SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

318, MARCH 9, 6 P.M.

The army estimates were introduced in the House of Commons yesterday by the Minister of War, with a statement not only of the policies of the Government in building up the military establishment but with an analysis of the proposed organization and distribution of land forces, both regular and territorial, in relation to Great Britain's strategic problem, which carried political implications of major importance in British foreign policy.

The Minister of War referred to the Prime Minister's declarations in the House of Commons on December 15 and February 11 and quoted Mr. Chamberlain's statement that the solidarity of interest by which France and Great Britain are united is such that any threat to the vital interests of France, from whatever quarter it came, must evoke the immediate cooperation of Great Britain. He then made the unreserved statement that if Great Britain were involved in war, her contribution and the ways in which she
she could best make it would not be half-hearted nor based upon any theory of limited liability. In his statement of facts regarding the organization of the army, the Minister of War said that restrictions limiting the territorial army to home service would be removed; that a field force of 19 divisions was being trained and equipped to meet eventualities which might arise in any quarter; this force to be despatched abroad if necessary in echelons.

Such an announcement of an expeditionary force to be available before the contingency calling for it has arisen, is not only a radical departure from British military tradition but is concrete evidence of the stiffening of the Government's attitude since Munich. It should therefore be associated with the Prime Minister's statement on the solidarity of Anglo-French interests, the enormous sums which the Government has proposed to raise for carrying out the armament programme and recent energetic activities of the Board of Trade to hold British markets abroad in the face of competition from the totalitarian states. These succeeding announcements of policy, culminating with a definite armament programme of ambitious dimensions,
REB

-3- /316, March 9, 6 p. m., from London.

dimensions, are all part of one pattern and designed to indicate not only Great Britain's determination but her confidence in her ability to defend herself.

The statement of the Minister of War has been received with uniform satisfaction by all sections of the press.

KENNEDY.

CSB
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

LONDON
Dated March 10, 1939
Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

321, March 10, 6 p.m.

(GRAY) The Prime Minister last night gave a background talk to the Parliamentary correspondents of the British press which has produced a spate of optimistic articles on the European outlook in today's newspapers. The three principal points are (one) that with the end of the Spanish war drawing near in a short time the relationship of the European powers to Franco Spain will be "clarified", (two) then Italo-French diplomatic negotiations can be undertaken to settle their differences, which are not irreconcilable, and (three) both the German industrialists and the Nazi leaders are anxious to improve their economic relations with Great Britain; and that when progress is made on (one) and (two) tentative disarmament discussions might be opened. (END GRAY)

While it is impossible accurately to assess the Prime Minister's
Minister's motives in giving this public lead I do know that Ashton-Gwatkin's report of his sympathetic and friendly reception in Berlin has not yet been received here. It was perhaps also realized that this speciﬁer might sooth somewhat the irritation which the steps enumerated in the Embassy's 311 of March 9, 6 p.m., have caused in Germany and Italy without necessarily impairing their effectiveness; also that it might augment conﬁdence in this country which has an extraordinary important effect on British economic activity.

It might be added that Parliamentary gossip has it that if the international situation does not deteriorate during the summer and if economic conditions are reasonably favorable the Government will decide to hold a general election in the autumn.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated March 14, 1939

REG'D 5:37 P.M.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

329, March 14, 8 p.m.

My 321, March 10, 6 p.m.

The Under Secretary this afternoon commented on the press articles which have followed the Prime Minister's background talk to the Parliamentary correspondents on March 9. He said that it was perhaps unfortunate that the Prime Minister had made this talk to the Parliamentary correspondents rather than to the diplomatic correspondents who would have known how to put it in proper perspective. The Prime Minister, he said, was merely thinking out loud and what he said was the expression rather of a hope of what might develop in the future if "everything went all right". The Parliamentary correspondents had seized assurances of words and reported them in such context and with such literalness as to make it appear that the British Government had already formulated advance plans for the future. This, said the Under Secretary, was entirely erroneous as no definite plans have yet been formulated. He said that the Prime
NC  -2- #329 from London, March 14, 1939 8 p.m.

Prime Minister himself had been somewhat disturbed at the kind of emphasis given by the press to his statements, particularly as the press articles had disturbed the French. The Under Secretary said he had been to some pains to explain to the French Ambassador that the Prime Minister's statement did not indicate any attempt on the part of the British to inject themselves as mediators between Italy and France.

JOHNSON

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London

Dated March 17, 1939

Rec’d 5:23 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

353, March 17, 6 p. m.

The Rumanian Minister just called to see me. He is on his way to the Foreign Office with instructions from his Government to try and get some idea of what England proposes to do. He is going to ask them three questions: (one) Does England propose to do anything at all? If not Rumania will make the best deal she can; (two) are they going to draw a line somewhere in Europe beyond which Hitler must not go that will just include Turkey, or will it possibly include Rumania and Yugoslavia? (three) If the Rumanians fight, will England give them any support? He said that the German demands, made about a week or ten days ago, were economic and really meant the end of Rumania, and have been turned down by the Rumanians. The Germans ordered them (one) to stop certain industries, (two) to give them oil concessions and (three) to become nothing but an agricultural country. Germany in turn would take
LMS 2-No. 353, March 17, 6 p. m., from London.

take all their exports. He said this is an impossible situation for them and they will not agree. He also said that all their orders for armament were with the Czechs and they have all been stopped, with the result that they find themselves with practically no armaments and they are asking England to sell them some of theirs, even if they are antiquated.

I imagine you get most of the information direct from Rumania but I have asked him to keep in touch with me.

KENNEDY

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (O)

Dated March 17, 1939

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington

Rec'd 8:10 p.m.

384, March 17, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

During my visit to Rome I had a long talk with Countess Ciano and I reported to Phillips three outstanding points in the two and a half hours conversation I had with her. First, she could see no reason for the democracies fighting Fascist Italy. Fascism suited Italy and had been going on for seventeen years and had done great good for the Italian people. Its chief disrepute had come from its close tieup with Hitler. Secondly, she said that after all if England, France, and the United States all stuck together, there was nothing left for Mussolini to do but play along with Hitler for his own protection. Third, by implication she made it very clear that the Italians were deeply concerned over the loss of America's friendship and, since there are a number of enthusiasts for America around Mussolini, I believe there is a good deal in what she said.

I had lunch with the Minister of Agriculture whom I met with a very close friend of mine. He outlined to me his plan
plan of handling wheat in Italy and told me that during his visit last week to Germany, where they are arranging to send many Italian laborers to work in the fields, he found that the German farmer and businessman were definitely not in good shape. I gathered from his conversation that up to now Italy has not stored very much wheat for its protection, although they have urged the farmers to plan well beyond Italy's demand in order to provide for substantial storage.

He felt that trouble between countries because of a difference in government was unthinkable. He said that the Italian people definitely did not want to go to war; that their problem was completely economic.

I also met Ciano. I sat next to him in St. Peter's for five hours on Sunday; I saw him at a tea with his wife and I attended a dinner at which he was present. I have no idea how able he is in his office, but I have never met a more pompous ass in my life. Every time it was necessary for the distinguished guests to march through St. Peter's he spent most of his time giving the Fascist salute and trying to share honors with the Pope. At the tea which we attended there were, I should judge, about forty cardinals. He spent most of his time rushing girls into the corner for conversation and at the dinner he could not talk seriously for five minutes for fear that
that the two or three girls, who were invited in order to get him to come, might get out of sight. As a result of my observations of Ciano and the gossip that Mussolini now has a German sweetheart, I came away with the belief that we would accomplish much more by sending a dozen beautiful chorus girls to Rome than a flock of diplomats and a fleet of airplanes. If Ciano, in spite of his tendencies becomes a great Secretary of State, then I have lost all judgment of men.

The President's speeches drive them absolutely crazy. My Italian friends tell me that every time the President says anything, nobody in the cabinet or Government in Rome is fit to talk with for the rest of the day.

KENNEDY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

LG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

360, March 18, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
My 353, March 17, 6 a.m.

I have just seen Halifax. The Rumanian Minister saw him after (the Rumanian Minister) talked with me last night and asked what England would do if Rumania, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia joined to fight Hitler. Halifax asked him whether he thought Russia would help them. He said he did. So late last night the British sent a wire to their representatives in these countries to find out what the countries were disposed to do. A Cabinet meeting has been called for 5 o'clock this afternoon but Halifax only expects a general conversation as he does not think that the reports will be in from their representatives in these various countries by that time.

Halifax last February definitely came to the opinion, it is my belief, that England must fight
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

-2- #360, March 18, 2 p.m. from London

if Hitler enters Rumania. He is not inclined to think an entrance into Hungary should provoke a war because he says Hungary is at the present minute honeycombed with Naziism. But on a step into Rumania he believes that England cannot wait any longer. He has asked France for an expression of opinion and Maisky, the Ambassador, was there when I left.

Halifax says that they must determine at once one of two things: first, whether Hitler is bluffing, and if so his bluff should be called; if he is not bluffing the sooner they take him on the better it will be. He thought that the Prime Minister's speech last night very definitely committed them to action if Hitler started for Rumania. My hunch is that if Chamberlain opposes that idea very strongly there may be a break between the Prime Minister and Halifax.

KENNEDY

RR: HPD
EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London
Dated March 18, 1939
Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

361, March 18, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Halifax told me this morning that von Dirksen came to see him to complain about Duff Cooper's attack on Hitler as a violation of the rule against an attack on the head of a state. Halifax told him that Hitler had not been careful about attacks on heads of states, as witness his attack on Benes, and also that, since he had attacked Duff Cooper, he had to expect a little of his own medicine.

Halifax said that von Dirksen went away very indignant.

KENNEDY

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED PAGE ONE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM
London
Dated March 20, 1939
Rec'd 3:34 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

370, March 20, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Halifax told me they have sent a message to Russia, Poland and France, with the text of an agreement it is proposed these countries should consider for signature with Great Britain saying that the four countries will consult with the idea of stopping any further German moves in the direction of Eastern Europe. They spent six or seven hours yesterday trying to get the draft agreement in shape so that Russia and France would sign and they think they have it. Halifax is inclined to believe that Russia and France will sign but he thinks that Beck may balk. He thinks that it will be a calamity if he does because, with this agreement signed, they think they will be in a position to serve notice on Hitler that it means war if he persists. They feel that, if this agreement is signed, the trade unions may be willing to withdraw their opposition to conscription and they may introduce conscription.
conscription. If they do, it is very likely that there will be some form of conscription of wealth to go along with it.

