This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

35, January 7, 1 p.m.

In the course of a conversation yesterday the Bulgarian Minister told me that no political subjects had been discussed during the recent negotiations between the Bulgarian mission and the Soviet Government. He said that the Soviet negotiators had broached political subjects on two occasions but that the members of the Bulgarian mission had replied they were neither authorized nor qualified to discuss this aspect.

The Bulgarian Minister expressed the opinion that a month ago the Rumanian Government was prepared virtually to cede Bessarabia to the Soviet Union without a conflict but that recently and as the direct result of the reverses encountered by the Soviet armed forces in Finland, he had heard that Great Britain and France were urging Rumania to resist the annexation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union by force if necessary and had promised...
33, January 7 from Moscow

promised assistance. The foregoing statement, which
was made to me yesterday, appears to be confirmed by
the statement made by the British Broadcasting Corporation
today reporting an alleged statement by King Carol that
Rumania would defend Bessarabia.

The Bulgarian Minister also stated that he had
learned that Ritter's return to Berlin (see my telegram
January 4, noon) was the result of difficulties en-
countered in the commercial and economic negotiations
with the Soviet authorities.

STEINARDT

KLP
AMERICAN EMBASSY
Moscow, January 16, 1940.

No. 257.

Subject: Soviet Press Articles Concerning American Foreign Policy.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:


The article describes the "open door" policy of the United States as being designed to prevent other powers from obtaining economic advantages in China and to reserve that area for its own purposes, one of which is to make China economically dependent upon the United States. To attain this end the United States is said to be refraining from rendering China the full support which would insure
insure its victory and ultimate independence. Reference is made to the adverse effect upon American trade with China of the Japanese invasion, with respect to which the conclusion is drawn that Japan's expansion in China is not only a threat to American interests there but also implies a threat of the loss of the Japanese market. In consequence, American policy since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war has been to furnish a certain degree of aid to China, largely of a nature which will increase China's economic dependence on the United States, while at the same time supporting Japan in its war against China. The article concludes by asserting that American imperialists are growing rich as a result of the Sino-Japanese war by withdrawing gold and silver from both belligerents, and that when the latter have become fully exhausted direct intervention may be resorted to in order to force a peace upon China and Japan which will conform to the imperialist interests of the United States.

On January 12 Izvestiya published an article entitled "Naval Strategy of the United States", which asserts that the United States has assumed the role of an observer of the European conflict but not a disinterested observer. As proof it cites the American neutrality law, which assures profits for American armament manufacturers and implies military and economic support by American capitalism of the Anglo-French military bloc. The article further states that American foreign policy
is utilizing the present war to strengthen its hegemony, especially in the American hemisphere where the United States is endeavoring not only to usurp Germany's place in the Latin American market but also to drive out Britain. The three-hundred-mile 'neutral zone' along the American coasts is described as being in reality merely an expansion of the zone of operation of the American navy and air force, and it is added that behind the "screen of loud talk about solidarity of the American republics" the United States is carrying out the largest military program in its history, which should assure to it control of the eastern Atlantic and western Pacific. After asserting that one aspect of the present American naval policy is to overtake and perhaps surpass Britain as a naval power, the article closes with the statement that the European war not only inspires hopes for large profits by American capitalism but also affords the opportunity for the United States to strengthen its strategic position.

The two articles above are among the few devoted entirely to the United States that have appeared in the Soviet press for some time.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

In quintuplicate
File 710-United States
MT 25W
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Dated March 1, 1940

Rec'd 7:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

231, March 1, 6 p.m.

The Rumanian Minister informed me today in confidence that his Government has reason to believe that Germany has recently delivered to the Soviet Union a very large quantity of mines. The Minister added that according to the information in possession of his Government these mines are being laid with the assistance of German specialists in the Black Sea area particularly in the vicinity of Odessa and that a large number of such German specialists are already in Odessa.

STEINHARDT

NPL
Gray
Moscow
Dated March 12, 1940
Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

279, March 12, 7 p.m.

The Soviet press continues to devote attention at intervals to the role of Italy in the present international situation and, while comment continues to be critical in this case, there has been an increasing tendency to present Italy as the object of pressure and intrigue on the part of the Anglo-French imperialist bloc in an endeavor to draw Italy into the orbit of the war as well as to advance the view that Italy's interests are in conflict with those of England and France. An article in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA yesterday entitled "English pressure on Italy" in discussing the Italian-English conflict over the question of coal imports from Germany advances the view that while the export of coal to Italy is not vital to Germany, its import is to Italy, and the British action in this connection is clearly directed more against Italy than against Germany. The article likewise asserts that the "intrigues of the Anglo-French bloc" in the Balkans are designed to weaken in that area the position
position of Italy and that the concentration of Anglo-French troops in the Near East creates a direct danger for the Italian possessions in Africa while the English blockade at Gibraltar threatens Italian shipping in the Mediterranean. In conclusion the (*) of the article writes that Italy has every opportunity to become convinced of the "inconvenience of falling between two stools".

(END OF SECTION ONE)

STEINHARDT

KLP

(*) Apparent omission
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

MOSCOW
Dated March 12, 1940
Rec'd 3:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

279, March 12, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. In commenting on the slightly more favorable attitude shown by the Soviet press towards Italy a member of the Italian Embassy here has stated that although no information has been received on the subject it might well be that one of the purposes of Ribbentrop's visit to Rome would be an attempt to bring about some readjustment of Soviet-Italian relations on the basis that Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union at the present time share a common interest to keep the war out of the Balkans and Black Sea areas.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CSB

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM

Moscow

Dated July 7, 1940

Rec'd 11:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

825, July 7, 10 a.m.

For several days past the commissioned members of the British Embassy have quite freely predicted in conversations with myself and other members of this mission that Japan will declare war on England in the immediate future. These statements were repeated to me last night in the British Embassy in apparent earnestness.

THURSTON

APL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (D)

FROM
Moscow

Dated August 27, 1940
Rec'd 10:34 a.m.

No distribution.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1078, August 27, 11 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I am informed in strict confidence by a member of the British Embassy that the meeting between Mikoyan and the British Ambassador was not "encouraging" and that Mikoyan had merely said that the Soviet Government was interested in obtaining certain kinds and restricted categories of material from England and would exchange for an equivalent amount of Soviet products. Mikoyan, however, was unable to give any assurance in regard to reexport to Germany and refused to admit that there could be any connection with or restrictions on Soviet trade with Germany as a result of unsuitable arrangement with England. In this connection he referred vaguely to the political situation as not being propitious. According to the informant while conversations might be continued there appeared to be little prospect of modification in the immediate future of Soviet attitude toward its economic commitments to Germany.

(END SECTION ONE)

THURSTON

TFV
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGT

1076, August 27, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

WITH reference to the attempts of Sir Stafford Cripps in Moscow to bring about an improvement of British-Soviet relations and to draw the Soviet Union away from Germany from the same source I have learned in the strictest confidence that when Cripps saw Stalin some weeks ago, (see Embassy's 884, July 20, 4 p.m.) he pointed out at great length that Russia's real interest lay with England since in the event of a complete German victory Russia would alone almost certainly have to fight Germany; by this time Stalin while admitting that everything was possible in international affairs made it quite clear that he did not feel in a position to risk a conflict with Germany's army at the present time and appeared to prefer the possibility of a future war with Germany to the very real risk of a military defeat at the present time. While the foregoing interview took place some six weeks ago, it is believed to be of considerable interest. Stalin's statement in the opinion of the Embassy is a very frank and realistic statement of the attitude of the Soviet Government in the present
-2- 1078, August 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

present situation. As of possible interest in relation to the foregoing it has been ascertained from a foreign newspaper source that Stalin is believed to have been very much annoyed that the report of the meeting with Cripps had leaked out into the foreign press and that this may be one of the reasons why he has shown no disposition to see the British Ambassador since that time.

(END OF MESSAGE)

THURSTON

TOB: AGR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM MOSCOW
Dated September 19, 1940
Rec'd 10:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1194, September 19, 7 p.m.

The following observations made in the course of my trans-Siberian trip may be of interest to the Department:

One. Military preparations: On both sides of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier extreme measures were taken by both the Japanese and Soviet authorities to conceal fairly extensive military measures. While entering and departing from the frontier stations of Manchuli and Otpor the blinds were carefully drawn, the passengers supervised and the train was not permitted to depart until after dark. Through the entire seven days from Otpor to Moscow large numbers of soldiers and officers were in evidence and in all of the stations stopped at one out of three men were in uniform. I noted a large number of airfields along the entire route spaced from three to four hundred miles apart. The airfields were large but the hangars and facilities appeared to be in a poor state of repair and the buildings very small in relation to the size of the fields. Such planes as were visible appeared to be antiquated, consisting largely of single or twin motors.
-2- 1944, September 19, 7 P.M., from Moscow.

bombers and small pursuit craft. I observed no important troop movements either east or west and did not see a single troop train moving in either direction during the entire trip.

Two. Trans-Siberian Railway line: In general the eastern and central Siberian roadbed showed evidence of heavy wear with little maintenance work in progress. There was a noticeable improvement in the condition of the roadbed the farther west the train proceeded. From Otpor, the eastern frontier station, to Omsk, the line was double tracked in part but not for the entire length. Some of the double tracking was obviously of recent date. From Omsk to approximately 200 miles west of Sverdlovsk, a total distance of some 800 miles, I can categorically state from personal observation that the line is single track with not the slightest evidence of double tracking in progress or laid out. Furthermore the three principal bridges across the Irtysh, Enesi and Ob Rivers are single span, too light to carry double track and in respect of the two last bridges they would have to be entirely reconstructed or duplicated in order to carry a second track. I am of the opinion, based on my observations of the roadbed and the great width of these rivers that it would require at least two years to double track the section of
-3- #1194, September 19, 7:30 a.m., from Moscow.

600 miles referred to above. I saw no evidence that this work is in contemplation.

Three. General conditions: From my observations at the stations at various points there appeared to be a shortage of food in Eastern Siberia. Conditions appeared somewhat better in central Siberia improving progressively the farther west we went. In Eastern and Central Siberia little agricultural machinery or evidence of modern method of farming was to be seen and I was struck by the small number of cattle which were to be seen in areas which appeared to be excellent grazing country. The condition of the cereal crop appeared to be poor in the east and fair in the west.

STEINHARDT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ATP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

FROM

MOSCOW
Dated September 20, 1940
Rec'd 11:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

1138, September 20, 7 p.m.
Department's 537, September 13, 4 p.m.

Gaftenco, the Rumanian Minister, called on me yesterday. He stated he was convinced there had been no Soviet-German cooperation in regard to the Rumanian question at any stage. While presumably the Soviet Government may have been informed of the results of the Salzburg Conference in July and of developments subsequent thereto such exchanges had been merely in the form of information and did not constitute prior consultation with the Soviet Government. In respect of the Italian-German guaranty of Rumania, the Minister confirmed the information contained in Embassy's 1144, September 10, 11 a.m., to the effect that the Soviet Government had been informed by the German Ambassador either at the very last moment or even subsequent to the announcement and that there was little doubt as to Soviet influence of Italian move. He added that the Italian Ambassador here was of the opinion that the guaranty had been deliberately designed to oppose Soviet pretensions in the Balkans. The Minister likewise stated that it
that it was his impression that at his interview with Drakenosov on August 29, which was made the subject of the communique in regard to the alleged border incidents (see the Embassy's 1088, August 30) the Soviets had been motivated by the desire to proclaim their interest in the Rumanian question in anticipation of the possibility of a confused situation or even conflict between Rumania and Hungary from which the Soviet Union might profit. (It will be noted that this confirms the view of the Italian Secretary reported in the Embassy's 1160, September 13, 8 p.m. ). Gafencou went on to say that Vishinski's protest to German Ambassador in regard to the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Danube Conference in Vienna had been acrimonious as the Soviet Union felt that this exclusion had been deliberate and evidenced an anti-Soviet policy. He added that according to his information in reply to the Soviet protest, the German Government had agreed to include the Soviet Union in a comparatively unimportant meeting of technical experts but not in a second and more important Danubian Conference which was to be held simultaneously to consider general policies affecting the Danube. Gafencou informed me that on September 17 he had transmitted such a note from his Government to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning the Soviet protest of September 12 (see the Embassy's...
-3- 1198, September 20, 7 p.m. from Moscow

Embassy's 1157, September 13 and that this reply, as in the first Romanian note had been firm in rejecting responsibility for the incidents. The Minister added that he attached some importance to the fact that no mention had appeared in the Soviet press in regard to the second note and he was inclined to believe that for the moment at least the Soviet Union was willing to let the question of the border incidents subside.

