TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY JR.

Berlin

FROM
Dated May 18, 1939
Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

386, May 18, noon.
My number 371, ay 15, 7 p.m.

The press today announces prominently Ciano's visit to Berlin and reports that he is due to arrive on May 21. It is stated that the formal signature by the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Italo-German Agreement will take place on the morning of May 22nd in the new Chancellery in the presence of the German Ambassador to Italy and the Italian Ambassador to Germany and that other ceremonies and conferences have been arranged. The visit will last two days and Ciano will be accompanied by Italian officials and journalists.

The VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER points out that the speedy preparation of the agreement for signature is in the spirit of the unreserved confidence which marks the friendly association of the two countries and states that "the armored block of hundred and fifty million men is the decisive factor in Europe about which all political events revolve."
-2- #386, May 18, noon, from Berlin.

revolve and whose peace ensuring might has been emphasized by the Milan Agreement and the speech of Mussolini at Turin."
Telegraph Received
Gray

Berlin

From: Dated May 24, 1939

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

412, May 24, 4 p.m.

During the last few days growing attention to Japan has been noticeable in the press. This is manifested in the numerous descriptive articles about Japan most of which are written by members of the group of German journalists now making a tour there and in the prominence given both to Premier Hiranuma's recent announcement of Japan's determination to maintain the closest cooperation with Germany and Italy as well as to the alleged strongly favorable reaction of the Japanese press to the German-Italian pact. In the latter connection this morning's Boersen Zeitung summarizes an editorial said to have appeared in the Japan Times which declares that just as Germany and Italy have united in a front for peace in Europe so Japan stands for peace in the East and that in this way Japan best serves its German and Italian partners. In a brief editorial comment the paper avers that in conjunction with Hiranuma's statement a clear warning to the Western...
western powers may be discerned in this semi-official utterance of the Japan TIMES. Japan it is asserted emphasizes its specific duty to reorganize Eastern Asia as well as its concurrence with the axis powers in the anti-Comintern front and "in the face of the current efforts to create an unfriendly triple pact lets it be known in this way that a common enemy of the axis powers and Japan would be jointly opposed though in different parts of the world."

KIRK

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (C)

FROM BERLIN

Dated May 25, 1939
Rec'd 6 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

416, May 25, 7 p.m.

Thus far the continued press comment on the German-
Italian pact has followed the same general lines described
in my 408, May 25, 5 p.m. which has revealed little of
a definite nature as to the future policy of Germany and
Italy under the pact and no official act or utterance
of which the Embassy is aware has thrown any light on
this question. In the absence of any such concrete
indications an analysis of the pact must therefore be
confined to impressions current in diplomatic and press
circles here and among the Germans with whom the Embassy
has had an opportunity to confer.

It is generally agreed that much in the pact may be
regarded as constituting merely a declaration of agreements
previously arrived at between the two countries. Accord-
ingly there is a tendency notably on the part of certain
diplomats to conclude that the pact represents no important
change in the European political situation and that the
outburst of publicity accompanying its preparation and
signature
signature was intended to divert public attention from the failure thus far of German and Italian diplomacy to achieve German aims in Danzig and the Corridor, to fulfill aside from the acquisition of Albania Italy's aspirations in the Mediterranean, and to prevent the signing of the Anglo-Turkish agreement. The same persons advance the opinion that whereas Germany was formerly free to proceed without consulting Italy it is now prevented from doing so in future by Article II and that Italy, deeply adverse to risking a general war, is thus enabled to exert its influence toward a moderation of German policy especially with regard to Poland.

The foregoing interpretation, however, is not shared by the predominant majority of foreign journalists here or by certain other diplomats particularly those representing countries having close relations with Germany and Italy and it does not conform to the reaction of with whom the Embassy has come in contact. It is asserted in these circles that the pact constitutes one of the most remarkable alliances in modern history as it is complete and unconditional and in its intent obligates the respective parties to come to the aid of the other in case of war however started or for whatever purpose it may be waged. In this regard the new pact is compared with the pre-war
pre-war triple alliance which left Italy a legal loophole of escape in 1914 and which Austria felt free to exploit in an attempt to conclude a separate peace with the Allies. Furthermore the belief prevails that the military terms of the actual treaty go beyond those agreed upon at Milan and that an understanding has been reached either confirming an already existing arrangement for the assignment of German officers to Italian troops or inaugurating such a system with which the trip to Rome of General Milch announced in the press this morning is associated.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

KIRK

EMB: JRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

Secretary of State
Washington

416, May 25, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The view is likewise advanced in the foregoing circles that Germany has succeeded in committing Italy not only in the military field but in the economic sphere as well and by virtue of Article IV which binds the parties to collaboration in the sphere of war economy in times of peace as well as in actual war the pact is said to be adjusted to the conditions of blockade which a common enemy would doubtless employ against Germany and Italy. It is thought along this line that as Italy is the economically poorer of the two and is less advanced in the realm of "autarchy" or self sufficiency this would mean making Italy more or less dependent upon Germany economically and that this trend would develop even if peace were to be maintained. The pact is thus looked upon as the comprehensive framework of an alliance which would doubtless be amplified by special secret technical agreements in the field of military and economic collaboration.
The vague wording of the provisions of Article VI of the pact regarding the development of the relations of the signatories with friendly states has in particular given rise to speculation. The view is expressed that the denunciation of certain agreements may be expected in consequence thereof and in this connection the Anglo-Italian agreements is being widely mentioned. It is also asserted that the Article may connote that a creation of German and Italian spheres of interest in the Balkans and Eastern Europe has been determined or will be effected with the purpose of evolving at the same time a joint coalition of these nations with Germany and Italy. Ribbentrop’s reference to the "mighty and invincible bloc of 300,000,000 men" contained in his statement issued following the signature of the pact is regarded as indicating such a purpose and the view is advanced that the pact as a whole may envisage a larger application than merely the immediate attachment of Italy to Germany and may be intended to constitute a nucleus for further combinations.

The foregoing impressions are based on considerations limited to the extent of the information so far revealed and any definite evaluation of the real significance of the pact would depend upon a knowledge of such unpublished understandings as may have attended it or may be in contemplation.
contemplation as well as upon a subsequent disclosure of the means which may be adopted with a view to implementing its terms. It is clear, however, that whatever the past in itself may signify or whatever effect may be given thereto, the chief consideration is the action which the Axis powers may take in pursuit of their policies and that factor depends solely on the intent in the minds of Mussolini and Hitler and its development in the face of future events in Europe.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KIRK

EMB:JRL
A portion of
this telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

BERLIN
FROM Dated May 26, 1939
Rec'd 3:56 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

417, May 26, 2 p.m.
(GRAY) My 398, May 21, 11 a.m.

During the last few days the more or less chronic
anti-Polish press campaign has undergone a definite
intensification which began at the first of the week
with lengthy accounts accompanied by sharply condemnatory
editorials of the shooting at Kalthof on the Polish-
Danzig frontiers of a Danzig citizen the responsibility
for which was attributed to Polish officials. The
protests of the Danzig Government with regard to this
matter were featured as was also the despatch of a
wreath by Hitler to the funeral of this "German victim
of Polish brutality". This account has been followed by
a series of derogatory reports of new instances of
violence perpetrated by Polish mobs against the German
minority notably riots in Tama and Lodz which are said
to have resulted in serious injuries to Germans resident
in these places and in extensive damage to their property. Yesterday the press gave prominent publication to reports that a German truck heading from East Prussia across the corridor to the Reich was fired upon by Polish guards while stopping at the Danzig customs station. In commenting on this incident the LOKAL-ANZEIGER declares that despite the protection by international law of traffic across the corridor no one in the world can argue that such traffic can be maintained if drivers are met with Polish shots and that in this way "Poland itself provides better proof than would otherwise be obtainable that conditions in the corridor have become impossible especially since the Polish Government protects subordinate Polish authorities responsible for such incidents and thereby practically provokes them."

This emphasis on Polish acts of provocation against Germany is coupled with editorial attacks on the chauvinistic attitude of the Polish press which according to the VOLKISCHER BEOBCHTER as well as other papers is now being manifested not only toward Germany but likewise toward Italy. (END GRAY)
This reference to comment in the Polish press unfavorable to Italy has aroused interest here in view of the rumors which have been circulating as to the possibility that Italy may exercise a restraining influence on Poland over the Danzig controversy. Members of the Polish Embassy here are increasingly outspoken in their assertions as to the necessity of making a definite and conclusive stand against German aggression as well as in their profession of absolute confidence in the strength of the armed forces of Poland coupled in certain instances with disparaging comments on the war power of Germany. They also state that no conversations are now being carried on between Warsaw and Berlin and that none can proceed until the requirements laid down by Beck as condition precedent to negotiations are fulfilled. They indicate furthermore that the situation with which German action has confronted the Polish Government would be simplified if Poland could be assured that Danzig would not eventually be made a base for German fortifications as a menace to Polish territory and that the threat of German arms would be removed but state that the only guarantee of the execution of any commitments by Germany to the foregoing effect would be some reduction in German war preparations.
NC -4- #417 from Berlin, May 26, 1939 2 p.m.

In certain neutral diplomatic circles in Berlin this attitude as expressed by Polish representatives is characterized as intransigent and fraught with the gravest danger. Hitler is said to maintain his position that the Polish controversy must be settled either peacefully or by force although he is said to have given assurances to Italy at the time of the signature of the Italo-German pact that he contemplated no drastic development until August. It is also variously reported that at the same time secret commitments were entered into by the two governments envisaging German action against Poland and Italian action against Tunis. There is no uniformity in the conjectures as to the nature of these commitments but the impression prevails that they are intended to favor particularly the accomplishment of the aims of Germany and that in the meanwhile the Polish controversy is being allowed to drift with the increasing danger of the precipitation of a crisis through the development of incidents on either side.

