CA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated September 1, 1939

1-1536

Rec'd 9:35 p.m. August 31

Secretary of State

Washington

1690, September 1, 1 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

When I saw Bonnet at midnight tonight he was in pitiable condition still hoping against hope that the Italian proposal which was rejected by the cabinet this afternoon might be revived in some form that would prevent the outbreak of war. He has given orders to the press censors that no press story about the Italian proposal and its rejection by the cabinet shall be permitted to leave France.

Whatever may be Bonnet’s attitude I feel entirely certain that Daladier will not again participate in a new Munich.

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1698, September 1, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Bonnet has just stated to me that orders for French general mobilization will be given today. The Chamber of Deputies will meet tomorrow afternoon at 3 o'clock to declare war. Bonnet added that the British House of Commons will meet this afternoon at 6 o'clock for the same purpose.

Bonnet said, "It is war and all that we can do now is to be prudent and not bring in against us more enemies than necessary". He said that for his part he considered it wildly insane for any Frenchman to talk about attacking Italy because of the fear that after German armies should have overwhelmed Poland and should have been returned to the French frontier to attack France, Italy would join with Germany in attacking France.

(END SECTION ONE).
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP 1-1939
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM PARIS
Dated September 1, 1939
Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1698, September 1, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He said that he had stated flatly to Daladier that he would resign at once if he should not be permitted to do everything humanly possible to maintain the position of neutrality which Italy had assumed.

He stated that he had the unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers for this policy.

As to war with Germany, Bonnet said that France had no choice: a ruthless and unprovoked attack had been launched by Germany on France's ally Poland; France must honor her obligations.

The Government has just announced the decision taken at this morning's Council of Ministers ordering general mobilization of all of France's land, sea and air forces and declaring a state of siege throughout France and Algeria.

(END MESSAGE)

BULLITT
EG
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON,

RUSH.
1749, September 3, 12:30 p.m.

I have just been informed by the French Foreign Office that France and Germany will be at war officially at 5 o'clock this afternoon Paris time.

I have already informed the President by telephone.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM Dated September 13, 1939.

Rec'd. 1:03 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
1942, September 13, 3 p. m. (SECTION ONE).

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Daladier lunched with me alone today.
His conversation with Chamberlain yesterday dealt with the problems of conducting the war in Europe. The Far East was not mentioned.

Daladier suggested to Chamberlain British aviation should be used to bomb military objectives in Germany including the Rhine bridges. Chamberlain flatly refused to consider the use of British bombardment planes against Germany at the present time stating that he did not wish to provoke German bombardments of Great Britain and especially of British aeroplane factories which at the moment were turning out a great many machines. He was also apprehensive of the effect of any British bombardment of military objectives in Germany on public opinion in the United States.

Daladier argued that this attitude on the part of Great
Great Britain left the German air force free to bomb Poland at will. Chamberlain expressed the opinion that Poland was lost in any case.

Daladier did not agree with this opinion and told Chamberlain that he would send further French aeroplanes and tanks via Rumania in support of Poland. He has already given orders for these to be shipped at once.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
1942, September 13, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Daladier was satisfied in the highest degree by the success of the French attacks in the Saar district.

Chamberlain assured Daladier that the German submarine warfare against British vessels was extraordinarily ineffective compared to the German submarine warfare at the outset of the war in 1914.

The question of Italy was discussed and the conclusion was reached that it was impossible to be certain of Italy's intentions since, in spite of the hostility to war/at least nine tenths of the Italian people, Mussolini remained among the tenth who desired to enter war on the side of Germany. No offers in the nature of bribes will be made to Italy and on the other hand no threats will be made against Italy. In other words, a wait and see policy will be adopted in respect of Italy.

Daladier said that he felt the position of Italy would be determined largely by the action of the Congress of the United States in respect of the Neutrality Act.
NC -2- #1942 from Paris, September 13, 1939

If the embargo against shipment of arms and munitions should be lifted quickly Italy would continue to remain neutral and finally would fight on the side of France and England. If, on the other hand, the change in the Neutrality Act should be greatly delayed or refused by the Congress, Italy might come into the war on the side of Germany.

END SECTION TWO.

BULLITT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated September 13, 1939
Rec'd 1:26 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
1942, September 13, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE).
Daladier said he intended tonight to reform his cabinet. He will take the Ministry for Foreign Affairs himself but will retain his posts as Minister of National Defence and Minister of War.

He will place the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the hands of an under-secretary who will be Champetier de Ribes now Minister of Pensions - provided Champetier de Ribes agrees. He has not yet made the suggestion to Champetier de Ribes.

He will make Coulondre, former Ambassador to Berlin, his personal Chef de Cabinet for Foreign Affairs. He will continue to have the Foreign Minister if they do not accept in the Ministry of War.

If this arrangement works out in such a manner as to show that Champetier de Ribes can handle the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he will make Champetier de Ribes Minister for
-2- #1942, September 13, 3 p.m. (SEC. THREE) from Paris

for Foreign Affairs. If it does not he will give up
the War Ministry and put a military man at its head and
actively direct the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I trust that you approve of my not reporting in advance
such events as the flight of Prime Minister Chamberlain
to France. I recall the sinking of the HAMPSHIRE with
Field Marshal Kitchener and believe that we cannot be too
careful about giving advance information of such
voyages.

(END MESSAGE).

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

PARIS

FROM

Dated September 18, 1939.

Rec'd. 5:29 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2045, September 18, 7 p.m.

Rochat has just informed me that the Polish Government has asked the French Government if the Polish Government may be established in France and that the French Government has replied in the affirmative. He added that the Polish Government would be treated in exactly the same manner that the Belgian Government was treated in 1914 and that diplomats accredited to the Polish Government would be welcomed in France and given diplomatic status. He added that it was the hope of the French Government that the Diplomatic Corps would accompany the Polish Government to France and remain for at least some time.

(END SECTION ONE)

NPL

BULLITT

860C. 01/449
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

PARIS

Dated September 18, 1939
Rec'd 7:22 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2045, September 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

No decision has yet been taken with regard to the questions raised by the attack of the Soviet Union on Poland. It seems probable, however, that France will neither declare war on the Soviet Union nor break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but that all persons in France who are in the pay of the Soviet Union will be either jailed or shot.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated October 31, 1939
Cons'd 6:50 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

2622, October 31, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Information received by the French Government with regard to the changes in the Italian Government indicates that the men who have opposed the policy of neutrality which Italy has followed since the first of September have been replaced by men who are close personal friends of Ciano and in support of his present views. Those views as you know are based on the extremely bad impression which Ciano derived from his last conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler.

