PSF: Australia, Sept. 1942-1944
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON  

September 14, 1942  

My dear Mr. President:  

I am returning herewith the copy of the telegram from the American Minister to Australia, Mr. Johnson.  

I have carried out your instructions contained in your memorandum to me and talked this matter over with the Secretary of State. He sees no objection whatever to the proposal. I will take it up at once with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and see that the suggestion is carried out at as early a date as possible.

Sincerely yours,  

[Signature]

The President  
The White House  

Enclosure
MEC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Canberra
Dated September 1, 1942
Rec'd 9:43 a.m., 2nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

380, September 1, Midnight.

It has occurred to me that, if at all feasible and considered by our Government to be desirable, it might prove a profitable gesture if we were to give the name "Canberra" to a cruiser yet to be built. The fact that the Australian cruiser of that name was lost in joint action with our navy suggests that a gesture of this kind might have immediate favorable repercussion and create a lasting tie between the two countries.

If this suggestion favorably received it would be advisable to consult Australian Government before publicity.

JOHNSON

CSB
September 15, 1942.

My dear Mr. Minister:

I am enclosing a message for the Right Honorable John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, with the request that it be transmitted to him. It is in reply to the messages from Mr. Curtin as quoted in your letters of September 11th.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency,
Sir Owen Dixon, K.C.M.G.,
Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Washington, D.C.

Original of these papers sent to

Geo. T. Summerlin

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
September 15, 1942.

My dear Mr. Curtin:

I have given very careful consideration to the situation in the Southwest Pacific area as presented in your two messages of September 11, and fully appreciate the anxiety which you must naturally feel with regard to the security of Australia.

It would appear from your messages that Mr. Churchill has already communicated to you the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to the immediate employment of the British Eastern Fleet. This employment precludes reinforcement by British forces of the United States Pacific Fleet at the present time. Since it is clear that the United States Pacific Fleet is unable to provide a superior naval force solely concerned with the defense of Australia and New Zealand, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have carefully considered the necessity for and possibility of increasing the ground and air forces required for the territorial defense of Australia.

On December 7, 1941, Japan's gross shipping tonnage amounted to 6,350,000. By September 1, 1942 she had lost through sinkings about 990,000 tons, she had acquired through new construction 250,000 tons, capture and seizure 550,000 tons, resulting in a net loss of 190,000 tons. Present plans contemplate ever increasing attacks by United States Naval Forces against Japanese lines of communication, merchant shipping as well as naval units. If the Air Forces available in the Southwest Pacific Area are similarly concentrated on Japanese shipping, I anticipate that the extent to which the Japanese can mount and support operations in the Southwest Pacific Area will be continually decreased.

It is estimated that the Japanese have at this time a maximum of 700,000 tons of shipping available for employment in large scale military operations, and that this shipping could support about 200,000 troops.

After considering all of the factors involved, I agree with the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that your present armed forces, assuming that they are fully equipped and effectively trained, are sufficient to defeat the present Japanese force in New Guinea and to provide for the security of Australia against an invasion on the scale that the Japanese are capable of launching at this time or in the immediate future.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4, 1972
My dear Mr. Curtin: (Cont'd)

The present operations in the Solomons area are designed to strengthen our position in the line of communications leading to Australia and therefore, if successful, should contribute to its security. Projected reinforcements for these operations will further strengthen the Allied position in the Southwest Pacific and will create favorable conditions for more extensive operations against the enemy as appropriate means become available.

Present commitments of shipping are such that it is not possible to move additional troops to Australia now or in the immediate future.

Every effort is being made to insure the uninterrupted flow of supplies, equipment and forces presently committed to your area, and I can assure you that it will be my personal obligation that these commitments will be fulfilled to the limit of our capabilities. I regret that my reply cannot be more favorable, however, I am confident that you appreciate fully the necessity of rigidly pursuing our present over-all strategy that envisages the early and decisive defeat of Germany in order that we can quickly undertake an "all out" effort in the Pacific.

Very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Rear Admiral McIntire has seen
the attached letter from Sir Owen Dixon
and its accompanying report on diseases
affecting or liable to affect the Japanese
Army operating in the Southwest Pacific
Zone.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA
Dear Captain McCrea,

On Saturday last the President requested me to ascertain what Australian information was available concerning the effect of tropical diseases upon Japanese troops. I telegraphed to Australia accordingly and I have now received a reply, which says that, upon the information available, the Japanese are considered as susceptible to malaria and other tropical diseases as other races. The Japanese are, however, very alive to the problem. Evidence of this is provided by their establishment of a Tropical Diseases Institute at Singora just before the outbreak of the war. Many of their troops were trained in Formosa, which is the only Japanese territory where malaria is common, and their troops in Malaya were reputed to carry prophylactic atebrin. The Australian Quarantine authorities in peace-time found that the health of the crews of Japanese merchant ships and of sampans poaching in northern waters was very good. A report on the health conditions in the Japanese Mandated Islands of some six or seven years ago disclosed that there was no malaria there but that amoebic dysentery was endemic.

It happened that while I was awaiting a reply to my telegram Colonel Fairley, who is the Director of Medicine of the Australian Army, arrived in Washington from Australia. He is an authority on tropical diseases and has been recently dealing with the whole question of the effect of malaria upon operations in the S.W.P.A. I therefore requested him to prepare a brief appreciation of the diseases affecting or liable to affect the Japanese troops in the Southwest Pacific area. I believe that his statement will be found to answer the President's question specifically. You will see that it deals with the problem from a medical point of view and also considers our own difficulties in that area. I should be obliged if you would be good enough to inform the President of the effect of this material.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Captain J. L. McCrea,
Naval Aide to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
AN APPRECIATION OF THE
DISEASES AFFECTING OR LIABLE TO AFFECT THE JAPANESE
ARMY OPERATING IN THE S.W. PACIFIC ZONE

Col. N. Hamilton Fairley, C.B.E., F.R.S.
Director of Medicine, Australian Army.

Diseases to which the Japanese troops are being exposed in the
S.W. Pacific Zone include:

1. Malaria transmitted by certain night-biting species of
   anopheline mosquitoes.
2. Dengue or "break bone" fever transmitted by the day-biting culicine mosquito, Aedes aegypti.
3. Bacillary and amoebic dysentery both of which are transmitted by flies and infected water and food. No cases of cholera have yet been reported.
4. Scrub typhus (Japanese River Fever) which is transmitted by biting mites and affects troops travelling through thick scrub and rank grass.
5. Leptospirosis - a febrile disease contracted from rats.
6. Plague, also a rat-borne disease which may occur in troops billeted in native villages especially in the hills in Java.
7. Certain forms of venereal disease, such as climatic bubo and ulcerating granuloma contracted from native women in the S.W. Pacific Zone.
8. The food deficiency disease, beri-beri, which is especially prone to affect troops fed predominantly on milled rice.
9. Skin diseases including:
   (a) Tropical ulcer and septic sores
   (b) Ring-worm infections
   (c) Scabies
10. Stings by scorpions and the "stinging" tree and bites by venomous snakes and leeches.
    Of these diseases by far the most important is malaria.
Dengue fever is temporarily a disabling disease but one which practically never kills. No curative treatment is available. It is liable to affect large numbers of troops shortly after their arrival in endemic areas and for this reason is definitely of military significance.

This also applies to bacillary dysentery which has already infected thousands of allied troops in this zone and presumably thousands of Japanese troops as well. Fly control and good camp sanitation prevent this disease, while the recent American discovery of sulfaguanidine has revolutionised its treatment.

Owing to the paucity of Japanese prisoners little reliable data have yet been collected regarding the incidence of malaria and other relevant diseases. A medical review of the disease incidence in the 450 Japanese prisoners recently captured by the American marines on the Solomon Islands should, however, yield positive information of value.

MALARIA

A high incidence of malaria has been found in Japanese internees in Australia who have formerly resided in the S.W. Pacific, and information which has percolated through from time to time indicates that malaria is taking its toll of Japanese troops operating in this zone.

Malaria constitutes a major menace to troops on both sides at present fighting in New Guinea and the Solomons. It is generally very prevalent throughout the S.W. Pacific West of 170th Meridian of East Longitude and North of the 20th parallel of South latitude.

Like the American and Australian Forces, the Japanese do not come from highly malarious countries and are "unseasoned" troops as far as malaria is concerned. They are equally susceptible to the ravages of this disease which may reduce their fighting efficiency to a level which entails disaster.

Until the fall of Java the Japanese were handicapped in regard to malaria since they had to depend on limited reserves of quinine and cotton. Now they control over 90% of the quinine supply of the world and possess adequate supplies of cotton for the production of mosquito nets.

Translations of recent documents in India captured from the Japanese reveal that they are malaria-minded. They insist on (1) avoidance of mosquito bites at night by sleeping under nets (2) the taking of medicine (quinine) regularly to prevent malaria fever.
These are the most practicable methods of controlling malaria in jungle warfare or a war of movement. Allied troops on the other hand are facing the difficulty of a disappearing quinine reserve and will have to depend to an increasing degree on atebrin and plasmoquine both to cure the disease and to suppress malaria fever and keep the army on its feet. On the production and supply of these two synthetic anti-malarial drugs may depend the issue of the campaign in the S.W. Pacific zone. The recent history of Bataan illustrates the devastating effects of failure of the quinine supply in an army infected with chronic malaria.

September 17th, 1942.
November 20, 1942

My dear Johnson:

I want to thank you for your letter of October 12 setting forth certain impressions which you have gained during your first year in Australia. I have read your comprehensive survey with great interest and feel that it brings me closely and profitably in touch with the Australian scene. May I congratulate you upon your presentation of this complicated picture with such convincing clarity.

It is encouraging to know that some of the Australian leaders are developing a genuine realization of the problems which we must all face after the war and of the role which Australia must inevitably play in world affairs.

I feel sure that the Australian Government and the Australian people understand and approve our current operations in Africa as a first important step toward the defeat of our common enemies - Japan no less than Germany and Italy.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Canberra.

Signed original of this letter sent to Hon. Spencer Wells for delivery.
Canberra, Australia,
October 12, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Having completed my first year of service in Australia, it seems useful to set down, as of interest to you, certain impressions which I have gained.

In the first place, there is the Australian land. The isolation of the Australian continent has been both a curse and a blessing. Its remoteness makes it difficult for the average American to conceive of its size, or, knowing its size, to appreciate that the entire population of this island continent, with an area larger than that of territorial United States, numbers seven million, approximately the population of the city of New York. Perhaps three-fourths of this small population is concentrated within a narrow belt of east coast line running from the center of Queensland south, and half way along the south coast, as far as Adelaide. The whole of the central part of this vast continent is unpopulated.

The President,
The White House.
unpopulated. The only other center of population is that immediately adjacent to the city of Perth on the west coast, and in the green forests immediately south of Perth, as far from the east coast as San Francisco is from New York.

Settlement began on the east coast, at Sydney in New South Wales. The early English settlers very quickly saw the value of sheep, introducing sheep from England, Spain and France. Since that time Australian wool has dominated world markets in fineness and price. It costs less to raise sheep in Australia than in any other place in the world, and the shepherds of Australia throve.

Then there are the people. Speaking generally, it may be said that the Australian represents the purest type of Anglo-Irish-Welsh-Scotch. These people transplanted their culture, civilization and habits of life to the Australian land, set up large estates based on primary industry, principally wool, cattle and horse raising. Pastoral society was patriarchal. In the beginning, hard labor was done by a form of slavery, through the use of convicts contracted for with the representatives of the Crown, who maintained an autocratic government. This form of slave labor continued down to 1840, although it was early supplemented by immigrant free
free and industrial labor and the emancipated convict. These factors of indentured and slave labor gave form to the social organization of the people, with certain results which survive to-day. They are a fine, outstanding people who can be led but not driven. They are individually jealous of the general standard of equality oft asserted against social classification.