KIRK

CSB
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

423, May 27, 3 p.m.

Although the Berlin papers continue to publish reports of apparently minor attacks upon Germans and German property in Poland, editorial comment this morning passes over these incidents and concentrates upon the state and progress of the alleged British "encirclement policy".

The semi-official DDPK attempts to demolish British professions that the action of that Government is directed only against "aggression" as such and not against any particular country and that Great Britain is prepared to negotiate guarantees with all other nations. The DDPK points out that "indirect and direct aggression" and the "violation of vital interests" is defined by the British in such a way as to induce the countries already guaranteed to undertake provocative acts and steps which would set "collective security" in motion in their favor. The sympathetic treatment
treatment accorded in Great Britain and France to the recent Polish outrages against Germans in Danzig is taken as indicating the spirit in which future provocation by Poland may be judged.

The DDPK comments that the irresponsible manner in which Great Britain is trying to will over Russia and the willingness on the part of England to submit to Soviet blackmail for these purposes emphasize the common danger involved for all in the British maneuver and in this connection special reference is made to the uneasiness apparent in Scandinavian countries which is held to be prompted by the example of Soviet help in Spain. The DDPK says that whoever speaks of willingness to negotiate and yet at the same time holds them to intransigence and arrogance can hardly awake confidence and that the professions of good will made by such parties concerned are only intended as a cloak under which to continue the policy of division and tension.

Let no one be deceived, the commentary concludes, that Berlin and Rome do not see behind the veil or are lacking in the perception and determination to meet the danger at the proper time.
In an article in the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER called "the encirclers" Doctor Goebbels remarks upon the strange affinity which Great Britain is trying to cultivate with Soviet Russia. This shows, he says, that the British front has nothing in common with democracy but cutting across ideologies is a purely political weapon designed to hold Germany down in the interest of the balance of power and of British trade. The weakness of the front is illustrated in Great Britain itself where young men can only reluctantly be forced to shed their blood for their country's policy. According to Doctor Goebbels Germany and Italy have already won the first move as they have created an alliance ideologically, politically, and militarily perfect. "Any attack against this front will be met with a stunning blow". Doctor Goebbels says. "At present people are talking of a war of nerves which has broken out and must be gone through. We know nothing of this. But should this be the case we are convinced that we will win it and chiefly for the reason that our better right gives us better nerves".

KIRK

CSB
Secretary of State
Washington

433, June 1, 6 p.m.
My 431, June 1, noon.

The text of the German-Danish nonaggression pact is published in this evening's press. Article I provides that neither of the two parties shall resort to war or employ force against the other or furnish support to third countries engaged in war against one of the parties. Article II provides that following the exchange of ratification which shall take place as soon as possible in Berlin, the treaty shall enter into force for a period of ten years that if not denounced before the expiration of that period the treaty will be prolonged for another ten years and that the same applies to the successive periods.

A protocol provides that support by the contracting party not engaged in the conflict will not be regarded as existent within the meaning of Article I of the treaty if the conduct of the party is in accord with the general rules of neutrality and that therefore the continuation of a normal exchange and transit of goods between the contracting
HRE 2-#433 From Berlin June 1, 6 p.m.

contracting party not engaged in the conflict and a third power will not be regarded as inadmissible support.

KIRK

NPL
MEMORANDUM

Lieutenant Colonel Antoni Szymański, Military and Air Attaché to the Polish Embassy, was not disposed to make optimistic predictions regarding anything but the most immediate future of European political and military affairs. In relation to the German-Italian Treaty of May 22, he said that the Italians had been giving out that the treaty would make for stability in Europe since the Germans would now have to consult the Italians. Since this interpretation of the treaty had emanated from Italian sources, he was not inclined to place undue reliance on its being necessarily the only possible one. At the same time, the treaty did seem to render it impracticable for the Germans, or rather for Hitler, to stage any sudden and unexpected move such as he had done in the past. In that sense the Italian pact might seem to institute delay in initiating military operations and so might tend to serve the cause of peace.

Lieutenant V. A. Sundman, Military and Air Attaché of the Finnish Legation in Berlin, stated in relation to the German-Italian treaty of alliance that he felt the somewhat generalized terms of the pact signed on May 22 must have behind them a more detailed military agreement if the provisions of the pact were to be executed. However, he felt that
any supplementary military agreement would be one of
detail only and would be designed merely to make ef-
fective the provisions of the general pact just
signed in Berlin. He hoped that the pact, which
obliged the Germans to consult their Italian allies,
might be interpreted as one which would prevent pre-
cipitate action by the former.

Berlin, June 2, 1939.

JP:AC
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Embassy's despatch No. 746 of April 27, 1939, reporting expressions of view by Mr. Raouf Fico, Minister of Albania in Berlin, on political and military developments in Europe, with special reference to the Balkan Peninsula, I have the honor to transmit a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Fico and a member of the Embassy in which the Minister expresses further views on recent developments in Europe and the Balkans.

It will be noted that the Albanian Minister, despite the occupation of his country by Italy, is

still
still recognized by the German Government as possessing a certain diplomatic status.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:
1/ Memorandum as above.
MEMORANDUM

May 27, 1939.

Subject: Conversation between Mr. Raouf Fico, Minister of Albania, and Mr. Patterson.

Mr. Raouf Fico, who had been a Turkish official before the creation of an independent Albania, stated that he was still recognised by the German Foreign Office as Minister of Albania. He had, however, virtually nothing to do, and seldom left his Legation. Instructions from Tirana were rare and of a routine nature. His family were actually at Tirana, but while he received letters occasionally from them, these carefully avoided references to aught but such non-political matters as personal health, etc.

On the occasion of Count Ciano's visit to Berlin, he had been invited to Ribbentrop's reception and had attended. He had, in view of the King of Italy's being also King of Albania, met Count Ciano at the Berlin railroad station on his arrival. He had, in so doing, acted on his own initiative and had received no instruction or invitation to do so. He had noted on the platform the diplomatic representatives of countries associated with the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact. On my remarking that Jugoslavia, whose Minister had been reported on the platform, did not appear officially to be of that number, Mr. Fico admitted that
that this was so officially but that Yugoslavia, since
the seizure of Albania, was in a most precarious pos-
ition vis-à-vis the Axis and that the country and
presumably its Berlin representative, did not have all
the freedom of action desired. Also Yugoslavia was one
of the countries which did not have official relations
with the Soviet Union so could be considered at least
associated with the Anti-Comintern group of countries.

Mr. Fico did not know what the result of the
German-Italian agreement of May 22 would be, but
appeared to feel that it had hitched Italy to the German
chariot. Italy would be the first loser in a general
war, due to its exposed position. Italy was, in his
view, the key to the situation during a coming war in
Europe, since if that country could be neutralized by
detachment through force or guile, from Germany, the
Germans could not win the war. Countries which, like
Yugoslavia, had now to play ball with Germany, would
at once side with Germany's opponents and Germany would
be absolutely alone in a world of antagonists. Germany's
economic situation would not permit of its fighting a
long war successfully, but Germany, on the other hand,
would not collapse economically without a prior war. The
oil wells of Rumania would probably be the first German
objective in a war due to the need of fuel for its air
force and motorized units. Mr. Fico thought that the
Poles would fight rather than yield substantially to
German demands and that the Turks would too. Greece,
and even
and even Bulgaria, would side against Germany in case of a continued war. Hungary was too much in the grip of Germany to be able to do very much by way of opposition to German demands. In short, Mr. Fico considered that Germany was in a less favorable situation than in 1914 as regards resources and allies. However, the East European countries had made mistakes through short-sightedness. Poland had been particularly at fault there in nibbling at Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938 at Teschen, despite its grievances against the Czechs who, when the Soviet troops had invaded Poland after the War, had refused to allow munitions destined for Poland to pass through Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, under Benes (whom he described as the spoiled child of the League of Nations) might, in the nature of affairs, not have been able to conciliate the Germans or Hungarians within their borders or outside, but they had shown political ineptitude in short-sightedness in not conciliating the other Slavs in the country: Slovaks and Ruthenians.

The danger of war, while perhaps not immediate, continued owing to the German expansionism which showed no sign of decreasing. However, this passion might be restrained now that Great Britain had formed an alliance of threatened countries. He felt that the Russian alliance would be obtained. Mr. Fico remarked bitterly that had the alliance organized by the British been in effect two months ago, the Italians would not have
have ventured to descend on Albania, which might in consequence have retained its independence. Jugoslavia had been short-sighted in not opposing Italian designs on Albania since that country was now occupied by a strong Italian force which could be used against Jugoslavia. Jugoslavia was really in a weaker position than Greece vis-à-vis the Axis.

It seemed probable that Germany would not resort to brutal coups just now, since the German people did not wish war and the leaders did not wish to precipitate it if they could get their ends by other means.

J.P.

The Minister, in conclusion, stated that he had received invitations to official ceremonies in connection with the coming visit to Berlin of Prince Paul and that he proposed to accept them. He would not, however, go to the station to receive the Prince-Regent; the situation not being the same as the case of Count Ciano was the representative of the Government of the King of Italy. He asked that his observations be considered confidential.

J.P.

