Copies of

COMMUNICATIONS FROM JAPAN

in two binders

Binder No. 2

May 8, 1939 to November 17, 1941
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

117, FEBRUARY 14, 1940,
6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In a confidential talk today with my British colleague he set forth two important reasons to support the present policy of his Government to endeavor to conciliate Japan as follows:

One. Great Britain is on the verge of war with Soviet Russia. Craigie described the situation as "tectonic." If war breaks out it will be a matter of prime importance to insure at least Japan's benevolent neutrality.

Two. Germany is negotiating with Japan for the acquisition and shipment to Germany via Soviet Russia of certain essential materials including rubber, tin, tungsten and molybdenum. Great Britain could not afford the expense and complications of establishing contraband control so far afield and must therefore depend upon Japan's goodwill in restricting the shipment of these commodities. Craigie seems hopeful of success.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from to anyone. (C)

268, April 19, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My Turkish colleague told me today in confidence that in the course of an official interview yesterday with the Foreign Minister the former asked Mr. Arita whether he thought that Italy would come into the war on the side of Germany. According to my informant Mr. Arita said that in his opinion Italy would support Germany up to the very brink of war but would always stop just short of war.

Grew.

DDM
CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japan's diplomatic policy: Primary object of-, is settlement of Sino-Japanese conflict, according to Foreign Minister in remarks at an anniversary dinner of the Japan International Association, May 3. "Hotheads" denounced; calmness and good judgment urged, with reference to-, and in relations with third powers. Foregoing is summary of quoted substance of press account.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 304

Dated May 4, 1940

From Japan (Govt)

To

File No. 793.94/15849
In the midst of the disturbances in the
sovereign states of the Soviet Union at an
eminent representative of the Soviet International Association
suggested.

On the relations of the Chinese about the man
Czechs were seen immediately after the outbreak of the
Chineses as after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.
Immediately after the Manchurian Incident some people
suggested: "Nothing China now that we've got Manchuria!"
And more by the Stimson statement the most hotheads
from "Manchuria America". How such utterances are ever
suitable: misleading and cannot be permitted to circulate for
the country. The foreign policy at the time was centered
on the settlement of the Soviet-Japanese issues and
preparations for relations with Britain and the United States.
Finally the Chinese war. Despite the local settlement
policy of Japanese hostilities spread and friction with other
countries. The same sort of hotheads cried that war
should be fought also with the Soviet Union or that Britain
just as much the German policy of hard lines as a possible strategy arrests an early peace. Nor should we be seeking those who are supporting the gloomy view that the Maginot Line is the cement that will hold France together. However, I should like to look at the enemy now, as the history of the war shows. It has been

The problem is how to break the stalemate and write a new chapter in European history.
TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

SECRET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BECOMING PARAPHRASED

BEFORE BEING COMMUNICATED

DATED MAY 14, 1940

TO ANYONE. (D)

FROM

READ AT 11:40 A.M.

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

338, MAY 14, 9 A.M.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY. (REPEAT ONLY) NO (REPEAT NO) CIRCULATION.

ONE. My British colleague has today shown to me Lord Lothian's telegram to Lord Halifax reporting his recent conversation with the President concerning the Netherlands East Indies and has also given me the text of the consequent statement of diplomatic representations to the press on May (*). While recognizing the extreme privacy of the President's conversation the fact that Lord Lothian's report has been communicated to me and that it mentions sources of information in Tokyo leaves me no option but to submit my comments. A close paraphrase of Lord Lothian's telegram as received by the British Ambassador in Tokyo follows: "President this evening told me that the news that he was receiving from Tokyo was causing him grave alarm. Intervention in Netherlands East Indies was apparently being contemplated by Japanese on excuse of intervention by British and French.
French in Netherlands West Indies in order to avoid possibility of the Dutch inviting assistance from British and French in East Indies as had been done in West Indies. In order to strengthen his hand in Tokyo President asked me to telephone two requests to London: first, that on Sunday British Government should issue public statement that it had no intention whatever of intervening in East Indies. Netherlands Government should also if possible state that it had no need of inviting assistance there and no such intention. Second, request was that tomorrow announcement should also be made that since arrest of Germans and other local leaders had safeguarded situation in Curaçao and Aruba there should be withdrawal at earliest moment and if possible immediately of British and French troops placed at disposal of local authorities. I shall telephone you at noon London time Sunday because President has asked me to let him have your answer if possible Sunday morning.

Two. Without accepting the accuracy of the foregoing report I trust that the following comment may be found helpful. I respectfully wish to print to the ever increasing questioning in Japan of the wisdom and practicability of Japanese foreign policy talks in the slogan “new order in East Asia.” As reported in several
May 14, 9 p.m., from Tokyo.

Of my recent telegrams, there is a growing number of Japanese who are more and more openly criticizing attempts by Japan to set up an economy of self-sufficiency and who advocate a policy of international cooperation. At the other end of the scale are the extremists, still insisting on Japanese domination of China. In between are elements pressing the Government to (*) the campaign in South and Central China and to entrench in North China and then to occupy the Dutch East Indies on the ground that China alone will not afford economic self-sufficiency to Japan. The persuasive character of this last thesis has been much strengthened by public discussion in the United States of the placing of embargoes against Japan, on the basis of the argument that the Indies would provide several raw materials which would be withheld by the United States. While admitting that Japan's occupation of the Indies would result in an American embargo, these elements believe that the United States would under no (repeat no) circumstances go to war against Japan.

Three, Sir Robert Craigie and I believe that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister oppose such action and are not deluded by theories of American restraint under such provocation.