Some of the Cabinet on Saturday night thought that the Prime Minister was not quite tough enough of the question of getting ready for war, but MacDonald told me today he thought that whereas the Prime Minister was once a strong advocate of peace, he has now definitely swung around to the war point of view. MacDonald also told me that there was no present point of difference between Halifax and Chamberlain.

MOST CONFIDENTIAL. The Prime Minister is writing to Mussolini, calling to his mind the result of their talk during the Prime Minister's visit, and trying to ascertain if it is possible to start driving in the wedge between Germany and Italy. I asked Halifax if they would be willing to pay a big price and he said he thought so, but he would not want to deliver until he saw Mussolini's performance, because he was afraid that after he had collected from England he still might try to collect from Germany.

He asked what America's point of view was as far as Italy was concerned, because I had mentioned to him that everybody
Everybody I met in Italy seemed to be more anxious to become friendly with the United States than with England and I said it seemed to me that the President had a very difficult position, because the one thing necessary to start working out anything with Italy would be recognition of Abyssinia and here was the United States all stirred up about Germany's aggression in Czechoslovakia and yet the recognition of Abyssinia would seem to countenance Italy's aggression in that country. He said he realized it was a very difficult position, but he was hoping something might be worked out.

KENNEDY

NPL
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

LONDON

Dated March 22, 1939

Rec'd 5:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

369, March 22, 8 p.m.

(Gray) By 369, March 22, 7 p.m., in particular last paragraph.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

 Replies to the British Government's proposals sent to Russia, Poland and France for signature of a joint declaration that the four countries would enter into discussions regarding concerted measures which might have to be taken in the event of an attack by Germany against any eastern European state have not been received. The Foreign Office has, however, received certain preliminary reactions and observations which may be summarized as follows:

(One) Russia. M. Litvinoff has expressed great disappointment at the rejection of his earlier proposals for a conference, which he still prefers. Russia has in no way committed herself with regard to the draft declaration and . Bonnet since his arrival in London has expressed the opinion that if anything is to be got from Russia she will have
2-#388, From London, Mar. 22, 6p.m.

have to be pinned down to a precise definition of exactly what she will do, as the Russians have a great predilection for making international propaganda by public statements, which do not commit them to anything.

(Two). Poland indicates fears of Germany and expresses dislike of cooperation with Russia. She says that if she gives her adherence to the declaration proposed by the British it would take her definitely off the fence and put her in the Soviet camp against Germany. She indicates that it would be easier for her to go along with Great Britain and France if Russia were out of the picture. The British proposal, however, will be further examined.

(Three). France. The French think it is time to call a halt to Germany but feel that it is necessary to know exactly how each country stands and exactly what action each country would take. M. Bonnet has expressed the view to Lord Halifax that the adherence of Poland to the proposed declaration is of vital importance and that it should be secured even if Poland had to be threatened. He apparently did not specify in what way Poland could be threatened.

Although
Although the proposed declaration has not been submitted by the British Government to Turkey, the Turkish Ambassador has been informed of it by the Foreign Secretary. The Ambassador said to Lord Halifax that he could speak with confidence and full knowledge of Turkish policy and that his country would go to all lengths with Great Britain if assured of British support and if Turkey could rely on British assistance should she herself be attacked in the Mediterranean. Turkey would depart from neutrality only if on the side of Great Britain. Her attachment to this relationship is unconditional and would not be affected by Polish and Russian replies. Apart from this, Turkey is prepared to fulfill all her existing treaty obligations. (END GRAY)

It will be seen from the foregoing features great are the difficulties of reaching any agreement on concerted action against Germany. Each country wants to know what the other one is going to do and if the views of the smaller countries are to be met to a degree sufficient to insure their cooperation, Great Britain and France will have to assume burdens of incalculable responsibility. With the Munich agreement washed away, an entirely new line
line of action has to be worked out and applied. Responsible officials indicate that the British Government has no attachment to solution along any doctrinaire line but that it is examining every possibility which might offer a lead to effective machinery for stemming German aggression. Such possibilities are therefore being examined solely from the viewpoint of what is practicable and expedient.

KENNEDY

JRL

EMB
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

391, March 23, 5 p.m.

Press opinion here is prepared to admit that Germany's acquisition of the Memel falls in a different category from its annexation of Czechoslovakia and criticism is directed against the method pursued rather than the development itself.

Comment is largely along the lines of that of the TIMES which, while recognizing that the Memel area is almost entirely German by race and that it was originally taken by Lithuania through a military coup, condemns the German action as a further example of Nazi "militarized diplomacy" and as disregarding Hitler's specific assurances to Mr. Chamberlain that he had no further territorial claims in Europe.

Several opposition press organs make the point that this further act of aggression emphasizes the need for hastening the formation of a collective "peace front" which is prepared to run some risks for peace.

HBD
KENNEDY
Secretary of State,
Washington.

365, March 23, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 389, March 22, 8 p.m.

The Foreign Office states that final replies to the British proposals for a joint declaration have been received from France and Soviet Russia and preliminary indications have been received from Poland.

One. The Soviet Government accepts and will sign as soon as France and Poland have accepted. Moscow is anxious that not only the Balkan but also the Baltic and Scandinavian countries be invited to adhere to the declaration after publication.

Two. The French reply expresses entire assent.

H. Bonnet, however, in conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax has emphasized the importance of Polish participation and the difficulty of effecting this in view of the Soviet participation.

Three,
Three. The chief preoccupation of Poland is the suggested participation of Russia. The Polish Ambassador in London has been instructed to propose that the British Government and the Polish Government enter into a secret agreement of consultation on the lines suggested in the declaration, this not however to prejudice any official decision regarding Polish participation in the public declaration on which the Ambassador is to communicate the views of the Polish Government later. It would not affect the position of France either as the existing Franco-Polish treaty already contains a consultative clause. The British Ambassador in Warsaw has suggested that publication with Polish consent might be possible if Poland were given definite assurances that the western powers would take effective and immediate steps in case of German aggression against Poland. Foreign Office officials do not venture an opinion as to whether the Polish and Soviet positions can be reconciled.

The British and French representatives are urging moderation at Budapest and Bucharest in view of the degree of military mobilization in Hungary and Rumania. The
3-3595, From London, Mar. 23, 8 p.m.

British also understand that Poland is making vigorous representation in those two capitals against violent action.

KENNEDY

KLP

(#) Apparent omission.
The Prime Minister this afternoon, answering a private question in the House of Commons, said inter alia: "I am not yet in a position to make a statement on the consultations which have been held with other Governments as the result of recent developments. I wish to make it clear, however, that there is no desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to stand in the way of any reasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand her export trade. On the contrary we were on the point of discussing, in the most friendly way, the possibility of trade arrangements which would have benefited both countries when the events took place which have, for the time being, put a stop to these discussions. Nor is this Government anxious to set up in Europe opposing blocs of countries with different ideas about the form of their internal administration. We are solely concerned here with the
proposition that we cannot submit to a procedure under which independent states are subjected to such pressure under threats of force as to be obliged to yield up their independence; and we are resolved by all means in our power to oppose demands, if they should be made, to put such a procedure into operation."

KENDRICK

CSB
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London
FROM
Dated March 24, 1939
Rec'd 6:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

399, March 24, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have just seen Halifax. He had just seen the Polish Ambassador. Poland says finally that they want to go along with Great Britain and France but hesitate to join up with Russia first of all because they do not like them as bedfellows and second because a tieup of any sort between Russia and Poland will cause an open break with Hitler and war will be on. Halifax feels, however, that on Beck's arrival here next week they will arrange, in a way, Halifax does not yet know, for Poland to assure Great Britain that it will fight if Hitler attempts to take Danzig or makes any other overt act against Poland.

As to the Russian situation, they have indicated their willingness to sign the statement which Britain and France asked them to sign, but Halifax feels that Poland is of much more value to the tieup than Russia, because their latest information on Russia shows their
air force to be very weak and old and of short range, their army very poor and their industrial backing for the army frightful and the most they could expect from Russia, if Russia wanted to be of help, would be that they might send some ammunition to Poland in the event of trouble.

As to the Rumanians, in spite of the trade agreement signed today between Rumania and Germany, which agreement Halifax said was signed by the Rumanians partially because they were promised that the ammunition under contract with the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia for their account should continue to be delivered as per schedule, Halifax still feels it is possible that they may also fight against the Germans if Poland decides to take up arms.

I told Halifax that it seemed to me that, when England and France got down to the last stages of a working agreement with Poland and possibly Rumania and Russia, in the event of acts of aggression by Hitler against them, it would become quite obvious that the assurances given might not be satisfactory to both France and England and they would then find it necessary to wash their hands of the whole of Southeastern Europe. Halifax said he did not believe that was the case.

(END SECTION ONE)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  (0)

FROM

Dated March 24, 1939.

Rec'd, 6:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

299, March 24, 8 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

He felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now and that the Prime Minister himself and the Cabinet are strongly of the opinion that a line should be laid down and a statement given to Berlin that if they cross that imaginary line the war is on. He is not quite sure whether they will want to include Rumania in that imaginary line.

England is turning out this month between 580 and 600 airplanes which is their regular production and which will get bigger every month. The various Cabinet chiefs of departments have been having meetings all this week with the idea of speeding up production in all departments. They have received information today from Lord Rennell in Italy that indirectly he has received intimations that unless something happens between now and Sunday Mussolini's speech will be reasonable. Bonnet told Halifax last night that if the demands are reasonable and made in a reasonable tone he thinks the French people will
will be willing to meet them.

I asked Halifax what the possibility of conscription was and he said the trade unions were still fighting it and the Prime Minister was trying to work out a plan over the weekend and call it something else such as military preparedness or starting a permanent division of anti-aircraft.

The other night when Halifax gave me the information about the divisions being called up on the western front by the Germans, which report he has not been able to confirm up to date, the Prime Minister gave orders to mobilize the fleet the following morning, provided the information was correct.

Halifax feels that he has to be very careful in handling the Poles and Russians because the Russians may work through the trade union group here in London and make difficulty in Parliament for any action that the Government wishes to take.

Halifax feels, he says again, for no reason at all, that things are somewhat quieter. He still believes that the information they have that conditions in Germany and Italy are very bad is true and that they will come to a head the minute it looks like war. He says the one thing
thing they want to be very careful of is not to permit Hitler through any acts of theirs to persuade the German people that this is an attempt to crush the Germans so for that reason they are proceeding, he feels, rather carefully because in the last analysis, they are hopeful that the German people will break away from Hitler in the event of war.