JP:PP
Subject: Account of the Visit to Berlin of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, May 21-23, 1939.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 921 of June 5, 1939, concerning the signature on the 22nd ultimo of a political and military pact between Germany and Italy, I have the honor to submit herewith for the Department's information an account of the ceremonies attending Count Ciano's visit to Berlin, during the course of which the Pact was signed.

The Italian Foreign Minister arrived in Berlin by train at 11 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, May 21, being met at the station not only by Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, but also by several Cabinet members; representatives of the German armed forces, including Admiral von Raeder, Generals von Brauchitsch and Milch; and members of the Party organizations, including
the S.S. and S.A., as well as of the municipality of Berlin. Furthermore, the diplomatic representatives of countries closely associated with the Rome-Berlin Axis or with the anti-Comintern Pact were on the station platform. These were the Japanese and Spanish Ministers and the Ministers of Albania, Yugoslavia, "Manchukuo" and Hungary. Count Ciano was accompanied by the ranking Italian army officer, General Pariani, by a company of Italian civil officials, and by a number of Italian journalists.

The first official act of Count Ciano was to lay a wreath at the War Memorial in Unter den Linden, which he did at 11:45 o'clock, reviewing afterwards the guard of honor drawn up for the occasion. At 12:15 Count Ciano paid a call on Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in the Foreign Office, which was immediately returned at the Hotel Adlon, in which the Italian party were lodged. Herr von Ribbentrop then offered a luncheon at the Hotel Kaiserhof in honor of the Italian visitors. Following the conclusion of the luncheon, Count Ciano was received by Chancellor Hitler in the new Chancellery in the presence of the German Foreign Minister and the Italian Ambassador to Germany. In the evening a dinner was given by Chancellor Hitler to the Italian visitors and among the guests were included Field Marshal Göring, Herr von Mackensen, the German Ambassador in Rome, and Herr von Papen, recently returned from his mission at Ankara.
The formal signature of the German-Italian Pact of Political and Military Alliance took place in the new Chancellery 24 hours after the arrival of Count Ciano in Berlin. Following signature by the two Foreign Ministers at 11 o’clock on the morning of the 22nd, Herr von Ribbentrop turned to Hitler, who witnessed the ceremony, with the following words: "My Leader, I announce to you the completed signature of the German-Italian Pact of Military Alliance." Thereupon, according to the press, Chancellor Hitler conferred on Count Ciano the highest decoration in the gift of the Reich, namely, the Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle, in gold. Thereafter the Führer withdrew, leaving the two Foreign Ministers to make public announcement of their act over the German and Italian radio nets.

Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano also later made statements to the press regarding the Treaty of Alliance. In view of the interest attaching to these two sets of addresses, which were mentioned in the Embassy’s telegram No. 408 of May 23, 5 p.m., the original German text, together with English translations, are being enclosed herewith. Incidentally the reference to the "mighty and invincible block of 300,000,000 people" made in the Reich Foreign Minister’s statement to the press, which is contained in the second enclosure to this despatch, has caused considerable speculation. According to sources close to local Party circles, this total was arrived at by the following calculation of the peoples whom the Reich Foreign Minister evidently hopes...
hopes will eventually form the Berlin-Rome diplomatic block. First, there would be the 150,000,000 comprising Germany and Italy, including Albania and the "protected" peoples of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as Slovakia. To this would be added 65,000,000 Japanese, 24,000,000 in Manchuria, 24,000,000 in Spain, 10,000,000 Hungarians, 6,000,000 Bulgars, as well as 14,000,000 Yugoslavs, whom Germany and Italy hope to gain either as willing allies or possibly as subject peoples through a division of this country among themselves. On this basis of speculation the total would thus come to about 293,000,000.

The remainder of the day of May 22 was occupied by conversations between Ribbentrop and Ciano, interrupted by the award by telegraph on the part of the "King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia" of the Order of the Annunciation to Ribbentrop. The decoration was conferred at a luncheon offered by the Italian Ambassador. Following the luncheon, Count Ciano called on Field Marshal Göring and is reported to have had a talk of some length with him.

The events of the day concluded with a large entertainment offered by the Foreign Minister and Frau von Ribbentrop to the Italian guests. The foreigners present included ambassadors and ministers who had received Ciano at the station on his arrival in Berlin. The Italian visitors took leave of Berlin and of Germany on the following morning.
On crossing the frontier into Italy Count Ciano addressed a telegram in the following terms to his German colleague:

"Upon my return to Italy I wish to express to you, Excellency, my thanks for the reception, prompted by such hearty friendship, accorded me by you, by your Government and by the citizens of Berlin.

"I will always cherish the memory of the two days I spent in Germany, for they are closely connected with the historic act which has united the history of National Socialist Germany and of Fascist Italy. Please give my kindest regards to the Führer and convey to him my warmest wishes. Will you also kindly express to Frau von Ribbentrop my deeply felt esteem and my hearty thanks for her charming hospitality. To you, my dear friend, my sincerest greetings and wishes.

Galeazzo Ciano."

The German press during the visit was devoted almost entirely to laudatory articles emphasizing the friendship existing between Germany and Italy and the influence and military might they would wield through the Treaty of Alliance (see in particular Embassy's telegrams No. 399 of May 21, 1 p.m., and No. 408 of May 23, 5 p.m.).

Japanese interest in the signature of the Italo-German pact was manifested by a telegram despatched by the Japanese Government to that of Germany reading in translation as follows: "The Japanese Government is firmly convinced that the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy, powers on a footing of intimate friendship with Japan, has deepened the existing ties between the two coun-
tries, and by giving a firm support to unstable European conditions constitutes a most valuable contribution to the maintenance and strengthening of world peace. On this account the Japanese Government offers its heartiest good wishes on the occasion of this historical event."

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

710
JP:AC

Copy to American Embassy, Rome.
VÖLKISCHER BEOBACHTER
May 23, 1939

Für unseren ausländischen Kabinettschef ist die Kriegserklärung unserer deutschen Kabinettschef. Der harte Krieg ist die unvermeidliche Alternative, die sich uns durch die internationale Lage und die politischen Erwartungen des Deutschen Volkes bietet.

Die internationalen Verhältnisse haben sich in den letzten Jahren unglaublich verändert. Der Krieg ist nicht mehr eine bloße Auseinandersetzung der Mächte, sondern eine Frage des Überlebens und der Nationen.

Der Krieg ist unvermeidlich, und wir müssen uns darum kümmern, dass er auf einem humanen und verantwortungsbewussten Weg geführt wird. Nur so können wir sicherstellen, dass der Krieg nicht zu einem totaler Vernichtungskrieg wird.

Die Menschen müssen sich der Realität stellen und die Hoffnung nicht aufgeben. Der Krieg ist nicht mehr nur eine militärische Auseinandersetzung, sondern auch eine Frage der Kultur und des Geistes.

Der Krieg ist ein großer Schmerz, aber auch ein großer Aufschwung. Er muss dazu führen, dass wir unsere Stärken erkennen und unsere Schwächen verbessern. Nur so können wir sicherstellen, dass wir in der Nachkriegszeit eine bessere, stärkere und gerechtere Welt finden.

Best Available Copy.
The Statements of the Foreign Ministers to the press.

The text of the declaration made by the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano to the German and foreign press is as follows:

"The pact which Herr von Ribbentrop and I signed in the name of our governments unequivocally establishes the complete political and military solidarity of Germany and Italy. Its provisions are categorical. The spirit with which they are imbued is the same that resides in the ethical laws of Fascism as outlined by the Duce in his historic speech on the May Field on September 28, 1937: "To be friends, and being a friend, to march together to the end." Italian-German relations have conformed with these laws in the past and they will do so in future. From now on the two countries and the two peoples constitute one indestructible bloc closely welded together by the analogy of their views, the existence of a common frontier established for all time, the community of their interests and the complete harmony of their policies.

"The pact of today's date lends to the historical fact of this firm unity the form of definitely defined obligations between the two states. The alliance concluded by Italy and Germany is without ulterior motives and reservations."
tions. Its basis, its provisions and its aims are clearly expressed. At the same time it is a pact of constant political cooperation and unconditional military collaboration.

"During the negotiations and conclusion of the agreement the National Socialist and the Fascist Governments had in mind the maintenance of European peace. I need not repeat what the Duce had occasion to say frequently a short time ago, namely that first and foremost Italy intends to continue her work and her cultural projects. Neither are there any problems in Europe that cannot be solved with good will and justice nor are there any grounds that would justify a war which would necessarily spread from a European war to a world war. This is what Italy thinks and it is also what Germany thinks.

"Just as our two countries agree in this common desire for peace so they agree in the resolve to demand that the knots shall be untied which are still binding the life of Europe and in the determination to unite their forces, their will and their destinies in order to make a front - in peace as in war - against any attempt to threaten their living space or to violate the development of the life and the interests of their peoples. For, in our opinion, these interests cannot be separated from each other and must be upheld and protected by us in an indissoluble community."

The declaration of Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop was as follows:

"The
"The Berlin-Rome axis, which was the outcome of Germany's and Italy's joint defensive begun years ago against the beneficiaries of the Versailles status quo, and of the determination of both states to give Europe a fairer peace, has repeatedly passed through the trial by fire successfully. Therefore, if the pact for a German-Italian alliance determined upon only two weeks ago in Milan was signed today by the plenipotentiaries of the Duce and the Führer in the capital of the Reich, this does not signify a new era in Germany's and Italy's policy, it merely means that the two governments are thereby bringing a natural development to a logical conclusion. It is only natural that the identical aims of National Socialism and Fascism should bring the peoples together in an ever closer community of interests and an ever deeper unity. Today's treaty, which comprehensively demonstrates the will of both nations to master their future together, has no other purpose therefore than to confront the world with a documentary statement of what has long since been a living political reality.

