TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From PARIS
Dated August 28, 1939
Rec'd 8:51 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

1638, August 28, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

The Polish Ambassador, who has talked twice with Beck tonight assures me that the Polish Government positively will not negotiate on the basis of Hitler's proposals of last March and April and if the British Government should attempt to force any acceptance of these proposals on the Polish Government the Polish Government would take action at once.

Daladier stated to me this evening that he could see nothing in the summary submitted to him which indicated that the British Government intended to run out on its pledges to Poland. On the contrary he considered the British note strong. If the British should be attempting to negotiate a new appeasement behind the back of France and Poland which he did not (repeat not) believe he would take the strongest possible line with the British Government in the morning.

(END OF MESSAGE).
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

1644, August 29, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

I have just read the official and authentic text of the note which Henderson handed to Hitler last night. This text reached Paris at 10 o'clock this morning.

It shows that the summaries which aroused apprehension in Paris last night that Great Britain might be about to attempt to disintegrate Polish resistance were misleading.

Briefly the British note states that Hitler's communication to Henderson raises two definite problems. The first is the question of the dispute between Germany and Poland and the second, the relations between Great Britain and Germany.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

HTM: WVC
Telegram Received

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

1644, August 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Germany is reminded that the British Government has entered into engagements to protect the independence of Poland and that these engagements will be fulfilled.

The opinion is expressed that the best way to settle the dispute between Poland and Germany is by direct negotiation between those two countries and that any settlement reached should be guaranteed by other powers.

The note states that the Polish Government has informed the British Government that it will be glad to enter into negotiations with the German Government on this basis.

Bullitt

GW:CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1644, August 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Hitler is reminded that in his declaration of last April he acknowledged Poland's interest in Danzig.

Reference is made to the necessity of both Poland and Germany restraining publication of unfounded rumors of atrocities.

The promise is then made that if a solution should be reached by Germany and Poland through direct negotiations, Great Britain would be glad to discuss at once with Germany economic problems and disarmament.

In my opinion the note is excellent and shows no inclination on the part of Great Britain to play the same role vis à vis Poland that Great Britain played vis à vis Czechoslovakia.

Bonnet who gave me the note said that he was completely satisfied by it. He felt that Germany certainly would not make war without further negotiations.

Hitler, he understood from Berlin, intended to reply to the British note this afternoon.

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1644, August 29, 1 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)

Whatever the outcome of these British-German negotiations his information from Italy was that Mussolini was becoming increasingly reluctant to go to war on the side of Germany against France and England. Since the conclusion of the German-Russian agreement Mussolini seemed to be almost without influence on Hitler. The Italians were beginning to suspect that the German-Russian agreement went much further than commonly assumed and that Hitler no longer cared greatly about Mussolini's assistance and planned eventually to swallow Italy.

KLP

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

1644, August 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Under the circumstances an Italian intervention in the form of a proposal of a general conference at the eleventh hour, even after general mobilization on all sides, appeared to be highly (**).

Bonnet added that Molotov would visit Berlin in the near future and stated that he had absolute proof that the Soviet Government had just sold an enormous quantity of gasoline to the German Government, thus providing Germany with the means it did not have to use to the full for a long period its air fleet and mechanized units.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

KLP

(**) Apparent omission.
CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 29, 1939
Rec'd 1:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1647, August 29, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Daladier said to me this afternoon that he had singularly little information of importance but that there were signs that at the last minute Hitler would not dare to go to war.

BULIT ITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State
Washington

1659, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)
CONFIDENTIAL.

A member of the German Embassy last evening requested a meeting with one of the officers of this mission whom he had met but once last winter and had not seen since. The German secretary talked at some length about the superior military position of Germany following the Russo-German pact. He gave the usual story that Germany would clean up Poland in a very brief time, merely holding the French and British in the west (with no aerial bombardments unless Germany were bombed first); that after a month or two the French and British with the Polish problem eliminated would be glad to negotiate "peace on a reasonable basis". (END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

KLP
1659, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

Rumania and Hungary he said would remain neutral; Germany would obtain all the oil she needed from Baku by the Danube and Turkey in view of Russia's position would not dare to act. In spite of his seeming confidence he was obviously anxious to ascertain our views as to whether the French would not weaken at the last moment and seemed somewhat unhappy at indications we gave him as to the confident attitude of the French Government and of the General Staff.

