This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1565, October 3, 3 p.m.

Insofar as can be ascertained up to the present time Ciano's visit did not mark any change in the position of Italy in its relations with Germany. The only statement made by Ciano while here which has come to my attention is that he believed that in the event of a general war the United States would eventually be aligned with England and France.

State Secretary Weliszewski in discussing Ciano's visit said that the status of Italy had undergone no change and that Italy should be content to be neutral. He added that if peace did not come now the real war would start and then nothing could stop it.

KIRK

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Secretary of State
Washington

2287, December 9, noon.

The "order of the day" adopted by the Fascist Grand Council on Thursday was first carried in the Berlin press on Friday evening and editorial comment was reserved for the most part for this morning's papers.

The general trend of this comment is to the effect that the reaffirmation in the "order of the day" of the binding character of German-Italian relations as well as the reference to Italy's intention to protect its sea trade will undoubtedly cause disappointment to Great Britain and France which have been trying to conjure up a rift between the alliance partners. According to the semi-official DDPK Italy's preparations are directed toward preventing an extension of the war, an aim which corresponds to Germany's view of the necessities of the situation. Italy it is stated is firmly anchored in the Balkans and is performing a service.
service there in circumscribing the effects of Anglo-
French intrigue as well as in resisting British ag-
gression upon its vital trading rights. Paraphrasing
the text of the Fascist "order of the day" the
VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER states that "Italy is not an
ordinary neutral but that its neutrality consists
only in the fact that it is not waging war". According
to this paper Italy's sole aim is "to assert its
vital rights in every sphere which it is prepared
to do by throwing the concentrated power of its
empire into the scale. Everything else remains a
question as to method and time".

KIRK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

December 3, 1939

(11:30 p.m.)

Secretary of State, [Signature]

Washington.

2385, December 17, noon.

(GRAY) Re 2297, December 8, noon.

The German reports of Ciano's speech to which brief references were made in the press of yesterday evening are subordinated in the Berlin Sunday papers to accounts of the exploits of the Admiral Graf Spee and editorial comment on the speech while highly laudatory is not featured with any particular prominence.

The general tenor of this morning's editorials is that Ciano confirmed the line of Italian policy laid down in the "order of the day" adopted by the Fascist Grand Council on December 7 and exposed the background which determined that policy in the description he gave of the "historical guilt" for the present war which rests upon Great Britain and France for having chosen collective security in place of the Duce's revisionist program and for having failed to exploit the possibilities for enduring peace offered in the Munich settlement of 1938. Ciano is thus
thus represented as having exercised British and French fantasies that Italy would shortly forsake Germany and would rejoin the League and he is credited with having recently indicated that Rome sees through the "incendiary intentions of the western powers". According to the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER "Italy has spoken the judgment which the German armed forces will execute" while the BOERSEN ZEITUNG states that "true to the aim of the axis alliance Italy together with Germany believes that lasting peace can only be brought about through a satisfaction of the vital interests of both countries and is keeping this aim before its eyes even although today it considers its first duty is to prevent an extension of the conflict."

In the German editorial thus far published no reference can be found of Russia's position in relation to the speech. (END ORAY)

CONFIDENTIAL. It is reported that a German press official yesterday informed certain foreign correspondents that Germany was highly pleased with Ciano's address and considered it "worth another White Book" in exposing British-French war guilt.

KIRK

ELP
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

144, January 19, noon.

The German press devotes marked attention to Nuti's speech of January 17 prominently publishing summaries of it as well as excerpts from the Italian newspapers with regard thereto. Typical of the accompanying editorial comment is the latest issue of which the Foreign Office DDEK states that indulging in wishful thinking London and Paris have manifested a tendency to interpret the changes made by Mussolini in his Government last November as an indication of an attitude in Italy's policy favorable to the Western Powers. In order to quash this hasty optimism Nuti it is stated in his capacity as authoritative spokesman of the Fascist Party made it perfectly clear that the new Italy remains true to its fundamental program of empire, race and autocracy and that it is ready to fight those who oppose this program with force. The DDEK observes that this vivid statement of Italian policy did not occur as a surprise.
ham -2- No. 144, January 19, noon, from Berlin

surprise to Germany and in conclusion states that "there have been no elements of any kind separating Germany and Italy since the Fuehrer and the Duce eliminated for all time the last possible seeds of mutual distrust. But there are accounts still not settled and it is a good thing that those concerned (England and France) are reminded of this."

KIRK

GBB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BE R L I N

FROM

Dated March 9, 1940
Rec'd 9:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

803, March 9, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 590, March 3, 8 p.m.

There is a report in circulation which is said to emanate from high party circles to the effect that Ribbentrop's present visit to Rome is primarily for the purpose of consolidating Italian support in the event of a German offensive. According to this report an offensive is being planned to take place within a few weeks as soon as weather conditions and the necessary allocation of troops in the west has been completed and will be directed against the Maginot Line and through Luxembourg. The foregoing plan is said in the first place to be predicated in part on the belief that the blow which the German armed forces are prepared to inflict on France will succeed in destroying directly the morale of that country and ultimately that of England and in the second place to envisage permanent noninterference from the United States. A prompt cessation of Soviet-Finnish hostilities according to this view an important
REB -2-#603, From Berlin, March 9, 6 p. m.

important factor in preparation of increased military activity on the part of Germany in the west and in this connection the noticeable interest which Soviet diplomatic representatives have manifested in regard to any tentatives towards a general peace has given rise to the contention in certain circles that Stalin may admit a temporary settlement with Finland if he believes that the present fighting there is regarded as a deterrent to the precipitation of a general conflict.

The circulation of reports such as the foregoing does not necessarily exclude the existence of a desire for peace on the part of Germany or the possibility that there may be bases for such a peace and in the minds of some these rumors are regarded as intended to counter the accusation of weakness which any peace move might provoke. In fact the statement has been made that the visit of Ribbentrop to Rome at this moment is connected with the conversations which Under Secretary Welles held in Berlin and which he is expected to engage in with Mussolini on his return to Rome. It should be added however, that observers within the last day or two especially remark upon the complete assurance of military success which Hitler is manifesting and upon the confidence in the German forces which Goering has expressed since his visit to the west front.

Repeated to Rome.

KIRK

RP
DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

685, March 18, 6 p.m.
My 684, March 18, 5 p.m.

Foreign Office officials are reported as expressing up to the present no further views as to the meeting at the Brenner than that it was intended to consolidate further the Axis and this opinion has been interpreted here as signifying that Italy is being brought to the support of a peace on German lines or else into a commitment to aid Germany in a war whenever such assistance is considered opportune. It is also being stated that Ribbentrop is actively maneuvering an understanding between Rome and Moscow and in support thereof a rumor has been in circulation to the effect that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs is planning a trip to Moscow in order to align Soviet Russia definitely with the Axis powers.