STEINHARDT,

HTM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Moscow
Dated September 22, 1940
Rec'd 3:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1202, September 22, 6 p.m.

The British Ambassador called on me yesterday and in the course of an extended and I believe very frank conversation discussed the entire field of British-Soviet relations, various negotiations with Soviet officials and his personal views concerning present Soviet policy. Sir Stafford's remarks on the more important subjects touched upon may be summarized as follows:

One. Conversation with Stalin. The Ambassador informed me that Stalin had been extremely frank, realistic and outspoken during his interview with him and although the conversation had been confined to a general evaluation of the present European situation with no proposals being advanced by either side, Stalin had made it quite clear that his present policy was designed to avoid the involvement of the Soviet Union in the war and in particular to avoid a conflict with the German army. Stalin had admitted that Germany constituted the only real threat to the Soviet Union
From Moscow.

Union and that a German victory would place the Soviet Union in a difficult if not dangerous position, but he felt that it was impossible at the present time to invite the certainty of a German invasion of the Soviet Union by any alteration of Soviet policy. Stalin had said that he preferred to run the risk of war with Germany without allies in the event of a British defeat, because he believed (a) that even should Germany be victorious over Great Britain, German military power would be appreciably weakened, and (b) that after the efforts involved in the present war it would be very difficult for the Nazi leaders to persuade the German people to embark on a new major military objective.

(End Section One)

Steinhardt

Rr
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM Moscow.

Date: September 22, 1940
Rec'd: 9:27...

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1202, September 22, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Tw.: Trade negotiations with Soviet officials.

The Ambassador stated that in connection with the frequency and regularity of Stalin, other Soviet officials, Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan and Latvian Vishinsky, with whom he had dealt, but had received information or in their dealings with them in the question of a trade agreement between the United of Socialist Soviet Republics and Britain, he stated that following his arrival here last evening he and the negotiations had promptly been resummed individually but that during the last ten weeks the Soviet Government had allowed these negotiations to lapse, to change in attitude which he attributed in great part to the collapse of France and the consequent decline of the her continental power which might have supplied Germany. He confirmed the fact that recently negotiations have proceeded for an agreement for a limited exchange of British products for Soviet flax. The Ambassador said that he had talked with you that Great Britain could not interest itself in flax exchange.
exchange of specific commodities but only in a general trade agreement. The Ambassador said that in his most recent interview with Vishinski he had expressed his dissatisfaction with the evasive tactics of Soviet officials on the question of a general trade agreement and that Vishinski had finally said to him that the Soviet Government was not disposed to continue the negotiations unless the British Government would release the eleven ships which had been sequestered following the incorporation of the Baltic States. The Ambassador added in this connection that he had been informed by his Foreign Office that the British refusal to release the gold of the Baltic States had been taken at the instance of the American Government and went on to state that in his opinion there was no necessity for the British Government to continue to acquiesce in this request inasmuch as it was quite possible for the British Government being at war to pursue the policy this matter for obvious reasons without impairing the position adopted in principle by the United States. I received a strong impression that one of Sir Stafford’s purposes was to enlist my support in
suggesting to the Department that it reconsider its request of the British Government in the subject of the withholding of the gold of the Baltic States.

Three. Soviet Turkish relations. (END SECTION TWO)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Moscow
Dated September 22, 1940
Rec’d 10:32 a.m., 23rd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1203, September 32, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE).
The Ambassador told me that Stalin had dwelt at length on Soviet-Turkish relations and had made clear his desire to obtain for the Soviet Union a voice in the regime of the Dardanelles. He said he had gained the impression that while Stalin's preference would be for joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits and possibly one or more bases in the vicinity, he would be satisfied with a commitment on the part of the Turkish Government to consult the Soviet Union before taking any action under the Montreux Convention. The Ambassador gained the impression that Stalin was seeking to enlist British support to achieve his objective.

Sir Stafford was extremely outspoken in his criticism of previous British statesmanship and diplomacy as well as the internal regime in England. He said that even now, although certain important and needed changes had been
AS-2- No. 1203, Sept. 22, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE), fr. Moscow.

been made since the formation of the Churchill Cabinet; the retention of Chamberlain and other diehards continued to operate as a break on the fullest development of Britain's war effort.

In conclusion the Ambassador admitted to me quite frankly that he was extremely blooming and disappointed as a result of his efforts in Moscow and felt that he had accomplished virtually nothing since his arrival. He said that he had reached the very definite conclusion following his conversation with Stalin and his contact with other Soviet officials that any alteration of Soviet policy towards Germany would only occur when the military power of Germany had been sufficiently impaired to obviate the possibility of a German invasion of Russia and that consequently any hope of even indirect Soviet assistance in the immediate future would depend on the ability of Great Britain to withstand the German attack and by so doing to seriously impair German military power.

(END MESSAGE).

STEINHARDT

TFV
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Moscow

Dated September 30, 1940
Rec'd 12:01 a.m., Oct. 1

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1221, September 30, 1 p.m.
Embassy's 1244, September 28, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The editorial reported in my telegram under reference appears to reflect the public position which the Soviet Government has elected at the moment to adopt in regard to the German-Italian-Japanese agreement in that it accepts at its face value the reservation contained in the pact concerning the Soviet Union and even interprets the inclusion of this reservation as proof of the efficiency of the non-aggression pacts between the Soviet Union and Germany and Italy. In regard to the general outline of the pact the most interesting feature is the blunt statement in the Pravda editorial that the United States is now making common cause in a military sense with Great Britain and that the pact paves the way for the development of the war on a world-wide stage between Germany, Italy, and Japan on the one hand and England and the United States on the other development which, as the Embassy has previously reported, would
-2- 1251, September 30, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

would not be displeasing to the Soviet Union.

Despite however the public acceptance through the medium of the Pravda editorial of the view that the tripartite pact will not affect the Soviet Union it must be assumed that the similarity of the present agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan and the anti-Comintern Pact has not passed unnoticed in Moscow. It will be recalled in this connection that one of the chief advantages which the Soviet Union obtained through the non-aggression pact with Germany last August was the elimination of German-Japanese cooperation directed against the Soviet Union. It is furthermore significant that while the editorial refers somewhat pointedly to the existence of non-aggression pacts between the U.S.S.R. and Germany and Italy no mention is made of the effect of the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance on Soviet-Japanese relations. (END SECTION ONE)

STEINHARDT

(#) Apparent omission

HTM
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

1251, September 30, 1 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

In this connection the Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, while professing to be unaware of the exact nature of the instructions which the new Japanese Ambassador will bring him from Tokyo, was quite frank in stating that the general position in view of Japanese preoccupation in the south was more favorable for an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations than at any time in the past. As the Embassy has reported since Molotov's speech on October 31, 1939 (Embassy's 847, November 1, 10 p. m.) the Soviet Government has given certain indication of a disposition to reach some political agreement between Germany and Japan. The failure of this event to materialize appears to have been primarily due to hesitancy on the part of Tokyo. The general tone of the editorial under reference would seem to indicate that the Soviet attitude in this respect has undergone no change and
hem - No. 1251, September 30, 1 p.m. (Section 2) from Moscow.

and that the possibility of a Japanese-Soviet political agreement has been enhanced rather than diminished by the German-Italian-Japanese alliance. Indeed, since as a result of this alliance the Soviet Union is now precluded from taking advantage by hostile action of any difficulties which Japan might encounter in the Far East without running the risk of becoming involved in war with Germany and Italy at the same time it is possible that the Soviet Government may be prepared to make greater concessions than heretofore particularly in respect of its assistance to China in an endeavor to reach an agreement with the Japanese.

Not repeated to Tokyo. (END MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT

TPV
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1927, October 2, 6 P.M.

The Turkish Military Attaché, who in the past has proved to be a reliable observer and who has just returned from a trip to Sweden and Finland, told me yesterday that in his opinion there is considerable evidence that the Germans are concentrating large forces in areas which might serve as eventual bases of operation against the Soviet Union. He said he has obtained reliable information that at the present time the Germans have 79 divisions on the Soviet-German frontier supported by 3 to 4 thousand first line planes with 2,000 additional planes in reserve. In addition he stated that at least half of the more than 150,000 troops in Norway are in the northern area of Norway close to the Norwegian-Finnish frontier with many in the vicinity of Petsamo where an important German military base is in the process of construction and that roads in northern Norway leading to the Finnish frontier are being built by German troops. (END SECTION ONE)

STEINHARDE

GW

WWG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Dated October 2, 1940

Rec'd 4:25 a.m., 3rd

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1267, October 2, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Attaché stated that while he was in Sweden the German Military Attaché there had told him with conviction that the Soviet-German Pact had served its purpose and that should the Soviets again attack Finland, Germany would without question go to the latter's assistance.

He added that from the same source he had been informed that at a meeting with most of the German Military Attaches Hitler had stated that the invasion of England might have to be postponed until next year. While I am unable to confirm the foregoing it is interesting as indicating the speculation which has been aroused in diplomatic circles in Moscow by the recent German diplomatic moves as to Germany's intentions in regard to the Soviet Union and particularly the conclusion of the military alliance with Japan. While the extent of the German forces bordering on the Soviet Union may be exaggerated it is of interest in connection with the information contained in my 1247, September 28, 4 p.m., from a German source.

(END MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT

WWC
AS
This telegram must be
closedy paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

FROM
Moscow
Dated October 23, 1940
Rec'd 9:05 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1393, October 23, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT,
THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY.

My 1390, October 22, 5 p.m.

The British Ambassador told me last night
that having been unable to obtain an appointment
with Molotov he had seen Vishinski yesterday after-
noon who had offered no explanation of the failure
of Molotov to receive the Ambassador. The Ambassador
said that he had prefaced the submission of the pro-
posals contained in his instructions by informing
Vishinski that Great Britain was now confident of ulti-
mate victory particularly as the most powerful in-
dustrial country in the world the United States was
coming more and more to the aid of Great Britain.

Vishinski brought out comment on this statement by in-
quiring of the Ambassador what the diplomatic corps in

Moscow
AS-2- No. 1393, Oct. 23, 4 p.m., from Moscow.

Moscow was saying with reference to recent diplomatic "maneuvers" to which Cripps replied that it was the consensus of opinion in diplomatic circles that a Soviet-Japanese pact would be signed shortly after the arrival of the new Japanese Ambassador to which Vishinski replied "reports of such a pact are perhaps greatly exaggerated". Cripps told me that from Vishinski's reply he had deduced that some form of Soviet-Japanese pact would be signed but that it might well be more limited in scope than had previously been expected. Cripps then outlined to Vishinski the proposals which he had been authorized by his Government to make as follows:

That the British Government would bind itself in writing (1) to conclude no peace without consulting the Soviet Union; (2) to conclude no anti-Soviet agreements with any third nation, (3) to give definite assurances that no attack would be made by Great Britain against Baku or Baum; and (4) to conclude a commercial agreement with the Soviet Union for the delivery by Great Britain of rubber, tin and other commodities required by the Soviet Union.