"Since Germany and Italy have shaken off the fetters of Versailles and the Geneva system and have been building up their policies exclusively on the strength of their newly arisen empires, instead of on ideologies remote from reality, the so-called democracies have doubled their exertions to force the two powers into dependence again and, more recently, even to encircle them"
them. At the same time, those countries tried again and again to play off the axis powers against each other and even to disrupt the axis. In spite of all the disappointments which the clear policy and the unshakable coalition of the Powers of Order have caused these democratic schemers, they never stopped speculating wildly about a possible breach of the axis. This play was meant to make others forget the lack of any positive political success of their own.

"In the face of all these illusions and intrigues, the new pact proves beyond all doubt and misrepresentations the indestructible unity of the 150 million people united under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. While the encirclement policy of the democratic governments is directed against Germany and Italy - disguised or openly - the new Berlin-Rome pact threatens no one. While the pact policy of our opponents is playing an irresponsible game with war and war panic, while they endeavor to rouse whole continents against each other, the object of the new pact is precisely to guarantee peace against such dangerous menaces. While the aims of the encirclement politicians are purely negative and work to maintain old injustices in order to prevent Germany and Italy from occupying the place they are entitled to in the world and to keep them from enjoying the goods of this earth, the ideals of the Powers of Order are positive and constructive: They want peace, but a just peace, in order to guarantee to their peoples and the whole of Europe - and in the last analysis, the world
world - the blessings of permanent and firmly established order.

"Both governments are firmly convinced that there is not a single problem in Europe that cannot be solved peaceably if there is good will on all sides. But at the same time, they are definitely resolved not to retreat one step before threats of force and to protect the vital rights of their peoples with all their might and with every means at their disposal. No one in the world can henceforth doubt, misinterpret or shake the indissoluble and fateful unity of the Great German Reich and the Italian Empire.

"Any inroads on Italian or German rights will in future have to face the combined might of the two countries. Every inch of German and Italian soil will from now on be defended jointly by Italian and German soldiers. Germany and Italy together with their powerful and loyal friends throughout the world form a mighty and invincible bloc of 300 million people who are prepared to offer their hand to everyone in friendship but who are also determined to shatter every enemy with their massed forces."
DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
May 22, 1939

Encl.-No. 2 to despatch N. 538 of June 5, 1939, from American Embassy, Berlin.

**lands und Ribbentrops**

In Berlin, 25. 5.

Die Bundeskanzlergemeinde, die das italienische Gesandte, Graf Colombo, nach der Unterzeichnung des Potsdamer Abkommens folgenden Worten:"

Nach dem bisherigen Verständnis mit der deutschen und französischen Regierung und dem deutschen Außenministerium ist die Möglichkeit, in die Zukunft die geplanten militärischen Maßnahmen fortzusetzen, von Interesse für Deutschland und die beiden Stämme.

Die Verhandlungen zwischen den beiden Seiten führen zu einer Annäherung in der Lage und Interessen in Bereichen von Interesse für Deutschland und die beiden Stämme.

Die Unterschriften der Kabinettspapiere sind in ihrer Lage und Interessen von Interesse für Deutschland.

Die Bundeskanzlergemeinde hat die Möglichkeit, in die Zukunft die geplanten militärischen Maßnahmen fortzusetzen, von Interesse für Deutschland und die beiden Stämme.

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Die Bundeskanzlergemeinde hat die Möglichkeit, in die Zukunft die geplanten militärischen Maßnahmen fortzusetzen, von Interesse für Deutschland und die beiden Stämme.
Radio Addresses by Ciano and Ribbentrop.

The radio address which the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano gave after the signing of the pact was as follows:

"The pact of alliance and friendship concluded today stipulates and confirms in clearly outlined political and military obligations the deep relationship of the spirit and the work existing between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy.

"The two great nations renewed and strengthened by the genius and the will of the Führer and the Duce have taken their place at the head of European history in order to maintain the foundations of a thousand-year old culture, and today they have welded themselves together into an indestructible bloc of strength, will and interests to protect the principles of order and justice in a world which is in the process of disintegration.

"The agreements in the pact are so unequivocal in their brevity and clarity that they require no commentary. They correspond in nature to the honest frankness which characterizes the Italian-German relations. The will which they express is the will of two nations deeply conscious of the community of their destinies.

"It
"It affords me particular pleasure to see my name connected with that of Herr von Ribbentrop on this document - on this document which while putting a seal on the work Germany and Italy have accomplished together in the past also points the long way which our two nations with their 150 million workers, civilians and soldiers will march along together into the future, imbued with the desire to keep the peace - always their highest ideal - but at the same time firmly resolved to protect their inalienable rights to life and progress with unyielding determination."

The statement of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop made over the radio was as follows:

"Early in May the Führer and the Duce resolved to give expression to the close coalition between their two nations by concluding a comprehensive political and military pact of alliance. In Milan, where the people of northern Italy gave the envoy of the Führer a triumphal reception, the Italian Foreign Minister and I by a handshake confirmed this resolution of the chiefs of government with the approval of the entire Italian people. Today, only two weeks later, with the same enthusiasm, the whole German nation is welcoming the envoy of the Duce, Count Ciano, who has just signed the pact with me.

"This historic act is the conclusion of a development which grew out of the inner similarity between the National Socialist and the Fascist revolutions and has led to an ever closer community of interests and deeper union of the two nations. Germany and Italy are now an indissoluble community."

"The
"The world will have to make the best of this fact. No power on earth, no enmity and no agitation can alter it. To democratic war agitators who are trying to invent the most complicated and double-faced pact system in order to encircle Germany and Italy, this alliance is a positive answer. Its language is clear and sure of its aims, in conformity with our way of thinking. The two nations will stand together in future, come what may, always ready to hold out a hand of peace to a friend but grimly determined to protect and guarantee their vital rights together.

"One hundred and fifty million Germans and Italians with their friends in the world constitute a bloc that is invincible. It is a proud feeling for every German and Italian to be a member of this indissoluble militant community (Kampfgemeinschaft) under the leadership of Hitler and Benito Mussolini."
Embassy of the United States of America
Berlin, June 5, 1939.

No. 929

Subject: Remarks concerning German-Italian Military and Political Agreement of May 22, 1939.

[Confidential]

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir: [Strictly Confidential]

Referring to my despatch No. 927 of even date, enclosing the text of the Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy, signed in Berlin on May 22, I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum containing certain observations on this agreement made to a member of the Embassy staff by the Military and Air Attachés to the Embassy of Poland and to the Legation of Finland in Berlin.

Respectfully yours,

For the Charge d'Affaires a. i.:

Donald R. Heath
First Secretary of Embassy.
GRAY
BERLIN
Dated June 7, 1939
Received 12:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

454, June 7, noon.
My 427, May 31, 4 p.m.

As a climax to the parade and other ceremonies in celebration of the return from Spain of the Condor Legion, Hitler at noon yesterday in the Lustgarten addressed the volunteers in a speech which is characterized chiefly by the omission of any direct mention of Soviet Russia or Bolshevnikism which has usually been associated with the Spanish question and on the other hand by sharp condemnation of the democracies, notable Great Britain and France arming in the latter instance, perhaps reflects German resentment emphatically voiced in the press of Daladier's speech last Sunday. A summary of Hitler's remarks follows.

Stating that in the summer of 1936 "international forces" stirred up in Spain the fire of a revolution which was intended to lay not only Spain but Europe in ashes and ruin, Hitler declared that in response to Franco's
Franco's plea for assistance in rescuing his country he had decided in July of that year to render active aid to the same extent and for such a time as the rest of the world should support the internal enemies of Spain. He had taken this step not only to protect Europe but also Germany from a similar catastrophe at some later date and in so doing had likewise demonstrated Germany's sympathy for a courageous nation which, despite British pressure to enlist its aid against Germany, had remained powerful throughout the world war. Italy he said had arrived at the same decision for similar reasons and German-Italian cooperation in this respect thus constituted the first practical demonstration of the ideological bonds uniting these two countries. Hitler then sharply condemned the "international plutocracies" for their inability to understand and their unwillingness to admit these idealistic motives back of German and Italian action and said that the return of the volunteers now gave the lie to the vicious allegations by politicians and journalists in France and England that Italy and Germany had intended to conquer Spain, divide it among themselves and steal its colonies. With such lies, these people in the democracies stirred up their nations and tried again and again to make Spain the starting point...
point of the catastrophe which these encirclement politicians, war agitators and war profiteers desired most ardently, namely, the next great European war. Recalling how painful it has been for so long to have to make silent about the deeds of the Condor Legion in Spain, Hitler heaped praise on the volunteers and assured them of the full recognition by the entire German nation of their heroism. Their successful struggle in Spain would only serve to increase the German nation’s confidence in itself to strengthen the bond of comradeship with its friends and to leave no doubt in the world that if international war agitators should ever try to carry out their intentions of attacking the German Reich, such an attempt would meet with a defense by the German people and the German army regarding which the encirclement propagandists do not yet seem to have a correct idea. Hitler concluded with a tribute to the Italian volunteers in Spain and to Franco who, through his courageous and unfailing belief in victory, became the savior of his people.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Berlin
Dated June 14, 1939
Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

491, June 14, 11 a.m.
CONFIDENTIAL.

My 488, June 13, 7 p.m.

