

France 7/26/71 - 8/11/39

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

file
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

Paris

Dated July 26, 1939

Rec'd 9:42 a.m., July 27

EG
This message must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
JUL 31 1939
MR. BERLE

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
JUL 28 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

It has occurred to me that you might be interested
in a summary of the views of Daladier, the members of his
Cabinet and the General Staff on the general situation as
the critical month of August approaches:

In their opinion the decision as to whether or not
there shall be war rests entirely with Hitler. His con-
trol over the actions of the Nazis at Danzig is absolute
and he has reduced Mussolini to the status of "Gaulleiter"
of Italy.

It is believed that Hitler has not yet made up his
mind definitely whether or not to strike. It is thought
that he is at last convinced that if Poland should fight
on the Danzig issue both France and England immediately
would declare war on Germany.

BULLITT

KLP

740.00/1955

FILED

GMB

Confidential File

E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be
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to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated July 26, 1939

Rec'd 9:50 a.m., July 27

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The French General Staff has received a report considered trustworthy of a conversation between Hitler, Keitel and Brauschitch in the course of which Keitel expressed the opinion that Germany and Italy could win a war against France, England and Poland but Brauschitch expressed grave doubts as to the outcome of such a war. Both Keitel and Brauschitch are said to have expressed the opinion to Hitler that if the Soviet Union should engage its military forces from the beginning in such a war Germany and Italy would be defeated.

At the moment the negotiations in Moscow have taken a turn for the better. General Georges, Chief of the General Staff, told me last night that in addition to General Doumenc the General Staff probably would order General Huntziger to proceed to Moscow as soon as the military agreement with Turkey should have been signed. He added that he expected the signature of the agreement

with

-2- #1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris

with Turkey within two or three days. He asserted that the Turks had engaged themselves not only to take action in the Mediterranean notably against the thirty thousand Italian troops in the Dodecanese in cooperation with fleets but also to mobilize against Bulgaria if necessary to keep Bulgaria quiet.

BULLITT

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

Dated July 26, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 9:20 a.m., July 27

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

In the opinion of the General Staff the Turks would not have gone this far unless they had had authoritative information from Moscow that the Soviet Union would sign the proposed pact with France and England. In the opinion of the General Staff the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia during the next two weeks would create such a coalition of forces that Hitler would hesitate to risk war.

In this connection the Chief of the General Staff expressed the opinion to me that French and British military airplane production per month was now almost equal to German and Italian production and added that plane for plane the French and British production was of superior quality.

It is a fact that British and French production of military planes this month will reach almost one thousand - of which the British will produce somewhat more than seven hundred and the French somewhat less than three hundred.

BULLITT

KLP

FD
PA-D

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be
closely paraphrased be-
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Dated July 26, 1939

FROM Rec'd 9:59 a.m., July 27

Secretary of State,
Washington,

File
PA-D
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

The Chief of the General Staff also informed me
that owing to financial ~~and~~ economic difficulties
Mussolini recently had released on furlough for work
at home 400,000 of the troops that he had mobilized -
leaving mobilized in Italy 1,100,000 men.

The information from Spain that Franco refused not
only Ciano's request for a base in Minorca but also re-
quests for the use of other Spanish ports and aeroplane
bases is taken as an indication that in the event of
war Spain will remain neutral.

The statement of British policy vis a vis Japan
made by Chamberlain is considered merely an attempt to
delay an evil day. Both Daladier and Bonnet have said
to me in the past few days that they believe that France
and England must sacrifice all their possessions in the
Far East, if necessary, in order to maintain the concen-
tration of their forces in Europe. They say this will
be done in the hope that after the conclusion of a
successful war in Europe ~~and~~ ^{the} positions lost to Japan
in the Far East ^{maybe} regained.

DDM:RR

BULLITT

740.00 / 1955

GMB

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Eu
PA-D
FL

EG
This message must be
closely paraphrased be-
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to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated July 26, 1939

Rec'd 10:12 a.m., July 27

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

There is no expectation that the Craigie-Arita
agreement will lead to anything except a brief delay
followed by protests by the Japanese and accusations
that the British are acting in bad faith.

The information of the French General Staff
indicates that Hitler has now established in Danzig
20,000 SS and SA-troopers; that these men have a
plentiful supply of machine guns and a few undefined
caliber cannon but no big guns.

General Ironside on returning from Poland reported
to the French General Staff that he considered that the
Poles were behaving with an altogether remarkable re-
straint. The French General Staff believes that this
is due to the fact that the Poles desire to delay the
Danzig crisis as long as possible due to the fact that
every day of summer which passes diminishes the period
in which Germany's mechanized equipment can be used
effectively against Poland since after October 15 the
condition

740.00/1955 SEC. 5

Confidential File

GMB

-2- #1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Paris

condition of Polish roads and terrain becomes progressively worse for mechanized equipment of all sorts. The same interpretation has been given me by the Polish Ambassador here.

BULLITT

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

52 PM

jr
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closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

Paris
FROM Dated July 26, 1939

Rec'd 10:11 a.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

The French Counselor of Embassy in Poland who has just returned to Paris has reported to his Government that the Poles will overlook as many small incidents as possible and will not protest merely to receive rebuffs; but when some important incident occurs which interferes with the rights of Poland in the free port of Danzig or the customs control or the railroad the Poles will act--and confront the Germans either with the necessity of recoiling from use of force or making war.

Since the Poles desire to delay this moment as long as possible and since, according to the information of the French General Staff, the German mechanized divisions have not yet been sent from their bases to the Polish frontiers, it is believed by the General Staff that unless some unforeseen incident should occur there will be no extremely serious crisis during the next two weeks.

BULLITT

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

50/PM

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
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to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated July 26, 1939

Rec'd 10:20 a.m., 27th,

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

It is however, the general belief not only of Daladier and the Cabinet but also of the General Staff that Hitler will not allow the Nuremberg Congress which is scheduled to take place early in September to be held without making some sort of a major effort to annex Danzig to the Reich. It is believed that he will begin to build up a crisis before August 15.

If the agreement between France and England and the Soviet Union should go through as now seems possible it is thought that Hitler, at the last minute being convinced that action with regard to Danzig would produce general war, might refrain from such action and attempt to find a compensation by joint action with Italy against Yugoslavia or by an attempt to overthrow the present Government in Hungary and replace it by a government which would do his bidding.

