



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, November 4, 1938

No. 402

Subject: Conversation with Dr. Mastný, Czecho-
slovak Minister in Berlin.

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Handwritten initials and signatures



Strictly confidential

*7601.62
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



Sir:



I have the honor to transmit for the information
1/ of the Department a memorandum of a recent conversa-
tion with Dr. Mastný, Czechoslovak Minister in
Berlin.

Respectfully yours,

Handwritten signature of Hugh R. Wilson
Hugh R. Wilson

Handwritten initials and a large checkmark

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum

702

HRW/hu

cc. to Legation, Prague.

7601.62/1858

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 402, dated Nov. 4, 1938,
from the American Embassy,
Berlin, Germany.

MEMORANDUM OF
CONVERSATION WITH DR. MASTNÝ,
CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER.

7604.60/62

Dr. Mastný called on me on the morning of October 31 and stated that he had received an instruction from his Government to do a thing which he was most happy personally to do, namely, to assure me of the deep gratitude with which his country regarded the United States both for its willingness to accept the protection of Czechoslovak interests in the event of hostilities and for its sympathy with Czechoslovakia during its struggle.

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Dr. Mastný said that he was now engaged in negotiating with the Germans regarding rectifications of the line; for instance, there were points at which the present line crossed the main road of supply for Pilsen and points at which the German frontier crossed into indispensable railroad lines connecting important points. He hoped they would be able to wash these things out. In the event that they were unable to do so the Czechs might have to apply to the Committee of the Four Powers. They were in hopes, however, that they could do the thing in a friendly way with Germany alone as they realized that they were completely at Germany's mercy.

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He felt that Czechoslovakia would become a three-state entity, - Bohemia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. There was little sympathy here for the Polish claims to a common frontier with Hungary, and he thought that in the near future these matters would be finally liquidated in the sense he had described.

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He then continued, in the most confidential way, to tell me of his own experience during the past few months. He said that he had repeatedly urged upon his Government the necessity for autonomy for the Sudetenland. He had warned again and again that half measures would not satisfy this country and that only the most far-reaching autonomy would save the state intact. He had even had a serious quarrel with Benes, his old-time friend, over this matter. Benes had felt convinced that from a democratic standpoint he could not allow any section of the country to become Nazi. He was bound both by the Left elements, anti-Nazi in principle, and the Extreme Right, deeply nationalistic, and was unable, he thought, to make the necessary concessions.

Benes had called him early on the morning of the 29th of September and had told him to fly immediately to Munich. Mastný refused, on the grounds that he could not represent Benes as his views differed from the President's. Benes had replied that he wanted him to go "only as an observer", and on this basis Mastný took the plane for Munich. He found all the principals in conference and was able to talk only with Ashton-Gwatkin. At 1:15 a.m. he was finally summoned to Chamberlain's room, where the latter handed him his memorandum of the decisions reached. Mastný stated that he would return at once to Prague and the President would answer. Chamberlain replied that no reply was expected. They simply wanted Mastný to sit on the Committee to meet in Berlin. Mastný said that, nevertheless, he must go to Prague,

which

which he did. Benes thereupon instructed him to return to Berlin and sit on the Committee.

I was shocked at the appearance of Mastný. He has grown perceptibly older and is in an extremely nervous condition. He said that he had not imagined that any one day could contain such mental suffering as that which he went through in Munich.

As he left the room I expressed my sympathy to him. He then said that as the days went by he felt more reconciled to the situation. They might, after all, now be able to lead self-respecting lives. He was convinced that had war broken out nothing of Czechoslovakia would have survived, whatever turn the war had taken. He said he felt like a man who found that he and his wife could no longer live happily together, who had gone through the misery of a divorce, but now felt that it was better after all that incompatible people should not try to live in unison. As to the fate of individuals he had no information. He did not know whether Masaryk and Osusky would continue to represent Czechoslovakia, nor did he know whether he himself would continue to do so. He said that the Germans had shown him repeatedly evidences of personal sympathy during this trouble and that he might be able to utilize these feelings of esteem for the benefit of his country. This he was willing to do for a short time, but was anxious to retire as soon as someone could replace him who could gain as favorable treatment for Czechoslovakia.

H.R.N.

Berlin, October 31, 1938



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 429

Berlin, November 12, 1938.

Handwritten initials and scribbles

Subject: Hitler's Speeches of November 6
and November 8.

*copy in file
Full [initials]*

Summary

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1938 NOV 25 AM 11 04

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

*O.N.I.
M.I.D.*

DEC 9 1938

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Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith summaries of two of Chancellor Hitler's recent speeches, including translations of the more pertinent passages thereof. The first was given on November 6 at Weimar at a congress of the Party in Thuringia. The second address was delivered on November 8 at the traditional meeting in the Bürgerbräukellar in Munich celebrating the anniversary of the abortive Nazi "putsch" of 1923.

It is understood that these speeches were treated extensively in the American press. It is believed, however, that the Department may find it useful to have on record the text of Hitler's remarks concerning German foreign policy, which constitute a sharp reiteration of his determination

to

GML

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
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to base his reliance first and foremost on Germany's armed might and of his reasons for adopting this position.

It may be observed that German papers commented with surprised dismay on the reception given these speeches by large sections of the British and French press which, emphasizing the shrill bitterness of their general tone and noting the sharp attacks on Churchill and other British political leaders and at the same time the omission of any tribute to Chamberlain and Daladier for their part in concluding the Munich agreement, tended to interpret Hitler's statements as only a thinly veiled warning that if he does not achieve his "just rights" through negotiation he will resort to quite "other methods." The German press vehemently denied the validity of such assertions and endeavored to counter them by featuring Hitler's assurance that the return of German colonies is not an occasion for war, and his declarations of Germany's desire for peace.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Donald R. Heath

Donald R. Heath
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures:

1-2. Summaries and translations of Hitler's speeches on November 6 and November 8, respectively.

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HFL:EM

Summary and Translation of
Hitler's Speech at the Party Congress at
Weimar on November 6, 1938.

Chancellor Hitler spoke on the afternoon of November 6 at Weimar. The following is a translation of relevant passages in his speech, the first half of which was devoted to the customary comparison between the situation today and that before National Socialism.

"We are now reaping the reward of our foresight, just as once upon a time the Germany of the year 1918 reaped its reward. It obtained a share in the blessings of what we understand as democracy. The Germany of those days had clung to the hopes which were perhaps most clearly expressed by that American who assured us of a peace in which there should be neither victor nor vanquished. When the German people relying on these theories had laid down its arms it learned that democracy in practice is quite different to what it is in theory. When parliamentarians and politicians in foreign countries now dare to maintain that Germany has not kept her treaties, we can only reply to them that the greatest treaty-breach of all time was committed against the German people. Everything which promised to Germany in those 14 points in reliance upon which German arms were laid down was subsequently denied her."

.....

After describing National Socialism's achievements in freeing the German people from its parties and divisions and in creating a new governing class - "a corps of the toughest determination and most ruthless energy" - Herr

Hitler

Hitler continued that the third achievement was the new army. "The German is either the first soldier in the world or no soldier at all. We must be soldiers and we want to be. Therefore we can only be the first. As a peace lover I have made every effort to create for the German people those weapons and defences which are calculated to convince others as well of the advantages of peace. There are people who abuse the hedgehog for having prickles. They have only to leave this animal in peace. No hedgehog has ever attacked anybody unless it was threatened itself. That is how we feel ourselves. People should not tread on our toes; we only want quiet, the opportunity to work and essential rights for our people, the same rights which others claim for themselves. The democratic states especially must understand that, for they are always talking about equality of rights. When they talk of the rights of small peoples, how can they be indignant when a great people claims the same rights? Our National-Socialist defence forces serve to assure and guarantee this claim. On these principles I have undertaken a reorientation in foreign policy and have joined those States which have been obliged like ourselves to assert their rights. In examining the results of this our policy today I can say: Let all judge whether we have not in fact achieved great things on this principle.