Reports have continued to circulate in Berlin to the effect that conversations were proceeding between the German and Polish Governments in regard to the controversy between the two countries and it has been variously rumored that proposals on the part of Germany have been presented not only in Warsaw but also in London and Paris and that the Italian Government was manifesting an active interest in the alleged conversations through the Polish Ambassador to Rome whose visit to Warsaw was said to have coincided with that of the Polish Ambassador to Berlin.

In discussing these rumors a member of the Polish Embassy here stated that insofar as he was aware they were entirely without foundation, that neither Government had made any approaches in the matter since last March, that according to his information the Polish Government was not contemplating the possibility of any progress until there...
there should be some indication of an intent on the part of the German Government to meet the conditions precedent to negotiations as laid down in Beck's speech on May 5 and that Germany need not be expected to make any constructive proposal in regard to Danzig and the corridor until it had become convinced that the intimidation tactics which it was employing against Poland could not (repeat not) succeed.

The Polish Embassy here, the secretary said, was awaiting with interest developments in connection with Goebbels' projected trip to Danzig where he might make some statements which would throw some light on German plans. He added, however, that in spite of the recurrent waves of tension it was his personal opinion that Polish-German relations need not be expected to undergo any drastic change until the latter part of the summer and in this connection he referred to the current rumor to the effect that on or about August 1 Germany would inaugurate some action possibly in the form of an intensive agitation against Polish "control" of Danzig.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PAP 11230
FROM BERLIN
Dated June 17, 1939
Rec'd 10:30 a.m. June 18.

Secretary of State
Washington

614, June 17, noon
by 510, June 17, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The British Ambassador in discussing the Anglo-
French-Soviet negotiations expressed the opinion that
although there was no reason to believe that the German
military group was particularly impressed by the evaluation
of the possible extent and efficacy of Soviet aid as a
positive factor in the event of war in Europe the attitude
which the Soviet Government might adopt was certainly
of most consideration in the minds of that group in re-
lation to meeting the glaring risks involved in a war
on two fronts and that this consideration constituted
ample justification for the current allegations that the
German Government was not only restraining anti-Soviet
manifestations but was even looking to the possibility
of insuring a benevolent neutrality on the part of
Soviet Russia towards Germany in the event of war. In
the immediate circumstances, however, the Ambassador
stated
stated the main importance of the outcome of the Anglo-French negotiations lay in the moral support which would accrue to the extremists in Germany in case those negotiations might fail. (END OF SECTION ONE)

KIRK

HTM:EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

515, June 18, 1 p.m.
Continuing my 514, June 18, noon (SECTION TWO).

The Italian Ambassador here in discussing the same subject said that the delay in concluding the above mentioned negotiations lends strength to the argument heard in Germany that the complications encountered arise at least in part from the fact that the aims of the accord exceed the requirements of a policy of defence on the part of the so-called encirclement powers and that in fact the proposed accord looks to a policy of offense against Germany. As a possible counteraction to this impression the Ambassador added intimations had been in circulation to the effect that, when an agreement had been reached with the Soviet, England would propose some broad constructive measures which would be destined to relieve the tension throughout the world. In a subsequent conversation with the French Ambassador he informed me that he had heard of the foregoing intimation and was inclined to ascribe its origin to British sources.

(END OF MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Secretary of State

Washington

545, June 23, 3 p.m.

My 505, June 15, 9 p.m.

A member of the Polish Embassy here has made the following observations in regard to recent developments in Polish-German relations:

BEGIN STATEMENT. Goebbels' latest speeches marked no conspicuous contribution and constituted merely a forceful reiteration of the claim to Danzig which had been asserted and consistently maintained by Germany. The fact, however, that a Minister of the Reich could make with impunity so anti-Polish a speech in Danzig itself might induce a more favorable reaction abroad to the Polish cause in that it proved the actual free status of the city and hence gave support to the contention that Germany was not primarily interested in the technical return of Danzig to the Reich or a "corridor through the Corridor" but in reality was entertaining for more extensive territorial pretentions. Although Goebbels did not reveal
reveal those territorial ambitions the Polish Embassy had information to the effect that discussions in Nazi party sectional meetings had covered the return to Germany of the Corridor and Posen.

There were no definite indications as to what would be the next steps which Germany might take in the Danzig controversy. The Polish Embassy assumed, however, that later on in the summer an intense press campaign would be started against Poland similar to that launched against Czechoslovakia last summer in the hope that it would be successful in undermining Polish morale to the point that the Polish Government would yield Danzig. Obviously no one could know what Hitler was planning or would eventually do but it was conceivable that in the present international situation he would seek to avoid any military action and was prepared if necessary to allow the matter to go over for another year hoping with the lapse of time he could weaken the British and French determination to support Poland.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

KIRK

EMB NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM BERLIN
Dated June 23, 1939
Rec'd 3:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

546, June 23, 4 p.m.
Continuing my 545.
(SECTION TWO).

The Polish Embassy had noticed one rather alarming development and that was the visit to the Baltic countries of German officers and members of Ribbentrop's personal staff with the purpose it was assumed of exploring the possibilities of "encircling" Poland politically or militarily from the north. There was strong opposition in Lithuania to the present Government and there had been speculation in Poland as to whether Germany would endeavor to exploit this situation. It was thought, however, that after Germany's action of taking over the Czechs such attempts would not (repeat not) be successful. Furthermore as a result of the March into Prague the German influence in inciting autonomous agitation among the Ukrainians in Southern Poland was no longer effective. In any case at the present time
-2- #546, June 23, 4 p.m., from Berlin

Germany would not make any discoverable effort to stir up agitation among the Ukrainian elements in Poland because such action would arouse Russian suspicion at a time when Germany was endeavoring to gain Russian goodwill.

End Statement.

END OF MESSAGE.

KIRK

NPL:EMB
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM BERLIN
Dated July 21, 1939
Rec'd 5:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

682, July 21, 10 p.m. (663?)

GRAY My telegram No. 682, July 17, 4 p.m.

German press comment on Rydz-Smiłly's recent speech while sparse, has been to the effect that it denotes a repudiation of "Pilsudski's testament" which enjoined a permanent understanding between Germany and Poland that it demonstrated the spirit inspiring Poland's actions and that it showed that the danger of conflict did not arise from the side of Danzig or Germany but from a possible adventure by Poland on England's orders or even on its own initiative.

The local press featured with head lines "A warning to Poland" General Brauchitsch's speech yesterday at Tannenberg in which he interpreted the symbolic significance to Germans of the term "Prussian land".

The Berlin papers have devoted meager attention to the incident at Postelau involving the shooting of a Polish custom
customs guard by a Danzig border official and it is stated that at a press conference for the foreign press held this afternoon at the Propaganda Ministry it was announced that in the German view the incident is liquidated. (END GRAY)

According to foreign correspondents present at this conference the official spokesman also expressed the opinion that while Germany demanded the unconditional return of Danzig it rejected completely a warlike solution and did not expect a so-called August crisis although it was indicated that the present situation could not endure many months longer.

KIRK

EMB

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
GRAY

FROM

Berlin

Dated August 5, 1939

Rec'd 10:40 A.M.

736, August 5, 1 p.m.

Under headlines proclaiming the weakness of the British fleet in the Far East and charging Great Britain with "perfidious double dealing" this morning's press publishes lengthy summaries of Chamberlain's statement in the House yesterday relative to British policy vis-à-vis Japan. The Foreign Office DDPK declares that although the statement revealed a stiffening of the British attitude in consequence of the denunciation by the United States of the American-Japanese treaty Chamberlain nevertheless had to admit that England is unable to proceed as far as it would like to and that it would only use force in the Far East as a last resort since its military strength is required nearer home because of the obligations assumed by Great Britain in Europe. The article goes on to assert that only Great Britain itself is responsible for its present dilemma since in the pursuit of its encirclement policy England has extended its obligations so far that there is no longer any possibility of

retracement
RFP -2- #736, August 5, 1 p.m. from Berlin

retrenchment and that by the terms of the guarantee
extended to Poland Great Britain has signed over to Poland
the power to decide whether and when the entire British
military force is to be used. In conclusion it is
asserted that as long as England participates in
artificially created disputes and even goes so far as to
side with those who are not amenable to a reasonable
settlement "should after all be the one to bear the costs
of the growing unrest and the impossibility of a peaceful
development."

Other papers also stress the weakness of the British
position as revealed by Chamberlain's remarks and likewise
emphatically assert that his replies have exposed the
profound deceitfulness of British foreign policy. In
this connection the BOERSEN ZEITUNG for example declares
editorially that Chamberlain made it clear that Great
Britain intends to observe the agreement arrived at by
Arita and Craigie only until such time as it can free
its hands in Europe.

KIRK

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

BERLIN

FROM: Dated August 8, 1939
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

751, August 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE

From conversations with colleagues here during the past few days the impression is obtained that the accumulated tension of recent months is regarded as being concentrated now into a period covering the next few weeks. Many point to the next fortnight as the crucial time, some look to the latter half of September, but all are inclined to agree that owing to the technical problem of transporting the masses who are expected to attend the celebration of the anniversary of Tannberg on August 27th and the Party Congress at Nuremberg which is scheduled to close on September 11th it is unlikely that any action requiring extensive use of railroad and other transportation will be launched by Germany from the latter part of August to the middle of September.