There is no question in my mind but what Halifax definitely wants to lay down a line and say to Hitler "If you step over that it is war." He tells me that all his colleagues are in unity with him. Knowing the kind of man Halifax is, I would think that all last year he was impressed with the fact that the British people were afraid of war but that now they are afraid of tyranny which they fear more than war, and therefore they are prepared to fight.

I think all of this is background and that we will get no definite moves until, (one), we see what Mussolini does on Sunday; (two), what assurances Beck can give the British that will satisfy them that Poland will fight; (three), what help and cooperation in a general way they can get from Rumania and Russia, both of whom they regard as very weak sisters; (four), whether they can persuade the
the trade unions here to accept some form of conscription, because the French will demand that the British put some form of conscription into effect and: (five), what they will be able to say publicly to the English people and the Dominions that will persuade them to believe that the course of action outlined by Great Britain, France and the other two or three countries looks to make sense in a fight against Germany. The next week may show this. (END MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM London

Dated March 27, 1939

Rec'd noon

Secretary of State,

Washington.

403, March 27, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I saw Halifax this morning. Mussolini's speech does not displease them and they think they may be able to work something out.

They are proposing today, after a long conference with the Prime Minister last night, to send a note to Poland saying that if Poland is willing to agree to help Rumania if she is attacked, which Halifax thinks is unlikely, or to defend themselves if they are attacked, her England will make a statement that all forces and resources will be used to back them up. They are stipulating from their point of view that Poland in turn will agree to help England in the event she is attacked. Halifax believes that this note will not get an immediate answer and it may take some while for the Poles to decide on a course of action, but England is prepared to make the step today.

There is a story in the papers here today that a
note has been sent to Poland by Germany regarding a deal on Danzig. Halifax doubts if this note has ever been sent. At least the British have not been advised that it has been sent and they have seen no indication of any note from Germany to Poland.

As to conscription, they have decided against it for the present for two reasons: (one) they have not the material to supply an army if they were all called up; (two) they feel that the trade unions are prepared to upset the industrial program if the Government attempts to force conscription. I think, however, that, in order to keep France satisfied, they may start some system in a modified manner which they will not call conscription calling the people up as they need them.

I asked Halifax again if there were any truth in the reports in the Sunday papers of a split in the Cabinet. He said there was absolutely not one single word of truth in them.

KENNEDY

RR: CSB
Secretary of State,
Washington.

404, March 27, 3 p.m.

British press opinion is not displeased by Mussolini's speech yesterday. Three points are stressed: It is truculent in tone but moderate in substance; it reduces Italian claims from the extravagant to the reasonable; and it leaves the way open for a settlement with France by negotiation.

The TIMES goes so far as to say that "with the help of a skillful diplomacy the speech may mark a turning point in European affairs. Signor Mussolini has at least created a fresh starting point".

The press generally sees in the speech a confirmation of the strength of the axis but notes the possible warning implication for Germany of the passage "the Adriatic as a vital area for Italy". The MANCHESTER GUARDIAN speculates whether this means that although the axis, in Mussolini's words, cannot be unhinged or bent, it might one day be broken if Germany leaned too heavily on it.

Copies to Paris and Rome.

WWC:RF

KENNEDY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London

Dated March 28, 1939.

Rec'd 2:38 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

409, March 28, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this morning. He told me that no definite moves had been made by Germany, except the trouble of yesterday, and, on investigation by the Poles, they assured us there was no reason for any upset at all; that there were two speeches made in the Corridor: one on strictly internal Polish matters and the other on how the Germans fared in Poland as against how the Poles fared in Germany, but that there was nothing in either speech about which the Germans could take any real offense.

The Ambassador feels that the Germans are trying to blackmail Poland because of Beck's visit here. No mention of the disturbance was published in any German paper because they do not want to stir up public opinion against the Poles yet. The only observation made at all was in the
the German semiofficial paper, which published a sort of warning to Poland to behave themselves as far as Germany was concerned, or else.

The Ambassador said that, as far as Danzig was concerned, they had made a gentlemen’s agreement with Germany in 1934 that Germany and Poland would never go to war over Danzig and that if Germany had come along with a reasonable proposition, Poland would probably have accepted it. The Ambassador said he has in mind all the time that four years ago the British urged Poland strongly to give Danzig to Germany and, even now, he becomes a little distrustful of Britain’s desire to fight from the intimations he gets that Poland ought perhaps to work out something with the Germans about Danzig. He said, however, that if Germany tries to take Danzig by a coup or makes a proposition that means adding it to the Reich, Poland will fight. He says Beck hopes, of course, to get the assistance of England and France, but he is definitely urging the Polish people to be ready to fight to protect themselves, whether they have assurances from England and France or not the Ambassador feels that, in spite of the fact that England complains that Poland is not clear-cut
in their answers to England, England is far from clear-cut in their propositions to Poland. His opinion of coalitions and their efficiency reminds me of that old general during the World War who said that he thought a great deal less of Napoleon now that he had seen how badly coalitions work.

The great problem for all these European countries at the minute is to find out how they can get somebody else to come to their assistance for some other reason than one hundred per cent selfishness and, from the way I see it, it is impossible.

KENNEDY

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C).

FROM
LONDON
Dated March 28, 1939
Rec'd 4:55 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

412, March 29, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

403, March 27, 1 p.m.

A responsible Foreign Office official this afternoon alleged that they have fully realized here the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of the declaration proposed to be signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Poland (my 386, March 29, 8 p.m.), these difficulties arising not only from Polish reluctance to join any formal undertaking on the side of Russia, but because of the suspicion of the countries in Germany's path that any form of declaration not implemented by a guarantee of action would be merely another stalling operation on the part of the great powers. Moreover, the intensity of Polish and Rumanian feeling about Russia is an important factor which has not always been clearly understood either in England or in France.

The British have therefore devised a new plan which would include only Great Britain, France, and Poland and...
which would be based on British and French guarantees to Poland that they would go immediately to her assistance in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany. These guarantees, however, are to be contingent upon a similar guarantee being given by Poland that she would immediately go to the aid of Rumania in the event of an attack on that country by Germany. This new plan was stated to have received Government approval last night and has been communicated to the French. It has not yet been put up to the Poles nor have the Rumanians been informed and this will not be done until full agreement is reached with France. The official indicated that the Foreign Office hopes to have the details of this plan worked out and accepted by Poland before Beck gets here next week.

There seems to be no undue optimism about positive results to come from the Polish Foreign Minister's visit. The official said that they have doubts as to how fully he represents his country. The army is now completely in the saddle, and they feel that Beck no longer has the effective direction of Polish foreign policy. It is obvious that the Foreign Office attaches the utmost importance to the unreserved adherence and cooperation of Poland in any scheme of guarantee designed to commit Great Britain and France to military
military action. They are ready to relegate Russia to a second line of defense not only, it seems, because of the practical difficulties of including her in any agreement reached with the Poles but also because they have little confidence in Russia's reliability and potential effectiveness as an ally. In this respect official British views have changed but little since the Czechoslovak crisis of last September. While continuing to keep friendly with Russia and to assure her remaining in their camp, it is obvious that they do not expect her to make any substantial contribution to the problem of common security.

KENNEDY

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTENTS

Communications from Great Britain

Despatch No. 2344, March 26, 1939, (8601.M.01 Memel/602)
Despatch No. 2363, March 29, 1939, (662.7131/134)
Telegram No. 420, March 30, 1939, (740.00/710)
Telegram No. 425, March 31, 1939, (741.600/43)
Telegram No. 440, April 4, 1939, (740.00/736)
Telegram No. 447, April 5, 1939, (741.600/56)
Telegram No. 448, April 6, 1939, (740.00/741)
Telegram No. 459, April 10, 1939, (741.66/27)
Telegram No. 478, April 14, 1939, (741.65/729)
Telegram No. 538, April 21, 1939, (740.00/1084)
Telegram No. 542, April 22, 1939, (740.00/1088)
Telegram No. 550, April 25, 1939, (740.00/1160)
Telegram No. 601, May 3, 1939, (7600.62/545)
Telegram No. 630, May 6, 1939, (7600.62/567)
Telegram No. 640, May 8, 1939, (740.00/1381)
Telegram No. 658, May 10, 1939, (740.00/1415)
Telegram No. 734, May 24, 1939, (741.61/639)
Telegram No. 798, June 7, 1939, (741.61/679)
Telegram No. 807, June 9, 1939, (740.00/1684)
Telegram No. 809, June 9, 1939, (741.62/362)
Despatch No. 2347, June 13, 1939, (741.62/366)
Telegram No. 918, June 30, 1939, (740.00/1839)
Telegram No. 931, July 1, 1939, (7600.62/670)
Telegram No. 966, July 10, 1939, (7600.62/698)
Telegram No. 969, July 11, 1939, (7600.62/700)
Communications from Great Britain

Telegram No. 1022, July 19, 1939, (740.00/1931)
Telegram No. 1041, July 21, 1939, (740.00/1937)
Dispatch No. 3156, August 2, 1939, (741.00/250)
Dispatch No. 3170, August 5, 1939, (741.00/251)
Telegram No. 1159, August 8, 1939, (760C.62/770)
Telegram No. 1146, August 9, 1939, (740.00/2055)
Telegram No. 1172, August 16, 1939, (760C.62/836)
Telegram No. 1183, August 17, 1939, (740.00/2068)
Telegram No. 1197, August 19, 1939, (760C.62/873)
Telegram No. 1219, August 23, 1939, (761.6211/82)
Telegram No. 1223, August 24, 1939, (760C.62/943)
Telegram No. 1229, August 24, 1939, (760C.62/960)
Telegram No. 1243, August 25, 1939, (760C.62/973)
Telegram No. 1244, August 25, 1939, (761.6211/115)
Telegram No. 1252, August 25, 1939, (760C.62/996)
Telegram No. 1259, August 25, 1939, (760C.62/1002)
Telegram No. 1262, August 26, 1939, (760C.62/1013)
Telegram unnumbered received August 26, 1939, (760C.62/1077)
Telegram No. 1263, August 26, 1939, (760C.62/1022)
Telegram No. 1278, August 27, 1939, (760C.62/1059)
Telegram No. 1288, August 28, 1939, (760C.62/1100)
Telegram No. 1293, August 28, 1939, (760C.62/1103)
Telegram No. 1299, August 29, 1939, (760C.62/1135)
Telegram No. 1300, August 29, 1939, (760C.62/1138)
Telegram No. 1314, August 29, 1939, (760C.62/1166)
Communications from Great Britain

Telegram No. 1315, August 30, 1939, (760C.62/1179)
Telegram No. 1325, August 30, 1939, (760C.62/1208)
Despatch No. 3285, August 30, 1939, (760C.62/1279)
Telegram No. 1389, September 2, 1939, (740.0011 E.W.1939/70)
Telegram No. 26, January 4, 1940, (760D.61/919)
Despatch No. 4481, January 26, 1940, (741.65/779)
Telegram No. 2435, June 15, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/12030)
Telegram No. 5048, October 22, 1941, ("/16039")
Telegram No. 6147, December 19, 1941, ("/17699")
Telegram No. 2142, April 24, 1942, ("/21209")
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, March 28, 1939.

