CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT
Franco-German collaboration, resumption of conversations between F. von Berrgen and Secretary Hullner on August 26th.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Des. #4
(Dagspacht, telegram, interview, letter, etc.)

Dated Sept. 16, 1940 From
To

File No. 63100/3103
Conversation with Gaston Bergery.

On the morning of August 28, rumors were current in Vichy that the German authorities had let it be known to Laval, who was then in Paris, that the Pétain Government must be changed within a week. Of the present ministers only Laval would remain, and Béat, Bergery, Doriot and others would be drafted to assist him. This was reported in the Embassy's telegram No. 447.

After some difficulty, I obtained an appointment for the afternoon with Gaston Bergery, a man of considerable personal charm and an American wife, with whom I have been on casually friendly terms for two months, and whom I know to be brilliant, ambitious and amoral. He was one of the small number of deputies who opposed the declaration of war in September, and he worked actively for capitulation in Bordeaux and for the abolition of the Third Republic in Vichy (see Embassy's dispatch of July 28, 1940). He has been openly and virulently critical of the Pétain Government (though not of the Marshal himself), and announcements of an early change in the direction of national revolution in which Bergery would play an important part have been circulated every few days from Bergery headquarters. His wife and his followers have constantly referred with awe to his weekly letter's to Pétain, but I have heard no references to any replies which the Marshal may have made. As one of the leaders and the avowed "idea man" of the Parti Unique (recently renamed) he has been variously reported as having been selected to make a study of totalitarian doctrine and practice in Berlin, Rome and Madrid or chosen as Governor of one of the seven administrative provinces which were to replace the 86 Departments.

But as he continued to be seen in Vichy, the report that he had been invited
to confer with the Germans in Paris caused no undue interest until the rumors mentioned in the opening paragraph began to circulate a few days after his return.

Bergery was working feverishly when I arrived at his hotel, and he greeted me with the haggard look of one of great responsibilities. I told him that my name was being used freely in that May's unusually interesting batch of rumors and asked him to tell me what he would about his trip. In his direct manner he agreed on condition that I not quote him locally and above all that I not use his name in a cabled cable, the only kind, he said, that the Germans bothered to read.

Bergery said that he was "invited" to meet on Abetz, that is, he received a message saying the Ambassador would receive him "not before Tuesday evening and not after Wednesday afternoon." A safe-conduct came with it: he was at some pains to tell me that he went as close to the Marshall, of whom he asked, and obtained, an order to proceed to Versailles for the purpose of conferring with the forces of occupation.

"I went to Paris," said Bergery, "to find out three things: first, the trends of German thought that would be reflected in the peace terms; second, the German plans for the immediate problems of France - food supply, prisoners and communications between occupied and unoccupied areas; third, the German views on French internal politics. On the first point I shall tell you what I said to them and what I deduced from their replies. The second point comprises too many technical questions for me to go into now, and is closely associated with, and dependent upon, the solution which is reached with respect to, the third, when I speak of this you will understand that I can use no names."

Bergery repeated to me, in concentrated form what he frankly termed his "prepared speech" to Abetz on continental cooperation. Continental
Europe had been torn for centuries by war between East and West, and between coalitions of powers, which gave the alternating conquerors (France and Germany) only a temporary advantage which they were unable to exploit for long and which resulted a few years later in an equally profitless reversal. This endless struggle weakened the continent to the profit of England, who had recently so far overstepped her previously cautious policy of provocation and intervention as to guarantee, "with the French army", the most exposed countries of Europe. The time was now ripe for a new order. In an amazingly short period of time, and with relatively little bloodshed, Germany had conquered, or drawn within her orbit, the greater part of the continent. So little blood had flowed, so few privations had as yet been experienced by the invaded countries, that Hitler was in a unique position to avoid the mistakes which had brought about the downfall of the great conquerors of history: the arrogance, incapacity and short-sighted greed of the victor, causing dissatisfaction and a desire for revenge in the vanquished which the latter were soon able to exploit as a result of the self-assurance and easy living which followed the enjoyment by the conqueror of his spoils.

Sorcery said he pointed out the danger to Germany, and to the future peace of the continent, of allowing a situation to develop where forty million satisfied Slavs to the east, and forty million angry Frenchmen to the west, dreamed of one day uniting to crush their former conqueror. Without mentioning Russia, a potential bastion of Pan-Slavic doctrines, Sorcery said he emphasized the opportunity this would give to an already hostile and increasingly militaristic America, which the progress of innovation was bringing daily nearer to European shores. He emphasized the point that a peaceful and prosperous Europe meant a friendly America.

Sorcery went on to say that he, for one, as an interlocutor knew, the aim—to spare his own country, and Europe as a whole, a repetition of
history, but that in order to accomplish this it was necessary that on the one hand a national revolutionary movement be started in France under the auspices of a government imbued with the doctrines of continental cooperation, and, on the other, that the rigors of occupation, particularly the question of prisoners and the lack of communication between the two areas, be relaxed.

Abetz' first reaction to this appeal was to inquire politely of Bergery whether he would mind if he were not granted a safe-conduct to return to Vichy. Bergery said he replied very politely that he was in Paris on the orders of the marshal and that nothing would displease him more than to be unable to return to make his report.

After this pause at arms on the relations of which Abetz, with obvious enjoyment, dwelt at length, as he had on the matter of his obtaining Rétain's permission to proceed to Paris, Abetz (and Bergery, who was present much of the time, I gathered) stated that there were several schools of thought in Germany as to the future of France. Naturally, until the English question was settled, no final decision on this matter would be taken by the French. The military apparently favored anything not involving to take out the entire industrial North, permanently crippling France as a modern nation and leaving the rest to its own devices. There was a tendency to weaken France by including the northeast in a Greater Flanders, and the recreating of something resembling the Empire of Charles V was also talked of, in certain circles, but the thought of a France as a state within her present frontiers minus possibly Alsace-Lorraine, flourishing and prosperous in a great European polity, was far from being without appeal to the great German masses, were it to remain the immediate entourage of the faure...
terms amounting to a peacé blanche that Germany was prepared to offer her. That England had no place in the Continental system Germany was aware, and she would be quite content to allow her to live peaceably within the orbit of her dominions. But it was becoming obvious that the madmen Churchill was unwilling to listen to reason and that England must be conquered.

Abetz andenheim also spoke of their incomprehension of the present hysterical emotion in the United States, based apparently on a ridiculous fear of a German invasion, which was being sedulously nourished by British agents. Germany would have her hands full in Europe for years to come and the sooner the United States realized the need for cooperation with a German-controlled Europe, the happier both continents would be.

As for the immediate problems of France, Jergens was given to understand that the Germans were becoming impatient. If France was to enjoy relative independence and prosperity under the new European order, there must be an approximation of thought between her leaders and those of Germany. There had been much talk about a France Nouvelle, but it was obvious to anyone that the men composing the Vichy Government, all old-line politicians, were incapable of thinking out, much less leading, the National Revolution which would bring France within the ideological framework of the New Europe. Since nothing was being done about this in Vichy, the Germans were tempted to encourage a political movement under their aegis in occupied France which, if successful, might spread by its own momentum and cause a corresponding extension of German occupation.

Jergens stated that he warned Abetz and Achenbach against starting some such a movement, which would inevitably be led by German agents among former French Communists and would inspire nothing but suspicion in the French people. Jergens said he was made to feel that this was the alternative unless something serious was done to the Jewish problem:

Jergens related, under my questioning, that it was an ultimatum, or that it was the occasion of soubriquet, that always brings...
of German guarantee that an early return to Paris would result from
the formation of a Government such as he had outlined and of which they
had agreed to approve. Nor did they threaten direct action if no move in the
direction took place. Bargery felt quite confident, however, of persuad-
ing the Marshal of the absolute necessity of a drastic change among his
advisers. He implied that it would take place very soon.

It was obvious, in spite of Bargery's parenthetical remarks to the
effect that Achet and Achenbach did not speak for Hitler, that he took
great stock in what they told him and that he felt he had made a profound
impression which would be immediately reported to, and much discussed in,
Berlin. He almost angrily ridiculed my suggestion that Laval might bring
back from Paris some clarification or at least some recent bulletin on
the trend among the Germans there as a result of Bargery's trip. "Laval",
he said, "merely is discussing the modalities of minor points with
Openachitz." It was apparent that there was no place not for Laval as
Bargery's Franco-German banquet of brotherly love.

I came away from this conversation, which was marked by great
sharpness on Bargery's part, with a thrill by the chasm which separated
the majority of my French friends (and acquaintances, official and
unofficial) from the few who would be the leaders of the new France.

Woodruff Wallner,
Third Secretary of Embassy.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
GRAY
(Paris)
Vichy

Dated September 23, 1940
Rec'd 9:30 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State
Washington

618, September 23, 11 p.m.

At a press conference this evening originally scheduled for the issuance of a communiqué on the Far East (my 611 of today) Baudouin announced that a British squadron had arrived at Dakar, ordered the Commissaire to surrender and upon his refusal opened fire at 4:15. Fighting he said was still going on. (There seems some doubt whether the six French warships which proceeded to Dakar from Toulon are actually there at this time or not). American correspondents present tell me that Baudouin was visibly extremely agitated and embittered. He said, however, that the incident would not mean war against the British - that the attack is not a casus belli but the French would return blow for blow. He likewise described it as an "ignoble act" with "less excuse than Mers-el-Kebir".

Whether
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

- 2 - "613, September 23, 11 ... from Paris"

Whether de Gaulle is actually on board one of the British ships along with French troops which is rumored here is not definitely known.

The Foreign Office tells me no further information has yet...

