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Telegram No. 401, March 27, 1940, (760C.0011 E.W.1939/1)
Telegram No. 503, April 19, 1940, (760C.0011 E.W.1939/1)
Telegram No. 524, April 24, 1940, (760C.0011 E.W.1939/1)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH.
1541, August 22, 4 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Daladier said to me this afternoon that he believed that Hitler was planning to attack Poland within the next eight days most probably this weekend.

In my presence he gave orders to General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan to prepare for immediate war.

He (*) Gamelin to mobilize at once certain special reserves and to bring his troops up to the French frontier. He ordered Darlan to keep the fleet ready for immediate action. (END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

PEG:HPD

(*) Apparent omission.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd Noon

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH.
1541, August 22, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

He added to them both that tomorrow morning he might decide to order general mobilization.

Duladier then said to me that he wished to transmit immediately a message to you. He felt that general European war was imminent and that Japan would also enter the war. He did not know whether or not an appeal by you at the present moment might have any deterrent effect but he hoped profoundly that you would issue a declaration stating that war seemed imminent and summoning all the nations of the earth to send delegates immediately to Washington to try to work out a pacific solution of the present situation.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH,
1541, August 22, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He added that he would accept such a proposal instantly and with deep gratitude on behalf of France. He feared that Germany would reject such a proposal. In any event you would have done your utmost to prevent a horrible catastrophe for the entire human race, and you would have made the moral issue clear.

I hope that you will let me know in advance what action if any you intend to take. Daladier can be trusted not to divulge secrets. (END MESSAGE).

BULLET

RPD: FEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 2:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Daladier said to me this afternoon that the action of the Soviet Government in signing a non-aggression pact with Germany, the secret clauses of which were unknown, placed France in a most tragic and terrible situation.

He said that he could not understand how the French diplomats and negotiators could have been so deceived by the Russians. He reminded me that at least six times since last January I had warned him that most serious negotiations were under way between the Germans and the Russians and said that he had told all the French Government services to attempt to verify my statements to him but had been reassured that there were no negotiations other than the commercial negotiations in progress between Germany and the Soviet Union.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT
WWW:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington

Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 2:43 p.m.

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The entire diplomatic structure which he had attempted to build up had been destroyed by this act of the Russians. Turkey had made it clear that unless an alliance should be signed between the Soviet Union, France and England, Turkey could not give military assistance to Rumania. Rumania deprived of both Russian and Turkish support was bound to fall without resistance into the arms of Germany. Poland could not be supplied with arms and ammunition except by way of Russia and the agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany would mean that the Poles would have to fight their battle against the Germans alone except for the support the French could give by engaging a number of German divisions on the French-German frontier.

He believed that in spite of their courage the Poles could not hold out against the German armies for more than two months. Thereafter the entire brunt of the war on land against Germany and Italy would fall on
No. 1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris

on the French Army. The British could not have a serious army ready for another two years.

BULLITT

WVC:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED:

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated August 22, 1939

FROM

Recl'd 3:28 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Furthermore he believed that as soon as England and France should become engaged in Europe, Japan would begin taking over French, British and Dutch possessions in the Pacific.

Under the circumstances he was faced with the alternative of sacrificing the lives of all able-bodied men in France in a war, the outcome of which would be to say the least doubtful; or the worse alternative of abandoning the commitments of France to support Poland which would be a horrible moral blow to the French people and would result in Germany swallowing one after another, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslav, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. In the end Germany would turn on France and England with all the economic resources of these countries at her disposal.

The decision which he faced was therefore one of the most profound gravity.
lw -2- No. 1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris

He felt that the Poles had been guilty of criminal folly in not replying in the affirmative to the Russian's proposal for active assistance to Poland. This morning Beck had received the French Ambassador to Warsaw and had pretended to be delighted that the Russians had now made their position clear. Beck had stated to the French Ambassador that Poland would fight the moment Hitler should make any move against Danzig. Daladier said he believed this was true.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
FROM
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).
Finally he said that he realized that the Russians had hoodwinked the French and British completely and that possibly even though the Poles had agreed to accept Russian assistance the Russians would have found an excuse not to conclude their negotiations with France and England and to conclude the agreement with Germany.

Daladier said that he had not yet decided to order general mobilization; but believed he would issue the order tomorrow morning. Later in my presence he repeated this statement to General Gamelin and ordered Gamelin today to mobilize further reserves and advance certain troops to the German frontier.

Later I asked General Gamelin if he was not also mobilizing reserves on the Italian frontier. He replied that he was not since the French Government did not desire at the present moment to excite the Italians.