It is believed that it is too early to state that the Italian Government is about to take a line which will be pro-French and pro-British rather than pro-German; but it is also believed that these changes represent a final crack in the axis.

French information from the Netherlands is disquieting since it seems to indicate that in case of a German attack the
FAP -2- 2622, October 31, 6 P.M. from Paris

the Dutch would make no real resistance to the occupancy of the Netherlands by the German army. On the other hand, information from Belgium indicates that a German invasion of Belgium would be fought to the bitter end.

BULLITT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM Dated November 9, 1939
Rec'd 3:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Champetier de Ribes said to me today that after considering all the information which had come in during the past twenty-four hours the French Government this morning had reached the conclusion that it was almost certain that Hitler would launch his long expected offensive against France sometime between the twelfth and fifteenth of this month.

He added that it was considered equally certain that Germany at the same time would attack the Netherlands.

It was almost as certain that Germany would attack Belgium.

He expressed the opinion that the German offensive would be begun by an intense bombardment from the air by the entire German air force.

In this connection he stated that the French Government had been informed by the Dutch Government that German agents had
had been able to steal several truck loads of uniforms of the Dutch army and that it was expected that German agents dressed in these uniforms would be dropped on the Netherlands by parachutes from German planes and would be used not only for spy purposes but also to destroy vital centers.

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 9, 1939
Rec'd 2:48 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He stated that he was now convinced that the peace appeal of the sovereigns of Holland and Belgium had been caused by the fact that the Queen of the Netherlands had become panic stricken because of accumulating threats from Germany and accumulating pieces of evidence that Germany would attack the Netherlands during the coming week.

The fact that Germany had not taken up the peace appeal but on the contrary had seemed to receive it with disfavor also seemed to indicate that Germany desired to strike.

The Belgian Ambassador in his conversation with him yesterday afternoon had stated that the King of the Belgians was entirely aware that it would be impossible for France and England to accept the Dutch-Belgian appeal for peace and had added that the object of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands
-2-2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION T-0) from Paris

Netherlands in making their appeal had been to attempt to impose a further period of delay on Germany in the hope that the rains might recommence and thus render impossible the attack on the Netherlands and Belgium which now appeared to them inevitable.

BULLITT

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The Belgian Government has asked the French Government to accept the Belgian gold reserve in temporary custody.

Champetier de Ribes added that the French Government had as yet been unable to obtain any statement from the Belgian Government as to the readiness of the Belgian Government to support the Netherlands at once in case of a German invasion of the Netherlands or to permit the passage of the French army.

Opinion in Belgium nevertheless seemed to be veering in the direction of determination to support the Netherlands and it might be that at the last minute Belgium would make common cause with the Netherlands and would ask the French and British for immediate support. Unfortunately the support which could be given at the last minute would be much less efficacious than the support which could be given if
LMS 2-No. 2705, November 9, 5 p.m. Sec. 3, from Paris.

an arrangement could be made now for cooperation by the French and British armies.

(END SECTION THREE)

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
FROM Dated November 9, 1939
Rec'd 5:38 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

The French Government is of the opinion that the explosion in Munich yesterday was the work of the German Gestapo and was designed to excite the German people in the same way that they had been excited by the Reichstag fire at another critical moment.

I talked this afternoon with the Belgian Ambassador who stated to me that it was the opinion of his Government that an attack on the Netherlands was imminent and that this attack might also include Belgium as well as France. He stated that the Government of the Netherlands had refused to discuss with the Belgian Government the question of Belgian troops entering the Netherlands to help the Dutch army resist an attack. I said that I felt sure that the subject had been discussed by the King of Belgium and the Queen of the Netherlands. He agreed but said he did not know whether or not the sovereigns had reached any definite conclusions.

The Dutch Minister is also of the opinion that the Netherlands is about to be attacked.

BULLITT
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

The Swiss Minister stated to me this afternoon that at noon today his Government had informed him that German preparations on the Swiss frontier were altogether inadequate to permit an early attack on Switzerland by the German army. He pointed out that the Germans had not brought up any bridge building material and that the Rhine between Switzerland and Germany at the present time was a formidable obstacle which would have to be bridged by pontoons since the Swiss would at once destroy existing bridges.

In spite of the conviction of nearly every one in Paris that the Germans are about to attack the Netherlands as well as France and Belgium the Swiss Minister who is extremely well informed remains of the opinion that Germany will not attack although his conviction in this regard has been shaken by the explosion in Munich which he feels may be the prelude
2-2705, November 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Paris to a German attack.

The Hungarian Minister stated to me yesterday that his Government is absolutely convinced that Germany will not attack on the western front this year.

Information reaching the French Government from Finland indicates that an immediate attack by the Soviet Union on Finland is not (repeat not) to be expected. (END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)  

FROM  
Paris  
Dated November 28, 1939  
Rec'd 7:25 p.m.  

Secretary of State  
Washington  
2845, November 28, 5 p.m.  

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.  

Chauvel, Director of Far Eastern Affairs, asked to 
see me today and gave me to read the text of a seven-page 
telegram sent on the evening of November 23 by Arsene 
Henry, French Ambassador to Tokyo.  

The telegram stated that the British Ambassador, the 
Polish Ambassador, and he himself (Arsene Henry) were all 
so much disturbed by the negotiations in progress between 
the Japanese Government and the Soviet Government that 
they had decided that it was their duty to communicate 
their opinions to their respective governments in identical 
language.  

They stated in brief that they feared that if the 
present Japanese Government should be unable to reach an 
agreement with the Government of the United States through 
the conversations between Ambassador Grew and Foreign 
Minister Nomura the Abe government would be overthrown 
and replaced by a government of militarists which would 
conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union and would wipe
RFF -2- #2845, November 28, 5 p.m. from Paris

out French and British interests in the Tientsin area,
and other areas in North China and perhaps also in
Shanghai.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated November 28, 1939
Rec'd 9:36 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

2485
2485, November 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The three ambassadors added that the German Government was doing everything that it could to bring about a rapprochement between the Japanese and Soviet governments; and also was doing everything possible to increase ill feeling in Japan against the United States in the hope that a (*) might develop between the United States and Japan of such dimensions that American supply to France and England might be cut off.