In reply to my inquiry Cripps stated that the British Government would not require guarantees from the Soviet Union that the commodities referred to in number (4) above or
or their equivalents would not be reexported to Germany since in conformity with the recent declarations of avoiding any appearance of suspicion in its relations with the Soviet Union his Government has informed him that the acceptance of the proposals of the British Government as a whole would eliminate the probability of reexport.

In return for the foregoing proposals the British Government would require (1) that the Soviet Union observe genuine neutrality in the present war between Germany and Great Britain; (2) that in the event of the involvement of Turkey or Iran or both in war with the Axis powers the Soviet Union would adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality towards these countries; (3) that there should be no cessation of aid to and support of China; and (4) that subsequent to the conclusion of the commercial agreement referred to above and at a propitious time in the future a non-aggression pact should be concluded between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador informed me that after he had set forth the foregoing proposals to Vishinski the latter had asked him whether these proposals and terms had been communicated by the British Government to the Government of the United States.
AS-4. No. 1393, Oct. 23, 4 p.m., from Moscow.

States to which Cripps had replied in the affirmative.

With further reference to Soviet-Japanese relations Cripps took occasion to tell Vishinski that a Soviet-Japanese pact which contained the implication of cessation of Soviet aid to China would probably result in the collapse of China's resistance in which event the Japanese armies on the continent of Asia would be "free for other purposes".

The Ambassador told me that he had given Vishinski renewed assurances that there would be no publicity emanating from Great Britain concerning the proposals which he had just submitted on behalf of his Government or any negotiations resulting therefrom. In conclusion the Ambassador said that Vishinski on the whole, except for his question as to whether the Government of the United States had been informed of the British proposals, had been entirely non-committal and had merely promised to submit the proposals to his Government.

STEINHARDT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
(But)

FROM

MOSCOW

Dated November 25, 1940

Rec'd 8:30 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION

NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1608, November 25, 2 p.m.

(GRAY)

The Soviet press this morning publishes a two column Tass dispatch reporting in detail a meeting of the Bulgarian Parliament on November 21. The dispatch states that the discussions concerning a bill "for the defense of the nation" revealed deep differences of opinion among the deputies on internal political questions and Bulgarian foreign policy and cites at length the statements of a number of deputies concerning the existence of friendly relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the gratitude due to the Soviet Union in connection with the return of the southern Dobrudja, and the importance to Bulgaria of the maintenance and development of Soviet-Bulgarian friendship. In this connection one deputy is reported to have stated that "the interests of the Soviet Union which desires to preserve its neutrality and avoid participation in the war coincide completely with those of Bulgaria".

In regard to Germany and Italy one deputy is quoted as stating
stating that while relations with those countries are friendly they should not be distorted so as to create the impression "that we are participating in the new order". The report refers to remarks of several deputies in regard to the necessity of a just solution of Bulgarian claims in Macedonia which are a disturbing element in Bulgarian relations with Yugoslavia as well as to the Bulgarian claim to an outlet on the Aegean Sea. In regard to the latter question one deputy is said to have asserted "that Turkey is carrying out a concentration of its forces on our frontier and is threatening military resistance if Bulgaria demands a realization of its claims to an outlet on the Aegean Sea."

(End Gray)

CONFIDENTIAL. The publication at this time in the Soviet press of a detailed report of the sessions of the Bulgarian Parliament and in particular the implied approval of Bulgarian claims to Macedonia and access to the Aegean Sea is in conformity with the previous indication (see my No. 1149, September 11, 11 a.m.) of Soviet support of Bulgaria and may especially in view of the report that the Bulgarian Prime Minister will shortly visit Berlin be regarded as emphasizing Soviet interest in Bulgaria. While it is certain that the formal inclusion of Bulgaria in the Axis orbit would not be regarded by the Soviet Government with
-3- #1608, November 25, 2 p.m., from Moscow.

with favor it is not believed inasmuch as the question was presumably discussed in Berlin during Molotov's visit that the Soviet Government would take any active steps to prevent such action on the part of Bulgaria.

STEINHARDT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

FROM
Moscow

Dated November 27, 1940
Rec'd 7:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
1630, November 27, 7 p.m.
By 1631, November 23, 6 p.m.

The British Ambassador informed me today that he had received no reply to the British proposals submitted by him over a month ago to Vyshinski and that he was no less of the opinion that no reply would be received. Cripps added that since the interview reported in my telegram under reference he has had no further talks with Vyshinski or anyone in the Foreign Office and that he had decided as a matter of tactics not to press the subject for the time being especially as he feels that his position has been seriously prejudiced as a result of the publication by the British Broadcasting Corporation of the British terms which he had solemnly assured Vyshinski would not be made public.

The Ambassador today was more inclined to direct his charge of "sabotage" against the British Broadcasting Corporation rather than his Foreign Office since he said that almost all "issues" in regard to Soviet-British relations had been given currency
EH -2- 1630, November 27, 7 p.m. from Moscow.

currency by that organization. In this general connection he informed me that he had sent several strong telegrams to the British Foreign Office concerning the fantastic report put out by the British Radio of my alleged visit to Sofia.

The Ambassador said that he had heard reports which indicate that certain Soviet airplane factories were working day and night producing planes for export to Germany.

In respect of the recent visit of the Secretary General of the Soviet Foreign Office to Sofia Gripps is inclined to the view that the Soviet Government intervened diplomatically with the object of preventing Bulgaria from joining the Axis. He also told me that according to his information King Boris had gone to Berlin to ask Hitler not to compel Bulgaria to join the Tripartite Pact at the present time because of the possible consequences that such adherence might produce in the Balkans especially in the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey.

STEINHARDT

EM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM MOSCOW.

Dated January 6, 1941

Rec'd 7:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

14, January 6, 4 p.m.

Although I can see no reason at this time to attach significance to the coincidence of a halt in the Soviet-Japanese, Soviet-German and Soviet-Hungarian negotiations at approximately the same time, certain general observations in relation thereto suggest themselves.

The halt in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations appears to have been occasioned by the unwillingness of the Japanese Government to pay the price demanded by the Soviets. The Soviet attitude appears to be a confident belief that as Japanese difficulties increase the Japanese Government will eventually decide to pay the price and that in consequence the Soviet Government has every reason to adopt a waiting attitude.

The halt in the Soviet-German negotiations appears to have been occasioned by considerably more than Schnurres's casual reference in a conversation with me three days ago to "endless detail and Russian exactions in respect of unimportant matters". I am more inclined to the (?) (?)—
-2- #14, January 6, 4 p.m. from Moscow.

The Soviets have been insistent in seeking a final adjustment of the problems affecting German interests which have arisen out of the seizure of the Baltic States by the Soviets (See my 13, January 5, 1 p.m.).

(END OF SECTION ONE)

STEINHARDT

EMB

Repetition requested on above garbled groups.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

MOSCO:
Dated January 6, 1941
Rec'd 6:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

14, January 6, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

and that while this subject will probably be amicably disposed of it has caused the present delay. I am also inclined to the view that the recent demarches by the Soviet Government to the United States and Great Britain with respect to the Baltic island ships constitute an attempt to offset German pressure with respect to German interests in the Baltic States, the Soviets entertaining the hope that concessions by the United States or Great Britain or both could be used to their advantage in dealing with the German demands. This view is supported by the Soviet endeavors to extract concessions from the United States and Great Britain by holding out the hope that such concessions will result in driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and Germany without any real intention at the present time on the part of the Soviet Government to depart from its policy of cooperation with Germany. Apparently the Soviet Government hopes by these means to gain concessions from the
-2- #14, January 8, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

the United States and Great Britain without giving anything in return other than the encouragement of wishful thinking.

The halt in the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations appears to have been occasioned by an unwillingness of the Soviet Government to conclude these negotiations until its agreement with Germany has become effective while at the same time giving evidence to the Rumanian Govern-
ment of its displeasure with German domination of Rumania and for the further purpose of having the question of control of the mouths of the Danube determined according to the be exclusively under Joint Soviet-Rumanian supervision.

(END OF MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT

EMP
Repetition requested on above garbled groups (* apparent omission
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

4th, January 10, 9 p.m.

By 1720, December 13, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. In the course of a conversation with the Turkish ambassador last night he told me that some time after Sobolyov’s visit to Sofia he had called on Molotov and inquired of him as to the purpose of Sobolyov’s visit. He said that Molotov had made the following statement:

"I sent Sobolyov to Sofia because the Soviet Government had heard that Bulgaria considered itself menaced by Turkey and had asked Germany and Italy for a guarantee against Turkish aggression. My instructions to Sobolyov were to offer the Bulgarian Government a mutual assistance pact. Sobolyov reported to me that the Bulgarian Government did not consider itself menaced by Turkey and did not desire a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union."

The Ambassador continued that after Molotov had made the foregoing statement he had reminded him that under the Turkish-Soviet treaty of 1929 the Soviet Union could not properly
properly enter into a mutual assistance pact with a country contiguous to Turkey without the latter's consent. To this Molotov replied that Sobolov's mission had been merely a "sondage" and that nothing had come of it. Molotov then said that it had come to his attention that conversations were being carried on between Turkey and Bulgaria and asked the Ambassador whether he was prepared to advise him as to the nature of these discussions. The Ambassador replied that he had been instructed by his Government to tell Molotov that the Turkish Government had advised the Bulgarian Government through its Minister in Sofia that Turkey had deemed it in its interest to associate itself "with the countries that control the oceans" whereas Bulgaria apparently deemed it in its interest to associate itself with the country "that constituted the greatest menace to it" but that as both countries were opposed to the entry of any new power into the Balkans there was no reason why they should not cooperate in an endeavor to maintain the status quo in the areas which concerned them both. The Ambassador then informed Molotov that while no results had been achieved up to the present time the conversations between the Turkish and Bulgarian Governments had continued along the above lines and that the Turkish Minister in Sofia had returned to Ankara for consultation.
-3- GMW 47, January 10, 9 p.m. from Moscow consultation.

(END SECTION ONE).

STEINHARDT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (80)

FROM Moscow

Dated January 10, 1941

Rec'd 3 a.m., 11th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

49, January 10, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

In so far as concerns the present general situation in the Near East the Ambassador expressed the opinion to me that Turkey would not enter Thrace to protect Greece against German penetration but on the other hand would vigorously defend its own frontiers against a German attack without running the risk of weakening its own prepared defense lines and lend all possible assistance other than troops to Greece. He also expressed the opinion that in the event of a German penetration of Thrace the Soviet Union would not attack Turkey as long as there was a possibility that Britain might win the war but that at the first sign that Britain was losing the war the Soviets would "fall on" Turkey. The Ambassador concluded his observations with the statement that the firm and determined position which his Government had taken and maintained vis a vis the Soviet Union had resulted in a decided improvement in their relations.

(END MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT

GW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (30)

MOSCOW

Dated February 19, 1941
Rec'd 7:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

311, February 19, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I inquired of Vyshinski last evening as to his views concerning the situation in the Far East. He would not discuss the Soviet–Japanese negotiations but expressed the opinion that the Japanese mediation in the Thailand–French Indochina conflict was a sign of weakness. He also expressed the opinion that Japanese economic and financial conditions are steadily deteriorating and said that he does not expect the outbreak of further hostilities in the Pacific in the near future.

STEINHARDT

LMS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one.  (SC)

From

Dated February 26, 1941
Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

379, February 26, 10 p.m.

Minister told me this afternoon that reports have reached his Government allegedly from high German military authorities to the effect that if the contemplated German submarine campaign in March and April should not achieve the desired results in weakening British resistance, a press campaign against the Soviet Union would be initiated by Germany as a prelude to a military offensive against the Soviet Union. The German military authorities alluded to appear to believe that a war between Germany and the Soviet Union would be so popular in all capitalist countries, including Great Britain that a satisfactory peace between Germany and Great Britain could be brought about.