He professed to believe that peace will still be negotiated and spoke of the "very reasonable attitude Beck had always adopted until the Poles had been egged on by the British".
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to anyone. (9)

FROM
Paris

Dated August 30, 1939

Re: 13151
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 30 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Washington

1939, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

We told him that the Polish and German positions
seemed so far apart that the way out was difficult to
perceive and that the "peace front" powers seemed
quite prepared for the clash. He replied "Danzig imme-
diately must be German but the Poles could be given eco-
nomic facilities there (he cited Hamburg for Czecho-
slovakia) and one could negotiate about the Corridor". We referred
to Hitler's stipulation that the Corridor must be German
and he merely smiled.

We gained the distinct impression that he had been
told to seek the interview to sound out the Embassy's
views on the possibility of France's weakening at the
of last moment and on the attitude of the United States in
the event of hostilities. He could have derived small
comfort on either score. (END MESSAGE).

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
FROM Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

RUSH.
1660, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE).

SECRETARY.

I have just read at the Foreign Office the account which Henderson gave Coulondre of his conversation last night with Hitler.

Hitler in a condition of violent excitement stated that Poland because of the actions of the "dirty English" had taken an intolerable position. He must have at once delivered to him Danzig, the Corridor and the Polish provinces of Pomerania and Silesia. Furthermore, he had already prepared an economic accord between Germany and Poland which he had ready for signature by Poland. He would wait twenty-four hours but if a responsible Polish statesman did not come to Berlin to sign an agreement on this basis within twenty-four hours he would crush Poland.

BULLITT

DDM: HPD
AC
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

1660, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

The British Ambassador replied that this statement
sounded like an ultimatum. He would like to have assur-
ance before transmitting any message to his Government
that Hitler did not intend to make war without further
notification.

Hitler replied that he could not give any promise
to refrain from war before consulting his associate
power, the Soviet Union.

The British Ambassador then said that a delay of
twenty-four hours was much too short. Hitler replied
that it would take only eighty minutes for a responsible
Polish official to take a plane in Warsaw and reach
Berlin.

The British Ambassador asked how such an official
would be received and Hitler made it clear that he
would be received with the same official courtesy as
Schuschnigg and Hacha.

BULLITT

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated August 30, 1939
FROM
Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1660, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)
Leger then asked to see me urgently. While I was with him he had in my presence a fifteen minute conversation with Daladier on their direct telephone. Their estimate of the situation is as follows.

Hitler is attempting to repeat step by step the maneuver which won him Austria and Czechoslovakia without war.

They take it as certain that Poland will not weaken and that no Pole will follow the footsteps of Schusnigg and Hacha to Munich.

They believe that Hitler will send a definite ultimatum today and that at the last minute Mussolini will intervene and propose a general conference for the settlement not only of the Polish-Danzig dispute but of all other questions of national demands including his own.

The position of Daladier and Leger remains the same as that expressed in the British note. They will not
not be drawn into a general conference on the lateral
German dispute in view of the conditions for peace with
Poland which Hitler gave last night to the British
Ambassador in London since acceptance of a conference
would imply a willingness to consent to the enslave-
ment of Poland in Germany.

They will insist that the Polish dispute should
be settled by direct negotiation between Germany and
Poland and that the larger questions should be reserved
for a conference when this dispute shall have been
settled.

BULLITT

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 30, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

1660, August 30, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Léger after talking with Daladier, asked me to communicate to the President most urgently that the French Government hoped that the President would not (repeat not) call any general conference but would insist if he should make a further statement or effort that the Polish-German dispute should be settled by direct negotiation between Poland and Germany.