Chauvel added that on the receipt of this telegram which had arrived badly garbled and had therefore required repetition which had occasioned some delay, he had telegraphed to the French Ambassador in Tokyo suggesting that the British, French, and Polish ambassadors in Tokyo should communicate their views to Ambassador Grew. He also had sent a copy of the telegram in question to Saint Quentin instructing him to make such use of it as he might consider highly important.

Chauvel added that about eight days ago he had sent a
RFP -2- #2355, November 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris telegram to Saint Quentin asking him to see the Acting Secretary and to call the attention of the Acting Secretary to the possibility that if Japan should be unable to reach an agreement with the United States the present government in Japan might (*) and might be replaced by a government of militarists which would seek immediate agreement with the Soviet Union.

BULLITT

EMB

(*) apparent omissions
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA
This telegram must be
rtly paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone.

PARIS
FROM
Dated November 28, 1939

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
RECEIVED 9:40 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE
W:ashington

2845, November 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Chauvel went on to say that he hoped the Government
of the United States understood that in making these communi-
cations the French Government in no way desired to alter
the line of policy which had been followed of late by the
American Government. The French Government was most happy
that the American Government was following its present
line. The French Government merely wished to be certain
that the American Government was aware of the possibility
of danger involved in the Soviet-Japanese conversations.

I asked Chauvel if he had any recent information with
regard to Soviet supplies to China. He replied that he
had, and that these supplies of late had been much greater
than ever before.

I expressed skepticism as to the possibility of an
agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union for the
division of China. Chauvel said that he too was skeptical,
but that, through a most private source, he had learned
yesterday that the representatives of both Mitsui and
Mitsubishi
EDA - 2 - #2846, November 28, 5 p.m. from Paris
Section three

Mitsubishi in Paris were now convinced that the Soviet-Japanese conversations would lead to an accord that would involve the cessation of Soviet supplies to China.

BULLITT

RR
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

2845, November 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I asked him if he did not believe that even though the Soviet Government might make such a promise it would in reality continue to send supplies to China. He said that he agreed. He did not believe that the Soviet Union would keep its word to Japan but an agreement between the Soviet Union and Japan might have a surface appearance of reality sufficient to encourage Japan to take violent action against the French and British position in both North China and Shanghai.

I expressed skepticism on this point also citing the attitude taken recently by the Government of the United States.

Chauvel then said that the substance of his worry was the following: There were many persons in Paris who knew nothing about the Far East. Indeed there was almost no one who did know anything about the Far East. Such persons in and outside the present government looking at the Far East superficially were arguing that since Russia was supporting Germany, France should make an agreement with
EDA - 2 - #2845, November 28, 5 p.m. from Paris Section 4

with Japan at the price of sacrificing China if necessary. He personally had to combat this point of view every day. The French Government had taken no step in this sense and he believed that any such step would be folly.

BULLIPT

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From Paris

Dated November 28, 1939
Rec'd 8:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2845, November 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

He would be extremely grateful to me, however, if I could obtain from my Government a statement as to our view of the present situation in the Far East in order to give him some sort of a further weapon with which to combat those who desire a change in French policy. He went on to say that the successful Japanese attack on Nanning had provoked a new wave of arguments from those persons who desired the French Government to appease Japan at all costs.

I said that for my own part I was absolutely confident that our policy in the Far East was based on the fullest information which was both gathered and considered by our ablest brains in foreign affairs. I felt sure that our Government was taking no step in the Far East without the fullest possible consideration and I was confident that my Government would be careful to avoid provoking a Japanese attack on the British and French interests in China.
2-12845, November 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Paris.

We doubt both Crew and Saint Quentin have communicated to you the contents of the telegram of the three ambassadors. If you can give me some sort of a message to pass along to Chauvel who is, I am convinced, entirely sincere, I should be obliged. If you do not care to give me such a message I hope that you will inform me the moment that you receive any information of a change in the French position since if informed in time I believe that I might have some influence with Daladier.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated December 14, 1939

Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

2979, December 14, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Daladier said to me late this afternoon that he was delighted that the Soviet Union had been expelled from the League of Nations. He felt that this action was a triumph for human decency. He thought that it would have a fine moral influence not only now but for years to come. The expulsion from the League of the Soviet Union he felt certain would detach from the Communist parties of the earth all those misguided individuals and ignorant idealists who believed that communism represented a hope for the future. These persons who from now on should remain members of the communist parties would be members for unavowable reasons. They would be for the most part paid agents of the Soviet. He felt that it would be difficult for both the Soviet Government and the Communist International to establish again any contact with even relatively decent people. (END OF SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

EHB
Telegram received
December 14, 1939

FROM
Secretary of State
Washington.

2979, December 14, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

He said it was his personal opinion that the Soviet Union would not (repeat not) break diplomatic relations with France and England.

I had a conversation on the Soviet Union today with the Turkish Ambassador and Rochat. They both felt that outright physical support in the form of anti-tank guns and airplanes would be sufficient to enable Finland to hold out against the Soviet Union.

The Turkish Ambassador and Rochat expressed the opinion that the weakness which the Soviet armies had displayed in their attacks on Finland made it relatively unlikely that the Soviet Union would dare to attack either Rumania or Turkey. They pointed out that the Soviet Government was extremely afraid of an entrance of the French and British fleets into the Black Sea and a bombardment of the port of Batum from the sea and air and a bombardment from the air of Baku. They stressed the fact that since
hsm -2- No. 2979, December 14, 4 p.m. (Section 2) from Paris since the Soviet Government had introduced tractors to replace horses in Soviet agriculture the food supplies of the Soviet Union had become dependent on the oil of the Caucasus.

BULLITT

RR

WWC
HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM Paris
Dated December 14, 1939
Rec'd 12:25 a.m., 15th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2979, December 14, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE).
A suppression of these oil fields might be fatal to the Soviet Union. It was therefore their impression that if Finland could be helped sufficiently to enable the Finnish Government to make a successful resistance the Soviet Union would be inclined to refrain from further military adventures.

Rochat confirmed to me what Leger had said about the efforts of the French and British Governments to persuade the Swedish and Norwegian Governments to assist Finland actively with the full military support of France and England. He also confirmed the information that orders had been given to send modern French pursuit planes to the Finnish Government.