"We must never forget what has made these successes possible. When certain foreign papers say:

You

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You could have got all that by negotiation, we know quite well that the Germany before us did nothing but negotiate. For fifteen years they only negotiated and in so doing lost everything. I too am ready to negotiate but I will not allow any doubt as to the fact that German rights are not to be infringed either by negotiation or in any other way. Never forget, German people, whom you have to thank for your success! What movement, what idea and what principles! And secondly, always be careful, always be on guard!

"It is all very well to talk of international peace and international disarmament, but I am mistrustful of material disarmament as long as there is no moral disarmament. It has become a curious custom in the world to divide the peoples into authoritarian, that is to say disciplined States, and democratic States. In the authoritarian, that is to say disciplined States, it is a matter of course that foreign peoples should not be slandered or lied about and that there should be no war-mongering. But the democratic States are democratic, which means that all this is allowed. In authoritarian countries war agitation naturally does not occur, because their Governments are bound to see that there is none. In the democracies, however, the Governments have only one duty, to maintain democracy which is freedom, if necessary, to agitate even as far as war. Not long ago I called three international war-mongers by name. They felt injured, but not as regards their principles, no, only

because

because I dared to call them by names. Mr. Churchill has declared openly that in his opinion the present régime in Germany should be abolished in cooperation with internal German forces who would put themselves gratefully at his disposal for the purpose. If Mr. Churchill had less to do with emigrés, that is to say exiled foreign-paid traitors, and more to do with Germans, then he would see the whole idiocy and stupidity of what he says. I can only assure this gentleman, who seems to live in the moon, that there is in Germany no such power as could set itself against the present régime. In Germany there is only one power, the power of the German nation, in leadership and followers, in defence and arms. I will not deny to this gentleman that we have naturally no right to demand that other peoples should change their constitutions. As leader of the Germans, however, it is my duty to take account of such constitutions and the possibilities which can arise from them. When a few days ago ~~was~~ the deputy leader of the Opposition in the English House of Commons declared roundly that he would welcome the destruction of Germany and Italy, I am unable to prevent this man in the course of the democratic game from coming with his party in a year or two into power. But I can assure him that I shall prevent him from destroying Germany and equally that I am convinced that the German people will see to it that these gentlemen's plans in regard to Germany will never succeed just as Fascist Italy will do the same thing herself.

"I think that for all of us these international hopes can provide one lesson, to stand fast together and to hold fast to our friends. The more we in Germany form a single community, the smaller will the prospects of these agitators be, and the closer we identify ourselves with the State which is in the same position as ourselves, that is with Italy, the less will they feel inclined to egg us on.

.....

"When the outside world talks of disarmament we too are ready but on one condition: that first of all the war-mongers should be disarmed. As long as the others only talk of disarmament but go on with their infamous war agitation, we must conclude that they only want to steal our weapons from us and prepare us again for the same fate as in 1918 - 19. I can tell Messrs. Churchill and company one thing: that happened once but never again.

.....

"In these last weeks our German people presented a magnificent picture of iron determination, such as I learned to know in the darkest days of the war: no nervousness, no haste, no uncertainty, no air of desperation, but confidence and complete loyalty. Each single man and woman knew that fate would perhaps ask from us the last sacrifice. It is thanks to this determination and this steadiness that we were spared this last sacrifice. Fate did not put us to the test, because it knew we were strong. We will keep this lesson for the future. ~~Then nothing can hurt~~ our beloved Germany, now and for all eternity."

Summary and Translation of Hitler's
Speech to old Party Members at the
traditional meeting in the Bürger-
bräukellar in Munich celebrating
the Nazi "Putsch" of 1923.

Chancellor Hitler spoke on the evening of November 8 at the traditional meeting in the Bürgerbräu Keller at Munich on the anniversary of the 1923 Putsch. This speech is usually internal in character and the first part adhered to custom in this respect, save for an extract which is quoted below. The second part dealt with foreign affairs.

The opening theme was inevitably the collapse of November 1918 but Herr Hitler, who spoke with vehemence, subsequently made more than usually bitter attacks upon the bourgeoisie and biting sallies at Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Duff Cooper. He quoted a long extract from Clausewitz rather on the same lines, insisting on the virtues of force as against "false cleverness".

The following is the passage referred to above:

"There was no further question of a defensive war by the German nation but of a struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Then came the well-known great Apostle from America preaching international morality with his Fourteen Points. In spite of this there would have been no collapse in 1918 if the German people in its blindness had not allowed

the internal struggle to develop into a civil war. I think I have the right to say that if Fate had then placed me in command this collapse would never have occurred. One collapse there would have been nevertheless, the collapse of our ruinous parties. As we removed them in 1933 so would I then have removed them. And just as Germany has since risen again so she would then never have fallen. The outside world knows quite well why it whines after democratic ideas. When an English Opposition leader declares that we Germans should give proof of our friendliness to the world by setting free the imprisoned enemies of the State, I reply that I was once/^{an}imprisoned enemy of the State but I never noticed that the leaders of the English Opposition said a single word on my behalf. I know why they take the part of these enemies of the German State: they were then and they are now the allies of the foreigner."

The following is a translation of the latter part of the speech:

"Today we can look back on a great historical achievement. Very seldom is it vouchsafed to a generation to fight so tremendous a battle and to live to enjoy success. This is a special reward of foresight for us all. Bearing the past in mind we will today more than ever hold to the resolve not to depart from our longstanding principles and virtues. That is to say, we will be watchful and careful. We have been through too much and our experiences have been

too painful for us ever to be able to give easy credence to anyone whose siren tones reach us from without. I only believe in the right which we ourselves are able and resolved to defend. And secondly, I only believe in the reward which we ourselves have earned. Nothing in this world is ever presented to a people. As you know at this very moment attempts are being made from a certain quarter to speculate upon the credulity and good nature of our people in the hope of finding even now in the German people some sentimental reaction. You, my old fighters, will understand me when I remain cool and reserved towards these approaches. It would be very fine if the world would turn round and embark on a new course, a course of universal peace and justice. We should be happy if we could see any signs of such a change of heart. For the moment, I only see one thing, a rearming and everywhere threatening world. They say, 'Now we have found a new basis for a peaceful development - therefore we must rearm'. I don't quite understand this logic but I don't protest. Let me nowhere be misunderstood. When every day I read in the foreign press that our armaments are shaking the outside world to the foundations then I can only say one thing: only the non-armament of the German nation would shake me. The armament of others does not shake me. For there can be no doubt whatever of one thing: if the world clothes itself in weapons the German people will not wander about on earth armed only with a palm of peace. In these circumstances we will

do everything necessary to ensure peace for ourselves. When they complain that we give so little credence to peaceful assurances then I must refer to my recent speeches. It is not true that we in any way aspire to interfere with other people's constitutions. I have no desire that National Socialist principles should be applied to others. They can keep their democracy and we will keep our National Socialism. As a German statesman, however, I am obliged in the interests of my people to study the proceeding of the rest of the world, to examine the questions arising therefrom and to take account of possible dangers. And in this I do not take my orders from a British Member of Parliament. When they now say, 'As a matter of fact we meant that the dictatorships and not the German and Italian peoples should be destroyed' I can only answer, 'What sort of thing could be said before November 1918 but since then no more'. In those days the same people said that it was only a question of getting rid of Prussian militarism, only of getting rid of the dynasty, only of the House of Hohenzollern, but not of the German people. They would then lead the German people to freedom in the international democratic system. We learned to know that freedom. The German people learned its lesson. A collapse such as Germany, thanks to her credulity, then experienced will not be repeated during the next thousand years. I can assure you that to all those who think they can let loose a war agitation against the German people. Germany can no longer be deceived by such phrases.