Daladier, also in my presence, ordered Admiral Durlan
-2- #1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR) from Paris

Darlan to keep the fleet in immediate readiness for action. Darlan stated to me that the fleet was already on a war footing and prepared to act at once.

BULLITT

WWC:C3B
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
FROM
Dated August 22, 1939
Reo'd 2:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

I discussed the general situation at great length with Léger at the Foreign Office. He blamed the Poles for the failure of the negotiations of the French and British with the Soviet Union. He said that it was on Sunday August 20 that Beck had rejected the proposal to permit the Soviet army to enter Polish soil to support the Polish army.

Throughout our conversation politicians kept calling him on the telephone urging that it would be folly to go to war in support of Poland in view of the agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. Léger replied to them as he did to me that France must fight since if Poland should be abandoned the whole of eastern and southeastern Europe would fall without a struggle into Hitler's hands and with the resources of this vast area behind him Hitler would be able to overwhelm France and England.

BULLITT

NPL: EMB.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 5 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

I asked Leger what he thought the result of war would be in case it should begin. He said that obviously a war now would begin at an exceedingly bad moment for France and England. If the Germans should attack and conquer Poland, they could then receive supplies of all sorts from the Soviet Union and Rumania. It was exceedingly doubtful, to put it mildly, that France and England would be able to win the war. Nevertheless the chance must be taken since the chance would be even less if France should permit Poland to be destroyed. He added the nebulous hope that if Poland recognizing the seriousness of the situation should begin to try to work intimately with the Bolsheviks, the Soviet Union might turn around and abandon the agreement it had entered into with Germany.

BULLITT

EMB:NPL
CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1543, August 22, 5 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).
Both Léger and Daladier said to me that they were not sure that Italy would decide to enter war on the side of Germany immediately.

The stupafaction of the French Foreign Office which has been most optimistic with regard to the conclusion of the agreement between the Soviet Union, France, and England is so great, that no constructive ideas have yet been evolved.

The British Government has not yet communicated to the French Government its opinions on the present situation.

In brief the opinion of Daladier, Gamelin, Darlan, Léger, Guy La Chambre and other ministers with whom I have talked today is that Hitler is not likely to lose his present opportunity to strike with hope of success, that France must support Poland even though the successful issue of a war thus engaged may be most doubtful since the abandonment of Poland would mean that France and England
England would have to fight somewhat later in an even worse position and that they would lose their moral standing in the world.

Laladier said to me that his guess was that as soon as Ribbentrop should have signed in Moscow the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union and should have returned to Germany Hitler would launch his attack against Poland.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

EMB:NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 22, 1939
Rec'd 3:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1544, August 22, 6 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL.

The Polish Ambassador has just stated to me that his government sees no possibility of preserving peace and expects Germany to provoke incidents in Danzig which will oblige Poland to send another ultimatum which will be rejected and that war will begin shortly after the return of Ribbentrop from his trip to Moscow.

BULLITT

NPL: EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 23, 1939
Rec'd 1:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH,
1550, August 23, 4 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

If...should be contemplated along lines anything like those transmitted in my number 1541 August 22, 4 p.m.

it seems to me that a maximum of effect would be produced if you could arrange to have the Pope issue a general appeal for peace twelve hours before launching any proposals.

It is obvious that today the question is not one of making peace but one of delaying for a brief space at least the outbreak of war.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated August 23, 1939

Rec'd 1:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1553, August 23, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Rochat informed me this morning that the conversation Naggiar French Ambassador in Moscow with Molotov had been most unsatisfactory. Molotov had refused to give any details whatsoever with regard to the German-Soviet agreement and had merely said that it was the point of view of the Soviet Government that the military conversations with France and England could be recommenced just as soon as the situation was somewhat more clear.

The French Government therefore has no idea what may be in the text of the Soviet-German agreement but hoping against hope that the German-Soviet negotiations may break down at the last moment, the French and British Governments have decided to keep their military negotiators in Moscow until the Soviet Government shall have made it clear that their presence is no longer desirable.

(END SECTION ONE)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From PARIS

Dated August 23, 1939

Rec’d 2:39 p.m. [summarized]

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1553, August 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The French Government is continuing quietly to summon men to the front and now has well over a million and a half men on the frontiers.

The Italians yesterday began reinforcing their troops on French frontier and it is probable that now the French Government will inform the Italian Government that in view of these measures the French will be obliged to reinforce their troops on the Italian frontier. Up to the present time all French reinforcements are evidently sent to the German frontier.

Ciano has not yet received the French Ambassador, Francois Poncet and there are no conversations whatsoever in progress between the French and Italian Governments.