The reasons for cheerful state of mind in Paris at present is shown remarkably by a conversation I had with Bonnet this evening in the course of which he said that he felt that everything connected with the war was going extraordinarily
ham -2- No. 2979, December 14, 4 p.m. (Section 3) from Paris
extraordinarily well; that he was absolutely certain that
Germany had no chance of winning the war; that France
and England would defeat Germany and that in the end
the Soviet Union as well as Germany would collapse.
(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

DDM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris
December 30, 1939

Rec'd 7:50 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Strictly Confidential.

A member of my staff accompanied Ambassador Phillips on a call on Léger this morning. In the ensuing conversation the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed in great detail the thought reported in my No. 2973, December 14, 2 p.m. that Mussolini is seeking to bring about a premature peace that would preserve the Nazi regime in Germany and thereby protect his own regime in Italy.

Léger is convinced that Mussolini still leans toward Germany because (1) of considerations of regime and (2) because he fears that only with the entire weight of Germany can Italy exert a real influence in European affairs against France and England. In other words, Léger believes that Mussolini still holds to the underlying principle of his fellowship pact of four powers. At the same time, Léger feels that the Italian people fully aware of their contribution to the Christian civilization of Western Europe, are alive to their responsibility to protect that civilization from the danger.
MJB -2- No. 3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (Sec. One) from Paris
danger of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia.
(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

WSB
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

In these circumstances the French Government has considered it the course of universal wisdom neither to force Italy nor to attempt to bargain with her to abandon the policy of "non-belligerency". It is the French hope that by a natural evolution Italy despite Mussolini's predispositions will come to know where her true interests lie. In the meantime France is prepared through the purchase of Italian goods and a lenient enforcement of the blockade to make this non-belligerency as profitable as possible to Italy. Léger said that the French military authorities point out that the free exchange accruing to Italy as a result of this policy serves only to strengthen a potential enemy of France. The military, he said, are also critical of the policy because of the supplies which it is known are reaching Germany through Italy. Léger's reply to these critics is that no policy vis-à-vis Italy could be elaborated that did not entail risks.

EMB
NPL

BULLITT

[2] Apparent omission
Secretary of State,
Washington.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Léger does not rate the perspicacity of diplomats very high. He thinks it likely that many chiefs of mission here and particularly the representatives of some of the small neutral states and the Italian Ambassador have placed too much importance to the possibility of political change within France and to the current of opinion here that would like to turn the fury of French and British feelings on Russia and thereby get out of war with Germany. Léger said that French policy vis à vis Italy is concentrated upon the task of making Mussolini understand that France is in this war to the bitter end and that no matter what domestic political changes might occur no Government of France could do other than prosecute the present war to the end that is now sought, namely, the destruction of a German Government inspired by the precedent of Genghis Khan rather than traditions of European Christianity. He said that at the outset
-2- No. 3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (Sec. Four) from Paris

outset of this war France had found herself with her back to the wall there was no further ground for retreat and that it is of the utmost importance that Mussolini be made to understand that such was and remains the case.

BULLITT

WSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Paris
Dated December 30, 1939
FROM:
Rec'd 8:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3063, December 30, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Léger implied that this policy of hopeful benevolence toward Italy would have to be abandoned should Mussolini compromise himself by some "overt peace move" calculated to save Germany from the punishment that is due her. He said that Mussolini has had ample warning that while France would not take umbrage at Italy's policy of nonbelligerency it would react immediately and strenuously to any effort on Italy's part to save the Nazi regime from the natural consequences of its ruthless acts of aggression and aggrandizement. He ascribed the failure of Italy and of Spain to take part in the German-Russian peace offensive of October-November to the force of these warnings.

In this connection Léger is unable to look upon the strengthening of the ties between the Papacy and the head of the Italian state as foreshadowing (BEGIN UNDERLINING) only (END UNDERLINING) good for Europe. He is fearful that a factor in this movement is Mussolini's desire to save Germany by a premature peace.

FULLERTON
SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

Léger is most suspicious of Holland with respect to a further inopportune step in favor of peace. He professed the opinion that as between the immediate danger of material loss resulting from warfare on its territory and future subservience to an all powerful Germany, Holland would choose the latter. He said that herein lies the true explanation of Holland's unwillingness to accept an agreement with Belgium. He said that every effort of Belgium to date looking to such an agreement has been repulsed by Holland.

Unfortunately according to Léger the same supineness obtains in Sweden and Norway. In a preceding conversation Charverlat had informed us that the Quai d'Orsay's first impression of the Swedish and Norwegian reaction to the Franco-British démarche in favor of substantial aid to Finland was not discouraging.

EMB

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Dated December 30, 1939
From
Rec'd 8:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Léger spoke of Mussolini's disclaimer in connection with President Roosevelt's laudable interest in peace and the appointment of Myron Taylor as the President's personal representative at the Vatican. He said that he had noted in the press yesterday the implication which he judged had come from the White House that the President does not believe that the next few months would prove opportune for any peace move and that probably circumstances would not be such as to favor such a move before next fall or later. Léger remarked that this was manifestly true, that France and England are determined to build a new Europe on a mature not a premature peace. It is his view that a peace move during the military inactivity of the winter could only complicate matters for France and England and would therefore arouse resentment here.

HTM: WWC

BULLITT
MJB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated December 30, 1939
Rec'd. 9:08 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN) FACIMILIE OF STATE
Charveriat it would not have been surprising to the Quai d'Orsay had this démarche met with the immediate reply that the Norwegian and Swedish Governments could not entertain any proposal looking to their participation in substantial aid by France and England for Finland. Charveriat said that instead of such a refusal the two governments had accepted the démarche without closing the door to examination and study of the problem. Léger on the other hand, who had just come from a long conference with Daladier and who therefore may have had information not available to Charveriat when we talked to him, said that the démarche had been refused by Norway and Sweden. Asked to explain the nature of the refusal he replied that the two Scandinavian countries had said that they could not cooperate beyond what would be possible and proper under international law and that in any event whatever they did must remain secret from Germany.

BULLITT

EMB
MJB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

DATED DECEMBER 30, 1939

FROM

RECD 9:15 P.M.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

3063, DECEMBER 30, 7 P.M. (SECTION EIGHT)

LEGER said that the Norwegians and the Swedes had been informed that France and England were prepared to go the limit in assisting the Finns; that it had been pointed out that the independence of Norway and Sweden was a matter of vital interest to France and England and that whatever might be the consequences of Norwegian and Swedish cooperation these consequences would be met in a forthcoming manner by France and England with the full might of their...