REPEATED TO ROME.

KIRK

N. P. L.
CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Italian position.

Report regarding possibility of change in --, either one way or the other.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See _______ Tel. #977, 7 p.m. _______

(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 14, 1940 From _______ Germany (Kirk) _______

______ To _______

File No. 740.0011 European War 1939/2193
Dear Sir,

This telegram must be sent immediately, but will be delayed until it can be presented to the President. The situation is urgent.

Washington,

March 14, 1943

SIR,

Recent reports from Berlin indicate an intensification of Nazi activity in invading Italy. In certain quarters it has been said that France is contemplating the abandonment of its neutrality and that Italy may be about to invade Italy. There is evidence in certain Italian circles here of a crisis in the Italian situation, and it is possible that a decision may be made to take advantage of this situation. There is also reliable information that the Italian ambassador here has visited the Chancellor within the last few days with instructions from Mussolini, and although the subject matter of these instructions are not known, one hypothesis has been offered that they dealt with representations which the Allies may have made to Italy with a view to forcing a decision by that country as to its participation in the war either with or against Germany.

Yours truly,

[Signature]

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 14, 1943

SIR,

[Further text redacted due to visibility issues]
Germany. In support of this hypothesis, which it should be noted is based almost entirely on speculation, is the report that German troops have been moving to the south but there is no definite indication as to whether these alleged movements are those already mentioned as taking place in the direction of Rumania (see my 940, April 1, 2:10 a.m., paragraph four) or whether they may be additional troops proceeding to the Italian border for either defensive or offensive purposes.

The foregoing information has given rise to an impression that discussions of importance are proceeding between Rome and Berlin, and that during their progress there may be a temporary delay in extensive offensive military operations. The opinion has also been offered in Belgian circles that, judging from a slight irritation received directly after the conversations reported to have taken place between the Italian Ambassador and the Chancellor, an attack on Belgium itself may be deferred for the moment although the results may be only the matter of days.

Revealed to Rome.

KIRK
This telegram must be closely parceled in the event of being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

1304, May 11, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

By 1129, May 3, 1 p.m. and 1027, April 17, 7 p.m.

Russian circles in Berlin believe that danger of German or Italian military action in the Balkans has been at least temporarily removed as a result of the German offensive. Prior to last Wednesday's outbreak they had been alarmed over the visit of General Tippelskirch to Sofia which they had heard was for the purpose of organizing flying fields for eventual German use against Turkey and very possibly Rumania also. In this connection it is to be noted that along with the rumors of a German invasion of Rumania and Yugoslavia which enjoyed some currency prior to the move against Holland and Belgium were stories of German designs of closing the Dardanelles by electrical mines and other obstructions. It is argued, however, that such arrangements will not be developed by the Germans at the present time since their entire force will be required for their western operations.

As regards Italy it is claimed in Russian circles that
that some indications have been received that Mussolini is not planning any action in the Balkans at the present time although rumors are circulating here to the effect that the Italian policy will be definitely established during the coming week. Furthermore they do not believe that Italy will enter the war in advance of clear evidence of decisive German successes in the west and find some support of the latter view inclinations received from Italian circles in Berlin.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRET

FROM

Dated June 13, 1940
Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH

1840, June 13, 5 p.m.
My 1830, June 13, 1 p.m.

My next two numbered telegrams contain respectively:

(one) Additional statements of Hitler not included in the officially approved version of Wiegand's interview and (two) Wiegand's personal observations regarding his talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop and his own views of the situation.

HEATH

JRL

BERLIN

40.0011 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/2855 21/28 Confidential File
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From

BERLIN
Dated June 13, 1940
Rec'd 5:51 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1841, June 13, 6 p.m.

He said that present navies would be scrapped after this war and that there will be revolutionary changes in naval construction. He marveled that the United States was embarking on an expanded program at this time of naval vessels which would soon be outmoded.

He intimated that the peace terms which would be granted the western powers in the next few weeks would be drastically revised if the latter protracted their resistance over several months period, while stating that it was desired to save Paris, he said that not one stone would be left on another if the French determined to make it a point of resistance and referred to a new type of shell "prall grenade" stated to be of tremendous explosive force which might be used.

As regards Mussolini's entrance into the war he stated that the Duce was a man who could neither be forced into nor dissuaded from any action which he had determined to take.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BERLIN

Dated June 13, 1940

Rec'd 6:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1942, June 13, 6 p.m.

My informant said that he felt that while Hitler's confidence in early victory over England and France was absolute the latter was nevertheless troubled over the possibility of American intervention because of the uncertainty as to the ultimate effect on Germany of such a development. Ribbentrop, however, he thought was definitely worried about the possibility of American participation and had treated the President's speech with relative relief because it did not advocate armed intervention.

My informant says that he has had two talks with Weizsaecker who on both occasions had said that whether the present is a short or protracted war depends entirely upon the United States.

(END SECTION ONE)

HEATH

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
REB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone. (SC) 

BERLIN
Dated June 13, 1940
Rec'd 9:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1942, June 13, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

My informant said that he conceived that the reason for these interviews was a double one (one) to pacify public opinion in the United States and (two) to induce England to make overtures for peace.

He said he had a feeling that the Fuhrer had definitely determined upon the details of the peace terms for France but that he was not yet settled in his own mind as to the exact demands he will make upon Great Britain. My informant said that undoubtedly the French army would be summoned to capitulate unconditionally and the final terms would include the destruction of the Maginot Line, the reduction of the French army to at least one-fourth its size and the surrender of channel ports to Germany or to German control.

HEATH

HTM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Berlin

Dated June 13, 1940

Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

RUSH
1842, June 13, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

As regards my informant's own opinion he asserted that he had the sad feeling that America's desire to give increasing assistance to the Western powers was the very thing that might in fact destroy them for the effect on the one hand was to speed up the German attack in order to gain a decision before American assistance could be really effective and on the other the prospects of American aid would encourage the Allies to a "last ditch" resistance. He felt after his last trip to the front that the German army was irresistible. As regards a German invasion of Great Britain his own opinion was that the strength of the German army plus the inefficiency of the British staff and military leadership made German success in the admittedly difficult operation likely.

(End of Message)

Heath

LMS
SECRET

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1974, June 20, 3 p.m.