MATTHEWS

TFW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 JT
 This telegram must be __________ (PARIS)
 closely paraphrased before being communicated
 to anyone. (br) FROM
 VIChY Dated September 28, 1940
 Rec'd 10:56 a.m., 29th
 Secretary of State; OCT 17 1940
 Washington.
 655; September 28, 3 p.m.
 Charles Roux, whom I saw this morning tells me
 that certain aspects of the aftermath of Dakar are not
 unsatisfactory to the French Government; he hoped that
 the incident had proved both French determination and
 French ability to defend the Empire; he hoped it had
 shown the British "the stupidity" of supporting
 deGaulle both personally and the movement in general
 and that a less caustic attitude toward the French Govern-
 ment might ensue. With respect to this last, however,
 he had little hope. The last three months he had devoted
 most of his energy to trying to bring about an improve-
 ment in relations between the former allies and to
 denying mendacious reports circulated by the B.B.C.
 Within the past two days even he had noticed the British
 radio continues to ridicule the Vichy Government and to
 speak of Marshal Petain in a derogatory vein.

 (END SECTION ONE)

 MATTHEWS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON

655, September 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He fails to see what the British hope to gain from this "stupid policy": The French government is compelled by the Germans he said to do many things it would of course prefer not to do; but he failed to see what the British gained by their constant attacks on it. As an example he showed me a telegram which he had just sent to the French Minister at Budapest quoting a message from Beirut. It was evident therefore that the Turkish Legation at Budapest had inquired as to rumors that quantities of war materials of all sorts were being turned over to an Italian mission in Syria as charged by British propaganda. The message from Beirut constituted a categorical denial.

ATHENS.

[No date or time]
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

D. (Paris)
Vichy

FROM
Dated September 28, 1940
Rec'd. 11:00 a.m., 29th

Secretary of State,
Washington

295, September 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He then showed me a batch of telegrams transmitted on the Dakar incident including several to French Ministers at Ottawa, Pretoria and Dublin informing them of the French point of view. They all denied the presence of any Germans at Dakar and one stated that the Germans "had only expressed interest in the export trade of the colonies".

One to Madrid made reference to British assurances that their only interest in the French colonies "was to see to their economic protection and the safety of their coasts". There was likewise reference to specific British guarantees that no effort would be made to stir up trouble in Morocco.

Pointing out that the De Gaulle expedition must have required at least a fortnight's preparation this telegram to Madrid charged that at the same time these informal "negotiations" (which Charles Roux said
26th, September 26, 3 p.m., Paris (Para) Vichy.

said took place between the British and French

Civil Attachés in Madrid) were going on the de

while expeditionary force was being organised.

ATHENS.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(PARIS)
FROM

VICHY

Dated September 28, 1940
Rec'd 11:07 a.m., 29th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

655, September 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Charles Roux expressed the view that while "the reasonable elements in Great Britain represented by Lord Halifax and even to a certain extent by the War Office" were endeavoring to bring about an improvement in Franco-British relations, "the Admiralty and Churchill, influenced by deGaulle" would secretly take the contrary line. (He did not mention that somewhat similar disparity of views (*) between the Anglophobe French Navy and certain French Ministers on the one hand and the permanent French Foreign Office officials on the other). He denied that any similar informal negotiations took place through Dublin though he said the French endeavored to keep the Dublin Legation fully informed of developments.

He also showed me a telegram from Henry Hayes quoting American press comment on the "Dakar fiasco" and "the blow it represented to British prestige as well as to the material damage to the British fleet".

MATTHEWS

WWC

(*) Apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PARIS

VICHY

FROM Dated September 28, 1940
Rec'd 11:20 a.m., 29th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

655, September 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

A telegram from the French Legation in Belgrade which Charles Roux let me look at indicated that plans are in an advanced stage for a partition of Yugoslavia though the Minister estimates the partition imminent. They would provide that Croatia and Slovenia go to Germany; Dalmatia to Italy; and Hungary would receive territory down to Zemun. It spoke of a possible amalgamation of Bulgaria and the remainder of Yugoslavia. Charles Roux did not seem to feel that this would come about imme-
diately and stated that the Germans were doing all poss-
sible to prevent the outbreak of war in the Balkans;
that they had acted as a restraining influence on the Italians who were eager to increase their pressure on Greece.

It is difficult to evaluate in this isolated spot the importance of any or all of the foregoing or to know with how much of it the Department is already familiar.
No. 655, September 28, 3 p.m. (SEC FIVE) from Vichy

I pass these reports along for what they may be worth to you in view of the source and in the hope that they may fit somehow into your general picture.

(END MESSAGE)

MATTHEWS

WWC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

[Signature]

Dated October 5, 1940
Rec'd 10:45 a.m., 6th

Secretary of State
Washington

636; October 5, 7 p.m.
My telegrams Nos. 592, September 18, 10 p.m.
and 658, September 29, 11 a.m.

In a press interview which Foreign Minister
Baudouin gave out last evening in which he briefly
attacked "the traitor" de Gaulle and the British
Government over the Dakar incident and spoke of the
difficulties of the French Government in rebuilding
France, he made the following statement with respect
to the Far East:

"We have had serious worries as regards Indo-
china. I do not wish to recall them now that our
agreement with Japan has come into force. It is
being applied by both parties in the friendly spirit
which governed the negotiations which took place in
Tokyo between our Ambassador and Mr. Matsuoka, the
Japanese Foreign Minister.

Japan is a great nation. Its preponderant position
696, October 5, 7 p.m. from Paris

in the Far East cannot be denied by any realistic statesman but this position imposes duties which I am sure its government will fulfill with honor.

The concessions which we agreed to will not impair the independence of our beautiful colony but open, I am convinced, an era of loyal collaboration between the Japanese and French people."

MATTHEWS

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM
(PARIS)
VICHY

Dated October 16, 1940
11 a.m. Oct. 17.

Secretary of State
Washington

760, October 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I talked with Pierre Fressy this afternoon. He has just returned from ten days in Paris and I note a change in his attitude: he no longer appears to believe in an early German victory over England and states that the Germans in Paris are obviously far from happy over the prospect of a long war; the feeling of the French population in Paris is becoming increasingly hostile to the occupation forces and he found no fraternizing between victor and vanquished. (Similar reports reach me from a number of other reliable sources). There have been he said (also confirmed from other sources) even a few riots at the markets over the food situation and German requisitions.

MATTHEWS

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

(Paris) Vichy

FROM
Dated October 16, 1940
Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

760, October 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION T/O)

As a result of this the German attitude toward the French population in occupied territory will become increasingly severe, he believes. The prestige in occupied France, he said, of the Vichy Government is certainly at a very low ebb; on the other hand the population tends to blame the Germans now for all their misfortunes - a change from their earlier attitude.

As to Wiesbaden, he said, there is unfortunately little personal contact with the Germans and little opportunity to accomplish much. He confirmed the fact (see my telegram number 722, October 9, 4 p.m.) that discussions are in progress looking toward the extension of German control over ports and frontiers of unoccupied France with a governmental return to Paris and relaxation of the demarcation line as quid pro quo.

CSB

MATTHEWS
EN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From
(Paris)
Vichy

Dated October 16, 1940
Rec'd 12:46 p.m., 17th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

760, October 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Unfortunately he said when one examines what the Germans mean by "relaxation" of the present severe barriers to inter-zone communications it is found that they are offering very little. He does not believe that the Germans wish to take over and administer the whole of France given the complexity of the problem with a hostile population but he does admit the likelihood of an early extension (either by agreement with the French or otherwise) of this control at the frontiers. As to the Government's return to Paris he feels that if this is accomplished it will mean almost a complete severance of free communication with the outside world and whether the gain in preventing the continued division of the country both morally and materially is worth it he is not sure.

RR

MATTHEWS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From (Paris)
Vichy

Dated October 16, 1940
Rec'd 10:38 a.m., 17th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

760, October 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Whether the Germans have yet abandoned their idea of attempting an invasion of England this fall, he does not know. He does believe in extended operations in the Mediterranean area this winter. The attitude in Spain he feels is better than when I last talked with him (my telegram 663, September 23, 6 p.m.), and he seems less inclined to fear Spanish intervention in the war. He is still impressed however by the severe punishment which the British are taking and the fear that sooner or later England will be forced to her knees unless much greater help is forthcoming from us. (While many in France do not share his pessimism, I do receive inquiries every day as to the nature and extent of our help. "When are you coming in?" Is the eager and pathetic question on everyone's lips these days.)

MATTHEWS
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

760, OCTOBER 16, 9 P.M.

(SECTION FIVE)

The Italians at the present time are being quite difficult, particularly with regard to the French fleet. "They wish, of course," he said, "that when the war ends there will be the only fleet in the Mediterranean" and declined to permit repairs on the French ships damaged at Oran, hoping they would remain as useless hulks. It required, he said, German "orders" to override this Italian insistence, the Germans being much more amenable with respect to the French fleet and French colonies than the Mediterranean partner of the Axis. In fact I hear from other sources that given the strong Anglaphobe sentiments of Darlan and high French naval circles, the Germans are actively encouraging the French to build up their fleet. (Under Governor Ruff of the Bank of France told me yesterday that at Wiesbaden when the Italians make difficulty...
MHO
- 2 - 760, October 16, 9 p.m. from (Paris) Vichy.
(SECTION FIVE)

over a point which the Germans are willing to concede they say openly and without pretense: "very well we will order the Italians to do so and so for you.")

(END SECTION FIVE)

MATTHEWS

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM (PARIS) VICAR

Dated October 16, 1940
Read 9:10 a.m. Oct. 17.