Reports reaching the French Foreign Office from all quarters have produced the impression that Hitler may send an ultimatum to Poland on the day after tomorrow, Friday and that in any event such an ultimatum may be expected within a week at the outside. (END SECTION TWO)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

1553, August 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Reports from Poland indicate that the Poles certainly will fight.

The Rumanians are reported to be in a state of acute anxiety and there is little confidence that they will resist German pressure.

On the other hand reports from Hungary indicate that Horthy and Teleki are remaining firm in their opposition to German threats and blandishments and are unwilling to enter the German's orbit.

Reports from Yugoslavia indicate a determination on the part of the Yugoslavs to maintain their independence.

Greece is reported to be absolutely determined to resist any Italian pressure and to contemplate entering war on the side of France and England.

It is still believed that in spite of the Russian defection, Turkey will enter war on the side of France and England, and will occupy the Dodecanese.

All
All reports from Spain tend to show that General Franco's government will maintain a strict neutrality.

Reports from Japan state that the Japanese Government has been completely bewildered by the German action in making a pact with the Soviet Union, and that a great opportunity has been presented for England to improve her relations with Japan.

The British Government has given no indication of weakening in its intention to support Poland. The French Government remains determined to fight in support of Poland.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

PEG: KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 23, 1939
Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1557, August 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Hungarian Minister who returned from Budapest this morning called on me this afternoon. He said that the information of the Hungarian Government indicated that Germany intended to make war on Poland the end of this week.

Ciano had told Csaky that while he and Mussolini knew that war on the side of Germany would be unpopular in Italy they felt that no nation would ever make an agreement again with Italy if Italy again repeated the performance of the war of 1914 and refused to give support to Germany at this time. If Germany should go to war with Poland therefore Italy would march by the side of Germany.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
RUSH
1557, August 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The Hungarian Minister said that Germany had put no pressure whatsoever on Hungary to permit the passage of German troops and had not offered Hungary any portion of Slovakia. The question of the passage of German troops through Hungary had not been raised in any of Csaky's talks. He said that Csaky's visit to Ribbentrop was motivated by the simple fact that if you were a small state next to a very big one you tried to be polite to the big one.

Csaky's visit to Frick on the other hand was an attempt to get information as to Hitler's real intentions. Frick had talked to Csaky in a hair raising manner and had stated that Hitler was convinced that he could starve England to death by airplane attacks on British merchant shipping. Frick also had indicated that Hitler was likely to make war on Poland the end of this week.

Csaky had been so shocked by the statements that Frick had made to him that he had dashed to Italy to see Ciano.
#1557, August 23 (SECTION TWO) from Paris

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL
1557, August 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The Hungarian Minister assured me three times that there was no chance of Hungary joining Germany and Italy in war against France, England and Poland and added that although Hungary would not make any declaration of neutrality, Hungary would, in fact, remain neutral.

The Hungarian Minister went on to say that the news of the German-Russian agreement had greatly angered those elements in Hungary which were anti-German; but on the whole the Hungarian Government thought that two advantages to Hungary might accrue from it: (1) There could be no further talk about an anti-comintern pact which would be a relief to Hungary; (2) now that Rumanians knew that they could expect no support from the Soviet Union, they would be apt to treat the Hungarian minorities in Rumania with much more politeness and decency. (END OF MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM  Dated August 23, 1939

Rec'd 4:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1560, August 23, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

The British Charge d'Affaires in Paris has just called on me and informed me in the utmost confidence that the message from Chamberlain which Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, delivered to Hitler today was in the following sense:

Chamberlain expresses the hope that Hitler was under no illusions as to the attitude the British Government would take in case Germany should attack Poland. Great Britain would make war at once in support of Poland. He continued to hope, however, that such a catastrophe as general European war could be averted and if the German Government and the Polish Government should desire to have a direct discussion of the subjects in dispute between them the British Government would be glad to attempt to create the atmosphere necessary to make such discussions possible.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

Dated August 23, 1939

Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

15 GO, August 23, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The British Charge d'Affaires added that he had
delivered a copy of this message to Daladier and a copy
to Bonnet and that both had said that they considered it
a good move.

He asked me what I thought of it and I replied that
it sounded to me like the preparation for a new Munich
but that it was extremely difficult for me to express
any opinions since I had not seen the text of the message
and that everything depended on the exact words used and
the spirit behind them.

The British Minister said that he was certain that
the statement with regard to Great Britain's intentions to
support Poland was so strong that the message could not be
considered as a preparation for a new "appeasement" in
the Munich manner. He added that he had not yet received
any information from Henderson as to the reception he had
received from Hitler.