I am of course unable to gauge the value to be attached to this information but feel it to be worth reporting to the Department.

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM MOSCOW
Dated March 7, 1941
Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

449, March 7, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The British Ambassador who has just returned from his meeting with Eden at Ankara told me last night:

One. That Eden had received satisfactory assurances from the Turkish Government that Turkey would fight if the Germans endeavored to cross its frontier. He added, however, that Eden had expressed the opinion that the Turkish equipment is in a "miserable condition" and was disposed to place the principle blame on the supplies received from France which he said are in large part worthless.

Two. That British intend insofar as possible to assist Greece against a German attack and while they do not expect to be able to hold Salonika, they believe they can hold a good part of the rest of Greece. If possible they intend to put enough British forces in Greece to constitute a major front.

Three. The Germans have recently succeeded in sowing a considerable
a considerable number of magnetic mines in the Suez Canal and putting it out of use. As there is no equipment available for immunizing these mines it is not known how long the Canal will be closed. He said the principal embarrassment resulting from the closing of the Canal at the present time is the inability to move supplies intended for the probable campaign in Greece.

Four. The Germans have succeeded in making the passage between Sicily and Bizerte extremely dangerous for both merchant ships under convoy and naval vessels.

Five. With respect to rumors concerning the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union, Cripps stated that there are many individuals in high office, both military and civil in Germany, who favor such an attack but that as Hitler is obsessed with the idea of not waging a war on two fronts, unless this obsession were overcome he would not make such an attack. He thought, however, that Hitler might eventually be argued into it on the grounds that there is no western front and that if he made the attack while England was still in a relatively weak position he could reduce the Soviet Union before England became strong enough to constitute "another front" or the Soviet Union became strong enough to offer dangerous resistance. He also expressed the opinion that an attack by Germany on the Soviet
the Soviet Union would be "viewed with favor in England and particularly in the United States" and that in consequence a basis for peace might be found after such an attack should Hitler offer to relinquish the entire west provided he were left undisturbed in the east. When I asked Cripps if he thought any such proposal would appeal to an individual of Churchill's temperament, he replied that it was quite possible and that he was by no means certain that a basis for peace could not be found were Germany to attack the Soviet Union.

STEINHARDT

PEG
Secretary of State,
Washington.

449, March 7, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Six. Cripps expressed continued concern at shipments from the Western Hemisphere, not only direct to Vladivostok, but also to Japan, saying that there is a cumulative evidence that many of the shipments to Japan are finding their way into Germany over the trans-Siberian railroad.

Seven. The conversation having turned to the subject of British shipping losses, I asked Cripps to what extent the British published figures could be accepted in the face of German claims. He said that he had no reason to believe that the published figures of actual total losses are not reasonably accurate, but that there had been a tremendous amount of damage, and that there are at all times many ships waiting for repairs or in need of them. He also emphasized the great loss in potential tonnage by having to go around the Cape.

Eight. Dill told the Ambassador that there is no evidence of any diminution of the intensity with which
The Germans are preparing for an invasion of England, and he expects the attempt to be made. He is seriously concerned about German ninety-ton tanks, of which he understands they intend to employ about fourteen hundred. These are to be carried on separate boats so constructed that the tanks can be run ashore at once.

Nine. He stated that with respect to airplanes, the British position is considerably improved. They are fairly well satisfied insofar as pursuit planes are concerned, but are still suffering from a shortage of bombers and long distance planes of every type. Dill expects any German aerial attack preceding an invasion to start with six thousand planes, to be followed by another six thousand—the planes to be rotated in the hope of being able to wear down the British air force within a few days. He told Cripps that the ability of the Germans to carry out this plan would depend on the ratio of losses.

Ten. I judged from Cripps' remarks that both Eden and Dill are seriously concerned about the next six months, and that they regard the British position as critical.

End Message.

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM

Moscow

Dated March 11, 1941

Received 11:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

493, March 11, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In the course of a conversation with the German Ambassador last night, he said that he had heard the rumors current in Moscow that Germany contemplated an attack on the Soviet Union and that he could categorically state that there was "absolutely nothing to them."

The Rumanian Minister later told me that after a long talk with the British Ambassador yesterday, he had come to the conclusion that the rumors of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union were of British origin and that they resulted from "a stubborn continuation of the policy of wishful thinking which has misguided the destinies of Britain for the past five years."

(END OF MESSAGE).

STEINHARDT

MARCH 21, 1941
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM

Dated March 17, 1941

Rec’d 1:45 p.m.

MOSCOW

Secretary of State,
Washington.

521, March 17, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

During the past two weeks occasional reports have reached the Embassy of speeches made by Party officials at factory meetings in Moscow in which the speakers have alluded to the possibility of a conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany. Of perhaps greater significance is an alleged statement by "a Party official" at a meeting a few days ago implying that Germany is attempting to get control of the Dardanelles and that this would not be permitted. He is said to have declared that Germany is maintaining an army of one million men on the Soviet Union’s western frontier and to have warned his audience that the Soviet Union must be ready for any aggression.

All competent observers in Moscow remain convinced that the Soviet Union will not consider attacking a strong Germany and to the extent to which statements of
-2- 521, March 17, 5 p.m., from Moscow

the above character may be intended to prepare the population for eventualities they may be taken to indicate fear of a German attack. I do not believe, however, that they constitute in themselves any indication that such attack is believed to be imminent.

STEINHARDT

HTM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Bo)

MOSCOW

Dated March 24, 1941
Rec'd 6:30 a.m., 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

583, March 24, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In connection with the rumors of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union (Department's 240 of March 1, 11 a.m.) the Swedish Minister has given me the following information on the purported German plan as reported to Stockholm by his colleague in Berlin. This report stated that having virtually abandoned the plan to invade England, the Germans have decided to confront the Soviet Union—probably in May—with the alternative of taking of such parts of Finland and of Iran as it desires, joining the tripartite pact and going into a full alliance with the axis powers or of being subjected to a "blitzkrieg" by Germany. The reason for this decision is said by this source to be the German conviction that the United States will soon enter the war and that a long struggle will ensue, that Soviet
Soviet deliveries to Germany are uncertain; that the Soviet Union is becoming stronger from month to month and that under these circumstances it may become necessary, or at any rate expedient, for Germany to seize the main productive areas of the Soviet Union. In the event of the refusal by the Soviet Government of the German terms, the German plan is said to envisage the continuance of aerial and submarine attacks against England while a "blitzkrieg" is conducted against the Soviet Union. Three groups are to be employed according to this source; the first to operate from Königsberg under Von Runstedt; the second, from Warsaw under Von Bock; and the third, from Krakow under Liszt. All of the details of this campaign are said to have been already perfected and German troops in large numbers are said to have been moving at night towards the Soviet-German frontier. The same source states that these troop movements have been confirmed during the past week or ten days by Swedish engineers whose headquarters are in Warsaw.

STEINHARDT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM

Moscow

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

667, April 3, 5 p.m.

STRICLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In the course of conversation last night with Sobolev, the Secretary General of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who was more communicative than usual, he expressed the view that the situation in the Balkans had reached a crisis and that "something would happen within the next few days". He remarked that the Yugoslavs were good fighters and that he expected them to defend themselves unless internal dissension prevented an organized defence.

When I remarked that I assumed he had heard the rumors of a possible German attack on the Soviet Union, he replied that not only would such an attack be "madness" but that he could not conceive of any reason therefor as "this was no time" for the Germans to create a second front. When I replied that the German attack on Stevenga, Bergen, and Narvik could have been considered "madness"
EH-2-667, April 3, 5 p.m. from Moscow.

"madness" and that there was no "front" in western Europe he remarked that he still could find no "adequate reason" for a German attack on the Soviet Union particularly with "conditions as they are in the Balkans".

STEINHARDT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated April 7, 1941
Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

704, April 7, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

It has been reported to the Embassy, based on first hand information, that quiet recruiting is now progressing in Moscow and that engineering students have also been mobilized quietly and dispatched to the German frontier for the purpose of erecting defense works there.

STEINHARDT

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

MOSCOW
Dated April 7, 1941
Rec'd 9:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

703, April 7, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 698, April 6, 9 p.m.

The Yugoslav Minister told me this afternoon that he saw Molotov again last night and that insofar as concerns the delivery of material by the Soviet Union he had asked particularly for anti-tank guns and aircraft. He emphasized the fact that there would be considerable delay in such deliveries as the Soviet Union might agree to make and that there are serious transport problems. He said that Stalin was not present at this interview.

He told me also that he had again brought up the subject of a possible attack by Germany on the Soviet Union and that Molotov had observed "we are ready".

STEINHARDT

NK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM MOSCOW

Dated April 11, 1941

Rec'd 9:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

744, April 11, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

Ly 738, April 11, 5 p.m.

In the course of my conversation with Matsuoka this afternoon I casually (*) to the receipt by him of a "message from the British Government" having reference of course to the message sent by Churchill to Matsuoka through Cripps reported in Tokyo's 534, April 10, 10 p.m. Matsuoka obviously knew nothing of this message and assuming that I had reference to British comment regarding an alleged offer on his part to mediate in the European war gave me the following explanation of that incident:

He said that some time ago in the course of a conversation between the Japanese Ambassador in London and Eden the latter had questioned the motives of Matsuoka in acting as mediator between Thailand and French Indochina.

Matsuoka
-3-  744, April 11, 9 p.m. (SEC ONE) from Moscow

Hatsuoka regarded this as reprehensible where a "friendly power" was concerned but in view of his friendship for Eden he had decided to ignore the questioning of Japan's motives and merely (*) to send him a memorandum explaining his reasons for acting as mediator.

STEINHARDT

ELB

(*) Apparent omissions
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

744, April 11, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

At the end of the memorandum he had appended as a separate paragraph his "ideas on world peace" including a general statement that Japan was prepared to mediate at any time anywhere in the world. His one reason for including this thought, he said, was the attack on his motives in mediating in the Thailand dispute. On the receipt of the memorandum in London Eden was absent and the Japanese Ambassador had given a synopsis of the memorandum to Butler. A copy of the memorandum was given to Craigie in Tokyo who was told that the paragraph dealing with peace had nothing to do with the war in Europe and it had not been inspired by Germany. Matsuoka said that Craigie had told him that he understood this thoroughly as he had been aware of Matsuoka's views on world peace for over two years.

Matsuoka said that in view of the foregoing he was amazed one morning to see published in the Japanese newspapers only that part of the memorandum which dealt with his views on world peace.

CSB

STEINHARDT
This telegram closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated April 11, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 11:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

744, April 11, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

He said that he had been "furious" and on investigation had learned that this particular paragraph had been taken out of the text by a subordinate official of the Japanese Foreign Office attached to the Cabinet and given by him to the press without the knowledge of the Foreign Office. He said the German Government of course had been embarrassed by the publicity and that the British Government had thereupon done something which he characterized as "beneath Britiherers" by seizing upon the publication of this paragraph in the Japanese press to create the impression throughout the world that Germany was seeking peace.

He expressed the view that the alarmist reports emanating from London and echoes in Australia at the time were designated to induce the President and Mr. Hull to "take action against Japan". He added that Japan had not at any time nor has it now the slightest hostile intentions against Singapore or the Dutch East Indies.