Secretary of State
Washington

780, October 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

In Syria he said there is an Italian mission which is attempting both to supervise French disarmament in that area and to stir up trouble with the natives. "The Italians," he said "have silly illusions that if they drive us out of Syria they can take it over themselves. It won't be they, it will be the Turks." (The foregoing may be of interest in connection with the Department's telegram 589 October 11, 8 p.m. and my telegram 747 October 14, 9 p.m.) He finds however that the natives in Syria and in the rest of North Africa have shown an almost unexpected loyalty to France. Unrest or uprising which seemed possible after the collapse of June he said have failed to materialize. Anti-Italian feeling in Tunis is particularly strong. The fact that France still "has her colonial empire and a portion of her fleet is something to build on for the future".

(END OF MESSAGE)

MATTHEWS

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM
PARIS
VICHY

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 8:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

803, October 23, noon (SECTION ONE)

Chauvel showed me this morning a telegram from the French Ambassador at Tokyo which contained reported Japanese proposals to be made to Russia by Tatsukawa, the new Japanese Ambassador at Moscow. The proposals for a Russo-Japanese agreement contained five points: (one) the Soviets would recognize Manchukuo; (two) Japan would recognize outer Mongolia as Russian and open a legation at Ularbator; (three) Japan would recognize Russia's position at Sinkiang; (four) both countries would materially reduce their military effective in the frontier region; (five) both countries would agree to "neutralize" the Amur River and the Chinese Eastern Railway. Henry said that while the first four points seemed plausible he was less confident with respect to the fifth.

MATTHEWS

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

PARIS

FROM
VICHY

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 9:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

803, October 23, noon (SECTION TWO)

Chauvel expressed the opinion that the Japanese might in fact be willing to make the foregoing proposals but if so he felt that they also require some agreement on the part of Russia for cessation of material aid to Chiang Kai Shek. This last he feels the Russians will not be willing to grant as they "have no desire to see a million and a half Japanese soldiers released from war in China". The Russians have too much interest, he said, in the continuation of the Sino-Japanese conflict—as distinct from Chinese victory. He believes on the other hand that the Russians might well be prepared to reach an agreement on the foregoing points as "they will make every effort to avoid being drawn into war anywhere until they are better prepared."

Chauvel said there was nothing new in the Indo-Chinese situation nor have they received recent news from Hanoi.

(End of Message)

MATTHEWS

Emb
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 8:03 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
805, October 23, 2 p.m.

The British broadcasts concerning yesterday's meeting of Laval with Hitler and Ribbentrop and the proposals for a more active role by France against Great Britain have of course stirred up a great deal of excitement here. The Foreign Office (with the probable exception of Baudouin) continues as I have reported in the past to be largely in ignorance of Laval's negotiations. My visitor from the Foreign Office this morning (see my 803, October 23, noon and 804, October 23, 1 p.m.) who came ostensibly to talk of the matters reported therein stated that in his opinion Churchill must have had previous information with regard to Laval's negotiations and made his radio appeal to the French nation in view thereof.

He whispered briefly: "If you want to stop this I can only urge a direct appeal from your President to the Marshal."

NPL

MATTHEWS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(DATED OCTOBER 23, 1940)

Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

FROM
(VICHY)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

RUSH
805, October 23, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

(Laval is being openly attacked now in L'ACTION FRANCAISE, one of the Marshal's enthusiastic supporters. Last Saturday Frossard's L'EFFORT published an article by Deat reprinted from the Paris L'OEUVRE designed to prove that legally Laval was the repository of the powers of the National Assembly of last July; that consequently he could not be ousted from the government. L'ACTION FRANCAISE endeavored effectively to demolish these legal arguments and to uphold the thesis that Laval could be fired just as easily as any other member of the Marshal's government. While Laval's censors ventilated this editorial with large open spaces, the meaning was quite clear.

(END SECTION TWO)

MATTHEWS

JRL: MPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

805, October 23, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
The opposition to him is gaining and the possibility of active warfare against the British advocated by him will certainly not strengthen his position. Personal relations between the Marshal and Laval are far from good and the better elements in Vichy seem hopeful that the latter may yet be forced out. In such case, so go the rumors, a puppet government might be set up at Versailles or Paris including Laval, Deat, Doriot, and Flandin.)

The most that can be said at the present moment is that the situation in France is fluid.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MATTHEWS

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

J T
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(VICHY)

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 8:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

808, October 23, 5 p.m.

My telegram No. 791, October 21, 6 p.m.

While Laval knew that he was to see higher German officials on his return north, presumably Ribbentrop, he either did not know or did not tell Marshal Petain that he was to be called to see Hitler. Up until 11 p.m. last night the French Government knew of his meeting with the Fuhrer only through the radio. He telephoned the Marshal shortly thereafter to report on his talks.

I understand that he did in fact discuss: (a) German control of ports and naval bases in metropolitan France and North Africa (Please see my telegram No. 722, October 9, 4 p.m.);

(END SECTION ONE)

MATTHEWS

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

From (PARIS) VICHY
Dated October 23, 1940
Received 11:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
808, October 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

(B) utilization of the French fleet (my telegram No. 761, October 17, 4 p.m. and 709, October 22, 5 p.m.) and French air force in action against Great Britain. There were no "diplomatic negotiations" before this meeting.

Upon receipt of this telephone call Marshal Petain summoned General Huntzig and telephoned Baudouin. General Huntzig told the Marshal that in case of "war" between France and Great Britain "he could not be responsible for the attitude either of himself or of the French army". Baudouin who, as the Department is aware, (for instance my telegram No. 801, October 22, 9 p.m.) favors Franco-German collaboration expressed strong opposition to utilization of the French fleet or air force against the British.

MATTHEWS

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM VICHY

Dated October 23, 1940

Secrecy of State,

Washington.

RUSH

808, October 23, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The bait held out to Laval is, apparently, that if an understanding is definitely reached on the above German territorial claims will be limited to Alsace-Lorraine plus Tunis and Corsica for the Italians. The Marshal declined to agree and instructed Laval to communicate that fact to Hitler. Laval's conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop were to continue this morning and he is expected back here this evening.

It is superfluous to add that a great deal hangs in the balance.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MATTHEWS

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM VICHY

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 9:15 a.m., 24th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

809, October 23, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
SECT 1

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 808, October 23, 5 p.m.

I called on Rochat this afternoon and before I could even ask what news he had of Laval's "negotiations" with Hitler on the return of the Government to Paris he said in obvious excitement and sincerity: "Neither I nor the Foreign Office know anything about Laval's talks what they involved or what will be decided. I do not even know when he is coming back." (I told him that while Laval had been somewhat delayed by a motor accident he had now reached Vichy). If any proof were needed of the ignorance in which the Foreign Office (*)--suspect as it is with the present rulers of France--this announcement of Laval's secret dealings would seem to furnish it.

MATTHEWS

KLP
(*) Apparent omission.
AS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(Paris)

Vichy

Dated October 23, 1940

Rec'd 7:18 a.m., 24th

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

809, October 23, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

It is quite impossible to indicate at this time the outcome of the present crisis—the Cabinet is now sitting to hear of Laval's talks but the possibility of internal trouble, if some of the reported German demands are accepted should not be overlooked. I have, of course, requested our Military and Naval Attaches to discuss today's news with their respective Ministries. They have found both the War and Navy Ministries completely ignorant of developments both have denied several times in the past any possibility of warfare against the British except in "self-defense" as at Mers el Kebir and Dakar, but officers in both have volunteered the opinion implied in General Huntziger's statement to the Marshal "my 306, October 23, 5 p.m." that a move in that direction would meet with serious opposition both in the armed forces and among the public.

(End Section Two).
AS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated
Rec'd 3:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

809, October 23, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

On the negotiations for the return of Paris which apparently were the basis for Laval's broader talks, Rochat confirmed that the Germans are offering practically nothing and are setting out conditions which are "quite unacceptable." In addition to the embarrassment of the position of the Diplomatic corps, apparently communications facilities offered by the occupying forces are extremely meager. Rochat himself stands for non-acceptance.

(END OF MESSAGE).

MATTHEWS

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(Faris)
Vichy
Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 7:15 a.m., 24th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Blé, October 23, 8 p.m.

Hitler has apparently dressed his proposals for agreement with France in a sufficiently attractive garb to make it satisfactory not only to those who believe in an early and complete German victory and hence seek a favored place for France (and themselves) in the new German Europe, but also to the Marshal and others who have lately begun to wonder whether such collaboration was not a street. I understand that at this afternoon's Cabinet meeting the outlines one way of a "modus vivendi" between Germany and the Vichy Government were in principle but not definitely agreed to. This "modus vivendi" provides for "a spirit of amicable collaboration" on the part of both Governments "to reach as soon as possible a concrete realization of France's future status". (END OF SECTION ONE)

MATTHEWS

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM (Paris)
Vichy

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 9:17 a.m., 24th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

810, October 23, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Apparent that the utilization of the French fleet against Great Britain, in view of the obvious inacceptability of an open agreement to that end, has been somewhat concealed. The fleet is to be employed, I understand, ostensibly under the pretext of ensuring free communications between Metropolitan France and North Africa. The explanation advanced is that the French fleet will assume the same role in patrolling portions of the Mediterranean that we are "in patrolling the Atlantic for the British". The control of French ports both in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, is apparently to be given the Germans, gradually perhaps, once the modus vivendi enters into effect.