BULLITT

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Ed
PA-D

JR

This telegram must be _____
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fore being communicated
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Paris

FROM Dated July 26, 1939

Rec'd 10:15 a.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Handwritten initials
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1382, July 26, 8 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT).

It is believed that both Prince Paul and the
leaders of the Yugoslav army would decide to fight
if attacked. It is thought that Horthy and Teleki
will oppose to the end German domination of Hungary
and that Germany will not find it easy to dislodge
them.

The determination of France to stand by Poland is
absolute. No one in this country wants war but every
one is entirely ready for it.

In brief the belief here is that Hitler may or
may not decide to make war this summer but that if
he does he will be defeated.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

KLP

Confidential File

740.00/1955 SEC. 8 GMB

REB

2-#1414, From Paris, July 31, 4pm

situation in Europe they could not take any other attitude unless they could count on the active support of the United States in the Far East. Their attitude would depend on the degree of cooperation and collaboration that the British Government might be able to establish with the Government of the United States.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CW

WWC

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
FROM Dated July 31, 1939
Rec'd 1:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1414, July 31, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

He added that while our denunciation of the trade treaty with Japan had produced a most wholesome and admirable effect he regretted that this action had not occurred before the Arita-Craigie agreement as the British might have taken a stronger position.

I then asked Leger if he had heard any rumors that the British might be inclined to close the Burma Road to shipments for China. Leger replied that he knew that the Japanese were asking this and he thought the British might be disposed to make this concession to the Japanese.

I then asked him if shipments through Indo-China were being continued as heretofore. He replied that they were being continued. I asked if they would be continued in the future even though Great Britain should forbid passage of supplies to the Chinese Government via the Burma Road. He answered that in that case the French Government would be obliged to follow the lead of the British Government and forbid shipments of

military

REB

2-#1414, From Paris, July 31, 4p.m.
(Sec. Two)

military supplies by way of Indo-China.

Beger made it entirely clear that the French Government would follow the lead of the British Government in respect of policy in the Far East.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

GW

WWC

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS

FROM Dated July 31, 1939

Rec'd 1:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1415, July 31, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



Leger said to me this afternoon that no progress had been made in Moscow yesterday with regard to agreement on a definition of "indirect aggression". It would not be possible, therefore, for Chamberlain to make any very definite statement in the House of Commons.

The French and British negotiators for the military agreement would not reach Moscow for another eight or ten days. It would, therefore, be impossible to expect any binding agreement with the Soviet Union before the latter part of August. Leger added that neither the French nor the British representatives in Moscow had any doubt that an agreement finally would be concluded.

In spite of the delay in the Moscow negotiations Leger expressed the opinion that both Hitler and Mussolini had become most hesitant to begin the war for which they had so carefully prepared.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

WVC-GW

741:611799
SECTION
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GWL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM
This message must be
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to anyone. (C)

Paris
Dated July 31, 1939
FROM
Rec'd 3:02 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

1415, July 31, 5 p.m.
(SECTION TWO).



It was obvious to both Hitler and Mussolini that France and England would fight and were well prepared to fight. It was obvious also that Poland would fight; that the Soviet Union probably would support Poland; that Japan in view of the attitude taken by the United States could not be counted on to attack the Soviet Union or the British and French possessions in the Far East; and that Franco would give no military help to Italy and Germany. Hitler and Mussolini were therefore in the position of horses that wanted to jump a fence but were afraid to jump because it seemed too high.

760c.62
He thought that Hitler's continued concentration of troops in Danzig and other activities in Danzig might bring on war for the simple reason that one of these acts finally would be the straw that would break the camel's back of Poland's patience. Any act which should infringe on Poland's rights with regard to the Westerplatte, the port, the customs, or the railroad might constitute a last straw.

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

VM -2- 1415, July 31, 5 p.m., from Paris,

If Hitler should continue to encourage the present Nazi activities in Danzig a moment would come therefore when the Poles would be obliged to act. The Polish Government would not talk but would order troops to enter Danzig. The German troops in Danzig would resist and it would be almost impossible for Hitler not to support them by making war on Poland -- which would automatically produce a general European conflict.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL:ROW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

From Paris August 3, 1939

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1429, August 3, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 4 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Polish Ambassador said to me today that he had just received a personal letter from Beck in which the latter expressed the opinion that Hitler would go on ~~ordering~~ the Nazi leaders in Danzig to create incident ^{incident} after/ until it should be necessary for the Polish Government to take action. The Polish Ambassador added that such action would be in the form of an ultimatum to the Government of Danzig.

He said that Beck took the most serious view of the threat of the Danzig authorities to open the customs frontier between Danzig and East Prussia. Poland would not permit this economic attachment of Danzig to the Reich. If the Danzig authorities should attempt to abolish Polish customs control on this frontier Poland would be obliged to take action.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

WFC:G'1

7602.62/758

SEC. 1

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

7602.62

ED

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated August 3, 1939

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1429, August 3, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)



The Polish Ambassador said that Beck believed that an intense crisis with regard to Danzig might be provoked by Germany on either the 6th, 12th or 15th of this month. Beck had stated in his letter that he thought that Hitler would have to go before the Nuremberg Congress early in September either with Danzig as a part of Germany or with the statement that since Danzig was certain in the long run to return Germany it was not necessary for Germany to precipitate war now.

Beck thought that Hitler had not yet definitely made up his mind to provoke war but he felt certain Hitler had decided to bring matters to the edge of war in the hope that either Poland, France or England would recoil and give him another diplomatic victory.

BULLITT

KLP

7600.62/758

SEC. 2

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB


This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 3, 1939

Rec'd 3:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1429, August 3, 4 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

A story was prevalent in London last night to the effect that Germany had proposed to Great Britain a conference to be composed of Germany, Italy, France, England and Poland to settle the question of Danzig. The Polish Ambassador stated to me that his colleague in London had telephoned him last night with regard to this story. He added that Poland would not accept such a conference. The Polish Government is ready to discuss with Germany alterations in the status of Danzig on the basis that Danzig should remain independent and that its independence should be guaranteed by Germany ~~and~~ *and* ~~Poland~~ *Poland* ~~and~~ *the* Polish Government therefore would be glad to have a conversation on this basis with the German Government but would not permit the Danzig question to become the subject of a general conference in which Italy, France, and England should participate.