LEGER's reaction to what he termed an overweening material interest on the part of the neutral states and particularly Holland, Norway, and Sweden one of contempt than of depression. He appears not to entertain the slightest doubt as to the outcome of this war no matter what may be the ultimate role of the small European neutrals or Italy.

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM
DATED December 30, 1939
Rec'd. 9:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3063, December 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION NINE)

He was most emphatic on the point that everything possible would be done to further and strengthen non-belligerent or pro-allied tendencies in Italy but that if Italy should take the lead in a new German peace offensive France would have no alternative but to reconsider her policy toward Rome.

Léger said that France and England have no concern whatsoever about what may be Russia's reaction to Franco-British policy either in the Scandinavian area or in the Balkans. He explained, however, that the allies have no intention of taking the initiative in bringing their relations with Russia into line with their contempt and enmity for everything that Soviet Russia stands for. He said that the controlling consideration on this point was that it would be foolish for France and England to take the initiative in bringing about a situation which might worsen matters at this time for their ally, Turkey.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

WWC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) Dated January 15, 1940

Rec'd 7:45 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington, Jan. 17, 1940

80, January 15, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Leger said to me this afternoon that in his opinion there were at least 75 chances in 100 that Hitler would attack the Netherlands and Belgium in the very near future.

He said that until about two weeks ago Hitler had believed that Mussolini could procure him a good German peace by playing on the tender heart strings of the Pope and President Roosevelt and the weak stomachs of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands.

He thought that Hitler now knew that neither the Pope nor the President was likely to be led into attempting to bring about a peace which would leave Germany in possession of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the Nazi party undefeated.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Dated January 15, 1940

Rec'd 7:52 p.m.

He felt that Hitler now knew he would have to fight. There was evidence increasing hourly that Hitler had decided to attack Belgium and the Netherlands at once. The German General Staff was still opposed to such an attack but could no longer resist the pressure from Hitler. Both the Dutch and the Belgians were fully prepared to fight and they would have the full support of the French Army.

(In this connection I may add that military men in Paris (*) the Dutch army relatively valueless but on the other hand hold a high opinion of the fighting ability of the Belgian army. In case of German attack therefore they believe that Dutch resistance north and east of the Rhine will be overcome fairly quickly by the Germans but that resistance of the Dutch, Belgians and French south and west of the Rhine will be prolonged indefinitely.)

BR

SULLIVAN

(*) Apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C).

Dated January 15, 1940

FROM

Rec'd 9:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

80, January 15, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE). DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Later went on to say that although the probable attack on the Netherlands and Belgium dominated the situation at the moment the French Government had by no means forgotten the power of the Finns. He was happy to say that the first 30 planes sent to Finland (see my No. 3062, December 30, 8 p.m.) had already arrived and had taken the air today.

The question of aid to Finland was becoming more and more complicated. The French Government had offered to send an army to Finland either by way of Norway and Sweden or by way of Petsamo. The Norwegians and the Swedes had refused to permit the passage of a French army to Finland and the British had refused to permit any expedition against Petsamo.

The French had gone so far as to propose that if the British would release the three Polish destroyers which are now with the British fleet they would add sufficient French cruisers to them to make a strong Polish fleet and the Polish fleet would cover the landing of the French army at Petsamo.

RR

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Paris
Dated January 15, 1940
Received 0:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

80, January 15, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

The British first had stated that the Poles were absolutely opposed to any such action. General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, in the presence of himself and Daladier had stated flatly that he would be delighted to have a Polish fleet attack Petsamo and cover the landing of the French army. Confronted with this statement of General Sikorski's the British had finally taken refuge in a simple negative stating that they controlled the allied effort at sea; that the Polish fleet would have to be based on British ports and that they would not do anything which could be construed by the Bolsheviks as a hostile British act against the Soviet Union.

RR

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (G)

FROM
Paris
Dated January 15, 1940
Rec'd 7:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

80, January 15, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Léger expressed the opinion that the British were entirely idiotic in believing that they could detach the Russians from the Germans and that they could finally obtain the support of the Soviet Union against Germany.

He went on to say that the French Government had proposed to the British Government that the British and French fleets both should enter the Black Sea and bombard Batum and send airplanes to bomb Baku and thus cut off both Germany and the Soviet Union from supplies of oil.

The British Government had replied that no British ship would be fitted for any action in the Black Sea hostile to the Soviet Union. Léger added that the Turkish Government also was opposed to permitting the passage of the French and British fleets to the Black Sea and a bombardment of the Russian coast.

AR
BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

F3
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM
Paris
Dated January 15, 1940
Rec'd 9:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

80, January 15, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

Lager said that he really could not understand the attitude of the British with regard to support to Finland and hostility to the Soviet Union at the present time. He asked me if I had any information on this subject and I replied that I had none. I should be grateful if you have anything of interest that you may care to communicate to me.

The French position is that France will not break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war on the Soviet Union but will if possible destroy the Soviet Union—using cannon if necessary.

(END MESSAGE).

RR

Bullitt
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM
Paris
Dated January 25, 1940
Rec'd 2:50 p.m., 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.
In reply to your letter of November 24 received recently in which you indicate that you would like to have my personal opinions.

One. I have no doubt about the determination of either France or England to go on fighting until the Nazi regime in Germany shall have been destroyed. Daladier and Chamberlain are preparing for a three years war. The political position of both Prime Ministers at the moment is strong. It will probably remain strong unless there should be severe military reverses.

Two. The allies will not attack this year either on the western front or in the Near East.

The Germans may attack on the western front.

(End Section One).

BULLITT

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

FROM Paris
Dated January 25, 1940
Rec'd 3:35 p.m., 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
That Hitler desires to attack France by way of the Netherlands and Belgium but that the German general staff is opposed to an attack for the following reasons:
(a) At the moment the defensive is much stronger than the offensive; (b) a mass attack would consume so great a portion of Germany's reserves of material that the failure of such an attack would leave Germany with supplies for less than a year of defensive warfare; (c) because the German general staff estimates that such an attack would be unsuccessful; (d) because the German general staff hopes that if the Germany Army makes no attack Germany may be able to hold out longer financially and economically than Great Britain and France; and also that attacks on shipping by submarines, airplanes and mines may bring England to a compromise peace.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated January 26, 1940
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The disagreement as to policy between Hitler and leaders of the Nazi Party on the one hand and most of the important officers of the general staff on the other may possibly lead to a serious dispute this spring.