MATTHEWS

C38
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from Vichy (br)

Date: October 23, 1940
Rec'd 7:20 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

810, October 23, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

As indicated in my telegram 808, October 23, 5 p.m. the territorial demands are relatively mild after what France had been led to expect. Alsace-Lorraine and possibly the coal mine region of Calais go to Germany and Djibouti and Tunis to Italy (about Corsica I am not sure). Nothing is said as to Soudan and Nior and Italian appetites are to be satisfied from British Colonial territory in Africa. The Italians are likewise, I am told, to be given a number of French mine sweepers which they urgently need and drydock facilities. This modus vivendi has been decorated as part of the large political and economic plan for the integration of Europe in which France according to the German story will play a prominent role.

(END SECTION THREE).

MATTHEWS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC

From (Paris)

This telegram must be closely censored before being communicated to anyone. (Sr)

Vichy

Date: October 23, 1940

Read 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

310, October 23, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

This proposal envisages an early return of the French Government to Paris and an elimination (as frontier control grows) of the present strangling division of the country by the present line of demarcation (some say the latter is to be moved up to the 32 nd) and likewise an early return of French prisoners of war. Certainly these will be the most popular features of the agreement in the eyes of the French public.

Laval who came down today accompanied by Achel of the German Embassy at Paris had planned to, but did not return tonight to work out details and it is understood that the Marshal himself may visit Paris and have an interview with Hitler in the next few days. It is believed here that some such scheme as the present was agreed to at the recent Brenner meeting.

MATTHEWS

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

AC  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)  

(Paris)  
Vichy  
Dated October 23, 1940  
Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

819, October 23, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

It would seem at first glance from the foregoing that what little birthright of independence was left to the Vichy Government may be sold for a mess of Paris pottage — presumably under threats of worse conditions. Just how unpopular the agreement will be either with the public or with the armed forces will, I think, depend upon the degree of palatability with which it is served. Strong as the feeling has grown, particularly in occupied France, against the country's German masters, I question whether the country has yet recovered sufficient of the spirit that made France a great nation to offer any real resistance.

MATTHEWS

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From (Paris)
Vichy

Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 3:10 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

810, October 23, 8 p.m. (SECTION SIX).
The marshal's personal prestige (as distinct from that of his Government) and faith in his integrity are still high. Just as the armistice was accepted because of his name this modus vivendi may likewise be. It is, I am told, to replace the armistice agreement: the promise contained therein (Article VIII) that the French fleet should not be used against France's recent British ally therefore disappears from the picture.

(END OF MESSAGE).

MATTHEWS

EMB
AS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM (Paris)
Vichy

Dated October 24, 1940
Recl'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

S13. October 24, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE).
My telegram S10, October 23, 8 p.m.

Marshal Pétain, Laval and Achenbach left around
7 this morning presumably to meet Hitler and Ribbentrop
at some unknown point (this follows a trip by Laval to
Moulins last night from which point he telephoned Paris).
There is still much confusion as to the exact terms of
the "modus vivendi" under consideration and the attitude
of various personalities with respect thereto.

MATTHEWS

KLP
AS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

From

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated October 24, 1940

Rcd'd 9:43 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
813, October 24, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO).
The principal stumbling block for the Marshal is,
of course, the question of the utilization of the
French fleet and air force in operations against the
British and the extent of German control at French
frontiers, naval bases and ports both in the Medi-
terranean and Africa—precisely the points I presume in
which Hitler is most interested. I do not believe
that Dakar has been excluded from the conversation.

It appears that if agreement is reached German
occupation of both the Atlantic and Mediterranean
coasts—other than ports and bases—as well as in the
interior of France would, the Germans indicate, be
"extremely light".

(END MESSAGE).

KLP

MATTHEWS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

[REDacted]

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM (PARIS) VICHY

Dated October 25, 1940

Dec'd 11:29 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

922, October 25, 6 p.m.

I have just seen the Marshal return at 7:40 this evening.

The entire Foreign Office and others, who are afraid of what "peace"—as it is now called—with Germany at this time and under these circumstances may really hold in store, have been anxiously awaiting all day the rumored message from the President to the Marshal or some other word of our position. Jules Henry with tears in his eyes at the prospect of serious trouble between France and the United States told me this evening that he thought some definite word from Washington of our views on the present situation might even determine the outcome; the next hours are critical. He said that Henri Hayes's cable merely reported that he had been told that if press reports of the Laval negotiations were anywhere near accurate "the United States would be forced to take drastic measures". (END SECTION ONE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM (PARIS) VICHY

Dated October 25, 1940
Rec'd 11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
822, October 25, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He urged, on the basis of his long friendship with us, that we send something more precise.

It would facilitate my task at this critical juncture if the Department, in case no message is to be or has been sent, could at least cable me the substance of what was told to Henri Hayes.

(I am not sure that he always telegraphs either fully or accurately or with proper emphasis concerning his conversations with the Department.) (END OF MESSAGE

MATTHEWS

VK
RDS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM
(VICHY)

Dated December 9, 1940

Rec'd 4:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m.

Laval, who is leaving this evening for Paris, received me today and discussed for over an hour several phases of the situation which are of special interest. He commenced by a reference to American sentiment regarding France which he hopes is improving. Laval said with some feeling that he believed that the efforts of a number of discredited French emigres now in the United States, plus the antagonism of certain American and foreign Jews, are doing much to obscure the verities of the French situation and to endanger the friendship which he hopes will continue between our two countries.

(END SECTION ONE)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

From (Paris)

Vichy

Dated December 9, 1940

Rec'd 8:07 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION TIO)

He expressed no bitterness except for a passing reference to the bluntness of the Secretary's November conversation with Henry Hayes saying that time alone will demonstrate the facts in the European situation and the merits of Laval's policy. He hoped that the Secretary would understand from the reply he personally drafted that he is motivated by no desire to play Germany's game but merely to protect French interests and to retain intact France's Colonial Empire. Malicious stories to the effect that he is eager to do the German bidding; that he even goes farther in subservient compliance than the Germans demand are the mouthings of the ignorant and uninformed. He is French he said and the best interests of his own people are his only goal.

Murphy

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

(Paris)

(PARIS)

(VICHY)

Dated December 9, 1940

Emb 3:50 p.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

At this point I referred to the statement made by the Secretary that he felt frequently that Laval had failed to keep our government advised of his policies and his negotiations especially those relating to matters of direct mutual concern such as Indo-China. He said he regretted if we believed there was any desire on his part to conceal from us matters which would be of mutual interest. Often the rapidity of events and the pressure under which he worked caused him to overlook and neglect many important items. He was resolved that there should be a better understanding on our part of his acts and intentions; that later in the discussion he would give me proof of his sincerity in this regard. I said he had been quoted as saying "Je m'en fous de l'opinion Americaine". He replied that it is always easy to pick a phrase out of a conversation and twist it's meaning.

ÉMB

MURPHY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Sr.)

FROM
VICHY

Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 4:35 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1099, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)
I could hardly consider him so unintelligent as to belittle the importance of the United States. His reference in that connection was simply to his conviction that whether the American people liked or did not like it the German success is a hard fact and not a theory. The French Government has to deal unfortunately with the facts, and in that respect if American public opinion was critical, it simply could not be helped.

Laval asked what the prevailing sentiment is on the part of the Administration and the American public concerning "that war between England and Germany".

MURPHY
RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Sr.)

(PARIS)
VICHY

Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 4:30 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)
I replied that there is no change—that the belief in a victory was growing and that we were committed to give all possible aid to Great Britain short of entry into the war. We believed our best interests and those of humanity would be served by a victory.

Laval said that he had thought we believed in a victory "less and less" and that he personally believed in a German victory "more and more". One of his principal reasons he said in indulging in such a hope is that in such case Britain will pay the bill and not France.

MURPHY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From
HSM (Paris)
Vichy

Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 9:20 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

Laval added that in his conversation with Hitler the subject of the eventual conditions of peace had never been discussed, even in the most preliminary fashion, but that he is convinced that Hitler is far too astute to wish the ruin of France. He said that while it is obvious that Germany has no intention of relinquishing Alsace-Lorraine, Germany, he is convinced, had no intention to destroy the French colonial empire.

Laval went on to deplore what he believes is a lack of understanding in the United States that an economic and political revolution is under way in Europe; that it was bound to happen and would continue whether Hitler and associated personalities ever existed or whether they disappear.

MURPHY

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

European order would have fallen in any event he said and the sooner the United States understands that fact the quicker some of the problems will be solved. Their solution will only be delayed, he believes, if through American aid the war is prolonged and Europe reduced to a shambles. What good, he said, will Europe be to itself or to the United States, whose best customer it has been, if it is nothing but a cemetery?

Laval inquired about our interest in the French fleet and asked why we could not believe that it would be preserved to retain the French Empire intact, and would never fall into German hands.

MURPHY

TFV
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

From (PARIS)

VICHY

Dated December 9, 1940

Rec'd 4:25 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

I replied that we entertained no doubts of the good intentions of his Government to prevent the fleet falling into German hands but it was a question whether in view of all the circumstances France could in an eventuality execute its intentions. Laval said we could feel secure in our minds that the only use which would be made of the French fleet would be the protection of France's empire that it would be used to repel any aggressive action just as it would any stupid British or De Gaulle attempt to seize and occupy French territory.

At this point I mentioned to Laval the interest which so many elements in the United States attach to the North African situation, Martinique and to Indo-China.