From

REB

2-#1429, From Paris, Aug. 3, 4p.m.
(Sec. Three)

From London also, through circles close to Lord Beaverbrook, stories are reaching Paris that at the last moment Chamberlain will let down Poland. Whatever may be the position of the British Government there is no doubt whatsoever of the position of the French Government.

BULLITT

NPL

EMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 3, 1939

Rec'd 3:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1429, August 3, 4 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)


About a month ago Bonnet addressed a letter to

Ribbentrop reminding him that when he had visited Paris last December he had stated that the German Government accepted as entirely natural the Franco-Polish alliance. Bonnet's letter went on to remind Ribbentrop that this alliance would take effect immediately and France would support Poland with force in case of a change in the status of Danzig produced by direct or indirect German activities.

About two weeks and a half ago Bonnet received a twelve page reply from Ribbentrop couched in the most violent language in which Ribbentrop denied that he had ^{what he had said} ever said in Paris and stated that if France should support Poland's position with regard to Danzig, France would be responsible for the war which would ensue and predicted that such a war would result in the complete demolition of the French army and the French state.

KLP

BULLITT



7600.62/758 SEC. 4

CONFIDENTIAL

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated August 3, 1939
Rec'd 5:27 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1429, August 3, 4 p. m. (SECTION FIVE)

Recently Bonnet replied most politely reiterating, however, the complete determination of France to fight in case Poland should become involved in war with Germany over any matter concerning Danzig.

The general impression here remains that Hitler has not yet decided definitely whether or not to provoke war but that he will provoke a crisis of the most serious nature in the course of this month -- probably about August 15 -- and that by the repetition of small acts against Polish interests in Danzig he may push Europe into a general war.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB



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SEC. 5

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FILED

GML

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be _____
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fore being ⁱⁿcommunicated
to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM Dated August 8, 1939

Rec'd 2:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF	
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS	
AUG 9, 1939	LIT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE	

1461, August 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

CONFIDENTIAL.

This afternoon Bonnet said to me that the German Ambassador had called on him this morning and stated that there was no danger of Hitler making war over Danzig. In addition the officials of the Wilhemstrasse were all engaged in saying the same thing to the French Ambassador in Berlin.

Inasmuch as the German Ambassador in Paris had kept assuring the French Government that German troops would not enter Czechoslovakia even after they had crossed the border and inasmuch as the Wilhemstrasse was apt to be equally ill-informed as to Hitler's intentions he was not impressed by these assurances.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

CSB

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7600.621773
SEC. 2
SEC. 1
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
GWL

E.O.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be _____ Paris
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fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

FROM

Dated August 8, 1939

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1461, August 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AUG 9 1939 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
--

Burckhardt, the League Commissioner in Danzig,
had just communicated to him that his impression was that
the people of Danzig did not desire to push their
provocation of the Poles to the point of war.

From a great many sources, military and civil,
however, he had reports of such a disquieting nature that
the most optimistic conclusion he could reach was that
Hitler had not yet decided whether or not to provoke
war on the issue of Danzig.

His private opinion was that Hitler would come to a
decision in the course of the next eight days; and his
guess was that Hitler would order a continuation of
incidents in Danzig which finally would provoke the
Poles to send an ultimatum which the Danzig Gauleiter
would reject and war would begin. Bonnet emphasized that
this was a personal impression.

BULLITT

CSB

7600:62/773

SEC. 2

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be _____ PARIS
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to anyone. (D)

Dated August 8, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 4:30 p.m.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 9 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1461, August 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

With regard to the negotiations with the Soviet Union Bonnet said that there was still no agreement on the text of the article about "indirect aggression". The negotiators were still haggling over two words. He was less convinced than he had been that the Russians desired to reach an early conclusion of the negotiations and he feared that the military conversations might get lost in a morass of words.

He had been informed this afternoon that the Japanese Cabinet had been unable to reach any decision with regard to the question of a military alliance with Germany and Italy and that the cabinet would meet again tomorrow to consider the question further. He felt that reports from Tokyo indicated that there was an intense disagreement among the leading Japanese on this point.

Bonnet said that Marshal Petain had spent an hour with him this morning and that the Marshal was most

optimistic

7600.62/773 SEC. 3

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

GM

-2- #1461, August 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris

optimistic with regard to developments in Spain. He was convinced that the Spaniards would not give assistance of any kind to the Germans or Italians in case of war.

(END SECTION THREE).

BULLITT

EMB:NPL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

1-1336

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 8, 1939

Rec'd 5:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1461, August 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Bonnet said that his reports from Italy continued to indicate that there was a growing hostility among all classes of the population to the idea of war with France and England.

Ciano continued to say to the French Embassy that the moment was favorable for France to place her relations with Italy on a more friendly basis. The French Government was refusing, however, to enter into any negotiations for psychological rather than factual reasons. It was obvious that the question of the French railroad from Djibouti to Addis Ababa must be discussed some day with Italy. The railroad was carrying no traffic and losing money at a tremendous rate. There was no fundamental reason why France should not hand over this railroad to Italy and give Italy a free port in Djibouti and a seat on the Board of the Suez Canal and the continuation of the statute of 1896 in Tunis. But there was the psychological reason that at the moment such action would be interpreted

7600.62/773 SEC. 4

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

GML

-2- #1461, August 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR) from Paris

interpreted everywhere as the product of weakness and a desire again to "appease" the Axis powers. Nothing was being done or would be done in the immediate future by the French which might involve concessions to Italy.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

NPL:EMB

FD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
1-1226
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Paris

Dated August 12, 1939

Rec'd 11:53 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1491, August 12, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

used - Summary of news to the President
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (of Sec)
AUG 14 1939 8-13-39
PH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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760C.62/803

Charveriat Director of Political Affairs who is in charge at the Quai d'Orsay today said to me this morning that the exchange of notes between the German and Polish Governments (the texts of which are contained in Ambassador Biddle's 163, August 10, midnight) had brought the Polish and German Governments to grips so definitely in the Danzig dispute that while there might be no acute crisis for a number of days the governments of the world must be prepared to have such a crisis in any twenty-four hours.

AUG 14 1939

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Charveriat added that the French position remained that Poland would receive the fullest possible support from France at any moment that Poland might decide to defend her vital interests by force. Poland would be the sole judge as to the policy to be followed. He added that the position of the British Government was identical with the position of the French Government and that there was no sign whatsoever of any weakening in the British attitude

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

G.M.

-2- #1491, August 12, 2 p.m., from Paris.

attitude. There had been no communications from the British Government to the French Government that indicated a desire to return to a policy of "appease ^{ment} ~~(*)~~".

