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TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PARIS
Dated April 30, 1940
Rec'd 3:45 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

548, April 30, 6 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY.

I found Daladier today extremely depressed by events in Norway. He confirmed the information which had been given me previously by General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, that the Germans had captured 800 British officers and men.

It was not this event but the general handling of the entire war in Norway by the British who hold supreme command of the operations both by sea and land that had reduced him to extreme pessimism. He said that he had always been doubtful about the ability of British generals but he had now been obliged to doubt the ability of British admirals. The British had fine ships and fine sailors but their high command seemed lamentably deficient in foresight and energy. It was appalling that the British refused risk even their destroyers and submarines in order to attempt to bar the way of German transports to Norway.

BULLETT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

FROM

Dated April 30, 1940
Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

549, April 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He believed that a German victory at Trondheim would be followed by an Italian attack on Dalmatia. The Turkish government had indicated that if Italy should attack Yugoslavia Turkey would declare war at once on Italy which would compel the British and French to make war on Italy immediately.

He thought that the Italian troops in Ethiopia would launch an attack on Egypt and try to march down the Nile to join the Italian troops in Libya. He had confidence, of course, in Nogues and the French troops on the Tunisian frontier of Libya.

The problem which was worrying was not any local problem but the wide (?) of the whole military-naval and diplomatic direction of the war.

He felt that the French would have to carry henceforth the entire intellectual burden of organizing the war and would have to impose French control over all operations. He did not see, however, how this could be done.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

549, April 30, 6 p.m.-(SECTION THREE)

He expected the fighting in Norway to turn out so badly that the Reynaud Government would fall. He himself would do everything he could to avoid taking Reynaud's position since he could not see clearly at the moment.

Both General Sikorski and Daladier had received an unconfirmed report that Hitler had visited Oslo yesterday. Neither knew whether this was true or not.

General Sikorski expressed an opinion similar to Daladier's that the destruction of the British forces north of Trondheim would be the signal for Mussolini to attack Yugoslavia. In this connection he said to me that Mr. Welles had praised Mussolini to him in terms of admiration which seemed to indicate a close relationship between Mr. Welles and Mussolini and he wondered if at the present juncture we might not be able to have some influence on Mussolini.

(END OF MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D.)

FROM

Dated May 1, 1940
Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

195, May 1, 3 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In the course of a long conversation this morning on the present situation, Léger said to me that he was convinced that Mussolini would take the first opportunity that he considered completely favorable to attack Yugoslavia. It might be that a German victory in the Trondhjem area would not be enough to act Mussolini into action. It might be that he would wait until German troops should invade Slovenia and Croatia.

I asked whether or not it was true that Turkey had stated (as Deladier had informed me yesterday) that an Italian attack on Yugoslavia would bring an immediate declaration of war by Turkey on Italy and thus would entail immediate declarations of war by France and England on Italy.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLETIN

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
Paris

Dated May 1, 1940
Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

535, May 1, 3 p.m. (SECTION 190)

Leger replied that in case of an Italian attack on Yugoslavia the Turks undoubtedly would desire an immediate declaration of war on Italy by Turkey, France and England. The British, however, in his opinion would be immovably opposed to a declaration of war on Italy even though Italy should invade Yugoslavia. If the British should refuse flatly to support Yugoslavia he thought that Turkey would not declare war on Italy and that France also would not.

Leger added that this question had not yet been clarified by discussions between the French and British Governments. In his own opinion it would be folly to permit Italy and Germany or Italy alone to seize Yugoslavia without active intervention on the part of France and England. At the moment he felt he hopefully did not know what would happen.

For obvious reasons I hope that you will keep this information as secret as possible.

636, PESS. 38.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM Paris

Dated May 3, 1940
Rec'd 5:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

571, May 3, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

This morning I talked with Paul Reynaud who is still confined to his bed with grique and a slight fever. He said that he felt that the conversations of Ambassador Phillips in Rome with Mussolini had been useful. It was his impression from the reports that he had received from Francois-Loest and others that it was not now likely that the Italian plans for an attack on Corfu or attack Greece from Albania. On the other hand he felt that an Italian attack on Yugoslavia was still in suspense.

It is obvious that little is expected during their conversation at the moment of the overwhelming strength of the German army. Mussolini himself has been confirmed in his belief that a campaign to the west, and Mussolini would continue it in northern Africa when he could enter the war. Since the death of the Premier of Spain on 30 April.
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

571, May 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

He felt that Mussolini was somewhat afraid of the disapproval of the Government of the United States and that our Government might therefore be able to restrain him.

He thought that there was a slight possibility that Mussolini might now attempt another maneuver designed ostensibly to produce immediate peace but in reality to disintegrate morale in France and England. Even though Mussolini should make a peace proposal at this moment, which he did not consider likely, he thought that such a proposal would have no effect on morale in either France or England since Mussolini had made his personal sympathies and antipathies so obvious by his telegram to Hitler expressing his certainty of German victory that his standing in France and England was now that of a fellow bandit of Hitler.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (1)

FROM: Dated May 3, 1945

Sec'd 1:56 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

SIX, May 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Not only the Governments but also the peoples of Germany and England would reject a peace proposal from us with contempt. Of course, if Mussolini should be able to seduce either the Pope or the President of the United States into supporting a peace appeal, the effect on morale and England would be serious. I did not believe, however, that such seduction was within the realm of possibility.

Both Charvieriat and Rochat, with whom I talked after leaving Reynaud, expressed the same views.

The withdrawal of the British troops south of Tournai has been received calmly in Paris where almost everyone who is influential can remember the sound of the German guns in September 1914 and the final outcome of the war. (END OF PAGE).
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From
Dated May 8, 1940
Rec'd 5:22 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

593, May 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

I discussed the general situation today with Paul Reynaud and also with Leger.

Both insisted that the French and British governments were pushing the operations in Narvik as hard as possible and stated that they did not believe that the Germans would be able to send any further reinforcements to Narvik by airplane since the Allied troops at last have been supplied with sufficient anti-aircraft guns and machine guns to prevent planes landing.

On the other hand neither one could give me any prediction as to the moment when the capture of Narvik might be expected and both had in mind the possibility that as soon as the ice should break up in the Gulf of Bothnia the Germans might land forces and send them rapidly along the railroad from Lulea to Kiruna and Narvik.

They both felt that at the present moment Mussolini is reluctant to attack Yugoslavia without German assistance.
May 8, 6 p.m. (Section One) from Paris.