MURPHY

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM
(VICHY)

PARIS)

Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 5:05 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION NINE)

Laval replied that that brought him to something of importance which he wished to convey to the Secretary. Japan, he said, has offered its arbitration to settle the present difficulties between Thailand and Indo-China. Laval said Arsené Henry would inform the Tokyo Government in forty-eight hours that France prefers to settle the difference directly with Thailand or if necessary resort to the good offices of the United States. Laval would also request Henry-Haye to inform the Secretary fully in this connection.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM (Paris) VICHY

DATED December 9, 1940

RECEIVED 5:03 P.M., 10TH

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. — (SECTION TEN)

Laval said that he wishes by this action to make plain to the Secretary that he is fully conscious that the power of the United States is the bulwark protecting Indochina against Japanese aggression. At the same time he said that he thought our Government should support the French demand that colonial troops be allowed to proceed to Indochina from Djibouti, this demand having been rejected by Britain without any intelligent reason. Laval added that he hoped that aviation equipment could be sent from the United States to Indochina to strengthen the French position. I asked at this point whether he had ever seriously considered sending the modern planes of American manufacture now in Martinique to Indochina as would be the French right under the armistice convention.

MURPHY

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closed or paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM (PARIS)

VICRY

DATED December 9, 1940

RECD 6 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION ELEVEN)

(I emphasized that this was only a personal inquiry as I had no instructions from my government to raise the question.)

Laval said that he was glad I had mentioned the matter—he would like to see it done and would bring up the question again after a discussion with his colleagues. Personally he saw no objection and did not believe the Germans would oppose. He said he found amusing many of the American press reports on the subject of Martinique. In fact he said some of the criticism of France, as unjust as it might be, appearing in the American press occasionally pleased the Germans and made it easier for Laval to obtain concessions from them.

MURPHY

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  (br)

FROM
(Paris)
Vichy

Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 5 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWELVE).

Laval emphasized his recognition of our interest in Martinique and his desire in every way to please our Government in that regard.

The conversation then swung to North Africa with a question from Laval regarding the reported visit, said to be under contemplation, by Colonel Donovan to North Africa. I replied that I was without information except for a radio report on the subject but that Colonel Donovan is a well known private American citizen whose judgment is respected in the United States.

Laval said we would find no German interference in French African affairs—the Germans had been absolutely correct and circumspect regarding French African interests, much more so than the British.

MURPHY

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

HSM (Paris)
Vichy
Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 4:33 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION THIRTEEN)
There are no Germans at Dakar, he said, and only one civilian observer near Casablanca. The Italians, he is confident, are also withdrawing completely. Laval is certain that France with some minor exceptions (I inquired about Spanish demands but he brushed the question aside saying he would revert to it some other time and it was nothing to worry about) will retain her African interests practically intact. He said with a bland smile: "My friendly efforts with the Germans are bearing some fruit".

MURPHY

DLM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

HSM (Paris)
Vichy

Dated December 9, 1940
Rec'd 7:50 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1109, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOURTEEN)
I seized the opportunity to mention that an inspection of our consular establishments in North Africa was long overdue and was desired by my Government. I would probably make it shortly and this would give me an opportunity to see the actual conditions. Laval ended the conversation by saying with a grimace that the French and American policies seemed to differ only in respect to the "small question" of a British victory, but that for him American friendship, in any event, would always be a cornerstone in France's foreign policy. (END OF MESSAGE)

MURPHY

DDM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (or)

Vichy

Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd 3:48 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

174, February 8, noon (SECTION ONE)

Chauvel read us yesterday several telegrams on the Far East. One from Tokyo dated February 6 reported that the so-called "southern party" (apparently the elements in Japan favoring a move toward the south rather than against Russia) was rapidly gaining the ascendancy.

Arsene Henry is convinced that the Germans have now reached some secret agreement with the Japanese in which the latter in return for some unknown territorial promises from Germany--perhaps Indochina, perhaps the Dutch East Indies--are preparing some move toward the south to coincide with Germany's early attack against England.

LEAHY

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR*
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From
(Paris) Vichy
Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd 4:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

174, February 8, noon. (SECTION TWO).

The Japanese, he reported, have definite information that the British will do nothing if the Japanese move in the direction of Cochin-China or Cam-Romh Boy, but will merely prepare their defences against a further Japanese advance southwards. Henry suspected that this information, as well as the previous Japanese reports that British offers of mediation in the Thailand-Indochina dispute were derived through the breaking of British codes. The Japanese, he reported, are also convinced that we will make no move unless Singapore or the Dutch East Indies are directly threatened. On the other hand the Japanese press is now refraining from any adverse criticism of Russia or Russian policy.

LEAHY

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM (Paris) Vichy

Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd 3:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

174, February 8, noon. (SECTION THREE)

From Bangkok Chauvel had a telegram indicating anxiety lest the Japanese as the price of their "mediation" would demand naval bases in Thailand—anxiety which the French Charge d'Affaires stated was shared by the American and British Ministers. A further telegram from Bangkok via Hanoi indicated an increase in the number of Japanese officers in the southern provinces of Thailand and a general strengthening of Thai forces in that area. There had likewise been a minor border incident on the Malay frontier.

LEAHY

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From (Paris)

Vichy

Dated February 8, 1941

Rec'd 1:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

174, February 8, noon. (SECTION FOUR).

Finally from Moscow the French Ambassador reported an improvement in Russo-Japanese relations. The Russians, said Labonne, now talk of a willingness to reach a permanent settlement of the fisheries question which they have been unwilling to consider for the past twenty years. They are also indicating that there are possibilities of reaching a general accord with the Japanese. On the other hand, they are now making several complaints against Chiang Kai Shek arising out of his difficulties with the Fourth Army Corps (Communist).

LEAHY

NPL

Corrected 1/27/41
JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From
(Paris)
Vichy

Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

17th, February 8, noon. (SECTION FIVE).
Chauvel interpreted the foregoing as a clear indication that the Russians are for the moment attempting to lull the Japanese into a sense of security in the north to encourage them to turn their attention either toward Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. What tactics the Russians would pursue once the Japanese became entangled in the south, said Chauvel, was another matter.

All the foregoing, Chauvel continued, convinced him that the Japanese are definitely getting ready to embark on a new operation in the south in the near future;

LEAHY

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(Paris) Vichy
Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd. 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

174, February 8, Noon. (SECTION SIX)

that they have reached some agreement with the Germans designed to keep us occupied in the Far East and cause further difficulties for the British at the time when the Germans launch their expected attack on England. A further sign confirming this was a complete absence at present of German inquiries at Wiesbaden with respect to the situation in Indochina in contrast to the rather "sympathetic" attitude which the Germans had displayed toward French problems in that area until recently.

In conclusion he said: "I felt until quite recently that Japanese maneuvers in your regard were largely bluff. I am now convinced that this is not the case."

(END OF MESSAGE).

LEAHY

EPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM
(Paris)
Vichy
Dated April 16, 1941
Rec'd 2:31 p.m.

Secretary of State.
Washington.

445, April 16, 1 p.m. (SECTION 09C)
Embassy's telegram 436 April 13, 3 p.m.

After two days without information the foreign office has now received a telegram from Moscow with reference to the Russo-Japanese pact which Chouwei showed us this morning. Labonne reported that the signature of the pact has occasioned less surprise than the unprecedented public attitude of Stalin in proceeding to the station to bid farewell "to one who was not Chief of Staff." While it had generally been expected by observers in Moscow, the telegram continued, that the Japanese would have to pay a "higher price" for such an agreement, developments in the west had hastened Moscow's acceptance.

LEAHY

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM (Paris) Vichy

Dated April 16, 1941
Rec'd 1:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

445, April 16, 1 p.m. (SECTION 7.0)

Chauvel has come to the conclusion that the Russians feel with the situation "deteriorating" as rapidly as it is in the Balkans and the "certainty" of a German move on the Ukraine within the next three months "whether the British make peace or not", the Kremlin must have insurance against any Japanese attack in the East in order to protect itself and "its interests" in the West. The only sure guarantee against such Japanese attack would be Japanese involvement in the south. Consequently Chauvel still confidently expects an early Japanese attack against Singapore. As an indication in this direction he says that since the signing of the agreement with Russia, the Japanese attitude with respect to Indochina has become noticeably more aggressive (Please see Embassy's telegram no. 428 April 11, 6 p.m.).

LEAHY

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(from)

Vichy
Dated April 16, 1941
Rec'd 5:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

445, April 16, 1 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

He feels that the Russians must have weighed all the factors and decided that the weakening of the British through such a move and consequently of the Russian position in the west must be accepted as the price for insurance against Japan "particularly as Moscow expects the United States to take care of the Japanese".

Labonne reported that the Chinese Embassy at Moscow has expressed satisfaction with the considerable amount of material which the Russians have been furnishing the Chinese over the past several months and that the Embassy does not expect any change in this policy as a result of the Russo-Japanese pact. If such a change of policy does take place, said Labonne, it should be readily apparent in the very near future.

(END OF MESSAGE).

NK
LEAHY
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
682, June 12, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
My telegram 389, June 12, 7 p.m.

Marshal Pétain received me in the presence of Admiral Darlan. After I had delivered the message the Marshal said: "The British have attacked us. We said that we were going to defend our territory and we shall do so all the way up to the Turkish frontier. We know that we shall lose Syria but we are determined to fight to the end." Admiral Darlan stated that British and Gaulist forces vastly outnumber the French forces, the former totaling approximately 50,000 men against some three divisions or roughly 25,000 French and colonial forces. The British are also sending reinforcements. In addition, said the Marshal, the British have "several hundred tanks" and the French none.
GMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(Paris)

FROM

Vichy

Dated June 12, 1941

Rec'd 7:45 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

682, June 12, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The fact, he went on, that the British have been held so well so far (and he showed me on the map) constitutes "almost a French victory", particularly in view of the support given the British coastal column by naval units. Darlan remarked that he hoped, however, "to sink a couple of British warships very soon" (thus appearing to confirm reports of the sending of French submarines to that area).