Both Daladier and Léger agreed that the only possible alternative might be an appeal by the Pope, the King of Belgium, or the Queen of the Netherlands to Germany and Poland under the terms of the Hague Convention of 1927 for special mediation to which Germany was still a signatory. By this convention each party to a dispute obliges itself to choose a mediator and these mediators meet and attempt to produce a settlement acceptable to both sides. Their decision is not binding on either power.

Léger asked me to suggest to the President instantly that he might propose to either the Pope, the King of Belgium, or
NC -2- #1660, from Paris, August 30, 1939

or the Queen of the Netherlands that one of them should issue at once an appeal to Germany and Poland to accept the special mediation provided for in the Hague Convention of 1927. He felt that since Hitler had refused to answer the President's two messages any further appeal by the President would be left without answer. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

HPD
CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1661, August 30, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Yugoslav Minister has just called on me to say that he has received a message from Prince Paul informing him that he has absolute information that Germany and Italy have agreed that at the last minute Italy shall propose a general conference on the Polish-German dispute with the object of producing the impression that France, England and Poland are unwilling to accept a peaceful settlement.

BULLITT

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 30, 1939
Rec’d 2:02 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1669, August 30, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I have just read the full written text of the German reply to the British proposals which was handed to Henderson by Hitler in Berlin last night.

This document repeats all the demands which Hitler blurted out (reported in my 1660 of August 30, 11 a.m.) except the demand with regard to Silesia but veils them in such extremely clever diplomatic language that the public or anyone ignorant of the duplicities of diplomacy might consider it a comparatively reasonable document.

Under the circumstances the French Foreign Office is extremely glad that Hitler threw a verbal limelight on the demands which his diplomats had carefully veiled in their note.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

Dated August 30, 1939

FROM Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1669, August 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The note begins by stating that the German Government is glad that the British Government agrees on the desirability of good relations between Great Britain and Germany. It states that the present dispute with Poland could have been solved at a time when there were good relations between Poland and Germany if the Poles had been willing to accept the offer which Chancellor Hitler made to Poland last April.

It goes on to say that Poland replied to this entirely reasonable proposal by mobilization of military forces and a persecution of the German population in Poland and a political harassment and economic blockade of Danzig designed to drive Danzig to political despair and economic destruction. These activities of the Poles had become so terrible during the past weeks that the question of ending them was no longer one of months or weeks but of hours.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1939
FROM
PARIS
Dated August 30, 1939

NC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH.
1669, August 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The revision of the Treaty of Versailles must be continued and Danzig and the Corridor must be returned to the Reich. The question of the protection of German minorities and economic interests in Poland must be solved.

The Reich had no intention of extinguishing the independence of Poland; but the question of guaranteeing those portions of the Polish state which should remain after Germany's claims had been satisfied could not be answered by the Reich before consultation with and the agreement of Germany's associate, the Soviet Union.

(END SECTION THREE )

PEG

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
From
Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1669, August 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

The German Government had no confidence that direct conversations between Germany and Poland would lead to any result; but to accomplish its acquired love of peace and in order to put an end to reports of the British Government that there should be direct conversations the German Government would be glad to receive a plenipotentiary negotiator in Berlin, if one should arrive from Warsaw today Wednesday the 30th.

I have really rarely read a clearer piece of casuistry than this note which in fact makes all the demands that Hitler made verbally; but produces a surface appearance of sweet reasonableness.

The French and British Governments are now in consultation as to the reply which should be made to this note.

The French Government has received from a number of sources information that Germany may start war with Poland tonight.

(END SECTION FOUR).

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
From Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1669, August 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

The French Government has also received information from a number of sources that if war should begin in the immediate future Italy would not at first enter the war but would try to remain neutral until Poland had been crushed by Germany and until the German forces concentrated against Poland could be returned to the French frontier for an attack on France. At that moment Italy and Germany together would attack France.

The single astounding feature of the note is the phrase about the Soviet Union which seems to indicate that Germany has promised to give the Soviet Union eastern Poland and may mean that the Soviet Union will attack Poland. (END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

PEG
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

RUSH
1675, August 30, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Bonnet informed me at 7:00 this evening that at 6:00 o'clock this evening the British Government sent a telegram to the Polish Government informing the Polish Government of the contents of the note which was given last night by Hitler to Henderson and pointing out that although the British Government reserved all comment on the contents of this note Hitler had agreed to have direct negotiations with Poland.