Four,
Four. In the face of fairly strong defensive forces in the Dutch East Indies we believe that a large Japanese expeditionary force would be required for occupation. We have seen no (repeat no) indications here of such a force. A considerable part of the Japanese fleet has recently returned from South China to Yokosuka. Presumably such an expeditionary force would be prepared in Yokosuka, Formosa or Hainan. British authorities here and in Hong Kong and Singapore are closely watching developments. Our Naval Attache has been consulted on the contents of this paragraph and concurs.

GREW

HPD

(*) Apparent omissions
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Tokyo
Dated June 10, 1940
Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

431, June 10, 8 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL: Cc
Department's 180, June 4, 11 p.m. 711.94/1525 confidential

One. In order to reduce the risk of publicity I met the Minister for Foreign Affairs today privately at the house of a mutual friend. Resume of my oral and informal presentation to the Minister as on my own initiative and as expressing my own thoughts is reported in non-confidential code in our 429/524 June 10. Full report with copies of documents left with the Minister will go by pouch. My remarks were based upon the general tenor of paragraphs seven and eight of my 400, July 3, noon; Department's 172/517 a May 30, 2 p.m.; and Department's 180/518 June 4, 11 p.m. Particular care was taken to safeguard against any possible inference that the American Government or its Ambassador is leaning toward a procedure of compromise or abandonment in part of policy or principle. My approach was in broad not in specific terms.

Two. On completion of my presentation the Minister said "I agree in spirit and in principle with everything you
-2- #431, June 10, 8 p.m., from Tokyo.

you have said". He later went on to speak "off the record" of the difficulties of the Government of coping with open-door elements in Japan which advocated rapprochement with the totalitarian powers and although using guarded terms he left me in no doubt that the Government (he mentioned especially the Prime Minister and himself) desired a different orientation. From his previous and subsequent remarks it was clear that he referred to their desire for closer relations with the United States. (END SECTION ONE).

CREW

CSB
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

431, JUNE 10, 8 P. M. (SECTION TWO)

Issued by Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet. Immediately after his opening remark the Minister observed that "the greater part" of the American fleet is in Hawaii. I replied that Hawaii is American territory and that Pearl Harbor is one of our important naval ports and I added that the presence of our fleet in those waters constitutes no menace whatsoever to Japan. Mr. Arita said that nevertheless the continued presence of our fleet in those waters implies suspicion of Japan's intentions with regard to the South Seas and the Netherlands East Indies and he wished to state categorically that Japan has no territorial ambitions. On the contrary, he said, Japan is doing her best to cultivate good relations with her neighbors and as an example is to sign in a few days a non-aggression pact with Thailand. The prominence which the Minister gave to this subject indicates the powerful effect
effect on Japanese consciousness of the presence of our fleet in Hawaii.

Four. The Minister in replying to my own discourse asked what concrete suggestions the American Government could offer for improving the relations between the two countries. I said that my whole presentation had clearly indicated what the tenor of the reply of my Government would be to such an inquiry. He asked me nevertheless to communicate his inquiry to Washington and he hoped for a reply. (Possibly the Minister may wish for some specific purpose to receive a formal statement from me "under instructions");

Five. The Minister then said he assumed that I was familiar with his talks with Mr. Sayre. He said that Mr. Sayre had suggested the possibility of a meeting in Hong Kong or Manila of representatives of the United States and of Chiang Kai-shek but that subsequently Mr. Sayre had feared publicity and had not pursued the matter. Mr. Arita said that the Japanese Government was prepared to deal with Chiang on the basis of the terms announced by Prince Konoye. It was perfectly clear to me that Mr. Arita was exploring the possibility of American good offices although he made no (repeat no) request. I made no (repeat no) comment except to say that I assumed that if the Japanese Government desired to get in touch with Chiang it would be
HSM -3- No. 431, June 10, 8 p. m. (Section 2), from Tokyo

a very simple matter to do so privately and directly. The Minister merely murmured something to the effect that the military were difficult. The subject was then dropped.

(END OF SECTION TWO)

GREW

DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM
Tokyo

Dated June 10, 1940
Rec'd 12:21 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

431, June 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Six. Some further desultory discussion of the war in Europe followed in which the Minister said that he expected at any moment to hear that Italy had entered the war.

Seven. The Minister, who is generally somewhat reserved and austere, was exceptionally cordial and when I left at the end of more than an hour's conversation he wrung my hand with marked friendliness. In fact I sensed a new and unaccustomed tone in his general attitude. He asked me to leave with him the informal notes on which I had based my presentation as he might wish to comment further on what I had said. The net result of the meeting, as I see it, is that while the attitude of the American Government towards Japan's present policy involving the continued use of force has once again been set forth in clear and emphatic terms which left no shadow of doubt as to our own
own policy and our unequivocal determination to abide by that policy without compromise or abandonment of our fundamental principles, nevertheless a note has been struck for the future "long haul" which may and probably will be carefully considered by the Japanese Government. Incidentally I prefaced my remarks today by reading a press report quoting Mr. Welles as having stated on June 8 inter alia that the United States is anxious to attain friendlier relations with all other nations including Japan providing their internal conditions make such improvement possible. I said that I had received no confirmation of the accuracy of the text but I knew that its general tenor reflected the attitude of my Government. Mr. Arita said that he also had read the report with much pleasure.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

TFV:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AS
This telegram must be FROM closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

725, August 31, 8 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL.
The following is a paraphrase of a telegram recently sent by my British colleague to London:

(BEGIN PARAPHRASE). In some Japanese quarters there are signs that irritation with Germany is growing, according to a reliable official source. Many Japanese are convinced that the establishment of German interests in China would result from a German victory and that Germany still wishes Chiang Kai-Shek to win. The failure of the rapidly increasing German colony in Japan to register and report their movements is causing dissatisfaction with the police. In the event of a German victory possible German designs on the Netherlands East Indies are also causing anxiety. (END OF PARAPHRASE).