While the manner of both was cordial and personally friendly throughout the interview they seemed to resent the implication that the French defense of Syria is to help Hitler. Darlan said that had this been the case they would have accepted "the aid which the Germans offered" and which, he went on, the French had "formally refused"; they are determined to fight the battle of Syria by themselves he said.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

KD (Paris)
Vichy
Dated June 12, 1941
Rec'd. 7:25 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

682, June 12, 8 p. m. (SECTION THREE).

"If the British think that they are going to stop a German drive on Suez by conquering Syria they are gravely mistaken," Darlan went on, "for the Germans have never planned to use Syria in their major operation."

On the other hand letters in French possession, he said, which date back six months conclusively show that the British even at that time were planning an invasion of Syria. "In fact," said Darlan, "they always wanted Syria."

Darlan likewise expressed surprise that the Department's message gave no recognition to the fact that the British had attacked the French without warning.

LEAHY.

WSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From

GMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated June 12, 1941
Rec'd 10:05 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
682, June 12, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Both the Marshal and Admiral Darlan appeared surprisingly calm and resigned to the loss of Syria. Darlan indicated however that this would be "the last affront" which the French would submit to on the part of the British. He also said that a written reply to the side-memoire would be prepared.

Repeated to Algiers.

(END OF MESSAGE)

LEAHY

RR
WT
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-

FROM (Paris)
Vichy

before being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Dated June 13, 1941
Rec'd 6:21 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

688, June 13, 6 P.M.

Rochat remarked this afternoon that reports reaching

the French Foreign Office from many quarters definitely

indicate important German preparations for a move

against the Ukraine. He said that whether the Germans

expect to get what they want by threats or whether they

will resort to actual invasion of the Ukraine he has

no idea. He feels, however, that developments in that

area may be expected in the relatively near future.

Leary

EMB

(France)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

From Vichy

Dated June 13, 1941

Rec'd 9:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

707, June 16, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Both Rochat and Chauvel reiterated again this afternoon that information reaching France from all sources, particularly French missions in countries under Axis influence—Hungary, Rumania, Sweden for instance—points to some early German move to the east. The information is so persistent and so similar as to arouse some suspicion.

On the other hand, from the Russian side the insistence that all is well with relations between Berlin and Moscow and that Hitler has made no demands on Stalin is equally emphatic. Rochat said that the Tass communiqué of June 13 was so categorical in its praise of Germany's "loyal" attitude as to make it "a really extraordinary document".

LEAHY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

Vichy

Dated June 16, 1941

Rec'd 9:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

707, June 16, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

It looks, he said, as though Russia "is attempting to build up a sound moral case for herself in the face of some anticipated German aggression." Simultaneously, however, German preparations continue in northern France he said for the possible invasion of England and a move through Spain is always a danger. "Thus it is another case of methodical preparation for several major moves," said Rochat, "anyone of which may be put into operation, depending upon Hitler's estimate of propitious circumstances and possibilities of success." (END OF MESSAGE)

LEAHY

WFC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated. FROM (SC)
Vichy

Dated July 24, 1941

Secretary of State,
Washington

927, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

We had a long confidential talk last evening with Weygand's personal representative at Vichy. The object of the conversation on his part was emphatically to urge the utmost discretion by our Government (and that we use our "influence" to the same end with the British) in all that concerns French Africa. He emphasized how delicate is the French position there and how suspicious the Germans are. When privileges are granted our "vice consuls" in their control duties in Africa, the Germans immediately demand similar privileges for their own people. Auer is closely watched and some of his native contacts in the past have actually been shot, he said, which had proved "extremely annoying to the Germans" although they are told that the same surveillance is exercised over Murphy. The Germans are insisting that the British and Americans are getting ready
MP -2- 927, July 24, 3 p. m. (SECTION ONE) from Vichy
ready for an attack on either Casablanca or Dakar,
that we are "buying" native chieftains and otherwise
preparing for direct future action. He went on to say
that he does not believe these German charges nor does
Weygand, but they do call for the utmost discretion to
prevent some German move.

LEAHY

ALC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED (confidential)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) FROM Vichy

Dated July 24, 1941
Rec'd 12:40 a.m. 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

927, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He denied that there has been any recent increase of Germans in Morocco or elsewhere in North Africa and particularly the development reported in the Embassy's telegram no. 925, July 24, 2 p.m. though he admitted the possibility of a "few Germans" getting into the territory clandestinely through Tangier.

He said that the prestige of Weygand, to whom he is personally devoted, grows each time he comes to Vichy and that he has been able to resist German pressure in general and specifically Germans for bases in Africa. "You can rest easy while Weygand is there", he said, "though he will resist any Anglo-American attack on Africa, just as he will resist a German move. So be careful," he went on, "until you have ten thousand planes; then, I say personally, you can do what you want."

He then said that Franco-German relations are "almost at the breaking point" and that this is due solely
-2- 927, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Vichy.

solely to French resistance to German penetration in
Africa. The Germans interpreted "collaboration" to
mean utilization of French African territory and are
extremely annoyed at Weygand's resistance to their
infiltration into or control over that area.

LEAHY

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated July 24, 1941
Rec'd 12:25 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

927, July 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

They would give anything he said to get rid of Weygand, but realize that that is impossible. They will probably however he said succeed in eliminating Monick, (who has arrived back in Vichy but who has discreetly kept away from the Embassy). The Germans blame him partly for the success of our program of economy supply and for his general anti-German measures. What action the Germans are planning in "retaliation" for French refusal to collaborate in the matter of African bases, he does not know. He confirmed though that there is much anxiety in this respect on the part of the Government here.

We asked whether there is anything specific which had brought forth his request for American "discretion" in Africa and he replied in the negative. He said that our economic plan is working "most satisfactorily" and that
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ml -2- Telegram from (Paris) Vichy #927, July 24, 1941
FROM

that General Weygand has great confidence in Murphy. He had broached the subject he said merely in the hope that we would be careful and to let us know how pressing the Germans are becoming with respect to our activities in that area.

Repeated to Algiers and Casablanca.

END OF MESSAGE.

LEAHY

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (50)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

(Date)

23, January 7, 3 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

It asked the person mentioned in our 1550, December 17, noon whether he could confirm the rumor we have just heard that Admiral Darlan will leave Vichy for Berlin within the next day or two. He replied that he had no information of such a trip. He went on to say, however, that since the Saint Florentin meeting Benoist-Léoncin, who was greatly intrigued at not having been present, had been endeavoring to arrange a meeting between Darlan and Ribbentrop but insofar as he knows nothing has been definitely decided.

He then reverted to our conversation of several weeks ago (Embassy's reference telegram above) and said that the Germans had been ominously quiet since then, and although they have unquestionably been dealing with the collaborationists at Paris, they have sent no demands...
23, January 7, 3 p.m., (SECTION ONE), FRAP (Paris), Vichy.

Sent no demands to Vichy. "There is no doubt," he said, "that the Germans are furious at the Marshal's speech and their action in protesting here, coupled with the violent attacks against the Vichy government in the German-controlled Paris press, is most disgusting." Also disgusting, he said is the fact that Leval has been recalled to Paris, Doriot has been recalled suddenly back from the Russian front, and that is arriving there today.

LEAHY

JHL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM (Paris) Vichy
Dated January 7, 1942
Rece'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH.

23, January 7, 3 p.m., (STATION T.O.).

He does not know, he said, the reason for these people being summoned to Paris, but expressed the personal opinion that the Germans may, as means of putting pressure on the Vichy Government, again threaten to establish an independent government in Paris.

He said that Debré said that he classified as a German agent, has just returned from Paris and has been spreading stories of the lack of comprehension of the Vichy Government in a form as the occupied zone is concerned, and that the Germans wish the Vichy Cabinet to be shuffled so that "there will be a greater representation of persons such as Debré to understand the problems of the Indies and not just a part of France."

He concluded by stating that while things were in the surface calm.
-2-23, January 7, 3 p.m., (SECTION 1-G), T.P.
(Paris), Vichy.

The surface calm in Vichy, he personally thinks it is possible that Vichy may shortly be faced with another crisis in French-German relations. While he feels that the atmosphere in Government circles is somewhat better than it has been and believes that France, because of German difficulties, is in a better position to resist than last year, he is apprehensive about what the next two or three weeks may bring.

(END OF MESSAGE).
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Corresponding postmark on March 14th, 1942, 8:34 p.m. (Kirstiefer - 97)

A responsible official in the Foreign Office in Peking has transmitted a telegram dated February 29 from Arsen-Kei, the French Ambassador in Tokyo. The chief points in the message are the following:

One. Both the Ambassador and his colleagues in China are in complete agreement that a Russo-Japanese conflict is inevitable and will probably be started in April by a Japanese attack on the Maritime Province of Siberia.

Two. Henry reports that the transport of a large number of Japanese troops and material since February 1st to Korea and adds that all civilian travel to Korea and commercial navigation from Japan to Vladivostok have been suspended.

Three. The Russian Consul in Seoul informed the Counselor of the French Embassy in Tokyo that no (repeat no) important elements of the Siberian for eastern
February 27, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE), from (Paris), Vichy.

Far eastern army has been sent to the west and that on the contrary there had been an increase in Russian transbaikal effectives.

Four. The Tokyo press has not as yet attacked Russia openly but Russia is never mentioned and Russian communiques are not published.

LENNY

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SO)

Vichy
FROM

Dated February 27, 1942
Rec'd 2:50 p.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

313, February 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Five. Public opinion in Japan freely expresses the opinion that Russia will attack Japan in the spring.

Six. A responsible Foreign Office official in Tokyo informed the French Ambassador that Japan would do all in its power to avoid a conflict but that Russia could not be trusted.