Mussolini's position remains that of a turkey buzzard soaring and peering and hoping for something dead to eat. I am entirely certain that he still hopes that Germany will be victorious and that Italy will obtain North Africa and Syria as carrion. France and England cannot offer Italy a comparable meal. Mussolini therefore, will not abandon his hope of German victory although he will attempt to alleviate Italy's present financial and economic misery by sales of war supplies to France and England. He himself will continue to maintain close and friendly relations with Hitler while using Ciano to say pleasant things to the British and French Ambassadors in Rome.

BULLITT

JWR:NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

So long as the Italian Government continues to force an annual increase of 450,000 souls in an over-populated peninsula Italy's foreign policy will necessarily be a bad neighbor policy involving a readiness to attack and swallow anyone of her neighbors sufficiently unlucky to grow weak.

Four. The Pope is entirely aware of the spiritual limitations of Mussolini's interest in peace. In the course of 45 minutes of intense conversation on international politics which had with His Holiness a few days ago in Rome he expressed the pleasure that the appointment of Myron Taylor had given him and said that he hoped that at some future day he and the President in collaboration could help establish peace on earth.

BULLITT

NPL: NK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated January 25, 1940
Rec'd 5:45 p.m. 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

I asked him how he felt about the cooperation of Mussolini in such a collaboration. A shadow crossed his face as if I had said something slightly indecent and he said: "Your President is disinterested and a genuine lover of humanity. I care about nothing except bringing souls to God and relieving the sufferings of humanity. These are my sole concerns on earth. The Italian Government has its own selfish political entanglements and its own selfish political aims."

The Pope went on to say that he felt that both sides were much too far apart for there to be any hope of stopping the war in the near future. He thought it would be unwise to make any attempt now to mediate or appeal for peace. He had no intention of making such an appeal or offering mediation. He was convinced that the British and French were determined to go on fighting until Hitler and the Nazis should have disappeared.

BULLITT

NPL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

Six. I believe that the project of an attack by the French and British fleets on Batum and an airplane attack on Baku to deprive Russia of oil supplies will not be pushed at the moment. It is by general agreement the most effective manner to injure the Soviet Union; but is opposed by the British admiralty. Winston-Churchill himself is strongly opposed to any hostile activity directed against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Turkey is opposed to the passage of the British and French fleets into the Black Sea for the purpose of attacking the Soviet Union.

Seven. To sum up: either side which takes the offensive on the western front before it has been able to establish an absolute control of the air will probably be defeated. Therefore unless Hitler shall insist on an attack by the German army there will be no vast mass attack this year. Morale in France and England will
#127, From Paris, Jan. 25, 10 p.m. (SEC. EIGHT)

will hold out excellently through such a period of inactivity and it is my opinion that morale in Germany also will hold.

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM PARIS
Dated January 25, 1940
Rec'd 6 p.m. 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

He went on to say that he personally was extremely fond of the people of Germany among whom he had lived for thirteen years. He had been unable to work out any agreements with Hitler however and had been obliged to conclude that it would be impossible to work out the difficulties of the church so long as Hitler should remain in power. The Nazi view of the church after all had been expressed clearly by Rosenberg when he had written that Christianity was the invention of the Jews to enslave the great German race.

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated January 25, 1940
Rec'd 6:20 p.m. 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN)
Five. The Pope expressed the opinion with which I entirely agree that not even the most ample supplies of arms and ammunition and airplanes will be sufficient to prevent the defeat of the Finns unless fighting men shall be sent soon from abroad to join in the defense of Finland. At the present moment Daladier desires to send divisions of French Chasseurs Alpins to Finland but neither Norway nor Sweden will permit their passage and Great Britain will not agree to a naval descent on Petsamo or Murmansk. Daladier's personal feelings with regard to the Russian attack on Finland are so strong that he may be able to drive the British into agreement for a French attack on Petsamo. Since such an expedition would be beyond the ability of British troops or officers to carry out the possibility of saving Finland seems to depend entirely on French soldiers and Daladier's determination.

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
127, January 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION NINE)

The Finns have made it clear to everyone in Europe that Stalin's system of government is the most inefficient possible from the point of view of military strength and human welfare, although perhaps the most efficient in the production of misery and lice. The spectre of Bolshevism sweeping Europe has been replaced therefore by the hope of Europe sweeping out Bolshevism. (END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C & br)

FROM Paris
DATED February 27, 1940
Rec'd 6:22 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

263, February 27, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

A French army commander told a member of the Embassy staff several days ago that he had no idea how and where this war was going to be fought but that he would be more pleased if the enemy would attack his section of the line.

This statement is symptomatic of the general view now obtaining here. It is still hoped that Hitler will take the initiative but there is a strong undercurrent of fear that "total war" (except against British shipping) will not materialize unless France and England assume the offensive.

MURPHY

JRL:NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Paris
Dated February 27, 1940
Rec'd 6:27 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

263, February 27, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Much is now heard in various circles here of the desirability of sending a Franco-British expeditionary force to Finland. For the past month the press and particularly the more influential newspapers of moderate and rightist opinion have been increasingly insistent upon organized military aid for Finland and "recognition of the fundamental hostility of Russia to French and British aims". Impetus has been given to the talk in favor of the despatch of a Franco-British military expedition to Finland by rumors during the past three or four days of the presence of British and French naval units off Petsamo and Murmansk. It is also being remarked that the Russian army is now making such an improved showing as to warrant the belief that German officers have been lending a hand.

(END SECTION TWO).

MURPHY

JRL:NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Paris

Dated February 27, 1940

FROM

Rec'd 7:15 p.m.

Secretory of State
Washington

263, February 27, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Inquiries by our Military Attache based on these stories have elicited the information that the French military authorities are organizing an expeditionary unit (something about the size of a division perhaps) to be sent to Finland and to reach there presumably by way of Petsamo not later than the end of March. It is believed that this unit is composed largely of chasseurs alpins and that the plan is to have it cooperate with a similar force of Canadians and a third unit to be composed of Polish troops.

The Quai d'Orsay holds to the statement that the French Government has entered into no commitment to send an expeditionary force and furthermore, that Finland has not even requested such aid. Charvetiat points out that it is the duty of the military to plan for all eventualities and to consider any opportunity to further the French cause that may present itself, but that such preparation does not commit the French Government. It therefore
RFP -2- #263, February 27, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Paris therefore seems that that section of public opinion which insists upon a clear-cut position toward the Soviet Union is still well ahead of opinion obtaining at the Quai d'Orsay.