No. 2344

SUBJECT: British Position on Germany's Annexation of Memel

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 1762 of December 28, 1938 reporting Chancellor Hitler's assurance of willingness to leave the Memel district as it was so long as the Memel Statute was observed by the Lithuanian Government, I have the honor to report that Mr. R. H. Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a parliamentary question by
by Mr. A. Henderson (Labor), yesterday made the following statement on the British position in regard to Germany's annexation of Memel:

"Mr. Butler: My right hon. Friend, the Home Secretary, informed the House on 22nd March of the circumstances in which the German demand for the cession of the Memelland was made to the Lithuanian Government. His Majesty's Government have now been officially informed by that Government that on the evening of 22nd March a treaty between Germany and Lithuania was signed at Berlin providing for the immediate return of the Memelland to Germany and the establishment of a free harbour zone for Lithuania at Memel. Both parties further undertook not to employ force against each other or to support the use of force directed against them by a third party. On receiving this communication, His Majesty's Government expressed to the Lithuanian Government their sympathy in the situation in which Lithuania had been placed. As the Prime Minister informed the House on 18th December last, in reply to a question by the hon. Member for Derby (Mr. Noel-Baker), His Majesty's Government as a Signatory to the Memel Convention, expressed their hope to the German Government that they would use their influence to ensure respect for the Memel Statute. At that date and again in reply to an inquiry by the Lithuanian Government on 16th March His Majesty's Government made it clear that they could only endeavour to secure respect for the Statute in so far as this lay in their power. In the actual circumstances of the case it is understandable that the Lithuanian Government acted without again consulting the Signatory Powers.

"Mr. Henderson: Is it not a fact that the Lithuanian Government did observe the provisions of their 1924 Statute, and is not this intervention on the part of the German Government quite contrary again to the promises made by Herr Hitler in the Anglo-German declaration in September last?

"Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir."
"Mr. Benn: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the frontiers as occupied by the German troops are the same frontiers as were laid down in the Treaty of Versailles?

"Mr. Butler: I should require notice to give an exact answer, but I understand that that is the case.

"Mr. Noel-Baker: In view of our responsibility as guarantors, have His Majesty's Government made a protest to the Government in Berlin against the method by which this new aggression has been carried through?

"Mr. Butler: We are a signatory to the Convention, but no protest has been made."

Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy

RES: VMC
LONDON, March 29, 1939.

SUBJECT: Conversation with a Former High Official of the German Dye Trust Concerning the German-Rumanian Trade Agreement.

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatches Nos. 2350 and 2351 dated March 29, 1939 in regard to the German-Rumanian Trade Agreement and the proposed British Trade Mission to Rumania respectively.

By chance, on the day these despatches were being prepared, an officer of the Embassy lunched with Mr. Wilhelm Roth, until early 1938 the managing director of
of the Vienna office of the I.G. Dye Trust, in charge of all their Balkan business. It was Herr Roth who was actually responsible for the initiation of the soya bean cultivation by the I.G. Farben in Bulgaria and Rumania in 1934. He is reliably stated to have been the major influence behind Director Ilgner of the Dye Trust in building up the firm's business during the past five years in both the Balkan countries and Poland.

It therefore can be said, without exaggeration, that there are few individuals better acquainted with the German trade methods and trade penetration tactics in the Danubian basin. Herr Roth was kept on by the I.G. since 1933, notwithstanding his partial Semitic ancestry, by special permission because of his exceptional knowledge of Eastern European trade. He was only forced to retire early in 1938.

In discussing the German-Rumanian Trade Pact, Herr Roth described the Agreement as "the wooden horse which will enable the Germans to sabotage King Carol's regime from within". He went on to state that the Rumanian assurances to Mr. Chamberlain that the Agreement contains no political clauses may well be true. "None are required the way the German technique operates," said Herr Roth, "particularly in the case of an arrangement which goes far beyond the normal trade pact."

He went on to state that he knew from intimate experience the vast importance that the Germans attached to the economic and political dominance of Rumania and the lengths they were prepared to go to secure the implementation of this aim.
It was this individual’s opinion that the Reich’s method of operation—presuming no direct attack was made—might be to pay very high prices for Romanian agricultural products for from four to six months in order to convince the peasants concerning the advantages of trading with Germany. Severe political demands would then be made, thought Mr. Roth, which in essence would reduce Rumania to a vassal state and if refused the threat of cessation of agricultural purchases would be made. At the same time German agents might stir up the peasants with the slogan that it was King Carol’s regime which was ruining their highly profitable agricultural market in Germany.

The peasants, Mr. Roth considered, could then be incited to riot and the Germans would utilize these uprisings as an excuse for internal interference upon the grounds that such revolts were being poorly suppressed, were endangering the lives of the German technicians and business men supervising the operation of the Trade Pact or were preventing the proper operation of the Agreement. The German and Hungarian minorities, he went on to say, might be utilized at the same moment to promote internal discord, and in his opinion the Reich was convinced that by this method it would be possible to overturn King Carol and install a regime in Rumania coordinated (selbigestellt) to the German political and economic system.

When questioned if he considered it too late for a British trade mission to achieve any worthwhile results
results, he stated that there was still time to retrieve the situation as the present Rumanian Government was far from happy about the new arrangement and would be prepared to undermine their German Agreement if any substantial alternative scheme were presented.

Mr. Roth continued that he greatly feared that the British Mission would not employ the proper methods. "The Germans," he said, "utilize bribery on a wide scale and among the highest officials and do not hesitate to employ direct methods. (Die Deutschen machen es groß aber kennen ihre Wege). The British must be prepared to spend £500,000 for bribes (für Schmiergeld), and I doubt that they would do so."

Mr. Roth declared a loan almost useless and cited the failure of the French loan policy in the Balkans. "A loan will be gone the day after tomorrow" (Ein Lohn wird übermorgen verpufft), he said, "unless an organization is built up which will control the expenditures and see that a rotating credit fund under joint Anglo-Rumanian supervision operates with actual British control."

"In the Balkans," he continued, "one must deliver the money regularly but slowly (Gold regelmässig aber nur langsam tropfenweise ausgeben)" and the British were not prepared to handle their Rumanian trade promotion in this manner. Mr. Roth claimed to have spoken to high British officials only recently on this matter, and his statement was based upon these interviews.

While Mr. Roth's opinions may well be biased on
account of his status as émigré and therefore must be accepted with some reserve, his observations are considered worth citing because of his outstanding knowledge of German-Rumanian trade relations. It might be mentioned in closing that he left Germany less than a year ago with, according to reliable London banking circles, a very substantial fortune. This, at least, indicates that his specialized experience must have been of more than ordinary value to the Reich.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy

ANS: WEH
SR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London
Dated March 30, 1939
Rec'd 3:03 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

420, March 30, 6 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
My 418, March 29, 7 p.m.

The final text of plan of guarantee for Poland and Rumania was telegraphed by the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador at Washington and should have been in your hands yesterday. French approval has been received and the Foreign Office informs me that instructions have not been sent to the British representatives at Warsaw and Bucharest to deliver the communication to the Polish and the Rumanian Governments. It was stated that no change in the draft was proposed by the French and the text of the proposal to be submitted to Poland and Rumania is therefore the same as that telegraphed to Washington.

KENNEDY
CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS
A portion of this tele-
gram must be closely
paraphrased before be-
communicated to anyone
(BR)

FROM London
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
APR 11 1939
Rec'd noon

Dated March 31, 1939

Secretary of State,
WASHINGTON

RUSH
425, March 31, 2 p.m.

(GRAY) STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF
STATE.

The Prime Minister this afternoon will answer the
following question in the following manner:

"Question. To ask the Prime Minister whether he can
now make a statement as to the European situation.

Answer. As I said this morning His Majesty's Govern-
ment have no official confirmation of the rumors of any
projected attack on Poland and they must not therefore be
taken as accepting them as true.

I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again
the general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have
constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free negotia-
tions between the parties concerned, of any differences that
may arise between them. They consider that this is the
natural and proper course where differences exist. In
their opinion there should be no question incapable of
solution.
solution by peaceful means and they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threat of force for the method of negotiation.

As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government." (END GRAY).

I asked Cadogan whether this meant if Poland fights Britain fights. He said if Poland itself committed an act of aggression it would not mean that but for the first time in the history of Great Britain the latter has left the final decision as to their fighting outside of their own country to the other power.
FS     S No. 425, March 31, 2... From London

I asked Cadogan could there be any hedging on the part of Great Britain as to whether Poland was fighting for "Polish independence"; he said absolutely not; that if Poland thought that any gesture of Germany's threatened their independence and they themselves are the judges of that, Great Britain commits itself to fight.

HPD       KENNEDY
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

APRIL 11, 1939

SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

440, April 4, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have just had lunch with the Prime Minister. No news except a few observations he made. He has heard nothing from Germany except the fact that they are spreading as definitely as they can that Great Britain is starting a policy of encirclement. The Prime Minister is hopeful that Hitler may hold up at least temporarily, but he admits it may be wishful thinking. He told me of a conversation he had at Godesberg after a rather heated discussion with Hitler. Hitler came to the door to see him out and said to him, "Remember, I have won more with words than I have with bayonets" and Chamberlain says, hanging on to a straw, this may indicate something. He is disgusted with the British newspapers that are crying that Hitler has the jitters and that Hitler backs down, because he realizes that is the surest way to cause trouble. I told him that I was rather upset by the opinion
opinion of the people I had met, supposedly with sense, who really thought that all the British Government need do was to threaten Hitler with force to make him stop and they persist in pointing out that his speech of Saturday indicates how frightened he was when England spoke. Chamberlain says that he was constantly running into that the last 48 hours and could not be more unhappy.