Charveriat said that in addition to the concentrations on the Polish frontier the Germans were concentrating in Slovakia in a manner which had aroused great apprehension in both Rumania and Hungary. The Rumanians and Hungarians feared that if war should break out German troops would march from Slovakia against Rumania either through Polish territory or possibly through the Ruthenian tip of Slovakia recently acquired by Hungary.

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Charveriat said that whereas Ciano had been optimistic with regard to the possibility of preserving peace before he saw Ribbentrop he was now pessimistic. The fact that Ciano was to spend two more days in Germany than had been planned seemed to indicate that the most serious decisions were being discussed.

BULLITT

WHC:DDM

(*) Apparent omission.

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FE

JR—

1-1336

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

Dated August 12, 1939

Rec'd 12:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1492, August 12, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Handwritten: *Does in Summary I used work*
Stamp: DIVISION OF THE PRESIDENT
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (2) (see)
AUG 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Daladier expressed to me today the same opinions as those expressed by Charveriat reported in my No. 1491, August 12, 2 p.m.

He added that in his opinion the German troop movements to date were disquieting but did not yet indicate definitely an intention to strike in the immediate future. He thought that a major Far Eastern crisis which might lead to war was imminent but he did not believe that war itself would come during the next few days.

Daladier said that his information from Moscow indicated that Voroshilov and the officers of the Red army were genuinely eager to come to a definite agreement.

BULLITT

DDM:W/C

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FILED
AUG 16 1939

CONFIDENTIAL FILE
GML

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS

Dated August 15, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 1:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1494, August 15, 5 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Charveriat who is in charge

Paraphrased - tel to the Ph

Div. (C-100)
EUR: 8-16-39
AUG 16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File Ph

at the Foreign Office stated to me this afternoon that the telegrams received this morning from Berlin and Rome indicated that Hitler was determined to have war with Poland.

A telegram received from Berlin this morning stated that the Italian Ambassador there Attolico was intensely depressed because Hitler and Ribbentrop seemed to be determined to have war with Poland whether Mussolini wished it or not.

From both Rome and Berlin the French Government had information to the effect that Hitler and Ribbentrop had talked to Ciano in such a manner that Ciano had been shocked and had refused to make any definite reply to Hitler's proposals and had not telephoned or reported otherwise to Mussolini but had returned to Rome to report in order to avoid giving answers to the requests of Hitler and Ribbentrop for Italian support in an attack on Poland.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

RR
WVC

760c.62

*FILED
AUG 16 1939*

760c.62/819
SEC. 1
CONFIDENTIAL
GML

E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

PARIS

Dated August 15, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1494, August 15, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)



It was the impression of the French Government that Mussolini at the moment was reluctant to support Hitler in an attack on Poland and desired to bring about a conference at which Germany and Italy might present all their demands in all the different international fields. The Italians, however, appeared now to doubt their ability to obtain Hitler's consent to such a conference or to restrain him from almost immediate action against Poland.

From the French point of view the proposal of such a conference would involve an exceedingly grave decision. Because of the manner in which Hitler had broken the promises which he had made at Munich it was obvious that no confidence could be placed in any future promises of his. As a preliminary to any such conference it seemed essential that the French and British should demand the carrying out of the promises made at Munich which would involve the evacuation by German troops of the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.

BULLITT

HPD

7600.62/818

SEC. 2

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 15, 1939

Rec'd 2:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1494, August 15, 5 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

The telegrams this morning from Berlin indicated that the responsible officials of the German Government were now talking about Poland in a manner which indicated that the Germans would insist not only upon the acquisition of Danzig but also the annexation of the corridor and of Polish Upper Silesia. Danzig still remained the probable point at which the Germans would strike the spark that would set fire to Europe; but the most responsible German officials were now talking about the necessity of entering Poland to protect the Germans resident in Poland. It might be that this sort of talk was merely intended to produce terror in Poland but it might also be that Hitler had decided to strike and that he was fanning German feeling to a greater head. The German mobilization was continuing without interruption.

Charveriat expressed the same opinion which Daladier expressed to me a few days ago, to wit, that the only

hope

7600.62/818

SEC. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

GMC

REB

2-#1494, From Paris, Aug.15, 5p.m.
(Sec. Three)

741.61
hope of preserving peace lay in convincing Hitler that an attack on Poland would involve immediate declarations of war by France and England. The nub of the question was that it was not Danzig's freedom but Poland's which was at stake. Charveriat said that reports thus far received from Moscow indicated that the Russian military men desired to get on with the business of the military pact rapidly; but he added that up to date the negotiators had not yet touched the heart of the question.

Charveriat concluded by saying that it was his conviction that the Germans might provoke an incident in any 24 hours that might start general war. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

CSB

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated August 15, 1939

Rec'd 2:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1495, August 15, 6 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

I have just received a letter from Kirk written last night in which he states "without being at all hysterical, I do know that there is enough evidence to justify one in thinking that the worst can happen at any moment."

He suggests that some one against whom Hitler is not prejudiced should visit Hitler immediately and inform him that his present actions inevitably will produce general war and suggest that he should propose a moratorium of six months on the execution of all international political designs.

I suggested to Charveriat today entirely unofficially and personally that such a visit by some one to Hitler might produce some effect. He was not at all sure that it would produce any effect and was somewhat apprehensive that if such a move should be instigated by France or England

7600.62/324

CONFIDENTIAL

11

REB

2-#1495, From Paris, Aug.15,6p.m.

England it would be taken as a sign of weakness and desire to restart a policy of "appeasement" and might encourage Hitler to strike.

I do not know anyone who has a personal influence with Hitler at the present time that might be sent on such a mission. I am inclined to believe that the best chance of preventing Hitler from starting war lies in convincing him that Poland, France and England with the support of the Soviet Union will certainly fight. A word from you to the German Charge d'Affaires in Washington might possibly be timely and of some use.

BULLITT

WWC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~WAG~~
~~SR~~ ~~20~~
~~BDC~~
~~WET~~
~~RWB~~
~~ST~~

CJ

GRAY

FROM PARIS

Dated August 16, 1939

Rec'd 3:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1939
Cor. [Signature]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1500, August 16, 6 p.m.

With Assumption Day falling on Tuesday, France has enjoyed a three and one-half day week-end holiday. But the political commentators in the Paris press have been kept to their grindstones by the Salzburg conversations and by the activity of the Danzig High Commissioner presumably in liaison with the Salzburg meetings.