MURPHY

NK:NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State
Washington

263, February 27, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

There is also much talk current concerning the possibility of allied action against the Baku oil field (the only Russian oil field that appears to be producing in important quantities at this time) and of joint Franco-British-Turkish military action looking to the isolation of Rumania, first from Russia, and secondly from Germany. Discussions along this line generally recognize that a major effort in the Near East would be hazardous so long as Italy's position remains enigmatical. Cherviat's remark about the duty of the French military to plan with respect to any opportunity that might arise also applies to this talk of allied action in the Near East.

While the foregoing contains little that may be characterized as fact, the lively interest that is being shown here now in the possibility of an Anglo-French initiative looking to the creation of a new war front is certainly worthy of note, even if it is indicative of nothing more than increasing fear that France and England may yet have to force the pace.

(END OF MESSAGE).

NK:NPL
MURPHY
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Yesterday evening in a radio address in which he promised "war in all fields" Reynaud presented himself to the French people for the first time in the role of Prime Minister.

If one can accurately judge from the press reaction this morning the new Prime Minister was more successful in his first contact with the public than in his first encounter with the Chamber.

This morning's press notes that the Prime Minister assured the people of France that they would all be put to work to gain undoubted victory for France. This assurance observes the press should be sufficient for the time being as it is obviously impossible "completely to develop a program of success in ten minutes".

MURPHY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Paris
Dated March 27, 1940
Rec'd 8:55 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

(GRAY) This tolerance inherent in the "wait and see attitude" that has now come to the foreground in contrast with the definite reserve with which the news of the formation of the Reynaud cabinet was first received is probably to be explained largely by recognition over the Easter holidays of the prejudice to which the majority of one vote in the Chamber and the critical attitude of French opinion toward the new cabinet subjected the Allied cause in neutral European countries. (END GRAY)

The softening of French opinion no doubt also reflects opinion critical of Parliament which first upset the Daladier government without really meaning to do so and secondly made impossible a prompt and effective solution of the crisis thus precipitated.

While opinion in France is doubtless no more enthusiastic over the outcome of the crises than when Reynaud presented himself and his cabinet to the Chamber it nevertheless recognizes that a show of discipline behind the lines
CK-2-#401, March 27, 9 p.m. (section two) from Paris.

lines is quite as essential to the winning of the war as discipline at the front.

MURPHY
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Reynaud stated last night in his broadcast that he had "hoped for unanimity" and that he had sought "the collaboration of all parties". "This unanimity", he continued, "will come but it is not by adroitness that we are to attain it; it is by the result of our actions".

French opinion is willing at least for the time being to accept this test of "action".

Reynaud explained by indirection why despite the unsatisfactory vote in the Chamber the Government had decided to hold on while awaiting "unanimity". He said that, "If, in the meantime, in the midst of a war France had offered the spectacle of one of those series of ministerial crises, but even in peace-time the enemy propaganda would surely have denounced the failure of our democracy and the impotence of our regime", that in fact "if they had seen emerge from a series of ministerial crises an impotent government without the support of the nation and incapable of directing the country, that indeed would have been Mr. Hitler's chance".
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

In Reynaud's words "This danger has been avoided; it is now a question of governing" -- "The objective is to conquer the enemy". Reynaud pointed out that war, to be carried to victory, requires a total effort on the part of the country. "Even before military victory" said he "our diplomatic successes will depend on our force, on the number of our tanks, cannon and airplanes. And these tanks, cannon and airplanes themselves depend on our will to work, on our moral resolution, and on the capacity of all Frenchmen to suffer and to persevere, those in the rear and those at the front. The future depends on us. Our salvation is in our own hands".

MURPHY
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

Dated March 27, 1940

Rec'd 9:20 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In the light of these words and the obvious desire of French opinion to give the Government the benefit of the doubt in the interests of winning a war in which the "stakes are total stakes" it is not surprising that the press today should be canvassing the military, diplomatic and economic fields with respect to the possibilities of a success which will mean either continuance in office or defeat for the present government in the near future.

No one who is aware of the facts really believes that in the short period available to Reynaud to prove his worth military operations of importance can be initiated by the Allies. Also no one expects Germany to solve the major problem confronting the Allies by itself taking the initiative. Likewise no one in France has for a long time believed that economic warfare will prove a decisive factor within the relatively near future. It is therefore natural that the press should concentrate today on the diplomatic field.

MURPHY
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

It is in this field that the energy or lack of energy of the Reynaud government is expected to reveal itself. Three possibilities for success are suggested.

The first is that Reynaud will force a show down with respect to the small European neutrals. For example Germany utilizes the neutral waters of Scandinavia in order to obtain vital necessities such as Swedish iron ore. Le Temps observed last night that Germany cannot with impunity violate the neutrality of the territorial waters of the Scandinavian states without England and France acquiring the right to enter these waters the neutrality of which the Scandinavian states are impotent to defend.

MURPHY

CK
RP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

Secretary of State

Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

Vigorous action with respect to German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters might give the Reynaud government the success that is necessary to its continuance in power.

Another field of possible successful action according to the press would be Italy. It is generally recognized that Allied initiative in the Balkans, the Black Sea and possibly farther east is largely dependent upon Italy's ultimate role in the war. It is therefore suggested by a number of writers that one of Mr. Reynaud's first acts may be to send former Prime Minister Laval along, standing exponent of Franco-Italian friendship, to Rome as Ambassador.

MURPHY

CK
RP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

A third suggestion is that the Reynaud Government will seek to strengthen and to extend the understanding of France and England with Turkey so that if all else fails naval action in the Black Sea area if nothing more complicated may become a possibility. With respect to this and related suggestions it is recognized by such writers as Pertinax that Turkey should be allowed the last word and that state of belligerency must not be forced upon Russia but freely elected by Russia if that country is in reality an ally of Germany. There is in fact widespread recognition here that the alliance with Turkey must not be subjected to unreasonable strain, that in fact Turkey and Russia are immediate neighbors and will long remain so.