Seven. The French Ambassador attaches little importance to the recent agreement whereby Japanese and Russian troops had been withdrawn on both sides of the Manchurian frontier. He considers that relatively few Japanese troops are being employed in southern action which for the time being, at least, is more of a novel affair and that at least three million Japanese are under arms. From the manpower angle he therefore concludes that it would be possible for Japan to start a spring offensive in the North.

Eight.
Eight. The French Ambassador stressed in conclusion the extent to which Japanese public opinion is drunk with success. The slogans "on to Washington" and "on to London" which are heard on all sides amongst the people are only important as interpreting the existing state of mind in Japan and therefore the possibility of a Japanese offensive in Siberia should not (repeat not) be excluded.

LEAHY

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) Dated February 27, 1942 FROM Sec'd 6:53 p.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

315, February 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
Our informant, who has been stationed in China, Russia, and Turkey, and who may be regarded as a qualified observer, is also convinced that a conflict between Russia and Japan is inevitable. The Germans, he says, are bringing pressure to bear on the Japanese, telling them that if Germany is defeated, the Japanese cannot possibly resist American, British, Russian and possibly French pressure, and consequently it is to Japan's immediate interest to help Germany by attacking Russia in Siberia.

With regard to the western theater our informant stated that, even in the event of a German military expedition by sea to Syria for the purpose of reaching Egypt, the Turkish Government would not move unless it were attacked. He felt certain, however, that if the Germans should commit the psychological error of sending Bulgarian and Italian divisions against Turks
-2- 313, February 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from (Paris) Vichy

Turks from the north, the Turkish Government would not hesitate to enter the war on the side of the Allies.

(END OF MESSAGE).

LEAF

HTH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretaries of State,

and No. 91, March 20, to Ambassador,

Washington.

Dated March 17, 1942

Rec'd 2:50 p.m., 18th.

407, March 17, 10 p.m.

Embassy's 33B, March 4, 3 p.m.

An official of the Foreign Office read to us a telegram which has been received from Arsenie Henry in Tokyo.

In this message Henry described Sato the new Japanese Ambassador to Moscow as an intelligent moderate, but stated that the consensus of opinion was that he was being sent to Moscow on much the same mission as that of Kurusu's to Washington, and that the Japanese attack would probably occur before Russo-Japanese relations had completely broken down. The telegram went on to say that there were elements within the government who were opposed to an attack on Russia but that military authorities were in complete control and would do as they wish.

LEAHY

WTD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

From

Paris

Vichy

Dated March 17, 1942

Rec'd 4:51 p.m., 18th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

407, March 17, 10 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The anti-Russian press campaign according to the telegram started on February 26 (see Embassy's 313 February 27, 7 p.m.) with a communication from the Manchurian headquarters of the Japanese army stating that the Japanese military were taking the necessary precautionary steps toward manning the frontier. This was followed by articles speaking of Japan's crushing superiority over the Russians in this area and an announcement of a fifteen day military maneuver near the frontier. Subsequently photographs were published of the Japanese army maneuvering in the snow. In Japan itself the anti-Communist league is disseminating tracts and propaganda speaking of a coming attack on Japan from the north. Japanese editorial comment was to the effect that Russia must choose whether it is with or against Japan.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CSB

LEAHY
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated April 2, 1942
Rec’d 7:58 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

RUSH
492, April 2, 9 p.m.

The person mentioned in our 486, April 1, 8 p.m., tells us that the Marshal received Laval this morning at eleven at the Sevigné Palace and conferred with him for about an hour. Our informant stated that Laval had brought nothing with him in the form of concessions from the Germans and that consequently there is no question of his return to the Government at this time. He added, however, that while "the Laval crisis is dead for the present" the Marshal did agree to receive Laval in future when the latter had useful information to give him. Our informant believes that Laval may endeavor to use this as a means of showing that "he is once again in the Marshal's confidence'.

He went on to say that the Marshal would now be able to proceed to the reorganization of the cabinet and that in his opinion the cabinet changes will take place.
-2-492, April 2, 9 p.m., from Vichy (Paris).

place "within the next ten days". He expressed again the opinion that Carcopino, Lehieux and Benoist Mechin will go. The latter he said had endeavored to support Laval in the recent crisis and had committed "the unpardonable stupidity" of preparing a letter to the German authorities indicating that in his (Benoist Mechin's) opinion France should assist Germany with military force against Russia and if necessary England.

KLP

LEAHY
RS

FROM (Paris)

Vichy

Dated April 29, 1942

Rec'd 3:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

631, April 29, 10 a.m., (SECTION ONE)

A responsible Foreign Office official read us in strictest confidence portions of two telegrams just received from Arsene Henry which he asked be kept completely secret.

The first telegram, dealing with the bombardment of Tokyo by American planes, stated that a full report had been cabled by the French Military Attaché to the Ministry of War (we have not as yet been able to ascertain the substance of this message). In speaking of the bombardment Henry reported that insofar as he could ascertain the damage in Tokyo had been slight. He went on to say that a considerable portion of the population had at first mistaken the air raid for a Japanese aerial display but when it had become evident that it was a bombardment although there had been no panic there was consternation among the public and it had left the people with a feeling of uneasiness
-2-, #631, April 29, 10 a.m., (SECTION ONE) from Paris, Vichy

of uneasiness.

The second telegram dealt with present relations between Japan and Germany, and Japan and Russia. The telegram stated that coolness too obvious to conceal had arisen between the Japanese and the Germans in Tokyo.

LEAHY

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

B.S. (Paris)
This telegram must be from Vichy
in a closely paraphrased form before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated April 29, 1942
Reg'd 2:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

631, April 29, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Henry reported that members of the German Embassy were already talking about the necessity for a negotiated peace and a subsequent European crusade against the Japanese menace. There were also other indications that the German Embassy in Tokyo was not pleased with the continued Japanese successes. The Germans, according to the telegram, have antagonized the Japanese by their arrogance and adopt the line that Japan should not compare her success in "a small colonial war" with the great successes of the German military machine on many fronts in Europe and Africa. The Japanese, given their feeling of racial inferiority, are quite naturally angered by this attitude and in official Japanese circles the comment has been heard that after Japan has defeated England and the United States it will be free to teach the Germans a thing or two. While with the exception of the recent
-2- 4631, April 29, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from (Paris) Vichy.

The arrest of a German in Tokyo there have been no incidents. Henry reports that there are many small telltale signs of growing friction. On the other hand, insofar as relations with Russia are concerned, the Japanese attitude has changed very considerably in the past two months.

LENNY

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated. FROM

Washington, D.C., April 29, 1943

FRIDAY, 6:10 P.M.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

631, April 29, 10 A.M. (SECRET TIMES)

The campaign in the west against Moscow has
ceased completely and there are even official and
semi-official expressions of confidence in Russia's
desire to observe the terms of her non-aggression
pact with Japan. While there are still members of
the Japanese military clique who insist that it is
necessary to attack now, the more conservative
Japanese elements, including the Foreign Office, have
expressed the hope that Russo-Japanese relations can
remain friendly. As indicative of the change in at-
mosphere, Henry reported that while several months
ago a high official in the Japanese Foreign Office
told him that, because of the deterioration of re-
lations with Russia, Japanese diplomats would not
be sent to their posts by the Trans-Siberian Railway,
recently three members of the Japanese Embassy in Rome
were instructed to return via this route. Another
possible straw in the wind was a curious statement
to
-2- #631, April 29, 10 a.m. (SECTION THREE), from (Paris) Vichy

to the press by former Ambassador Tatakawa upon his return from Moscow. In this statement, carried by the Japanese press, he said in substance that Russia was not a Communist country; that the Russian people were solidly behind Stalin who had the situation well in hand; that while they were called upon to make many sacrifices they were willingly making these sacrifices;

LEAHY

HTM
This telegram must be closely guarded before being communicated to anyone. (EC) 

Secretary of State, FROM
Washington

631, April 29, 10 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

That they had bread to eat and that although their material condition was necessarily difficult it was not desperate. This public statement had quite naturally made the Germans in Tokyo furious.

While several months ago Henry believed that a Japanese attack against Russia was almost inevitable this spring now while recognizing that Japan might be trying to lull the Russians into a sense of false security prior to attacking without warning he does not believe that such an attack is a certainty. He expressed the opinion that if the Russians hold on the Eastern Front the Japanese who now have their forces well spread out may not wish to create further difficulties for themselves due to Japan's vulnerability to Siberian based air craft. If on the other hand the Germans have great success on the Eastern front he believes that the more chauvinistic elements in the Japanese military clique will probably force an attack against the Maritime provinces of Siberia.

(END OF MESSAGE)
Telegraphic dispatch from Rochat to the Secretary of State, Washington, dated June 1, 1942.

789, June 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

Rochat has called my attention to a Havas dispatch dealing with an article by Gayda which appeared in the GIORNALI D'ITALIA of May 29.

The Havas dispatch in question was not released for publication here and was distributed for information only. We are cautioned against considering the Gayda article as a misapprehension of the Italian position. A competent Foreign Office official assures us in fact that the greater part of the Italian press continues to insist on territorial claims and that Gayda's article is almost unique. While this official believes that should be viewed with reserve he nevertheless considers the article interesting because of Gayda's prominence and the fact that he has so often been used as the official Fascist mouthpiece.

Tuck
Washington:

May 1, 4 p.m. (S.S.S.S.)

The text in translation of the Italian dispatch follows:

"In the Times, L. F. P., an Italian newspaper which during the past few years have censored Franco-Italian relations. The publicist declares that such interpretations are unjustified, and that the interpretations of the newspapers are 'as erroneous as they are arbitrary.'