I may add that in official circles there is a growing sense of irritation at the constant activities of the
AS-2—No. 725, August 21, 8 p.m., from Tokyo.

German Embassy in Tokyo in trying to influence the Japanese Government in problems of purely domestic concern and in its efforts to embroil Japan with Great Britain and the United States. The opinion is expressed that Germany is overplaying its hand.

GREW

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated September 12, 1940

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

227, September 12, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele concerning 994.00/951 (?) in Japan conveyed in Peiping's 300, August 31, 3 p.m., recently received here by mail, have had my careful attention. In general terms I believe that Mr. Steele's observations are well founded and sound, a belief which applies equally to the important considerations advanced in the final two paragraphs of the summary of Mr. Steele's statement.

His thesis that "firmness is the soundest and safest American naval policy" and that "the risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States" is however of such far-reaching gravity as to deserve carefully studied analysis and comment. In presenting the present trend of my thoughts on this general subject I have constantly in mind the fact that the shaping of our policy vis-a-vis Japan must depend upon the broader viewpoint of the administration in Washington and upon many factors which may not be apparent to this Treasury.
-2- September 19, 1915, from Tokyo.

To: The Situation and circumstances which have led to the spirit of exploratory conversations with the former Russian Minister Ariga (May 29, June 3, noon) and to a recommendation for considering the leading points of the organization of a new treaty of countries with Japan (May 3, 1915, 3 p.m.) have not obviously changed. I regard the time as ripe when I shall give further consideration to those recommendations, but with the views of the cabinet and the radically different views of the present section. I am thus still of the opinion that any proposals for conciliatory measures at this present time will appear to be futile and unwise.

Three considerations may be found in determining the Japanese government. Those are: (1) the views of the other elements in the country, (2) the situation of the world situation, and (3) the desire of expanding the Japanese imperial possessions. The heads like those who control the government implicitly in the direction of preparing that the war will soon become inevitable, and that it is not possible to conclude a satisfactory treaty without an understanding of the terms of surrender. But we face this important question before the war shall break out, and we are dealing with nations which are not at peace.
Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control those elements has been and is doubtful.

Four. Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawning realization, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition of naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of Singapore. These developments and rumors are having their logical effect on Japanese consciousness. On the one hand they tend to emphasize the potential danger which Japan faces from eventual positive action by the United States and Great Britain acting together (the danger of combined

Anglo-American
September 16, 1942,

... the situation with which we are faced is a result of the economic and political activities of the German and Japanese empires in the Pacific area. Economic and political activities have led to the creation of sources of raw materials closer than the empire of Japan. As for China, its resources are being used to support the United States and China, and the United States, which has a larger population, is able to provide a new market to their raw materials. The United States is China and the southern advance. Meanwhile, the need for raw materials and the situation of the Japanese economy is always an uncertain factor in their calculations. Under various considerations, it becomes necessary to give them more...

[Handwritten note: apparent omission]

E.M.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
TOKYO
Dated September 12, 1940
Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

825, September 12, 10 p.m.
High pressure diplomacy, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, will continue, but the fact that the Japanese Government was able even temporarily to restrain the military forces from their plans for a headlong invasion of Indo-China indicates a degree of caution which I do not doubt was at least partially influenced by the attitude of the United States that Mr. Stett describes as the "nibbling policy" appears likely to continue until the world situation, and especially the attitude of the United States, becomes clearer.

I have, in previous communications, expressed the opinion that sanctions by the United States could set Japanese-American relations on a downward curve. It is true that our own new initiated program of national preparedness now justifies measures that cannot be set within the realm of outright sanctions. On the other hand, I must envisage the probability that drastic measures on the export of such important products as petroleum, of
-2- 1939, September 13, 12 p.m., from State.

which the United States is known to favor would be interpreted by the Japanese, on the other hand, as actually (?) solutions which might and would lead to more serious personnel. The

State feels as well that there must be some effort on the United States' part to give the Jap a calaulation of the Japanese government's reactions, calculating "d on his" tendency, in the same way as they should attribute to the United States' responsibility for the failure of an interpretation of Japanese retaliation must take the Soviet government Must be a government of some sudden order. In the instant of any government's price knowing the price of the construction of a wonder pl.

potential of effect its demand. It

however, to any time a mere formulation of policy and

living through the potential war and the

Man. His being controlable to

Six. In his view, the admission of the side, nothing of the Fundamental principles

nearly the purpose of the previous

the government of the

States and Japan. Then these two desiderata conflict, the
preponderant emphasis to be placed on the one or the other
is a matter of high policy which does not lie within my
comparisons. My object is merely to place before the ad-
ministration in Washington the outstanding factors in the
situation as we see them from the angle of this Embassy.
Having carefully set forth the inevitable hazards involved
in a strong policy I now respectfully turn to the hazards
involved in a laissez-faire policy.