They think that as soon as Hitler shall have returned a portion of his air force from Norway he will enter Yugoslavia by way of Slovenia in order to precipitate an Italian attack on Yugoslavia. They also believe that Hitler may make a move against Rumania in order to precipitate a Soviet attack on Bessarabia.
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

593, May 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

If Italy should attack Dalmatia, the army of General Weygand, which is now in Syria probably would be landed at Salonika at the earliest possible moment.

Both Reynaud and Leger are inclined to believe that these attacks in the Balkans would be only the prelude to a German attack on the Western Front which would involve Belgium and the Netherlands as well as France.

In this connection the Dutch Minister called on me this morning to say that when at 2 o'clock today the rumor had circulated in Paris that German troops had crossed the frontier of the Netherlands he had telephoned to the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs who had replied that the rumor was entirely untrue but that the Dutch Government remained apprehensive with regard to the immediate future. The Dutch Minister
minister went on to say that he was absolutely certain that if German troops should enter the Netherlands, Belgium would march at once in support of the Netherlands and France would march in support of Belgium.

A story from Washington was published in Paris A DI today under the heading that a new peace move by President Roosevelt and the Vatican was expected. Leader asked me if I knew anything about any such project and I replied that I had no reason to believe that the story was anything more than rumor. Leader then asked me to note the possible disastrous effect on French and British morale of a peace proposal by the President which would have to be rejected since the only peace which could be made at the present time would be one which would leave Germany completely dominant on the continent of Europe.

(End of Message)

Bullitt

E.B.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM
Paris
Dated May 11, 1940
Rec'd 2:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

632, May 11, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Papal Nuncio has just informed me that he believes that the Pope tomorrow in the course of an address will condemn the invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium and Luxembourg. The Nuncio is fairly confident that the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands has produced a reaction in Italian public opinion which will make it difficult for Mussolini to drag Italy into the war against France and England.

BULLITT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From: PAIS
Dated May 14, 1940
Rec'd 3:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

657, May 14, 7 p.m.

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

The Germans have launched the greatest attack of modern times on the French army from the point where the Maginot line ends at Montmedy northwestward to the line Sedan Givet Dinant Namur. They have put in four armored divisions and many other troops and an overwhelming number of tanks and airplanes. This is as you know, the shortest road to Paris.

The Belgians have been obliged to fall back to the line of Namur Louvain Malines Antwerp. Dutch resistance has been almost crushed.

At this moment news has reached the French general staff that certain dispositions of airplanes and troops indicate that Mussolini is contemplating making direct attack on France and that he has adjourned his attack on Yugoslavia.
There are literally no French planes available to face an Italian attack and the Italian aviation would be able to bomb southern and southwestern France at will.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

RUSH
657, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I have talked with eyewitnesses of the German bombings in Belgium and Luxembourg, including the Archduke Otto and Bech, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg. Neither men, women, nor children are being spared and the tales of horror pass belief.

No one in Paris doubts that Mussolini is contemplating pleasurably the infliction of similar atrocities. Information reaching the French Foreign Office today which Leger has just given me indicates moreover that the Italians are trying to provoke incidents which will give them an excuse for attacking France. The Italian colony in Tunis has become most provocative and insults to French and English in Italy continue.

BULLITT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
657, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Nearly every member of the French Government and many French senators have appealed to me today to ask you to make a final effort to keep Italy from entering the war as Germany's ally. Telegrams from the French Ambassador in Rome today report that the Italian press is filled with praise of the American Government and its friendly gesture in eliminating certain duties on Italian goods. Poncet reports that this is being interpreted to mean that the Government of the United States approves of Mussolini's present policies. Since you have handed Mussolini a carrot of this variety I trust that you have not forgotten the club.

The suggestions that have been made to me are the following:

(One) That the most powerful weapon to employ against Mussolini would be a statement by the Pope based on purely spiritual grounds denouncing the barbarities which Germany has inflicted on the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

BULLITT
PARIS
Dated May 14, 1940
Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
657, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I have been requested by numerous members of the French Government to ask you to use all the influence you have to persuade the Pope to make such a declaration. It is pointed out that his telegrams to the sovereigns of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg were in the nature of political acts whereas what is needed is a declaration on the ecclesiastical and spiritual plane which centuries ago would have taken the form of excommunication of Hitler and Germany.

Two: Several members of the French Government and the Argentine Ambassador have suggested to me that if all the countries of Latin America should join in denouncing the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, and if this denunciation should be fully supported by public re- flect in Italy would be important.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated May 14, 1940

FROM
Rec'd 8:05 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH

657, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

(Three) It has been suggested to me by many persons that you might let Mussolini know privately that in case he should go to war at this time as Hitler's ally you would do everything in your power to cut off from Italy all immigrant remittances and other funds which Italy ordinarily receives from the United States.

(Four) All the members of the government, including Reynaud, the Senators, and others with whom I have talked today have implored me to obtain more planes immediately and have become exceedingly depressed when I explained that so far as I knew no planes were available.

You will have thought of other possible methods of influencing Mussolini and I do not wish to make this telegram any longer but I must and it by saying the unless action is immediate it will come too late and that no one in France, general or statesman, believes that France can resist an attack by Italy at this time when every available man
PAP -2- 657, May 14 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Paris

man in the French army is needed to stem the German advance through Belgium.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
659, May 14, 7 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I received from Rome at 7 o'clock this evening Ambassador Phillips' rush 347, May 14, noon.

I felt that it was my duty to communicate the information it contained immediately to the Prime Minister. He was in a meeting of the War Cabinet but came out and I communicated the information to him at 7:10 p.m.

He said that the British Ambassador in Paris had just given him the same news. He expressed the opinion that Italy certainly would enter the war on the side of Germany and might even attack France tonight.

I asked where he expected the attack. He said that it might come in Tunis or might be begun by bombardments of the Riviera and Marseilles by Italian planes.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he felt Mussolini had decided to act at this moment because of the appalling
appalling success which the German army had had in the sector Montmady-Sedan. He said that the Germans had attacked with colossal tanks and at the same time with a totally overwhelming mass of bombardment planes and pursuit planes.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
PARIS
Dated May 14, 1940
Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH.

659, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The German tanks had crossed the River Meuse as if it did not exist. They had run through the French anti-tank defenses which consisted of railroad rails sunk deep in concrete and protruding from ground as if the rails were straw. They had crossed the anti-tank traps and had completely demolished the concrete fortifications by which the Maginot Line had been extended in that region since the beginning of the war.

Reynaud then said "at this moment there is nothing between those German tanks and Paris".