As a responsible leader I shall warn the nation of dangers and I see a danger in the fact that a continuous war agitation is being carried on in other countries. Anyone who does not believe that has only to look at a few recent incidents. It is not so long ago that questions of civil aviation were under discussion in the English House of Commons and that a new civil aeroplane was described as especially useful and practical. An Opposition Member called out, 'It is to be hoped that this machine can carry bombs to Berlin too'. We know what that means. Perhaps I shall be answered, 'That is only one of the Opposition'. My reply is that according to the constitution of the democracies the Opposition of today can be the Government of tomorrow. In fact this is generally the case. We are very thankful when the leading men in France and England repudiate such ideas and wish to live on good terms with Germany. We have stated more than once that we want nothing from these countries but the return of the colonies illegally taken from us. I have however always given an assurance that this is naturally not an occasion for war. It is a question, shall we say, of justice and of the genuine intention to make the common existence of the peoples possible. Otherwise we have nothing to ask of these countries and we ask nothing from them. We only want to do business with them, that is to trade with them. When therefore they talk of understanding we don't know what the understanding is to be about. One thing however we must keep before our eyes. In France

and

and England today there are certainly men in control who desire peace but others make no secret of wanting war against Germany. I am obliged to state this quite plainly to the nation and to draw the conclusions. Tomorrow Mr. Churchill could be Prime Minister. When a British Opposition leader declares, 'We do not want to destroy the German people but only the regime, that is exactly the same for no one destroys the regime without destroying the German people. If anybody says he wants to free the German people from the regime, I say to him, 'You do not speak for the German people.' If there is anyone who speaks for the German people, gentlemen of the British Parliament, it is I. The German regime is an internal matter for the German people and we will not tolerate any schoolmasterish supervision. Furthermore, it seems to me that we have achieved more than these gentlemen, and above all we have brought order late into our State, which cannot be said of all the countries in the world, and therefore obliged to take account also of the mentality of those who are not in power today but who may be tomorrow and to leave no doubts about their inner thoughts. The German people will understand why I warn it and why I myself am resolved to take all measures to be safe against every onslaught. I can assure you besides that the German people will not collapse in fear, shall we say, before bombs from Mars or the moon. Here too we will keep our heads in the German fashion. I am however resolved to

reinforce

reinforce the security of the Reich to the limit and I know that the whole German people will agree with me in this. There is no doubt that this means sacrifices. But it is better to undertake these sacrifices than one day to have to make them in the form of contributions as used to be said of reparations to foreign countries. There can therefore be only one decision for us, that which I stated at Saarbrücken: we are always desirous of peace. Nor have we broken it. But we are also always ready for defence and to manly and determined defence. If somebody now says to me, 'Then you do not want to make history by legal means but by force', I can only reply that Germany today has not refused to realize its rights by negotiation. Year after year we have tried by means of negotiation to obtain our rights. English Members of Parliament especially have no right to doubt this. For we have made a treaty with England by negotiation. That others did not do so too is not our fault. But one thing must be emphasized, National Socialist Germany will never go to Canossa. We have no need to. If the rest of the world obstinately persists in opposing the attempt to let right be done by negotiation, then there is no ground for surprise if we assert our rights by other means when we could not do so by the normal methods. When these British advocates of world democracy now state that we have destroyed two democracies in a year, then I can only inquire 'What is a democracy then? Who has the right to speak in the name of democracy? Has God handed the keys of democracy to Messrs. Churchill and Duff Cooper?

Is this engraved on tables of stone in the possession of the British Opposition? Democracy is in our eyes a regime resting on the will of the people. Once upon a time I became Chancellor in Germany in accordance with the rules of Parliamentary democracy. Indeed I was the leader of by far the biggest party. According to the rules of Parliamentary democracy I then received a clear majority and - Mr. Churchill may doubt it - I have today the unanimous support of the German people. I did not remove two democracies this year but I might almost say as an arch-democrat I removed two dictatorships, namely those of Messrs. Schuschnigg and Benes. I tried peaceably to persuade these two dictatorships by democratic means finally to give the right of self-determination to those affected. The attempt failed. Only then did I set in motion the power of the great German people in order to bring democracy to these countries, that is, to give freedom to oppressed people. The gentlemen of the British Parliament are no doubt at home in the British Empire but not in Central Europe. There they have no knowledge whatever of the conditions of events and circumstances. They will not and must not take this statement as an insult for we are not after all so well informed about India or Egypt or Palestine. I should however consider it proper if these gentlemen with their enormous knowledge and the unfailing wisdom which is their own would concentrate for the moment on Palestine, shall we say. They could shower blessings there. For what is going on there smells damned strongly

force and very little of democracy. But I only give that as an example, not as a criticism, for I am only the representative of my German people and not the advocate of others. That is where I differ from Messrs. Churchill and Eden who are the advocates of the whole world. I am only the representative of my people and I do here what I think necessary. When Mr. Churchill says to me, 'How can the Head of a State cross swords with a British Member of Parliament?' I answer him, 'Mr. Churchill, dont you feel honored? You can see from the fact that in Germany even the Head of the State is not afraid to cross swords with a British Member of Parliament the high esteem in which British Members of Parliament are held. Moreover, I am not the Head of a State like a dictator or a monarch, but I am the German people's Leader. I could, you may be convinced, have had quite different titles. I have kept the old one and shall keep it as long as I live because I want to be nothing else and never think of it. I am satisfied.' Mr. Churchill and these gentlemen are deputies of the English people and I am a deputy of the German people. The difference is only that Mr. Churchill received but a fraction of British votes and I represent the whole German people. Therefore, my old comrades in arms, when I call you and the whole German people to watchfulness I have a holy right to do it. I have secured great successes for the nation in these few years. It must understand that I am always caring for its security. I never want to live to make at the end of my days dark prophesies, as I close my eyes, such as Bismarck made.

I want to keep that which we have toilsomely achieved and to keep it forever by the tremendous power of the whole German nation. Thereby is a task fulfilled which our dead gave up. For this Germany they once marched with us with the same faith in their hearts as we.*

The remainder of the speech consists of a short but powerful peroration in memory of the martyrs of the Movement.

(EM)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 29 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

FROM

Berlin (part air)

Dated December 28, 1938

Rec'd 8:45 a.m. 29th

Secretary of State,
Washington,

758, December 28, 9 a.m.

My No. 649, November 23, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. From the South African Legation which has long maintained an extreme reticence concerning Pirow's visit to Germany, there is now privately learned the most noteworthy feature of the visit, that is the substance of Hitler's conversations with Pirow at Berchtesgaden.

Pirow inquired of Hitler the reason for his apparent extreme annoyance with the British following Munich—which has been evidenced by attacks in the German press and which has been popularly rumored as having to do with some "incident" during the Munich meeting. Hitler stated in reply that following the Anglo-German joint declaration at Munich and Chamberlain's return to London, the British immediately emphasized their need for rearmament, conjoined with unmistakable implications that Germany was the potential enemy. Hitler said that nothing had intervened between Chamberlain's statements at Munich and this display of British feeling,

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which would suggest a reason for such a change in attitude which was both inconsistent and unfriendly. Hitler said that he could not possibly have any objection to Great Britain's rearming which was entirely a British right but that he did object strongly to the circumstance of Germany being named in a manner which was provocative and unexplained in the light of Chamberlain's expressed desires for appeasement. Hitler commented that there was no parallel French action.

On the point of colonies, Pirow said that he did not raise the question (possibly for the reason given in my telegram under reference) and Hitler in the little he said about colonies did not seem interested except in a very long term sense.

As to foreign policy, especially as related to some possible German move, Pirow related that Hitler seemed most vague and uncertain. From Hitler's entire attitude and remarks Pirow gained the impression that Hitler had long been thinking solely in terms of Austria and Czechoslovakia, that these questions were settled much more rapidly than he had anticipated and that he now had no concrete thoughts in respect of the future.

I personally have grounds to believe that the foregoing is a substantially true narration of what took place.

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I would say that it checks in general with other evidence concerning Hitler's present state of mind and in the light of Hitler's personal control of German policy may prove to be illuminating.

Two. No one can, of course, know with any certainty what is in Hitler's mind. In respect of this, I must report that in diplomatic circles here there is current an undefined air of apprehension as to some German move in the offing. In recent days a number of representatives of the smaller European states have called on me and stated that they have received instructions setting forth accounts on this score reaching their capitals and asking for confirmation or reports. They tell me that they are able to present absolutely nothing concrete in reply. Points in these inquiries center chiefly on the Mediterranean and the Ukraine.

(A) Respecting the Mediterranean, the question seems to be as to whether Berlin intends to back up Rome in Italy's demands concerning French territory. To date there appears to be nothing but speculation on this score aside from generalized press support of the Italian position.