The diversity of speculation with respect to Salzburg conversations is indicative of the lack of trustworthy information here as to what transpired. It is the general views of the Paris press that Italy is not ready for war and that Mussolini is at last alive to the fact that from the Alps to the Mediterranean his country is vulnerable to attack from the democratic powers while Germany is relatively safe on the west and can attack on the east.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

CSB

7600-62/842

7600-62/842

AUG 19 1939

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

GRAY

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 16, 1939

Rec'd 4:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,
— Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1500, August 16, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

And yet it is Hitler not Mussolini nor the partners jointly in whose hands lies the decision of war or peace. No wonder that the Salzburg conversations took place!

Most commentators believe that at Salzburg Ciano made a bid for more equality of decision between the Axis partners and failing that attempted to drive a bargain which would give Italy and not only Germany a dividend from the Axis. In this connection there are some who believe that Count Csaky received less support from Ciano than he had hoped for, the theory being that Italy may have gained a freer hand with respect to Yugoslavia and the Adriatic by according Hitler a free hand with respect to Hungary and what that might mean for Rumania.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

EMB:NPL

AUG 18 1939

FILED

76 OC. 62/842

227
792
1-9-63

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

FROM

Dated August 16, 1939

Rec'd 5:41 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1500, August 16, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

In any event the commentators are all agreed that the Salzburg meeting was not merely a show of German-Italian unity but that important decisions were taken up there. The press fully expects that the Axis powers will now push their war of nerves to the limit hoping thereby to gain without war what can only be obtained by war if France and England remain firm.

Comment on the High Commissioner's conversation with Hitler is to the effect that there is no place in Europe today for a second Runciman escapade though his name may be Burkhardt an official of the League of Nations. The press as a whole agrees that England and France should favor a peaceful settlement of the Danzig issue but such negotiations it is emphasized must be based upon goodwill not upon force and they should consist of free discussions on between equals and not discussions at the point of a pistol. Also all agree that Poland must be the sole judge of its vital interests. The unanimous advice of the press commentators

7600 C. 62/ 842

AUG 19 1939

ML -2- Paris Aug. 16, 1939, 5:41 p.m. #1500 (Sec.3)

is that France and England should above all avoid giving the impression that they would once again jump at a peace offer no matter what the price.

BULLITT

RR:DDM

50

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP

GRAY

FROM

Paris

Dated August 16, 1939

Rec'd 6:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1500, August 16, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1939
[Signature]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Despite the readiness of the commentators to discuss the subject of a pacific settlement it is practically impossible to find any opinion contending that such a solution is likely. Of course there are those who are hopeful that something will turn up at the last moment which can be seized upon to avoid war. These are the old-time appeasers such as Matin who would like to avoid war at most any cost but who have found that this is not a popular view.

Despite the general view that in his talk with Burckhardt the Fuehrer failed to depart in any way from the position outlined in his "ultimatum" of April 28 to Poland, no one seems convinced that Hitler really wants war but many feel that he has set forces in motion which in the end he may be powerless to control. One of the most potent of these is the question of his own prestige. The only grounds for satisfaction in this whole deplorable business is that the tactics of weakening the will to resist by sudden and brutal changes of

atmosphere

7600.62/842

FP

RFP -2- #1500, August 16 (SECTION FOUR) from Paris atmosphere from fictive optimism to new alarms has lost its effectiveness.

Pertinax makes the interesting point that the western powers are now engaged not to negotiate a European settlement, total or partial, without Russian agreement. It is his view that Russia would hardly consent to negotiations which would entail the risk for her falling prey to the totalitarian states. He also thinks it possible that at Salzburg Italy "may have been authorized in case of war to adopt a course of armed neutrality" thus avoiding the dangers of her exposed position. In exchange Italy may have consented to some new status for Hungary.

Copies mailed Berlin, Rome.

(End message.)

BULLITT

RR:DDM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM Dated August 16, 1939

Rec'd 4:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1501, August 16, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Paraphrase to Paris

DIVISION	<i>Ed 8-17-39</i>
EUROPEAN A	
AUG 17 1939	<i>File</i>
DEPARTMENT OF STATE	<i>File</i>

760C-62

Bonnet said to me today that Hitler had made no specific proposal whatsoever to Burckhardt in the course of their conversation. He had made the customary accusations against Poland but had said that he did not (repeat not) desire to provoke general European war because of the Danzig dispute.

The French Government, Bonnet added, had absolutely positive information that Hitler had ordered Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig, not to provoke any incident for the moment which would compel the Poles to send another ultimatum to the Government of Danzig. It appeared therefore that Hitler had not yet made up his mind whether or not to provoke war. He might of course change his instructions to Forster at any minute but there was no reason to believe that he would strike during the next few days.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

NPL:EMB

760C-62/837

FILED

AUG 19 1939

Confidential File

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EBA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 16, 1939

Received 5:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1501, August 16, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

AUG 17 1939

Bonnet said that the rumors that the Italian Government and the Pope were preparing to make an appeal for a general conference to settle the question of Danzig and other questions had been investigated by the French Government and so far as could be discovered neither the Pope nor the Italian Government was contemplating any such move in the immediate future.

The Polish Ambassador said to me today that in spite of the continuance of the German mobilization it was the impression of the Polish Government that Hitler had not yet made up his mind whether or not to have war.

He added that he could see no sign of a policy of appeasement in either France or England. Indeed such a policy would be impossible to pursue because Poland whatever attitude might be taken by France or England would fight in case of an attack on her vital interests. He added that relations between Poland and the Soviet Union were more cordial at the moment ^{than} ~~than~~ at any time in years but

insisted

7600.62/837

FP

EDA - 2 - #1501, August 16, 6 p.m. from Paris (SECTION TWO)

insisted that the Polish Government had had no conversations with regard to military cooperation between the Polish and ^{Soviet} ~~the~~ armies and expressed the opinion that Poland would not enter into such conversations under any circumstances.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

(*) Apparent omission

RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Handwritten: Paris + P. No. 1/4
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 18 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PARIS

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Dated August 18, 1939

Received 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1517, August 18, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Daladier said to me today that according to his personal estimate the Germans now had approximately two million men mobilized. The Italians had a million he declared. Three times during the past few days he had suggested to General Gamelin that at least 300,000 additional French soldiers should be mobilized to add to the million already under arms. He said that Gamelin was not yet convinced that a further French mobilization was necessary. He expected to discuss this question with Gamelin again tomorrow and he might decide to mobilize further troops.