(END SECTION TWO)

NPL

BULLITT
This telegram closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated August 23, 1939

FROM Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1560, August 23, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

He asked me what steps if any the President of the United States might be about to take to prevent the outbreak of war and I replied that I had no information on this subject.

On the subject of the German-Russian agreement the British Minister said that Molotov had received the British Ambassador in Moscow yesterday and had talked to him in the most insulting manner. Molotov had said that it has been obvious to the Soviet Government that Great Britain had been completely insincere throughout its negotiations with the Soviet Government and had not desired to reach an agreement. Since this was clear the British Government should have no objection to the Soviet Government concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany.

Molotov had, however, indicated that he hoped the military missions would remain in Moscow and that pressure would
would be brought to bear on Poland to permit the passage of Soviet troops.

The British Minister said that the British Government agreed with the French Government that it was desirable to leave the military missions in Moscow for the present.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

CSB
CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 24, 1939
Rec'd 1:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1565, August 24, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

The information of the French General Staff indicates that the concentration of German troops against Poland will be completed not later than Friday evening. It is believed that the only question in doubt is the question of the exact date on which Hitler will provoke war with Poland.

BULLITT

DDM:WGC
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON,

1568, August 24, 3 p.m.

Strictly Confidential.

The British Ambassador who returned from London this morning said to me that he had had a long talk yesterday with Chamberlain and Halifax. They were both of the opinion that war was inevitable and that while efforts to prevent war should be continued to the last moment such efforts would prove to be futile. The British Ambassador said that both Chamberlain and Halifax were absolutely determined to support Poland in case of war between Poland and Germany.

BULLITT

KLP
A portion of this message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

PARIS
Dated August 24, 1939
Rec'd 2:03 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1569, August 24, 4 p.m.

This morning's Council of Ministers reviewed the International situation in the light of most recent developments particularly with regard to the Russo-German "neutral alliance" pact and considered the military measures necessary to meet conditions. Shortly after the meeting the Havas agency put out a story to the effect that the Prime Minister will soon address the nation on the need for national union and that he will probably form a national union government. The Socialists this morning began to clamor in their press for the immediate convocation of the government.

Three groups of military reservists totaling about 400,000 in all have already been called to the colors today and it is rumored that by nightfall three more groups will be called.

(END OF SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

WWC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PARIS

Dated August 24, 1939

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

1569, August 24, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Information as to the nature and the size of these groups is withheld from the public but it is obvious to everyone from the steps that are being taken that France is speedily manning her frontiers on a war basis. The military requisition law has also been put into force and motor cars and other automotive equipment are now being taken over.

(Gray) While it was generally thought yesterday morning that the then impending Russo-German agreement would be framed along the usual lines of non-aggression pacts the press nevertheless dealt with the subject as if the agreement contemplated was of much wider scope. Under the circumstances there was no leeway for expression of surprise when the true nature of the agreement was revealed early this morning. No had yesterday's comment left anything unsaid of a condemnatory nature of the course that the Soviet Government has followed. Today's press is much less firm than yesterday on the score that France and England must resist force by superior force. (End of Message)

CSB

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

PARIS

Dated August 25, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 6:04 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

1581, August 25, 7 a.m.

We were informed last evening by General Giraud who is a member of the French Supreme War Council that the Reich now has three billion men mobilized and is fully prepared for an attack against Poland. According to the General the French are exerting every effort to induce the Poles to maintain their sang froid in order that it may not possibly be said with the slightest regard for the truth that anyone but Germany is the aggressor. He stated also that the French Government is fully aware that an extensive campaign is under way in the United States to persuade American public opinion that Poland is the aggressor.

He asserted that French mobilization is proceeding in methodical rhythm and that morale is high. He expressed his firm conviction of the imminence of a general European war.

BULLITT

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D-1)

Secretary of State
Washington

1593, August 25, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE).
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Daladier lunches alone with me today and discussed every aspect of the present situation.

He said that he was profoundly grateful for the message of the President to the King of Italy and also for the President's messages to Moscicki and Hitler. He felt that the President had done more than any other man had done or could have done to avert war.

If Germany should attack Poland there was no question whatsoever about the result. Both France and England would march at once to the assistance of Poland. He had now mobilized 1,900,000 men. He did not wish to introduce general mobilization yet because this measure would stop the normal economic life of the country and would put the country virtually under the rule of the army.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated August 25, 1939
Rec'd 5:14 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1593, August 25, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

He was certain, however, that the German Government now realized that France was in earnest. The German Military Attaché had called at the French Ministry of War today to say that if the French should continue to mobilize men on the German frontier the German Government would have to order general mobilization. The reply had been that the French would continue to mobilize.