Immigrants in the early days included large numbers of Irish forced to leave Ireland because of famine and political oppression. This element in the community has been generally restive under English control and has taken leadership in labor agitation and in labor politics. At the same time, this people is fundamentally jealous of its English heritage and may be expected, in times of crisis, to give evidence of passionate loyalty to England and to the throne, and all that that symbolizes in the way of home, unity of culture and ancient heritage.

The isolation and the remoteness of Australia tended to cut the people off from contact with the world of Europe and America and Asia, and from the problems that stirred that distant world. By the same token they were insulated against contact with the spiritual changes that occurred in the mental outlook of peoples in America, England and Europe during the past sixty years.

The remarkable success which attended wool growing
in Australia, in conjunction with the production of large quantities of gold during the middle years of the nineteenth century, tended to give to the people a sense of economic security, and an opportunity to develop in their isolation a society of their own fashioning, free from the conditions of poverty, want and misery which they associated with the social conditions from which they had fled in England. When self-government was finally granted to the Australian colonists the first use which they made of their new freedom was to begin the program of social legislation which has continued to characterize the aims and ideals of Australian political life.

Free labor organized itself very early, first to extract concessions from those who controlled the convict labor, later to extract concessions from those in political power. These early relations between master and servant, plus conditions under which migrant labor left England, perhaps gave the set of implacable hostility between labor and employer that characterizes those relations to-day.

Public economy was characterized by the great strides made in social legislation in the interests of the people as a whole. The six separate colonies united under a federal or commonwealth government in 1900, in
the presence of a fear engendered by activity on the part of Germany and France, who had begun to establish political interests in the lands of the Pacific close to the shores of Australia.

One of the earliest acts of the new Commonwealth Parliament was to fix what has come to be known as the "white Australia policy" as one of the aims of the Government. This policy was to enable organized Australian labor, under the pretext of the right of Australians to choose the people who might settle in their midst, to exclude from the country cheap labor of any color whose presence and competition would tend to retard progress in establishing a high standard of wage and living for Australia. The remoteness of Australia from the centers in Europe and America where international strife was a constantly recurring phenomenon encouraged the feeling among these people that they could sacrifice mere numbers of population in the interest of the social betterment of the few.

Control of Australia's relations with the outside world remained remotely located in London, at the heart of the Empire, which dealt with all such problems from an Empire point of view, with the center of gravity - as far as Australia was concerned - located in India. Nothing occurred in the neighborhood of Australia through these years to take the minds of the people and their
their leaders off the internal social problems which were ever their immediate concern.

The dominant policy of the oldest state, New South Wales, influenced by Cobden, was free trade, in the interest of primary producers who constituted the principal industry of the state. The State of Victoria was given an economic lead over New South Wales and the other states by the discovery of gold in 1851, and for a number of years it enjoyed a period of prosperity which made it the financial headquarters of Australia. But the gold diggings were soon worked out in so far as easy access to gold was concerned, and the ensuing depression with its unemployment problem forced Victorian political leaders, in their attempt to rehabilitate their situation, into a policy of protection, for the purpose of establishing industries which would absorb the unemployed from the failing gold fields. The State of Victoria by this accident became protectionist in its political outlook.

With the establishment of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Parliament, and the introduction of federal politics in contrast to state politics, protectionist Victorian political leaders were brought into partnership with the federal Labor politicians from New South Wales, who had been notably indifferent up to that time to financial problems, but who quickly saw
the advantage to Labor in the Victorian suggestion of protection for those industries that paid a fair wage to Labor. The High Court of Australia nullified a tariff law of the Australian Parliament passed by protectionists with the aid of Labor. But an award of the Australian Arbitration Court made under that law, prior to its invalidation, laying down the basis of a fair wage in Australia, placed the question of a "fair wage" directly into the hands of Government; and from that time to this we have the interesting spectacle of seeing established again and again, by Court decree, and always upwards, the basic wage which is intended to enable Australian Labor to live in a manner that is civilized. This is a development that could only have occurred in a society free of competitive immigrant labor that felt secure from all outward pressure or threat.

These developments and ideals encouraged the people in a belief in the unlimited possibilities of Australia. This belief was rudely shattered during the terrible depression of 1929, 30, 31 and 32 that followed the short-lived post-war prosperity, and started Australians upon a reappraisal of their situation and of the resources of the country generally. The realization of the limited fertility of their land, the slow growth in population, the impossibility of Australian industry to compete with world prices because the high cost of so-
cial security at home made the price of Australian industries' products prohibitive,- all brought about a disillusionment, and a loss of confidence in themselves which depressed them still further.

When I arrived, a year ago, the people were suffering from this feeling of complete disillusionment over the resources of the country, and the success of their legislatively-planned social paradise secured by their remoteness from Europe and the protection afforded by membership in the British Empire.

Mid-September, 1941, saw the United Australia Party, Country Party Government, which began under the leadership of Menzies, tottering toward its end under Fadden. The Empire had been at war with Germany and Italy for two years. Australia had played its part, sending some three divisions of its best manhood as volunteer soldiers to the aid of the mother country. Much had been done locally in mobilizing and organizing Australian heavy industry for war production, but it had been done by a Government dominated by the big business and pastoral interests of Australia with headquarters in tory Melbourne, a Government possessing an uncertain majority in the House. It was a Government that had not won the confidence of the rank and file of industrial Labor, for its admittedly magnificent war effort was being hampered by strikes in munition factories, on the docks, and in
PAGE MISSING IN THE ORIGINAL
realization that Japan's mastery of the air rendered Australia vulnerable to attack at any point on her coast.

The realization that the pick of Australia's young men were serving thousands of miles from home and that Australia's fate depended upon the untrained militia conscripted under an Act of Parliament which prohibited service abroad; the realization that the Australian coast was practically undefended; the realization that Australia, while training airmen for service in Europe, had made no preparation whatever for defense at home and possessed no bombing planes or fighters capable of repelling attacks,—all resulted in a situation of near panic.

People began to move from the cities and the coast. It was realized that the entire industrial plant of Australia was located on the east and south coasts within yards of the water front and within easy reach of any raiding party in the air or from the sea determined to destroy them. There was even talk of the abandonment of Canberra, which is only about seventy miles from the coast. This feeling of utter helplessness, superimposed on the disillusionment which had followed the depression of 1929, presented to the onlooker a tragic picture.

It was in this atmosphere and under these conditions that John Curtin began to organize his country to meet the disasters which threatened from without. It was in this atmosphere that John Curtin made the state-
ment which appeared in an article by him on December 27, 1941, and which read as follows:

"..... without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom....."

This statement hurt him among his own people and in England, and it has been used against him politically since, but one has to recall the dire situation that he and his Government faced when the statement was made. To an outsider the situation looked tragic. Everywhere one got the feeling that Australia was ready to give up without a struggle; that if it had been possible to leave the country, the people would have gone. For a time, the transportation system was clogged, with people leaving Perth for the east, Queensland for the south, Melbourne and Sydney for anywhere in the interior. One began to hear expressions of resentment of the policy inaugurated under the Ottawa agreement, which provided for Empire preference in trade, a policy under which British business interests had discouraged expansion of Australian industries which might compete with British industry. People forgot that Australia had refused to contribute to the cost of the Empire naval base at Singapore. They forgot that Australian Commonwealth Governments of all party complexions, but chiefly under the necessity of conciliating Labor and its supporters, had disbanded
disbanded Australia's armed forces, refused to invest in naval or air protection, and devoted Commonwealth surpluses to social security.

One of John Curtin's first acts was to recall from the Near East two of Australia's fighting divisions, for the defense of Australia. The arrival in Australia of General MacArthur from beleaguered Bataan, on March 17, and the landing in Australia a few days later of Australian veterans from Egypt and Syria, had an effect on the morale of the people which was electric. The rebound was almost as sudden as the slump in public morale. But the people have not yet recovered entirely their confidence in themselves. The arrival of American troops was greeted with enthusiasm everywhere, as concrete evidence that this remote island of occidental culture and civilization would not be abandoned to its fate at the hands of the oriental hordes that were bearing southward upon it. The battle of the Coral Sea, the battle of Midway, and the recent occupation of the Solomon Islands have all served to raise the morale of the people and lift the black blanket of despair which had covered them. There was even some tendency to return to the feeling of complacency which had existed before,- a feeling which is yielding reluctantly to the realization that all, young and old, will have to make tremendous sacrifices if they are to support a success-
ful attack upon the enemy and push him away from the threatening positions which he now holds.

The year in Australia under reference has been dominated by one man, John Curtin, fifty-seven years of age, a former Secretary of the Victorian Timberworkers' Union and former editor of THE WESTRALIAN WORKER. Mr. Curtin is now domiciled in Perth in Western Australia. He has been a Labor member of the Commonwealth Parliament since 1928, with the exception of the years 1931 to 1934, when he suffered defeat along with the Scullin Government. A clear and forceful speaker, John Curtin impresses one with his sincerity, innate honesty of purpose, and earnestness. He is completely unable to dramatize himself, his cause, or the events with which he has to deal. Bound by the Labor caucus, he has been limited in his choice of responsible advisers, with the result that his Cabinet is made up of men some of whom are exceedingly narrow in their outlook, one or two of whom have not been entirely cooperative with his leadership, and all of whom are dull and equally unable to dramatize for the people the problems which the country has to meet and solve. Nevertheless, by his earnestness and his honesty of purpose and his innate integrity, John Curtin has dominated Parliament and the country; and in spite of the handi­caps, prejudices, parochial-mindedness, and the impenetrable suspicion which characterizes the relationships between
between employer and employee in Australia, John Curtin has done an admirable job.

I called upon him when he was leader of the opposition, and my first reactions were that he was somewhat timid in his leadership, that he was slow in seizing opportunities for unifying the groups under him at a time when it was becoming obvious that unity in the Government parties was disintegrating. On a visit which I made shortly after he took office as Prime Minister, he made the remark that it was a strange turn of fate which had brought him to political leadership in Australia. I imagine that in his mind was the recollection that his membership in Parliament had depended upon a very slight majority among preference votes. I saw him again a few days after Japan entered the war, when he was still somewhat stunned by the terrible burden which fate had placed on his shoulders. He again commented on this fate, and the other day when I congratulated him on the work which he had accomplished during his first year of office in the face of overwhelming disasters, he remarked that no one who could have foreseen the burdens and the disasters that fate had in store would have willingly undertaken Government leadership. This was a man who feared the future his people faced, but possessed the high moral courage necessary to take up the burden and carry it on.
At no time has he given the impression of the happy warrior, confident of his strength and of his cause, gloriing in the struggle in which he is participating and which has for its aim the emancipation of his people from fear. In his talks to the people he chides and threatens, rather than leads - an approach which is the result, doubtless, of his Labor Union training in facing the employer. Identified as he had been throughout his adult life with the Labor movement in Australia, and with the problems and politics of Labor, absorbed as he has been in the internal problems of Australia, it is doubtful whether he is yet conscious of the enlarged opportunity which Australia and its people are destined to play in the future, either as part of the British Empire or as a member of a great group of freedom-loving peoples in the theater of the Pacific. But it is also equally doubtful whether any member of his Cabinet, with possible exception of Evatt, or in fact any leader in Australia, has risen to this realization.

Perhaps one reason for this lies in the terrible domestic problems of defense and spiritual mobilization with which John Curtin and his Cabinet had to grapple at the entry of Japan in the war. Australia's magnificent isolation took on a new meaning. It was cut off entirely from help from England; its cause was desperate. The United States suddenly took the place of the United King-
dom as Australia's protector. Dr. Evatt, the Attorney General, was sent to the United States and London to plead the desperate cause of Australia. He left Sydney a day or so before the arrival of MacArthur, when the morale of the people was at its lowest ebb, at a time when local gossip found it possible to say that even some of the Ministers were prepared to flee the country. There is some indication that Dr. Evatt's views of the situation of Australia, the part it has played, and the nature of the war in general, underwent a sea change during his trip and as a result of his talks in Washington and in London. In a conversation which I had with him shortly after his return, on June 21, he made statements indicating that he had achieved a realization that the defense of Australia was only part of a vast naval problem covering the entire Pacific Ocean, and he was inclined to be less impatient with the United States and Great Britain.

During his absence, the Commonwealth Government took the first step to meet a situation which had hampered all of its efforts to mobilize the man power and the finances of the country in its war effort. This was the conflict between the federal authority of the Commonwealth and the State Governments, and the step taken was to unify the income tax. The Commonwealth introduced in Parliament, and Parliament passed, an income tax.
tax law levying a uniform tax on the incomes of Australians, pushing the State Governments out of this field of taxation. Up to this time there were some twenty-odd income taxes paid by Australians to Federal and State Governments. This step was not accomplished without resistance on the part of the States, who took the matter into the High Court.

Since the Attorney General's return, one other step toward freeing the Commonwealth Government in the legislative field has been taken, namely, the ratification of the Statute of Westminster, which will free Commonwealth law from the taint of repugnancy to the laws of the Parliament at Westminster.

One other and still more important step is to be taken: a referendum will be offered the people of Australia, asking them to approve an amendment to the Constitution which, if approved in its present form, will free the Commonwealth Parliament legislation

"..... to achieve economic security and social justice, including security of employment and the provision of useful occupation for all the people ...."

from all review by the High Court of the Commonwealth as regards its constitutionality. This question is to be discussed in a convention or committee made up of members of Parliament and representatives from the State Governments, which is to be held publicly at Canberra
during the month of November, and it is expected that the referendum which will result can be presented to the people early in the coming year. The text of the preamble which will be presented to the convention is interesting, as indicating a realization by the Attorney General that in the world which will follow this war Australia will have to play a part externally far more important than it has ever played before. It reads:

"An Act to alter the Constitution by empowering the Parliament to make laws for the purpose of carrying into effect the war aims and objects of Australia as one of the United Nations, including the attainment of economic security and social justice in the post-war world, and for the purpose of post-war reconstruction."

It is currently believed that Dr. Evatt has chosen this phraseology and this method of bringing home to the people of Australia a realization that Australia's future lies, not merely in the organization of a local social paradise, but in playing a part externally which will insure that security without which such social paradise may not be accomplished.

No appreciation of John Curtin and his Government would be complete without some reference to the Commonwealth public service men who are the permanent officials of the Government and who constitute the real Government of the Commonwealth. On June 30, 1937, there were some 29,000 of these public servants, divided as follows:

4,500 odd assigned to the Cabinet; 364 to defense; 1,437
to trade and customs; and over 22,000 to the Department of the Postmaster General. The permanent head of each Commonwealth Department is a public service officer of the first division of the service. These men have risen to the top after long service and by slow promotion.

During the forty-two years of the Commonwealth there have been sixteen Parliaments and twenty Ministries, with an average term of two years. It is thus obvious that the burden of government and policy-making, as well as execution, falls upon these permanent heads of departments of the Commonwealth recruited from the public service. This is a group of experts whose experience has been entirely local, except of course for occasional visits within the Empire or to England, or to other countries, either to plead some particular need of Australia or to investigate some particular phase of public work.

All of these men have been trained to serve Australia first, and then the Empire. Their training has been in the local schools and night schools and in local universities. Their monopoly of experience and knowledge of what can or cannot be done gives them a control over political ministers for the time being in office that has a profound effect on the execution of Commonwealth Government policies.

The city of Canberra, capital of the Commonwealth, is the public servants' city par excellence. Here re-
side the aristocrats of the public service, the men who have achieved the top rank in the public service and who by the same token are the heads of the Departments. They and their families make up such society as exists in the capital, for seldom do the Commonwealth Ministers maintain permanent residence at the capital, exceptions being the Prime Minister and the Attorney General. There was no Canberra until the Government with its permanent public service moved here, and therefore there are no old non-official residents; nor is there any social lobby in Canberra. Members of Parliament, both House and Senate, remain in Canberra only for the duration of a sitting of the Parliament.

These public servants are devoted to their work, loyal to the Minister for the time being at the head of their offices, and they have given loyal, complete and good service to Australia. It would be difficult to find a higher type of public servant anywhere in the world. Their limitations are the natural limitations of their environment, their experience, and the prejudices bred of their experience.

Australia's direct relations with countries outside of the Empire began with an exchange of Ministers between the United States and Australia in 1940; and at present Australia maintains direct relations with the United States, China, and The Netherlands. (And on October 12
it announced exchange of diplomatic representatives with the U.S.S.R.) Ministers had been exchanged with Japan, but that relationship lasted hardly a year before Japan entered the war.

Section 51 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides that the Parliament shall, subject to the Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:

...... XXIX. External Affairs. The Commonwealth Ministry of External Affairs has always been the adjunct of some more important Ministry. For years it was handled by the Prime Minister's office. It is a small department, in many respects completely inadequate to handle the problems that it has to meet, or to give very much positive assistance in the formulation and enunciation of any foreign policy. Naturally, such foreign policy as the Commonwealth may have must always be subordinated to the policy of the Empire, for the relationship of the Commonwealth to the United Kingdom is not merely that of an alliance, but that of subject and king.

At the present time there would appear to be some evidence that Australian foreign policy lags behind that of the United Kingdom with respect to war aims and preparations for the post-war period. As I have said before, there seems to exist very little realization of the fact that the post-war world is going to impose cer-
tain responsibilities on Australia which will require cooperation with England and with the United States, and the fulfilment of financial and political obligations beyond the territorial limits of Australia far greater than has ever been dreamed of.

It is a little difficult to see how Australia, with its intimate connection with, and its first responsibilities to the Empire, can play this part which it must play in the Pacific area,—a part which at times may run contrary to policies which may seem wise in Downing Street. It has already become apparent to us that prominent officials in the Treasury and in External Affairs view with jaundiced eye Article 7 of the master Lend-Lease Agreement and its references to the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

For over twenty years the public service of Australia has been attempting loyally to adjust the Australian policy of protecting and fostering industry for the purpose of maintaining a high basic wage to the need of maintaining industries in England through preference for British products and the exclusion from Australia of American and other extra-Empire products which might compete either with the products of Australia or the products of England.

Corollary to the successful maintenance of this policy of Empire preference and high standards of living...
within Australia was the continued security of Australia from attack guaranteed by the Empire and by England. That security was proven false in December, 1941, and security must now be sought in an unknown world that will follow this war which is absorbing all of the energies of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commonwealth of Australia. That security as outlined in the Atlantic Charter will become the joint responsibility of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia, and it is difficult for the Australian public servant to separate himself from his past and adjust himself to such a responsibility. Thus far it has proven difficult, if not impossible, for his political leaders to dramatize current events or that future in such a way as to make it possible for the public servant, whose time is consumed with the day-to-day problems of local Government, to visualize and face that new world and those new responsibilities with any feeling of confidence. The public servant knows his country as one which produces the raw materials necessary to keep alive the industries of the old country. He knows that his is a country that has been hitherto secure and therefore able to develop its industries, both primary and secondary, to meet Empire needs. Wedded to that conception of Australia's place in the world, he looks upon the future with fear and suspicion.

Australia will need every bit of help that it can
get from the United Kingdom and the United States if it is to emerge from that era of security with its patriarchal, pastoral society, and pass from a buyer to a seller of consumer goods; for when it thus passes from the status of a protected market to that of a competitor-producing nation, it must be prepared, either itself to take and hold a share of world trade and markets, or to be granted its share, so as to enable its people to live as they have lived and hope to live.

When this war is over, Australia will have roads, airfields, enlarged factories, better-organized ports; and it will need a larger population to enable it to maintain and use those larger facilities. It remains to be seen whether Australian leadership will be able to fire the will of the people of Australia to use those facilities to meet the aims for which they are now united with us in a death struggle.

You, Mr. President, are credited in their minds and in their speech with having stated those aims as

1) freedom of speech and expression;
2) religious freedom;
3) freedom from want; and
4) freedom from fear.

Of these four freedoms, our age has failed most significantly in guaranteeing freedom from want. This involves the problem of distribution, and until this problem of distribution is solved, man will not be free from want. It is this fear that drives him behind village or nation-
al walls, within which he can build up social security for himself, his family and his people. In our democratic way of life we have freed man from slavery; we have substituted economic slaves for human slaves in solving the question of production. But we have yet to break down the village and economic walls behind which we have taken refuge. We have yet to free the distribution of the consumer goods produced by our mechanical slaves from the handicaps of the high cost of transportation and national currencies which bind distribution like a strait jacket.

National currencies in the form of money must go, along with human slavery, for production is no longer limited to small isolated families or communities or nations. World prices and world demand govern production and distribution. Money merely represents unused human energy, and the world can no longer tolerate the monopolization of this unused human and mechanical slave energy by individuals. The world will no longer tolerate the inheritance of hoarded, unused human energy by men and women who have contributed nothing of their own energy to the supply of human needs. The world will demand that such unused energy be distributed and thus serve to guarantee that freedom from want, the lack of which has disturbed human relationships through the years and compelled men to build economic and armed walls of their own
own devising. The aims of your new deal have given new hope to the democratic world. As you stated when inaugurating the plan of Lend-Lease, the dollar and pound sign must be eliminated from international trade.

What part Australia is to play is a problem which faces Australian leadership. This leadership at the moment is political Labor. Political Labor in Australia has fought through the years for social security and high standards of living for the common man in Australia. Australian Labor leaders have had little time or occasion to think of themselves or of Australia as a part of the world and world policy. For a hundred years Australia has been carefully fostered by her leaders, within, as an economic paradise for her population, and without, as an economic adjunct to the United Kingdom. The new world will demand something more than this of Australia.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
1. Draft Reply to Mr. Johnson;
2. From Mr. Johnson, October 12, 1942.

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of November 9, 1942 enclosing a letter from Mr. Nelson T. Johnson, Minister to Australia, I attach a draft reply which you may wish to send to Mr. Johnson.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. Draft reply to Mr. Johnson;
2. From Mr. Johnson, October 12, 1942.

The President,
The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 11-11-42

ADDRESSED TO

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is very interesting.
Please prepare reply for my signature.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Nelson T. Johnson, our Minister to Australia, reporting on his first year of service there, dated Oct. 12, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.
March 19, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

The Counselor of the Australian Legation, in the absence of the Australian Minister, has requested me to transmit to you the text of a message addressed to you by the Prime Minister of Australia.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of Mr. Watt's letter to me for your information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Encs.

The President,

The White House.
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 18th, 1943

Dear Mr. Sumner Welles,

In the temporary absence of the Minister in Toronto, Canada, I enclose herewith the text of a message to the President from the Australian Prime Minister which Sir Owen Dixon has been instructed to transmit. The Minister would be grateful if you would be so good as to arrange for the message to be brought to the President's notice as early as possible.

You will no doubt remember that on 20th day of January Sir Owen Dixon handed to you copies of messages from the Australian Prime Minister to the President and to Mr. Churchill. At that time it was not known that the President and Mr. Churchill were meeting at Casablanca and the Australian Government forwarded the messages to Washington on the assumption that Mr. Churchill had come to the United States. I understand that you informed Sir Owen Dixon that Mr. Churchill was not in the United States but that you would be glad to transmit the two messages immediately. Sir Owen Dixon passed on this information to Australia.

The enclosed message refers to the earlier messages handed to you on 20th day of January.

Sir Owen Dixon is expected to return to Washington on Saturday morning, March 20th.

Yours sincerely,

A. S. WATT

The Honourable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
March 18th, 1943

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"On the 19th of January I addressed to Washington for transmission to Mr. Churchill and yourself a cablegram urging, in view of the lessons of the use of air power in the New Guinea campaign, that 1500 additional operational and 500 additional transport aircraft be made available to the South West Pacific Area as soon as possible in 1943.

Mr. Sumner Welles undertook to transmit these messages to both of you immediately but I have had no reply from either Mr. Churchill or yourself.

Since I first approached you there has occurred the battle of the Bismarck Sea which resulted in the virtual annihilation of a Japanese convoy attempting to reinforce Lae and Salamaua. This victory was a further practical demonstration of the case urged by me on the 19th of January.

Intelligence Reports have recently indicated that the Japanese are intensively consolidating an arc of air bases extending through the Netherlands East Indies, Portuguese Timor, New Guinea, Rabaul and the Northern Solomons to the Marshall Islands.

It would appear from their air superiority in the operations in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies
that they under-rated the strength that could be brought against them. Since their bitter experiences in the Solomons, New Guinea and the Bismarck Sea they are apparently determined to secure air superiority in the arc I have described and concentrations of land forces are taking place. There is no evidence of air concentrations so far but the air bases will be sufficient to enable a strength of 1500 to 2000 planes to be operated in these regions.

I shall be glad to be informed of the air strength that it is proposed to provide in the South West Pacific Area to ensure that the initiative in the air is retained by the United Nations and that the Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area is in a position to deter and if necessary severely repulse any attempts by the Japanese to raid heavily by air and naval forces territories in our possession.

It is noteworthy and also a tribute to the effectiveness of the forces engaged that in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea it was possible to concentrate only 136 aircraft for this attack. The renewal of attacks on Darwin and reconnaissance of the North West Coast indicate the paramount importance of sufficient strength being available to ensure air superiority along the whole line of contact with the enemy and at other vulnerable points on our coastline especially in the West. Of particular importance is the vital base of Fremantle where, owing to the depletion of the Eastern Fleet, a heavy attack of the hit and run variety might be carried out by naval bombardment and carrier-borne aircraft."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you take this up with General Marshall and the Joint Staff and prepare reply for my signature?

F.D.R.

Letter from Prime Minister Curtin to the President 3/31/43 transmitted through the Australian Legation. (Letter to be kept in Map Room)
May 5, 1943.

Dr. H. V. Evatt,
Minister of State
for External Affairs,
Australian Legation,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Evatt:

In respect to the allocation of additional aircraft to the R.A.A.F., which you requested in your letter of April 22nd, I have caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present me their views.

I am informed that an increase in present allocations would require a corresponding reduction in other commitments which might seriously disjoint programs which are now under way. You will recall that on January 21, 1943, the British Chiefs of Staff and your representatives agreed to the allocations from our 1943 production proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. Allocations to Australia provided for expansion and support of your 45 squadron program. At that time all of our estimated 1943 aircraft production was committed and current production is not exceeding estimates. However, when conditions hereafter permit a general revision of allocations, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff will give full consideration to the requirements for further expanding the Royal Australian Air Force. As you know, the recent conference of high ranking U. S. commanders from the Pacific theater held in Washington has resulted in materially strengthening our combined air forces in the Pacific theater.

The needs of the Pacific theater must be integrated with those of the global war, and you may feel sure that constant study and thought are being given to the Pacific to the end that we maintain the initiative and prevent the Japanese from consolidating his position.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Handwritten initials)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AUSTRALIAN - NEW ZEALAND AGREEMENT

You will recall the Department's memorandum of January 31, 1944 forwarding to you the text of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, together with a draft message to be sent to Prime Ministers Curtin and Fraser expressing our opposition to the calling of a Southwest Pacific conference at this time. With your approval this message was telegraphed to our Legations at Canberra and Wellington on February 1 and was delivered to Prime Ministers Curtin and Fraser. I enclose a copy of this message for your convenience.

Our Legation in Canberra has now telegraphed the Australian Government's reply, a copy of which is enclosed. You will note the specific references in the Australian reply to statements which they say were made by you at meetings of the Pacific War Council in regard to territories of the Southwest Pacific, in particular the references to New Caledonia. We should appreciate your instructions on any statement you wish us to include in the reply to the Australian Government with regard to its inclusion of these references in its note.

The draft reply will be submitted to you for approval in due course.

Enclosures:

1. Copy, telegram dated February 1, 1944.
2. Copy, telegram from Canberra.
February 1, 1944
6 p.m.

BROWN

US URGENT
AMERICAN LEGATION,
CANBERRA, (AUSTRALIA).

Please request an appointment with Prime Minister Curtin and hand him the text of the following message from the Secretary of State:

"I have read the text of the Australian-New Zealand agreement of January 21 expressing the views of the two governments on certain matters of common interest relating particularly to the South and Southwest Pacific region. I am, of course, aware that this agreement, in so far as it undertakes to deal with matters affecting territories other than those of the two governments, is wholly without prejudice to the interests of other countries. I am certain that both the Australian and New Zealand Governments are likewise aware of this and that they have no desire to affect the interests of other countries prejudicially.

It is understandable that the Australian and New Zealand Governments should wish to reach agreement"
between themselves on matters of common concern and that they should wish to make their views known to other governments. I am frankly disturbed, however, at the proposal of the two governments to call an early conference of Powers with territorial interests in the South and Southwest Pacific to consider the problem of regional security and related matters. I have discussed this with the President and, while we agree that these matters must be given utmost attention, we have considerable doubts that it is yet time for discussing them at a formal conference of interested Powers. Our doubts have, I believe, already been communicated informally to the Australian Government. Despite all the progress we have made, the war in the Pacific has still to be won and, in our opinion, it has not yet reached the stage which would warrant the type of formalized discussions which appear to be contemplated.

QUOTE There is also the question of approach which should be carefully considered. In our opinion, it is necessary to agree upon arrangements for a general international security system before attempting to deal with problems of regional security. Any attempt to deal with
regional security in the Southwest Pacific in advance of agreement on a general system might well give rise to efforts on the part of other regional groups to make their own exclusive arrangements for security. Thus, such a conference as is proposed might in the end result in a number of independent regional systems and seriously interfere with efforts to achieve a general system of world security.

QUOTE We have also to consider the effect of such a conference upon our immediate war effort. The President and I have some fears that a formal conference of the interested Powers for the purpose contemplated would possibly do more harm than good to our united war effort. Such a conference might well arouse suspicions and possibly bring into focus conflicting opinions on matters which do not require decision at this time. We are sure you share our strong feeling that nothing should be done at this time to impair existing harmony among all the United Nations fighting together against our common enemies.

QUOTE We hope, therefore, that you will not take any steps toward calling such a conference until we have had an
opportunity to discuss these matters fully together personally. I understand that you may be coming to Washington within the next month or two. The President and I look forward with pleasure to seeing you at that time and believe that your visit will give us an excellent opportunity for a full and frank exchange of views on all these problems.

QUOTE I am also communicating with Prime Minister Fraser in this sense. UNQUOTE

Note to Code Room:

Please repeat to Wellington as Department's No. changing opening sentence to read "Please request an appointment with Prime Minister Fraser and hand him the text of the following message from the Secretary of State".

Also change closing sentence to read: "I am also communicating with Prime Minister Curtin in this sense".

RC#RBS:VAS#SS
HS-563

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government agency. (BR)

Canberra Dated February 25, 1944
Rec'd 7:57 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT

30, February 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Below is quoted text of note signed by Minister for External Affairs and dated today which constitutes the Commonwealth Government's reply to the message from the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Curtin (Department's telegram No. 10, February 1, 6 p.m.)

"Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that careful consideration has been given to the recent message of the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister dated February 3 and relating in the main to the time of calling the conference contemplated in Clause 34 of the Australian - New Zealand agreement 1944.

I note the important suggestion of the Secretary of State that the Australian Prime Minister should discuss the matter at Washington while on route
route to the forthcoming talks in London between Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

It was agreed between Australia and New Zealand during the recent Canberra conference that the proposed international conference should not take place before the London talks and we readily accept the suggestion of an informal discussion at Washington.

While this answers the main suggestions of the Secretary of State, there are other observations in his message which require comment, so that there shall be no misunderstanding of Australia's general policy.

The general tenor of the message is that the holding of a 'formalized' or 'formal' conference may not be desirable at the present time. However, the degree of form or formality which might attach to the proposed conference is a matter on which prior agreement should readily be obtained. Of course we are more interested in the substance than in the form of the 'frank exchange of views' envisaged in Article 34 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement.

It is
It is the opinion of the Australian Government that the prosecution of the war especially in the Pacific would be aided by such a frank and friendly exchange of views.

If it appeared that the powers with territorial interests in the South Pacific were determined to safeguard the future welfare and good Government of all the native peoples, it is certain that the joint war effort against Japan would be aided; something of positive value could be presented to the world as an answer to the Japanese political and economic propaganda within the great areas not yet liberated.

JOHNSON

NPL
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government agency. (BR)

Canberra

Dated February 15, 1944

Rec'd 8:27 a.m., 25th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

U.S. URGENT

30, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The message under reply rather assumes that Australia and New Zealand wished problems of regional defense to be dealt with prior to and irrespective of arrangements for a general international security system. This is not so. The agreement between Australia and New Zealand makes the position very clear. Article 13 speaks of a regional zone of defense 'within the framework of a general world plan of security'. Further, the obvious intention both of Australia and New Zealand was that any discussions of regional defense should be related at all times to plans for the General International Organization referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943. With that organization Australia and New Zealand desire to be associated at the planning stages and before any definite proposals are formulated, vide Article 14.

The Australian Government finds it difficult to appreciate
February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Canberra
to appreciate the suggestion that a conference in
Australia of representatives of every Allied power
without exception interested in the South Pacific
area, whether held formally or informally, could create
any reasonable ground whatsoever for objection or suspicion.
On the contrary, such a conference should, in our view
be a helpful contribution to the maintenance of harmonious
action among the United Nations. All the matters covered
by the Australian New Zealand Agreement have postwar
relevance and some of the matters will form the main
content of the postwar settlement in this part of the
world. The purpose of the Conference is to ensure that
the discussion of these great matters is set on foot
in good time so as to avert the grave risk of insufficiently
considered decisions which, through the great
pressure of events at or towards the close of hostilities,
may prejudice the final peace settlement.

Even in the midst of war every principal government
of the United Nations has found it necessary to concern
itself with these vital postwar problems, and nearly
all have established agencies for the purpose of
making suitable plans and arrangements. In this
connection
-3- #30, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Canberra connection it is appropriate to emphasize that no country has more frequently taken the initiative than has the United States of America, and that in all such matters the United States has received the fullest possible support both from Australian and New Zealand.

We feel strongly that Australian and New Zealand are entitled to the fullest degree of preliminary consultation, especially in relation to Pacific matters. At the recent Cairo conference decisions affecting the future of certain portions of the Pacific and vitally affecting both Australia and New Zealand were not only made but publicly announced without any prior reference either to the Australian or the New Zealand Government. Actually the first news the Australian Government received of the Cairo decisions was through the medium of the press.

Further, it is gradually becoming clear that certain Governments, including the United States Government, are tending to indicate their policy, though not publicly, on important phases of the Pacific settlement.

For instance at the Pacific Council on March 31, 1943 the
February 15, 3 p.m., (SECTION TWO) from Canberra
1943 the President said he had discussed with Mr.
Eden different island territories in the Pacific. The
President expressed opinions not only as to sovereignty,
but as to proposed economic coordination. The
President added that he had also discussed with Mr.
Eden the question of Japanese mandated islands and of
(*).

Subsequently, on 29 September 1943, also at the
Pacific Council, the President referred to the
Marshall and Caroline Islands and other islands east
of the Philippines. He indicated the existence
of plans to determine what postwar policy should be
adopted for the maintenance of peace in that part
of the Pacific.

JOHNSON

REP

(*) Apparent omission
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Canberra

Dated February 25, 1944

Rec'd 8:33 a.m.

Secretory of State,
Washington.

30, February 25, 3 p.m., (SECTION THREE)

Very recent, at the meeting of the Pacific council on January 12 last, the President communicated his views regarding the future of the Pacific Islands both north and south of the equator. With reference to the latter, he spoke of the possibility of "some arrangement" for their future allocation.

In the course of the meeting of January 12 the President referred specially to the question of what should be done with the French islands. The President stated that he had told Mr. Churchill that the French should not have New Caledonia back under any conditions and that he believed that the people of Australia and New Zealand would back him up.

It is realized that the President may not have been speaking definitively on these matters but they are cited as illustrations of the fact that, in matters of tremendous
tremendous consequence to Australia and New Zealand postwar arrangements are under consideration by the United States Government. We fear that they may be dealt with in a way which can prejudice harmonious Pacific settlement.

For instance, I should mention that Australia is under a deep obligation to Fighting France. It is publicly pledged to do its utmost to maintain the sovereignty of France in its present South Pacific possessions. Similar pledges have been given by other of the United Nations.

We trust that the United States Government will appreciate that our reference to France is intended merely to indicate, in our view, the danger of postponing the frank exchange of views which is the purpose of the conference referred to in article 34 of the Australian New Zealand agreement.

It is pointed out that Australia's proposal to call the International Conference was announced in a speech delivered by myself as long ago as October 12 of last year.

It is the hope of the United States that the proposed conference should be held about July of the present year. Therefore we request that when the time comes for decision
decision the United States Government will give the conference such active and vigorous support as will help to secure its success.

As I have already mentioned the United States has during the present war frequently taken the initiative in matters designed to secure closer collaboration among groups of the United Nations in matters of common interest. Groups initiative has extended to matters of regional cooperation, e.g. the Caribbean Commission. Now, when Australia and New Zealand have taken the initiative in relation to an important aspect of future international collaboration in their part of the world, we confidently ask the United States for understanding and sympathy commensurate with that which has always been extended by both Australia and New Zealand.

I understand a note along similar lines has been communicated by Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand.

(END OF MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

WSB
GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT
JUST BEFORE CURTIN ARRIVES.

file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR. HARRY HOPKINS.

I attach for your information a copy of the letter which the Prime Minister sent today to Dr. Evatt.

T.R.
13.5.43

(Penned notation)
"O.H.
This seems OK?
F.D.R."
at/

The White House,  
Washington, D.C.  
May 13, 1943.

My dear Evatt,

I have just had a reply from London about the friendly and spontaneous offer which you made on behalf of the Commonwealth Government to take over the representation of Poland at Moscow, and I write to inform you that the British Government gratefully accepts this offer, which is entirely agreeable to the President.

I am communicating a copy of this letter to London by telegram, and shall be very ready to take any further action you may wish.

May I also add my thanks for the five books about Australia's war effort which you sent me. They are a notable collection, and will make a fine addition to my library.

Yours very sincerely,

(sgd.) Winston S. Churchill

The Right Hon. Dr. H.V. Evatt
Dear Mr. Roosevelt,

I thank you for your letter of 2nd March in which you were good enough to intimate that you would be delighted to see Dr. Evatt and that he would take the place of Sir Owen Dixon on the Pacific War Council. I trust that Dr. Evatt's presence in the United States during the course of your discussions with Mr. Churchill has been advantageous by reason of his ability to furnish up-to-date information of our defence strengths and of our requirements.

I have already conferred with Sir Owen Dixon at length on several occasions and he has supplied me with a great amount of very valuable information concerning our representation in the United States, its relationships with your various authorities, and of the tremendous development of your war organisation. I am sure that his visit to Australia will be highly beneficial not only to the Commonwealth Government and the Departments of State but also to our future representation in the United States. I am indeed grateful for the courtesies and facilities which have been accorded to Sir Owen and for the assistance which has been extended to him in carrying out his duties.

The successful completion of the campaign in North Africa was a remarkable achievement for which we are all thankful. With you we look forward with confidence to the difficult tasks ahead believing that the cause of the United Nations being righteous must prevail. We are proud to be so closely associated with the forces of the United States in this theatre under the outstanding leadership of General MacArthur.

With all good wishes and my warmest greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

President F.D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL McNARNEY

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, June 3, 1943, from Dr. H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, Australian Legation, Washington, D.C. thanking for the President's assistance in re Mr. Curtin's proposal for equipping and developing the Royal Australian Air Force. Requests agreement to the Revised Programme for the Equipment of the Royal Australian Air Force which is submitted and attached.
Dear Mr. President,

I desire to acknowledge your letter of June 11th stating that the United States Government will give Australia approximately 475 planes in accordance with my application to enable the Royal Australian Air Force to be expanded and equipped. I also note that this allocation will be in addition to any previous commitments; that some of the planes will be sent at once, and that while the exact dates cannot yet be stated, delivery will take place as early as the strategic requirements permit.

I notice that the type of plane to be delivered is to be canvassed immediately and I trust that this will be decided in co-operation with Air Marshal Williams of the R.A.A.F. who is very familiar with the plan of expansion determined on by the R.A.A.F. itself in accordance with its proved needs.

On behalf of the Government I desire to thank you for acceding to my request. The contribution will be a great help to the Royal Australian Air Force and will also materially add to the fighting strength of the Southwest Pacific Area, permitting heavier blows to be struck against Japan in that area.

May I thank you for your extreme courtesy and kindness to myself throughout the negotiations. This planned expansion was the one specific object of my mission so far as military requirements are concerned. I believe that, through your massive and judicial approach and your patience, you have finally reached a decision which will be of significance when, after victory, the history of this war comes to be written.

On the eve of my departure for London I am taking this opportunity of sending to you two rare books on Australia— one of them is signed by the printer, Mr. Shea, who specially asked me to submit his book for your acceptance.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

The Honourable Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
June 15, 1943

Dear Mr. Shee:

I am most grateful to you for that fine inscribed copy of "The Pioneers of Sydney Cove" which you forwarded through Dr. Evatt. It is a strikingly beautiful piece of printing of which you have reason to be proud. I was previously familiar with this work and I am therefore more appreciative of your gift. It will always be a treasured possession.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Ernest H. Shee, Esq.,
Sydney,
Australia.

Carbon given to Mrs. Eden.
June 15, 1943.

My dear Evatt:-

I was terribly sorry not to get a glimpse of you before you went to England, and I hope to welcome you back very soon.

I, too, am delighted over the result which, by constant pressure, came out of the War Department! I will keep at it to assure deliveries as soon as possible.

Those two books are a real joy and I am glad indeed to have them to put among my "voyages and travels". I knew of the Golden Cockerel volume but had never seen a copy, and that book which Mr. Shea has so kindly signed is a lovely piece of work and a true source book.

Ever so many thanks and every best wish,

Always sincerely,

Dr. H. V. Evatt,
Australian Legation,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter to the Pres. from Dr. Evatt
Australian Legation, dated May 20th
re Mr. Curtin's proposal for equipping
the additional squadrons of Royal
Australian Air Force, asks President
to endorse this proposal.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

At the
Australian Legation,
Washington, D.C.
June 3rd, 1943

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Australian Government I thank you most sincerely for your continued assistance in connection with Mr. Curtin's proposal for equipping and developing the Royal Australian Air Force. Australia will be most grateful. Mr. Churchill's signal from abroad too was most satisfactory indeed.

As I explained to Mr. Hopkins yesterday, I have felt it my special duty to yourself to revise the programme so as to make compliance with it far more easy to the military authorities. I have, therefore, planned for deliveries of aircraft not within the period of six months originally suggested, but over a far longer period, viz. 18 months, i.e. July 1st 1943 to December 31st 1944. This appears clearly from the revised programme which I now enclose.

I would prefer a far more rapid development and have authorised the revision with reluctance. Naturally the value of the special contribution to Australia is directly related to the speed of deliveries.

As revised, the programme calls for the delivery of only 135 unit equipment in 1943 and 339 unit equipment during the whole of 1944. I think you will agree that this is moderate and reasonable.

Having regard to all the circumstances and the special endeavours I have made to satisfy the military authorities, I now respectfully request agreement to the revised programme as now submitted.

Yours sincerely,

The Honourable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
### REVISIRED PROGRAMME FOR THE EQUIPMENT OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squadrons</td>
<td>Unit Equipment</td>
<td>Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Bombers</td>
<td>2 (36)</td>
<td>7 (126)</td>
<td>9 (162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.S.Fighters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.S.Fighters</td>
<td>1 (24)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dive Bombers</td>
<td>2 (48)</td>
<td>2 (48)</td>
<td>4 (96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (Landplanes)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>5 (45)</td>
<td>6 (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR/F Boats</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (Seaplane)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>8 (135)</td>
<td>19 (339)</td>
<td>27 (474)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPLANATORY NOTES:**

1. **Heavy Bombers:** The Royal Australian Air Force now includes no unit armed with aircraft heavier than a "Hudson" and as a Force is quite unbalanced, its striking power, especially at long range, being almost negligible.

   The 71 Squadron Programme calls for 9 such squadrons and for this development two Squadrons should be supplied this year.

   Experienced Heavy Bomber crews are now available, having completed an operational tour with the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom or Middle East.

2. **Single-seater Fighters:** Only one of the total number of squadrons of this type remains to be provided. It is suggested that it would be preferable to form this squadron this year, with aircraft similar to that with which
other Single Seater Fighter Squadrons in the area are now armed, rather than leaving it until next year when it may have to be armed with an odd type of aircraft.

3. Dive Bombers: Dive bomber squadrons in the R.A.A.F. are now armed with A-35 (Vengeance) aircraft. The main disadvantage of this aircraft is its comparatively short range, poor performance and light armament.

Conditions of operations in the Australian theatres call primarily for multi-engined aircraft, but whilst this is not a characteristic of the A-35, an aircraft with a poorer performance would be no practical contribution to the operational requirements of the area.

4. Transport (Landplanes): Because of the undeveloped nature of the country in which operations are being conducted, as well as the long stretches of sea and jungle to be covered, the Transport Squadrons are the most urgently needed. Six of these squadrons have yet to be provided, and it is considered that one should be supplied this year.

5. GR/F Boats: General Reconnaissance squadrons armed with Catalina Aircraft are the only units in the R.A.A.F. possessing more than medium range. They are called upon to cover a large area and they are doing excellent work. Only one of this type of squadron remains to be provided to complete the programme. It is understood that production of the type is good and the provision of this squadron this year would be valuable contribution to the operational demands of the immediate future.
6. Transport (Seaplanes) The R.A.A.F. contains one Transport Squadron equipped with Flying Boats. This squadron was formed originally by taking Empire Boats from Qantas Empire Airways. The squadron is composed of personnel of long experience, who have done excellent work. Their equipment, however, has now been reduced to one boat only. This unit should be re-equipped as early as possible. The conditions of the area offer exceptional possibilities for the use of this type, especially during operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Dr. Evatt's request for planes for the R.A.A.F.

A reply for your signature to Dr. Evatt's letter of June third is attached. The principles involved were fully covered in General Marshall's memorandum of May twenty-fifth, copy attached.

[Signature]

Acting Chief of Staff.

Incls.
Dear Dr. Evatt:

Your revised program for the delivery of aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force, which you submitted in your letter of June 3, is being referred to the Combined Aircraft Allocation Committee. As you know, this Committee will meet on June 10 for the purpose of revising and making appropriate changes in scheduled aircraft allocations from 1943 production.

You may be sure that your revised program will be given the most careful consideration, and that it will be met insofar as it is possible to do so. At this time I cannot state definitely how far along we can go in accepting your program. Because our 1943 production output is not now exceeding existing commitments, any increase in planes for Australia must be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in planes allocated to the United States, British or Russian air forces. This involves strategic considerations which must be carefully considered.

I understand full well your great concern and zeal in the matter of aircraft for Australia and appreciate your desire to revise the Australian program so as to make compliance with it far more easy for the United States military authorities. We will do the very best we can for you consistent with our other commitments.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Dr. Evatt's request for the R.A.A.F.

Since your brief conversation with me yesterday evening on the above subject I have gone into the matter again and as a result submit a new draft for a reply by you to Dr. Evatt. It is attached.

It is my opinion that to meet Dr. Evatt's request at this time we must do definite harm to our program in some direction. I wish you would consider these aspects of his request.

We agreed a few weeks ago to a material increase in the air forces to the Southwest Pacific and those reinforcements are now en route or, in the case of the heavy bombers, have already arrived.

These additional planes proposed by Dr. Evatt amount to approximately a 42% increase in the total air forces, actually 64% of the present U.S. air force under MacArthur.

The British Chiefs of Staff have discussed this with the representative of the R.A.A.F. in Washington and they do not agree with Dr. Evatt's proposal.

It is not a small matter but a very large one. Frankly he has pounded us with propaganda and personal pressures. We will be seriously hurt if we submit to his demands.

If the attached letter does not meet your views I am prepared to redraft it accordingly.

(sgd) G.C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

Incl.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

January 3, 1944.

My dear Mr. Curtin:—

Now that I am back from the Conferences with Mr. Churchill and the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin, I feel even more strongly that you and I should meet. As you know, I have been close to Mackenzie King almost since we were boys; Marshal Smuts and I first met in 1918, and I had a grand reunion with him in Cairo last month; and Peter Fraser has stopped off here in Washington several times; and I feel that there is a real void which can only be filled by a meeting between you and me.

I do hope that you will consider coming here within a few months. It would not take you long and my thought is that you would spend a couple of days at the White House, making perhaps one public appearance either on the West Coast or in New York City at a big meeting. Then you could run up for a day or two to see Mackenzie King.

Incidentally and confidentially, while Churchill and I did not discuss the matter in any way, I do not think it would do anything but good if you could go to London for a short visit. I think you would receive a very warm welcome.

My plans call for no definite absence from Washington for some months, though, of course, the military situation may change suddenly making it necessary for me to dash off to a meeting before that.

There are many things I want to talk with you about, even though they are not matters which require immediate decisions. For instance, I think we should discuss the future military, naval and air protection of Australia and, in a preliminary way at least, the disposition of the Japanese-owned mandated or controlled islands. Also, I want to talk with you about the future policing of the whole Pacific and Asiatic area.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
In this country we are all very keen about the splendid work that is being done by Australia. As the head of a Government you realize as I do that when there are "no complaints" and "no criticisms", it means that things are going well! As we used to say in my rowing days, Australia is "pulling its weight in the boat".

With my warm regards and all good wishes for the New Year,

Always sincerely,

The Right Honorable
John Curtin,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Canberra,
Australia.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADmiral leahy

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Note, 1-25-44, from Hon. Owen Dixon, re Rear Admiral Robert Carney stating in press interview that next objectives of forces in the South and South West Pacific areas are Rabaul and Kavieng - this public statement is viewed with concern by Australian Govt. and it feels an instruction should be issued prohibiting other officers from making statements on plans for future operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a copy of a note dated January 25, 1944 from the Australian Minister transmitting a message to you from Prime Minister Curtin in regard to a reported press interview by Rear Admiral Robert Carney on operations in the South West Pacific.

Enclosure:

From Australian Minister, January 25, 1944.

740.0011 Pacific War/3686
My dear Mr. President,

I am very grateful for your kind invitation to visit Washington and to stay with Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself at the White House. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to be able to accept it.

2. Mr. Churchill has been in touch with me about a meeting of Prime Ministers this year and, if this eventuates, I would be delighted to visit you on my way to London. We could then discuss those matters relating to the Pacific area in which we have such mutual and common interests.

3. Thank you for your kind remarks about Australia’s war effort. We are stretched to the utmost, and, as the demands on our manpower and material resources exceed our capacity, the constant problem confronting the Government is to determine the precise limits of what we are capable of doing in the field and in the various avenues of services and supplies. Our great anxiety is to help General MacArthur to the utmost, both in respect of our own military effort and the aid which we can give to the United States Forces in the Southwest and South Pacific Areas.

4. Your good wishes for the New Year are heartily reciprocated, and I trust that, at the end of 1944, we shall be well on the way to final victory.

With kindest regards to Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself.

Yours very sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.

Prime Minister,
Canberra.
2nd February, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State

In reply to your memorandum of January 29th, transmitting a copy of a note dated January 25, 1944, from the Australian Minister in regard to a reported press interview by Rear Admiral Carney, U. S. Navy, on operations in the Southwest Pacific, I have had the matter looked into by the Navy Department with the following result.

It has been ascertained that Rear Admiral Carney included the following statement in an interview with the press:

"The next two obvious points of Jap strength are Rabaul and Kavieng; it is perfectly evident to everyone that the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Forces are rushing along their respective axes toward eliminating these bases; they are next on the list and we plan to put them out of business."

Speculation of this sort is not countenanced in the United States Fleet. Furthermore, Rear Admiral Carney exceeded his authority in commenting publicly on Southwest Pacific matters. Steps have been taken to ensure that there will be no repetition.

Please convey this information to the Minister from Australia.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Subject: Press Interview Protested by Australian Government.

Reference: (a) Your memorandum of 10 February 1944.

1. With reference to the note dated 25 January 1944 from the Australian Minister concerning a reported press interview by Rear Admiral Robert Carney on operations in the Southwest Pacific, I have ascertained from the Commander, South Pacific Force that Rear Admiral Carney included the following statement in an interview with the press:

"The next two obvious points of Jap strength are Rabaul and Kavieng; it is perfectly evident to everyone that the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Forces are rushing along their respective axes toward eliminating these bases; they are next on the list and we plan to put them out of business."

2. While this particular statement is unlikely to prejudice the security of future operations, nevertheless speculation of this sort is not countenanced in the United States Fleet. Furthermore, Admiral Carney exceeded his authority in commenting publicly on Southwest Pacific Area matters.

3. The indiscretion of Rear Admiral Carney is deeply regretted. Steps have been taken to ensure that there will be no repetition.
February 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Admiral King:

There is forwarded herewith attached a copy of a communication received from the Prime Minister of Australia regarding an alleged public statement by Rear Admiral Carney.

Can you take appropriate action and inform me of the action with return of papers in order that I may prepare a reply to the Prime Minister of Australia?

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.
January 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a copy of a note dated January 25, 1944 from the Australian Minister transmitting a message to you from Prime Minister Curtin in regard to a reported press interview by Rear Admiral Robert Carney on operations in the South West Pacific.

Hull

Enclosure:

From Australian Minister,
January 25, 1944.

740.0011 Pacific War/3686
25th January, 1944.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have been instructed by the Australian Minister for External Affairs to arrange for the following message from the Australian Prime Minister, the Right Honourable John Curtin, to be conveyed to the President. I should be grateful if you could arrange for this message to be transmitted.

"In the Australian Press of 20th January a report is published of an interview with Rear Admiral Robert Carney, Chief of Staff, South Pacific Forces, in which he states that the next objectives of the forces in the South and South West Pacific areas are Rabaul and Kavieng.

2. The Australian Government views with concern authoritative public statements of this nature on plans of operations with which its own naval land and air forces are associated. The only information which the Government receives on these plans is that which is given to me as the Prime Minister by the Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area, in the strictest secrecy. Apart from the value to the enemy of such authoritative public statements and the consequent additional risk to our forces it is embarrassing that officers should speak in public on matters of this nature on which the head of the Government is precluded from making any statement.

3. Under the Commander in Chief's Directive he alone is authorised to issue communiqués and it is considered

OD:EDC

The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
an instruction should be issued prohibiting other officers from making statements on plans for future operations.

4. I am communicating a copy of this message to General MacArthur for his information.

5. The Government and the people of Australia are glad to learn that you have recovered from your recent illness and have been able to resume your responsible task. I hope that your great endeavours will be crowned this year with decisive military victories."

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) Owen Dixon
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1944.

REMINDER FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Prime Minister Curtin is arriving in Washington on April 18th to stay at the White House that night. He will have about six people in his party but the rest can stay at Blair House.

G.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I asked Summerlin to present a memorandum giving all the expected visits and the status at present. I thought this would be of interest to you.

Regarding the visit of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Summy's memorandum was sent prior to my telling him that the President would probably be away from Washington at that time. Summy will arrange for suitable accommodations for the Prime Minister and his party and Mr. Hull will receive him. I explained that whether the President sees Mr. Fraser will depend upon circumstances at the time.

E.M.W.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

The latest information available on pending visits of distinguished foreigners is as follows:

CANADA - His Excellency The Governor General of Canada and Her Royal Highness The Princess Alice

The Governor General and HRH The Princess Alice are expected to arrive in Washington by plane on Monday, April 17 at 12:30 P.M. It is understood that they will stay at the White House and leave Washington on Thursday, April 20 at 11 A.M. by air for New York. (See Ray Atherton's letter attached).

The party will comprise the Governor General and HRH The Princess Alice; Miss Vera Grenfell, Lady-in-Waiting; Sir Shuldham Federn, Secretary to the Governor General; one Aide-de-Camp; a maid and a valet.

AUSTRALIA - The Right Honorable John Curtin
Prime Minister of Australia

The Department has been notified of no change in the Prime Minister's schedule to arrive in Washington on Wednesday, April 19, although the Australian Legation states that there may be some delay, owing to the PM's reluctance to fly the Pacific. According to the Legation, if he comes by boat, he could not arrive in Washington before April 25. The Legation has cabled again today to Canberra for the PM's plans.

NEW ZEALAND - The Right Honorable Peter Fraser
Prime Minister of New Zealand

The New Zealand Legation at Washington has informed the Department that the Prime Minister, accompanied by Mrs. Fraser
Fraser, Mr. McIntosh, Secretary for External Affairs, and four others, expects to arrive in Washington "about the middle of the month (of April)" en route to London for the opening of the Conference of Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth on May 1.

COSTA RICA - His Excellency Tedoro Picado
President-elect of Costa Rica

President-elect Picado has been told that if he wishes to visit the United States, he should not arrive until after the visit of the Prime Minister of Australia. This was done pursuant to your instruction.

S/ G.T. SUMMERLIN
George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:
From Ray Atherton,
March 20, 1944
CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Jack:

I had a talk with the Secretary to the Governor General, Sir Shuldham Fedfern, on Saturday, who advised me that, subsequent to an invitation from the President, His Excellency The Governor General and Her Royal Highness The Princess Alice will visit Washington (The White House).

The party will consist of the Governor General and the Princess Alice, Miss Vera Grenfell, Lady-in-Waiting, Sir Shuldham Fedfern, Secretary to the Governor General, one Aide-de-Camp, a maid and a valet. The dates and itinerary are as follows:

Monday, April 17
9:00 a.m. Depart Ottawa (Rockcliffe) by air
12:30 p.m. Arrive Washington.

Thursday, April 20
11:00 a.m. Depart Washington (by air)
12:00 noon Arrive New York (La Guardia Field)
3:30 p.m. Depart New York (by air)
5:45 p.m. Arrive Ottawa (Rockcliffe)

Sir Shuldham Fedfern informed me this is the first visit that their Excellencies had ever made to Washington and that, being very fond of sightseeing, they would first of all welcome an occasion to visit The National Gallery and also, if possible, Mount Vernon and some of the sights about Washington. Furthermore, although they are entirely at the disposal of the President as to their plans, they would be agreeable, if the opportunity permitted, to accept an invitation from the Canadian Ambassador at the Canadian Embassy and

John D. Hickerson, Esquire,
Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs,
Office of European Affairs,
Washington, D. C.,
U.S.A.
from the British Ambassador at the British Embassy.

We will advise you shortly prior to their arrival as to any pending matters of interest as useful background to any conversations.

Yours sincerely,

RAY AHERTON
TELEGRAM From THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

March 22, 1944.

MRS. ROOSEVELT

I do hope you can arrange to be here when Lord Athlone and Princess Alice are here. They get here the seventeenth and stay until the nineteenth. It is not necessary to be here with Curtin though he may be here at the same time.

F. D. R.
TELEGRAM

From THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1944.

MRS. ROOSEVELT

Lord Athlone, Governor General of Canada, and his wife want to stay with us at the White House April 17th to 19th. Prime Minister Curtin is expected to arrive about April 18th or 19th. I hope much that you can be in Washington at that time. Will you let me know? Love

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ambassador McCarthy informed me that the Governor General and his wife, the Princess Alice, want to avail themselves of the President's repeated invitation to visit him. They suggested they might arrive April 17th and stay until April 19th. May I call the President's attention to the fact that Prime Minister Curtin, of Australia, is expected to arrive about April 18th or 19th.

Ambassador McCarthy says he will this afternoon submit the formal notification and request through the Division of Protocol of the State Department. They should arrive tomorrow.
WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

We have just received the following message from Mrs. Roosevelt at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, for delivery to the President:

"Can be home 18th and 19th. Am trying to cancel engagement for 17th but it may not be possible. Hope your cold is not serious. All well. Much love, signed E. R."

B. W. DAVIDENPORT,  
Major, G. S. C.,  
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

Date: 6-14-66  
Signature: [Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 22, 1944

This memorandum is for your background information in talking to Prime Minister Curtin on April 25th.

The Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January 21, 1944 is the principal question outstanding between the United States and Australia at present. Certain provisions of the agreement are aimed, all too obviously, at the United States. This is especially evident in the declaration that the construction or use of military bases in the Pacific islands does not provide any basis for "territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control." It is evident also in the declaration that "no change in the sovereignty or the system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific" should be made except by agreement of Australia and New Zealand.

I have told Prime Minister Fraser that this agreement, so far as tone and method are concerned, seems to resemble the Russian action against Great Britain when the Russians, being dissatisfied with the British attitude toward Poland, issued a world-wide statement charging Britain with the intention of negotiating a separate peace with Germany.

The New Zealanders have confirmed our impression that this agreement is primarily the work of Australia, and of Dr. Evatt in particular. I intend to repeat to Prime Minister Curtin the same statement that I made to Mr. Fraser. Mr. Curtin is understood to be a very reasonable man and I believe we should tell him very frankly how we feel about Dr. Evatt's recent actions.

You might say that we have been unable to understand Dr. Evatt's attitude on a number of questions including: (a) his efforts to put the whole blame on the United States and the American internal political situation for our failure to reach a trade agreement with Australia; and (b) worst of all, Evatt's whole attitude in connection with the Australian-New Zealand Agreement. The
height of Dr. Evatt's bad manners was reached in his reply to our request that the proposed conference on the Southwest Pacific should be postponed. Dr. Evatt included in his reply references to statements said to have been made by you at meetings on the Pacific War Council regarding New Caledonia. You might point out to Mr. Curtin that meetings of the Pacific War Council are intended to be entirely informal with no written record of the proceedings and that you were greatly shocked to receive a formal note from the Australian Government citing statements thrown out for informal discussion at these meetings.

The most immediate question in connection with the agreement is the proposal to call a conference of countries with territorial interests in the South and Southwest Pacific to deal with "the problem of security, post-war development and native welfare". I have emphasized to Mr. Fraser our strong feelings against holding such a conference at this time, since the war in the Pacific is still to be won and since any attempt to deal with regional security now would only harm our efforts to achieve a general system of world security.

Mr. Fraser has told me that he is entirely willing that the proposed conference should be postponed. It is the Australians who have been pushing the conference idea and we should try to convince Mr. Curtin that the idea should be abandoned for the time being. I hope that you will specifically request Mr. Curtin to agree to this procedure.

Both Australia and New Zealand have felt a grievance in not being consulted more closely in connection with the conduct of the war. Both countries wish to be brought in on the early stages of planning a general international organization, and it would be helpful to assure Prime Minister Curtin that this will be done.

Attached are biographical sketches of Mr. Curtin and members of his party.

Enclosures:

Biographical sketches.
The Right Honorable John Curtin - Australia

Prime Minister of Australia since October 8, 1941. Member of Parliament for Western Australia since 1934 and leader of the Australian Labor Party in Parliament since 1935. Mr. Curtin is the first member from Western Australia to become Prime Minister. For a number of years he was Editor of *The Westralian Worker* and has been in labor politics throughout his career. As Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin has shown qualities of leadership and was returned to power with a strong majority in the general election of August 1943. Mr. Curtin's Cabinet, with two or three exceptions, is very weak. As a labor leader, Curtin has had the difficult task in trying to hold the gains which labor has made and at the same time press the war effort. He has recently started dealing more firmly with organized labor in Australia whose strikes and other tactics have impeded the war effort. Mr. Curtin has a great admiration for General MacArthur and has worked closely with him. It is believed that the two men are on excellent terms. As a labor man, Curtin has traditionally opposed conscription and is said to have served a day in jail during the last war on a non-conscription charge. However, he took the lead in inaugurating conscription for a limited area in the Southwest Pacific.

Mr. Curtin left the Roman Catholic Church and is now a Protestant. His formal education was limited to high school. He is said to be not a very personable man, being shy and retiring and displaying social discomfort until engaged in conversation on serious subjects of his preference. While not popular in a social sense, he is popular as a man with public spirit who spends his time in work and study.

Mr. Curtin also holds the post of Minister for Defense Coordination and it is believed that on his visit he will be primarily concerned with military affairs. While he is understood to be fairly conversant with international affairs and conscious of their importance, it is believed that he has left this field largely to his Minister for External Affairs. It is believed also that he has not personally taken leadership in recent pronouncements on Australian foreign policy and in the conclusion of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement. In general he is believed
to be friendly to the United States. In December 1941, Curtin stated that Australia must look to the United States "free from any pangs as to our traditional links or friendship with the United Kingdom." More recently Australia, and probably Curtin personally, have felt less dependent on the United States. Recently Mr. Curtin has proposed a scheme for closer consultation within the British Commonwealth, "by the establishment of some Imperial authority... so that the British Commonwealth of Nations will have, if not an executive body, at least a standing consultative body with all the facilities for communication and meeting."

Mr. Curtin is proceeding to London to attend the meeting of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
General Sir Thomas Blamey - Australia

Commander of Allied Land Forces in the Southwest Pacific area and Commander in Chief of Australian Military Forces. Born January 24, 1864. As a career military officer Blamey participated in the operations in Egypt in 1914, in Gallipoli in 1915 and in France and Belgium 1916-1918. He won a great reputation during these years of the first world war as an energetic Chief of Staff to the late Sir John Monash, the real Australian hero leader of that war. His ventures between the wars as Chief of Police are classed as far from successful but on the outbreak of war in 1939 he was given a high post and served as Commander of the First Australian Corps in the Near East. Upon the appointment of General MacArthur to command the Southwest Pacific area, Blamey was given the next highest command, that of Field Commander of all fighting forces. He is thus Commander of Allied Land Forces in Australia, including such American and Australian troops as may be serving in the field. General Blamey was criticized by certain members of Parliament in the fall of 1942 and was sometimes referred to as "Boozy" Blamey. General Blamey served in New Guinea and directed the offensive which cleared the Japanese from the Owen Stanley range and the Buna area. He was awarded the American Distinguished Service Cross for his New Guinea campaign. General Blamey appears to have high confidence of the Curtin government. This belief is supported by his inclusion in the Prime Minister's party to Washington and London. General Blamey is described as short, stubby, jolly, friendly, energetic and frank.
Sir Frederick Geoffrey Shedden - Australia

Secretary to the War Cabinet and Secretary to the Department of Defense Coordination since 1939. Sir Frederick is a career official whose position now corresponds to that of our Under Secretary of War. He has been specially trained over a period of years in administration particularly in defense matters. He was born August 8, 1893 at Kyneton, Victoria. He attended the University of London, studying military accounting. He attended the Imperial Defense College in Britain in 1928 and was accredited to the War Office and the British Treasury in 1929 for study in financial administration. His training was for the purpose of qualifying him as Permanent Head of the Defense Department which he has now become. He attended the Disarmament Conference in 1932 and served as adviser and secretary to the Australian delegation to the World Economic Conference in 1933. Some say that Sir Frederick excels in laying out administrative plans on paper but is not so able in their execution. As Secretary to the War Cabinet, Sir Frederick occupies a key position and is fully informed on all important matters of government policy. He is close to the Prime Minister.

Personally Sir Frederick is somewhat silent and not aggressive, yet able to hold his own in discussions.
May 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Honorable John A. Beasley, Australian Minister for Supply and Shipping, who is in this country as Australia's Delegate to the International Labor Conference, has expressed a special desire to meet you.

Mr. Beasley has shown his warm friendship for this country in numerous ways. He has done an outstanding job in supplying American forces in the Southwest Pacific and has been called "Quartermaster of the Southwest Pacific". As champion of the United States and its cause in Australia and as the one person in Australia most responsible for meeting the needs of our troops, Mr. Beasley does not want to return to Australia without at least having shaken hands with you.

As you know the Australian Government, Dr. Evatt in particular, has been behaving outrageously in a number of respects. I understand that Mr. Beasley does not share Dr. Evatt's views, and I believe that if you could see Mr. Beasley for only a few minutes it might pay excellent dividends. Both Minister Nelson T. Johnson and Sir Owen Dixon have emphasized their belief that we ought to pay special attention to Mr. Beasley while he is in Washington. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to see Mr. Beasley. Sir Owen Dixon should, of course, be asked to accompany him.

I believe you should talk to Mr. Beasley with complete frankness and say that we have been considerably shocked by the attitude of the Australian Government and of Dr. Evatt in particular on a number of questions recently, including:

(a) The Australia-New Zealand Agreement, parts of which were aimed obviously at the United States.

(b) The proposal to call a conference on the Southwest Pacific. We have opposed holding such a conference, since the war in the Pacific is still
is still to be won and since any attempt to
deal with regional security now would only
harm our efforts to achieve a general system
of world security.

(e) Dr. Evatt's bad manners in including in a
formal note references to statements said to
have been made by you at meetings of the
Pacific War Council regarding New Caledonia.

(d) Dr. Evatt's efforts to put the whole blame on
the United States and the American internal
political situation for our failure to reach
a trade agreement with Australia. In fact
we took the initiative and tried for two years
to push the agreement.

Mr. Beasley will be in Washington until Friday.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

With reference to my memorandum of May 17th last in regard to a request for the Honorable J. A. Beasley, Minister of Supply and Shipping of the Australian Cabinet, to be received by the President, I am enclosing a copy of a confidential memorandum from the Office of European Affairs (Division of British Commonwealth Affairs), asking the Division of Protocol to re-submit this request.

CONFIDENTIAL - It seems to me that somebody is trying to force your hand!

Enclosure: Copy of memorandum.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of European Affairs
Division of British Commonwealth Affairs

May 26, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

PR:

The Honorable John A. Beasley, Australian Minister for Supply and Shipping, now in Washington, has expressed a special desire to meet the President. He has emphasized that he does not wish to take up the President's time, but that he does not wish to return to Australia without having at least shaken hands with the President.

It is understood that the Australian Legation has already been informed that the President will not be able to see Mr. Beasley. Nevertheless, it is believed that the special circumstances in this case warrant a further approach to the White House. Mr. Beasley, probably more than any other single individual, has been responsible for meeting the needs of American forces in the Southwest Pacific for food and other supplies. Mr. Beasley, as a member of the Australian Cabinet, outranks Dr. H. V. Evatt, who on his visits to the United States had access to the President on a number of occasions and exploited this association upon returning to Australia. Mr. Beasley appears to be very favorably disposed toward this country, and, in view of the recent attitude of the Australian Government on a number of questions, a short talk by the President with Mr. Beasley might pay good dividends.

It is also rumored that Mr. Beasley may one day be appointed as Australian Minister to Washington, succeeding Sir Owen Dixon.

For these reasons it is believed that Mr. Beasley's request should be put to the White House again. Mr. Beasley will be in Washington until next Thursday.

H.F.M.

BC:RBStewart:fw

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaub Date FEB 4 1972
Moscow

Dated June 7, 1944

Rec'd 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
2013, June 7, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

I met Mr. Curtin at Chequers with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister told me that he had developed great respect for and confidence in Curtin and that of the Dominion Prime Ministers, Curtin had been the most constructive at the recent conference in London. I personally was much impressed with Mr. Curtin, his attitude as expressed on the various subjects that came up, and the manner in which he dealt with Mr. Churchill.

HARRIMAN

RB
RR

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

Do you think this needs a reply? If so, will you prepare one. Otherwise, just return for my files.

F.D.R.

Most Secret letter to the President from Hon. John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, dated 6-5-44, re demands likely to be made on Australia when United Kingdom Forces come into the war against Japan. (two enclosures)
July 12, 1944.

PERSONAL

My dear Johnson:

This will introduce to you my old personal friend, His Excellency, Most Reverend Francis J. Spellman, D.D., Archbishop of New York, and Chaplain Bishop of the Army and Navy. He plans to visit a number of fronts and I hope much you will have a chance to visit with him while he is in your area. He is doing a wonderful job and I am sure you will enjoy knowing him.

With my warm regards,

Always sincerely,

Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
Minister to Australia,
American Legation,
Canberra, Australia.

Copy filed - Spellman folder, 12-4-44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 13, 1944

I am returning Prime Minister Curtin's communication to you of June 5, together with his enclosed memorandum submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their reply in regard to basic Australian policy for the maintenance of its armed forces and the production of foodstuffs and other supplies.

Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to Mr. Curtin's proposal, and since Mr. Curtin submitted these documents for your information, it is believed that no reply is necessary.

Enclosures:

1. From Prime Minister Curtin, June 5, 1944.
2. Memorandum by the Prime Minister.
3. From the Combined Chiefs of Staff, June 3, 1944.
The President
5th June, 1944.

Very dear Mr President,

While in London, I have had discussions with Mr. Churchill and his advisers about the Australian war effort, with particular reference to the demands likely to be made on Australia when United Kingdom Forces come into the war against Japan in strength, following the defeat of Germany.

2. For some months the Australian Government has been seeking to re-balance the Australian war effort in order to remove certain stresses and strains which have arisen from the extensive call-up of manpower after the outbreak of war with Japan, when the A.I.F. was still in the Middle East. The return of the A.I.F. and the arrival of United States Forces gave rise to extensive demands for food and other requirements and a re-adjustment of manpower has been necessary to provide for these needs and to sustain the level of activity in a number of basic industries on which the Australian direct military effort ultimately depends. This process is not yet complete, but in conjunction with it, it will also be necessary to provide for the contribution which Australia might be able to make towards the supply and maintenance of United Kingdom Forces which may be based on Australia in the future.

3. While I have been seeking information as to the broad basis which should govern the Policy of the Australian Government in this direction, I have emphasized that the Government and people of Australia are anxious that the strength of the fighting forces shall not be permitted to fall below a certain minimum point. Mr. Churchill and I have reached agreement on these strengths and the level at which food production should be maintained for exports to Britain. As Australia is in a sphere of American strategic responsibility, Mr. Churchill also agreed that I should discuss the matter in Washington.

4. Had circumstances permitted, I would naturally have discussed this matter with you first. As this was not possible, I went ahead with my discussions with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and I am glad to say that, thanks to their cordial co-operation and their understanding of our position, a satisfactory conclusion has been reached.

5. I enclose for your information copies of:

   (1) The Memorandum submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

   (ii) Their reply.

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THE AUSTRALIAN WAR EFFORT.

MEMORANDUM BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to state the broad position confronting the Commonwealth Government in regard to the nature and extent of the Australian war effort. This effort is, of course, primarily based on the strategical plan in the South West Pacific area which is a part of the general scheme for the defeat of Japan.

2. Australia, in addition to maintaining Forces of considerable strength in the South West Pacific area, as well as continuing its part in the Empire Air scheme and manning certain ships for the Royal Navy, has accepted responsibilities for the provision of works, supplies and services for the American Forces as well as its own. It has also to maintain the civil economy on certain austerity standards, and to meet commitments for the supply of foodstuffs to the United Kingdom to assist in the maintenance of the rations of the British people.

3. The following was the distribution of Australian manpower in December, 1943:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Navy, Army and Air Force</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions industries</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other essential industries</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for direct war activities</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less essential industries</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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An indication of the degree to which the national effort has been concentrated on direct war activities is to be obtained from a comparison between the figures for the United Kingdom and Australia. In the case of the United Kingdom 75.1 per cent of its manpower is absorbed in direct war activities; the figure for Australia is 71.4 per cent.

4. As Australia does not possess the manpower and material resources to meet all the demands being made upon it, I discussed our problem with the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific area in December, 1945. General MacArthur fully agreed with the action contemplated by the Government to provide for the following needs:

(a) The additional manpower necessary to sustain the level of activity in a number of basic industries on which the Australian direct military effort ultimately depends (transport, power, timber, minerals, food, clothing, etc.), in order to ensure a proper balance between the direct military programme and its industrial basis.

(b) Certain further requirements of manpower for the production of food for Britain, and of food and general supplies for the rapidly growing Allied Forces in Pacific Areas.

5. While in London I discussed with Mr. Churchill the question of the additional demands likely to be made on Australia when British Forces are brought into the war against Japan. I agreed to a proposal by Mr. Churchill that British Staff Officers should be integrated into the Australian Staffs for the preparation of a report on the potentialities of Australia as a base. Mr. Churchill emphasized that this study will be made without any commitment on the part of the United Kingdom Government that the forces will be based on Australia, the latter aspect being reserved for later decision in the light of the military position when the forces become available.
6. Nevertheless, it is essential that the Commonwealth Government should have before it some broad ideas to govern its policy in regard to the Australian war effort. Australia can only maintain additional forces by adjusting her war effort in some other direction. The Government will be quite prepared to do this provided the Australian military effort is not permitted to fall below a certain point. Furthermore it is presumed that if strategical considerations indicate that additional forces should be sent to Australia, the resources of the United Nations will be capable of making good deficiencies which cannot be supplied by the Commonwealth.

7. Though a decision on the basing of British Forces on Australia is not possible at present, I pointed out to Mr. Churchill that the Australian Government would like a general view on the desirability of Australia proceeding with the measures necessary for supply and maintenance, in view of the fact that the resources can be absorbed in other directions in the war effort of the United Nations. A precise assessment of what Australia is capable of doing can then be worked out. The decision as to the nature and extent of its war effort is of course a matter for the Australian Government.

8. The following conclusions were reached by Mr. Churchill and myself:

(i) The Australian war effort should be on the following basis:
   (a) the maintenance of six divisions for active operations.
   (b) the maintenance of the Royal Australian Navy at its present strength plus additions arising from the Australian naval construction programme.
   (c) the maintenance of the Royal Australian Air Force at the strength of 55 squadrons to be achieved under the present programme by December, 1944.
This excludes:
   5 R.A.F. squadrons in Australia
2 N.E.I. squadrons in Australia
2 Permanent R.A.A.F. squadrons serving overseas
R.A.A.F. E.A.T.S. squadrons and personnel serving overseas

(d) food for Great Britain (including India) to be exported on the 1944 scale.

(ii) In the light of the strengths laid down for the Forces, the Commonwealth Government will review the extent and nature of other aspects of the Australian war effort. This will enable it to assess what can be done for the supply and maintenance of British Forces which may be based on Australia, in addition to the present similar commitments for the United States Forces. As demands will exist somewhere for supplies that could be produced, it may be feasible to go ahead with increased production. For example, if increases in food production should not be required for United Kingdom forces, they could be sent to the United Kingdom or the ceilings at present imposed on the United States Forces could be raised to some degree.

Mr. Churchill emphasized that agreement to this action does not imply any commitment or the adoption of any specific plan for the basing of British Forces on Australia.

9. As Australia is in a sphere of American strategic responsibility, Mr. Churchill agreed that I should discuss the matter in Washington.

Prime Minister.

2nd June, 1944.
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3 June 1944

The Secretary,
Australian War Cabinet.

Sir,

We have been instructed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to convey to Mr. Curtin their acceptance of the paper put forward by him containing the basis of policy that he suggests should be followed by the Australian Government with a view to the most effective prosecution of the war, and to request Mr. Curtin to proceed on the suggested basis of a reduction to six divisions and two armoured brigades.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff invite Mr. Curtin to inform them as to the alternative uses to which the Australian Government considers the manpower released by this reduction could best be applied.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

(Sgd.) H. Redman

H. REDMAN,

(Sgd.) A.J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Combined Secretariat