It is customary in certain ministries here to have occasional meetings of higher officials where addresses on party doctrine and internal and external political aims of the Reich are delivered. Recently at such a meeting officials were informed by a higher official in the same ministry that the war aims of the Reich as regards France contemplated that the Channel ports as far as Cherbourg were to be awarded to Belgium which was to have protectorate status under the Reich. German families would be settled in key positions of areas under German influence. See my 1544, May 28, noon. From the Mediterranean to the southern boundary of Belgium there was to be organized a neutral territory, no clear explanation being furnished as to whether it was to have independent political status or not. It was indicated that the destruction of Great Britain was not contemplated but that instead it was anticipated that country
hsm -2- No. 1974, June 20, 3 p. m., from Berlin

would become a subordinate ally to Germany in a campaign against the Soviet Republic which would be staged in the spring of 1941.

The above statements very possibly had no relation to the actual terms proposed and which may shortly be indicated officially or to the real external aims of Hitler but I believe that they are of interest as indicating the ideas discussed among responsible party officials.

HEATH

RR
FROM Berlin
Dated November 12, 1940
Rec'd 4:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

4670, November 12, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
Kirk's 3128, July 24, 11 a.m.

The following considerations are outlined as of possible value as background in connection with Molotov's arrival in Berlin today.

The German desire for a visit of Molotov to Berlin would probably find its explanation in one or both of two principal factors.

The first of these is the obsession of certain German circles—probably those around Von Ribbentrop—with the belief that if only a sufficiently imposing array of solidarity could be mustered between Germany and other powers in Europe and Asia, then the United States—impressed and disturbed—would become hesitant in its support of England and that the British disheartened to the point of considering a compromise peace.

It was an analogous line of reasoning which contributed to the establishment of the German-Russian understanding in
EH -2- 4670, November 12, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Berlin.

the first instance, and it appears never to have lost its fascination for the makers of German policy.

The second factor is the increasing probability that the British position in the Near East will not be seriously threatened without direct German intervention and the natural German desire to have a reassuring understanding with a power which would command the flank of any large-scale German military operation in that area.

There is little doubt, therefore, that the immediate impetus for the visit springs from the German side and that Russian consent to it—a consent which had been withheld for an entire year—represents an important Soviet concession to German wishes, even though it was not, as Berlin had hoped, given in time for the visit to take place before the American election. This concession would not be made unless the Russians had hopes of thereby achieving—or fears of otherwise not achieving—certain important objectives, and the fact of the visit may be taken as an indication that the Soviet Government, which has shown itself determined to lose no opportunity to profit by the preoccupation of others in order to improve its own future strategic position through territorial acquisition, now has its eyes on some further possibility along these lines.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From Berlin
Dated November 12, 1940
Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4671, November 12, 2 p.m.

Continuing my 4670, (SECTION TWO).

But the border from the Baltic to the Black Sea may now be regarded as settled and for further acquisitions Russia would presumably have to look north of the Gulf of Finland or south of the Danube delta.

It should be borne in mind in this connection that in coming to Berlin, Molotov will be interested primarily in those territories or facilities which may be said to be at Germany's effective disposal. It must be doubted whether Russian aims in eastern Turkey or in Iran would play any great part in inducing the Kremlin to send Molotov to Berlin. When the time comes and when there is some intimation of preoccupation of Turkey in other quarters, it must be assumed that Russia will take what she feels she advantageously can in that part of the world without asking leave of the Germans or paying tribute for the privilege. These more easterly territories may to be sure, be
be formally assigned to a Russian sphere of influence as a result of these discussions but they will not be the main point in question.

Russia's most serious territorial aspirations connected with Molotov's visit would therefore seem to boil down to Finland or the area around the Dardanelles. In Finland the Russians are going to encounter far greater inhibitions in German circles--particularly the army--against further Russian penetration than was the case eight months ago. Through their conquest of northern Norway the Germans now have a stake in that part of the world which is important to them not only from considerations of military operations but also of military prestige. The advent of the Russian's into northern Finland would not only render problematical the present supplying and reinforcing of these German troops over Finnish territory but would also confront these German forces in Norway for the first time with the proximity of a powerful and--in view of the strategic situation--potentially dangerous foreign land force.

This must not be taken to mean that there is no possibility that the Germans will toss the remainder of Finland to the Russian bear in order to facilitate their aims in the New East. Ribbentrop whose personal prestige is considerably involved with the German-Russian understanding has
-3- #1871, November 12, 2 p.m., from Berlin.

has on former occasions obtained Hitler's consent to serious sacrifices in order to preserve this understanding and he may succeed in doing so again.

MORRIS

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Berlin

dated November 12, 1940
Rec’d 8:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4672, November 12, 3 p.m.

Continuing my 4670 (SECTION THREE).

But the opposition to be overcome will be severe and if the German army yields in Finland its demands will surely be stiffer with respect to the Near East.

Rumor has it that the Germans are prepared to concede to the Russians the entire Dardanelles area. If it be remembered that the Russians made this one of the prices of their cooperation with the Allied Powers in 1915 and were promised it in the event of a victorious conclusion of hostilities it would not be surprising if they should turn out to be asking for it again and the possibility of obtaining it would be one of the few conceivable explanations for the visit. Recent information here has not indicated any progress in Russian-Turkish relations which would preclude the pursuance of such aims on Russia's part.

On the other hand if the Germans are planning to use this territory in the near future as a channel of expansion
expansion toward the Near East it would be difficult to conceive of any satisfactory arrangement which could be concluded just at this time. There can scarcely be any desire on the German side to conquer this area and then turn it over at once—or parts of it—to the Russians leaving the latter virtually sitting on the German line of march. Even an arrangement for a division of the area giving the German say the Dardanelles and the Russians the Bosphorus would have this effect. And it is not likely that the Russians would be interested in any promises of future delivery which would involve an interim consented to occupation.

An arrangement could more easily be envisaged if the Germans were prepared to keep their own hands off the area in question during the coming months. A passage of German armed forces through Bulgaria to Greece might well have the effect of producing hostilities between Turkey and Bulgaria. In this situation it might be left to the Russians to take what action they might wish against Turkey on the understanding that if they were to succeed in seizing the Dardanelles area Germany would impose no objection to their retaining it. In incurring some obligation of this nature which would amount initially to an agreement on spheres of influence the Germans might not be entirely impervious to the
-3- #4672, November 12, 3 p.m., from Berlin.

the thought that the Russians might possibly become so
seriously bogged down in Eastern Turkey and Iran that an
actual seizure of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles during
the coming winter would be improbable and that the German
commitment might thus eventually in view of changed
circumstances become meaningless. Such a plan would have
the added advantage in the German view of keeping the
Russians occupied with the Turks at a time when if idle
they might be a constant source of worry on the German
flank.

MORRIS

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Berlin
Dated November 12, 1940
Rec'd 9:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

4673, November 12, 4 p.m.
Continuing my 4670 (SECTION FOUR).