He stated that the French were attempting a counter attack to cut off the raids made by this German tank advance but he did not know what hopes of success remained. Even without the participation of Italy, France faced one of the gravest and most terrible moments in her history. With the participation of Italy the result would be tragic not only for France and England but for every country in the world including the United States.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

PARIS
FROM
Dated May 14, 1940
Rec'd 6:43 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH

659, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

We were at one of the most terrible moments in human history. France would fight on but the French soldiers, brave as they were, could not stand against simultaneous attacks by tanks on the ground and bombs and machine gun bullets from the air.

Reynaud then implored me to obtain additional aeroplanes from the United States. I told him I feared there were none to be had.

He then said that the war with Italy would involve Italian submarine attacks on all shipping in the Mediterranean. The British and French had an inadequate number of destroyers. He knew that the United States had a large number of old destroyers which could be used effectively against submarines. He implored me if possible to have the Government of the United States declare these destroyers to be without military value and sell them to the French and British Governments.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PARIS
May 14, 1940
Rec'd 8:10 p.m.

From
Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
659, May 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

He then went on to say that he had just talked with
the British Prime Minister on the telephone. The British
had been obsessed by the idea that the seizure of Belgium
and the Netherlands was merely a preparation for air
attacks on England. He had convinced Churchill at last that
the real objective of the German army was the destruction
of the French army and Churchill had agreed to send all
the British planes available to assist the French in the
Montmedy-Sedan sector.

Reynaud again referred to the overwhelming effect of
the attack of heavy tanks combined with incessant bombing
from the air.

In conclusion he thanked me with genuine gratitude for
having given him the information I had communicated and
said once more that at this moment we faced the enslavement
not only of Europe and of Africa, but also the rest of the
world by a barbarism which would crush twenty centuries of
Christian civilization.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (D)

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 10 a.m.

665, May 15, noon.

RUSH.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Paul Reynaud asked me to come to the Foreign Office this morning at 10:15. When I called he said that he wished to keep me and through me you fully informed personally as to the developments at the front. The situation continued to be one of the utmost gravity. The greatest battle in history was in progress in the region of Sedan. The Germans had crossed the Meuse at many points north of Sedan.

This morning at 6 o'clock Daladier had telephoned to him and had stated that the French troops positively could not hold out today against the masses of tanks and airplanes which were being launched against them and that the battle certainly would be lost quickly unless the troops could be protected from German attacks from the air.

(END SECTION ONE)
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SUS.
665, May 15, noon. (SECTION TWO)

Mr. Reynaud, had telephoned immediately to Churchill in London and had stated that since the Germans had broken through into open country where there were no fortifications whatever on the most direct route to Paris and since there was nothing to oppose the floods of German planes and tanks except ordinary infantrymen and artillery, the war might be lost in the course of a few days and in his opinion would be lost unless the British should send their airplanes from England at once.

Churchill, Reynaud said, had screamed at him that there was no chance of the war being lost and he, Reynaud, had replied that Churchill knew as well as he knew him that so long as he, Reynaud, should remain Prime Minister France would fight to the bitter end. It was his duty however to tell Churchill the facts. Churchill thereupon promised to call together at the earliest possible moment the War Cabinet and attempt to persuade the War Cabinet to
20 June 18, noon (SECTION TWO) from Paris

to promise to send the British pursuit plants which were being kept in England for the protection of the colonies to be sent at once to France to join in the battle of the Leuse.

BULLITT

CSB
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

RUSH

665, May 15, noon. (SECTION THREE)

Reynaud added that General Giraud had been recalled from Antwerp to take command of the French troops in the Sedan sector.

Reynaud said that the French planes were outnumbered almost ten to one and he implored me once more to ask you if it might not be possible by any means whatsoever to obtain new supplies of planes from the United States. I answered that you were as aware of the need as he was and that it was no lack of desire to help but simply the fact that the planes did not exist.

He then suggested that the planes of other types than those which the French had bought hitherto might be available in small quantities and asked if it might not be possible to obtain such planes. I replied that his own representative in Washington...
-2-#665, May 15, noon, (SECTION THREE) from Paris

Colonel Jacquin knew better than anyone else what could be bought in America and that he had only to order. Jacquin to act in order to obtain every plane available. He said that the difficulty was that Jacquin was not aware of the extreme gravity of the situation. I said that he should be informed.

BULLITT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

FRANCE

Dated May 15, 1940
Rec'd 10:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

665, May 15, noon. (SECTION FOUR)

Reynaud went on to say that the information from Italy indicated that Mussolini was preparing to attack almost immediately.

He repeated his request for old American destroyers. Will you please let me know if you can do anything about this matter?

I communicated to Reynaud your views that aviators should be trained in Canada and not in the United States. I asked that you would be glad to keep in close touch with the matter, and suggested that since the training was to be carried out in Canada the best way to organize it would probably be to have Lord Lothian call on you to make certain that nothing was done which would conflict with your desires.

I assume that when you said to me over the telephone yesterday that "the boat was all right" you meant that there was no objection to sending an aircraft carrier to take planes which had already been set up. Please cable me.
2. JCCS, May 16, noon (SECTION 4:10) from Paris.

As a confirmation of this immediately.

In concluding our conversation, Jynneb said that the
French counter-attacks against the German "healing" in
the Stemp region had not been successful either in
cutting it off or reducing it. On the contrary the
healing was growing hour by hour.

The situation could not be more grave. (END OF
MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Paris

Secretary of State

Washington

U.S. Embassy, May 15, 1940, 12:45 p.m.

682, May 15, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In connection with Paul Reynaud's request for destroyers for use in the Mediterranean I had a discussion with the Minister of Marine today and he brought Admiral Darlan, Supreme Commander of the French Naval Forces, into the conversation by telephone.

The Minister of Marine and Darlan asked me most urgently to obtain your consent for purchase or lease by the French Government from the American Navy 12 of our old destroyers.

I understand that we now have 131 old destroyers in commission of which 52 are doing neutrality patrol and that we have 68 old destroyers not in commission which it would take two to three months to put into commission. Since the need is immediate I trust that if it is possible to sell or lease 12 of these old destroyers you might be able to take 12 of the best of those that are now in commission.

W. C. Bullitt
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,

Washington

682, May 15, 5 p.m. (Section Two)

The Minister of Marine also said that he understood that we had 54 old patrol bombers which our navy considered obsolete but which would be most useful to the French in destroying submarines in the Mediterranean. He asked me urgently to obtain permission from you for the French Government to purchase these 54 old bombing planes. These planes are, I understand, marked P.B. 3., were manufactured in the navy aircraft factory, are equipped with Pratt and Whitney motors and make approximately 225 miles an hour.