Seven. In discussing the specific question of American-
Japanese relations it is impossible to view that problem
in its proper perspective without considering it as part
and parcel of the world problem which, briefly, presents
the following aspects: (a) the United States and Great
Britain are the leaders of a great group of English speak-
ing nations around the world standing for a "way of life"
which is being appallingly threatened today by a group of
Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia and Japan whose avowed pur-
pose is to impose by force of arms their will upon con-
quered peoples. In attempting to deal with such powers
the uses of diplomacy are in general bankrupt.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1. This telegram must be closely safeguarded. From
2. Foreign Office Communication to anyone.
3. 

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 12, 1917

Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot
effectively stem the tide. Force or the result of
force can alone prevent these powers from reaching
their objectives. Japan today as other anti-Anglo-Saxon
powers, she has submerging. It is a significant fact that
she has been freely and fundamentally colonizing,
seeking every turn to profit by the mistakes of
others. The policy of southern expansion is
definite threat to American interests in the Pacific
and is a threat of the British Empire as well.

(b) American security has implicitly come to
a measure upon the existence of the British Fleet
which in turn has been, and could only have been,
supported by the British Empire.

(c) If we conceive it to be in our interest to
support the British Empire in this hour of her
travail, and I most emphatically do so conceive it,
we must strive by every means to preserve the status quo
in
in the Pacific at least until the European war has been won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor can our interests be further adequately and properly protected by merely registering disapproval and keeping a careful record thereof. It is clear that Japan has been deterred from taking greater liberties with American interests only out of respect for our potential power; it is equally (3) that she has trampled upon our rights to a degree in precise ratio to the strength of her conviction that the American people would not permit that power to be used. Once conviction is shaken it is possible that the uses of diplomacy may again become accepted.

(d) If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunistic philosophy to maintain the upper hand. At a moment it might then be possible to undertake a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem on a fair, frank, and equitable basis to the lasting benefit of both the United States and of Japan. Until such time as there is a complete regeneration of thought in this country, a show of force, together with a determination to employ it if need be, alone contribute effectively to
29 SEP 1942, September 12, 1942, 30 Sep 1942

to the achievement of July 25. This situation is a threat to future security.

W H C

(*) A recent mission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

DOGO

RDS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1940

RECD 5:56 P.M.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

830, SEPTEMBER 12, MIDNIGHT.

Eight. Passing from the general to the specific problem that now confronts us, and with the foregoing picture in mind, I applauded the timeliness of the instructions contained in the second part of Department's 331, August 23, 6 p.m. concerning the Shanghai defense sectors. The Department will have seen from my 791, September 4, 11 p.m. paragraph No. two that the Foreign Minister's complaint as to alleged threats on our part was met with the statement that what we have in mind is "a logical reciprocal adjustment of international relations". I feel that the appropriate time has come to proceed, gradually but progressively, with that adjustment. In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese-American relations progressively precarious. It is my hope that if the Japanese Government and people can be led to believe that their
-2- WACO, September 12, midnights from Tokyo.

hand is being overplayed, there will probably result a reverse swing of the pendulum in their reconstruction of good relations between the United States and not at all be possible. The alternative seems to me to be hopeless.

Hinc. The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period of several days, and the expressed complete concurrence of the naval, military and Commercial Attache and all other members of the legations of this Embassy.

(END OF MESSAGE).

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-FROM for being communicated to anyone. (C)

Tokyo
Dated October 6, 1940
Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

950, October 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE).
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. A growing nervousness is evident among American citizens in Japan arising out of the present situation and the prospects of a possible rapid deterioration in Japan’s relations with the United States. In the light of the grave uncertainty surrounding the future, American citizens here have already begun to ask my advice with regard to the wisdom of sending their families to the United States and have begun provisionally to explore the question as to measures which would be taken by our Government to facilitate their repatriation in the event of an emergency.

Two. I have admitted the serious potentialities with which the situation in charged but I have indicated that I see no immediate cause for alarm.

Three. The consular officers at Osaka and at Kobe have likewise been consulted in this regard by American citizens and we were informed yesterday in strictest
- 2 - 950, October 6, 4 p.m. from Tokyo (SECTION ONE)

strictest confidence by the Manager of the Standard Oil Company here that the company is quietly but firmly requiring the families of all its employees in China and in Japan to return to the United States. We also learn that several British firms have received instructions of a similar nature. Several American newspaper correspondents have arranged upon their own initiative to have their families leave within the next two or three weeks. (END OF SECTION ONE).

GREW

GW
EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

FROM
TOKYO

Dated October 6, 1940

RECEIVED 8:58 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

950, October 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. I raise the point at the present time not in the belief that it is of immediate import but nevertheless as a question which both the Department and the Embassy will wish to have constantly in mind as developments in connection with Japanese measures further implementing its declared policy of establishing a "new order in greater East Asia, including the South Seas".

Five. I need hardly point out, purely as a consideration for the eventual future, the powerful effect which would be created on Japanese consciousness if at a given moment it were to become known, either directly or indirectly, that the Embassy was quietly advising certain categories of American citizens in Japan to return to the United States or that the American Government was exploring possibilities of transportation. As such a move would undoubtedly create a degree of alarm among Americans in Japan it should, of course,
EDA - 2 - #950; October 6, 4 p.m. from Tokyo Section two
not be resorted to unless, or until, an acute situation
appeared to be developing. I earnestly hope that such
a situation will never eventuate but it would be puerile
to deny that such a situation conceivably may develop
or that under certain circumstances it may develop
rapidly.

Six. This telegram is sent not (repeat not) with
the thought of seeking present instructions but rather
to indicate that I cannot and do not underrate the
future possibility of intensified difficulties between
the United States and Japan.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N.R.