Repeated to Tokyo. (END OF MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT

RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Moscow

Dated April 12, 1941

Rec'd 9:24 a.m., 13th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

756, April 12, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Although a few political observers in 1939 foresaw the German-Soviet alignment, their somewhat hesitant predictions attracted little attention with the result that the actual event came to the general public at least as a distinct shock. In consequence of the unpreparedness of most observers for such a reversal of the ostensible policy of both Germany and the Soviet Union, the alignment has been regarded during the past eighteen months as an expedient which not only would not endure but which, inevitably, would terminate in actual hostilities between the two parties. As a result the various moves of each party to the alignment since August 1939 have been repeatedly construed to indicate an impending rupture. This misinterpretation was especially noticeable in connection with the Soviet absorption of the Baltic states. The German infiltration into Romania and
E-2-756, April 12, 7 p.m. from Moscow.

and the Soviet seizure of Bessarabia. I have, however, steadfastly adhered to my conception of the basic fact underlying Soviet-German relations, which is that their alignment up to the present time has, as repeatedly asserted by both parties, responded to their major real interests and that consequently despite occasional strain the relationship would prevail until such time as either the Soviet Union no longer had occasion to fear the immediate military might of Germany or Germany might consider it advantageous to direct its activities away from western Europe and toward the east or until one party took action clearly inimical to the vital interests of the other. I am now of the opinion that the long anticipated change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Germany is in process of taking place, although this fact need not by any means be interpreted to mean that an immediate clash between the two countries must occur. The first clear indication I believe to have been the statement by the Soviet Foreign Office following the capitulation of Bulgaria (see Embassy's 428, March 4, 1 p.m.); the second and more pointed indication was exchange of notes between the Soviet and Turkish governments (see Embassy's 588, March 25, 4 p.m.) and most
CH-3-756, April 12, 7 p.m. from Moscow.

Recent and most striking the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of friendship and non-aggression concluded by the Soviet Government in the face of unmistakable preparations by the German Government for the military occupation of Yugoslavia, and in fact, a few hours before that event.

STEINHARDT

PEG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington
Dated April 12, 1941
Rec'd 9:26 a.m., 13th

SECRETARY OF STATE
Dated 11:34:34, 12:25 p.m.
127, April 12, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND UNDER SECRETARY.

The British Ambassador told me this afternoon that he has been endeavoring for several days through the Japanese Embassy to obtain an appointment to see Matsuoka for the purpose of delivering Churchill's 740. 00. 11 En War 439/9900 message to him (see my 744, April 11, 9 p.m.) but that although he had spoken personally with Embassy with rank of Minister, he has not been able to obtain an appointment. When I explained that the purpose of my invitation to him to attend the theater (see my 754, April 12, 5 p.m.) was to bring about a meeting between Matsuoka and himself he said that he would take Churchill's message with him and hand it to Matsuoka during one of the intermissions. He remarked in this connection that he had decided that should the Japanese Embassy continue its refusal to arrange an appointment for him with Matsuoka he would not
not attempt to deliver Churchill's message in any other manner and commented that the present arrangement of course overcame the difficulty. He gave no evidence that he realized that his refusal to enter into relations with the Japanese Ambassador since his arrival in Moscow had been the cause of his failure to obtain an interview with Matsuoka.

The Ambassador informed me that he received a telegram from Eden this morning stating that King George of Greece had informed him that Prince Paul of Yugoslavia recently stated to the King that Hitler had told him that he must eventually attack the Soviet Union "to insure Germany's sources of supply" but that he would choose his own time.

The Ambassador also told me that in the course of a conversation between Eden and Saracoglu, Eden advised the Turkish Foreign Minister that Britain was not in a position at present to furnish adequate war material to both Greece and Turkey and felt that its first obligation was to Greece. In consequence and recognizing the inadequacy of Turkish armaments, Britain would not expect Turkey to come to the assistance of Greece but merely to maintain a defensive position for the time being. Thus the failure of
Turkey to take offensive action at the time of the German attack on Greece was explained - having British consent. He added that the present British line of defense from Lake Ohrida to the Aegean south of Salonika had been agreed upon in the light of the foregoing.

Cripps further stated that he sent a note to Vyshinski yesterday which constituted a review of Soviet errors of policy during the past eighteen months and concluded with the admonition that a joint Soviet Turkish demand upon Germany that it vacate the Balkans might be the last opportunity for the Soviet Government (and Turkey) to avoid an attack by Germany. In this connection he said he had learned from what he described as "a reliable source" that Germany has evacuated the civilian population from Konigsberg and moved eight divisions to the Moldavian frontier obviously intended as a threat to Odessa.

STEINHARDT

WWC
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

776, April 16, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL,

I have learned from a confidential source that the Slovak Minister reported to his Government the substance of a conversation between Sakamoto, Director of the European Department of the Japanese Foreign Office, and himself during the former's stay in Moscow to the following effect:

Sakamoto stated that neither the United States nor Japan wanted war and that he did not anticipate war between the two countries. He said that in Japan the United States was not regarded as an enemy country and that the shipment of munitions by the United States to Britain was not a matter of concern to Japan, which had no intention of endeavoring to interfere with such shipments. He said that in the event the United States entered the European war Japan might be obliged to join the war on the side of the Axis but that he was convinced that there would be no
no necessity for the United States to enter the war for a long time to come. He said that Japan was "disinterested" in European affairs and that its sole interest lay in the Far East and that Japan did not wish to be drawn into the European war and that a war between the Soviet Union and Germany would be regarded by Japan as a European affair.

He said he believed Germany "wished to and was capable of destroying the Soviet Empire" and he believed that Germany would be successful in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. He then expressed the opinion that if the Balkan campaign did not prove too long or exhausting to the Germans they would attack the Soviet Union as soon as the campaign was over but that if the Balkan campaign proved exhausting Germany would first rest its armies and reorganize before attacking the Soviet Union. He also said that he was under the impression that the Russians are well informed about Germany's designs and that he did not consider it out of the question that the Soviet Union might precipitate the crisis by attacking Germany while the Balkan campaign was still in progress if real and determined resistance was shown by the Yugoslavs, Greeks and British. He said in such event he anticipated that while Russia and Great Britain would be on the same side of the war the Soviet Union would not necessarily
-3- 776, April 18, noon, from Moscow

necessarily fight as an ally of Great Britain but inde-

pendently and that in any event "Japan would definitely

stand aside".

Repeated to Tokyo.

STEINHARDT

HTM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Moscow

Date: April 30, 1941
Received: 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

866, April 30, 6 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

Strictly Confidential.

Gaston Berger-Gery, the new French Ambassador, called on me yesterday evening. He struck me as a ruthless opportunist of a type comparable to the carpet baggers of our past civil war. He professed ardently to desire "immediate collaboration between France and Germany in order to bring an end to the ceaseless strife in which the two countries have been engaged since the Treaty of Westphalia". I inquired whether the collaboration he had in mind would not be more opportune after the war and whether France's former ally, Britain, would not be embarrassed by collaboration at the present time. He replied that France would, of course, gain a British victory but could insure her position in the event of a German victory by collaborating with Germany now. He said that while he was not anti-British he bitterly resented Britain's having dragged France into the war and after
EH -2- 888, April 30, 6 p.m. from Moscow.

After eight months of war having been neither willing nor able to send more than a handful of troops to the continent when the German attack came. He called it Britain's historic policy to have other countries do her fighting for her.

He said that Petain was preparing and would shortly make a declaration announcing "collaboration" between France and Germany. After some questioning as to the nature of the declaration he said that it would include a statement that it was not directed against Britain and that it would be more in the nature of a declaration of a policy than an announcement of any definite steps agreed upon. When I inquired as to whether such a declaration at this time might not encourage Hitler to send troops through France into Spain he replied "what difference does it make. He could not stop them anyway". The Ambassador remarked that the French were being very well treated by the Germans and that the German forces of occupation were conducting themselves in a correct and even admirable manner.

STEINHARDT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

FROM
Dated April 30, 1941
Rec'd 9:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

888, April 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION T.O).
I then questioned the Ambassador as to Hit-ain's position with regard to the fleet and colonies. He was evasive about the fleet. As to the colonies he flatly denied that there had been any German infiltration and insisted that the colonies would remain "strictly neutral".

I inferred from disconnected statements made by the Ambassador in the course of our conversation that he had received the impression in Berlin that the Germans were contemplating an early entry into Spain but that if this should not prove feasible an attack might be made upon the Soviet Union. He said that plans in Berlin were far advanced to set up a new government in Russia consisting of emigrants some of whom had already been selected for their future posts (in this connection it is worth noting that Germany has been most active in bringing large numbers of important military and political leaders from the Baltic states to Germany and has in several cases virtually removed)
EN 2- 898, April 30, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

forced the Soviet Government to permit their departure.

The Ambassador said he was convinced that Germany was able to reorganize Europe, Africa, the Ukraine and the Caucasus both politically and economically and he expressed the firm belief that Germany would succeed in doing so.

(END OF MESSAGE.)

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MOSCOW

Dated May 2, 1941
Receiv'd 3:06 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

696, May 2, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 696, April 30, 4 p.m. von Schuleenburg returned to Moscow in von Ribbentrop's private plane, which instead of returning to Berlin immediately, has been held here. This may mean that von Schuleenburg expects to return at once to Berlin or that the plane is to be placed at the disposal of Dekanogor who told me yesterday that he plans to return to Berlin in the near future.

It is not yet known here whether von Schuleenburg has in fact brought back to Moscow any special instructions to discuss German-Soviet relations although it is generally assumed that this is the fact. Should conversations on this subject be under way I have no doubt that the Soviet Government will go to very great lengths to avoid an attack by Germany and that it is sufficiently crafty and unscrupulous to obtain a high price for complying with any demands which Germany may make--thereby both avoiding a clash and gaining compensation therefor.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

FROM

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated May 5, 1941
Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

907, May 5, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I have learned from a reliable source that Stalin recently made the statement to a Soviet official that he did not expect an attack by or war with Germany this year and that he anticipated "satisfactory" negotiations with Germany.

STEINHARDT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS
This telegram must be
el sey paraphrased be-
From
Tore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

MOSEOM
Dated May 7, 1941
Rec'd 12:45 a.m., 6th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

929, May 7, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
The German Ambassador last night told me:

One. That in the course of his recent visit to
Germany he had had a lengthy conference with Von
Ribbentrop in Vienna. The Ambassador described Von
Ribbentrop as the most anti-British of all the high
German Government officials and in this connection re-
marked that Hitler was not anti-British. He said that
in the course of the conversation he had emphasized the
importance of coming to an understanding with Britain and
had urged upon Von Ribbentrop that a sweeping peace
proposal be made through the King of Sweden as intermediary.
He said that for the first time in his many talks with
Von Ribbentrop the latter had listened to him soberly
and had not indulged in an outburst against the British
and that while he did not think anything would come of
his suggestion he had been impressed by Von Ribbentrop's
willingness to hear him out on the subject.

Two.
Two. Although there are influential individuals in Berlin who have been and still are endeavoring to influence Hitler to launch a sudden attack against the Soviet Union the Ambassador said he had argued strongly against any such course on the grounds that it might well be disastrous to the German cause. He said that during his stay in Berlin and in the course of his talk with Von Ribbentrop he had repeatedly emphasized that Germany had more to lose than to gain by attacking the Soviet Union. He expressed the opinion that there would be no such attack this year.

Three. He said that the German Government "was on the verge" of an agreement with France. He outlined to me the German desiderata from France as the basis for what he described as a permanent peace and friendship but did not make clear to me whether the agreement to which he referred was to incorporate these terms or was of a temporary nature calling for collaboration with an understanding that the general terms outlined below would be the final peace terms. He said that as Alsace Lorraine was German Germany could not be accused of what he termed "another Versailles" if it insisted on the return of these two provinces to Germany that the only other territorial concession which Germany desired from France on the continent was...
was the Erz Dy iron district. Insofar as concerns colonies Germany seeks the Cameroons and perhaps a part or all of Tunisia and the Belgian Congo from Belgium. The Ambassador stated that subject to the territorial concessions outlined above he is of the opinion that no attempt would be made to disturb the balance of the French Empire. He added, however, that "something would have to be done" about the Channel ports so as to put an end to what he described as "recurring British attempts to dictate the affairs of the continent from London".