In the course of our conversation Campinchi showed me telegrams from the French Naval Attaché in Madrid which gave the following facts.

Yesterday the Spanish Minister of Marine stated to the British Naval Attaché that the Italian Government had invited the assistance of the Spanish Government for the laying of mine fields in the western Mediterranean. The Spanish Government had refused this assistance.
Mc.

This message was not closely paraphrased or
fort to anyone. (D.)

PARIS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd. 4:40 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

682, May 15, 5 p.m. (Section Three)

The Spanish Minister of Marine had then stated that
he feared greatly that the Italians would attempt to
seize the Balsacri Islands. The Spanish Government had
decided to resist any attempt of the Italians to land
in the Balsacri and in case the Italians should attempt
such a landing would be grateful to have the assistance of
the British Navy.

Another telegram from the Naval Attache in Madrid
stated that Serrano Suner was building up with the
assistance of the Italians a tremendous "fifth column"
organization designed to bring Spain into the war on the
side of Italy.

I see no reason why the fifty-four old patrol
bombing planes cannot be sold to the French at once and I
hope most heartily that you will also be able to sell to
the French the twelve old destroyers.

Please cable me at the earliest possible moment an
affirmative answer to these requests. Incidentally the
requests were made personally and unofficially and will
not be presented in official form unless you should desire.

(END OF MESSAGE)

NPL 
BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
From Paris

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Recorded May 20, 1940

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH

760, May 20, 11 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

I have just gone over the telegrams concerning Italy with Daladier. They indicate that the entrance of Italy into the war is imminent. Among the indications are the following:

As you know following Reynaud's example Churchill wrote a personal letter to Mussolini on the subject of British-Italian relations. Mussolini's reply was received in London yesterday. In the coldest and driest terms Mussolini stated to the British that his present attitude was based on the acts of England in 1935; that since Great Britain had explained her hostility to Italy at that time by the statement that Great Britain must respect her signature he was certain that Mr. Churchill would understand that Italy now must respect her signature on her alliance with Germany.

(END SECTION ONE)
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

RUSH
760, May 20, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Sir Percy Lorraine, British Ambassador in Rome, telegraphed his Government that in his opinion Italy would enter the war within a few days.

Francis Poncet, French Ambassador in Rome, telegraphed that there were rumors that there would be a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council either tomorrow night or the day after and that Mussolini would speak and announce war.

It was the consensus of opinion of French observers in Rome that Italy would enter the war probably on May 25 although the entry of Italy on the 21st was possible.

Daladier went on to say that he did not need to point out the seriousness of an Italian attack just at the moment when all available French troops were engaged in stopping the German march on Paris. He knew that the President
hsm -2- No.760, May 20, 11 a. m., (Section 2), from Paris

President had done everything that he could to keep Mussolini from entering the war. He implored me however to ask the President to make another effort to hold back Mussolini. Every day that Mussolini could be kept out of the war was a day gained and made it more likely that the French could consolidate their positions against the Germans.

BULLITT

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated May 20, 1940

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

760, May 20, 9 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

He asked if the Government of the United States and all the Latin American Governments together could not address a public appeal to Italy not to enter the war against France and England. He said that he had no other ideas but he hoped that you would be able to invent others. A stab in the back at this moment by Italy might be fatal.

I know nothing of what you have said to Mussolini or what you have done but I think you ought to let him know immediately that if Italy should enter the war, you, by a slight extension of the policy you pursued in blocking all payments to Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, at once would block all Italian holdings in the United States, and all the Atlantic fleet today to make a courtesy visit to Portugal? The presence of our
hem-2 No. 760, May 30, 9 a.m., (Section 3), from Paris

our ships at Lisbon might make Mussolini think again.

Have you tried to get the Pope to threaten excommuni-
cation? And have you invited the Pope to establish
himself in the United States in case of war? I am so
out of touch with your efforts in respect of Italy that
I can make no other suggestions but I hope that you will
act promptly.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Paris
Dated May 20, 1940
Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

757, May 20, 3 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I have just talked with Reynaud. The situation is definitely worse than during the past two days. In his words "the defenses we put up against the German tanks are like the walls of sand that a child puts up on the seashore against the waves."

Furthermore the French Government has received no word of any kind from General Gireaud who is now in command of the French forces opposing the German drive for the past three days. Reynaud said that the only reason that he had to believe that General Gireaud was not either dead or captured was that the German radio had not announced this prize. He went on to say that he did not know whether or not General Weygand had taken command too late. The situation was desperate.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

767, May 20, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He then read me a telegram that he had just received from Francois-Poncet, French Ambassador in Rome, stating that he feared Mussolini would declare war tonight; but he did not know whether or not Mussolini would attack France at once or would attack Yugoslavia and Greece in the first instance.

He went on to say that the British and French armies in Belgium were sliding along towards Giraud’s army attempting to join it but that they were in no position to make a counter attack.

My personal opinion is that if Mussolini can be kept from stabbing France in the back the German drive on Paris will be held.

Please make a last effort to keep Mussolini from attacking. The blow to French morale if he should attack would be terrible. You could counter it in some measure by a $20,000,000 appropriation from Congress for the French
-2- 767, May 20, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

French refugees. I hope that you will be able to get Congress to act today. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

DDM
SECRET

SECRET

Secretary of State,
Washington.

610, May 22, 1 p.m.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

François Poncet, French Ambassador in Rome, reported today that there were many rumors which he could not confirm that Mussolini was thinking of making a peace proposal which would involve his obtaining everything that he wanted without fighting and that he might ask either you or the Pope to launch it.

Poncet emphasized that this was merely conversation in Rome and I report it only because your name was mentioned.

BULLITT

GW
SECRET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Paris
Dated May 24, 1940
Rec'd 8:09 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

851, May 24, noon.

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Information from Italy today indicates that Italian boats everywhere have been ordered to return to Italy without waiting for cargo. Daladier expects Italy to enter the war within ten days unless the battle now in progress in Northern France should result in a German disaster—which does not seem likely.

BULLITT

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From
Paris
Dated May 25, 1940
Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
879, May 25, 3 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY.

Daladier asked to see me at 11 o'clock this morning. He showed me a note from Halifax to the British Ambassador in Paris dated yesterday which the British Ambassador had handed to the French Government last night.

The note in summary ran approximately as follows:
The British Government was in agreement with the opinions expressed by the French Prime Minister and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the menace of an Italian attack was so great that the British and French Ambassadors in Washington should be instructed to convey to the President of the United States a communication in the following sense: (END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

WSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated May 25, 1940
Rec'd 11:34 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

879, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The President should be invited to make on his own behalf and not (repeat not) acting as agent for the allies the following statement to Mussolini.