Daladier said that he had now received Burekhardt's full report of his conversation with Hitler. Hitler had talked for the most part in a rather plaintive manner saying that he must have wheat and timber for Germany and that the world seemed determined not to let him have it. He could get wheat only in eastern Europe

and

Handwritten: 760C.62

Handwritten: 951.20

760C.62/864

FILED

FP

EDA - 2 - #1517, August 18, 5 p.m. from Paris

and timber in the Colonies.

END SECTION ONE.

BULLITT

WVC:PEG

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 18, 1939

Received 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1517, August 18, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Hitler had also talked violently about Polish provocation in Danzig but had made no definite threat of action. Furthermore, he had made no concrete proposals to Burckhardt. He had made the impression on Burckhardt of a man in emotional turmoil who had not yet made up his mind what to do.

751.65

Daladier said that the story printed in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE to the effect that he had sent a personal message to Mussolini through Francois Poncet was totally untrue. He had sent no message of any kind to Mussolini and did not intend to make any proposal to the Italians.

(END SECTION TWO).

BULLITT

VWC:PEG

7600.62/864

FP

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 18, 1939

Received 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1517, August 18, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He had not bothered to deny this story since, if he attempted to correct every incorrect story printed in the press at the moment he would have to spend his day preparing denials.

From all the information which reached him, Daladier said that he was of the opinion that Hitler had not yet made up his mind definitely to attack Poland but was preparing the army for immediate attack in case he should decide at any moment that an attack was advisable. A German attack on Poland at the present moment, he added, would produce immediately not simply a French mobilization but also an instant French attack on the Siegfried line.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

PEG:WWC

7600.62/864

FP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

Paris

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Dated August 18, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 4:32 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1520, August 18, 7 p.m.

We asked Charveriat to review some of the outstanding phases of the current situation.

He described the Burckhardt incident as closed and believes that Hitler desired simply to obtain Burckhardt's views on the general eastern European problem. Charveriat attaches no great importance to it. He said further that the French Government is without definite information concerning the nature of Csaky's Salzburg conversations. In his opinion Hungary is being drawn inevitably into the Axis net but earnestly desires to maintain its neutrality. The French Foreign Office has been unable to obtain evidence of definite German proposals and does not know whether anything in the nature of an agreement has been arrived at.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

PULLITT

EMBNPL

Paraphrased - tel to the Ph
DIVISION OF (7500)
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 8-17-39
AUG 19 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7600.62

7600.62

FILED
AUG 21 1939

7600.62/370

SEC. 1

QML

CJ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS

Dated August 18, 1939

FROM Rec'd 6:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1520, August 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

We inquired of the Hungarian Legation in this connection whether it had information regarding the tenor of these conversations. While it professed ignorance in the matter the Legation informed us that it had just received advice from Budapest that these fantastic newspaper stories have no foundation and that as far as it knew the visit of Csaky in response to a personal invitation from Frick was of a social nature.

The Foreign Office is likewise uninformed on the subject of Ciano's conversations but it believes that the Italian Government is being drawn into the vortex which the Italians may believe is an approach to a peaceful solution of Danzig and the Corridor but which will prove an impasse leading to the brutal fact of inevitable war. German mobilization he said is continuing apace and at present is well in excess of the recent figure of 2,000,000 men. Privately owned automotive equipment and drivers, including women, are under requisition. (END SECTION TWO).

BULLITT

EMB:NPL

7600.62/870 SEC. 2

GML

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

PARIS

FROM Dated August 18, 1939

Rec'd 6 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 19 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1520, August 18, 7 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

862,24
741.61

He confirmed the information regarding the purchase of gasoline and oil by Germany mentioned in my No. 1515, August 18, 4 p. m. saying that this is true of a number of other commodities. Both civilian and military population is in a state of full preparation for war. Charveriat said that the military conversations at Moscow were proceeding very satisfactorily and that the problems were being treated on a factual basis. The conversations regarding a political accord are suspended pending the military talks.

Charveriat views the German trial balloons on the subject of conferences concerning German minorities in Poland and on the Danzig and Corridor questions with grave suspicion. He said that the German technique had not changed and this method is too reminiscent of Munich and Czechoslovakia.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB
NPL

7600.62/870

SEC. 3

GML

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 18, 1939

FROM Rec'd 4:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1521, August 18, 8 p. m.

SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY ONLY.

Dalquier said to me today ~~that~~ when Bonnet had reported to him the reaction of the Polish Ambassador in Paris to the proposal of the Soviet Government for bringing aid to Poland in case of a German attack on Poland he had been shocked and angered by the violence of the Polish Ambassador's negative reaction.

Before Bonnet had spoken to Lukasiewicz he had advised Bonnet not to take the matter up with him but to have it taken up with Smigly-Rydz by the French Military Attache in Warsaw. He had now sent the French Military Attache to talk to Smigly-Rydz about the proposal. He considered it utter folly for the Poles to turn down a Russian proposal for genuine military assistance.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

PEG

NPL

760c.62
760c.61

760c.62/871

SEC. 1

AUG 22 1939

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

GML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 18, 1939

Rec'd 6:03 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1521, August 18, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He understood the reluctance of the Poles to have the Red Army enter the territory of Poland but as soon as Poland should have been invaded by the German armies the Polish Government certainly would be glad to take assistance from anyone who could bring assistance.

He would be glad to send two French divisions to Poland and he was certain that he could get a British division as well for Poland so that the support would be not exclusively Russian but international.

Moreover he could get the most absolute guarantees from the Soviet Government for the eventual evacuation of Polish territory and France and Great Britain would give absolute guarantees of those guarantees.

Voroshilov had struck the heart of the question when he had said to the British and French negotiators that the Soviet Army was ready to march against Germany but that the only practical lines of passage were by way of

Vilna

7600.62/871

SEC. 2

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

511

CA --2--1521 from Paris (Sec. 2)..

Vilna against East Prussia and by way of Lwow
(Lemberg) to the south.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL EMB —

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

Paris

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Dated August 18, 1939

Rec'd 3:27 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1521, August 18, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE) -

The Soviet Government would not send airplanes and tanks unaccompanied by other troops to the assistance of Poland. He, Daladier, considered that the Soviet position was reasonable. An army without airplanes was blind and without tanks was relatively disarmed. Daladier concluded by saying that if the Poles should reject this offer of Russian assistance he would not send a single French peasant to fight in defense of Poland.