I asked him if he did not think he had left Hitler no alternative but war because if he stopped Hitler's forward march, the Germans might be impressed with the idea that Hitler was finished and he would have plenty of trouble in his own country and would therefore have no alternative but to fight. Chamberlain felt this was definitely the great danger and that is why he always tries to leave a door open to work something out. I felt him out on this idea apropos of a conversation I had with the President the other day which he will remember. In other words, some thought must be given to the doorway that Hitler can get in if he really makes up his mind he does not want to fight and possibly the United States is the only one who can furnish that doorway.

Chamberlain says he also realizes that Hitler is definitely
definitely aware that the longer he permits England and France to arm, the less likely he is to win with one decisive blow. For that reason he is very leery of what Hitler has in the back of his mind.

I am not sending anything on the Polish situation until after I see Beck tomorrow night, because it is still being talked over.

As to Mussolini, Chamberlain feels that he has got more sense than Hitler, but, after all, he is a dictator and has got to keep moving. Therefore, Chamberlain would not be surprised if he moved against Albania, which Chamberlain thinks is his first logical move. I asked him what happens to British policy if this takes place. He said it would be a terrible calamity as far as England is concerned, because he would not want to get into a war over Albania and he would have to differentiate between an attempt at world domination, which he considers part of Hitler's program, and aggression, which the taking of Albania by Mussolini would be. He realizes it is a very fine point and will make him plenty of trouble, but he does not see what else he can do. Of course, there is always the chance that King Zog might not resist. He said
said he sent word to Mussolini at the same time he gave his speech to me on Friday, with the added paragraph that he was doing this in the cause of world peace which "he, Mussolini, was as vitally interested in as he, Chamberlain was."

He said that at the rate all the nations are spending money and the speed with which they are all moving, the present state of affairs cannot last much longer and therefore something must happen. He hopes it is not war, but I feel he is definitely doubtful. He indicated to me how psychologically important it was in the drive for peace that Hitler believed that the United States was definitely on the side of the democracies and, without the United States committing itself to anything, as long as nothing happened to change Hitler's opinion, it made the course that much easier. He again expressed his deep appreciation of the President's work for what he termed the cause of peace.

KENNEDY

NPL
EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

LONDON
FROM
Dated April 5, 1939
Received 6:47 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

447, April 5, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Just had a conference with Beck. He told me that the situation tonight in relation to the negotiations is much better than this morning when the British were dissatisfied as they felt he was not giving the cooperation they felt they must have. Beck's answer was: "There is no sense in getting the cheers in London and sweat blood tomorrow or when I get back to Poland; I shall not promise you anything I am not sure that I can deliver." However, after contacting Poland today and after further negotiations this afternoon they have come to a reciprocal agreement: England fights for Poland and Poland fights for England. The Prime Minister will give out a statement in the House of Commons tomorrow afternoon which will be their common statement. It will not contain full details as they are to be worked out in the course of the next two weeks. One of the most important points which will not be made public at this time is the agreement.
agreement of Poland to fight to protect the sovereignty of its neighbors. Tonight Beck has agreed to this. Beck also agreed to use method at his command to work out an agreement with Germany contingent of course on (one) not losing national respect and (two) not being forced to accept a unilateral agreement with Germany. He feels that England's handling of Germany so far has been too much concession in fact and too little in theory. He realizes that some method must be found whereby if Hitler is to back down he is given an opportunity to do so gracefully and Beck says if he sees the slightest chance of that he will notify his old friend America and his new friend Britain at once. He made the point of old and new very decidedly.

My own impression after a very friendly conference is that he is more than happy to have England's support given in the way that it was, i.e., that Poland is the one to determine when England is to come to her rescue. He said the method by which Britain had handled this matter made it three times as easy to get Poland to agree to almost anything Britain wanted.

He tends to be most reasonable about Russian cooperation but had nothing definite to say on that. He does not want to be a tool for either Russia or for Germany.
EDA - 3 - #447, April 5, 10 p.m. From London

Germany. At the same time he does not want to be the direct cause of plunging the world into war and hence his willingness to do everything in reason to try and work out some plan with Germany.

Will wire you details of plans when I see Halifax tomorrow.

KENNEDY

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB ---
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM London
Dated April 6, 1939
Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

448, April 6, 3 p.m.

STRICKLY CONFIDENTIAL AND URGENT FOR THE SECRETARY.

I have just seen Halifax. You will probably see Chamberlain's speech on the Polish situation from the newspapers before our despatch arrives, but we are sending it to you for the record. The things that do not appear in the speech are as follows:

One. Beck is definitely against making any tie-up with Russia beyond their normal trade commitments of the day. Halifax says Beck's strategy all along has been to stay friendly with both Germany and Russia without making any definite commitments and Beck is hopeful that while Hitler will be roaring mad at Poland's action in tying up with Great Britain, he will not be as mad as if Russia were in with Poland too. Halifax said he pressed Beck as to whether he would not want tanks, aeroplanes
2-#449, From London, Apr. 6, 3 p.m.
aeroplanes and ammunition, at least, from Russia if
Poland were attacked and, even with that as a bait,
Beck said no; that he has no confidence that conditions
in Russia would permit any help that would be worth while.

Two. As to Poland's helping Rumania, Beck said that
if the Hungarian situation remains as it is, he would be
averse to making any public commitment to help Rumania,
but, if the Germans finally moved into Hungary, then of
course it would be a different matter. He is perfectly
willing to say, without making any commitment except to
the Prime Minister and Secretary of State, that he would
go to the aid of Rumania if she were attacked.

Halifax told me today that Beck told him he considered
Biddle one of his best friends and a very great help to
him in Poland. Beck told me practically the same thing
last night.

Halifax, in summing up the Russian situation said
that their own political situation here makes it difficult
to do anything with them, but the general feeling is that
Russia cannot be of any help at all outside of her own
borders. They are going to try and go along with them.

But are not very hopeful of any results.
3-#448, From London, Apr. 6, 3 p.m.

As to the Italian situation, Halifax is convinced that Ciano was lying when he told Lord Perth that they were called into the Albania situation in a more or less friendly manner; that Italian interests had been threatened there; and that King Zog was not averse to the Italian moves, because the information the British Government gets from Albania is that King Zog has appealed to the Balkan Entente for help. The British Government is not at all sure what the move means or what it portends, but they definitely do not like the situation and it becomes all the more peculiar because, Halifax said, Ciano had dropped the suggestion that if the French representative would care to come around to the Italian Foreign Office to discuss the points of difference between their two countries, they would be glad to start discussions.

I asked Halifax what he thought of the Czech situation. He said he was inclined to believe still that neither Hitler nor Mussolini wanted to go to war. He thought they would do everything however to keep England in a state of jitters at least for a few months. He imagines the strategy of Hitler to be "I never wanted Poland".
Poland and never had any intention of attacking her. This is merely an excuse for Great Britain to *vindicate* Germany; therefore I call on all our people to arms and prepare for the next three to six months." In that way he can maintain a state of jitters in the world; he can save his own house and keep up his armament rumpus, without being obliged to find an economic alternative. After Halifax finished this statement he said "and by night fall I may be proved to be wrong."

The Prime Minister is leaving for Scotland tonight for the next four days. Halifax is remaining in town until tomorrow night and hopes to get away then. I am remaining here to get whatever information there is.

KENNEDY

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (0)

LONDON

FROM Dated April 10, 1939

Rec'd 9:07 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

459, April 10, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram No. 458, April 10, 4 p.m.

Sir Alexander Cadogan informed a member of the staff this evening that Cabinet approval was given today to a British pledge of guarantee against aggression for Greece. The time and manner of making this declaration have not yet been determined but the Under Secretary suggested that it might possibly be made in Parliament on Thursday. Its exact form and the definitions of territory to be covered will have to be worked out by the Foreign Secretary. While it will be designed to inform Mussolini beyond any doubt that Great Britain will fight if he attacks Greece, the Cabinet is nevertheless strongly of the opinion that it should be so drafted as not to create an impossible political difficulty for Mussolini. They have not yet had time to approach the French and Turkish Governments in regard to the matter but it is intended to do so and the British hope
hope and believe that both those countries will associate themselves with the declaration. In giving its approval to this action the Cabinet apparently discarded the idea of a bilateral pact along the lines of the one with Poland on the ground that negotiation of such an instrument requires too much time and in the case of Greece would not serve any really useful purpose.

The Under Secretary gave no indication that any action is contemplated with regard to Albania and it seems fairly plain that the main preoccupation of the Cabinet's discussions today was the possible extension of Italian military action. The assurance sent by Mussolini to the Prime Minister, and reported in my No. 458, April 10, 4 p.m. to the effect that Italy contemplated no attack against Greece and giving unreserved assurances that Italy would respect the independence of Greece and her entire territorial integrity, both continental and insular, was implemented this morning by a further message, delivered by the Italian Charge d'Affaires, to the effect that the British Government might if it wished make public use of those assurances.

The Under Secretary mentioned that the French had become particularly nervous in the last 24 hours and were retailing
retailing stories and rumors which he had been unable to substantiate. He felt that the "lie" factory had been operating again and had been successful in causing a mild attack of hysteria on the other side of the Channel. The British have no new information of importance either from Germany or Italy since the occupation of Albania and while the Government is obviously on the alert in the face of a situation full of menacing possibilities the Under Secretary gave the impression that it is not apprehensive of any immediately dangerous development.

KENNEDY

NPL:EMB
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

RUSH
476, April 14, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's 256, April 13, 6 p.m.

I have just seen the Prime Minister. There are no direct negotiations between the British and Italian Governments. Chamberlain at this time has no further plan designed to advance the interests of peace.

As to the Italian situation he said that no matter how much he tried to soften the speech against Mussolini yesterday he imagined that Mussolini is in no mood to talk of peace at the present time. The situation now rests on Mussolini's promise to withdraw the troops from Spain immediately after the 2nd of May. Chamberlain is very distrustful of him now and is watching to see whether he will withdraw the troops ostensibly and attempt to send them back secretly. They have information that he is now sending supplies and new troops into Spain. Chamberlain is
is trying to understand what this movement means.