I have, however, from a private Italian Embassy source, a definition of the precise obligations which it is alleged Hitler has assumed toward Mussolini, which is that Germany

will

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will accord Italy the same support and no more which Italy gave Germany at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis-- meaning that Germany will give full support short of war, Germany having no intention of being involved in a war to the west. Of this, I can only say that it is credited by what I consider the best informed diplomatic representatives here.

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(B) Respecting the Ukraine, certain happenings are noted, all centering around Ruthenia: the appointment of a German Consul General at Hust, the proposed highway from Germany through Czechoslovakia, the bringing to Germany of some two thousand to three thousand Ruthenians for work in the four-year plan operations, the Warsaw protest to Praha which, from the Polish press is alleged to concern agitation originating in Ruthenia among the Ukrainians in Poland. On this, I can only report that German officials (who have themselves no information on German policy and thus discuss these matters abstractly) appear incredulous that any relatively definite plan is in existence or even that anything is intended respecting the Ukraine. It can be said for what it is worth that this is essentially different from their attitude toward the Austrian and Czechoslovak questions prior to the occurrences there. They view the Ukraine, furthermore, not as an outlying possession but as an integral part of Russia with

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with all that this implies. They are skeptical of accounts of outside comments regarding the alleged autonomy movement and the Polish and Rumanian complications are very evident. In any event I can as yet report nothing substantial here concerning any immediate project for the Ukraine beyond the group of happenings enumerated above and inferences which are being drawn therefrom. In this I am not dealing with possible long term German projects respecting the Ukraine or eastern Europe.

PEG:CSB

GILBERT



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 550

Berlin, January 29, 1939

Subject: Notes on German External
Policy.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1939 FEB 3 - PM 2 11

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Copy in file
John P. ...
FEB 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
FEB 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

762.00/239

The honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Conversations in diplomatic and journalistic
circles in Berlin continue to discuss the question
of possible developments in German foreign policy
and European political situation. These conversations
often gravely base the form of speculation and
even of assertion respecting alleged plans of
Germany's part taking place at an early date in the
European field. Of these I have not yet had
yet encounter nothing upon which I can base
any positive statements. In view of the
importance of this matter, I have warranted in
reporting my impressions to other with dispatch
as to their source.

The present period, as the Department has noted, is marked by a series of visits between the Central and Eastern European capitals. The most important of these, including those apparently projected or rumored are: Beck to Beratesbaden, Ciano to Berlin, Ciano to Belgrade, Ciano to Warsaw, Ribbentrop to Warsaw, Stoyadinovich to Berlin, Ullrich to Rome, Goring to Belgrade, Chvalkowsky to Berlin, Czeky to Warsaw, Ciano to Berlin.

precisely what may have transpired at any of these meetings which have already occurred, aside of what purposely may have been permitted to leak out, I am unable to say. Their occurrence has, however, enhanced in some minds a belief in impending moves in the East. That is not, however, my impression. From one of his personal friends here I learn that Czeky came to Berlin apprehensive that he might be held on Hungary in connection with some Eastern developments, but that he left reassured that such was not the case. The most important of these conversations was obviously that between Hitler and Beck. If my information from presumably well informed sources be correct, what was said tended to confirm Hitler's general policy vis-a-vis Poland discussed in my telegram 708, December 9, 1939, to which I beg to refer. In this regard I am told that it is understood that no official change would take place in the status of Poland.

W

therefore that no early change would take place in the status of Danzig, the League High Commissioner to remain at least provisionally. As would be expected, Hitler questioned Beck concerning Warsaw's reaffirmation of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact. Beck replied that Hitler had expressed a desire for peace and that peace in Poland could lie only in maintaining an equilibrium between Germany and Russia. Hitler is said to have agreed that this was so. Beck, reportedly, feels assured that nothing in public is contemplated respecting the Cataline.

In connection with these conversations it is noted that British news has been left to one side. Evidence of Germany's antagonism toward the present Polish Government are repeatedly reported to be, the same, apparently being particularly out of favor with the press. These reports are borne out by articles in the British press, as to which it is agreed to be one source of information.

Whether or not that I have just discussed in the foregoing is true in detail, my impression is that these conversations on Germany's part are for the purpose of strengthening and regularizing Germany's relations with the existing situation in Poland, which is being reported to be favorable. It is felt that Germany desires to maintain the status of the conversations in public concrete

uniting with Poland in a far-reaching coalition of
Russia. There are, as I have said, no witnesses of
Germany's planning to undertake this at the present
time and Poland undoubtedly could have no greater
fear than to find herself between a fascist Russia,
which it would be Hitler's aim to create, and
fascist Germany.

In any considerations regarding Moscow, China
naturally comes into the picture. Respecting China,
Germany's current attitude seems to be one of con-
fusing complexity and from this angle the value of the Tokyo-
Berlin axis appears to be reduced without final
judgment. I may say incidentally that China's posi-
tion here is likely to be enhanced by the new Chinese
ambassador, Mr. Chen Bich, who is a graduate of the
University of Berlin and has many personal friends
in Germany. He appears to be forceful and intelligent,
and I have had a number of helpful talks with him.

Respecting German-Russian relations per se, I
have read Moscow's telegram to No. 50, January 30, 1939,
with considerable interest. It is noted of course that
Mr. Nirk characterizes what he relates as lying in the
field of rumor. I can not yet ascertain certain facts
respecting the possible relations with which these
rumors deal. It appears nevertheless that certain
notes and cordiality displayed by Hitler in connection
with the Munich Conference may have been a tactical
device.

standing nearby that no political questions were
raised in that conversation, I consider the possi-
bility that Moscow feels reassured respecting the
Ukraine is not excluded. All that I know on the
initiative side is what the Russian Ambassador tells
me that Germany has recently been making friendly
overtures looking towards an increase in commerce.
I might say that this would seem to fit in to the
general picture of Germany's possible
present Eastern policy.

In all I am inclined to think that 1909 means
consideration of the East is concerned & a period
of consolidation of the new territories of Austria
and the Balkans and definitely a development of
the political and economic relationships to the East
and South.

The direction now taken, looking at the German
situation as a whole, as to the revivification of such a
policy, an advantage to Germany can easily be seen
in adjusting her relations to the East for political
and economic reasons connected with her economic pro-
gram and trade problems. In a sense these adjustments
are a necessary condition of a defensive
policy to Germany's East and West for any activity
with the East will be impossible to carry out, and
the only way to carry out such a policy is to have
the East as a result of the East, in any event, it is
a necessary condition that there be no political
barriers.

At this point in this year, I must be
frankly that I have been unable to reach
on indications of one side or another of
of speculation. It is a terrible ground floor
which, while not yet formed in a forecast
future, embodies in my personal opinion of
probabilities - a measure of the
Berlin field of observation.

The point when I reached Berlin in 1948
was that the question of German unity was
conclusion of the German people. I
either however admitted that I had no
theoretical objections. I was
cross the river to the other side of the
was given to me. I was given to me
a union of the German people. I
will at the end of the year. I
will convert to the other side of
about colonial. It is a
should not be mentioned.

If a man could find a way to
his to the other side of the
included in the other side of the
was on the other side of the
I was, I was, I was, I was
one side of the other side of the
I was, I was, I was, I was

less dependent on Mussolini. I believe that Hitler might at a given moment back Mussolini's demands in the Mediterranean, there will exist a distinct limit both as to what demands he will back and as to the extent of the backing he will give.

In this connection Embassy's tele par No. 738, paragraph (4), may be noted. Mussolini, if he has a clear vision of Hitler, will thus correspondingly limit his real demands. In all this, even to come to that point, the extensive dust raised by German and Italian propaganda is liable to be misleading.

The crux of the matter, as I see it, is that Germany does not desire a war in the west and for this reason has no intention of permitting Italy to draw her into such a war. There is first the question of whether Germany could materially support a war to the west. There are technical differences of opinion on this score which I do not feel prepared or competent to go into. The most important thing to me is, however, that the German people do not wish a war and, as a corollary of this, that the German army is opposed to a general war. The feeling against war has grown in Germany ever since the risk of conflict was presented to the German people in the Sudeten crisis. They recoiled from the imminent possibility of war at that time and they are, I believe, potentially still very opposed to it now.