DATED NOVEMBER 26, 1940

REC'D 2:00 P.M. 27TH

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON

1304 NOVEMBER 26, 6 P.M.

Admiral Ryozo Nakamura, retired, in signed

KOKUMIN article declares impossible construct East Asia
coprospertiy sphere settle china incident without
(repeat without) war United States. Present Japanese
attitude said similar that preceding Russo-Japanese war.
Present crisis even greater. Every Japanese
must firmly resolve fight United States. United States
daringly blocking Japanese advance believing economic
sanctions financial aid Chungking effective. "American
trying with great ambition become greatest world nation
now seeking territories east west north south".
United States talk defense western hemisphere defense
south seas through joint action Britain United States
near plausible pretext hiding aggressive designs. Japan
must not be both anti-British pro-American must not
indulge wishful thinking possible appeasement United
States. "I fully realize burden imposed Japan four years
conflict China. Japan must now enter fight against
America in most daring spirit". Sent to Department via
Shanghai.

CREW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State
Washington.

1292, December 7, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 522, December 5, 6 p.m.

One. Many thanks for your telegram which is most helpful. It is difficult for us in Tokyo to sift the wheat from the chaff in the vast flow of rumors and speculation that reach us.

Two. My Turkish colleague recently told me that the Molotov-Ribbentrop conversations in Berlin had resulted in the signing of a previous understanding by which Germany would accord to Soviet Russia a free hand in Finland and Iran, while Germany would be accorded an equally free hand in the Balkans. The Turkish Ambassador observed that it is the usual practice of Moscow after signing such an agreement to issue an immediate official denial that any agreement was reached. I have no way of confirming the reliability of the alleged report which was, however, made to
-2-1292, December 7, 7 p.m., from Tokyo
to me as a categorical statement of fact.

Three. The Turkish Ambassador said that the position of Turkey vis a vis Soviet Russia is difficult because the Soviets will always act according to expediency and cannot be depended upon to honor previous assurances. Considering the weakness of Turkey's air arm and the always uncertain position of the Soviets he doubted that Turkey could stem the tide of German invasion if carried out through the Balkans.

GREW

DDM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated December 10, 1940
Rec'd 9:19 a.m., 11th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1314, December 10, 10 p.m.

The following is the substance of a telegram sent today to his Government by my British colleague.

"I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs today as arranged, making it clear that my remarks should not be regarded as a communication from Government to Government but rather as some indication of the comments I had received from Your Lordship on reports which I had sent on our various interviews. His Excellency listened carefully and at his request I left him some notes on which I had spoken. He stated that he understood position and, while I did not desire to make any detailed comment without further thought, he hoped that you would appreciate that, as the ally of Germany and Italy, Japan was now bound to give some assistance to their cause. By way of illustration he quoted the help that was being given to Great Britain by the United States without..."
AS-2—No. 1314, Dec. 10, 10 p.m., from Tokyo via Shanghai. actual entry into the war.

I replied that in that case His Excellency who was essentially a practical man, would consider it natural that we should also give what assistance we could to China—at which he nodded assent. There was, I continued, no disguising the fact that this state of affairs would need very careful handling if a collision were to be avoided and I expressed the personal hope that in neither case would the character of the assistance be such as to be incompatible with what was regarded under international law as the normal obligations of a neutral

(END SECTION ONE).

GREW

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.
Dated December 10, 1940
Rec’d 9:26 a.m., 11th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1314, December 10, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

His Excellency replied that this might be a matter of interpretation but that he feared that some of the actions which Japan would have to take might appear to us as going beyond neutral obligations as defined in the textbooks. He was not, however, prepared to elaborate on this theme. I said it was surely possible for Japan to be Germany’s ally without becoming her tool and that there were certain things which Germany would no doubt wish Japan to do for her which could only add to Japan’s embarrassments and economic difficulties citing the recent incident of the call of a German prize at Kobe as implying the possible presence of a German raider in these waters. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that at no time had Germany shown signs of wishing to see Japan involved in the war or urged action which might lead to such involvement and it was only on this basis that he had assented to sign the alliance. He sincerely hoped that war could be avoided between our two countries but repeated his previous statement in regard to the dangers.
-2- #1314, December 10, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo.

dangers attendant upon America's entry into the struggle.

Substance of document to the Foreign Office of December 9, 1940.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was as usual perfectly friendly and apparently anxious to eliminate minor causes of dispute between our two countries. At the same time his admission that Japan might have to take action which could appear to us incompatible with the ordinary obligations of a neutral was somewhat sinister. He appeared to be generalizing but he may have in mind some specific action for purpose of intensifying Japanese assistance to Germany."

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. (END MESSAGE)

GREW

DDM
At a large gathering of the America-Japan Society this afternoon in honor of its new president, three members of the Diet separately told me that at the meeting of the Diet held in camera (repeat in camera) today it was definitely announced that the policy of the Government is to conciliate the United States and that the "southward advance" will not (repeat not) under present circumstances be pursued by armed force. I am making an effort to obtain in confidence a transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings but this may prove difficult. The very marked anxiety over Japanese-American relations indicated by the remarks and questions of my Japanese contacts in recent weeks had given place today to an unmistakable air of optimism. Mrs. Grew, who was visiting Mrs. Matsuoka this afternoon, reports that the Foreign Minister returned from the Diet while she was there and exhibited an unusual spirit of buoyancy "as if a great load had been taken off his mind."
102, January 22, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

While these symptoms are interesting they are, of course, inconclusive. I believe, however, that they may properly be associated with the influences which appear to have prevented a public reply to Mr. Hull's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. One member of the Diet said to me that the proceedings in the Diet today reflected the desires of the Emperor. The general anxiety over the worsening of relations with the United States, as indicated in my recent contacts with prominent Japanese, has been more intense than at any time of my observations during the past eight years in Japan.