Daladier said that he was fully aware that there were elements in Germany and Italy strongly opposed to war and that he would order all French radio stations to keep pounding the President's message to Hitler into German ears. He had no indication whatsoever that there was any weakening in Hitler's determination to attack Poland.

BULLITT

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

1593, August 25, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Two most satisfactory pieces of news had reached him today. The Spanish Military Attache in Paris had called on General Gamelin to state that General Franco would like to conclude at once with France a treaty of commerce and amity. He had dictated, himself, a reply which he had ordered sent at once to Spain accepting at once this proposal.

All his information from Marshal Petain indicated that the Spaniards were deeply relieved that the conclusion of the German pact with the Soviet Union had relieved Spain of any obligations to take a hostile attitude toward France.

The second piece of good news was that the Turkish Government had informed the French Ambassador officially that it would stand by its alliance with France and England and would fight by their side if necessary. He had ordered General Weigand today to leave at once for Syria with an additional division of French troops which would act with Rumanian in case of war.

With
With regard to internal politics Daladier said that if he should be obliged to decree general mobilization he would reform his cabinet immediately. He would reduce the size of the cabinet from sixteen to twelve and would certainly eliminate Mansy and take Léon Blum and Louis Marin into the cabinet.

(END SECTION THREE)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 25, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 7:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1593, August 25, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

He had not yet decided whether or not to include Flandin or Pigno but was inclined to exclude both of them.

Daladier said that he had 150 officers in important points observing the mobilization. Their reports almost brought tears to his eyes. He stated that the stoicism and quiet courage of the men called from their homes was beyond praise.

I desire to add my own observations to this statement. Never has any nation confronted a war of the most terrible sort with greater calm or courage.

Daladier said that he was so incensed by the attitude of the communist papers in Paris which subsidized from Moscow are now saying that France should not fight in support of Poland that he intended to seize the Soviet subsidized RUHINA"HE tonight. He said that he would rather have his struggle with the communists now than later. It was
-2- #1593. August 25, 6 p.m. (SEC. FOUR), from Paris

was obvious the French communists with certain rare ex-
ceptions owed their allegiance to the Soviet Union and not
to France and it was better to have enemies in the open
than hidden in corners.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EMC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (BR)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 25, 1939
Rec'd 7:51 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1599 August 25, midnight. (SECTION ONE.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

As I told the President over the telephone this evening Bonnet has just informed me that Hitler said to the French Ambassador in Berlin this afternoon that while he did not intend to attack France he could no longer tolerate the manner in which the Poles were treating the German minority in Poland and must act.

Bonnet said that the whole tenor of the telegram was such that he was obliged to consider Hitler's statement a warning before action. He believed that Hitler would attack Poland almost immediately.

(END SECTION ONE.)

BULLITT

WWW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (Br)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 11:20 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH

1599, August 25, midnight (SECTION T:O)

Bonnet telephoned to me while the above was being typed to say that after studying the report of the French Ambassador in Berlin with his advisers in the Quai d'Orsay he felt that he would like to say to me that while the interpretation given above of Hitler's intentions was the most probable it was also possible to put another interpretation on Hitler's words since he had said that he did not desire general European war. He was not quite sure that Hitler's words did not indicate a desire to settle the question of Danzig by negotiation.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

CFW CA
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM PARIS
Dated August 26, 1939
Rec'd 10:35 p.m. August 25.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1600, August 26, 2 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Poland Ambassador at my request called Beck on
the telephone, the communication being established by way
of London and Riga, the direct lines via Germany having
been cut by the Germans.

Beck said that he had given Ambassador Bidle President
Moscicki's reply to the President's message at 12:00 mid-
night Paris time, 7:00 p.m. Washington time.

He added that the reply expresses deep gratitude to the
President for his efforts to preserve peace; accepts the pro-
posal of direct negotiation with Germany; accepts conciliat-
ion aided by an honorable neutral; omits to mention arbitra-
tion which the Poland Government has always refused to admit
on the principle that when a bandit reached for your watch
there is nothing to arbitrate; expresses the hope that the
President's notes will produce the result the President
desires.
--2--1600 from Paris (SEC ONE).

desires, and ends by calling attention to the fact that
Poland is demanding nothing of Germany.

END SECTION ONE.

BULLITT

ROW NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA GRAY

FROM PARIS

Dated August 26, 1939
Rec'd 10:41 p.m. 25th

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH

1600. August 26, 2 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

I talked with Bonnet again about Coulenre's conversation with Hitler. He said that after a careful study of the conversation of the French Ambassador with Hitler he felt that he had been too pessimistic when he had first talked with me. His first interpretation was probably correct but Hitler seemed to be genuinely afraid to provoke general European war and it might be that in the end Hitler would prove to be ready for negotiations.