I do not mean by this that Germany would not have
marched at the time of the Sudeten affair. I am certain
that Germany would have marched. Hitler may have put
forward a bluff to the extent that he believed that
he would be able to obtain what he desired without a
war. Most decidedly, however, viewing the situation
from this angle, I do not believe that Great Britain
and France by any display of force could have brought
Hitler to retire from his position respecting Czecho-
slovakia. It is effective, nevertheless, that Hitler
at that time realized, and that he has had later oc-
casions to note, that the German people do not wish
to become involved in war. A dictator in a modern
state, to a considerable degree with other rulers, must
depend for his support on the popular will. What would
have happened if Germany had become involved in
a world war, and had not wanted to resist. The maintenance
of this regime would undoubtedly to a degree at least be
assured, but not believe that Hitler was likely
to survive the war.

In respect to Italy's position in the war, it is
appreciated that Italy was prepared to fight, although
perhaps, it did not desire to fight, and
no work of destruction around to something in the nature
of a world war, which, in other words,
that it is a very serious matter which would arise. It is
clear that Italy was not in a position to do so.

line. The only other avenue to enter a war in support of Italy would be to send troops into Italy. This presents many practical difficulties and would also be exceedingly unpalatable to the German Army and the German people. On the other hand, I do not believe that Hitler could be bluffed by a display of force out of any position which he may choose to take, any more than I believe that such was the case in the Spanish crisis. I believe that the concept that Hitler could be thus bluffed would be a dangerous insight for anyone to entertain who was not ready to go to war. There naturally remains a consideration that Mussolini staying his own cards might face Hitler with a fait accompli by which Germany would be drawn into a conflict against Hitler's desires and plans.

As to the time when such developments may be expected I would say that any move must undoubtedly await the termination in some manner or other of the Spanish Civil War.

I reiterate that in the foregoing I have gone beyond my immediate impressions and have entered upon certain somewhat verified predictions. It is true that the Department will have numerous reports and the picture I have drawn is intended rather as a possible explanation of the present general situation rather than as any definite forecast of the future.

is symptomatic of other factors in which economic
 life is something which must be conserved and
 reserve. If, however, the difficulties are
 it may be that an attempt will be made to
 difficulties by various means, and
 in its handling on the part of the
 which is the subject of the present
 suggest that, should the conditions
 of a factual deterioration be in fact
 because of popular discontent, and
 apparent signs of revolt with
 or in the national interest,
 when attention is directed to

Prentiss Wilson

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 1 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials and scribbles.

REB-

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

BERLIN

Dated January 31, 1939

Rec'd 3:11 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
FEB 1 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

79, January 31, 4 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

The Embassy has not been unaware of accounts reaching Berlin during the past several days of apprehensions widely prevalent in certain states that some German military move to the west is imminent. From what I can learn here these apprehensions exist chiefly in Great Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and to a degree France and are reflected in the United States. This is made known to us by private telephone calls from such states, from travelers coming to Berlin and from flashes received by American press correspondents. To just what extent the Governments of these states share these beliefs or more particularly what grounds they may have for doing so I am unable to say.

A number of alleged German plans have come to me in detailed form. One respecting Belgium is that Germany contemplates seizing Liege and holding it as hostage so

to

762.00/231

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FILED

FEB 3 1939

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REB

2-#79, From Berlin, Jan.31,4p.m.
(Sec. One)

to speak for the turning over to Germany of the Belgian Congo. One concerning The Netherlands prefigures an armed assault on that country and the permanent holding of Amsterdam and Rotterdam as free ports.

I have naturally endeavored to ascertain what I can in respect of these matters. The French Ambassador and the British Charge d' Affaires in talking with me were entirely calm. While naturally sharing certain general anxieties concerning the European situation as a whole they are inclined entirely to discount these stories which had also reached them. The Belgian Ambassador and the Dutch Minister stated privately that they were constantly receiving instructions from their Foreign Offices asking for confirmation or comment on these stories and they said that they found themselves completely at a loss what to reply.

GILBERT

CSB

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated **FROM**
to anyone. (D)

BERLIN

Dated January 31, 1939

Rec'd 3:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

80, January 31, 5 p. m.

Continuing my 79, (SECTION TWO)

I may say that I find myself in the same position.
On the substantive side all that we are aware of
here is that it seems apparent that Germany has recently
shipped certain munitions to Italy and that limited
military movements are occurring in parts of Austria.
These developments do not nevertheless seem to be
taking place on a scale which would reveal their imme-
diate significance. In any event I can obtain no
indications that the German Government is contemplating
action to the west along the lines discussed above. I
naturally do not regard this as a proof that Germany
may not be considering such action. I can only report
that I encounter no evidences to that effect and that
the current local beliefs seem to be to the contrary.
At the moment I can add nothing to the discussion in
my despatch 550, January 25.

I now

762.00/231

F.P.

REB

2-#80, From Berlin, Jan.31,5p.m.

I now venture to suggest consideration of the possibility of accounts of this and of a similar nature respecting activities in various parts of Europe, being put in motion by individuals or groups seeking to promote certain beliefs and to agitate public opinion for their own political ends. Under modern technical conditions the mechanics of such projects would not appear to be difficult especially the device of creating the aspect of any given account being based on a number of apparently independent sources. Incidentally, as having something of a bearing on this, I have noted a growing practice somewhat alarming vis-a-vis the interests of truth, on the part of certain journalist circles to publish European political stories under false European datelines. In respect of this entire question I do not say that I assert the existence of planned efforts such as I have described above nor do I wish to exaggerate the possibility of their existence. There comes to my mind, nevertheless, the situation which I described in my 50, February 11, 1938, 8 p. m., and I can only feel that it is a question which merits at least some consideration.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GILBERT

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 6 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~EU~~
~~PAD~~
~~AVE~~

FROM

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Berlin (part air)
Dated February 4, 1939
Rec'd 7:40 a.m., 6th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 5 1939
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NS
sup

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
FEB 7 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

94, February 4, 10 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

139

In respect of German policy vis a vis the states to the east and southeast as pre-figured in Embassy's 550, January 25, I now learn from an entirely informed confidential German source that the following has been laid down as Germany's long term plan.

The aim gradually to be achieved is the bringing together with Germany into a, so to speak, "autarchic bloc" all of the states lying to the east and the southeast down to and including Turkey. In an exaggerated manner of speech this project might be described as a four year plan for the entire area. The plan will be developed without drama or sudden demonstrations primarily on an economic and commercial basis in distinction to a political basis. Such political associations as may occur will flow from economic associations. No particular methods

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

GML

FEB 11 1939

-2- #94, February 4, 10 a.m., from Berlin (part air).

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are worked out for the relationship with the several countries concerned; it is contemplated that they will merely take such form as progressive developments may suggest. On this score however a possible move during the relatively initial stages of this general project may be something in the nature of a customs union with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Italy will be granted wide participation in this scheme especially in the areas where her natural interests lie. An accord in principle and also including certain preliminary details has already been reached with Rome in respect of this matter. Poland will also participate to a degree this being progressively dependent on Poland's general political position toward Germany. The plan in a general sense is already in motion.

GILBERT

RR:HPD

EU

REB

GRAY

Berlin

Dated February 10, 1939

Rec'd 2:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

116, February 10, 3 p. m.

D. A. Z. evening February 9 in commenting on reported American conditions to the recognition of Franco Spain regards President Roosevelt as favoring the "Reds" in violation of his country's professed neutrality and as utilizing this occasion for pursuing his hostile ends against the authoritarian states.

BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG censures France for its tolerance of a Spanish "government" on French soil expressing the belief that in such circumstances it is difficult to entertain seriously French expression of friendship for them.