In return for any concessions of this nature which might be made in the Near East the Germans would probably demand first and foremost as indicated above a demonstrative association of the Soviet Union with the establishment of an anti-British "new order" in Europe and Asia or at least some gesture of acquiescence in this conception. They might also seek a deepening and widening of the present economic cooperation between the two countries designed not only to contribute to the propaganda effect of any political arrangements which may be made but also to render Germany less dependent during the coming months on the reserves and substance of the territories she has occupied or dominated in Europe. Any such development would presumably imply greater German efforts to meet the Russian need for up to date military equipment, a factor which may explain in part the inclusion of certain high officials of Soviet industry.
industry in the delegation.

It would be dangerous, however, to attribute the presence of so many high Russian officials solely to the need for the elaboration of the technical details of an increase in the exchange of goods between the two countries. The German expert Schnurre has been in Moscow a great deal recently and all such details could presumably be more conveniently worked out there at leisure. It is more likely that the size and composition of the delegation was conceived for its external effect. Ribbentrop took an imposing delegation to Moscow with him last year and it is possibly a dictation of the Russian cossack prestige that Molotov should travel to Berlin with no less pomp and circumstance.

In conclusion it may be worth noting that whatever the more important decisions which may be finally sealed or arrived at through this visit it is not likely that they will find expression in the published result of the meeting. It is more probable that abstract intimations of Russian acquiescence in the German new order, mutual professions of recognition of the other party's interests in certain undefined vital areas and professions of high intent with respect to the intensification of economic cooperation will all be put forward to mask the bolder details.
-3- #4673, November 12, 4 p.m., from Berlin.

Details of the arrangements until such time as the latter can find their expression in the practical application of military and diplomatic policy.

Repeated to Moscow.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MORRIS

DDM: TFV
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Strictly confidential.

Berlin, March 7, 1941.

I talked with Mr. Wohltath and his wife lunched with us today. He spoke of the situation in Holland, the war and his impending commercial mission to Japan.

Situation in Holland

He made it quite clear that he had been forced out of the German administration in Holland where he has been in charge of the Dutch monetary, banking and stock exchange systems, because of his objections to the policy of other German authorities there. He was quite outspoken in his condemnation of the policy and activities of the Gestapo in the Netherlands and plainly intimated not only his opposition to the policy of that organization and the German civil administration under Seyss-Inquart, but his belief that the recent difficulties and disorders will recur and increase. He remarked bitterly that given a certain willingness to heed the other man's viewpoint it was not difficult to obtain cooperation even in a country under military occupation.

The Embassy has had various reports (see Embassy's dispatch No. 4953 of March 3, 1941) that Wohltath had been quite conciliatory and successful in his dealings with Dutch businessmen and bankers. I gather from other sources that Wohltath's departure from Holland is not alone due, however, to differences of opinion as to the policy of the German occupational forces but also to a considerable inter-departmental jealousy within the German Government itself. It will be recalled that Wohltath negotiated the German-Dutch Commercial Agreement of March, 1939, and that he was over in London just before the war where he had talks with Sir Horace Wilson and, it is understood, with other members of the Government and City personalities who were reportedly in favor of a policy of appeasement. He has had a number of important special missions. Wohltath is a member of Göring's organization and it is understood that both Ribbentrop and the Reich Economics Ministry resented Göring's thrusting Wohltath into their preserves of foreign political and economic policy although, evidently due to Göring's insistence, they are now allowing him to head an economic mission to Japan.

The War

Wohltath said there would of course be major military operations during the next few months, but he thought that an invasion of England would be tried only as a last resort—and I gained the impression that, contrary to his optimism of last summer and which was shared by most German officials, he was no longer certain of the outcome of such an attempt. So far, he said, in spite of American assistance, the war was still one between Germany and Great Britain and as long
as that situation obtained there was always the possibility of peace either through a decisive military victory or as a result of compromise. The only real obstacles to peace, he said, were the personalities of the leaders. He did not specify which leaders. He did not believe that America's entry into the war against Germany was imminent or unavoidable; the chief danger was that some action by Japan might involve the United States in war in the Pacific, which would of course immediately mean war with the rest of the Axis. While he did not distinctly so state, he indicated that the German policy was to keep Japan in the situation of being a menace and not allow her to become an active participant and thus drag the United States into the war. He remarked that if America did come into the war it would presumably last for years, and I obtained the distinct impression that he considered that American participation meant German defeat. This impression was reinforced by a remark made at the luncheon by Mrs. Wohlthat to the effect that some people thought that Germany had already lost the war because it had not been able to solve the problem of fat supply. Wohlthat confirmed that this view was held by certain people. He did not express his concurrence but made no attempt to refute it.

Mission to Japan

He confirmed that he would be proceeding to Manchuria, Tokyo and Nanking, accompanied by a delegation of six officials and two clerical assistants, but said that he would not leave Berlin until toward the end of March. He expected to be absent for several months. He remarked that he had been engaged with the negotiation of the commercial treaty with Manchuria in 1937 and that he was particularly interested in the question of oil seeds and vegetable oils. When he returned to Germany in 1938 after having been in business in New York his first position with the government was as a specialist of vegetable oils in the Ministry of Agriculture, a subject on which he had written a doctoral thesis.

He stated that his mission was purely economic and that he was quite happy to be outside Berlin during these next few months. At the present time, he said that ideas of peace and European cooperation had no chance of being heard. Perhaps after a few months of military operations the situation might clear up enough so that ideas of international cooperation could again become actual.

Donald R. Heath
First Secretary of Embassy
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Berlin
Dated March 27, 1941
Rec'd 5:15 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1144, March 27, 6 p.m.

A reliable source informs me that there is a possibility that Mussolini may come to Germany for a conference with Hitler and Matsuoka to define the joint attitude of the three powers towards the United States including an examination of the advisability of bringing about a situation of direct hostilities with America. My informant emphasized that the meeting and its agenda were only a rumor and a possibility but in view of his previous occasional accuracy of prediction I have thought it advisable to report it to the Department and to Rome for possible confirmation or disproof.

MORRIS

JRL: EPL
Telegraph received

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Berlin
Dated April 2, 1941

Recorded 12:55 a.m., 3rd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1239, April 2, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

I have just received a code message from Kiefforth in Cologne stating that Hitler recently had an interview with certain leading industrialists of that region in which he first said that Germany had no intention of breaking down the entire British Empire. Hitler then indicated to his hearers that Russia would in the near future be forced to conclude a pact with Japan which would leave the latter country with its back free enabling it to fight the British. Hitler is reported to have said that if Russia refused to conclude such an arrangement with Japan then Germany would occupy a part of Russia including the Baku district thereby cutting off the Russian oil supply.