In spite of the impression of the imminence of a crisis the same uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed is noted as to the actual intentions which Hitler may have. Persons professing to be in a position to judge assert
assert that Hitler does not want war, that he is fully aware of the possibilities of social and economic chaos inherent in a general conflict, that he does not believe that the solution of the Danzig problem alone is worth a general war, and finally, that although he is preparing for eventualities he has not yet reached a definite decision as to his course in the immediate future. This general view is also reflected among the diplomatic representatives of those countries openly or tacitly aligned with Germany. The situation which has been created, however, is recognized as one which in its present course points to climax but although conjecture is without limit no agreement seems to exist as to the test by which Hitler's intent may at present be gauged or even as to the elements both within Germany and abroad which might combine in the formulation of that intent and direct its implementation.

(END SECTION ONE).

KIRK

NPL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
BERLIN
Dated August 8, 1939
Rec'd 4:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

752, August 8, 9 p.m.
Continuing my 751, August 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
In the meanwhile rumors circulate as to attempts which are being made towards palliative measures in the Danzig controversy in which Mussolini's name is most frequently mentioned. In my conversations with my colleagues here, however, nothing definite along this line has been forthcoming and no indication has been given that efforts are being made to ease the general state of tension which is so acute that there is little inclination to regard the specific points of conflict immediately at issue as subjects for peaceful solution or to cooperate with a view to dealing with those individual issues at a time when the overwhelming possibilities now envisaged may be rendered more remote.

(END OF MESSAGE).

KIRK

EMB:NPL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

772, August 10, midnight.

Today's Berlin press gives prominent attention to Goebbels' speech delivered yesterday in Vienna and to General Brauchitsch's noonday address to the armament workers at Dusseldorf today which was relayed by wireless to rallies held in all the armaments factories throughout Germany.

After emphasizing the solidarity of the Axis, Goebbels in his speech declared, "Europe today finds itself in a very serious crisis which cannot be brought to an end before the vital interests of the poorer peoples are settled. It is folly to speak of peace as long as this crisis lasts. To solve it is not to disturb the peace but to create it. This crisis can only be overcome by incisive measures". Goebbels also said that the result of the National Socialist and Fascist revolutions will not only be to create a new Germany and Italy but also a new Europe.

Dealing at first with the comradeship between armament...
ment workers and soldiers which he announced would be intensified by exchanges of visits of workers deputies to army maneuvers and soldiers' visits to armaments factories. Brauchitsch said Germany had no intention of intimidating the world with threats or of letting itself be intimidated "least of all by the senseless threats of certain foreign generals who speak already of a victorious battle before Berlin and a new peace of Versailles". The speaker stressed Germany's national and social unity and said, "we look to the future with the most profound confidence". Saying that the Führer would never play lightly with Germany's lives, Brauchitsch declared that should "the Führer however make of us the last and greatest demand then we can be sure that there is no other way but that this will be inalterably necessary for the survival of our people".

Editorial comment on this speech emphasizes that before and during the last war the German worker was never reconciled to the then political system that this has been changed by the fact that the Führer is a former worker and that the German people realize they are all in the same boat and that if Germany collapses everything collapses. The German papers quarrel with foreign press interpretations of the country-wide tours of German leaders
-3- #772, August 10, noon, Berlin

leaders such as those of Göring (see my 760, August 9, 7 p.m.) and Brauchitsch and state that far from being undertaken with a view to creating favorable public opinion for future difficult times they were designed to promote and reflect the comrade-ship of all classes in Germany's cause.

KIRK

JRL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
GRAY
Berlin
Dated August 12, 1939
Rec'd 1:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

785, August 12, 3 p.m.
My 775, August 11, 1 p.m.

This evening's BOERSEN ZEITUNG announces that a meeting took place this afternoon between Ciano and Ribbentrop and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The papers contain no comment with regard thereto or in connection with the conversations which have taken place between Ciano and Ribbentrop and merely publish summaries of editorials in the Italian press expressing approval of Ciano's visit and stating that it will serve to underline anew the competence of the Axis to engage in constructive work aimed towards the establishment of the long awaited peace of justice in Europe.

KIRK

[Stamp: DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AUG 14 1939]
[Stamp: DEPARTMENT OF STATE]
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone (D).

Secretary of State
Washington

789, August 12, 8 p.m.

A prominent German journalist who is known to be very close to Goering as well as to Ribbentrop and who in the past has proved to be reliably informed has stated categorically and with emphasis that there could be no compromise with regard to Danzig and that Hitler was determined to see it returned to the Reich. He expressed the conviction without qualifications that this would be achieved without the outbreak of a general European war, since he was convinced that neither Great Britain nor France would go to war over Danzig. Moreover, he indicated that this view was shared by the persons in authority in Germany. He admitted the possibility that the Poles might fight but declared that Germany could handle them in short time and that such action on their part would not suffice to bring Great Britain and France to their side.

The foregoing statement was made in a conversation with an American not connected with the Embassy and similar opinions have been expressed within the last few days by persons in close connection with Government officials.

NK: EMB

KIRK
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Telegram No. 1423, April 15, 1941, ("/9941")
Frankfort Report No. 12, April 16, 1941, (761.62/999)
Telegram No. 1617, April 28, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/10710)
Telegram No. 1674, May 1, 1941, (761.62/918)
Telegram No. 2094, May 27, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/11556)
Telegram No. 2095, May 27, 1941, ("/")
Telegram No. 2261, June 8, 1941, ("/11763")
Telegram No. 2319, June 12, 1941, (762.94/538)
Telegram No. 2483, June 21, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/12296)
Telegram No. 3318, August 28, 1941, (711.94/2218)
Secretary of State,
Washington.

794.

My 791, August 14, noon.

The evening papers none of which publish on Monday mornings feature Ciano's meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop characterizing it as a demonstration of the clear unanimity of German and Italian policy on all matters "from the Far East to Spain" and in particular on Danzig. The foreign press is ridiculed for its dangerous tendency to read into the meeting an indication of a difference of views between the axis partners when in fact the two Governments are in complete accord and the rumor circulated abroad that an aggressive move in the Balkans was the main subject of the conversations is bitterly denounced as an unscrupulous attempt to cause tension in eastern Europe which would draw these states toward the encirclement front. Although editorial comment thus follows the line adopted by the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER article quoted in my telegram under reference both BOERSEN ZEITUNG and the DAZ (*) with emphasis
emphasis that the axis powers believe that the points at issue in Europe today can be settled without war. At the same time, however, it is pointed out that they must be solved and both papers declare that whereas Great Britain and France are constantly proclaiming their love of peace, their actions belie these words, notably the guarantee which as part of the encirclement policy confers upon Poland the power to provoke a war. In the concluding paragraph of its editorial the BOERSEN ZEITUNG summarizes the German standpoint under the following three headings: "(One) now as ever Germany has no points of dispute with England and France which affect their vital interests or cannot be peacefully settled. (Two) The question of Danzig has nothing to do with the independence and freedom of Poland. (Three) Germany's determination to solve this question at the given time is as strong as is its armed power in case it should be forced to utilize it for its defense against certain blows."

KIRK

CSB
EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Secretory of State
Washington

804, August 15, 8 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Italian Ambassador did not (repeat not) proceed to Rome with Ciano as stated in the press but returned to Berlin. Although I have asked to see him he has not yet given me an appointment and it is now said that he has left Berlin this evening.

A friend of the Ambassador who saw him however informs me that the optimism which Attolico has hitherto displayed has disappeared and that he is manifesting great anxiety. He is under the impression that Attolico believed that Hitler might be inclined to adopt a more moderate attitude and although the Ambassador refrained from giving definite information as to the course of the conversations at Salzburg and Berchtesgaden he indicated that moderation had not been manifested and that Hitler was enraged by the tone and contents of the uncompromising reply of the Polish Government in the exchange of notes a few days ago in regard to the German protest over certain developments.
EDA - 2 - #804, August 15, 8 p.m. from Berlin

developments relating to matters in the city of Danzig.

My colleagues here are apparently in ignorance of what actually transpired in the course of the Ciano conversations and the results of the Bormann-Schacht conference at Berchtesgaden have not yet been discussed but the impression prevails that whatever efforts Ciano may have made to modify Hitler's attitude have failed.

(END SECTION ONE).

KIRK

CFW:RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Berlin
Dated August 15, 1939
Rec'd 8:29 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

805, August 15, 9 p.m.
Continuing my 804, August 15, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

The report has even been repeated to the effect that although Ciano and Ribbentrop had agreed in writing upon certain bases of cooperation between Germany and Italy in case of eventualities with the oral stipulation by Ciano that the Danzig issue would not (repeat not) be precipitated, Hitler himself had rejected that stipulation and had declared that Danzig was Germany's affair.

There is no indication here to minimize the gravity of the present situation. The extent of the military preparedness is generally acknowledged and certain indications have lately been detected that a process of mobilization which would enable immediate military action is being effected without the actual publication of orders usually attending mobilization. The intent of Hitler is still unknown and some authenticated account of the result of the Ciano visit as well as that of Csaky who is reported
-2- #805, August 15, 9 p.m., from Berlin.

reported to be again in Munich is awaited to throw some further light on this controlling factor. Certain of my colleagues however express the conviction that if the present momentum continues the Danzig issue may be precipitated within a brief delay unless Hitler can be prevailed upon by some direct approach unattended by publicity to postpone action or is presented with some compromise as to Danzig before an act occurs which he will seize upon as a final provocation.

(END OF MESSAGE).

Kirk

RR: NYC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

BERLIN
FROM Dated August 16, 1939
Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

809, August 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I have just seen the British Ambassador. He said that it was his belief that unless influence could be brought to bear upon Hitler within the next week or ten days he would take his decision on Danzig and that he could not then be deflected from his purpose. Hitler, Henderson said, had now reached a point where he could not help himself even if he wished to; that the possibility that some untoward incident would precipitate a decision at any time was always present, and that at any rate unless something intervened Hitler would have to declare himself at the coming celebration of Tannenberg or Nuremberg which in spite of rumors of postponement were still scheduled to take place at the dates announced.