Insofar as concerns Italian claims against France the Ambassador disposed of them with the remark that Italy "was not entitled to much" and that some "unimportant" concession would have to be acceptable to the Italians. He spoke of the Italian participation in the war with the utmost contempt. He concluded that insofar as concerned Britain Germany desired nothing from the British Empire and was prepared to make peace with Britain at any time provided the British "would stop interfering with Germany and attempting to dominate the continent."

Four. The Ambassador indicated that Nazi Party officials and the Gestapo were in some respects out of control and that many high officials in Berlin were displeased and disturbed by their conduct. He cited the behavior
behavior of the Nazi Party organization in Norway as an example remarking that Quisling "has no following in Norway" and stressed the difference in the various occupied countries as between the behavior of the German military authorities where they are in control and the Nazi Party officials where they dominate.

It was apparent from the Ambassador's expressions that he was seriously concerned with the interference of Nazi Party officials and the Gestapo in the internal affairs of at least some of the occupied countries. He looks upon this with disfavor and implied that some of the high officials in Berlin felt as he did but were in a quandary as to how to deal with the matter.

Pove. The Ambassador indicated that such conversations as are now taking place between the Soviet and German Governments did not as yet deal with "important" matters.

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased and communicated to W/2, 9/26.

FROM MOSCOW
Dated May 17, 1941
Rec'd 7:48 p.m.

SIR,

Secretary of State,

Washington,

987, W 17, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In discussing the flight of Hess with the German Ambassador last night, he expressed the opinion that overwork had brought about a nervous breakdown which had taken the form of an irresistible impulse in Hess to bring about peace. The Ambassador was not, however, disposed to question Hess' sanity. He stated categorically that Hess had departed without Hitler's knowledge and that his wife had no inkling of his intentions.

He regards Hess' removal from the scene in Berlin as "the most unfortunate" in that he was the most moderate of the men close to Hitler and said that it was difficult to predict whether Hess' disappearance would cause Hitler to embark suddenly on further ventures or would have a sobering influence. He added that recently "no one" appeared to have had any influence with Hitler.
-2- #987, May 17, noon from Moscow.

not even Ribbentrop and that Hitler now shunned advice more and from any source and that even the highest
German military authorities no longer appeared to exercise
any influence or control and predicted "important de-
velopments" within the next month.

In so far as concerns present Soviet-German
relations Von Schulenburg described them as "eminently
satisfactory" adding that the Soviet Government had
been "most cooperative" since the German occupation
of Yugoslavia and Greece and that all of his "requests"
were being complied with.

STEINHARDT

WWC
From Moscow

Dated May 17, 1941

Rec'd 7:45 p.m.

Division of European Affairs

MAY 19 1941

Department of State

Strictly Confidential,

The Japanese Ambassador told me last night that in the course of a conversation with Molotov two days ago Molotov had said that the rumors of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union were the result of "British and American propaganda" and were entirely without foundation. Molotov had added that in fact Soviet-German relations were "excellent".

I asked the Ambassador whether it was a fact that the Soviet Government was cooperating with Germany by increasing shipments from the Orient over the Trans-Siberian railway to which he replied "Germany now has 140 fully trained and equipped divisions on the Soviet frontier, the Soviets have 110, of which only 34 are fully trained and equipped. I think the cooperation will steadily increase". He confirmed the fact that shipments to Germany over the Trans-Siberian have been steadily increasing but was unable to give
May 17, 6 p.m. from Moscow

give me the percentage of increase during the past few weeks.

Insofar as concerns Soviet Japanese relations the Ambassador said that the Soviets had been "behaving somewhat better" since the signature of the neutrality pact but that the conclusion of a trade agreement had been delayed by a renewed demand for rubber by the Soviets at the last moment. He remarked that the Soviet Government had abandoned its request for tin as he believed they had located a source of supply but were most insistent upon the Japanese delivering rubber. He said that no progress had as yet been made towards a fisheries convention.

STEINHARDT

CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (sc)

Dated May 27, 1941
Rec'd 7:20 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington,

1051, May 27, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Japanese Ambassador told me this morning that his negotiations with the Soviet authorities looking towards a trade agreement and a permanent fisheries convention continue to be "deadlocked". He said that in addition to their repeated demands for rubber, the Soviet authorities now insist that Japan make substantial purchases in North and South America for Soviet account, pointing out that the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere would more likely hesitate to refuse sales to Japan than to the Soviet Union. He added that the Soviet demands particularly in respect of rubber, tin, and copper were so excessive that up to the present his government could not see its way clear to meet them.

He also said that the conferences to fix the permanent boundary between Manchukuo and outer Mongolia were nearly finished and that conversations will shortly begin to fix the
EH -2- 1051, May 27, 6 p.m. from Moscow.

the permanent border between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union particularly with respect to the question of the ownership of certain islands in the Amur River which has long been a source of conflict between the two governments.

With respect to Soviet-Japanese relations in general, he said there had been no marked improvement in these relations since the pact of neutrality with the possible exception of a more reasonable attitude by the Soviets in connection with the demarcation of frontiers.

The Ambassador said that based on his general observations and talks with Axis diplomats and members of the Soviet Government, he does not anticipate a German attack on the Soviet Union this summer although he is aware of the fact that his colleague in Berlin does not share this view and that preparations have been made by the Germans to carry out such an attack and by the Soviets to resist it. Speaking as an army officer, he gave it as his opinion that the Soviet Army is not capable of any real resistance to Germany and that the conquest of such areas in the western part of the Soviet Union as Germany might undertake would be a comparatively simple matter although
EH -3- 1051, May 27, 6 p.m., from Moscow.

although he expressed some doubt as to the ability of the Germans to translate any such conquest into economic or other advantages greater than those now flowing from Soviet cooperation.

Tatekawa likewise stated that he understood that the British are about to take steps to interfere with Japanese whaling operations in order to prevent the continued shipment of whale oil to Germany over the Trans-Siberian.

Repeated to Tokyo.

STEINHARDT

LMS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased FROM fort being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated June 12, 1941
Rec'd Noon

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1127, June 12, 11 a.m., (SECTION ONE.)

strictly confidential.
Department's 776, June 9, 9 p.m.

It is my understanding that the disposition of German armed forces from the Baltic to the Black Sea for quite some time has been of such a nature and in such force as to permit of an armed invasion of the Soviet Union at any time along the entire front and that Soviet troops have been disposed in the manner best calculated to resist such invasion. This circumstance combined with the fact that the present is the most favorable time of year for an attack upon this country would be sufficient to give rise to almost any kind of rumor. Moreover, it is evident that such rumors in themselves constitute a form of pressure which Germany has in the past employed with pronounced success. I have for over two months reported similar rumors on virtually all of the points mentioned in the Department's telegram.

STEINHARDT

GW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Moscow
Dated June 12, 1941
Rec'd 2:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1127, June 12, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

I have, however, no information which would indicate that an ultimatum has been delivered to the Soviet Government, and I may point out that the terms of the alleged ultimatum reported from Bucharest and Stockholm would be of such a nature as virtually to compel a rejection. In my opinion Germany would be more likely to present an ultimatum capable of acceptance or to attack without warning. The list of alleged demands appear to me to be a list of German desiderata rather than an ultimatum.

It is true that haphazard measures are being taken in Moscow to meet the possibility of an attack, such as the destruction of wooden sheds, et cetera, which would be likely to spread fires in the event of a bombing attack. On the other hand no specially constructed bomb shelters have been prepared and no antiaircraft precautions are in evidence. Drills against parachutists are being held which, from my observation of one of them, would
would probably be wholly ineffective. Stalin's assumption of the post of Prime Minister and the restrictions recently placed upon movements of foreign diplomats may be construed as a part of these general preparations. The foregoing, however, are in my opinion merely steps in a development which has been going on for some months and are called for by the general international situation, apart from any immediate menace.

On the other hand I was informed today in strictest confidence by the Rumanian Minister that Schullenburg told him yesterday that he had received no instructions and has carried on no negotiations since his return from Germany at the end of April and that he has received no information of any negotiations going on in Berlin. Schullenburg stated moreover that he doubted any negotiations were in fact taking place. According to Gafencu the German Ambassador was inclined to the opinion that in view of his past efforts to promote peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and his firm opposition to a German attack upon this country, his present "isolation" indicated a German intention to attack.

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated June 12, 1941

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

1127, June 12, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

He even went so far as to discuss how he might be able to get out of Moscow in the event of war. Gafencu also told me that two days ago the Italian Ambassador had expressed the opinion that Germany was contemplating an attack upon the Soviet Union but that he did not believe Italy would take part in it or would even declare war and cited the example of Germany's attitude toward Greece during the early stages of the Italo-Greek war. In evaluating these most recent remarks of the German and Italian Ambassadors it should be borne in mind that both are well aware of the fact that Gafencu continues to maintain close personal relations with the British Ambassador and myself.

As I have previously informed the Department I am convinced that in order to avoid war at this time Stalin is prepared to make almost any concessions provided they do not impair the ability of the Soviet Union to defend itself. He might even make promises which
-2-, #1127, from Moscow, June 12, 1941; 1:40 p.m. would have the latter effect if carried out but I believe would fight now rather than agree to terms which would make it impossible to resist later. Just where he would draw the line of possible concessions it is difficult to say.

STEINHARDT

GW
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) FROM MOSCOW Dated June 19, 1941 Rec'd 1:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1127, June 12, 11 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

While it is remotely conceivable that the restoration of Finnish territory, Bessarabia and Bukovina and the Baltic States could be hung from him it seems clear that Stalin could not yield control of the Ukraine and at the same time maintain the independence of the Soviet Union.

If the foregoing estimate of the Soviet position is correct Hitler will have to decide in the light of his major war strategy whether an attack upon the Soviet Union would be worth the risk.

In favor of an attack is the fact that whether Germany wins or loses the war with Britain it would be to her advantage to have disposed of the Soviet menace. In the event of victory over Britain the other occupied countries would be fertile fields for communism and Germany would either have to maintain a considerable number of troops under arms to offset the communist menace or ask her war weary people to forego the fruits
of victory until yet another campaign against the Soviet Union was fought. If the Soviet Union were crushed and the Ukraine in German hands, Germany in the event of a negotiated peace would be in a position to make substantial

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SD)

FROM MOSCOW

Dated June 12, 1941
Rec'd 7:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1127, June 12, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)
concessions in the west and even agree to disarm. As to the effectiveness of Soviet resistance opinions here differ with many unbiased observers believing that military resistance could be crushed within a few weeks. It is generally conceded, however, that as time passes Soviet strength will increase relative to that of Germany. Large numbers of German troops must in any event be left on the Soviet frontier and Germany may well decide to use them while conditions for an attack are favorable. Opinion here also differs as to the time it would take Germany to reorganize production in the Ukraine after an invasion. In time Germany could no doubt increase the wheat production considerably. Similarly the Baku oil production and deliveries to Germany could in time be increased if Baku and the transportation system were under German control.

Finally, Germany must consider that if her relative strength
-2- #1127, June 12, 11 a.m. from Moscow. (SECTION FIVE)

A strength should ever decline to the point where the Soviet Union need no longer fear attack the delivery of Soviet products would either cease or they would have to be purchased at exorbitant prices.

Against an attack is the argument that even if successful it would not win the war against Britain for Germany.

It would probably preclude or postpone an attempt to invade England, might encourage the British to reduce their forces and increase their armies on other fronts but in any event would diminish German aerial operations against Britain.

STEINHARDET

Gv
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM MOSCOW

Dated June 12, 1941

Rec'd 7:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1127, June 12, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

Some of my colleagues believe that a successful invasion of the Soviet Union would require over three months and that the cost of the campaign in men, materials and in particular, in airplanes, would be considerable. In the meantime deliveries from the Soviet Union would cease and so much of the current crop would be lost that little food would be obtained this year. Soviet deliveries are now appreciable and if Germany refrains from attack they will probably increase—at least for some time to come. So far as concerns grain, Germany would be in a far worse position next winter for having attacked, and it is probable that the invasion would not be productive before the harvest of 1942 at the earliest.