The British Government left the question of whether or not Poland should engage in such conversations entirely to the Polish Government but the British Government stated that it believed such negotiations might be useful.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1673, August 30, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Polish Ambassador has just stated to me that he believes that Beck will agree to have negotiations but in a neutral country.

While I was talking to the Polish Ambassador he received a press report (unverified) from Berlin that Hitler had sent for the Polish Ambassador in Berlin.

The Polish Ambassador expressed the opinion that this probably was for the purpose of presenting an ultimatum to Poland. The Polish Ambassador added that Beck positively would never take an aeroplane and follow the path of Schussnigg and Hacha to Berlin. In conclusion the Polish Ambassador stated that he considered war inevitable and a German attack on Poland imminent.

(END SECTION TWO)

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 30, 1939
Rec'd 5:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1073, August 30, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

A Polish mobilization which will be almost equivalent to general mobilization will be carried out tonight.

Bonnet stated to me that the French Government had absolute proof that the deal between Germany and the Soviet Union had been based on an agreement by Germany to permit the Soviet Union to seize at once Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. He was not certain whether Lithuania fell to the share of Germany or the Soviet Union. He had no absolute information on the German-Soviet deal with regard to Poland but many indications that the Soviet Union would annex all eastern Poland up to the line of Brest Litovsk.

He had positive information that Germany had promised the Soviet Union not to give any support direct or indirect to Japan and to give indirect support to the Soviet Union in the Far East.

Information
Information from Italy indicated that Italy would not proceed with war at once on the side of Germany whatever might be Italy's plans for an attack on France at a later date.

(END OF MESSAGE)

-BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd. 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1676, August 31, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Polish Ambassador in Paris has just communicated to me the report prepared by his colleague in London on the terms of the nine point British note delivered in Berlin last night. The text of the note itself has not yet reached Paris. I assume that you have a summary of it from London. If not and if you desire it I will cable you one.

Owing to the difficulty of communication with Warsaw neither Ambassador has yet received any indication as to Beck's opinion of the latest British note but both Ambassadors are most disquieted by it. They consider that it shows clearly that Great Britain is negotiating with Germany not merely on the point of establishing direct conversations between the Polish and German Governments but also on points of detail which touch the fundamental and vital interests of Poland without consultation with the Polish Government.

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS

Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

CJ

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1936, August 31, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

You will recall that the British-Polish political agreement was drawn up in terms which made each nation the sole judge of its own vital interests precisely because the Poles feared that the British might attempt to whittle away Polish vital interests.

Owing to the fact that the British are not keeping either the French or the Poles fully informed, suspicions of this nature are certain to arise. They may prove to be groundless, but they are important because, as the Polish Ambassador said to me this morning, the Poles will fight rather than permit themselves to be jockeyed into a position in which they will either have to accept proposals that they consider incompatible with their vital interests or lose the support of public opinion in England and France.

It might possibly be worth while to keep this Polish reaction in mind if you should happen to see Lothian today. It is really dangerous for the British to omit advance consultation with the Poles. End of Message.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1939

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

FROM
PARIS

Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

1676, August 31, 4 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE

AUG 3 1939

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

H. WILSON

STRICKLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Leger has informed me that the Polish Government at one o'clock today agreed in principle to enter into direct negotiations with Germany. All details as to place of meeting and subjects to be discussed are still undecided.

Daladier has just said to me that he is still not without hope of preserving peace since there are indications that Hitler at the last minute will not dare to risk war.

I have now read the full text of the British nine point (hitler referred to in my No. 1676 of August 31, 2 p.m., and while it shows a tendency to go into larger questions than the mere matter of arranging direct negotiations between Poland and Germany it will in my opinion do no damage provided this tendency is not permitted to develop further.

Everyone at the French Foreign Office is expecting in the immediate future some sort of a proposal by Mussolini designed to produce a general conference to deal with the question of Danzig and a vast number of other questions.