(1) He had reason to believe that France and England were aware that Italy entertained certain grievances against them; (2) that the French and British Governments were fully disposed to consider Italian claims now with a view to reaching agreement to satisfy reasonable Italian claims at the conclusion of the present war; (3) the Allies would admit Italy to the peace conference in the same status as any belligerent.

It was then suggested that the President should add that the United States would do its utmost to see to it that any agreements reached would be carried out provided that Italy should refrain from entering the war against France and England.

Please understand that the above is merely the summary of a rough suggestion for a communication to you.

BULLITT

WSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON,

RUSH

879, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Daladier said that he had stated to the British Ambassador that the French Government never took any action with regard to the United States without previous consultation with me. He had, therefore, informed the British Government that he intended to consult me this morning. I replied that the British Ambassador had attempted to see me last night and that I was lunching with him alone today and that I assumed he desired to discuss this question. Daladier said that he would be very grateful if I would discuss this question fully with the British Ambassador.

Daladier then asked me for my personal opinion as to the advisability of the French and British Governments making this appeal to you.

I replied that in principle I was sure you would be only too glad to continue your efforts to keep Italy out of the war. The only question which would arise, therefore, would be with regard to the advisability of this move and the
FS 2-No. 879, May 25, 3 p.m. from Paris (SECTION THREE).

the exact terms of the communication of the French and British to you. I added that you had constantly in mind the danger that some move of yours might be damaging to French and British morale and that you would wish to avoid any act which might make it appear that you were bringing pressure on the French and British to give up territory in response to blackmail.

WSB BULLITT
FS  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED  

Paris  
Dated May 25, 1940  
FROM  
Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
879, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Daladier replied that as I knew he was most vividly aware of this danger. Your voice carried such weight in France and England that you could break French and British morale. We then discussed the possibilities if you should send such a communication to Mussolini. Daladier felt that Mussolini might refuse to communicate his claims in which case his refusal would place him in a bad position vis a vis both American and Italian public opinion when and if the facts should become known.

In the second place he might refuse to accept any promise of the French and British as valid, arguing that the promises made during the last war had not been carried out. Daladier said that if you should have added that all the influence of the Government of the United States would be used to see to it that the promises made should be carried out, that objection would fall.

In the third place Mussolini might demand the

Immediate
immediate fulfillment of his claims. If these claims should merely include Djibouti and the railroad line from Djibouti to Addis Ababa and a different arrangement at Suez, this demand would not be an insuperable obstacle.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From
Dated May 25, 1940
Rec'd 11:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

879, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

But if they should include, as they probably would, the abandonment of Gibraltar by Great Britain and perhaps the cession of Tunisia by France the claims would be impossible of acceptance at the present time. For example, during this war Great Britain could not give up Gibraltar. You might be placed in the position of seeming to urge the French and British to give up essential portions of their empires. If Mussolini's demands should be rejected and Mussolini should publish a distorted version of the facts it might be made to appear that you were supporting Italian claims against France and England.

In conclusion Daladier said he felt that if the démarche should be handled in the most careful possible manner there might be a chance of success and certainly any disastrous failure could be avoided.

I shall telegraph you again after talking with the British Ambassador and once more with Daladier.

WSB  BULLITT
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

RUSH
879, MAY 25, 3 P.M. (SECTION SIX)

Please understand that the above is merely private information before an official démarche. I want to inform you now so that if and when Saint Quentin and Lothian call on you you will have had an opportunity to think over the question.

My own feeling is that if the French and British note to you should be couched in just the right language and if in making this démarche you should at the same time ask Mussolini to note the rising tide of American public opinion the effort might be worth while and possibly successful.

It would of course be reinforced immensely if you could not only call Mussolini's attention to the movement of American opinion but also the same day separately inform Mussolini that the Atlantic fleet was about to make a courtesy visit to Lisbon.

Please.
FS 2-No. 879, May 25, 3 p.m. from Paris

Please take every precaution that no inkling of this British French intention should leak—especially to the Italian Ambassador.

Postscript: I have just had luncheon with the British Ambassador who took up and confirmed all the above.

(END OF MESSAGE):

DDM  BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Paris
Dated May 28, 1940
Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH, 915, May 28, 1 p.m.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Paul Reynaud asked to see me urgently at 11 o'clock this morning.

I called on him at the Ministry of War. He said that he wished to consult me with regard to an appeal to you by the King of England and the President of France. He had written out one sentence of this appeal which began: "The armies fighting to preserve the liberties of the world have been stabbed in the back." (show?)

He then rose and said: "I will show you what the situation is."

He showed me the positions on the map which had been held by the Belgian army. They ran from the sea coast past Bruges almost down to the French frontier.

He said that as soon as the Belgians laid down their arms a German armored division drove for Dunkirk.

(END SECTION ONE)

HPD BULLITT
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

RUSH
915, May 28, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
As a result the whole British army and the finest French army were totally cut off from supplies of food and munitions. Their situation was desperate. They would fight until the last cartridge. They could do nothing but die well.

As soon as they should be destroyed all the German armored divisions would descend on Paris striking probably from Laon and probably not even bothering to sweep first on Rouen and Havre.

The French army would fight to the bitter end but it seemed certain that the end would be bitter and rapid.

At this moment when all that was decent in the world was threatened he felt obliged to address a supreme appeal to you. Enough evidence had accumulated to make it absolutely certain that if France and England should be conquered...
hsm -2- No. 915, May 28, 2 p. m. (Section 2), from Paris

conquered by the Germans, Hitler would move almost immediately against the United States. The fact was that the act of the King of the Belgians had been a knife thrust that might be fatal not only to France and England but also to America. Under the circumstances he felt that the President of France and the King of England must address today a message to you.

BULLITT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated May 28, 1940
Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

RUSH,

915, May 28, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I replied that it was obviously the right of the British sovereign and the President of France to address you at such a moment; but that I advised him before cabling such a message to have the British Government communicate immediately with Lord Lothian who could advise the British Government and French Government better than anyone else just what should be said and what should not be said. He promised me that he would have the British Government consult Lothian immediately and that no action would be taken before consulting Lothian.