Today's issue same paper returns to the attack on President Roosevelt representing him as a disturber of the peace through his alleged policy of promoting disunity and his collectivist inclinations. The President is described as the best friend of the Bolsheviks and as an inciter of all European elements of disturbance which

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2-#116, From Berlin, Feb. 10, 3p.m.

which has been quiescent since Munich. "He has sounded the war cry against the authoritarian states". This paper while conceding a certain success to Roosevelt's maneuvers notes with approval their failure to influence President Ortiz of Argentine. VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER under the caption "war agitator number one" follows the same line pointing out that Roosevelt despite the unexampled position of security which the United States enjoys is unabashedly intervening in European affairs in support of popular fronts everywhere even though such "fronts" were originally organized to disrupt democracies from within and even though his policy will tend to install the United States in conflicts everywhere.

The press in general professes not to treat the President's disclaimer seriously and repeats references to "frontiers in France."

GILBERT

EDA

RGC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

42

JR

GRAY
FROM
Berlin

Dated February 23, 1939

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

711.62

Secretary of State,
Washington.

138, February 23, 5 p.m.

The arrival of Washington's Birthday has given the press occasion to contrast Washington with Roosevelt to the disparagement of the latter. VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER quotes excerpts from Washington's farewell address which it supposes the President may view as a relic of "the horse and buggy age". The paper insisted that Roosevelt is arming for war and suggests that the experience of the German people with his predecessor Wilson should cause the Germans to be on their guard. Roosevelt is again described as being supported by united Jewry and in league with Bolshevism. BOERSEN ZEITUNG with similar references to Washington's farewell address laments that the friendly relations between the United States and Prussia developed under Washington should no longer influence American foreign policy, while DAZ warns Americans against entangling alliances describing Roosevelt as engaged in a dangerous pastime where the least slip may result in devastation for his whole people.

FEB 24 1939
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711.62/231

NATIONAL

GML

-2- #138, February 23, 5 p.m., from Berlin.

NATIONAL ZEITUNG regards Roosevelt as a disturber of world peace while Silex writing in DAZ contrasts Chamberlain to Roosevelt stating that the former's words before the House of Commons should be regarded as a warning to American war agitators. Even though Chamberlain is arming his country at an unprecedented rate there is a "fundamental difference" between him and Roosevelt in that the British statesman possesses a feeling of responsibility for Europe. D.D.P.K. likewise exudes friendliness toward England in anticipation of the approaching visit to Berlin of an economic delegation headed by the President of the Board of Trade. Its issue of the 21st refers to Stanley and expresses pleasures over the possibility of achieving a broad basis of understanding. However, D.D.P.K. warns against a belief that the German system of autarchy will be constrained to reach an agreement with the British since Germany has already without any economic help from abroad achieved full and enviable employment for its population. Germany is merely desirous of attaining to an honorable economic relationship in the spirit of the Munich Agreement. It is not for those who once robbed Germany of its foreign possessions and colonies to criticize this country.

GILBERT

WVC:HTM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BERLIN

FROM

Dated February 24, 1939

Received 9:38 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

141, February 24, 1 p.m.

Echoes of Washington's Birthday are commentated in semi-official DDPK which voices astonishment over speeches made by Daladier and Bullitt at the Paris American Club's dinner on the 22nd in which the President's policies are described as animated by good neighborliness. "It is just the German neighbor which is continually assailed from America in the most unworthy manner and from official sources while nothing remains unattempted to cause the relationships between Germany and the European democracies to deteriorate." In a similar strain DAZ considers Daladier's allusion to Roosevelt as a paladin of peace and freedom to be ridiculous since Roosevelt's policy "seems to have no other aim than from a safe distance to drive the peoples of Europe into a baseless and senseless war for the profit of Wall Street".

BOERSEN ZEITUNG finds the hand of Eden in the machinations of Washington while at the same time attributing the current outeries of the democratic states

FEB 25 1939

FILED

711.62/232

GML

EDA - 2 - #141, February 24, 1 p.m. from Berlin

states against the authoritarian ones to bolshevistic rage and despair arising through the fall of Catalonia. Washington is described as the base of this Bolshevik propaganda. Approving note has been taken of former Under Secretary of State Castle's remarks at Pittsfield.

The Press of the past two days has given ample publicity to alleged details of the stormy meeting of the German American bund in New York but seemingly refrained from extensive editorial comment thereon. For instance, VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER in devoting an editorial to denunciation of Senator Pittman and other members as war mongers and "pirates of world politics" in that Germany is described as coveting territory from Holland to Siberia remarks "naturally Pittman is not missing from the hysterical circle which attributes the most disreputable purposes to Americans of German origin because they in association with other sensible Americans have opposed those attempts at unscrupulous popular mystification which emanate from Pittman and company." It would appear that the Berlin press in mentioning the bund has taken pains to represent it as having a German American rather than a purely German character.

GILBERT

KLP

8/1. 23/24
American
Volkbund

EDA - 2 - #212, March 29, 3 p.m. from Berlin

a fact.

If the Poles should have the idea that a similar attitude toward the German nation was not equally necessary, in other words that it was not necessary to consider the vital rights and the honor of the German people, it would be regrettable for the future harmonious development within Europe as it would certainly be detrimental to the Polish nation itself. It is indeed a bigoted policy to consider it quite the right thing as they do in certain Polish cities to abuse or persecute Germans and this can mean nothing other than an avowal of adherence to the spirit of Versailles. For after all mutual respect is the condition precedent for friendly inter-governmental relations. The responsible factors in Poland surely will not overlook the special geographic situation of their country which has dictated its policy in the past, namely, to maintain good neighbor terms in all directions independently and without tensions. Poland itself should know what returns the former line of its policy has brought it and to what extent its independence and its position in the world has augmented as a result thereof. It seems questionable whether it would be profitable to desert this line

EVEN

EDA - 3 - #212, March 29, 3 p.m. from Berlin

even though the sound of foreign sirens may turn it
in a different direction".

(END OF SECTION ONE)

GEIST

FPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Berlin

Dated March 29, 1939

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 30 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

212, March 29, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Although this warning to Poland has not thus far been taken up in concerted form by the Berlin press the ESSENER NATIONAL ZEITUNG yesterday featured on its front page an article bitterly citing numerous alleged attacks on Germans in Poland and other forms of "oppression" as well as the holding of mass meetings in a number of cities at which insults to the "Reich and Fuehrer" are alleged to have been perpetrated. Clearly implying that French and British agents in Poland have been active in stirring up these incidents the article states: "but as it becomes more obvious from day to day that the increase in such excesses seems to be proceeding according to a certain system it is not permissible to continue observing silence with regard thereto for in the long run excesses of this nature constitute an intolerable strain on friendly German Polish relations".

Although

-2- #212, March 29, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Berlin.

Although this incipient press attack against Poland may represent primarily a move to influence Beck prior to his forthcoming journey to London it nevertheless strikes an ominous note in view of its close similarity, both in content and language, to the press campaigns preceding the annexation of Austria and the Sudeten and the establishment of the Czechoslovak protectorates.

The vitriolic attack on the "democracies" particularly Great Britain which has been carried on during the last weeks continues with unrelieved intensity. Although indignation and ridicule are centered around alleged British attempts to "encircle" Germany through formation of a coalition analogous to that erected against Napoleon articles are constantly appearing condemning other phases of alleged British policy, both past and present, for instance her current policy in Palestine, the Boer War and the historic British slave trade.

The fall of Madrid is greeted with acclaim in this morning's press. Since this development is interpreted as a defeat for Moscow it is consequently characterized as a victory in fact for all Europe which German National Socialism and Italian Fascism at least are eager to refuse. Great Britain and France are sharply chided for their "futile hypocritical" policies which attempted to prevent the inevitable triumph of Franco. (END MESSAGE).

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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15

EDA*
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (C)

FROM BERLIN

Dated March 29, 1939

Received 2:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 30 1939
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 30 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

213, March 29, 4 p.m.

Hitler has been so angered by the change of English policy recently announced by Chamberlain that he is contemplating naming the new battleship presently to be launched "ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ" the implications of which name the Germans think the British will well understand instead of "FREDERICK THE GREAT" as originally planned.