His whole plan is to get Turkey to come along on a reciprocal basis; that is if Italy attacks Turkey England will go to her aid and if Germany and England get into trouble Turkey will go to England's aid. They have not yet received an acceptance of this plan but Chamberlain is rather optimistic about the possibilities. The next thing he hopes to do is try and win Bulgaria away from Germany, where their tendency lies at the present moment, principally because eighty per cent of their exports are taken by Germany and also because they want a piece of Rumania and a corridor to the Mediterranean through Greece or Turkey, and they feel that with Greece and Rumania tied up with England they have not much chance to get what they want in the way of concessions, and that their best chance is with Germany. However, Chamberlain is working very hard to bring them into line.

With Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania, tied up the British could remove their fleet from Istanbul and the Dardanelles and use it to better advantage against the Italians in the Mediterranean and also, with this kind of a line, Chamberlain could see what he could work out with Russia but
but he is very pessimistic about this. Russia he feels is rather pleased with the way things are set up because it looks like a free for all, with Russia the general beneficiary when it is all over.

If there is an attack on Rumania, he said it will come through Hungary not through Czechoslovakia. He also does not give up hope that, if by any chance Bulgaria could be interested in coming along with England and France, Yugoslavia might then come into line and they would then definitely have Hitler stopped.

All his time and attention and all the money that Sir John Simon can find in a rather empty pocket is being used as a bait for these countries to come along. They are making their plans to strike a sudden and terrific blow, if trouble starts, with their fleet and all their resources to smash Italy at once.

He said he believes that the reports coming from their secret service are absolutely planted by Germany, such as the swift move of the German army against Holland, an attack on France by Spain aided by Italy, and that Germany and Italy are getting ready to make a sudden attack on the British fleet before they are ready, et cetera, et cetera. He said these reports are being planted
planted with the idea of keeping England and France in a state of jitters the result of which will be to finally break their spirit. Chamberlain says that, strangely enough the anti-Nazi Germans are helping to spread these rumors, hoping to start a war and then have a chance to rise against Hitler.

He believes that there will be no war if Hitler and Mussolini continue to believe that what the President is saying is the temper of the American public. He is under no misapprehension that the President intends to send an army to help him out, but he is well aware just now that the President's statements are the real balance in the scales for the cause of peace.

KENNEDY

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

538, April 21, 8 p.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

The Ambassador being absent in Edinburgh today, Sir Alexander Cadogan sent for Johnson this afternoon to convey the following highly secret information which he said the Prime Minister requests be communicated to the President also.

On Wednesday April 26 the Prime Minister will announce, probably under the guise of "a state of emergency" military measures of the first importance, including conscription. The territorial army will be integrated into the regular army for a period probably of three months. At the same time a certain number of reservists will be mobilized and trained to take over from the territorial army at the end of the period, the territorial army being then returned to its normal occupations and regular
regular training prescribed for those forces. At the end of another three months (the exact length of time has not been fixed) the mobilized reservists will in turn be released and their places taken by the new cadres of young conscripts who by that time will have received their training.

The decision on conscription doubtless will have unfavorable repercussions in Germany. The Government with a view therefore to "softening the blow" proposes to send Sir Nevile Henderson back to his post on Sunday or Monday next with instructions to communicate the information to the German Government perhaps twenty-four hours in advance of announcement here. The Government feels it important to have the Ambassador back in Berlin before the announcement is made on Wednesday and it is for this reason only that his return has been moved up from the original scheduled date of April 28. The Under Secretary said that they feel sure that his accelerated return will be interpreted in some quarters as a reversion to the policy of "appeasement" of Germany and he was quite emphatic in saying
LMS 3-No. 538, April 21, 8 p. m., from London

saying that the Ambassador's return at this particular time had no meaning at all other than the one above given. I understand that the French Ambassador is likewise returning to Berlin about the same time and in advance of his original schedule.

(END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

NPL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London
Promiss
Dated April 21, 1939
Rec'd 4:18 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

536, April 21, 8 p.m. (SECTION T/0).

At the time of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that the trade negotiations with Germany would be broken off. Cadogan says that a reference will probably be made to this in the announcement on Wednesday; that they will try to work in some sort of statement to indicate to the Germans that this Government would welcome a resumption of the interrupted trade talks.

The Under Secretary stated that few people were informed of the foregoing and that the Government attaches great importance to its not becoming public before the event. The British Ambassador in Paris has had, however, to advise Prime Minister Daladier and M. Bonnet and the Under Secretary expressed his doubt that entire secrecy could be kept; British Foreign Office experience of the ability of responsible French officials to keep secrets has not been an encouraging one.

(END OF MESSAGE).

KENNEDY

NPL: EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London
Dated April 27, 1939
Rece'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

542, April 27, 2 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

In view of indications of increasing Polish intransigence since conclusion of the Anglo-Polish guarantee agreement, the British Ambassador at Warsaw has been instructed to bring to Foreign Minister Beck's attention that because of the British guarantee of Poland, Great Britain expects Poland to approach the problem of Danzig in a reasonable manner and to keep this Government fully informed of developments. The Polish Ambassador here has also been advised of this Government's views.

KENNEDY

KLP
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM London
Dated April 25, 1939
Rec’d 12:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

550, April 25, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
I have just seen桂芳. There is nothing particularly interesting about his discussions with the British, except, of course, he is urging two things: (1) to make themselves very strong and that conscription is the best psychological means of doing that, and (2) urging them not to have anything to do with Russia until there actually is a war, because, after all, Russia does not think the same way and is not really interested in peace as the rest of the world understands it.

The interesting part of his talk was about his meeting with Hitler. He said he is convinced that Hitler does not want war and to prove that he said Hitler, in great excitement, told him the Germans possessed scientific means of destroying cities and towns and that the world in its wildest conceptions has no idea of what a next war would be but he said
-2- #550, April 25, 1 p.m. from London

after we have destroyed one another there will be almost nothing left and what is left Russia will enjoy. He said Hitler shows great hatred for the British particularly and that for the United States his hatred is not so great; Hitler said President stands alone; "that he has not his country behind him". He also said "England is trying to make my country starve; it is utter nonsense for the British to say that I have ever wanted to take Holland, Switzerland or Belgium. I have never conceived it and I have never intended any such thing."

Gafencu believes that in spite of the fact that he does not want to go to war he is going to try and win Danzig and the colonies with a battle of words. He said the Germans typified brute strength and that the English are too gentlemanly. He believes the only way to fight Hitler is to be rough and tough. He said Hitler's philosophy is to start off by trying to have right on his side so that his own people and a great many people in the rest of the world will believe there is some justification for his actions. This was true in Austria and the Sudeten but he failed when he marched into Czechoslovakia and Gafencu believes that the British should say to him: "You talked about wanting Danzig and
and the colonies because they are German; get out of Prague; that is not German. You are holding down millions of people who do not want to come under your sphere of influence."

Gafencu said that Hitler asked him if he had not asked the French and the English to fight for him. Gafencu said "I did not ask them; if Rumania is attacked she will fight for herself; if they help me, well and good". Hitler then said: "How long have you been a diplomat?" and Gafencu said: "Four months but I was a soldier for 20 years", and Hitler smiled.

Gafencu said he told Goering, whom he met on his way back from Italy, that when he started to make the economic deal with Germany, the people of Rumania agreed that they had to work out some deal with Germany. When it came time to sign the agreement, Germany had in the meantime taken possession of Czechoslovakia and the people were all against Germany and Gafencu said to Goering, who had two of his lieutenants in the room with him, "it is no use to say Yugoslavia is with Italy and Germany; there is no use for me to say I might make a deal with you, because all politicians are afraid of strength and do not want war and they will do their best to keep out of war, but the people
people of all nations are against Germany because they do not know the extent of their desires". He said Göring nodded and looked at his two lieutenants and they said there probably was something in that.

Gafencu believes, from what Hitler said and from what Ribbentrop, whom he calls his master's voice, said and from what Göring intimated without having seen either Ribbentrop or Hitler that Danzig is the next issue and will probably be used in his answer to the President and the question of colonies. He said Hitler talked to him for half an hour about colonies and how they wanted them and even though he knew that Gafencu had no colonies, Hitler said: "I do not want the colonies of Holland, Belgium or Portugal; even if they were to offer them to me I would not take them. I want German colonies back."

KENNEDY

KLP
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

DOI, May 3, 7 p. m. (GRAY)

by 542, April 22, 2 p. m.

S. RICHEL, CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office opinion discounts the violent warfare which has been carried on between the German and Polish press since Hitler's speech last Friday. Public opinion, however, has become increasingly apprehensive regarding the Danzig situation and is roughly divided into two classes: that which fears Great Britain may abandon Poland and do another Munich and that which fears that Polish invincibility and unreasonableness might land Great Britain in a war. (END GRAY)

There is no indication of any lack of official confidence here in Colonel Beck's moderation or sense of realism, but this government, having assumed the most serious and definite responsibilities toward Poland, expects the Polish Government will therefore act with a corresponding
REB

2-#601, From London, May 3, 7 p.m.

corresponding reasonableness and moderation and that the British Government will be kept fully informed of Polish official views and of any policies which that Government may decide to adopt toward Germany. The British Ambassador at Warsaw will be instructed again to bring these considerations to the attention of Colonel Beck before he speaks on Friday next together with an intimation of the British view that nothing should be said in his speech which will close the door to negotiations with Germany regarding Danzig and the Corridor on any reasonable basis.

Inform officials speaking privately express the opinion that while the Polish-German situation is jumpy and obviously dangerous they believe that Beck will be able to establish a basis for peaceful settlement. Also without minimizing the danger they think that Hitler fully realizes that an armed coup against Danzig would probably precipitate the worst and that he is unlikely to attempt any such solution.

KENNEDY

NPL
ROW
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

9:40, May 6, 3 p.m.

Colonel Beck's speech has made an excellent impression here. It is regarded as being firm but unprovocative, as entirely realistic and as leaving the door wide open for negotiations with Germany. The problem of Danzig particularly is held to have been put in admirable perspective. It is the consensus of opinion that if Herr Hitler fails to respond to the opportunity for negotiations, he will have no shred of justification.

The press in general holds that the position taken by Colonel Beck is deserving of full British support and that failure through us can only be a disservice to peace. The majority of papers echo the attitude of the TIMES which states that with calm and reason the question of Danzig is essentially one capable of solution by negotiation but it will be impossible to prevent a general conflagration following an outbreak of war between
KPP -2- #630, May 6, 3 p.m. From London between Poland and Germany. The DAILY MAIL alone strikes a discordant note. It states: "Britain is bound to assist Poland if her independence is threatened but neither the French nor the British are willing to die for Danzig. Are the Poles prepared to do so?"