Reynaud then went on to say that he knew perfectly well that even though the United States should declare war on Germany tomorrow we could not fly an army to France in airplanes which did not exist but there was our fleet. He implored me to ask you to order the Atlantic fleet at once to the Mediterranean. This act might at least prevent another stab in the back from Mussolini. (END MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated May 28, 1940
Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

920, May 28, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Chavarette said to me this afternoon a telegram from Francesco Pontec in Rome reporting a conversation that he had had with Ciano in the course of which Ciano said that he could guarantee Italy would not go to war before the first of June. He declined, however, to make a similar remark about the first of July and added that the decision was entirely in the hands of Mussolini and that no one knew when he would make the decision. There is no doubt whatsoever in Pontec’s mind that unless some new factor intervenes Italy will enter the war probably during the first week of June.

I still believe that the only new factor which might prevent Italian action and prevent it entirely without risk to the United States would be an order to our Atlantic fleet to proceed to Lisbon.

On the subject of the President’s démarche of Sunday, Ciano
Ciano said to Ponchet that the President's line of approach was an entirely inspiring fruitful one and that Mussolini was merely irritated by the attempts of the President to prevent him making whatever decision he chose to make about entering the war.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated May 29, 1940

Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

944, May 29, 7 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I cannot tell you how glad I was that you ordered the three ships to Lisbon.

Personally I am convinced that unless you can throw the fear of the United States into Al Capone he will attack about June 4. I know nothing about the state of American public opinion but I feel that the only chance is to send the rest of the Atlantic fleet. After all we have interests in Tangier.

I understand incidentally that Al intends to descend on Tangier. Why not have something good there before him?

BULLITT

GW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated May 29, 1940
Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

947, May 29, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

In view of the certainty that Italy will enter the war during the first week of June unless we send the Atlantic Fleet to Tangier, it would be folly to permit the WASHINGTON to enter the Mediterranean.

I consider it inhuman and indecent to refuse to permit embarkation on the WASHINGTON, after all Americans are embarked, of aliens who have fulfilled all visa requirements and I trust that before the WASHINGTON arrives in Bordeaux you will have authorized me to permit the embarkation of carefully selected aliens who have every right to seek refuge in our country. I can assure you that I will use such authority with discretion.

BULLITT

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-FROM
PARIS
Dated May 29, 1940
Rec'd 8:15 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH
948, May 29, 10 p.m.

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Reynaud has just read to me a telegram which he received this afternoon from Halifax containing the text of the report of Sir Percy Lorrain, British Ambassador in Rome, on his conversation with Ciano yesterday.

Ciano said to the British Ambassador that he had promised that he would keep him informed if there were to be any great change in Italian policy. He had sent for him to say to him that Mussolini had decided to go to war in the immediate future.

The delay before Italy should enter the war would be measured not in weeks but in days.

Ciano went on to say that even if France should offer Italy today Tunis, Morocco, and Algeria, that would not be enough. Mussolini had decided on May 8th to go to war and had merely been awaiting the most favorable moment,
2- #948, May 29, 10 p.m., from Paris

moment. The efforts of the Allies to buy him off with concessions and the efforts of President Roosevelt he considered indecent and immoral attempts to persuade him to break his pledged word. A Fascist never broke his word (see promises in re Ethiopia, Albania, et cetera).

(END-SECTION ONE)

CSB: IPL

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased for being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS
Dated May 29, 1940
Rec'd 8:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
948, May 29, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Sir Percy Lorrain replied that if Italy went to war against France and England he hoped that Count Ciano understood that Great Britain would make war on Italy with all her force. Ciano replied that he expected nothing else from a nation which had fought so bravely in the past but that this would make no difference whatsoever in Mussolini's decision.

After reading me the long telegram of which the above is a summary Reynaud expressed the opinion that Italy might make war within the next two or three days. I replied that it was difficult for me to believe that after the promise that the Italian Government had made to the American Government that the MANHATTAN would be permitted to leave Italy in safety Mussolini would dare to make war until the MANHATTAN had passed the Straits of Gibraltar. The MANHATTAN presumably would leave Genoa on
-2- #948, May 29, 10 p.m. (SEC TWO) from Paris

on June first and would pass the Straits of Gibraltar on June third. I therefore considered that June third or fourth was the more likely date for an Italian attack than the next three days.

Reynaud replied that he hoped that this was so but that it was absolutely certain now that unless the President of the United States should order the Atlantic Fleet to the Mediterranean immediately Mussolini would attack France. He added that independently the fate of the United States was no less involved than the fate of France in preventing Mussolini from attacking France in the rear at this moment when the French armies were concentrated against Germany. It was obvious that France, which was now fighting alone against Germany could not withstand an attack by Italy as well as Germany.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris
Dated May 29, 1940
Rec'd 6:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
948, May 29, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Reynaud went on to say that Weygand was most hopeful of stopping the Germans on the line of the Somme and the Aisne especially if an additional supply of 75's should be obtained from the obsolete stocks of the Government of the United States. Moreover the British and French armies fighting with their backs to the Channel at Dunkirk were selling their lives dearly and hoped to be able to kill many Germans before they should be exterminated in two or three days.

In conclusion Reynaud said "It is now or never for the United States. If you can send your Atlantic fleet to Tangier and inform Mussolini that you are doing so after the fleet has started he will not dare to strike. Otherwise he will strike and in a very few months you will face a joint attack by Germany, Italy and Japan alone."

As I have stated to you in a previous telegram today
-2- #948, May 29, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE), from Paris.

I think you should order the Atlantic Fleet tonight to proceed at once to Tangier. (End of Message)

CSB

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D) FROM

Paris
Dated May 31, 1940
Rec'd 6:42 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

962, May 31, noon (SECTION ONE)

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Your/534, May 30, 3 p.m.

The French Government is fully aware of the vitally useful part that our fleet is playing in the Pacific.

Reynaud in appealing to me to request you to send the Atlantic Fleet to the Mediterranean said "We are most grateful for the presence of your fleet in the Pacific. Without firing a shot it is keeping the war from spreading to the French and British Empires in the Far East. We hope it will stay there. Your Atlantic fleet can play exactly the same role in the Mediterranean."

RR

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D) Paris

FROM Dated May 31, 1940
Rec'd 7:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

962, May 31, noon. (SECTION TWO)

I believe that if we had sent the Atlantic fleet on a visit either to Greece or Tangier when first I made the recommendation more than two weeks ago Mussolini would not have dared to treat pressure of our Government to keep him out of war in the manner that he has.

I gather from your telegram under reference that you now consider inevitable the entrance of Italy into the war.