By a source I consider reliable I am informed that Hitler now intends to pursue his program of expansion in Europe without making any further effort to secure English non interference. Hitler's policy it is believed will be aimed at separating France from England and preparing more intensively for an eventual show-down with England, the intention being to induce France to make an agreement with the axis partners whereby France as a secondary power would enjoy a guarantee of security from both Germany and Italy. The present relatively conciliatory attitude of Mussolini

toward

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APR 1 1939
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EDA - 2 - #213, March 29, 4 p.m. from Berlin

toward France and the alleged secret encouragement he is giving to promoting conversations are designed to carry out the above mentioned aims.

562.248

Hitler contemplates in addition forging ahead by (1) maintaining steadily at all costs preponderance over England in the air, (2) by unrestricted submarine construction if the Germans eventually decide to denounce the British German naval treaty and, (3) by exerting pressure in conjunction with Italy and Spain against England's vital points such as the Sudan, Gibraltar, et cetera. There is no intention of allowing events in the immediate future to bring on a major conflict compelling the axis powers to face the combined forces of the British and French empires at their strongest points and under strategic conditions unfavorable to Germany and Italy.

762.44

In line with this policy the Germans contemplate announcing shortly that Spain is a great power whereupon Spain will soon join the anti-Comintern pact.

I believe the foregoing represents what the Germans are actively turning over in their mind. It is unnecessary to caution that the Nazi plans are subject to sudden change.

GEIST

CSB

~~44~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Berlin

Dated April 6, 1939

Rec'd 3:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

237, April 6, 4 p.m.



According to reports from Paris and London informed circles there consider that war may break out in a week or ten days. No such indications exist here. Hitler returned to Berlin Tuesday and after a few hours' conference with Ribbentrop departed for Berchtesgaden. He was in a cheerful state of mind, saw a private movie and busied himself chiefly with plans concerning his birthday.

The opinion is held here in governmental circles that Beck will most likely sign a defensive alliance with England. If so, the severest pressure will be placed upon Poland for a voluntary solution of the Danzig corridor and upper Silesian questions with the aim of finally choking Poland to death by eventually surrounding and cutting her off from access to the sea. The Germans are confident England will not guarantee the status quo of the territorial differences between Germany and Poland.

740.00/742

FP

APR 10 1939

RECEIVED

The

-2- #237, April 6, 4 p.m., from Berlin.

741.62
The Nazis consider relations with England have practically ceased to exist. The slogan is "Gott strafe England" and leaders are confident here that by playing on the words "encirclement" and "hunger blockade" a war spirit could be worked up which would be vocative enough to impress the world with the public approval back of Hitler in his campaign against England. It is not the intention however to precipitate a general struggle in Europe but to continue sapping and undermining the foundations of potential victims and enemies.

763.73
The Albanian Minister, formerly his country's Foreign Minister and considered well informed, states that despite denials of his own Government he has reason to fear imminent Italian attack on Albania as move to distract world from German contemplated aggression against Poland which he believes should shortly follow this Italian action.

While I cannot vouch for accuracy of story a reputable American just returned from Prague reports arrival there of German soldier casualties said to have been incurred in border fighting against Poles in Teschen area.

From

-3- #237, April 6, 4 p.m., from Berlin.

7600 v2
From available information there have been to date no troop concentrations along the Polish frontier although there is evidence of prior arrangements having been made for such an eventuality. Owners of various private cars were notified that they were to be commandeered this week and a new restricted area in southwestern Germany and East Prussia on the Polish border has been announced by the Foreign Office.

Military furloughs over Easter are being freely granted and leading officials of various Ministries are planning to leave Berlin for the holidays.

Presumably because of the concentration of the press against England and Poland less space is devoted to press criticism of the United States. In regard to the American attitude toward Germany a curious incident occurred yesterday when General Milch Chief of the German air corps asserted to the Military Attache that it would be impossible for the United States ever again to send troops to Europe because 8,000 out of every 10,000 would be lost. Similar statements are understood to have been made by air officers to other individuals.

It is believed locally that the publicly announced meeting of the German commanding general and the Italian chief

-4- //237, April 6, 4 p.m., from Berlin.

chief of staff at Innsbruck is intended as a demonstration of military solidarity and it is possible the meeting will be followed by a public affirmation in this sense.

GEIST

CSB

EU

JR

GRAY

Berlin

Dated April 8, 1939

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

240, April 8, 1 p.m.

Note

The few papers publishing editions this morning concentrate on expression of approval of Italy's action in Albania and on corroboration of Italian arguments advanced in justification thereof. Germany's official attitude in the matter is conveyed in the following announcement by the German News Agency:

451

"In connection with the reports of Italian troops landing in Durazzo it is learned from official German quarters that this action is in conformity with the word and the spirit of the Italo-Albanian Treaty of Friendship of 1927 and also with the deep fellow feeling of the Italians for the Albanian people. Germany appreciates the fact that Italy cannot permit a constant focus of unrest, disturbing to general order and at the same time threatening the security of the Italian population there to be created in a country of such vital importance to Italian interests on the other side of the Adriatic.

Germany

-2- #240, April 8, 1 p.m., from Berlin.

Germany fully understands that Italy must protect her interests in this area and would not understand or approve interference by the western democracies in the legally indisputable position and action of our axis partner where the former have no interests".

Although constituting in general a reiteration in stronger terms of this statement editorial commentaries add that Zog had for some time been intriguing against Italy and oppressing the Italian population in Albania. Indicating that his course in this respect was instigated by agents of other powers particularly Great Britain who wished to disturb Italy's relations with Yugoslavia, Mussolini's action is interpreted as a sharp rebuke to the democracies. In this connection the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER writes.

"The democratic world may also let today's incident serve it as a lesson to the effect that the developments of the young political movements in Central Europe cannot be broken by intrigues and diplomatic maneuvers."

Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact is likewise featured this morning. It is hailed as the logical outcome of Franco's valiant struggle against Bolshevism in which Germany and Italy have from the

outset

-3- /240, April 8, 1 p.m., from Berlin.

outset supported him. The announcement of Spain's association with Germany, Italy, Japan and Hungary in the fight against the "world scourge of Bolshevism" is welcomed as particularly propitious at this time, the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER stating

"At a moment when renewed efforts are being made to set up a democratic front and to adapt it to Moscow, Spain has formally accomplished her accession to the common aims and life of the young aspiring peoples among whom she had already taken her place through her heroic fight, now to shape her national destiny out of the forces of her blood and soil in cooperation with them."

GEIST

CSB

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 780c.62/497 FOR Tel #241 2pm

FROM Germany (Geist) DATED Apr. 8, 1939

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Italian attack on Albania

Believed - was part of a general plan
between Germany and Italy but the invasion
was started several days before the date set.

dg

765.75/475

6/15

MA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (C)

Berlin

Dated April 8, 1939

Rec'd 12 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

241, April 8, 2 p.m.

There is no doubt that unusual military preparations are under way at the moment in Germany. The concensus of opinion of military observers, however, is that these preparations are not far enough advanced to enable decisive action to be taken immediately against Poland.

"Preparations" so far reported are; (one) an order yesterday placing the German army in "march readiness"; (two) reported gradual strengthening of German garrisons along Polish frontier both in East Prussia and in the main area of the Reich.

According to one source of information here, while Germany and Italy had agreed to the latter's attack on Albania as part of a general plan, the Italian invasion was started several days before the date set.

SECRET

WAG:UD

7602.62/497

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

BERLIN

Dated April 13, 1939

Rec'd 2:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

247, April 13, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
APR 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Last night privately at the house of a friend I had a comprehensive conversation with the Chief of the German General Staff regarding the political situation in Europe.

I gave the General a clear and unequivocal exposition of our views on recent events in Europe. He appeared to be very much disturbed over the possibility of America, in case of war, throwing the weight of her resources and support on the side of Germany's potential enemies. He said that the German army was bound under all circumstances to support Hitler in his program of international action and negotiations no matter what course events took. The German military leaders while pledged to do their duty hoped that those statesmen politically responsible for Germany's future as well as foreign statesmen and diplomatists would be able to avoid an international conflict and settle all problems without bloodshed; as a
general

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GDG



REC'D
APR 13 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

REB

2-#247, From Berlin, Apr. 13, 5p.m.

general war he feared would destroy European civilization and the German army did not want war.