In view of the secrecy which shrouds the present relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and the fact that the vital decision involving peace or war rests in each country in the inner recesses of the mind
mind of an individual, it is obviously impossible to do more than draw inferences or conclusion from meager indications of trends or developments as little factual evidence is available here. Nor can official confirmation ever be obtained in respect of such apparently credible information as does come into my possession. The most that I can assert with reasonable confidence is that no hostile initiative will be taken by Stalin who on the contrary is undoubtedly prepared to satisfy any reasonable German demands.

STEINHARDT

JRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM MOSCOW

Dated June 12, 1941
Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1127, June 12, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

In consequence the decision of peace or war will be governed exclusively by considerations of German military, economic or political expediency which in turn will primarily be based upon the following considerations:

(A) The German estimate of the probable duration of the war.

(B) The feasibility of a successful invasion or blockade of Britain.

(C) The timeliness, extent and effectiveness of American assistance to Britain with or without active participation in the war.

(D) The ability of Germany to organize the "new order" in Europe with or without full Soviet cooperation.

(E) Germany's appraisal of its capacity to provide food and raw materials for itself as well as the countries encompassed in the "new order" without the certainty of Soviet supplies.

(F) The German appraisal of the position in the Near
-2- #1127, June 12, 11 a.m. from Moscow. (SECTION SEVEN)

and Middle East in the near future.

(3) The German appraisal of the possibility of a
conflict in the Pacific between Japan the United States
and Britain.

(END OF MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
MOSCOW

Dated June 20, 1941
Rec'd 11:10 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1183, June 20, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In the course of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador this morning he told me that he had called on Molotov a few days ago and had sought to draw him out on the subject of Soviet-German relations. Molotov had indicated that there was no reason for alarm and said that if there were any "differences" it was his function to smooth them out. The Ambassador gained the impression that while the Soviet Government perhaps anticipates demands from Germany it assumes they will be of such a nature that they cannot be met and that it is complacent about its ability to meet the situation. He added, however, that since yesterday he had been unable to share Molotov's sanguine outlook.

Insofar as concerns the Japanese position in the event of the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Germany the Ambassador said, "I do not think we will..."
-2- #1183, June 20, 7 p.m. from Moscow. (SECTION ONE)

will come in right away. We will probably wait to see what happens and if the outcome is what I think it will be we will pick up the pieces." He told me in the strictest confidence that the German Embassy has today started to make arrangements to evacuate 80 of its personnel and that he also had started today to evacuate as many of the members of his Embassy as possible. When he had made it clear to me that he expects a German attack on the Soviet Union I asked him whether he could "guess the date" to which he replied, "I think about the end of the month because I have just heard that the weather in Germany is still 'too wet' but that by the end of the month it should be 'dry enough.'" I then asked his opinion as to the duration of such a conflict to which he replied, "The Germans tell me that they have 35 mechanized divisions which they would employ and that they believe they can complete the operation in two months.

STEINHARDT

EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated June 20, 1941
Rec'd 11:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1138, June 20, 7 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

I believe they have selected the months of July and August". Tatekawa remarked that he anticipated "chaos" and perhaps even mob rule in Moscow adding that he thought the Government would probably "run away" without making any provision for the remaining diplomats and that he hoped the situation would not be too difficult for the diplomats between the time of the departure of the Soviet Government and the entry of the German army into Moscow. He said that he assumed the Germans would bomb the bridges on the Trans-Siberian Railway making this means of exit impassable. He expects all communication with the northwest and south would be cut off as soon as the war broke out and expressed grave doubt that telegraphic communications would be available to the diplomatic corps.

Speaking as a military man he expressed the opinion that the Red Army, which he said was anxious to fight Germany,
hsm -2- No. 1183, June 20, 7 p.m. from Moscow (Section 2)

Germany, might make a creditable showing for a brief period of time but that when the break came it would be largely a question of the Germans collecting hundreds of thousands of prisoners.

Towards the close of our discussion I asked the Ambassador whether in his opinion the tension which has been now built up to a peak might not be a pressure move or bluff designed to extract the maximum concessions from Stalin. He replied, "Of course, that is entirely possible and I have no definite information that a final decision has been made in Berlin to attack. But since yesterday I have had the distinct impression that Hitler has decided to liquidate Communism and that he intends to attack irrespective of any concessions that Stalin might be prepared to make and that after having liquidated Communism he may endeavor to negotiate peace with England."

Repeate to Tokyo.

(END OF MESSAGE)

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Moscow
Dated June 30, 1941

FROM
Rec'd. 1:59 p.m.

Division of
European Affairs
July 1941
Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington

1256, June 30, 4 p.m.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me this morning and stated that he had ascertained from the Soviet authorities that arrangements had now been concluded for the exchange of the German and Soviet Embassies on July 9 at the Turkish frontier and that the Italian Ambassador was being held at Kazan pending an exchange arrangement.

The Ambassador has received no intimation from Tokyo as to the immediate future of Soviet-Japanese relations but considers it not unlikely that under German pressure his Government may rupture diplomatic relations without entering the war at the present time. He expressed considerable annoyance at the unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to give him the slightest inkling of their intentions towards the "few remaining diplomats" in the event the Government should leave Moscow.

Repeated to Tokyo.

STEINHARDT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Moscow

Dated July 8, 1941

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY TO ONI AND MID

JUL 19 41

Secretary of State, U. LIAISON OFFICE

Washington, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1320, July 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

One. The Japanese Ambassador who called this morning described the present Japanese attitude toward the Soviet-German war as "wait and see" adding that Matsuoka was not only perturbed by but actually angry at the German attack on Russia as it had "disrupted all his plans". He said that were it not for the fear that the government would fall and "Matsuoka lose his job" there was sufficient feeling in Japanese circles to cause Matsuoka to propose Japan's withdrawal from the Axis. He pointed out that while Japan had considerable forces in Manchukuo they were only sufficient for defensive and not offensive purposes and that in his opinion the only development that could save Matsuoka's position was the disintegration of the Soviet Union from which Japan could profit without conducting a major war.

Two. The Ambassador said that while he was not informed as to the German plan of campaign he "suspected" that
-2- 1320, July 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

that it involved the greatest enveloping operation in all recorded history and that he expected the German army after cutting the Leningrad-Moscow line to continue eastward until a southerly course would bring it to the east bank of the Volga River.

STEINHARDT

BRK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated from Moscow to anyone. (br)

Dated July 8, 1941
Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1320, July 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He said there would, of course, be other military operations on a major scale south of Moscow and through the Ukraine towards the Caucasus, the purpose of which would be to hold the Russian forces in the southwesternly corner of the Soviet Union, the major strategy, however, being to prevent any Russian armies from crossing and escaping to the east of the Volga River. He said that in view of the importance of the Volga area the Germans would doubtless endeavor not only to reach the Volga from the West but to come down its East bank from the North.

Three, The Ambassador expressed the view that Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union had been an "act of desperation" and said that unless the Germans could occupy all of the area up to the Volga River by "their troubles would begin." He said that he envisaged "the most terrible difficulties" for the German Armies after
2-1320, July 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION T/J) from Moscow.

October

after in respect of transport, food supplies and munitions if the campaign for the occupation of such an enormous area with few roads and those virtually impassable after that month was prolonged beyond that month.

STEINHARDT

BB

(*) Apparent omission.

Corrected 2/10/42

(HE)
AF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Rec'd 7 p.m.

MOSCOW

Dated July 8, 1941

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1320, July 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Four. The Ambassador also gave it as his opinion that pride had caused the Soviet military authorities to "make a grave mistake" in massing the bulk of their forces on the German frontier and in having so many of their airdromes within a few hundred kilometers of the German starting point. He estimated that the Soviets have "already lost half of their effective airplanes and tanks" whereas had they kept the bulk of their forces and planes 500 miles back of the frontier their position even after the fall of Moscow would have made the German plan as he understood it "incredibly difficult."

Five. The General expressed the opinion that the Soviet troops now behind the German lines are interested in pillaging (*) than in fighting and said he doubted they would effectively interrupt German operations, expressing the view that in a week or two after their munitions and food supplies were exhausted they would attempt
1320, July 8, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Moscow.
attempt to merge into the local population or surrender
to the German forces. (END OF MESSAGE.)

STEINHARDT

BRK

(*) Apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
FROM
GRAY
Moscow
Dated August 16, 1941
Rec'd 1:50 a.m., 17th

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1518, August 16, 4 p.m.
My 1294, July 5, 4 p.m., 1,416, July 29, 10 a.m.
and 1,484, August 13, 2 p.m.

An announcement by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs published in today's newspapers states that on August 12 the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Foreign Office informed the Soviet Legation in Sofia that Soviet airplanes had dropped several bombs on Bulgarian territory the night of August 11-12, adding, however, that probably the bombs had been dropped by Serbs or Greeks flying in Soviet airplanes. He stated that the Bulgarian Government protested against this occurrence and requested the Soviet Government to take measures against its repetition.

In reply the Soviet Minister informed the Bulgarian Foreign Office that the Soviet Government categorically denied the report and pointed out that such flights and bombardments could only have been effected by German agents for provocative
-2- #1518, August 16, 4 p.m., from Moscow for provocative purposes. He rejected the protest of the Bulgarian Government as being without foundation and added that the Soviet Government also rejected the suggestion that Serbs or Greeks flying in Soviet planes had dropped the bombs as neither Serbs nor Greeks possess Soviet airplanes.

Inasmuch as the repeated publication of announcements regarding disagreeable incidents between the Soviet Union and other countries has usually portended direct or indirect hostilities with the country concerned, I am inclined to believe that the references to Bulgaria which have appeared in the Soviet press since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war may be viewed in this light. The Bulgarian Minister, however, is still in Moscow and insofar as I am aware there is no evidence of an immediate rupture of relations between the two countries.

STEINHARDT

PEG
This telegram must be FROM closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

Dated September 22, 1941

Read 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1695, September 22, 2 p.m.

Secret. I learn indirectly but from a source that I believe to be reliable that members of the Japanese Embassy here are not impressed by the progress of the campaign against the Soviet Union, although I understand that the Germans are keeping the Japanese fully informed and are emphasizing their successes. Japan is said to believe that Germany cannot long continue to support the heavy losses which they have been suffering.

The Japanese Naval Attache stated to my informant that the Soviet Far Eastern Army has not only not been weakened since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war but in some respects has been strengthened. He said that regardless of German successes in the west he did not believe that Japan would attack the Soviet Union as long as the morale of the Soviet Far Eastern Army remained high.
No. 1695, September 22, 1941, 2 p.m., from Moscow.

High but that if the country should begin to disintegrate Japan would probably take advantage of the situation.

Repeated to Tokyo.

STEINHARDT.

KLP
FROM Moscow
Dated September 22, 1941
Rec'd 5:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1696, September 22, 5 p.m.
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

In an endeavor to ascertain whether conversations or negotiations of moment are at present being carried on between the Soviet and Japanese Governments, I called on the Japanese Ambassador today.

He told me that he has not seen Molotov since August 15th and that the only subjects he has under discussion with the Soviet authorities are a Japanese protest concerning floating mines from Vladivostok (one of which blew up a Japanese fishing vessel with the loss of four Japanese lives, while seven others have been picked up in Japanese fishing waters); a Soviet protest at the continued increase of Japanese forces in Manchuria; and other "minor" subjects.

In so far as concerns the Japanese protest at the movement of American oil to Vladivostok,
The Ambassador described it as "formal" as he said he did not see how anything more could be done about the matter by his Government in view of the clear right of the Soviet and American Governments to carry on trade. He said he doubted that the protest would be followed by any further action by the Japanese Government, "particularly as four tankers have already arrived at Vladivostok."