MORRIS

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BERLIN

Dated April 2, 1941
Rec'd 1:03 a.m., 3rd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1239, April 2, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The foregoing report of a possible German invasion of Russia is the only one I have heard which bears any stamp of authenticity but a flood of rumors that German military action against Russia was imminent has recently been circulating not only in the Diplomatic Corps but in the German ministries as well. These rumors are possibly based on the increase of German troops along the Russian border and fanned by such incidents as Russia's assurances of neutrality in case of Turkey's involvement in the war and more recently theories of Russian responsibility in the revolution in Yugoslavia. Many, if not indeed a majority, of the contacts who have repeated this rumor have remarked that it may have been deliberately circulated by Government officials here either for its effect on Russia for purposes of mystification as to Germany's real military intentions or merely as a contribution to the war of nerves. Whatever its validity the rumor has had remarkable circulation. (END OF MESSAGE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM Berlin

DEPT. of STATE

Rec'd 9 a.m., 10th.

1360, April 9, 5 p.m.

Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece there has been a subsidence of the flood of rumors—possibly deliberately circulated by the Germans for effect on Russia or for purposes of general mystification—that a German attack on Russia was quite imminent. Our Consul in Konigsberg however, reports that in East Prussia the population is still apprehensive that military operations may soon occur in the Baltic area. Under date of April 5 he reported that there were persistent reports in Konigsberg that a decision to make use of the augmented German military forces in that area would be made within the next few days and rumors also circulated there that a difference of opinion had arisen between Stalin and Molotov with regard to Russian policy in the present situation.

Repeated to Moscow.

MORRIS

WSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Berlin

Dated April 13, 1941

Reg'd 5:51 p.m. APR 22 1941

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

1423, April 13, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

My 1368, April 9, 5 p.m.

I feel impelled to report that following German successes in the Balkans there is a revival and increase of belief here that Germany will shortly attack Russia. Although no good authority is cited for this report and many of those who believe it profess inability to perceive the logic of such action at this precise time it is nevertheless firmly believed by many Germans including officials and by members of the diplomatic corps. May is the month usually assigned for the action and there are now appearing corollary rumors that it will be accompanied by a revolution in Moscow.

In only one case known to the Embassy has an informant stated that his information came from Hitler himself (see my no. 1239, of April 2, 8 p.m.) and in this instance no date was set for the action which was only threatened in case Russia failed to come to terms with Japan. Several Germans believed to be sincere who have frequently
frequently furnished reliable information insist that an invasion of Russia has been definitely decided upon but they do not claim that their information in this instance comes from any high authoritative sources.

MORRIS

WWC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated April 13, 1941

FROM Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1423, April 13, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Apart from these informants there is the fact that Germany has in the last months been steadily increasing its forces along the Russian frontier. But this fact and the rumors themselves are explainable as a deliberate attempt on Germany's part to arouse the apprehension of Russia and make it more amenable to Axis demands for supplies and for a cessation of its attitude of opposition and threat to the third partner Japan.

Opponents of the theory of an early German attack on Russia, while expressing the belief that Germany would eventually attack Russia, insist that to do so now would establish a war on two fronts and detract from if indeed not entirely destroy Germany's ability to invade or disable England which would be the only operation which might bring an early end of the war. They characterize the rumors as deliberately planted either to impress Russia or to detract attention from possible German large-scale military action to drive Britain from the Mediterranean.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased by the
form being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Dated April 13, 1941
Rec'd 5:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1423, April 13, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Apart from the probably authentic information transmitted in my 1239 the best justification of the reports I have heard was given by the former Lithuanian Minister here who recently asserted to me that his belief was not derived from wishful thinking but was based on numerous indications he had received. The only thing which might prevent Germany's taking such action he claimed would be a Soviet agreement to admit large numbers of German experts with adequate authority to organize Russian oil and agricultural production and transportation for German use which Russia would never in fact permit. Germany he asserted had given up hope of invading England (a statement which is repeated by various Germans) and had little belief that its Atlantic operations would be finally successful in preventing an intensification of the British blockade and mastery of the seas. Neither had Hitler hopes of being
-2- #1423, April 15, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Berlin.

being able to make a compromise peace at this time.

MORRIS

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

From

Berlin

Dated April 13, 1941

Rec'd 5:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1423, April 13, 4 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

His only recourse therefore was to enlarge Germany's economic base for a defensive war and destroy the possibilities of Russian military growth. Hitler could not wait for it would take a considerable period to restore the Russian economy to the position it occupied in Czarist times of being a principal grain supplier of European role largely taken over by South America in recent years. European food reserves were steadily if slowly declining and only immediate steps toward reorganization in the Ukraine could bring an increased food supply in time to prevent hunger and political desperation in many sections of Europe.

MORRIS
LS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

BERLIN
Dated April 13, 1941
Rec'd 5:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1423, April 13, 4 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In addition to the foregoing "logic" of a German
attack on Russia at this time certain Germans here say
that such action is looked on with favor by elements
in the High Command who are skeptical of Germany's
ability permanently to subject Western Europe and
believe that a victory over the Bolshevik regime might
restore Germany to "social standing" among conservative
elements in other countries and enable the Reich to
make peace.

Repeated to Moscow. (END MESSAGE)

MORRIS

HPD
POLITICAL REPORT NO. 18

SUBJECT: GERMAN RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

Leland B. Norris, Esquire,
Charge d'Affaires a.i.,
American Embassy,
Berlin.

Sir:

Chief among subjects now occupying public opinion, rivalling in interest even the current exciting military campaigns in the Balkans and Northern Africa, is the question of Germany's relations with Soviet Russia.

Indeed, for some months there had been increasing speculation regarding Russia's position but in the last two weeks or so public interest in Russia has reached a very high pitch. In general, the feeling is that highly important developments are now in the making vis-a-vis Russia and that almost anything may happen at any time from now on in Germany's relations with that country.

The keen interest of the more intelligent classes in Russian affairs at this time is the more notable and significant since for weeks past very little information of any kind has appeared in the German press, or been heard over the radio, regarding Russia. This current reserve is in marked contrast to the situation prevailing until say last January when German newspapers were in the custom of carrying extensive articles regarding Russia.
Russia, its economy, international relations, etc., the local press contained many quotations from Soviet publications, and much space was devoted especially to Russia's immense economic resources. All of the newspaper articles and news items published until a few months ago tended to play up the importance of Russia as a friendly disposed neutral whose vast economic resources were available to Germany in the latter's life and death struggle with the British Empire. The sudden disappearance of all of this rather pro-Russian publicity excited misgivings among the general public as regards the true state of Russia's relations with Germany and these misgivings have been considerably intensified in most recent times by a veritable deluge of sensational reports and rumors regarding German troop concentrations along the Russian frontier, differences developing between the German and Soviet Governments, and difficulties apparently being encountered in the carrying out of economic agreements between the two countries.