I take this statement seriously but not too seriously although he repeated it three times. He was angry at the Polish Ambassador in Paris and inclined to overstate.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
EMB

7600.62/871

SEC. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

GMI

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) FROM

PARIS

Dated August 19, 1939

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Paraphrase to the Ph (ad sea)
DIVISION OF 8-21-39
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1524, August 19, noon (SECTION ONE)

Following from Kirk, Berlin received in Paris this morning by hand of Third Secretary Beam:

A member of the Polish Embassy in a conversation today said that despite the rumors to that effect the Polish Embassy did not believe that Hitler would launch a sudden military coup against Danzig or the Corridor within the next few days although the possibility of such an occurrence had to be recognized. The informant stated that while the Embassy had no sure information concerning the content of the conversations at Berchtesgaden that Ciano's visit could only be construed as an effort on the part of Italy to moderate German action against Poland. He said that the Embassy had heard from Rome that Ciano on his return had said to members of the Diplomatic Corps that no war was likely and if it did occur it would be a purely localized conflict between Poland and Germany since England and France "would not fight". The Polish

Embassy

760c.62

760c.62/884

SEC. 1

AUG 22 1939

FILED

QML

-2- #1524, August 19, noon (SECTION ONE), from Paris

Embassy, the informant said, considered these reported observations of Ciano to be purely "propaganda" designed to mask Italy's anxiety over the situation.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

PEG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS

FROM Dated August 19, 1939

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1524, August 19, noon (SECTION TWO)

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The informant continued that while the Polish Embassy could not see any final solution of the present situation except war that nevertheless it was not without hope that war would be averted. The disturbing developments were that Hitler had now gone on record in his press of claiming not only Danzig but the corridor as well, a definite stand from which only a very ingenious statesman could retreat without loss of prestige. The Poles were also disturbed by the reports that Hitler and his entourage did not believe that England would fight. He said that the Poles were convinced that if Germany invaded Danzig, England would immediately come into the war although he indicated that Poland had received disturbing suggestions from England that the British would prefer the crisis to be postponed possibly until next spring when they would be in stronger military position. He said the Embassy considered that if this attitude became known it would incline the Germans to precipitate action.

BULLITT

CSB

7600.62/884 SEC. 2

GML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

PARIS

Dated August 19, 1939

Rec'd 12:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1524, August 19, noon (SECTION THREE).

The Poles, he said, are not only convinced that in case of German attack Great Britain would make good its pledges but are also convinced that Russia would come substantially to the aid of Poland which would accept Soviet assistance although with some regret because it would create future problems for Poland. He said that the Embassy had sure information that there had been no definite political negotiations between Russia and Germany as yet and did not believe that they would occur. The present German-Russian commercial negotiations were a straight business matter with no political implications.

The informant stated that the Embassy saw no possibility of avoiding war except by Poland maintaining a resolute stand of immediate readiness for military defense. With regard to the rumor that suggestions had been made that the Polish Ambassador should have a personal talk with Hitler he said that the Ambassador yesterday had expressed himself in conversation as "not having the right" under

761.62
667.6231

7600.62/884
SEQ. 3

UWIL

-2- #1524, August 19, noon (SEC. THREE), from Paris

under present conditions of German pressure to undertake
conversations with anyone in the German Government since
such action would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

BULLITT

GW:CSB

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

PARIS

FROM Dated August 19, 1939

Rec'd 11:53 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1524, August 19, noon (SECTION FOUR). AUG 21 1939

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Not only would it be so interpreted by the Germans and serve to strengthen their determination but it would be so construed by those elements in England which despite the British commitments were still trying to influence their Government toward a policy of appeasement and consequent "selling out" of Polish interests. He said that the activities of these elements in Great Britain were illustrated by events of a few weeks ago by which it is presumed he meant the Wohlthat-Hudson conversations.

He said that Poland had constantly made clear from the Beck speeches of last spring to date that it was ready in free negotiations to make certain concessions in regard to Danzig and the corridor although it could not be said now what form and extent they would take. The stand of the Polish Government was that there could be no talk of concessions until the Germans had realized that Poland would not succumb to a "war of nerves" and stopped the

the

7600.62/884

SEC. 4

GML

-2- #1524, August 19, noon (SECTION FOUR) from Paris

the present press and other pressure against Poland. He said that early last June the Embassy had accepted with alacrity an invitation from the German Foreign Office for talks with a view to moderating the press campaign in both countries but two days later before any conversations occurred the Foreign Office abruptly informed the Embassy that they were no longer interested in such negotiations.

BULLITT

CW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (C)

Paris
FROM Dated August 19, 1939
Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1524, August 19, noon (SECTION FIVE)

HE said that should the Danzig Senate declare that Danzig was now a part of the Reich such action while it would be regarded "seriously" by the Polish Government might not be considered "at once" as a casus belli provided it was not followed by open German military occupation or denial of Polish customs rights. He complained about the "grossly exaggerated" German accounts of incidents in Poland. As yet the Embassy was not informed as to whether there was any foundation for recent German reports that a thousand German residents had been removed from homes but several incidents of alleged killings of Germans had been investigated and had been disproved or found to have no connection with political events.

BULLITT

GW:CSB

7600.62/884

SEC. 5

GML

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

PARIS

Dated August 19, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1524, August 19, noon (SECTION SIX)

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

He said that given the state of feeling it is impos-
sible to guarantee Germans in Poland entirely from an-
noyance or even some molestation but asserted that the
government had quite effectively protected German lives
and property.

I desire to point out that the foregoing statements
were made by the member of the Polish Embassy in an en-
tirely informal and confidential conversation with a mem-
ber of this Embassy and that consequently the opinions
expressed therein should be regarded as entirely personal
on his part. Kirk. (END MESSAGE)

CSB

BILLITT

7600.62/884

SEC. 6

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM to anyone. (.)

PARIS

Dated August 19, 1939

Rec'd 11:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1529, August 19, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My No. 1526 August 19, 1 p.m.

The British Charge d'Affaires in Paris called on me this morning and stated that he was familiar with the questions which Weizsaecker had put to Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin and Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin.

He said that he had received this morning Henderson's account of this conversation.

Henderson had stated flatly to Weizsaecker that he hoped there was no doubt in the mind of the German Government with regard to the support that Great Britain would give the Government of Poland in case of war between Germany and Poland. Great Britain would make war at once to support Poland.