With respect to Japanese policy in general, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that his Government would consolidate its position in Indochina but said that he does not anticipate any move towards Thailand in the near future. Tatekawa also stated that although the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo was carrying on discussions with the Japanese Foreign Office he did not believe that the subjects under consideration were "political" or "important."

Repealed to Tokyo.

STEINHARDT.

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

From: December 17, 1941

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
2070, December 17, noon.

Department's 1284, December 13, 3 p.m.

One. It is not unlikely that Sikorski expressed sentiments similar to those reported from London during his visit to the Soviet Union (as it is probable that from the Polish viewpoint it is preferable that the Soviet war effort against Germany should not be diminished by additional activities in the East), but as he had returned to Moscow prior to the Japanese attack on us he presumably did not address his remarks to Stalin.

Two. The British Ambassador called on me the day of the Japanese attack. In discussing the probable attitude of the Soviet Government he expressed the opinion that it might well be that of neutrality. His statements in this respect did not at the time convey
-2- #2070, December 17, noon from (Moscow) Kuibyshev.

convey to me the impression that he advocated such a policy. The Chinese ambassador however, with whom I carefully explored this subject last evening, stated explicitly that Cripps seemed to favor Soviet abstention from war with Japan. Upon Cripps return from Moscow I shall endeavor definitely to ascertain his attitude in this respect.

Three. The Chinese ambassador has informed me that insofar as he is aware Stalin has not replied to Chiang Kai Shek's note of December 8 (a copy of which he understands was handed to ambassador Gauss). He believes however from the general attitude of the Soviet officials with whom he has conversed that the Soviet Government will not be disposed to engage in hostilities with Japan at this time if they can be avoided.

Four. With respect to Litvinov's exposition to the Secretary of the decisions arrived at by his government I may say that, as the Department is aware, Soviet foreign policy is superlatively realistic. It may be taken for granted therefore that until the Soviet government can be convinced of the advantages of entering the war against Japan no other considerations (such as the general wisdom of such action or the help
-3- #2070, December 17, noon from (Moscow) Kuibyshev.

the help that would thereby be rendered us and the British) will affect its decision. In this connection, it has been reported to me by persons having some association with Soviet citizens, and the same opinion was expressed to me last night by a Soviet official who may be presumed to know the present "party line", that the Soviet Government would be disposed to participate in the War of the Pacific only if Britain establishes a second front with Germany on the continent - the North African campaign being definitely regarded as a minor operation in no way capable of diminishing Germany's effective strength against the Soviet Union.

THURSTON

RR
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

2005, December 19, 5 p.m.

VOLSKAYA KOMUNA today publishes without comment a Tass despatch from Tokyo dated yesterday and briefly summarizing the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister before the special session of Parliament. Togo is quoted as stating in respect of Soviet-Japanese relations that Japan has not altered its policy of assuring security in the north and that the Soviet Government has also repeatedly declared its intention of adherence to its neutrality pact with Japan.

DICKERSON

HSM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Moscow

Dated December 26, 1941

Rec'd 7:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

17, December 23, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In the course of a conversation last evening General Ho Farlane informed me that he has had several conversations with high Soviet authorities regarding the question of Soviet participation in the war against Japan and said that he had expressed to them the purely personal opinion that Soviet participation would be highly desirable from the Anglo-American viewpoint. He stated, however, that he recognized that the Soviet Union is not now in a position to engage in hostilities in the Far East and will not be until next spring. At the same time it is probable that, owing to its preoccupation with the war in China and its new activities in the south as well as because of unfavorable winter weather conditions Japan is not in a position at present to attack Russia.

The General
#17, December 28, 1 p.m. from Moscow

The General added it must be presumed that the Japanese view the situation in somewhat the same manner and will take no action at present. As they probably also recognize the impossibility of maintaining a situation wherein two of the major powers on either side of the present world conflict are not themselves engaged in war they undoubtedly plan in due time to strike at the Soviet Union without warning. He has expressed the opinion to the Soviet authorities therefore that they should prepare themselves, endeavor to gauge the Japanese plans as accurately as possible and strike first.

With respect to German plans in general McFaulen said that he believes that Germany has not enough air power to undertake operations in Turkey and the Near East, which in any event would require over two months preparation in Bulgaria, and that it is more likely that any new German move will take the form of an advance through the Italian Peninsula to North Africa. In this connection Ambassador Kastorff-Huesgen informed Thompson just prior to his return to Ankara yesterday that he did not believe Germany would attack Turkey at this time.


-5- #17, December 16, 1 p.m. from Moscow

At this time),

As to the Russian front the General stated that while the Soviets undoubtedly achieved positive victories at Rostov and Tikhvin and are now engaged in very important operations on the Moscow front it is his impression based in part on a visit to the Klin area that Soviet claims during the last two weeks have been exaggerated. He believes that the Germans having encountered much stronger resistance than they anticipated are falling back in accordance with a designed plan and that as a result of energetic Soviet pressure they are being greatly harrassed during this move and have lost much valuable material. He is convinced however that the Germans will not be able to launch a new major offensive against either Leningrad or Moscow before next spring. Thurston.

THOMPSON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Moscow

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SEC)

Dated December 27, 1941
FROM

Rec’d. 11:33 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

19, December 27, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir Stafford Cripps informed me this morning that he has resigned his post as Ambassador and plans to return to England. I inferred that he contemplates reentering political life there.

With respect to Japan, Cripps expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union is not now in a position to engage Japan successfully and that by entering the War in the Pacific it would weaken the effort against Germany. He added however that he believes that Russia will be at war with Japan within three months and implied that the Soviet Government both expects and desires that hostilities shall be initiated by the Japanese.

THURSTON

RDS

JAN 3 - 1942
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
(Riga)
Kuibyshev

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM
Dated January 13, 1942
Rec'd 6:36 p.m.
APR 27 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State
Washington.

URGENT
42, January 13, 2 p.m.

By 41, January 13, 1 p.m.

The Chinese Ambassador expressed the opinion yesterday that while the Soviet Government has for the present adopted a policy of prudence with respect to Japan (in conformity with which it may extend the fisheries agreement) it is preparing for conflict with that state.

He stated that he understood that whereas men and material had been withdrawn from the Far Eastern armies to meet the emergency in the West, the trend has already been reversed and new equipment and personnel are now being supplied to those armies.

THURSTON

JAN 22 1942
Secretary of State,
Washington.

72, January 26, 11 a.m.

The local press of January 26 publishes without comment a Tass despatch from Tokyo briefly summarizing speeches made before the Japanese Diet on January 23 by Tojo and Togo. The latter is reported as having stated that relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have not suffered any changes since the outbreak of war in the Pacific, and that as in the past these relations are governed by the neutrality pact which is in existence between the two countries. Togo is further quoted as follows: "The various rumors surrounding the negotiations between the Soviet Union and England and the United States should in no way influence Soviet-Japanese relations."

THURSTON

JAN 26 1942
HRL

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (SR)

Kulibyshev

Dated April 15, 1942
Rec'd 2:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

314, April 15, 10 a.m.
Reference Embassy's 84, January 29, 3 p.m.

PRAVDA of April 13 publishes a short back page editorial devoted to Soviet-Japanese relations on the occasion of the anniversary of the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. The editorial begins by stating that this pact was for the purpose of preventing the expansion of the world war, and was also the result of the comprehension on the part of Japan that the USSR is not a country whose interests can be violated with impunity. It proceeds to point out that the German attack on the Soviet Union, Japan's participation in the prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Japanese attack on American and British naval bases in the Pacific, and the signature of a new Tripartite Pact by Japan, Germany and Italy, have all subjected the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact to a serious trial. The editorial concludes as follows: "at the moment when the Soviet Japanese Neutrality Pact enters its
second year of operation, we must say that this
fact has played a positive role and has maintained
its force despite the extremely complex and pecu-
liar world situation. It has maintained its force
primarily because the Soviet Union never violates
the treaties which it signs. By its agreement to
prolong the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention for
one year under definite conditions, the Soviet
Government confirmed its readiness to maintain normal
businesslike relations with Japan based on sober
consideration of mutual economic interests.

In order that the Neutrality Pact should prevail
in the future, Japan must display the same attitude
towards treaties as does the Soviet Union. Treaties
signed and obligations assumed must be strictly and
undeviatingly fulfilled, without leaving unregulated
the details of settled questions. The Japanese Fascist
military clique, whose head is giddy from military
success, must understand that its chatter about a predatory
war in the north can harm, primarily and most of all,
Japan itself if Japan will strictly observe the obli-
gations it has assumed, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact will preserve its importance for the peoples of
the two countries even in the present complex and serious
-8- #314, April 15, 10 a.m. from Kuibyshev

International situation. This is the second article published in the Soviet Press since Japan's attack on the United States and Great Britain warning the "Japanese Fascist military clique" to refrain from any adventures directed against the Soviet Union.

Reported to Moscow.

REINHARDT

LESB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be held secret and be communicated to nobody except a government agency. (BR)

FROM

Secretary of State, Washington,

Tel. Drafted Feb. 15

Feb. 25, 1943

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION LIASON

 Cablegram of Feb. 10 published without comment. A Tokyo dispatch from Tokyo dated Feb. 3, summarizing speeches of the Japanese Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Finance before the recently reconvened Japanese Parliament. Special space is devoted to the remarks of the Foreign Minister with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations. These are reported to have been substantially to the effect that those relations are defined by the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact and that has taken place in Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union.

STANDLEY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated March 19, 1943
Rec'd 4:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

183, March 19, 5 p.m.

The new Chinese Ambassador has informed me that in his initial conversations Molotov and
Kalinin had emphasized the great strength and
endurance of Japan and had given the Ambassador
the impression that the Soviet Union was determined
to be most circumspect in its relations with Japan
in order not to permit development of any untoward
incident.

He stated that in his conversations with
Molotov and Mykoyan on the question of transit
shipments through the Soviet Union a figure of
2,000 tons a month had finally been agreed upon
that although the Russians at first had insisted
upon return freight of a like tonnage consisting
of minerals and agricultural products they finally
had accepted a figure of 1,000 tons and payment in
cash of 75% of the freight costs involved in sending
the trucks.
the trucks back empty; that 500 tons of oil would be included in the outbound tonnage and that as transport facilities improved the oil tonnage would be in addition to the original tonnage.

The Ambassador stated that 1056 trucks would be needed on the Almaata-Hami run and 2,000 additional trucks on the Hami-Chungking run to move this tonnage and that he had requested T.V Soong to urge through Harry Hopkins that every effort be made to supply the trucks necessary to put this line in operation and I informed him that I would also emphasize to the Department the importance of expediting action in this respect.

The Ambassador stated that he felt that the agreement with the Russians was a real accomplishment in view of present Soviet caution vis a vis Japan and that it was vital that the route be put into operation as soon as possible not only because of its political significance but also in order to develop the transport facilities so that freight tonnages could only be increased.

STANDLEY

EDA
DLA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

FROM Moscow

Dated June 15, 1943

12:30 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUN 17, 1943

664, June 15, 11 a.m.

The following has been received from Vladivostok signed Ward.

"52/ June 3, 11 a.m.

During the course of lecture delivered here some days ago before a gathering of Army and Navy officers the statement was made that there are now on the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian peoples republic 10 divisions of Japanese and 6 divisions of Koreans, which in case of a Soviet-Japanese conflict would be supplemented by 100,000 "white" Russians.

Insofar as I can learn no mention was made of the number if any, of Chinese and Manchurian divisions. The fact that the Russian brigades were not designated in terms of military units although they are grouped with the effective military forces may indicate that they are organized.
-2- #664, June 15, 11 a.m. from Madrid

organized and equipped for induction into effective military service on short notice even though they are not actually mobilized to date. While not identifying Yamashita by name the lecturer stated that in case of a Soviet-Japanese conflict command of the land forces would be assured by "the general who took Singapore."

STANDLEY

BF