Grew

TFV
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

125, January 27, 6 p.m.

My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.

Grew.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

KD

GRAY
Tokyo
Dated January 28, 1941
Rec'd. 7:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

131, January 28, 8 P.M.

Press reports radio address yesterday afternoon over station J O A K to Japanese in North America by Admiral Nobuasa Syutsugu. Concluding sentence quoted as follows: "Japan dislikes war but if United States persists in its misunderstanding Japan is fully prepared. I ask all of you as Japanese subjects to serve the country in your various positions."

CREW.

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.
Dated February 16, 1941
Rec'd 9:08 a.m., 17th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

239, February 16, 4 p.m.

According to a Domi report of Friday's session of the Budget Committee published in the Japan TIMES and ADVERTISER yesterday, the Foreign Minister in reply to a question stated that Japanese diplomacy was continuing its efforts begun at the conclusion of the tripartite alliance to bring about an adjustment of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Matsuoka, while warning of the difficulties and inevitable delays attending upon any negotiations with the Soviet Union, noted nevertheless with satisfaction the temporary settlement of the fishery issue, the appointment of commissions to consider the question of the north Sakhalien concessions and the conclusion of a permanent fishery agreement as well as the negotiations for the conclusion of a trade agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union. In discussing the general
general trend of Soviet-Japanese relations Matsuoka stated that while it is impossible to forecast the future trend of events, the apparent willingness of the Soviet Government to settle outstanding questions was gratifying and remarked in this connection certain measure of mutual understanding had been reached between the Japanese Ambassador and Molotov and that as a result it would appear that the Soviet authorities were beginning to understand and were less suspicious of "the real intentions of Japan". He concluded with the statement that the Japanese Government is determined to utilize to the full the opportunity that has at last been presented for adjusting relations with the Soviet Union. In reply to a further question concerning the bearing of Article 5 of the tripartite alliance on the question of relations with the Soviet Union, Matsuoka is quoted as stating that this article exempting from the operation of the pact the relations between the signatories and the Soviet Union was not without concern to the Japanese Government and that should Soviet-Japanese relations between take a turn for the worse the Japanese Government could be depended upon to take steps to have Article 5 adjusted before such a contingency arose.
DFB -3- 239, February 16, 4 p.m., from Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

On the subject of the anti-Comintern Pact and its connection with Soviet-Japanese relations, Matsuoka stated that the anti-Comintern Pact retained its validity as an instrument for combating communism but denied that it was demoralizing influence against the Soviet Union or had any direct bearing on the question of adjusting relations with that country.

Mr. Matsuoka's remarks, closed with the general tenor of Japanese press comment concerning the relations with the Soviet Union, reveal the continuing desire and effort of the Japanese Government to bring about an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai repeated to Moscow.

CREW

RR
WGC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo

Dated February 17, 1941

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

244, February 17, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Embassy's 243, February 15, noon.

Following is substance of telegram from my British colleague to London commenting on his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Prolonged of Minister of Foreign Affairs' language makes it difficult to carry away any clear cut impression from these long interviews with him but he made one point quite clear, namely, that in view of the difficulties which he and the Prime Minister were having with certain influential quarters (from remarks let fall during other parts of the conversation I judge these to be the army and possibly also the navy) he could not blame me for feeling some anxiety as to the future (this remark being private should on no account be quoted). A further point on which he laid special emphasis was that neither Great Britain nor United States need have the slightest fear of any Japanese attack so long as we took no action calculated to force Japan to take measures in her own defense.

RR
GREW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DFB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (△)

Tokyo

Dated February 17, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 12:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

244, February 17, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I did not fail to point out that, although Singapore was 3000 miles distant from Japan, the Japanese military and naval authorities were quite capable of stigmatizing as 'offensive' the most obvious and necessary military and naval precautions in our own territory. From this part of our conversation I carried away the impression that the reinforcement of our own defenses would not be regarded as unnatural but that what Mr. Matsuoka apprehended was some enlarged Anglo-American action which might play into the hands of those who were pressing the Japanese Government to strengthen their strategic position in South-eastern Asia.

Two. In another point in the conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated an assurance given in an earlier interview that at no time had the German Government shown any desire to embroil Japan with the United States
DFB-2- 244, February 17, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

States or Great Britain, except in eventuality contemplated by Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. On my suggesting that the Germans were using indirect rather than direct methods of pressure to achieve this purpose, he replied that he could only speak for his official relations with the German Government."

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

WSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM

Dated February 18, 1941
Rec'd 2:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

259, February 18, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Recent utterances of Japanese officials as reported in various telegrams from this Embassy, including the statement issued today to foreign news correspondents by the Information Board, convey the impression that the Japanese Government has become seriously disturbed by the reaction abroad to recent Japanese moves in connection with the southward advance, particularly the penetration into Indochina and Japanese naval movements in Camranh Bay. The local press also has recently tended to play down the gravity of the situation and also to fasten blame on Great Britain rather than on the United States. Among other manifestations of this reaction abroad may be mentioned (a) the President's reported statement in press conference that if the United States should happen to get into war in the Far East, it would not affect deliveries by the United States to Great Britain; (b) the reported statement by the Australian Government indicating the
-2- 259, February 18, 9 p.m., from Tokyo

the acute situation in the Far East; (d) the notion of the Netherlands East Indies in recalling Dutch ships from the waters of Japan and China; (d) the reported British action in mining the waters of Singapore and in sending troops to the border between Malaya and the Island.