Weizsaecker had replied that in view of Polish provocation toward Germany he felt that Great Britain was completely absolved of all obligations to Poland and trusted

that



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GML

-2- #1529, August 19, 3 p.m., from Paris

that Great Britain did not intend to go to war in support
of a lunatic nation - meaning Poland.

BULLITT

PEG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 2:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1532, August 21, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Paraphrase to PH

DIVISION	<i>8-21-39</i>
DATE	<i>Aug 22 1939</i>
DEPARTMENT OF STATE	<i>Shore & ...</i>

I have just read at the Foreign Office the military reports of this morning from Germany. They state that last night the mechanized division stationed in the Berlin area was fully mobilized and that in the night the transport to the east of the tanks of this division was begun.

The mechanized division based at Bremen was also mobilized and started to the east last evening.

Yesterday there was a large and continuing flight of German planes to the east ~~planes to the (2).~~

In the Vienna military area there was intense military activity with departures of troops in the direction of Slovakia.

The estimate of the French military representatives in Germany is that Germany now has 2,400,000 men under arms.

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Aug 22 1939

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SEC. 3

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-2- #1532, August 21, 4 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from Paris.

The Polish Embassy confirms that extensive concentration of German troops on Polish frontier which commenced yesterday should be completed between Thursday and Saturday when German army will be in position for offensive.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

WFC:HTM

D

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
FROM Dated August 21, 1939
Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1532 August 21, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

DIVISION 11 AUG 22 1939 DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXTREME SECTEY
--

This troop movement coupled with the ~~EXTREME SECTEY~~ with regard to the conversations between Ciano, Ribbentrop and Hitler and between Csaky and Ribbentrop has produced the belief here that Hitler may have made up his mind to attack in the immediate future.

The French Foreign Office has been unable to obtain any accurate information with regard to Csaky's conversations and little absolutely authoritative information with regard to Ciano's conversations. The conversations of the French and British Ambassadors with Ciano today in Rome were arranged last week and do not therefore necessarily indicate any new Italian proposal. Both the French and British Ambassadors had appointments with Ciano for last Saturday which he asked them to put off until his return from his unexpected visit to Albania.

The French representative at the Vatican reports that the Pope and the Vatican consider the situation extremely grave. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

HPD

7600.62/902

SEC. 2

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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SR
BAC

CJ

GRAY

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 5:07 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 22 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1535, August 21, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

The Paris press individually and as a whole is of the opinion that Europe has now entered a most critical period; that in fact general war in Europe is today far nearer than it was last September. No one yet insists that war is inevitable but this is more because Hitler's actions are thought to be unpredictable than because of any uncertainty with respect to France and England.

It is the general view that France and England have taken up their final positions; that they will inevitably live up to their obligations to resist aggression. Under these circumstances there is only one way in which peace can be saved. If Hitler moves against the independence of Poland a general European war is certain.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

NPL:EMB

FILED
AUG 24 1939

7600.62/903

SEC. 1

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

PARIS

FROM Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 4:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 22 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1535, August 21, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The recent comings and goings of Ciano are thought to reflect at least to some extent the fear that Mussolini is supposed to have of the consequences of war for Italy. On the other hand the press here does not expect Italy to be a controlling factor in the gravest decision of Hitler's career. Also Csaky's recent movements are susceptible of an interpretation that would give an entirely different meaning to Ciano's movements, namely that the axis has been giving the last polishing touches to the future relationship of Hungary and Yugoslavia to Berlin and Rome.

BULLITT

CSB

AUG 21 1939

FILED

7500-62/905

SEC. 2

GML

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

GRAY

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 5:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1535, August 21, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The Pope's appeal yesterday for world peace and his probable secret activities of a political nature along the same lines are respected here but at the same time it is not anticipated that they will bear fruit. In fact all talk at the present time of negotiations and of conferences is discounted by the press here despite the fact that inherently no Frenchman likes the thought of war. Everyone is impressed by the fact that Hitler's word is worthless and that it must so be regarded until he himself makes a gesture to inspire at least a modicum of confidence. There is also a disposition on the part of the commentators to recognize that France and England have now gone so far in their negotiations with Russia that a "settlement of the European question" without Russian participation is probably quite out of the question. The press is unanimous in the view that France and England, however, much they desire a "just settlement" must not fail

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SEC. 1

AUG 21 1939

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-2- #1535, August 21, 7 p.m. (SEC. THREE) from Paris

to make it understood in Berlin that power politics can
no longer produce a dividend for Hitler.

(END SECTION THREE).

BULLITT

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

GRAY

FROM PARIS

Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 5:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1535, August 21, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

The press also points out that it is hardly the time to talk negotiations and conferences at the very moment when Germany's claim to Danzig is being extended to read:

"All that was once Germany must again be Germany".

Thus according to the views of the press here the only way in which peace can be saved at this late date is for Hitler to put a stop to his ruthless methods. There is still room for an about-face. Perhaps he can side-step for a time and thus maintain a little longer the "war of nerves" but he cannot possibly go forward without precipitating war.

(END SECTION FOUR).

BULLITT

NPL:EMB

AUG 24 1939
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

GRAY

FROM PARIS

Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 22 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1535, August 21, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Preoccupation with this situation is so complete that the press has little to say this morning on the subject of Britain's refusal to discuss with Japan the Chinese currency question except in conjunction with other interested governments and with respect to Japan's reply that it will not talk with other nations about these matters in connection with the Tientsin negotiations. However, the press does not lose sight of the obvious connection between events in the Far East and the European situation but as the commentators are of the opinion that the future course of the world will be set in Europe they quite naturally concentrate their attention on the grave tension that now exists here.

Copy to London, Berlin, Rome.

(END OF MESSAGE).

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BULLITT

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7600-62/903

SEC. 15

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CORRECTED COPY

DIVISION OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AUG 22 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

cu

F W 7600.62/904

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated August 21, 1939

Rec'd 9:07 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 22 1939
AIRMAIL

RUSH.

1536, August 21, midnight.

FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Kirk has sent me the following message by special courier tonight:

"According to a source close to a vital source of the German Army Hitler decided last night to attack Danzig and the Corridor on either Thursday the 24th or Friday the 25th of this month and orders to the German War Office to this effect were issued last night."

The same information has been received by the French Foreign Office with the date fixed for August 25.

BULLITT

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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