
1249, July 3, 9 p.m. (Section One).
CONFIDENTIAL.

Both Léger and the British Ambassador said to me this afternoon that the French and British Governments had not yet received the Soviet reply to their latest proposal.

Léger said that the French secret service had established the fact that there were now ten thousand German troops in Danzig; that they were equipped with all the machine guns that they could use effectively and that they had an undetermined number of small cannon. The French secret service had also established the fact that Hitler last Friday had sent to Danzig a general who had been in command at Königsberg and two civilian functionaries from Berlin and had given Förster - who was now virtually gauleiter of Danzig - a free hand to decide when he should attempt his coup d'État. (END SECTION ONE).
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM
PARIS
Dated July 3, 1939
Rec'd 5:05 p.m.

1249, July 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Last Saturday Foerster had decided that owing to the determined attitude of the Polish, French and British Governments it would be undesirable to strike at once.

The project was merely adjourned but not by any means abandoned. Foerster would choose the moment to strike and it might come at any time but in the opinion of the French secret service the most probable moment was at some time between the fifteenth of July and the fifteenth of August.

Daladier said to me this afternoon that he was so apprehensive that Hitler might strike next Saturday or Sunday that he would not leave town for the weekend. Indeed he felt his presence in Paris every day for the remainder of the summer would be absolutely essential.

BULLITT
PEG: WW3
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM
FAR'S
Dated July 3, 1939
Rec'd 5:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1249, July 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

In commenting on the general situation Léger said that he felt that Germany would continue to increase the tension at Danzig and that the only chance of stopping war was to make it obvious that France, Poland, England and the Soviet Union were prepared to fight at once.

He added that he felt Hitler had received considerable encouragement by the action of the House of Representatives in forbidding the export of arms and ammunition.

He stated finally that in his opinion if Hitler should feel that it would be too dangerous for him to strike at Danzig, he would make a move against Yugoslavia. The French general staff had absolute information that Hitler's plans for the conquest of Rumania now involved not an advance across Hungary but an advance across Yugoslavia.

END OF MESSAGE

BULLITT

PEG
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1253, July 5, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I talked with Daladier this morning. He had just conferred with Blum on the subject of the latest Soviet reply to the French and British. He said that Blum agreed with him that the Soviet Union's latest proposal was totally unacceptable because the Soviet Union had repeated to the French and British the definition of aggression which had been contained in the Soviet Union's note to Estonia, reported in my No. 1071 of June 5, 7 p.m.

Daladier went on to say that the Soviet Union's demand amounted to this: if there should be a change of Government or any other event displeasing to the Soviet Union in any one of the Baltic States the Soviet Union should have carte blanche in advance to invade any one of those states with the full support of France and England. He would never agree to such a demand.

Daladier
Daladier added that although he had no specific information with regard to negotiations between the Germans and the Russians he feared that they might be most serious.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

WWG:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)  

PARIS  
Dated July 5, 1939  
Rec'd 10:52 a.m.  

FROM  

Secretary of State,  
Washington.  

1253, July 5, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO).  

(When I was in Washington recently I found that our Government was far better informed on this subject than the French or ____ governments. I should be greatly obliged if you could give me any information you have with regard to the negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union which have taken place since the return of Count Schulenberg the German Ambassador to Moscow).  

Daladier went on to say that he was pessimistic about the possibility of preserving peace. He was certain that Hitler would not stop his efforts to get Danzig unless he should be confronted by an absolute determination of England, France and the Soviet Union to fight at once in case the Poles should take up arms in defense of their vital interests.

In addition the action of the House of Representatives with regard to the Neutrality Act had encouraged Hitler to believe that France and England would receive no arms and ammunition from the United States.  

BULLITT  

EDM: WWC  
(*) Apparent omission
Telegram received

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS
Dated July 5, 1939

FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

1253, July 5, 1 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

It was clear that if France, England and Poland should come into war with Germany and Italy -- and the Soviet Union should remain neutral -- and the United States should refuse to supply arms and ammunition, the prospects of victory for France and England would be much worse than in 1914. Indeed the prospects indicated that France and England would be defeated.

In 1914 Germany with the support of Austria-Hungary had stood against England, France and Russia with the later assistance of Italy. At the present time Germany had all that part of Austria-Hungary which was a source of strength and in addition had Italy and might have Japan; France and England might not have Russia.

Under the circumstances the fight for England, France and Poland would be a desperate one. Nevertheless it would be made. If the Poles should fight -- and they would -- France and England would fight at once.

He felt that Hitler would certainly decide to make war
EDA - 2 - #1233, July 5, 1 p.m. from Paris Section three war unless the Soviet Union should agree in the immediate future to an alliance with France and England and unless our neutral act should be changed to permit the export of arms and munitions.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington,
1270, July 7, 7 p.m.

Strictly confidential.

Léger confirmed Bonnet's statements to me with regard to the orders sent to the French and British ambassadors in Moscow but added that he feared greatly that the Russians had about decided that it would be to their advantage to remain neutral in any conflict between Germany, France, and England. He therefore felt less optimistic than at any time about a successful conclusion of the negotiations.