In discussing the possibilities of some approach to Hitler, Henderson said that he believed that Daladier was in a better position to intervene this time than Chamberlain unless it might be possible to induce Mussolini to cooperate.
-2- #809, August 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Berlin

cooperate with the latter in an approach to Hitler and in
this connection the Italian Ambassador here left for Rome
last night. Henderson also mentioned rumors of action by
the Vatican but appeared to know nothing specific on this
point.

(END SECTION ONE).

KIRK

MPL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

BERLIN
FROM Dated August 16, 1939
Rec'd 3:38 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

810, August 16, 6 p.m.
Continuing my 809, August 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
The most expeditious and probably most efficacious step that might be taken, however, Henderson continued would be for the Polish Ambassador here to see Hitler. Lipski had consistently held himself aloof from contacts with German officials. The Ambassador said he knew that Hitler in June of this year had told Lipski in a public gathering that he should ask to see him whenever he wished. Lipski, Henderson said, should tell Hitler that the recent exchange of notes between the German and Polish Governments had been unfortunate that neither country wished to assume the responsibility for the overwhelming consequence of a war, that as long as the present state of tension continued and grew to a climax no reasonable consideration could be given to the problems which now had grown to incorporate the threat of war, and that time should be given to an effort to find some solution for those problems. In the meantime
meantime it was essential Henderson said, that both Germany and Poland and especially Poland should agree to put an end to all adverse treatment of the nationals of one country established in the territory of the other and should refrain from all utterances both official and public which might further endanger mutual relations.

I understand that Henderson is communicating with his government in the sense of the foregoing and that he is conferring today with the French Ambassador and possibly with Lipski. He spoke without reserve but I know that he did not intend that his views should be ascribed to him in conversation with others and especially with officials of his own Government.

(END OF MESSAGE).

Kirk

NPL:EB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Berlin

Dated August 18, 1939

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

827, August 18, 3 p.m.

The following message received from the American Consul General at Munich repeated herewith for the Department's information.

"August 17, 1 p.m.

An Italian friend who was at Salzburg in an official capacity for the duration of the Ciano conversations is not at all optimistic regarding the chance of preserving peace unless Poland yields to Germany on Danzig. I cannot say with certainty that he is fully informed about the discussions and the decisions reached, but from his attitude and his guarded words it was clear that he is not pleased with what within the limit of his knowledge transpired at Salzburg.

He would say only that Italy would like to have the matter of Danzig settled by a compromise, but that he does not believe this to be probable. He believes that Hitler is prepared to risk a war at this time if he cannot obtain what he wants by other methods, he added that..."
-2- #827, August 18, 3 p.m., from Berlin.

that while there is not the slightest doubt that Italy does not want war, it is so committed to Germany that it must march with the latter even though the ostensible cause of hostilities should be Danzig."

KIRK

DDM
Subject: German Public Opinion regarding the Current International Situation.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to present the following estimate of German public reaction to the international situation at this juncture based upon local observation and reports from our consulates:

By virtue of the press campaign and knowledge of the extensive military preparations the public has been prepared to believe that the Danzig-Polish issue will be forced to a speedy conclusion, and by virtue furthermore of the threats uttered in the German press, it is now envisaging the possibility of military action against Poland. Briefly, it would appear that the great mass of the German population is ready to follow Hitler in
any action along these lines but as yet is not regarding with any degree of conviction the possibility of a general conflict.

The anti-Polish agitation carried on after the World War up to the conclusion of the German-Polish Agreement of 1934 has, together with a natural antipathy for the Poles, unquestionably laid a foundation for the present drive, particularly in Prussia where the division of the Reich by the Corridor has loomed larger as an intolerable servitude than perhaps the fate of Danzig itself, and where the seizure of Upper Silesia was for a long time regarded as a greater injury than the prohibition of the Austrian Anschluss following the War and then the incorporation of the Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia.

The question of whether Germany in asserting its demands against Poland will be forced to go to war with the Western Powers is that which admits such doubts and apprehensions as exist, although here again the variant effect of several factors seem to produce a balance of support for the Reich's present policy. While it is true that an international business community such as Hamburg, as well as considerable sections of the older population, are opposed to any course which might so much as involve a risk of general war, a curious state of confidence prevails that this will not take place, and as a result of National Socialist propaganda many people believe
that if war does eventuate, Germany has, even despite its economic difficulties, a more than equal chance of obtaining, if not complete victory, at least a profitable peace. The following considerations play a role in the popular mind in determining this state of feeling: (1) that Great Britain and France will probably not fight for Danzig or Poland; (2) that if they do Germany would have just cause for waging a war forced upon it by the encirclement policy of the western nations; and (3) that its diplomatic and military position is vastly improved as compared with that of 1914.

In the eyes of many Germans Great Britain, supported by the present Administration in the United States, is regarded as the Reich's arch enemy rather than France or Russia. In the popular view France has no desire to wage war unless attacked and the French are portrayed in the role of being incited against Germany by Great Britain which is endeavoring likewise to ensnare Russia for the same purpose although, according to German belief, with little hope of success inasmuch as it is thought that Russia, occupied as it is with its internal affairs and incapable of surviving a war, will stick to a strictly isolationist course. Large sections of the public seem to have accepted the picture of Great Britain painted by the
the German press, which is to the effect that that
country is pursuing a meddlesome policy in encour-
aging Poland to resist a reasonable settlement with
Germany such as that proposed by Hitler last March,
and furthermore that Great Britain's course would
appear to be all the more irresponsible from the de-
scriptions given by the German press of British gen-
eral incompetence and weaknesses resulting from the
world-wide embarrassments and commitments of its
Empire.

Although from memories of the last war, Great
Britain may still to a certain extent be feared, it
is morally discredited and it is felt that even if
it succeeds in crushing Germany, the Empire and the
British nation will collapse in the process. Many
people, including thinking Germans and particularly
German Government officials, are inclined to leave
out of account the operation of a possible "last
stand psychology" on the part of the democracies and
are sincerely convinced that the British and the
French out of regard for their own interest will not
fight Germany over Poland. In these quarters the
present encirclement line-up is regarded as a some-
what tenuous affair and the belief is expressed
that to be really effective an anti-German front would
not only require an out-and-out alliance between Great
Britain, France, Poland and Russia, but one which had
been developed over a period of time through the exchanges of army officers and a pooling of re-
sources. From official analyses published in the press of Germany's present diplomatic and military
positions, particularly as compared with that of
1914, it is widely felt here that it would follow
that Germany would have an undeniably just cause in
proceeding against Poland either on the basis of
present conditions or new Polish provocations, that
in this case the onus of attacking Germany would be
placed upon Britain and France, that, with the speedy
defeat of Poland and the subordination of Russia to
German influence which might even result in Russia,
for its own immediate safety, concluding an agree-
ment with Germany, the encirclement ring would be
opened up to the East and to the Southeast where in
the Balkans Germany might secure needed raw mater-
ials, and that Great Britain and France, held in a
stalemate on Germany's western frontier, and possi-
ibly harried in distant quarters of the world by the
other Axis partners, might have no other course than
to sue for peace on the basis of a recognition of
Germany's eastern conquest. With respect to the
United States, the recent action on the neutrality
legislation is viewed, particularly in National So-
cialist Party quarters, as an indication that iso-
lation sentiment may delay America's entry into
the European war for a considerable period and it is believed that even if America does associate itself with Great Britain and France it will not be able to make its influence decisively felt in time.

By the immensity of its purport and by its appeal to German patriotism the present international situation has for the time being overshadowed internal problems and in conjunction with a certain amount of official restraint in dealing with discontented groups such as the churches and the reactionary opposition, has produced a high degree of domestic solidarity. While it is true that there is much latent discontent owing to economic difficulties, the very pressure of these difficulties seems at the present time to have increased the force of the patriotic impulse which in calling for further sacrifice for national gain overrides contemplation of personal inconvenience. Crowning the thoughts and hopes of large masses of the population is an almost blind confidence that the Führer will solve the people's problems without war and that Germany's diplomatic campaign against Poland will either succeed in breaking up that country or in the event of hostilities in persuading other nations of the soundness of Germany's case. While the German people are still averse to a general war and would doubtless betray a more intense state of nervousness
if they really believed it imminent, they would perhaps accept it with a greater conviction in the justice of Germany's cause than they presumed last September, the more particularly perhaps because, under the stress of economic pressure and following an adjustment to the idea of absorbing foreign peoples according to the Czech example, they have come to believe that Germany as a matter of vital necessity has a natural claim to an empire which the Western Powers have no right to dispute. On the basis of that conviction and of their faith in the Führer there is every reason to believe that even if confronted with the imminence of a general conflict the German people would conserve their solidarity and march in blind obedience.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

8CO

AK/JDB: EM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

BERLIN

Dated August 19, 1939
Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

833, August 19, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

In a conversation with the Polish Ambassador yesterday evening he was emphatic in denouncing the anti-Polish campaign in the German papers which he said was exceeding all proportion and was presenting information and accounts of occurrences and incidents that were not only gravely exaggerated or distorted but of which some were entirely without foundation in fact. He cited published accounts of certain instances which even the German Embassy in Warsaw had passed over as unworthy of consideration and said that he believed that any denials submitted to the Foreign Office here could serve no purpose as the press campaign in question was directed solely by the Propaganda Ministry.