Copy by mail to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw.

KENNEDY

DDM: WWC
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

640, May 8, 10 p.m.
My 628, May 6, 2 p.m.

Strictly confidential. Instructions for the British reply to the Russian proposals were cabled to Moscow Saturday, not Friday, night. The British Ambassador before communicating the reply and discussing it with the new Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs is to assure himself that the Russian proposals (my 514, April 18, 7 p.m.) still stand and that the change of foreign ministers does not indicate any vital change in Russian foreign policy. If the Ambassador discovers any reason to believe that there is such a change, he will delay for presenting the British reply and will telegraph further instructions.

With reference to point (six) of the Russian proposals (penultimate paragraph my 514, April 18, 7 p.m.) the Foreign Office observes to the Ambassador that the British Government quite understands the reasons which prompt the Soviet to include such a proposal. It is felt here
here however that it presents practical difficulties and the Foreign Office hopes that the Ambassador will be able to dissuade the Russians from insisting on its inclusion in any final agreement; should an impasse be reached on this point however the Ambassador is requested to consult further with London as the British do not want the negotiations to break down on this point nor in fact on any other particular point.

The new British suggestion is almost identically the same as that set forth in the fourth paragraph of my 590, May 1, 9 p.m., except that the final sentence concludes as follows: "The assistance of the Soviet Government would be immediately available, if desired, and would be afforded in such manner and on such terms as might be agreed". The expression "on such terms" is an addition.

When the original British proposal was made to the Soviet Government on April 14 (my 504, April 16, 9 p.m.) it was not intended to suggest that the Soviet Government should commit itself to intervention on behalf of Rumania and Poland regardless of whether Great Britain and France had already implemented their pledges to these countries, and if the Soviet Government should wish to make its own intervention contingent on that of Great Britain and France, the
-3- #640, May 8, 10 p.m., from London.

the British Government for its part would not object.
It is pointed out that the reason the British had in mind for suggesting that Soviet assistance be confined to cases in which the assistance was desired and to a form which would be acceptable to the governments to be assisted, is to be found in the attitude of those governments themselves rather than that of the British Government. The British object is to arrange quickly for help and protection to Poland and Rumania, as those countries are the ones most immediately threatened, and to arrange for this help in the way which may seem best calculated to deter any aggression against them. It had seemed to the British Government that the formula first suggested to Moscow, taken together with the unilateral assurances already given by Great Britain and France to Rumania and Poland, would be the best way of securing the desired object although in effect the Soviet Government was being asked to commit itself less completely than the French and the British were committed, in that it was to pledge itself to give assistance only if desired by the countries which were being attacked.

The principle British criticism of the new proposals made by the Soviet Government (my 814, April 18, 7 p.m.) is that they take too little account of practical difficulties,
-4- #640, May 8, 10 p.m., from London.

would require too long a time for negotiation and do not take account of the extreme difficulty of the Polish and Rumanian positions.

Poland and Turkey occupy the key positions in the system which the British are now endeavoring to perfect. With respect to Turkey there is no difficulty as far as Russia is concerned, for the Turkish Government is quite willing to associate itself with the Soviet Government in any defensive arrangements that may be reached. The situation of Poland however is entirely different and the attitude of Poland toward any close political association with the Soviet Government is well known to that Government and must as a fact be taken into account. This attitude is that the German Government would regard any political association between Poland and Soviet Russia as provocative and such an association would involve Poland in a risk of war which ought to be avoided. The same considerations would apply to the cases of Rumania.

The British feel that the most effective way in building up a front against aggressors is to start with what is practicable to realize at once and that the first step is to endeavor to assure the safety of states most
Most menaced in Eastern Europe. To this end the cooperation of the Soviet Government is regarded as of the greatest importance. British efforts have therefore been directed toward finding some means of circumventing the difficulties above described. The new proposal to the Soviet Government has however been drafted in the light of the Soviet counter-proposals and of British consultations with other governments.

Official opinion is still uncertain as to whether the new proposal will be acceptable to Russia. This uncertainty is of course accentuated by lack of information as to whether Russian foreign policy will change with the resignation of Litvinov. No light has yet been thrown on the new set up.

KENNEDY

HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM LONDON

Dated May 10, 1939

Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

652, May 10, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have seen Halifax and Cadogan. They think the Prime Minister's statement on Russia this afternoon will clear up the feeling about the Russian negotiations.

They are a bit concerned about the Danzig situation because unquestionably the Germans have the same group there they had in the Sudeten when the trouble started in November and Cadogan feels they are in there for no good. Halifax believes, however, that if the Germans think the British will fight, they will not mix up in the Danzig affair, but the Germans are constantly being advised that the British will not fight over Danzig. That is the great danger as he sees it. They do not regard the situation as dangerous, but extremely ticklish at the moment. They are attempting to bring pressure on Sweden to maintain strict neutrality in the event of trouble and not to sell any raw materials to either side. Halifax believes
believes there is a possibility they may succeed in doing this.

Stanley, President of International Nickel, came in to see me last night and told me very confidentially that the Russians canceled 26,000 tons of nickel which they had on order for delivery over the balance of the year and he understands they are canceling other metals with other producers. He is completely at a loss to explain it.

Halifax says they are now contemplating delaying the Palestine statement scheduled for Monday and I will see MacDonald on this later tonight.

Cadogan told me that all nations particularly Poland and Rumania whom, after all, they are most anxious to help, are bitterly set against making any deal with the Russians and he said that practically all the nations have expressed some opinion to them that they hoped the tie up will not be too strong; that is of course all nations who are not lined up with the Rome-Berlin Axis. Even the Japanese have urged them not to do it.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C & D)

LONDON

Dated May 24, 1939

Rec'd 5:36 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

734, May 24, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have just seen Halifax and delivered to him the messages contained in your 381, May 23, 11 a.m.

He told me that after his conference with the Russians in Geneva he made up his mind that if he were going to make any deal with them at all it would more or less have to be along their lines. So with that firmly fixed in his own mind he came back this morning and sold the idea to the Cabinet but, in order that their humiliation will not be too great in having to step down from their original plan and accept the Russians' plan, they decided to put it under the cloud of the League platform of anti-aggression and bring in Poland and Turkey and all the rest under the same canopy. But what it really amounts to is that France, Russia, and England will make an anti-aggression pact, all agreeing to come to the aid of the others.
others if they are attacked by any European power and also if any one of the countries finds itself involved in a war with anyone to protect any country the others will join in. They intend to handle the Baltic states by making an agreement that if any states are attacked while trying to preserve neutrality they are all in to save them. This is going to require some maneuvering and a good deal of secrecy, but Halifax is of the opinion that it will finally work out. The Russians have evinced a great willingness to have staff talks with the French and English as quickly as possible, once the agreement is signed, in order to prepare to use their resources, and Halifax is of the opinion now that, unless there is some nigger in the woodpile he cannot see, the arrangement will be made. He said the French told him they have almost agreed on their deal with Turkey, so that is cleaned up.

He told me he had a long private talk with Ambassador Dirksen away from the Foreign Office. Dirksen told him that whatever might be said of Hitler, he was not without judgment and sense and he was not going to take on a row with France and England and Turkey and Poland and Russia (and the United States not far behind). Here Halifax thought
thought it very strange that Dirksen should include Russia, at a time when it looked like there was a very wide breach between Russia and England in the settlement of their difficulties. Halifax then suggested to Dirksen that word be got to Hitler that if he would make a speech or a gesture of some kind that he did not want war and that he was hoping for peace and that while Danzig was an irritant, it could probably be worked out, regardless of what popular opinion in this country might be, Halifax assured Dirksen that officially England would welcome the statement and would so reply.

Halifax in the meantime is preparing a speech which he is going to give before some organization, trying to hold the door open for economic discussions with Hitler and has suggested that he will let Dirksen see the speech before he delivers it to see if any suggestions might be made.

KENNEDY

JRL

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London

Dated June 7, 1939
Rec'd 5 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, Division of European Affairs

798, June 7, 1939

My 793, J

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY

July 11, 1939

SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Have just talked with Halifax. The Russian situation is becoming a bit mysterious to him. They had planned to send for Seeds, as reported in my 787, June 6, 9 p.m., but he was taken down with influenza this morning, and instead they are sending a Foreign Office representative to Moscow. They believe that if they can get Molotov to sit around a table they can answer all his arguments, but a suspicion is beginning to dawn on them that he may be taking them up a very dark road. Halifax said that Phipps told him Bullitt had advised him not to press the Russians too much; that they would give in at the finish, but Halifax does not know what they are liable to do.

As to the German situation, they have no indications at all where Hitler is going to jump. Brehmhard, the High Commissioner from Danzig had an hour with Ribbentrop, who told him that if there were no further incidents and
-9- 798, June 7, 6 p.m., from London.

the Polish papers would play it down, the Germans would make every effort to keep peace in Danzig pending the discussions. Halifax does not know whether this is another attempt on the part of Ribbentrop to allay suspicion on the part of the British while at the same time the Germans are preparing. Halifax said there is no question but that German propaganda is beginning to have the effect on the German people that they are being encircled and since Hitler will never see Henderson, he is looking around for a man like Lord Derby or somebody who speaks German who could go to Germany on a vacation or a botany expedition or something and try to find out on what basis Hitler would talk turkey.

He realizes that the situation as it is today cannot go on indefinitely. Something must break.

As to the Italian situation, he said Mussolini has told Lorentz that since the British have made a Turkish agreement there does not seem to be any sense in keeping the Anglo-Italian agreement. They have answered this with a rather firm note to the effect that they regard the Anglo-Italian agreement as one conducive to good feeling and peace and if Mussolini regarded it in the same way, they wanted to maintain it; if he does not that is his lookout.

Halifax
Halifax told me he received a letter from Grandi two days ago saying he was called back to Italy and therefore would not be able to attend the dinner in honor of the King's birthday tomorrow night. He asked Grandi to come to see him and told him about these exchanges in Rome. Grandi told him he knew nothing about it whatsoever. Halifax chided him on his vicious speech made here a week or ten days ago and Grandi said his position at home was being so seriously damaged in the Fascist Party that it was necessary for him to make this speech; that he had not intended it to be published but that some of the leaders in the Fascist Party took care that it was published; that he has now regained his high position in the party and hopes he can use it in the cause of peace. Halifax says again what this is worth he does not know.