It is remarkable that amid the welter of vague and to some extent conflicting reports now in circulation, one fact stands out in high relief and that is the increasing belief on the part of the average thoughtful German that relations with Russia are tending toward a climax and that something decisive might occur in those relations at almost any time. However, it is not less remarkable that there is considerable diversity of opinion, first, as to the causes of the present seemingly strained relations, and secondly, as to measures which may be taken by either Germany or Russia for effectively deciding the course of their relations in the future.
The most arresting aspect of general public opinion at this time is the expectation apparently entertained by many of the better informed people that armed hostilities might break out between Germany and Russia at almost any time. This section of public opinion bases its view of the international situation upon the reported massing of formidable German armed forces in East Prussia, in Poland, and elsewhere near the Russian frontier, and the taking of other preparations by the German military authorities which are construed as presaging an armed invasion of Russia. The removal of the Jewish populations from frontier zones to points in the interior of Poland is interpreted as an additional sign indicating Germany's bellicose intentions towards Russia, and it is recalled that in the past in other prospective theatres of war, such as along the Dutch and Belgian frontiers, the German military authorities took care to remove all Jewish elements from near the frontier well in advance of the date upon which actual armed hostilities were started.

While opinion varies as to the exact scope of Germany's military preparations vis-à-vis Russia, it seems clear that truly formidable armed forces are now massed in territory from which an invasion of Russia might be launched, and some reports have it that over 2 million men are now concentrated in strategic positions near the Russian frontier available for an invasion of Russia if and when the order to advance may be given. It is also stated that immense quantities of the most formidable weapons, including aviation units, panzer divisions and most modern long-range field artillery, have been concentrated in border zones available for instant action.
Against the view that the invasion of Russia is virtually inevitable and a question of only a relatively short time is differing opinion held by some people that it will not be necessary or desirable for Germany to take military action against Russia at all. This section of opinion is based upon the premise that the military preparations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are largely of a demonstrative and precautionary nature and are designed to warn the Russians that Germany will "stand no nonsense" in the matter of effecting speedy and effective cooperation on the part of Russia in all matters of vital concern for Germany. As one well-informed German, with close Party connections, remarked: "When we negotiate with the Communists, we make sure to take all necessary military preparations in advance, to impress upon the Communists the seriousness of our intentions and our determination to have desired posts consezed and, after their conscription, to have them faithfully carried out."

Another section of opinion has it that a serious break of relations with Russia is, in the nature of things, something to be expected sooner or later and that there is no genuine basis for enduring friendship between the two countries as they are at present governed since both the national interests and political ideologies of the Nazi and Soviet regimes are fundamentally irreconcilable and that ultimately there must be a military showdown with Russia which will, once and for all time, establish National Socialist supremacy throughout Europe, including Russia. This school of thought is of the opinion that there has been no basic change in the attitude of the Nazi regime towards Communism, that the old hatred of the Nazis
Nazis for the Communists is still alive and as virile as ever, and that the Nazis are merely abiding their own time to have a final reckoning with the Communists. It is remarkable that in conversations with Party adherents one readily detects a deep and abiding dislike for the Communist regime and a fervent desire to take action which will extirpate that regime and enable Germany to establish some other system in its place which will be more conformable to Nazi tenets and subservient to the dictates of the Nazi Government.

Related to this general interpretation of the present Russo-German situation is also the view that increasing wartime strains upon Germany's national economy will render it imperative for Germany, regardless of ideological concepts, to seek to improve its economic position by direct action effecting the "acquisition" of the Ukraine with its vast resources of grain and other foodstuffs, petroleum, minerals, etc. In line with this reasoning, it is pointed out that increasing difficulties in its supply of motor fuel vital for carrying on the war, may compel Germany, through sheer desperation, to seize the Ukraine as a means of securing control over the important petroleum production provided by that territory. Aside from wartime economic necessities, persons holding this general view point out that the acquisition of the Ukraine is in any case a basic objective of Nazi policy and wartime economic problems have only served to render it more necessary than ever that this economically rich territory be acquired by the Reich so that its resources will be made available for direct and unhampered exploitation under exclusively German control. Persons holding this view are of the opinion that
that no matter what concessions the Soviet Union may feel disposed to make to Germany, the National Socialist regime is determined to free Germany of dependence upon "Communist favors" and "Communist goodwill" for meeting its vital economic requirements, and to eliminate, by drastic action, the various difficulties now impeding the supplying of Russian raw materials to Germany, such as international clearing balances, differences in railway transport systems and associated need for costly and time-consuming frontier transfers, withholding or diversion by Russia of raw materials badly needed by Germany, etc., all of which can prove very irritating to an aggressive and arrogant militaristic regime like National Socialism engaged in a momentous struggle for European hegemony.

Also allied to the view that Germany must sooner or later acquire the Ukraine for its own economic salvation is the theory that Germany's policy of collaboration with Japan will require that Germany shall be in a position to exert decisive influence in the control of the far-flung Russian domain separating Germany from Japan. Persons holding this view reason that for the successful prosecution of its Japanese policy Germany requires a subservient or vassal Russia so that it will be able to control not only Russia's economic resources but, what is vitally important, the Russian railway system extending across Russia and Siberia so that Germany can, unimpeded, exchange goods with Japan and Far Eastern countries and extend to Japan military assistance when and as needed by the latter in fulfillment of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact.
By gaining control over the trans-Russian and Siberian railway system, Germany would be placed in a vastly improved strategic situation through being able to secure badly needed raw materials and to export goods, via Japan, thus securing a far greater degree of independence of any enemy naval blockade that might be applied against Germany.

While admittedly the prospect of the conquest of Russia by Germany, especially at a time when the latter is already engaged in a life and death struggle with Britain, would impress the average "outsider" as rather a "large order", it nevertheless is remarkable that many Party people apparently regard the eventuality of armed hostilities with Russia with perfect equanimity. In fact, some local commentators seem to feel that Germany's conquest of the vital nerve centers of Russia would be a relative simple matter and could be achieved with almost as much celerity and efficiency as was shown by Germany in subjugating other Continental countries during the present war. These commentators are convinced that the German Army is invincible beyond all question and that if an armed conflict does develop with Russia, the odds will be heavily in Germany's favor, with every prospect of an early defeat of the Russian Army and overthrow of the Communist Government. For supporting this conclusion, these commentators point not only to the immense strength of Germany's armed forces but to the weakness and general inefficiency of the Russian Army, demonstrated to all the world in its blundering efforts to subdue Finland.