With regard to the Italian position Léger said that Ciano a number of times recently had stated to François-Poncet that he would like to make concrete proposals to the French Government for the improvement of relations between the Italian and French Governments and that he would talk to his father-in-law about the question. He had never yet said anything concrete to François-Poncet; and it was his, Léger's, conviction that Mussolini was just as determined as ever to bring

Italy
Italy into war on the side of Germany in case Germany should attack Poland. In view of this fact it did not matter what might be the Italian opinion. Italy would march.

Léger added that he and Daladier were aware that if the negotiations with the Soviet Government should be concluded successfully the British intended to press the French to make concessions to Italy. Daladier had decided to refuse.

BULLITT.

EMB
JUL 2. 1939

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

MR. WESBERRITH

Paris

Dated July 18, 1939

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

JUL 21. 1939

NOTED

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Welles

JUL 19. 1939

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUL 24. 1939

1922, July 18, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

This afternoon Daladier said to me that yesterday's conversations in Moscow had produced no result whatsoever.

The Russians were still demanding the signature of the military accord simultaneously with the political. Discussions of a military accord might last for months.

In addition the Russians were still demanding that if there should be any change in a government in any one of the Baltic States which they should consider might favor an aggressor against the Soviet Union, France and England would give immediate military support to the Soviet Union in attacking the Baltic State. Daladier added that he would never accept such a proposal and said that he was thinking seriously of ordering the French Ambassador in Moscow to say to Molotov that he believed further conversations at the present time were useless.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated July 18, 1939

Rec'd 1:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1322, July 18, 6 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

He went on to say that he considered the British had conducted their negotiations with the Russians in the stupidest manner possible and that he believed the British in spite of the Russians' obvious unwillingness to conclude an accord would wish to continue the negotiations.

Daladier stated that in his own opinion the Russians desired to string out the negotiations until after war should have begun. The basic policy of the Russians was to involve themselves as little as possible in war in Europe so that after England, France, Poland, Germany and Italy had torn each other thoroughly to pieces the Russians might advance and conquer all Europe in the interest of Bolshevism.

Finally Daladier said that he did not believe it would be possible to get the Russians to sign any accord unless they should again become afraid that the Soviet Union might be attacked by Germany with the support of Poland. At the present
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated July 18, 1939
Rec'd 1:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1322, July 18, 6 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

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Finally Daladier said that he did not believe it would be possible to get the Russians to sign any accord unless they should again become afraid that the Soviet Union might be attacked by Germany with the support of Poland. At the present
present moment he did not see how even a bluff in this direction could be made since it would require too great a reversal of public opinion.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
FROM Dated July 18, 1939
Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1322, July 18, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Daladier said that the French Government was still without accurate and intimate information as to the intentions of the Polish Government. He said that the Germans were continuing to slip men, machine guns, and cannon into and that the Polish Government had not given the French Government any exact indication as to the moment when it would oppose such actions with force.

There was official information to the effect that Hitler's next move would be to have the Danzig Senate elect him president of the Senate. He would then declare Danzig attached to the Reich in his person and would leave the Polish free port in Danzig intact for the moment and would demand from the Poles merely the construction of an automobile road across the Corridor. He would then turn to the world and say, "Do you wish to devastate Europe because of the question of an automobile road?" It was obvious that if Hitler should
LMS 2-No. 1322, July 18, 6 p.m., Sec. 3, from Paris

should do this there would be considerable differences of opinion in France and England as to the desirability of making war.

BULLITT

CSB
(*) Apparent omission.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated July 18, 1939
Rec'd 2:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1322, July 18, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Daladier said that his information from the Far East indicated that the Japanese British negotiations were going as badly as possible. There seemed to be not the slightest chance of a liquidation of the Tientsin incident and he believed that Great Britain would be obliged to evacuate the Tientsin concession and that Japan would seize one after another all the ports of China.

With regard to Spain Daladier said that he was somewhat more hopeful. The decision of the French Government to return the Spanish gold which decision had been communicated to the Spanish Government had improved considerably relations between the two countries. The Spanish had promised to take back the refugees; but this question was not of great importance in his opinion. He had informed the Spanish Government that on the first of September he would close the refugee camps and he had no doubt that the Spaniards now in those camps could be absorbed successfully into the economy of France.

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated July 18, 1939

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1322, July 18, 6 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Daladier said that the British Ambassador had called on him to say that he had been ordered by his government to urge him in the strongest possible terms to make concessions to Italy. The British Government felt that since it seemed unlikely that agreement could be reached soon with the Russians it was essential to detach Italy from Germany. Daladier commented that if he believed there were even a twenty per cent chance of detaching Italy from Germany by making concessions with regard to Djibouti, the railroad to Adis Ababa, the Suez Canal Board and the maintenance of the statute of 1896 in Tunis, he would make such concessions. He was completely convinced however that the Italians would merely crow loudly and would interpret such concessions by France at the present time as a sign of weakness and as an indication that France had no intention of supporting Poland in the matter of Danzig.