Two. Our Japanese contacts, as well as some of my better informed colleagues, sense a certain relation in the recent

GEB

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM TOKYO
Dated February 18, 1941
Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

259, February 18, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
period of high tension and reflect a more optimistic outlook than hitherto. Mr. Hugh Byas, one of the most astute foreign observers in Japan, feels that there has been "a painless showdown" and that beneficial results are likely to accrue from the recently revealed determination on the part of the four countries mentioned above. I share this view so far as the Japanese Government is concerned but am far from convinced that the government can control the armed forces afield. Only concrete evidence can carry such conviction.

Three. In the meantime many indications come to us that beneficial influences are at work. Hirota, who reflects the opinion of important elements associated with the Black Dragon Society, recently said to one of my reliable colleagues in confidence that Matsuoka is pursuing a policy fatal to Japan and that by allying Japan with the Axis and by further antagonizing the United States
-2- 259, February 18, 9 p.m. (SEC TWO) from Tokyo

with his provocative declarations he was unwittingly acting for the best interests of Soviet Russia whose greatest wish is to see open hostilities between the United States and Japan when Soviet Russia could effectively stab Japan in the back. These and other critics of the government hold that by its precipitous and

GREW

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DFB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated February 18, 1941
Rec'd 4:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

259, February 18, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Ill-considered adherence to the Axis, Japan has imprudently and uselessly permitted herself to be deprived of her liberty of action as a result of a blackmailing manoeuvre on the part of Germany risks "waking up one of these days in a full state of war with the United States, a certain victim of a push from behind on the part of the Soviets". Reliable informants state that this reasoning by the opposition has finally impressed the Government itself and that Matsuoka found it necessary to repeat it to his German friends, drawing their attention to the unilateral hazards which up to the present are the only results of the pact for Japan. The Germans meanwhile are leaving nothing undone to bring about a Japanese-American war, justifying their efforts with the argument that in case of war the United States would confine itself to defensive action in the Pacific in order to bring to bear its entire offensive
DFB-2-259, February 18, 9 p.m., from Tokyo.

offensive effort in Europe.

Four. Important circles furthermore aver that the Foreign Minister hastened to sign the recent provisional fisheries agreement with the Soviets for one year without regard to the costs of the operation. If Matsuoka, they continue, hopes to be able to make a personal success out of this he is mistaken, for it is obvious that this agreement was brought about only by the desire of the Soviet Government.

GREW

GW
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

259, February 18, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR) to chastize Chiang Kai Shek for his recent misconduct in regard to Chinese communists.

Five. The foregoing points are merely straws in the wind that the influences mentioned in the Embassy's 102, January 22, 8 p.m. are not idle and that the government is facing opposition by important elements whose strength, however, can not at present be appraised with assurance. Such appraisal must depend on future developments and upon the "facts and actions" to which I alluded before the American-Japan Society, having in mind, of course, not the actions of the Japanese Government but of the Japanese armed forces afield.

(END OF MESSAGE)
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (O-1)

Tokyo

Dated February 27, 1941

Rec'd: 7:55 a.m.

321, February 27, 1 p.m.

An official of the Japanese Foreign Office, formerly stationed in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, in private conversation with a member of my staff expressed the opinion that barring a sudden change in the attitude of the Soviet Government there was very little probability of the conclusion of a Soviet Japanese nonaggression pact in the near future. He said that following the deadlock reached last December as a result of the impossibly high price asked by the Soviet Government, the political negotiations by mutual consent had been shelved pending the solution of certain outstanding questions between the two countries. At the present time, aside from routine discussions concerning the North Sakhalin coal and oil concessions and the work of the commission for the demarcation of the Mongolian Manchurian border, the only active negotiations in progress between the Japanese and Soviet governments were those taking place in Moscow relating to a permanent fisheries convention and
and the conclusion of a commercial agreement. The official added as his personal opinion, based on his experience in Moscow, that Soviet policy in regard to Japan at the present time was primarily motivated by a desire to promote a Japanese-American war from which the Soviet Union would be the sole beneficiary and that, therefore, the possibility could not be excluded that the Soviet Union was deliberately delaying the conclusion of a political agreement with Japan until such a time as would best serve that purpose.

With reference to the current rumors of an impending visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to Europe the official stated that in view of the present status of Soviet-Japanese relations, should such a visit take place it would not have as its immediate purpose the conclusion of a pact of nonaggression with the Soviet Union but would probably be merely a visit of courtesy and consultation to Germany and Italy.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Moscow. Moscow please repeat to Berlin.

GREW

DRI
LS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

TOKYO
Dated March 5, 1941
Rec'd 8:17 a.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

362, March 5, 8 p.m.
Embassy's 207, February 12, 4 p.m.

It may be of some significance, in view of numerous reports, which cannot be readily confirmed, of growing dissatisfaction in influential quarters over the present Cabinet's foreign policies; that the Kenkokukai has recently distributed handbills carrying the following slogans: "We are not to be taken in by the maneuvers of The Third International to push us into war with the United States" and "Revise our policies toward the United States and Russia."

Repeated to Moscow.

GREW

DDM
No. 5443

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING COPY OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE TOKYO CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE AND COLONEL HIDEO IWAGURO OF THE JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to Embassy's 330, February 27, 10 p.m., reporting a conversation with Colonel Hideo Iwakuro (Iwaguro) of the Japanese Army General Staff, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a despatch telephoned to the New York Herald Tribune by its Tokyo correspondent on February 25, 1941, and which, it is understood
understood, was not published by the Herald Tribune. The despatch summarizes an exclusive interview given to the correspondent by Colonel Iwaguro prior to his departure for the United States to assume duties in the Japanese Embassy at Washington as a "Special Adviser" to Ambassador Nomura.