Local commentators state that, aside from principles of basic rational policy, which would require the acquisition of the Ukraine by Germany sooner or later in any case, there have been increasing causes of dissatisfaction
by Germany in its relations with the Soviet Union in recent months. Thus, it is stated that economic agreements concluded between the two countries have not been working out as favorably for Germany as was desired and that the Russians apparently have been placing some difficulties in the way of supplying Germany with desired quantities of raw materials. It is stated that by reason of war conditions and the overburdened condition of German industry, Germany has been behind schedule in making deliveries of machinery, industrial equipment, etc., ordered by Russia, and that in consequence of these delays Russia has been holding back in deliveries of foodstuffs and raw materials needed by Germany. It is stated, for instance, that Russia made especially strong complaints regarding Germany's failure to deliver industrial equipment like rotating lathes which were badly needed in Russia. Then, again, it would appear that the Russians have been causing difficulties in connection with the transfer of goods at the German-Russian frontier and that the Germans have been displeased by the refusal of the Russians to cooperate more fully in the matter of speeding up frontier freight transfers by allowing improvements in the organization of the railway freight traffic, such as the construction of German-gauge railway lines upon a wider scale and over a longer distance within Russian territory, increased scope of freight car marshalling yards, etc. It is also reported that Russian frontier authorities have been showing an increasingly unsympathetic and uncooperative attitude toward officials on the German side having to deal with them. As an expression of the antagonistic nature of relations reported to have developed between the frontier
frontier authorities of the two countries, it is stated
that at some frontier stations the Russians have put up
signs with arrows pointing towards Russia bearing the
words "To Freedom" and arrows pointing towards Germany
and German-controlled territory reading "To Slavery".
It is stated that Hitler is well informed regarding
these troubled relations between the two countries but
that he has established the policy of allowing the German
authorities to wrangle with the difficulties and settle
them as best they can. It is stated, however, that if an
improvement cannot be effected, Hitler is disposed to let
matters take their course until a certain point is reached,
presumably coinciding with the development of the general
international and military situations, when the leadership
will drastically intervene and be prepared to take even
military action with a view to clearing up the entire
German-Russian situation in a decisive manner similar to
the now familiar procedure followed since the war began
with reference to other countries which were "put on the
spot" and finally compelled to capitulate before the over-
whelming might of Germany's military power.

It is realized that the information contained in this
despatch is, unavoidably, of a vague and inconclusive charac-
ter and can in no way be regarded as offering anything au-
thoritative concerning the subject of Germany's relations
with Russia regarding which there is so much mystery and
speculation. At the same time, however, it was considered
that the information presented, providing a summary of views
of many intelligent and well-informed Germans, might be
useful to the Embassy in connection with its own knowledge
of
of the subject and for piecing together with information relative thereto received from other sources. The entire subject of Russo-German relations at the present time is of such outstanding importance in the existing world situation that it was thought that even sketchy and inconclusive information from sources lacking all claim to authoritativeness might be of value in throwing some light upon this subject and in suggesting possible new developing trends which may have far-reaching effects upon the future course of events in Europe and the world.

Respectfully yours,

Sydney B. Rodocker,
American Consul.

SBR.

Copy to the Division of Commercial Affairs, Dept. of State.
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 31.
Lisbon, May 4, 1941.


The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith the coded text of a communication which has been received at this Legation on May 2 from the American Embassy in Berlin with the request that it be forwarded by air courier since the contents are of such a highly confidential character as to make transmission by cable unwise.

Respectfully yours,

BERT FISH

Enclosed:

Coded text as stated - Cipher text 1612, in quadruplicate. Signed on Dick.

PM/jwh
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM

BERLIN VIA LISBON (AIR MAIL)

Dated April 28.

Rec'd May 7, 1941.

Secretary of State, Washington.

1617, April 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The following is the gist of information obtained from a highly placed and extremely well informed source.

One. The German position with respect to food and raw materials such that new and important sources of supply must be opened up before next winter. Reduction of certain German food rations has been postponed only in the hope that present victories would bring about sufficient improvement in civilian morale to soften the shock of such a reduction. The necessity to obtain new supplies is so pressing that it has influenced strongly the decision to go all out on the winning of the war during the present year. This decision being pursued with such consistency that certain basic German industries, the productive capacity of which would now have to be maintained at the highest pitch if German munitions production were to be continued at the present level beyond the next six months are now being seriously stripped of their labor forces by army conscription to the ultimate
-2- 1617, April 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Berlin

ultimate detriment of their productive capacity. This
applies particularly to the machine tool industry should
also eventually effect submarine production.

Two. In their plans for overcoming their supply
difficulties the Germans are calculating extensively
on Morocco particularly with respect to vegetable
oils and grains produced locally and other products now
imported there. They are at present receiving important
supplies from there and hope through an extension of
their influence there to increase this flow materially.
They are agreeably surprised at the little control which
seems to be exercised over the final disposition of
supplies received in French Morocco from the outside
world.

Rh. MORRIS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BERLIN

Dated April 28, 1941
Rec'd May 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1617, April 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

According to information they have received, American circles have promised delivery of motor fuels to French Morocco in amounts which to the German official mind indicate either remarkable naivety on our part or a desire to lay in supplies there for some future use by our own forces. They expect, of course, to acquire eventually practically everything of this nature which may be delivered there in the near future.

Three. With particular reference to motor fuels, Germany has plenty for immediate domestic use but the problem of supplying southern and western Europe is acute, due largely to transportation difficulties. New wind falls in that vicinity or the opening of a maritime supply route to the Western Mediterranean will be required if this problem is not to become critical after a time.

Four. On the success of their efforts to develop North Africa as a source of supply for southern and western Europe may depend in part their attitude toward Russia.
-2- 1617, April 28, 3 p.m. (SECTION WO) from Berlin

Russia. If they were to be cut off from further supplies from Morocco this fact, while not alone decisive, would give a powerful stimulus to the idea of diplomatic and military action against Russia. The German High Command is of the opinion that the Russian internal situation is not strong enough to permit any really formidable resistance to a German attack and it might well be inclined to attempt this as a means of solving the supply problem if other possibilities seemed insufficient.

(END MESSAGE)

MORRIS

HTM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Berlin

Dated May 1, 1941

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1674, May 1, noon. (SECTION ONE)

La Bonne, the returning French Ambassador to Moscow, en route to Vichy, called yesterday at the Embassy.