I feel sure that you realize the consequences that a stab in the back by Italy at this moment may have for France and England as well as the consequences it may have later this year for South America and the United States. I trust that no member of the American Government is still cherishing in the words of Reynaud "fatuous and naive illusions as to the virtues of Mussolini" and that the moment he stabs you will take every economic and financial measure that constructive imagination can devise to weaken Italy.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
Paris
Dated May 31, 1940
Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

962, May 31, noon (SECTION THREE).
To believe that the Government of the United States will be able ever to cooperate with Mussolini is as dangerous to the future of America as would have been the belief that our Government could cooperate with Al Capone.

The latest information of the French Government indicates that Mussolini will make war on France on June 4.

I am sure you realize the bitterness that such a step will produce.

May I inform the French Government when stating—as I must in view of your telegram under reference—that there is no hope whatsoever the Atlantic fleet will come to Tangier, that the moment Mussolini strikes economic and financial measures will be taken at once by our Government to make the lot of the aggressor hard?

Anything
2-1962, May 31, noon (SECTION THREE) from Paris.

Anything you can do now will leave Mussolini less strength with which to cooperate with Hitler in attacking the Americas.

At this moment words are not enough. Indeed, unaccompanied by acts they are rather sickening. (END MESSAGE)

BULLITT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Paris

Dated May 31, 1940
Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

964, May 31, 10 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Last night Daladier informed me that he was about to sign and send a note to the Italian Government stating that the Italian Government had informed the British Government that it intended to make war on France. The Italian Government had made no similar communication to the French Government. The French Government desired to know for what reasons the Italian Government intended to commit an unprovoked aggression against a people who had always lived in peace with the people of Italy and desired nothing but to live in peace with the people of Italy. The French Government was fully prepared at this moment to examine at once any claims which the Italian Government might have against France with a view to satisfying them.

Daladier went on to say that he felt this move was wise because either Mussolini would make such outrageous claims that the whole of the French Empire would be swept by
May 31, 10 a.m., from Paris.

by a flame of patriotism or Mussolini would refuse to reply, in which case the people of the French Empire would know that the French Government had done everything possible to avoid an unprovoked attack by Italy.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated June 3, 1940
Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secret

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH
1004, June 3, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

Paul Reynaud has just informed me that night before last Ciano stated to Francois-Poncot, French Ambassador in Rome, that Italy definitely, absolutely and unalterably had decided to make war on France. He could not give the exact date but the day of the attack would come soon.

Reynaud asked me to say to you that if you still could think of any means of preventing Mussolini from attacking France he felt that today was the last day for action.

BULLITT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From PARIS
Dated June 3, 1940
Rec'd 5:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1017, June 3, 8 p.m.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.
At the Quai d'Orsay, I went over the latest telegrams from Francois Poncet, French Ambassador in Rome. He is absolutely certain that Italy will strike in the immediate future. Indeed, as I have already reported, Italy is in the extraordinary situation of having declared war on France but refused to declare the date on which the attack will begin.

Italian preparations seem to indicate that Corsica and Egypt will be attacked at once, but there are also indications that Germany and Italy together may attack Switzerland or that Italy may attack Greece.

I know nothing in history more cynical than Mussolini's behavior and I trust that you are prepared to inflict on Italy the moment that Mussolini orders a gun fired, the most serious economic and financial injuries that the United States is in a position to inflict.

The
-2- #1017, June 3, 8 p.m., from Paris

The Turkish Government has once more assured the French Government that it intends to honor its engagements to come to the assistance of France and England immediately in case Italy should attack.

BULLITT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Paris
Dated June 3, 1940
Rec'd 5:52 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1018, June 3, 9 p. m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

With reference to the French offer to discuss immediately any and all Italian claims against France (see my telegram No. 964, May 31, 10 a. m.), Francois Poncet informed the French Government that Ciano had said to him that Mussolini would not be interested in receiving any French territories by peaceful negotiations. He had decided to make war on France. There would, therefore, be no reply to the French note.

Is it impossible for the President now to speak the truth in public about Mussolini?

BULLITT

LMS:NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

PARIS

Dated June 4, 1940

Rec'd 3:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1023, June 4, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Charveriat stated to me this morning that Maglione, Papal Secretary of State, had said to d'Ormesson, new French Ambassador to the Vatican, that the Pope had given up all hope of keeping Mussolini out of the war. The Pope had written a personal letter to Mussolini imploring him not to bring Italy into the war, but this had proved as unavailing as all his other efforts.

Francois Poncet was now inclined to believe that the Italians would not attack today or tomorrow but would attack the end of this week. There were fresh indications that the Italians and the Germans might be considering a joint attack on Switzerland.

BULLITT

NK
SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington.

19, July 5, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)
CONFIDENTIAL

I had long conversations with Petain, Laval, Chantems, Baudoin, General Requin and others yesterday. Petain was engaged in preparing a message to you stating the facts from the French point of view with regard to the British attack on the French fleet. Since there will be a delay of at least 12 to 24 hours on all my messages, as I am obliged to return to La Bourboule from Vichy to send them, I assume that you already have all the facts and Petain's message and will, therefore, omit them.

The reaction produced by the news of the British attack on the French fleet was, of course, violent in the extreme. Several members of the present cabinet advocated immediate acts of war against England. Baudoin stated to me that he had led the fight in the cabinet to prevent any act of war; but I learned later from three of his colleagues that he had advocated an act of war. Petain was resolutely opposed to anything more...
more than a break in diplomatic relations with England. Orders have been sent recalling the French Charge d'affaires in London.

The Germans and Italians were quick to try to take advantage of the violent wave of anti-British feeling. They lifted the armistice clauses with regard to the French fleet and French air force and also permitted the French to stop demobilization of that portion of the French army still remaining intact on the Italian frontier.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AS

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

(Paris)

La Bourboule

FROM

Dated July 5, 1940

Rec'd 6:50 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

19, July 5, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

Moreover, Petain informed me that the clause forbidding him and the Government to use the radio for broadcasts had been lifted.

(END GRAY) Baudoin in commenting to me said that he hoped I would not forget that henceforth there would be a chasm between France and Great Britain which it would be impossible to bridge. He added that France hoped to pursue good relations with the United States.

The British action strengthened greatly the hands of those who desire to establish as rapidly as possible a full and complete cooperation with Germany and Italy, and correspondingly weakened those who desire to continue a policy of cooperation with Great Britain and the United States. The latter indeed are in despair.

Petain recognizes that only a defeat of Hitler by some other power can restore independence to France.

He is, therefore, sincerely desirous of a British victory.
AS-2- #19, July 5, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO), from La Bourboule.

(Paris)

victory. Petain was inclined to minimize "breach" by

attributing it to Churchill's personal lack of balance.