I have telephoned the substance of the above to the President.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

JRL NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 26, 1939
Rec'd 8:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY. RUSH.
1608, August 26, noon (SECTION ONE).
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.
I now have the full explanation of Bonnet's statement to me that Hitler's talk with Coulondre was a warning before action and his subsequent telephone call saying that there were signs that Hitler might desire to enter into negotiations. See my rush 1599, August 25, midnight.

I have just had read to me at the Quai d'Orsay the telegrams of Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin, on his conversation with Hitler and Henderson's conversation with Hitler.

Hitler said to Coulondre that he had summoned him to say that he had no desire to have war with France. He had no claims against France. Personally he renounced all claims to Alsace-Lorraine.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated August 26, 1939
Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY. - RUSH. -
1606.
August 26, noon (SECTION TWO).

The French had, however, given carte blanche to the Poles and the Poles were acting in a manner that no self-respecting state could endure. If such actions should continue he on his side would have to act with force.

Hitler's voice then rose and he screamed out a series of imaginary Polish atrocities against the German minority in Poland. After this he said that he would regret war with France; but that he was ready for it. He knew that the French were a brave nation like the Germans and that they would expect to win. He also would expect to win especially since his agreement with the Soviet Union was a positive one. If France chose to make a general European war out of the action which he would be obliged to take if the Poles should continue their present behavior, there would be war.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D) 

FROM Rec'd 9:23 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY RUSH

1605, August 26, noon. (SECTION THREE)

He then said something vague which indicated that he seemed to have in his head some sort of an idea about an exchange of minority populations between Poland and Germany. He then returned to the alleged Polish atrocities against the German minority and ended his talking with the French Ambassador on a highly belligerent note.

It was immediately after receipt of the French Ambassador's telegram that Bonnet gave me the information that he considered Hitler's statements to Coulondre a warning before action.

A few minutes later Bonnet received a telegram from Coulondre giving the report that his British colleague, Henderson, had made to him with regard to his conversation with Hitler.

BULLITT

GW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
RUSH
1606, August 26, noon. (SECTION FOUR)

Hitler said to the British Ambassador that he did not desire to have war with Great Britain. The cruelties which the Poles were inflicting on Germans in Poland, if continued, would oblige him to take military action against the Poles.

He desired Henderson to convey a message to his Government positively not by telegraph or telephone but only by word of mouth.

The message was that he, Hitler, was prepared to consider a certain measure of disarmament and he desired to assure Great Britain that although he needed colonies and would continue to demand them, this demand need not be fulfilled for four or five years and Germany need not require the same colonies which she had lost after the War of 1914.

BULLITT

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP FROM PARIS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated August 26, 1939
Rec’d 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY. RUSH.
1606, August 26, noon (SECTION FIVE)

He said that he was in desperate need of timber and oilstuffs of all sorts.

His demands against Poland still remained the attachment to the Reich of Danzig and the establishment of a strip of territory across the Corridor to Danzig and from Danzig to East Prussia so that East Prussia would be connected directly through German territory with the Reich.

It might also be necessary to agree with the Polish Government to exchange the German minority in Poland against the Polish minority in Germany.

He requested Henderson to leave for London at the earliest possible moment and to return with the reply of the British Government to the statements that he had made.

BULLITT

GW:WWC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY. RUSH.
1606, August 26, noon (SECTION SIX).

Henderson expressed the opinion to Coulondre that Hitler would not make war during the 48 hours necessary to receive the reply.

It was after the receipt of this message from Coulondre that Bonnet telephoned to me and said that it appeared that Hitler did not desire a general European war and might be ready for negotiation.

I was informed by Leger and Rochat this morning that the French Ambassador in Berlin had informed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin about Hitler's remarks about the exchange of populations and that the Polish Ambassador had informed Beck.

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 26, 1939.
Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

FROM
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY. RUSH.

1606, August 26, noon. (SECTION SEVEN)

As you know both Leger and Rochat are intensely opposed to a policy of another Munich and absolutely determined that France and England shall support Poland. I asked them both if they did not fear that Henderson's conversation with Hitler was the prelude to British action designed to disintegrate Polish resistance. They both replied that there was not the slightest indication of any such weakening on the part of Great Britain and both assured me that France would oppose any such betrayal of Poland to the end.

END MESSAGE.