962.50
The General said that Hitler's mission was to procure for Germany sufficient room in which to live; that is, to put the country territorially on a self-sufficient basis with respect to raw materials and food. He said Hitler would not halt in his efforts to accomplish this program. He believed that when this was accomplished it would be the end in Germany of Hitler and a National Socialist regime. He said Hitler had hoped that the western democracies would take a realistic view of Germany's fundamental position and not interfere in Germany's eastern aims but since England and France are now making diplomatic moves to block Germany's eastern expansion Hitler was looking again toward the west; inferring that unless fewer obstacles were placed in the way of Germany's eastern expansion it would be necessary for Hitler to end the opposition which might happen in the west.

962.20
I obtained the conviction from the conversation that
(1) the German army was entirely subordinate to the wishes of Germany's present political leaders under Hitler, that
(2) the army while well prepared and probably so well

prepared

REB

3-#247, From Berlin, Apr. 13, 5p.m.

prepared that Hitler would not hesitate to use it to force his will is strongly opposed to war and that the military heads in Germany are apprehensive as to the course events may take.

The latest information from informed sources is that the Germans are becoming alarmed at the intense war talk abroad and that in Governmental circles here the word has gone out to make an effort to tone down the general strained international atmosphere.

GEIST.

WWC

CSB



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 7.

Berlin, April 24, 1939

Subject: Remarks of a National Socialist Party
Official Concerning Germany's Plans
and Ambitions.

Handwritten initials and marks:
EW
PAH
AMC
JH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1939 MAY 6 PM 12 45

OFFICE OF THE ADVICE IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
* JUN - 2 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
MAY 5 1939
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 24 1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
MAY 22 1939

740.00/1362

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor, as of possible interest to the Department, to transmit herewith a summary of observations concerning Germany's plans and ambitions made to a member of the Embassy's staff on April 20 (Hitler's birthday) by Herr Werner Daitz, a Reichstag Deputy who is also a principal in the National Socialist Party Foreign Press Bureau. He is understood to be closely associated with Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg.

It will be noted that Herr Daitz manifested considerable hostility toward recent actions and statements of the American administration and of the British Government as constituting an unwarranted interference in Germany's current development. Herr Daitz did not hesitate to emphasize


that

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

that such development involved expansion into
eastern Europe.

Respectfully yours,


Raymond H. Geist
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:
Summary, as above.

800

JP:EM

Enclosure to despatch
No. 7 of April 24,
1939, from American
Embassy, Berlin, Germany.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
April 20, 1939.

Subject: Germany's Plans.

Participants: Herr Werner Daitz, Reichstag Deputy and Director of the Office of Foreign Politics; Administrator of the National Socialist Party, and Mr. Patterson.

Herr Daitz, whom I met at a musical celebration in honor of Hitler's birthday held in the late afternoon of April 20, showed himself indignant over Roosevelt's message to Hitler and Mussolini, which he considered an unwarranted intrusion into European affairs. Mr. Daitz also strongly disapproved the imposition of 25 % countervailing duties on German articles imported into the United States. He stated that he was, in addition to being a National Socialist journalist, close to Rosenberg, an economist and had recently written a book on National Socialist economic proposals. Referring to the military parade held for four hours on the same day, Herr Daitz alluded with manifest exuberance to the display of artillery which he was certain had made an impression on all visitors. One gun shown was represented by him as being the largest piece of artillery (capable of being moved by motor vehicles) in use by any country.

Germany

Germany was determined to resist any attempt by any country to repeat the blockade measures of 1918 and was already in a position to withstand such measures should any country impose them. Germany, as a result of its experiences of the past war, desired to be 80% self-contained in a material sense. Foreign trade would supply the remaining 20% of Germany's material requisites. During the Middle Ages Germany had expanded toward the East but following the discovery of America this trend had been reversed so that immense numbers of Germans had crossed the seas to the Americas. Now, owing to the stoppage of large-scale emigration, Germany, possessed of a population too large for its present area, was determined to renew its eastward expansion. Such expansion was needed to supply the necessary bases for a good material life of the German people. However, such economic and financial considerations were not the sole urge impelling National Socialist Germany eastward. Bolshevik Russia was essentially an Asiatic conception and had brought Asia nearer to Europe than in the past. A glance at the map would show Europe to be at best a peninsula jutting out from Asia. Europe should be larger and Asiatic influence should be repelled.

German eastward advance thus would serve not only material needs but also to expand European culture. Germany's advance would destroy no cultures higher than its own and would indeed bring civilization to benighted areas.

Herr Daitz ridiculed the idea that Germany, once in possession of an eastern empire, might use its increased force to expand towards the West. He stated that such ideas were fanciful and that Germany would reduce her armament, on which excessive sums were now being expended, as soon as it had used it "to put a fence around the proper German field." He added that the National Socialist Government had consciously prevented the elevation of the German standard of living during the past years in order to obtain security for the people and an adequate area for their life. However, once this security had been gained, expenditures on non-productive matters would be reduced and the people given opportunity to lead a better life in a material sense. All the foregoing was, however, apparently not understood abroad although Germany had endeavored to make it abundantly clear, at least to Great Britain, that by concluding the Naval Agreement of 1935, Germany had no overseas ambitions or desires to disintegrate the vast British Empire.

811-62 N
As for the Americas, Germany wished merely to trade with the countries of the Western hemisphere. Pro-Nazi manifestations by Germans resident in the Americas did not constitute anything in the nature of "cells" for the furtherance of National Socialist designs on the security of such countries. The attitude of German nationals in the Americas resembled the attraction of filings toward a magnet, National Socialist Germany being the latter. It was spontaneous and inevitable but constituted no political danger for the lands in which these Germans were living.

In

760400
In Europe, Germany had absorbed Czechoslovakia as being merely a province which had been under German control for many centuries. The Czechs have been always subject to the Germans and have not had a real state of their own. This and similar areas were the natural field for German expansion.

On being asked why, when the Germans had had an eastern empire at the end of 1917, during the war, they had not made peace with the western powers on condition of continuing to hold such eastern lands, Herr Daitz stated that it was the effective entry of America into the War about that time which had made it impossible for the Germans to consolidate or organize their gains in the East, Germany had accordingly been obliged, in view of American participation in the hostilities, to transfer forces in the West and continue to fight there. Had the United States not entered the War, a much more reasonable and enduring peace would have resulted in Europe. Herr Daitz stated that the United States did not understand Europe and its intervention in the affairs of the older Continent resembled the attempt of an immature child to instruct its mother.

As for the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, these were simply war measures and were, as such, severe. They did not represent the attitude which Germany would adopt in the future toward areas falling under its control. He stated that one would merely need watch the reorganization of Czechoslovakia to be convinced of the truth of his observations. As for the Balkans, Germany's

commercial activity in that area had been the result of its own enterprise which had fructified a rather barren economic area for the benefit of all concerned. In the past, neither Great Britain nor France had shown any interest whatever in the Balkans and had contributed nothing to the development of the area. Now, however, that Germany had developed a thriving trade, the western powers wished to seize it for themselves.

Herr Daitz, however, stated that despite British unwillingness to recognize Germany's new position on the Continent, Germany would go ahead. He looked for a show-down in German-British relations in the near future, - in a future much nearer than most people might think possible. "The British think that God speaks English" and the Germans will not tolerate British interference and haughtiness. If certain countries fear Germany it is because they have guilty consciences from having stolen German territory at Versailles. The less said about morals in international relations, the better. Certainly Britain's conduct in the formation of its empire, and indeed the American's too, would not stand very close scrutiny. Germany, he repeated, did not wish to rule both East and West. It had no designs on Holland or the Dutch Colonies. Germany did not even desire to hold Poland, which had not belonged either to the Empire of Henry the Fowler, founder of the First Reich, or to the Holy Roman Empire. Poland might lie in the way, but Russia was the ultimate goal. There was no possibility, according to Herr Daitz, of an agreement with Russia. Any rumors regarding the possibility of an

alliance

alliance with Soviet Russia were more than absurd. Germany is going forward since nations, like individuals, must progress or decline. It is impossible to assume a static position or to accept one imposed by others. Roosevelt's recent message is in essence a plea for freezing of the territorial status quo and so cannot be accepted by Germany.

JP:EM