BULLITT

WWC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated July 18, 1939
Rec'd 3:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1322, July 18, 6 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

He had therefore told Phipps that France would make no concessions whatsoever to Italy at the present time and had suggested ironically that if Great Britain desired to mollify Italy, Great Britain might give Egypt to Italy. Daladier said that Phipps had argued with him at great length and had said to him that Chamberlain had done many things in response to Daladier's requests among them he had named the decision of the British Government not to have elections next October. Daladier said that he had replied that he had made no such request and had added that he did not care whether the British held elections next week or not. Incidentally Daladier asked me to say to any one who might ask me that there was not the slightest possibility that France would make concessions to Italy at the present time.

I asked Daladier if any arrests of prominent Frenchmen would follow the arrests of Poirier of FIGARO and Aubin of LE TEMPS. He said that unfortunately the secret service had
#1322, July 18, 6 p.m. (SECTION SIX) From Paris

had been unable to unearth any other persons of prominence who had received money for propaganda from Germany and he did not anticipate any sensational developments in this case. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT.

CSB
LEGER said to me this morning that the prospects for the conclusion of the agreement between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had improved. The Russians had stated that they now felt that the conclusion of an accord would be easy and had undertaken to prepare a formula which would meet the French and British objections to their definition of indirect aggression. On the other hand the French and British had agreed that the validity of the political accord should be subject to the future signature of a military accord.

I asked LEGER if this would not mean endless military negotiations before the political accord would be binding. He replied that it had taken only four days to work out a military accord with Turkey and he saw no reason why it should take more than a week to work out a military accord with the Soviet Union - provided the Russians were acting in
2- #1360, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Paris
in good faith and really desired to come to an agreement.
Both the French and British Ambassadors in Moscow had the
impression at the moment that the Russians genuinely de-
sired to reach agreement. He was, therefore, more optimi-
istic than he had been for some time. (END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Dated July 24, 1939

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1360, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Leger said that he expected Hitler to continue his pressure on Poland with increasing intensity in the hope that either the Polish, the British or the French would give way before a threat of imminent war. Neither the Polish, French nor British would give way and Hitler would then have to choose whether or not he should start a general conflagration.

If he should decide against provoking war with Poland he might turn against either Hungary or Yugoslavia. If he should decide to turn against Hungary he would attempt to throw out the Teleki Government by support given to the Nazi elements in Hungary and to force on Hungary a government which would do Germany's bidding and place Rumania in the position of having Germany virtually on the Transylvanian frontier.

On the other hand Hitler and Mussolini might agree to attack Yugoslavia with a view to obtaining a clear road for Germany to the Rumanian oil fields and a clear road for Italy to Salonica.
-2- #1360, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

In case of an attack on Yugoslavia neither France nor England was obliged to give military support to Yugoslavia. The question would have to be decided at the last minute and might easily lead to a general war.

(END MESSAGE).

BULLITT

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

1368, July 25, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

Bonnet showed me this afternoon his latest telegram from Moscow in which the French Ambassador quoted Molotov as saying that he considered the political accord between the Soviet Union, France and England now practically achieved.

Molotov believed that the difference of opinion on the subject of indirect aggression was a mere question of nuance which could easily be worked out. He believed therefore that the military conversations between France, England and the Soviet Union should be commenced at once so that both the military and political accords might be signed in the very near future. Bonnet said that he was convinced that this meant that the Russians really desired to come to an agreement.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1368, July 25, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The French Government had already selected General
Bonnet to go to Moscow to negotiate the military accord.
The British Government was having some difficulty in finding
a general who was sufficiently familiar with such matters
to be entrusted with such a mission but he hoped the
British Government would find one within a few days.

Bonnet said that the Craigie-Arita agreement in his
opinion was as mild as could have been expected under the
circumstances. Obviously there were so many weasel
words in it that it would be interpreted in a different
manner in Tokyo and in London; but it was clear that so
long as the United States should maintain a reserved
attitude with regard to responsibilities in the Far East
neither England nor France could do anything but make
whatever concessions necessary to prevent Japanese attack.

In commenting on the British-Polish financial
negotiation
REB

2-#1368, From Paris, July 25, 5 p.m.
(Sec. Two)

Negotiation Bonnet said he hoped a final agreement would be reached today or tomorrow.

HULLITT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D) FROM PARIS

Dated July 25, 1939
Rec'd 3:38 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1368, July 25, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He still believed that Hitler would begin to intensify his pressure on Poland before the fifteenth of August and that a serious crisis would begin to develop at about that date. His reports from Spain were most satisfactory. Ciano had requested military cooperation of various sorts from Franco including the use of Spanish ports and airplane bases in case of war. Franco had replied that he was most grateful for Italy's assistance during the civil war but that the present condition of Spain would not enable him to cooperate with Italy in any other fields than those of commercial and cultural relations. Ciano specifically had asked for the use of Port Mahon on the island of Minorca in case of war and Franco had categorically refused. Bonnet added that his information as to this conversation was absolute. He felt therefore that in case of war there was a strong argument that the neutrality of Spain would be genuine rather than a mere cloak to conceal help to Italy and Germany. (END MESSAGE)

EMB:ROW

BULLITT