KLP

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D-1)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1610, August 26, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Daladier said to me today that he had already sent a reply to Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin to communicate to Hitler based on Hitler's statements to Coulondre reported in my Number 1606, August 26, noon.

He had stated that France had not the slightest desire to go to war but that France had given a promise to Poland to support Poland in case of German attack on Poland and so far as possible this promise would be fulfilled. It was the hope of the French Government that the dispute between Poland and Germany could be settled by direct negotiation between the Polish and German governments.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLIT T

DDM
MA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
(D-1)

Paris
Dated August 26, 1939
Rec'd 3:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH

1610, August 26, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Daladier added that at the same time that he had sent this message for delivery to Hitler he had ordered the mobilization of another 700,000 men. Tomorrow on the French frontier there would be 2,550,000 soldiers.

We discussed at great length Hitler's remarks to Henderson the British Ambassador to Berlin. Daladier said that he had as yet received no communication from the British Government on this subject; but he would make certain that the British Government should not permit Henderson to lay the basis for a new Munich. He did not believe, however, that the British Government would attempt to do such a thing.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

HR
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (C)

Paris
Dated August 27, 1939
Rec'd 4:57 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1618, August 27, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. I have been informed by Bonnet and other officials of the Foreign Office that from the French Ambassador in Rome and a number of other sources the Foreign Office has received reports which have created the impression that while Mussolini is going through the motions of preparing to bring Italy into war on the side of Germany he intends at the last minute possibly even after general mobilization on all sides to suggest a brief period of delay before the beginning of hostilities for an immediate conference. This impression has been produced by a large series of small facts and is not based on any official declaration whatever to this effect by any responsible official of the Italian Government.

(End Section One)

BULLITT

CSB
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (C)

Secretary of State
Washington

1618, August 27, 8 p.m. (Section two)

There are signs also that Hitler may be afraid to turn loose a general European war but there is no single bit of authentic official information that proves this contention.

Daladier said to me this morning that he was not (repeat not) convinced that Hitler would be afraid to fight.

The conclusion of the French Government is that the real "war of nerves" will begin after the reply of the British Government to Hitler's proposal to Henderson has been received in Berlin and that Hitler and Mussolini may be expected to supply a series of cold and warm douches in an attempt to break down the present strong resolution of France, England and Poland.

It will not (repeat not) break in either France or Poland. (End Message)

CSB

Bullitt
HR

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 27, 1939

Rec'd 8:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1620, August 27, midnight.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

In the course of our conversation tonight Daladier said that in spite of the feeling of many persons that all the messages that Hitler was sending and his failure to make war while the French army was being mobilized indicated that Hitler might be afraid to face the issue, he could see nothing in Hitler's latest note which indicated that Hitler was weakening in his determination to make war if necessary to get Danzig.

While I was at the Ministry of War however I talked with Daladier's two closest advisors and both expressed the opinion that Hitler would not dare to make war.

(End Section One.)

BULLITT

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS
Dated August 27, 1939
Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1620, August 27, midnight (SECTION TWO)

Incidentally there is no truth whatever in the rumors that the French Government has made any offers to the Italian Government. It is Daladier's conviction that if the French Government should try to buy off the Italians at the present time the concessions to Italy would be interpreted in Germany merely as a sign that France was afraid of war and would encourage Germany to make war on Poland. From an unimpeachable source I learn that the NAZIS in Germany are saying to each other that France is about to give Tunis to Italy and that this indicates that France is afraid to fight which confirms Daladier's opinion.

BULLITT

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

From

PARIS

Date: August 27, 1939

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1620, August 27, midnight. (SECTION THREE)

The improvement in the relations between France and Spain has been so extraordinarily rapid since the agreement between Hitler and Stalin that Daladier said to me somewhat jokingly but not altogether that the man who today possibly might draw Mussolini away from his military alliance with Hitler was General Franco.

Daladier and several persons at the Foreign Office said to me today that the improvement in relations between France and Japan since the conclusion of the pact between Germany and the Soviet Union has been so great that the French Government would take active steps at once to try to draw Japan into the French British orbit and settle the war in China on a basis satisfactory to General Chiang Kai Shek if it were not for the simple physical fact that no one in Paris had time to give to this problem.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

OSB
SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

1622, August 28, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Karl von Wiegard came from Germany on Saturday where he was able to obtain information from his customary close contacts in the German general staff.

He informs me that the German general staff has stated to Hitler that an attack on Poland will be nothing more than a "bloody promenade" and that since the Soviet Union may be expected to remain at least neutral Germany can win a war against Poland, France and England. In spite of these statements to Hitler from the general staff, von Wiegard believes Hitler will not dare to loose war.