MURPHY

NFL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Paris
Dated March 27, 1940
Rec'd 9:45 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION NINE)

With respect to Russia, today's press carries the story that Souritz, the Soviet Ambassador to France, has been divested of his functions as Ambassador in response to French complaint that Souritz's telegram of congratulation to Molotov on the conclusion of peace with Finland was of such a nature as to make him persona non grata to France. The fact that this news has been allowed to come from Moscow instead of being announced here confirms the impression that France continues in the policy of "calling a spade a spade" with respect to the Soviet Union, but of leaving the initiative with Moscow if the pace is to be forced to anything like belligerency. The fact is that the latest development in Franco-Soviet relations is not expected here to have anything approaching grave consequences.

MURPHY

CK
RF
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

CK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Paris
Dated March 27, 1940
Rec'd 9:50 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

401, March 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION TEN)

In summary it may be said that French opinion agrees with the Reynaud cabinet's estimate of the situation which led it despite the unsatisfactory vote of the Chamber five days ago to remain in office. To have done otherwise would have, as Mr. Reynaud suggested last night, played into the hands of France's enemies. Nevertheless French opinion remains expectant toward the Government. Either "the results of our action" will convince the French public that it has gained what it wants namely a government of action or France will have a new cabinet in the near future. At the same time the possibility of some outstanding success for the Government at an early date does not seem very bright. (END OF MESSAGE)

MURPHY

EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (c)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

503, April 19, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Rochat tells us that the best information available here regarding the state of railway communication at certain points in the Netherlands is to the effect that the Dutch Government found it necessary to take such action for internal reasons rather than because of any threat of invasion. He said that it is true that the Dutch Government has been much concerned over "Nazi fermentation" and believes that the present procedure is the most effective way of combating it. Rochat said there is no evidence of an impending act of aggression on the part of Germany.

Rochat also said that there is absolutely no new development in Franco-Italian relations. The French Government is convinced that Italy is planning no immediate action either in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean, such as the occupation of Corfu. The Italians are engaged in naval maneuvers which have no particular significance; there is no evidence of mobilization, and France is taking no special measures at this time.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM PARIS
Dated April 19, 1940
Rec'd 4:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

503, April 19, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The present Italian press campaign is just one of those things which does not make good sense and is probably designed to amuse the population. He said there is not a single concrete factor conducive of change in the present relations between the two countries. Rochat said that Italian action directed against Corfu would of course under the treaty with Greece precipitate a general conflict with the Allies who would scrupulously maintain their obligations under the treaty. For this he believes Italy is not prepared or decisive.

Rochat said that the Foreign Office does not anticipate military operations of any sort in the Balkans in the near future. He does not attach particular importance to the resumption of relations with the Soviets by Yugoslavia. He said the latter is simply falling in line with its neighbors and Rochat sees no immediate results of this action.
-2- #503, April 19, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris

Our contact reaffirmed the belief of the Foreign Office that it is only a question of time before Japan will be drawn into the conflict in the North.

(END OF MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris
Dated April 24, 1940
Received 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

524, April 24, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Reynaud said to me at lunch today that he felt confident that the Allied forces would capture Narvik within 48 hours.

He was, on the other hand, not at all optimistic about the operations designed to (*) the Germans from Trondheim. He said that the eight German destroyers in the Trondheim Fjord would be hard nuts to crack and that the speed with which Germany was reinforcing her troops in Norway left him doubtful about the issue of the Allied attempt to take Trondheim.

He added that in his opinion the essential thing would be to hold Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish frontier and to maintain permanently a force in that region in spite of any efforts that the Germans might take.

BULLITT

NPL: HFD
(⁎) Apparent omission.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

[Redacted]

Secretary of State,
Washington.

March 24, 19xx (SECRET) (SIC)

Rumors received here indicate that the present situation in Sweden is unstable and that the Government is in retreat because of the losses concerning loss of territory and transports and Germany's growing in the region.

I thought that the Swedes would fight but that their militiamen would not last long.

Reynolds informed yesterday of the decision of the Supreme War Council in Rome to free and release several Fascists in the Austrian situation.

He said that the British entirely agreed with him as to the need for pouring all the energy possible into the fight in Germany.

[Redacted]
In commenting on Mussolini's telegrams to Hitler, Reynaud stated that while this public expression of Mussolini's belief that Germany could win the war would make it difficult for Mussolini to do anything in the future except help Hitler to win, he did not feel that the telegram would produce much change in the actual situation. Mussolini had known for a long time that he could have a free port in Djibouti and the railroad to Adis Ababa, the straits on the Suez Canal, and the maintenance of the defenses of 1866 in Tunisia. There was simply nothing else that France could offer him. Hitler was offering Mussolini the British and French possessions in the Mediterranean plus a large portion of Yugoslavia and since Mussolini was only after all he could get it was obvious that he would continue to work for German victory to a French and British victory.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PARIS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

524, April 24, 4 p.m. (SECRET.

French intelligence from Italy indicated that the opposition to war with France was so strong among the ordinary people of Italy, not so much the royal family, the Pope and the staff of the army, but a declaration of war against France in the mood produce serious internal disturbances. Certainly Italian troops would not fight with the slightest enthusiasm. Incidentally, the king was fully aware of this and would not be misled.

Incidentally, I think that Great Britain would lose its position, for the position of Great Britain in the world, her still causes to obtain a position of importance in the Franco and Italy, but there are a number of factors which are further very much the cause of this. In any case, it would indicate that she would have to consider the consequences of her action.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be
clairvoyance before being communicated
to anyone. (3)

FROM
Dated April 24, 1940

Secretary of State
Washington D.C.

524, April 24, 4 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Since Laval has been the chief exponent of French
cooperation with Italy there seems to be little or
no chance that even a change in Government in France
which might give Laval a certain degree of power would
alter the present relation of France and Italy.

Laval is still under the illusion that he has ad
personal influence with Mussolini; but I have been
informed by both Reynaud and Darlan that recently
when a rumor was published in the Paris press that
Laval was to be sent to Rome, Ciano asked Francois
Rome, French Ambassador in Rome, a portion of instruc-
tion from Mussolini stating that if Laval should come

to Rome, Mussolini would refuse to receive him.

Reynaud said that he had been told him that
he had received a communication or confidential sub-
jects which Nasmyth had sent here in London indicated
that the Soviet Union was less ardent than formerly
of close cooperation with Germany. Mr. Reynaud was
- 2 - 1924, April 24, 4 p.m. from Paris

not particularly impressed by this statement.

(END OF MESSAGE).

\[\text{\textsc{bullet}}\]

\[\text{\textsc{re:css}}\]