Incidentally, Darlan was opposed to acts of war against

England on the ground that the French fleet could not now

fight except by receiving its supplies entirely from

German and Italian hands and he was unwilling to take

any such assistance.

BULLITT

TFV

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

(Paris)

La Bourboulle

Dated July 5, 1936

Re: 7 p.m. 7th

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Secretary of State

Washington

II. (SECTION THREE)

Pétain and Laval both said to me that the Chamber and Senate would meet on Monday next and give full powers to the Marshal to establish a new constitution. Incidentally, Pétain has left the nature of this National Assembly entirely to Laval and, if Laval should be unable to obtain a majority for the abolition of the present constitution, Pétain is apparently prepared to dissociate himself from Laval, force Laval's resignation and remain himself Leader of the French nation.

Pétain has told us that in view of the new concessions made to France yesterday by Germany and Italy, he again hoped that it might be possible for the French Government to return to Paris in the near future.

(END OF MESSAGE).

BULLITT
RDS
This telegram must be from closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

Casablanca
Dated July 8, 1940
Rec'd 8:30 p.m., 20th

Secretary of State,
Washington,

66, July 8, noon.

I have had several conversations with Monsieur Edouard Daladier. He does not consider that the Oran affair has changed the situation in any way; the great enemy of democracy everywhere is Germany, and he fervently hopes that we shall give all possible assistance to Great Britain. He is anxious that the President, the Secretary of State and Mr. Bullitt know exactly how he feels. He does not think that there will be war between France and Great Britain.
This telegram must be **FROM** closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH.
359, July 12, 2 p.m.
Following from Bullitt.

"**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY:**

The intense anger caused in France by the British attacks on the French Navy is so universal at Vichy, even among the Frenchmen who have been intensely pro-British, that little stands between French acts of war against British except the good sense of Marshal Petain. During the last week I have said to each member of the French Cabinet that in my opinion he must realize that only a British victory can restore the independence of France. In each case the member of Cabinet in question has agreed, but Baudoin is apparently anxious to bring France into war on the side of Germany and argues that as an ally of Germany, France could obtain much better terms than as a defeated enemy. Laval is not far from acceptance of this point of view."
MA-2- tel # 359, July 12 from Madrid.

view.

If the British should continue acts of aggression against France which should further arouse French opinion, I am not sure that Marshal Pétain would be able to hold back the tide".

WEDDELL

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From (Paris)

Vichy

Dated July 15, 1940

Rec'd 5:05 p.m., 17th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

77, July 15, 8 p.m.

A number of changes in the personnel of the Foreign Office reflect the shift of general policy from hostility to Germany toward conciliation and rapprochement. Brüdoin of course is outspokenly Anglophobe. Before the days of Bonnet's Ministry with which he worked unofficially he was opposed to war with Germany. He asserts that his ideas were sound because hard realities have proved that France could only suffer ignominious defeat at the hands of a vastly stronger adversary, in the absence of an adequate British military establishment.

Charles Roux, Secretary General, Rochat, Political Director, Pierre Bressiv, the new Chief of the European Division and Dr Seguin, Chief of the American Section, all have been either lukewarm toward or opposed to France's entry into war.

(End Section One)
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

77, July 16th. (SECTION TWO).

None will admit, however, that an active state of warfare with Great Britain is contemplated. Paradoxically Reynaud and Bonnet continue to exert a certain influence on Baudoin. There is no doubt that they hope for a termination of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany in the near future and pray that France will not be the battleground of a lengthy exhaustive campaign.

Pétain has now told Henri-Haye that the latter may choose either the post of Ambassador at Washington or a place in Pétain's entourage in charge of the reorganization of the political subdivisions of France. According to Henri-Haye it is planned for reasons of economy and efficiency to abolish the 90 departments of France and substitute therefor approximately 20 states. Henri-Haye also said that Pétain has decided that Chautemps who is actively campaigning
AS-2- #77, July 16th. (SECTION TWO), from Vichy (Paris). campaigning for the Washington Embassy will not receive the appointment, but that Chautemps might go as Ambassador to Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro.  

(END OF MESSAGE).

MURPHY

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated July 19, 1940
Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

107, July 19, 5 p.m.

FOR WAR DEPARTMENT FROM MILITARY ATTACHE.

Learned from reliable source today that Russian concentration on Russo-German frontier in Poland estimated 50-60 divisions. Reported movement of German units from northern France to eastern front to meet this threat.

MURPHY

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ATP
This telegram must be

From (PARIS)

Vichy

Dated August 4, 1940

Rec'd 1:30 p.m. 5th.

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH 255, August 4, 8 p.m.

Chauvel has just informed me that Saint-Quentin

has been instructed at 6 p.m. this evening to inform

you of a proposal in the nature of a Japanese ultimatum with

no time limit under which France would allow the passage

of Japanese armed forces in Tonkin and the use of Tonkin

naval and air bases on the ground that such accommodation

is imperative because of military necessity looking to

the early conclusion of the war in China. It appears

that this proposition was discussed recently between

the French governor of Indochina and Japanese military

officials. The attitude of the governor in the matter

displeased the French Government and as the Department

is aware he was replaced by Admiral Duqueux. Chauvel said

that the idea originated with the Japanese high command

at Canton and that General Ishihara has been conducting

conversations regarding it in Indochina. (END SECTION 1)

MURPHY

RPV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT (PARIS)
VICHY

This telegram must be

(closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM

Dated August 4, 1940
Rec'd 3:40 p.m., 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
255, August 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Chauvel said that it is evident that Konoye has no
control over the military and that Matsuoka has been
ignored in the present instance. The present proposal
made by note to Arsene Henry in Tokyo in the greatest
secrecy offers to France Japanese protection in the Far
East and full economic cooperation in that area.

There is no doubt that the offer arouses in the
French the greatest repugnance. Baudoin insisted that
Saint Quentin be advised immediately and instructed to ask
our Government what support could be given France if it
endeavored to resist with the military forces at its
disposal in Indo-China.

MURPHY

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From (Paris)
Vichy

Dated August 4, 1940
Rec'd 3:09 p.m., 5th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

255, August 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Baudoin suspects that the Japanese action is in concert with Germany. Therefore if France should attempt to resist the French Government may be faced with pressure from Wiesbaden which could be applied in any number of ways and which France obviously is unable to resist.

Chauvel said that he is convinced that the Japanese fleet which proceeded south some days ago has for its objectives both Singapore and Indochina but which was first in the program he did not know.

The conversations on this subject have occurred in Tokyo. Sawada has not participated in them. (END OF MESSAGE)