Colonel Iwaguro stated that a war between Japan and the United States would be "one of the most stupid events that ever occurred." He insisted that he was in a position to say that Japan would not resort to force in carrying out her program of southward expansion and denied that Japanese forces were preparing to take military, air and naval bases in Indochina and Thailand. Attributing rumors of a Far Eastern crisis to a third Power, the Colonel stated that establishment of military or naval bases in Thailand or the Netherlands East Indies by the United States would be construed as a "kind of military encirclement of Japan by America" and the consequences could not be predicted in such an eventuality. He expressed the opinion that war between Japan and the United States would not occur unless America resorted to military operations or declared war against Germany. Regarding China, he said that a merger of the Governments of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei was necessary.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure:

1/ - As stated

JKB:rk.

710

Original and 3 copies to the Department,
Copy to Embassy: Chungking, Peiping,
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
(Interview between the Tokyo Correspondent of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE and Colonel Hideo Iwaguro of the Japanese Army General Staff.)

Telephone Despatch to the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, February 25, 1941.

The Japanese Army is prepared to accept a truce in the present undeclared economic war between Japan and the United States in view of the fact that the outbreak of a military conflict between the two countries would be "one of the most stupid events that ever occurred", Colonel Hideo Iwaguro of the Army General Staff declared yesterday in an exclusive interview at the War Office lasting over two hours. Colonel Iwaguro is to leave on March 6 for Washington as a special emissary of the Army who will assist Admiral Nomura in negotiations to prevent the outbreak of war and arrange an understanding between the two countries.

Colonel Iwaguro's arrival will mean there will be high officials of both the Japanese Army and Navy in Washington who will be in a position to deal directly and authoritatively with the American Government. In connection with his departure for Washington, Colonel Iwaguro agreed yesterday to receive this correspondent and present the Army's position in view of the present crisis and despite the fact it is an army principle for high officers not to express their views to the press.

He said a war between the two countries would be stupid because even if America won Japan could not be expelled from the earth and vice-versa. He added that one
of the causes of the present crisis is the "practice of bluffing on the part of irresponsible elements in both Japan and America." He said bluffing will contribute nothing to the improvement of the present situation.

Informed that Admiral Nomura in his interview with American correspondents Wednesday was unable to state definitely that Japan will not resort to force in her southward expansion program, Colonel Iwaguro said he was in a position to say that "there will absolutely be no resort to force." He said Japan urgently needs many raw materials in the South Sea area but will use only peaceful means in her attempt to secure them. He added that Japan will not demand any special consideration from the areas in the south but will ask for materials on the basis of the most favored nation principle. Asked what Japan would do in the event this were not granted, Colonel Iwaguro replied the result would be prolonged diplomatic negotiations but would not be a cause for the use of force.

Informed that the crisis is partly the result of apprehension in America that Japanese forces are preparing to move south and have taken or are preparing to take military, air and naval bases in Indochina and Thailand, Colonel Iwaguro said the Japanese Army "absolutely has made no such preparations against Indochina and Thailand." He denied press reports that the Japanese Army has taken over the airport at Saigon or has even entered into any negotiations for airports or any other military rights in South Indochina. He said the reports may have started because of the use of the airport for transporting members
of the Indochina delegation to Tokyo for negotiations with Thai representatives. He said in the present Indochina-Thai negotiations Japan is seeking only a settlement of the border conflict and has no intention of making any military demands against the two countries.

He attributed current rumors of a Far Eastern crisis to a third Power. If on the basis of these rumors America should advance to Thailand and the Dutch Indies by establishing military or naval bases in these areas, Colonel Iwaguro said this would be construed "as a kind of military encirclement of Japan by America." He said such an encirclement is what is meant by interference with Japan's "peaceful advance southward." In the event of such an encirclement he said it would be impossible to predict the consequences.

Barring such eventualities, Colonel Iwaguro said the Japanese Army has no intentions of altering its present policy of making no military demands against Indochina and Thailand. He said the Army generally was satisfied with the original military agreement with Indochina although it may be necessary to request an increase in the number of Japanese troops stationed in northern Indochina strictly for the conduct of operations in South China.

He said some of the causes of the present tension between Japan and America are the lack of proper understanding regarding each other and the diplomatic clumsiness of both nations in handling their relations. He said the present crisis will not lead to war unless America resorts to military operations after having "tortured Japan by an undeclared economic war," or America declares war.
war against Germany. He said it would be a different matter however in the event America engages in an undeclared war against Germany or the latter declares war against America.

Turning to the situation in China, Colonel Iwaguro said Japan's policy in China will not be a repetition of her Manchurian policy. He said Japan will respect the sovereignty and territory of China although she will ask for adjustment of customs duty rates and equality with other Third Powers in the enjoyment of rights of residence for Japanese and protection of vested interests.

Asked if the Japanese Army is prepared to negotiate with Chungking to settle the war he said negotiations have been carried on several times in the past but they proved in vain. He added that the Army at present has no intention of coming forward to reopen them but is ready to negotiate if Chungking approaches Japan with "just and appropriate proposals" by which he said he meant proposals based on the famous Konoye statement. He said the merger of the Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek governments is necessary for a solution of the war but that negotiations with Chungking must be based on the present treaty between Nanking and Tokyo.