In discussing the present situation the Ambassador said that he did not believe that Hitler had as yet taken a definite decision although there were influences surrounding him which were pushing him to extremes. In
The meanwhile the war of nerves was being intensified and was no doubt expected by the Germans to bring Poland to terms but, the Ambassador said in the present circumstances he saw no outcome which could be regarded as excluding the possibility of war. The Ambassador added that he believed or at least hoped that the disastrous consequences of a war was giving Hitler pause but that at the moment he himself saw no light ahead.

KIRK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM Berlin
Dated August 19, 1939
Rec'd 1:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

835, August 19, 5 p.m.
My 805, August 15, 9 p.m.

The following statement has reached the Embassy as coming from informed German official circles outside the Foreign Office. Hitler had desired Mussolini to attend the Salzburg conference in person, that Mussolini had refused to come but had sent Ciano with a message to Hitler, that if Germany precipitated action over the Danzig issue Italy would not take part. Furthermore, the support now being given Germany in the Italian press was intended to present to the world the outward appearance of the solidarity of the axis.

In connection with the general question of Italian-German cooperation, military observers make the point that if Germany could limit operations to a war against Poland only it would be strategically to her advantage to have Italy remain neutral and that Germany's interests could be best served if initially Italy should remain neutral with an assurance of military assistance in case a world war should develop.

GW:CSB
KIRK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

842, August 21, 9 a.m.
My 817, August 17, 3 p.m.

According to foreign military observers here troop concentrations started yesterday and should attain sufficient magnitude within three to five days from today to enable offensive action against Poland.

Inform War Department.

KIRK

PEG: KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM

Dated August 21, 1939

Received 12:09 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

849, August 21, 4 p.m.

Reputable German journalists are reliably reported as saying that Poland is ready to come to an agreement with Germany over Danzig but that Germany's aims now definitely include cession of large portions of Polish territory in order to obtain foodstuffs and timber which are immediately essential to Germany. According to this report Hitler has now definitely decided that Poland is to be shattered and that as soon as he has reached his territorial objectives in that direction he will declare a general peace with guarantees.

KIRK

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

911, August 25, 9 p.m.
SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

My 906, August 25, 6 p.m.

I have just had a brief talk with Henderson. He was not explicit as to the details of his talk with Hitler and consequently there is little to add to the statements contained in my telegram under reference which, however, I have reason to believe are in general accurate. The Ambassador was emphatic in his conviction of the necessity for Beck or the Polish Ambassador to approach the German Government and said that the Polish Government should be urged to submit at once a proposal for an exchange of population in order to relieve the tension caused by the minority question in German-Polish frontier districts which he said was increased by Hitler. A proposal on that matter might be followed by a discussion of the Danzig and Corridor problems. He remained from mention of the plan of Anglo-German cooperation and I was unable to press for further elucidation of that point as such a course might have entailed betrayal of the source of my previous information.
information. He stated, however, that Hitler had prepared a plan of limitation of armaments and had emphasized the German-Soviet accords as a definite phase in German policy.

Henderson said that he was flying to London tomorrow morning and that a German plane was being placed at his disposal as other accommodations were not available. He felt therefore that Hitler would defer any move until his return. He said that Hitler was much more calm during the interview today than at Berchtesgaden and that he ascribed Hitler's request to see him today to the Chamberlain letter delivered at Berchtesgaden to the vote in Parliament yesterday and to the President's message which he regarded as of great importance although it was not mentioned by Hitler. Henderson said also that he was impressed by Hitler's appearance of sincerity on this occasion and that he felt that it was too late to consider the possibility of bluff as Hitler would now have to risk a war if some formulae were not found to solve the points of conflict which had been developed in Polish-German relations. Italy, the Ambassador added, was using its influence on Poland to that end.

The French Ambassador was received by Hitler early this evening and is now preparing his report to his government but as he may not be able to see me until tomorrow morning I am telephoning Bullitt in Paris to acquaint
HRE  3-#911 From Berlin August 25, 9 p.m.

acquaint him with that fact.

I am told that the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors were also received by Hitler.

Am just informed 8:00 p.m.

KIRK

ROW:NPL
AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Berlin
Dated August 29, 1939
Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

SS2, August 29, 3 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
My 947, August 28, midnight.
The British Ambassador expects to see Hitler again sometime today. Although until the nature of Hitler's reply is known, any impression as to immediate developments must be based on conjecture, there are indications that the first view as to an implied rejection by Hitler of the British standpoint has moderated and the emphasis has shifted to the possibility that some way may still be found to avert war.

KIRK

PEG: WC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

NC

BERLIN

Dated August 30, 1939

Rec'd 11:22 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

958, August 30, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 955, August 29, 9 p.m.

I understand that the interview with Hitler yesterday evening created a distinctly unfavorable impression on Henderson. Not only did Hitler express himself with the vehemence which was lacking in the interview prior to Henderson's departure for London but the essential terms of Hitler's statement were regarded as offering small basis for a profitable continuation of discussions especially in regard to the German stipulation as to Danzig, the Corridor and the Polish minorities and the requirement as to the appointment of a Polish negotiator. As regards this latter point however I am informed that the German memorandum stated that the Government "counted on" the arrival of a negotiator during the day of August 30th but did not convey this requirement in the form of an ultimatum and that Hitler confirmed to Henderson that no (repeat no) ultimatum on this point was intended.

Both the French and British Ambassadors today manifest distinct pessimism as to the immediate situation and from information
information obtained from members of the Polish Embassy.

conditions are regarded as sufficiently grave to warrant the
immediate departure of several of the personnel of the
Embassy although the Ambassador himself and certain secretaries
are remaining. Speculation in general is turning on the
point as to whether Hitler has entered upon an actual phase
of negotiation in the hope of satisfying his aims sufficiently
without having to resort to war or whether he is working
for time pending the adjustment of new factors which may
have arisen as regards the military situation or the completion
of diplomatic moves especially in the direction of Moscow
and Tokyo. However unclear may be the opinion as to the
tactics now in process there seems to be agreement that while
on the one hand Hitler will be astute to detect any sign of
weakening on the part of governments opposing his aims and if
impressed by any such sign will endeavor to profit thereby
in his present dealings; on the other hand if circumstances
finally confront him with what appears to him to be definite
obstructions in the way which he feels he must go he cannot
choose but proceed in the attempt to override those obstruc-
tions regardless of methods and consequences.

I am informed that the official information from London
which reached the British Embassy during the night was to the
effect that attempts were being made to produce a Polish
negotiator
NEG -3- #358 FROM BERLIN, AUGUST 30, 1939

negotiator but that the time mentioned seemed short. From foreign sources I learn that the pessimism prevailing in London is in contrast to the moderate relaxation in tension which have lately discerned as being manifested in lower German Government circles in Berlin.

(Impossible to repeat foregoing to Paris or London).

KIRK

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

964 August 31, 3 a.m.

By 968, August 30, 2 p.m.

Henderson saw Ribbentrop at midnight and delivered to him the British reply to Hitler's statement. I understand that this reply repeated the gratification of the British Government that the German Government agreed to negotiate but suggested that in view of the fact that the time stipulated did not suffice for a Polish negotiator to reach Berlin the bases for the proposed negotiation be presented to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin for submission to his Government. I understand further that Henderson asked Ribbentrop to give him a statement of the proposed bases for negotiation and that the latter after at first refusing to do so on the excuse that it was after midnight of the day during which the Polish negotiator should have presented himself, finally read a statement but in so hurried a manner that the British Ambassador was unable to grasp the contents and Ribbentrop refused to furnish the Ambassador with a copy thereof.
thereof. Henderson urged upon Ribbentrop to give the proposals to the Polish Ambassador but Ribbentrop stated that he would not send for the Ambassador although he intimated that he would receive Lipski if he asked for an interview. Henderson left the interview with the impression that a deadlock had been reached and that the gravest consequences might be expected.

KIRK

CPW:NPL
NC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
965, August 31, 4 a.m.
SECRET AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
Continuing my 964, August 31, (SECTION TWO).

Shortly after Henderson's return from this interview he received from a secret emissary in whom the British had confidence an oral statement of what was said to be the proposals which Ribbentrop had read to the British Ambassador but which he had not understood. These proposals I understand are briefly and approximately as follows:

One. The Free City of Danzig to be returned immediately to Germany.

Two. A southern boundary of the Corridor to be drawn from Marienburg through Graudenz, Bromberg to a town to the northeast of Marensidehuhl.

Three. In that area of the Corridor a plebiscite is to be held on the basis of the population on January 1, 1918 with an absolute majority deciding.

Four. Pending the plebiscite that area is to be administered by an international commission consisting of representatives
NC -2-#965, from Berlin, August 31, 1939

of England, France, Italy and Russia and in the meanwhile the Polish police and military are to be withdrawn in favor of an international force.

Five. During the regime of the international commission free communication is to be established between Germany and Danzig and Poland and Gdynia.

Six. After the plebiscite an exchange of population is to take place if found necessary.

Seven. Gdynia is to be confirmed as Polish.

Eight. Danzig is to be purely a commercial city and not (repeat not) militarized.

Henderson I understand is greatly encouraged by the knowledge of these proposals; he has telegraphed to London a statement thereof and is urging that immediate steps be taken to persuade the Polish Government to appoint a representative for the purpose of negotiating on those bases. He has also with the Polish Ambassador here to seek an interview with Ribbentrop. As soon as possible in the morning Henderson will ask Ribbentrop for a copy of these proposed bases without revealing the fact that he has been given knowledge thereof.

Repeated nowhere. (END MESSAGE)

KIRK

HPD