Morris

HTM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1674, May 1, noon. (SECTION TWO)

He stated that it was firmly believed in Moscow that the German Ambassador Schulenberg would return there shortly with an ultimative request for greatly increased deliveries of oil and agricultural products, delivery of which was to be assured by certain "guarantees" which it was surmised would consist of rights of military occupation in the Ukraine and perhaps the Baltic region and privileges of technical organization and direction. The Ambassador is of the opinion that Stalin would go a long way to meet these conditions short of engagements which might definitely imperil the position of the Russian army and destroy the possibilities of eventual defense. If the Russian acceptance was immaterial from the German standpoint he believed that the Germans would drive across the Ukraine to the Caucasus in which case Russia would have to conclude peace on German terms as it could neither feed nor defend itself.

Whether Germany gained Lebensraum and supplies in South Russia by Russian surrender or by conquest he thought that Hitler would then endeavor to make peace with England on the basis of German withdrawal from Western Europe. (The)
#1674, from Berlin, dated May 1, 1941

The Ambassador did not pretend that his thesis proceeded from high authentic sources, but insisted that it was believed by the Soviet Government. (END OF MESSAGE)

MORRIS

HTM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Berlin

Dated May 27, 1941

Rec'd 6

MAY 28 1941

DIVISION III

DEPARTMENT

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2094, May 27, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE).


The previous rumors of German military actions against Russia which are known to have alarmed the Russian Embassy here and which were possibly if not probably circulated with that end in view have now been largely displaced by stories that Russia has already or is on the point of signing a far-reaching economic agreement containing also articles of military cooperation including the right of transit for German troops.

While the Embassy has received no information from any impressive source it is inclined to believe that some sort of Soviet-German agreement extending the trade negotiations mentioned in my telegram under reference may be forthcoming. The individual named in the Department's 1097, April 16, 7 p.m. asserts he has been informed by military sources that some written agreement has already been
EN-2-2094, May 27, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Berlin.

been signed by the German Ambassador in Moscow and Stalin wherein the latter inter-alia agrees upon German request to declare war on Britain.

MORRIS

GW
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

2095, May 27, 6 p.m.

Continuing my 2094, May 27, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

My informant asserts that there was also an intimation that the agreement or part of it might be made public in the near future to offset the effect of the President's speech tonight. Some color has been given to this story by the statement of a Tass correspondent here in private conversation that Russia wanted peace and might make some agreement with Germany to join its pressure on England to accept peace.

The above rumor and intimations are possible utterly unfounded. They are cited because in this particular situation there is little here but rumors to go on. The single known fact is that there are large numbers, perhaps 120 divisions, of German troops on the Russian border prepared for any eventuality. These numbers are perhaps increasing. Within the last few days there has been a great reduction here in passenger train schedules which can only mean troop movements to some destination.
EH -2- 2095, May 27, 6 p.m. from Berlin.

destination.

I also note that Dekanosov, Russian Ambassador, who contrary to his predecessors initiated some contacts with his colleagues including myself has apparently not been in social circulation since his return from Moscow.

Repeated to Moscow.

(END OF MESSAGE).

MORRIS

WWC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Berlin
Dated June 8, 1941
Rec'd 1:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2261, June 8, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

I have received rather impressive testimony that within a fortnight Germany will invade Russia. Hitler is described as determined to crush Soviet Russia and its army, although certain of his advisors are of the opinion that such action would be a profound military and economic error at this time. While the testimony is impressive, it is to be remembered that Hitler alone makes the great decisions and that he does not announce them until the exact moment of their execution. It is quite possible that the tremendous preparations on the Russian border are a form of final pressure on Russia or a mask for action in some other area.

MORRIS

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D-1)

FROM

BERLIN
Dated June 8, 1941
Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2261, June 8, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

From less impressive sources the assertion is heard that Russia has already reached or is on the point of reaching an agreement for entire economic and military cooperation with Germany, including use of Russian forces against the British in Asia. One interesting contact declares that German troops will move this week through the Ukraine with Russian assistance and permission.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MORRIS

KLP
June 12, 1941

This telegram must be closely paraphrased for communication to anyone. (br)

Since, as suggested in my telegram No. 1596 of April 28, 3 p.m., the success of the German economic mission now in Tokyo depends largely on a satisfactory outcome of the Tokyo-Batavia trade negotiations, the course of those negotiations has been followed with anxious interest in official circles in Berlin. There is evidence that those circles are now convinced that the negotiations have reached an impasse, with the result that both the economic and political relations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies are in a state of crisis. The status of the negotiations nevertheless described here as stagnation rather than breakdown, and it is believed that Germany is urging Japan to exert with all the means at its disposal pressure on Tokyo with the hope either of achieving some sort of agreement or of forcing the issue in such a manner that the resulting situation will be one most unfavorable to Berlin in collaboration with German military and naval strategy. Report to Tokyo.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Dated June 21, 1941
Rec'd 6:10 a.m., 22nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

2483, June 21, 6 p.m.

From many sides are coming rumors to the effect that the long diplomatic struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union is to come to a showdown within the next two days. It is said that 'the Soviet Government will be required either to yield forthwith to Germany's demands or to face an attack to be launched on Sunday or on Monday at the latest. It also is said that the Reichstag is to be convened tomorrow or on Monday if the attack is not begun until the latter day and that the familiar pattern of explanation and justification will be followed.

I am not prepared to say that these rumors are based on fact but they are so numerous and persistent that I feel you should be informed of them.

MORRIS

EMB
Telegram Received

From: GRAY
Berlin
Dated: August 28, 1941
Rec'd: 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3318, August 28, 5 p.m.

In a signed article appearing in several German newspapers this morning Japanese Finance Minister Omura declares that the situation in the Pacific region has become more difficult and more serious from day to day since the "proclamation by President Roosevelt on July 26 that all Japanese credits in the United States, Canada, England, South Africa, and India were immediately blocked and the Japanese ships in American ports confiscated." He states that this "economic war against Japan" was made complete by the oil blockade and the forcing of the Netherlands Government to participate and has been supplemented politically "by the drawing in of Moscow in the past few days as a new factor in the encirclement bloc." Japan he adds is forced "to resort to measures of violence" in order to "parry this attack on Japanese independence" since it is determined to continue its policy...
3318, August 28, 1941, 5 p.m. - from Berlin.

policy of "ending the China War" and organizing the "inexhaustible" human and material resources of China as the basis for the greater East Asian prosperity sphere. With Japanese capital and skill light industries are to be erected in China and the yen bloc "comprising all of East Asia will completely drive out the former rulers of East Asia, namely, the dollar and the pound" and thereby make possible "lively economic exchanges with the European bloc, South American, and other powers not hostile to us." Omura concludes that Japan is today facing an historic decision and that a false step or any sign of weakness now might "prevent the further development of our glorious nation for generations to come."

Repeated to Tokyo.

MORRIS

NPL