Paris military information this morning indicates that all available trains in Germany are today transporting units to the Polish frontier, that 50 reserve divisions have been mobilized and that the concentration of from 60 to 70 divisions on the Polish frontier will be completed within four or five days. It is believed that Germany will not be fully prepared to attack Poland for four or five days.
- 2 - #1622, August 28, 1 p.m. from Paris

Information from Italy indicates that military measures being taken do not indicate a serious intention to engage immediately in war.

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

PARIS

FROM

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1631, August 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Signs connoting the approach of war are becoming increasingly evident to the population of Paris still in the city. It is estimated that perhaps a third of the inhabitants are already in the provinces. Many of these were absent on vacation when the crisis developed. For the past two days the Government has been urging through the medium of the press and over the radio that residents of the city, particularly old people and women and children, leave at once wherever possible. The population is also reminded constantly of the existence and whereabouts of the bombproof shelters recently constructed throughout the city. Paris at night is now the city of almost complete darkness. Last night's "blackout" was impressively effective to the layman.

The press states that the German, French and the Italo-French frontiers are closed.

Telephonic communication outside the country is reserved exclusively for official calls. Telephonic communications
with the provinces reserved almost entirely for official calls and such private calls as are completed must be in the French language. Telegraphic communication outside the country is also subject to extensive control. This does not affect official messages. Private messages in code are not accepted nor are messages in a foreign language unless "certified by the police".

A decree establishing full censorship of the press, radio and photographs (including cinema) was published in the Official Journal this morning. (END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY
Paris
FROM
Dated August 28, 1939
Rec'd 3:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1631, August 28, 5 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Judging from the press, the public as a whole is strongly behind the Government in its determination not to give way before Hitler's threat of force and in the precautionary measures mentioned above. The Communist press both in Paris and in the provinces has been suppressed. Communist meetings are also prohibited. There has been no outcry against these steps, it appears that a large section of the Communists have been so embarrassed by the Russo-German agreement as to consider it wise for the Communist Party in France to remain quiet for the time being. The extremist section of the party is, of course, resentful of the measures which have deprived the Communists of any medium of expression. Several abortive attempts have been made to register this resentment in mimeographed circulars and bulletins. The police are most watchful with respect to such efforts.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
GRAY
PARIS
Dated August 28, 1939
Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1631, August 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Except for the Communists, the Government is being supported in the present crisis by all shades of political opinion in France. Today's press is unanimous in its praise of Daladier's refusal to be drawn into uncertain negotiations with Hitler. Such division of opinion as exists on the international situation relates almost entirely to the question of whether or not Hitler is weakening. A portion of the press interprets his approaches to the British and French Governments as a sign of hesitation. These newspapers therefore hope that it may yet be possible to negotiate with Hitler but only on the basis of predetermined conditions which would respect the guarantees that have been given to Poland. Another section of the press is convinced that Hitler will not give way. While many commentators believe that the comparative silence of Rome at this time may presage some last minute action by Mussolini which might materially alter the situation as it now appears, it is the
-2- #1631, August 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE), from Paris

general belief that war is very near and that the question
of whether it shall be war or peace depends entirely upon
Hitler.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 28, 1939
Recd. 7:45 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington

1638. August 28, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I assume that you have received from Ambassador Kennedy the authentic text of the British note to Germany.

A most peculiar situation developed this afternoon in Paris due to the failure of the British Government to communicate to the French Foreign Office a complete text of the note to Hitler. The summary of the note in the hands of the French Foreign Office aroused intense suspicion that Great Britain intended to attempt to force Poland to negotiate with Germany on the basis of Hitler's proposal that Danzig should be returned immediately to the Reich, together with a strip of territory across the corridor. An entirely different summary of the British note had been telegraphed to Beck and a third and different summary of the note was communicated to Daladier.

(END SECTION ONE.)

HTM
NPL

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D).

PARIS
Dated August 28, 1939
Rec'd 9:52 p.m.

FROM
Secretary of State
Washington

1638, August 28, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The summaries communicated to Daladier and Beck did not contain the phrase which seemed to indicate that the British Government was contemplating of maneuver similar to the British maneuver which disintegrated Czechoslovakia.

Daladier and Beck therefore were satisfied the British reply whereas the officials of the French Foreign Office and the Polish Ambassador in Paris were acutely anxious.

Inasmuch as the British Ambassador, Daladier and Bonnet have all assured me personally that the summaries they have are not the definitive text of the note, I can express no opinion on the basis of the texts I have seen.

The Polish Ambassador has informed me that Beck on the basis of the summary telegraphed to him has told the British Government that he is completely satisfied.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

NPL