Halifax said that the most serious situation at the present time is the unwillingness of the French to treat with either the Spaniards or Italians; that he has had it up with Daladier and that Daladier gave him no satisfaction at all and that he suggested to the Prime Minister today that he write Daladier a personal letter and call attention to the fact that England and France are urging that a conference be called to settle differences
differences and that France is the leader in refusing to (*) the
differences that concern her. I thought this point
would be of particular interest to you and the President.

Halifax understands that France is getting more
and more fed up with the French and he regards this
as very serious because he feels that France will be
driven very definitely into the hands of the axis, even
though he is reasonably willing to stay out. The
English are willing to do most anything, Halifax says,
to get the French to play along. I would think that
Halifax realizes they are still putting coal into an
engine that is not going any place but they are just
keeping it up because there does not seem to be anything
else for them to do.

Halifax said we may get some indication of what
the situation is going to be from Hitler's reaction to
Beck's attempt to settle Danzig. Halifax told me
he had suggested an outline when he was at Geneva on
the basis of a reasonable settlement and he thought
that Beck was in a fair mood to accept it. If Hitler
shows any indication of being willing to meet Beck,
then he is rather hopeful that something might be worked
out; if he does not, then he expects the worst. This
should show up reasonably soon.

KENNEDY

KLP
(*) Apparent omission.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated June 9, 1939
Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

807, June 9, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I had a talk with the Prime Minister last night. He said he does not regard the situation in a favorable light at all; that he would not be surprised if some time between now and the first of August Hitler would make a move. He regards the most important thing that could be done would be for the French to make some gesture to the Italians on the question of their demands. He said he is very much surprised that Daladier is so definitely opposed to even a discussion and thinks that the failure of the French to make some gesture may be the determining point in trouble starting. He is contemplating writing a personal letter, after Monday, urging Daladier to do something.

In answer to the critics who say that Mussolini is so tied up with the Germans that any gesture by the French could not possibly aid the democracies in their desire
desire for peace, he says he does not feel it any stranger for him to think that Mussolini would be anxious to have some sort of deal with the French than was his prediction that the Italians would be withdrawn from Spain during the month of May. He said that his idea that the Italians would evacuate was not at all supported by most of his associates and the idea that Mussolini would welcome in his heart an agreement with the French is also not supported by most of his associates. The gesture that he and Halifax made to Germany yesterday in their statements to Parliament was Chamberlain’s answer to German accusation of encirclement and the charge that the British, once having attained a strong political position, would be averse to making any concessions whatsoever, and at the same time a hint to the French to get busy and help defense.

The Russian situation is most annoying to him. He is not at all sure that the Russians have the slightest idea of concluding the pact and if they do not accept the latest proposition, he on the other hand, is not at all sure that he will not call the whole thing off.

He is overwhelmingly delighted with the reception of the King and Queen in America and again paid tribute to the President in saying that, no matter how history is written,
-3- #807, June 9, 1 p.m., from London

written, the President's attempt to save the world from war can never be forgotten.

Summing up my talk with him last night: he felt he was doing everything that could be done to put him in a position of strength to condemn Hitler, but he is not confident that Hitler, in the back of his mind, has not decided to take England on. When I asked him when he thought the time would come, he said "probably just in time to spoil our vacations - in August". His apprehension is not based on any new information but rather on his inability to get anything out of Germany that indicates the slightest cooperation.

KENNEDY

WWC: HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY
London
Dated June 9, 1939
Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

809, June 9, 5 p.m.

In a debate in the House of Lords yesterday on foreign affairs, Lord Halifax made a plea for the establishment of mutual understanding and confidence between Great Britain and Germany. He stated that the really dangerous element in the present situation was that the German people should get the notion that Great Britain had abandoned all desire to reach an understanding with Germany and had in fact written off the possibility of any such thing. Disclaiming any provocative intent in British foreign policy Lord Halifax emphasized that it was in fact the desire of the British to reach an understanding with Germany which would not only assist in the settlement of particular questions but which might also place the relations of the two countries upon a secure footing of mutual confidence. He insisted that allowances must be made on both sides for different points of view and that there should be a readiness to accept a give and take basis.

Lord
FS 2-No. 809, June 9, 5 p.m. from London

Lord Halifax pointed out that, provided the independence of nations was recognized, His Majesty's Government was not only willing but anxious to explore the whole problem of economic Lebensraum, not only for Germany but all European nations. He declared that, after the usual necessary preliminary preparations had been made for the success of any conference, any of Germany's claims were open to consideration around the table; that Great Britain was only anxious to see rival claims adjusted on a basis that may secure lasting peace. It was essential, he stated, that these claims be settled by negotiation, not by force, as on no other terms could international life proceed. Lord Halifax took care not to minimize the difficulties and stated that the success of any calm and unprejudiced negotiation rested upon the desire and will of both parties to achieve this end.

The Foreign Minister concluded his statement by saying that he did not share the view expressed by others that war was inevitable. Should the issue be joined, however, he had no misgivings as to the ultimate outcome.

In answer to a question in the House of Commons regarding allegations arising in Germany that Great Britain was striving for that country's extinction through the destruction of its trade and economic existence, the Prime Minister,
Minister, by reference to previous statements, reaffirmed yesterday that Great Britain would not refuse to discuss any methods by which reasonable aspirations could be satisfied—but that the discussion must take place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Mr. Chamberlain then concluded "I can only repeat my regret that declarations, whether official or otherwise, should be made in Germany which do nothing to assist in creating such an atmosphere".

GW:WWC

KENNEDY
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Mr:

Referring to my dispatch No. 2557 of June 12, 1863, and to the statement therein that Lord
Halifax's speech of June 6 had been interpreted
in some quarters as another gesture towards agree-
ment, I now have the honor to report that Lord
Halifax, on June 13, undertook to refute the various
misconstructions which had been placed thereon.

Lord Halifax observed that these various mis-
constructions arose from the "habitual propensity of
politicians
politicians and those who contributed to the press to “select from any speech only those portions of it which are in appearance, if not in fact, favorable to the particular argument that they desire to stress”. Therefore, but without alluding to the criticisms which had been made of his speech as a weakening of the Government’s position and as “a return to the policy of appeasement”, he denied that, if considered as a whole, it could be regarded to imply a change in British policy. It was, on the contrary, he declared, “a perfectly frank attempt to get people here and elsewhere to face realities of the present situation”. However, to remove all doubt as to the present policy of the Government, Lord Halifax explained that he desired to restate it in the clearest possible manner. It was, he said, twofold:

1. “British policy, while making no threats and while concealing no ulterior designs, does want to make it clear to the world that if force is used today, those who use it must count on force being met by force.”

2. “If there is no attempt or intention to resort to force, then the whole influence of this country, which is not negligible, will be thrown - and will be rightly thrown - on the side of reaching fair settlement by negotiation.”

With reference to the Government’s determination to meet force by force, Lord Halifax remarked that
foreign propaganda always failed to mention - for reasons that were now probably obvious enough - that not one of Britain's new engagements, designed to meet aggression by such power and resources as it has at its disposal, would function if in fact there existed nowhere any formidable disturber of the peace. On the other hand, and in regard to Great Britain's expressed willingness to negotiate on the basis of an established atmosphere of mutual confidence, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that "if you are to negotiate, both parties must mean the same thing. That is essential to the success for which we hope." He stated that there were two alternatives before the world, and added:

"I should be well content if I thought that this debate had had the effect of focusing the attention of all whom it might reach upon the incalculable advantage of exchanging the threatening and dangerous and sinister methods of arbitrament by force for the methods of negotiations and peaceful settlement."

With regard to some anxiety which had arisen as to the timeliness of his speech on June 8, Lord Halifax declared that there was no particular significance in respect to the moment selected for the delivery of such a statement. He explained that it had simply arisen from the fact that Lord Snell, Labor Opposition Leader, had some time ago put down a motion for the discussion of foreign affairs for last Thursday, June 8. In any case, he added that it was, on the whole, "seldom too early or too late.
to speak the truth, if you are sure that in fact truth it is."

Copies of the full text of the debate in the House of Lords of June 19, of which Lord Halifax's statement above referred to formed part, are enclosed herewith as recorded in Hansard.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:
Secretary of State,
Washington.

210, June 30, 4 p.m.

Speaking before the Royal Institute of International Affairs last night, Lord Halifax in one of the strongest speeches yet made by a member of the Government, gave vigorous expression to the country's fast crystalizing determination to resist every form of pressure during what is looked upon as an approaching vital and critical period. He stressed three points in particular.

One. "In the event of further aggression" he said "we are resolved to use at once the whole of our strength in fulfillment of our pledges to resist it".

Two. Regarding the changes of encirclement he stated "Germany is isolating herself (*** it depends on the Government, and the German German/Government alone, whether this process of isolation continues or not, for any day it can be ended by a policy of cooperation."

Three. Respecting colonies he declared that given certain conditions he "had no doubt that in the conduct of our colonial administration we should be ready to go
2- #918, June 30, 4 p.m., from London.

For upon the economic side as we have already done
on the political side in making wide application of the
principles which now obtain in the mandated territories
including, on terms of reciprocity, that of the open door."

On the day prior to Lord Halifax's speech Mr. Winston
Churchill in an address before the City Carlton Club
issued a warning to Herr Hitler to pause and consider.
He stated "I wish I could convince Herr Hitler—that is
why I am here today—that the British nation and surely
one must say the British Empire—have reached the limit
of their patience".

After referring to the number of times, in the
interests of peace, that Britain has recoiled and
acquiesced in the breaches of solemn promises and
treaties and after admitting the frightful consequences
of a war, Mr. Churchill added:

"But if there is any act of Nazi violence which will
lead to actual war, we shall not in this country stand
aside".

Representing another element of British opinion,
Mr. Arthur Greenwood, Deputy Labor leader, stated last
night that in the event of a German challenge, British
labor would fight. He stated:

"I
"I hear rumors today about a war breaking out tomorrow; I do not know. All I know is this: that British labor—ever ready to try and understand the problems of other peoples, to understand the problems of the German people—would, if the challenge came, stand and fight."

"I never thought" he added "that I should have to use words like that but there are greater things than life itself and one of them is liberty."

All sections of the press have warmly praised Lord Halifax's speech. In the words of the DAILY TELEGRAPH: "The conspicuous merit of the speech is that it leaves no room for any but the most wilful misunderstanding. Those who pretend to believe that the British nation is not/earnest will have to revise their calculations."

KENNEDY

RR: WVC