'The status of relations between France and Italy' he says 'is no more of moment today than it has been during the past months. These relations form part of the more general question of the war conducted by the Axis powers and the conclusion of a lasting peace. There is nothing to say on this subject today and in fact no Italian newspaper mentions it.

I only to rectify in a few words certain erroneous tendencies.
-2- \#789, June 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Vichy.

tendencies of foreign sources and also to refute
certain unwarranted indiscretions -- of equally
foreign origin.

M. Chyde protests furthermore against allegations
to the effect that during the Salzburg Conference
Italy may have obtained in exchange for a more active
participation in the Russian campaign the liquidation
of these claims against France.

FUCK

M. L
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
GRAY

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated June 1, 1940
Recev'd 7:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

730, June 1, (SECTION NR 15).

This is pure fantasy written by the Italian commentator and adds nothing about the territorial war to which Italy consents. All its armies on all fronts as Germany does is not necessary or any particular political question as it is common sense. Italy intends to participate in the war to its discretion, because Italy intends to have a great part in the victory. That is all. Peace problems were not discussed today because they have been excluded in the conception and presentation of the treaty between the Axis powers since the first day of the war and prior to the war they formed part of the policy of the Axis which wished to recognize rational and reasonable solutions in a spirit of future national collaboration, solving political obstacles
between Italy and Germany although they refer to important questions do not date from the conference at Salzburg. Likewise the agreement on the new European order on Italian and German rights and obligations between the two Axis powers do not date from that conference.

The June 1 Paris edition of PARIS SALLY under the Rome May 31 dateline announces that Ciano delivered an important speech before the Finance Commission of the Italian Senate in which he reviewed the basic principles of Italy's foreign policy and attributes the following declaration to him.

"Referring to relations with France since the Armistice Count Ciano underlined their perfect harmony and likened them to the relations France at present maintains with Germany."

TUCK

FR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: The June 1, 19...

TO: From... 2:40...

Secretary of State,
Washington.

7:19, June 1, 19...

Our Foreign Office Information states that while the Paris press articles in the whole substantially support France's declaration of expressions to Italy's relations with Rome are exaggerated and reflect an overly optimistic view.

Repeated London.

JRL
SECRET
Embassy's 631/April 29 10 a.m. and 747 May 23 11 a.m.

The Foreign Office official mentioned in the telegram under reference today read us another cable received from Ambassador Arseng Henry concerning the present status of German-Japanese relations.

The ambassador reported that the tension far from being relieved was becoming more and more marked and although there was of course as yet no indication of a possible break of relations it was apparent that the possibility of such a break was being seriously envisaged for the future. Furthermore, the desire for the maintenance of the status quo with Russia was becoming increasingly evident. The ambassador thought it significant that the local leaders of Patriotic Young Peoples Associations had been authorized (ordered -struck) to refer in their talks to members to the inevitability of war with Germany as soon as the Anglo-Saxon
Anglo-Saxon powers had been thrown out of the Pacific Ocean. The desire for better relations with Russia was made evident by the press handling of the Anglo-Soviet accord which emphasized that this treaty merely confirmed in writing a situation which already existed and that the treaty was directed against Germany now and concerned itself with the reconstruction of Europe after the war and that it in no way affected countries like Japan who were not at war with Russia.

The Ambassador concluded that the Japanese Government has now decided that Germany is going to be beaten and is preparing to meet (omission) under pressure for a Japanese attack on Siberia. He concluded that the Japanese are hopeful of maintaining the status quo with Russia until Germany's inevitable defeat and have no desire to make an attack on Russia now which would be more advantageous to Germany than to themselves.

TUCK

CSB

(\^) omissions

(entire message subject to correction)
June 19, 1942.

In evaluating the information contained in Vichy's 882, June 17, midnight, which emanates from the French Ambassador at Tokyo, it is believed that we should keep in mind that (1) the French Ambassador at Tokyo has not been in the past an especially accurate reporter and (2) the Japanese and German Governments would undoubtedly, if they thought that a useful purpose would be served thereby, deliberately give indication of attitudes and trends of the type reported simply to mask their own intent and to create confusion in the minds of the United Nations.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Vichy

Dated June 24, 1942.

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

909, June 24, 7 p.m.
Embassy's 882, June 17, midnight.

A Foreign Office official has given us the purport of another telegram from Arsen E. Henry at Tokio.

The Ambassador reports that the recent growing tension Russo Japanese relations has given strength to the belief in many quarters of the imminence of hostilities between the two countries. He cites among the many rumors which followed the conclusion of the Anglo Soviet treaty: the conviction among munitions workers that the Manchurian army corps would soon go into action, the reported arrival of an important German military mission which was exerting great pressure on the Government; and a series of conferences between high Government officials in an atmosphere which has in the past presaged great decisions. He adds that certain well placed persons were sending away women and children to the country in anticipation of Russian air raids.
-2 #909, June 24, 7 p.m. from (Paris) Vichy.

While admitting that he was unable positively to confirm these rumors he reports that they are being taken seriously by some of his colleagues, particularly the Turkish Ambassador.

The Ambassador, however, in the absence of more concrete indications of effective German pressure, persists in his belief that Japan will not attack unless the Russians suffer decisive reverses on the Eastern Front.

TUCK

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NMC (Paris)
Vichy

FROM
Dated August 1, 1942
Rec'd 8:50 a.m., 2nd.

Secretary of State, V
Washington.

1120, August 1, 1 p.m.

A responsible friendly official who has in the past supplied us with much accurate information on the trend of events in France is most pessimistic about the future and his views while perhaps too gloomy are of interest as they are shared by a number of qualified political observers.

He expressed the fear that Franco-American relations are inevitably doomed and that a break will probably occur in the next two months. In support of his view he said that Laval is a most ambitious man and that the only way he can remain in power is to make increasing concessions to the Germans which quite naturally are unacceptable to us. He believes Laval is prepared to do this given his overwhelming desire for power. If he is not he will be replaced by someone willing to do the German bidding which would also result in a break in relations.
Another factor in the situation is the attitude of the Germans concerning Franco-American relations which he claims has recently undergone a change. While after our entry into the war the Germans indicated to the French they did not desire a rupture in Franco-American relations they have now "become seriously concerned over the activities of Murphy and his consular officers in North Africa and wish to have American representatives withdrawn". Our informant said that Reiche and Von Midda at Vichy took the line that the Americans in North Africa have too many close contacts with persons whose hostility to Germany is no secret and that our representatives are preparing North Africa for dissidence. (In the past week the Paris press which is frequently used as a sounding board by the Germans has had some violent articles criticizing the activities of Murphy and American consular representatives which would appear to corroborate in part our informant's story). In our informant's opinion the Germans attach more importance to North Africa than to the continuance of Franco-American relations.

Returning
#1120, August 1, 1 p.m., from (Paris) Vichy

Returning to the question of a break in relations insofar as the French Government is concerned he said that Laval who had good reason upon his return to power to fear that the United States would break with France had been clever in handling the Madagascar and Martinique affairs. The obvious reason for his moderation in these two incidents was to convince the French people that "even in the face of unfriendly acts he had done everything possible to avoid a break" and that the responsibility for such an act would rest entirely on our shoulders. Our informant who said that we obviously did not have at this moment a pretext to break believes Laval will make further concessions to Germany in the coming weeks thus bringing the situation to a head and presenting us with a definite pretext. Such an act on Laval's part whatever it might be coming on top of previous French concessions to Germany (such as the government subsidizing and support of the Tri-Color Legion, Laval's public declaration that he hopes for a German victory, the open campaign of the French Government to send workers to Germany, the inhuman treatment of Jews and others) would
-4-  #1120, August 1, 1 p.m., from (Paris) Vichy would in our informant's opinion enable us to present our action in such a way as to discredit the propaganda with which Laval would unquestionably endeavor to convince the French people that we alone were responsible for the severance of relations.

THOMPSON

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy

FROM
Dated August 22, 1942
Rec'd 7:15 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1227, August 22, 9 p.m.

A reliable friendly official tells us in strictest confidence that Laval and Guérard, Secretary General of the Chief of Government, have fallen out and that Guérard will probably be given another post in the near future. The original trouble according to our informant arose from clashes of personality between the two in discussions of policy.

Matters came to a head at the time of the discussions concerning the French warships interned at Alexandria. Guérard apparently interpreted Laval's strongly worded note to us as an indication that Laval was ready in the event of the French warships being sunk to give active military assistance to the Germans. Subsequently Guérard went to Paris and had discussions with certain German officials, notably Kuhn, in the course of which he implied to the Germans that in the event the French warships at Alexandria were sunk...
From (Paris) Vichy 2.1227, August 22, 3 p.m.

The Vichy Government would be willing to use its navy against the British and that a French declaration of war against England might follow.

Laval, according to our informant, was angry when he learned of Guerard's conversations which went considerably further than he himself had gone and decided to remove the latter from his present position. Due to Guerard's close ties with certain German elements, the question of getting rid of him was a delicate matter and in order to avoid antagonizing Guerard's German friends, a post of some importance must be offered to him.

Guerard has been absent from Vichy "on vacation" for two weeks. He returned yesterday we are told and was offered first the Governorship of the Bank of France which he refused and then the post of ambassador at Buenos Aires which he also refused because "it is too far away". He indicated, however, that he wished to replace Admiral Esteva in Tunis but would be willing to accept the post of French Minister to Portugal pending such time as he might be appointed to Tunis. Insofar as we know there has as yet been no decision as to what post he will next occupy.
-3- #1227, August 22, 9 p.m. from (Paris) Vichy

As possible confirmation that something is in the air for Guerard another reliable informant tells us that this morning he was told by a German official that "Guerard may soon receive a new post."

Repeated to London.

TUCK