Needless.
PAP -2- 1678, August 31, 4 p.m. from Paris

Needless to say the Poles will not accept the decision of a general conference in respect of Hitler's demands against Poland, and the French at the present moment are also opposed to a general conference.

BULLITT

GW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1689, August 31, midnight. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. At about 3:45 this afternoon Francois Poncet, French Ambassador in Rome, telephoned to Bonnet to say that he had just had a conversation with Ciano and that Ciano had proposed on behalf of the Italian Government that a conference composed of representatives of Italy, Germany, France, and England should meet immediately to settle the Polish-German dispute and general outstanding problems connected with the liquidation of the Treaty of Versailles.

Daladier at once called a cabinet meeting which met at 6:00 o'clock. At this meeting the cabinet decided that it was impossible to accept such a conference since in reality it would be merely a conference of butchers to dismember Poland in the absence of Poland. It would be a new Munich and would be followed by the same results as Munich.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

PARIS

Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd 9:03 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1689, August 31, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

A member of the cabinet has informed me that Bonnet was rather in favor of accepting the proposal; that Reynaud opposed it most strongly and that Daladier was equally strong in his opposition. It was decided finally to send a rejection in a polite form stating that since both Poland and Germany had agreed to direct negotiations there was no reason to call such a conference at this time.

This afternoon also the Pope called before him the Ambassadors of Italy, England, France, Germany, and Poland and made an appeal to them to have their Governments confer with a view to the preservation of peace. The text of this appeal has not yet reached Paris.

(END SECTION TWO)

NPL

BULLITT
Telegram Received

MJB 1939
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Paris
Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd. 9:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
1689, August 31, midnight (SECTION THREE)

At 6:00 o'clock the Polish Ambassador in Berlin Lipsky went to the Wilhelmstrasse and stated that the Polish Government accepted in principle direct negotiations with Germany for the settlement of the German-Polish dispute. The representative of the German Government immediately attempted to state to Lipsky a series of conditions and concessions which Germany demanded before entering into direct negotiations with Poland. The Polish Ambassador replied that he was instructed merely to state what he had stated. He added that he would not listen to any statement of conditions before negotiation and that he would not report any such statements to his Government.

(END SECTION THREE)

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM PARIS
Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd 9:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1689, August 31, midnight. (SECTION FOUR)

At 8 o'clock the German Government issued by radio and by statement of the official German information service an official statement containing 16 demands against Poland the text of which I have just learned from the President over the telephone has already reached you through press channels.

I have discussed the trend of events tonight with Bonnet, Paul Reynaud, and the Polish Ambassador. The consensus of opinion is that Germany has exposed her intentions so clearly in this note that there can no longer be any doubt in the world as to her aggressive intentions. There is relief that Hitler stands nakedly in the open attempting to repeat the coup by which he disintegrated and swallowed Czechoslovakia. There is not the slightest disposition in either Poland or France or so far as I can learn England to submit to these demands.

(END SECTION FOUR) BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM
Paris
Dated August 31, 1939
Rec'd. 9:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
1689, August 31, midnight (SECTION FIVE)

The general opinion is that if Poland should be disintegrated by Germany similar demands against Rumania would follow within a few weeks, to be followed in turn by similar demands against Yugoslavia, Hungary, and other states and finally by similar demands against France and England and in the end Italy.

It is to be noted that Hitler did not state any time limit for the fulfillment of his demands so that there is still an extremely faint possibility that he may back down at the last minute; but such a possibility can be perceived only by the imagination rather than the eye. It is expected therefore that Hitler will attack Poland in the near future. France and England will fulfill their obligations and fight to assist Poland.

(END SECTION FIVE)

BULLITT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1689, August 31, midnight. (SECTION SIX)

Since Germany has replied to the official statement by the Polish Ambassador of Poland's readiness to negotiate directly with Germany by this public announcement of unacceptable demands I do not believe that any appeal will stop Hitler from attacking if he has the courage to face general European war. I feel, however, that a statement by the President might make the moral issue clearer and might increase Hitler's reluctance to begin the conflict.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL