Dear Miss Tully:

It is with real pleasure that I learned of the return of the President. Could you have the great kindness to tell the President my warmest congratulations for his complete recovery.

In the last days I received a complete and confidential report from Budapest on the happenings there and have been requested - owing to this report's character - to submit it personally to the President. The whole thing would be the matter of but a few minutes. May I therefore ask you to have the great kindness to ask the President for such a short appointment. If you should be free to fix the date, may I ask you to make it sometimes in the latter part of this week. But naturally I am at the disposition of the President at any other time sooner.

Thanking you in advance for your kindness and with my best regards, I am, dear Miss Tully

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

Washington, D.C.
May 9th, 1944.
Miss Tully:

I. Charles Louis back: Would like to see the President.

II. Concerning Exit Permit of Rudolf:
   a - Rudolf's trip is essential, because of the Austrian Underground couriers
   b - it is most urgent: only question of days because of boat.
   c - Secrecy absolutely safeguarded: not on passenger list, Promise of Salazar to keep the whole matter secret, right for Rudolf to become a resident of Portugal.
   d - No necessity to ask the others because trip on Austrian Affairs, R. up to now not active in politics.
   e - Are working for common cause: why hamper our action?
   f - Have come to this country on generous invitation by the President: should not be transformed by certain people into indirect internment hampering our action for the homeland.

So ask the President to have the great kindness:

order Mr. Howard K. Travers of the Visa Division, Department of State, to issue at once Exit Permit to Rudolf.

We ask for no backing, no help: only we want not to be hampered by our own friends in our collaboration.
My dear Mr. President:

With my memorandum of April 12 concerning certain projects proposed by the Archduke Otto I returned to you a long letter which he had written to you, in the course of which he referred to another matter which has now arisen; namely, a plan that his brother, Charles Louis, should return from Lisbon, and that the younger brother, Rudolf, should then proceed to Lisbon to carry on the activities in which Charles Louis had been engaged.

Charles Louis has in fact returned to this country, and the Department now has before it for consideration a request for an exit permit for the Archduke Rudolf, who wishes to proceed to Lisbon early in June.

I think there are good reasons why permission should not be given for this travel. The presence of the Archduke Charles Louis became generally known in Lisbon, where Mr. Wodianer, the Hungarian Minister, with whom he was in contact, is now active in an informal group of former Hungarian diplomats, stationed at Lisbon, Madrid, Bern, Stockholm, and Istanbul, in opposition to the present puppet government at Budapest and in plans for strengthening resistance within Hungary. Both the British Government and ourselves have extended some facilities of communication for these former officials, and the British and Soviet Governments are informed of their activities and plans. We have, as you know, a definite agreement with the British and Soviet Governments, which we have loyally kept and which I consider of great importance, to keep each other informed of all our transactions regarding the enemy states. The Archdukes are very definitely political and conspicuous personalities, and the departure of any of them from this country for Lisbon at the present time would surely give rise to wide speculation. I think

The President,

The White House.
you will agree that the involvement of this Government in questions concerned with the Archduke Otto's political aspirations is something very carefully to be avoided because of the political implications, both in this country and abroad.

I fear moreover that the Archdukes have not observed sufficient secrecy concerning the facilities of communication which have been afforded, and think that the impending military events would justify our withdrawing the privileges of secret and cipher traffic between the Archdukes in Lisbon and Washington which were extended some months ago.

I would therefore suggest that we terminate their communications through the special channels with which you are familiar, and, unless we are prepared to apprise the British and Soviet Governments of the nature of the Archduke Rudolf's proposed activity, that we take negative action on his application for an exit permit, since his travel abroad at this juncture would certainly be interpreted as being undertaken with the approval, or even on the initiative, of this Government.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
May 26, 1944.

My dear Miss Tully:

At the request of Mr. Belovsky of the Visa Division with whom you just spoke by telephone, I am enclosing here-with a carbon copy of the letter addressed by the Secretary to the President, we understand had been delivered to the White House yesterday afternoon.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Letter

Miss Grace G. Tully,

The White House.
Reminder for the President

To love Otto & Carl

Leaving on to sea some time after June 9

Dear Mr. President,

My brother Carl Ludwig, who has returned a few days ago from Europe, has given me a great amount of firsthand information which is of the greatest value. He gathered these informations from his contacts with people of the most divergent classes, nations and political creeds. I found that the reactions he got on the matters of their feelings towards America and of their trust and confidence in your leadership, is indeed most encouraging.

I feel an oral account on these matters might interest you. My brother is at your disposal to give it to you whenever you desire it.

My brother is now staying here in Washington until Friday night, goes then to Canada for a week and will be afterwards back in the States.

It was with genuine pleasure that I learned that your health has been completely re-established.

With all my best wishes I remain, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
FILE MEMORANDUM

Mr. Gray was notified of F.D.P. notation - and he said he would put it on the carbon, which was returned.

6/27/44
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Treatment of Austria

I append a report entitled "The Treatment of Austria" together with a summary thereof, including policy recommendations, which was prepared for and approved by the Committee on Post-War Programs of the Department of State. Without objection on your part, I should like to transmit this document to London for the guidance of Ambassador Winant in the discussions of the European Advisory Commission respecting the eventual occupation of Germany and Austria.

Paragraph 15 of the summary statement and the more detailed discussion of the occupation of Austria on page 6 of the basic memorandum will have to be modified in the light of information which has just been received from Ambassador Winant in London to the effect that he has agreed to a tripartite control of Austria on the understanding that he would in no way commit this Government to the size of the contingent that we might be willing to contribute for the occupation.

Ambassador Winant reported that he agreed to this tripartite control of Austria after having received your permission to do so on the last day he was in Washington before returning to London.

The enclosed report is also being submitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval with respect to the military aspects of this question.

Enclosures:
1. Report
2. Summary
Department of State

BUREAU

CE

DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 6/20

ADRESSED TO

The President
SUMMARY:

THE TREATMENT OF AUSTRIA:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I. LONG-TERM INTERESTS
AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES

A. International Status

1. Austria should be dealt with as a victim of Nazi aggression rather than as a willing and integral part of Germany.

2. This Government should favor the prompt restoration of Austria as an independent state.

3. This Government should support and use appropriate means to foster among Austrians a more pronounced loyalty to an independent and democratic Austria under effective protection against external encroachments.

4. This Government should favor a provision, whereby the Austrian people eventually could, with the approval of the international organization, arrange such economic and political relationships with neighboring states as are consistent with the maintenance of peace and with general economic welfare.

5. It is to the interest of the United States that Austria be enabled to develop that type of internal economy and those international economic relations that will not place Austria in the position of a special ward of the international community or of any power.

6. Austria should in the future be included without discrimination in international economic organizations and arrangements.

7. This
7. This Government should favor extending long-term credits and other financial assistance to Austria through such international machinery as may be set up.

B. Frontiers
8. The Austrian-Czechoslovak frontier of 1937 should be restored.
9. The Austrian-Yugoslav frontier of 1940 should be restored.
10. The present Austrian-Hungarian frontier should be maintained.
11. The Austrian-German frontier of January 1, 1938 should be maintained except for inclusion within Germany of the small Sonthofen area.
12. The Austrian-Italian frontier should be rectified by the cession of the Italian province of Bolzano subject to minor adjustments.

C. Internal Political Conditions
13. The Government should seek to foster in Austria the development of sound democratic self-government. As a part of this process all vestiges of the Fascist and Nazi regime should be eliminated.
14. This Government should oppose the restoration of the House of Hapsburg in Austria.

II. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Character and Duration of Occupation
15. This Government should favor a joint Anglo-American-Soviet occupation of Austria which would, however, leave the administration of the country primarily in the hands of the power controlling the projected zone of South Germany. The other two powers should have only token participation in the occupation and administration.
16. The
16. The occupation and control of Austria should be separate from the military government of Germany.

17. Unless a trustworthy provisional Austrian Government has emerged at the time of surrender or conquest, direct military government should be established, but should be supplanted by inter-allied civilian control as soon as conditions permit.

18. If not established at the time of surrender or conquest, a provisional Austrian government should be established as soon as security considerations and the prospect of a regime representative of the major non-Nazi and non-Fascist political groups make it feasible.

19. At the earliest opportunity the occupation authorities should encourage and assist the formation of local organs of self-government.

20. Troops of the United Nations should be withdrawn from Austria as quickly as considerations of security and internal order permit.

B. Security Functions
   Under Occupation
21. Austrian members of the Wehrmacht should be sent home without unnecessary delay.

22. Regulations similar to those with respect to the disarmament of Germany and to the disposition of surrendered German arms, ammunition and implements of war should be applied to Austria.

23. Austria's armed forces should be limited to a civilian police composed exclusively of bona fide Austrian nationals.

C. Immediate Political Dispositions
24. Nazi and pre-Nazi fascist legislation should be abrogated progressively rather than by means of one comprehensive decree.

25. Measures
25. Measures and procedures similar to those for the elimination of the National Socialist Party and subordinate organizations in Germany should be instituted in Austria. The principles for the exclusion of Nazi leaders and other active Nazis from political life should likewise be applied to Austria.

26. Germans whose residence in Austria is connected with the Nazi exploitation should be promptly deported to Germany.

27. As soon as military conditions permit, political activity should be permitted to those groups demonstrably seeking to establish democratic political life.

D. Economic Dispositions

28. In the interest of preventing economic collapse, economic controls comparable to those applied in Germany should be continued until their progressive relaxation appears feasible.

29. The customs union with Germany should be terminated and a systematic program should be instituted immediately to put the Austrian economy on a viable basis through the revival of foreign trade.

30. All foreign-owned property in Austria should be held in custody until plans for its ultimate disposition are made.

E. Establishment of Independent Austrian Government

31. There should be as speedy a transition as possible from a provisional regime to government on a regularized constitutional basis.

32. A freely elected constituent assembly should determine the character of Austria's future government and internal structure, without interference by the allied powers.
THE TREATMENT OF AUSTRIA

I. INTRODUCTION

The following discussion of the treatment of Austria makes a distinction between (1) the long-range interests and objectives of the United States and (2) the problems of the occupation period. The former involve the establishment and maintenance of Austria on a sound political and economic basis so that that country may not again become either a focus of Pan-German activity or a temptation to powerful neighbors. The second category includes the tasks of instituting military government in Austria, separation from Germany, immediate security dispositions, and the establishment of a permanent government.

This program is premised on the view that Austria is a victim of Nazi aggression rather than an integral part of Germany and should be dealt with on a different basis.

II. LONG-RANGE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

A. International Status

1. Political Aspects.—Austria's strategic position in Europe makes its future political status in relation to its neighbors a matter of concern to the international community and therefore to the United States. Austria has been the occasion of threat to general security chiefly for two reasons; first, the lack of internal economic and political stability, and second, the disposition of interested powers to seek to influence Austrian affairs to their own advantage.

The Moscow Declaration of Austria (November 1, 1943) poses the problem of Austria without specifying an ultimate solution. The initial independence of Austria is predicated as a corollary of liberation from Nazi tyranny. The Declaration refers to Austria as the first victim of "Hitlerite domination" and indicates that

Austria's
Austria's treatment will depend upon its own contribution to her liberation. Thus there exist clear grounds for according Austria a different treatment from that applied to Germany and for permitting the Austrian people a voice in the determination of their future status. Moreover, the Declaration asserts the desirability of collaboration between Austria and her neighboring states in a solution of their common problems. Thus independence is not a prescription against future economic and political relationships with Austria's neighbors which, presumably, might assume the character of special economic arrangements, political federation, or even a merger of sovereignties, provided any such arrangement was approved by the parties concerned and was acceptable to the international organization.

The United States, never having accorded de jure recognition to the union of Austria with the Reich, should favor the prompt restoration of Austria as an independent state.

Independence alone, however, would not be an adequate basis for Austria's future. The continuance of the revived state will depend on a solution of its internal problems and an adjustment of its political and economic relations with its neighbors.

To achieve Austrian revival, it is recommended that this government support all appropriate means of fostering the growth of a more pronounced Austrian national feeling along democratic lines, assuring a viable economy within the framework of European reconstruction, and providing effective protection through international organization or otherwise against external encroachments.

Since future developments in Austria and Central Europe are so uncertain, it is further recommended that there be no definitive prohibition at the end of the war against a future decision of the Austrian people to effect close economic or political relationships with neighboring states.

If Austria is to remain independent, its peculiar strategic and economic position would underscore the responsibility of the international community to make adequate provisions for the security and internal viability of small states.

2. Economic
2. Economic Aspects:--It is to the interest of the United States that Austria be enabled to develop that type of internal economy and those international economic relations that will not place Austria in the position of a special ward of the international community or of any power.

To this end it is recommended that Austria be included in those international organizations and arrangements which are established to lessen economic discrimination and to promote stable financial relations and the expansion of trade on a multilateral basis.

To guard against economic crisis in Austria, the United States should cooperate, through such international economic machinery as may be set up, in extending long-term credits for sound economic projects and in extending financial assistance in case of threatened financial breakdown. Any aid to reconstruction or to conversion of Austrian production should be such as to facilitate the elimination of uneconomic industry.

Since the question of economic union between Germany and Austria is largely contingent on the political desirability of such a union, this possibility need not be examined here. This Government should be prepared, however, to examine any specific proposals for Austria's participation in a central European or Danubian economic federation.

B. Frontiers

1. The Czechoslovak-Austrian Frontier:--The United States should favor the restoration of the 1937 Austro-Czechoslovak frontier.

The American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 favored the establishment of this frontier, which, in the main, followed the old administrative boundaries between Moravia and Bohemia, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other. Some Austrian groups have asked for a cession of about seventy square miles of territory in the regions of Gmünd (Třebon) and Feldsberg (Mikulov). The population of these regions, according to the 1930 census, was about 61,000, approximately 85 percent of whom were Austrian Germans. Restoration of Gmünd to Austria would threaten the communications of České Velenice to Pilsen and Prague, while restoration of Feldsberg to Austria would cut the railway from
from Breclav to Znojmo, endanger the Prague-Brno-Vienna route via Breclav, and cut river communications on the Thaya River.

2. The Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier:—The United States should favor the restoration of the 1940 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government-in-Exile is demanding the inclusion of all territory inhabited by the Slovenes, 27,000 of whom were left in Austrian Carinthia and less than 4,000 in Austrian Styria. Cession of the Klagenfurt Basin to Yugoslavia would probably run counter to the wishes of the Carinthian population consulted at the time of the Klagenfurt Plebiscite of 1920. It would, furthermore, disturb the economic stability of the region and would create economic difficulties for Austria without bringing any corresponding economic benefits to Yugoslavia. Modification of the frontier between Austrian Styria and Yugoslavia would not be justified, since the frontier of 1940 followed closely the ethnic line of division and the several thousand Slovenes north of the line are widely scattered.

3. The Austrian-Hungarian Frontier:—The United States should favor preservation of the existing frontier between Austria and Hungary, leaving the Burgenland within Austria.

In 1922, after a plebiscite, Austria acquired the Burgenland, previously a part of Hungary. The Burgenland covers an area of about 1,532 square miles with a population (1934) of about 292,247, of whom approximately 60 percent (241,300) are German Austrians, 14 percent (40,500) are Croats and 4 percent (10,400) are Magyars. Hungary has not asserted its claim to the Burgenland vigorously, and there is no compelling reason why this territorial question should be reopened.

4. The Austro-Italian Frontier:—It is recommended that the frontier between Austria and Italy be rectified by cession to Austria of the Italian province of Bolzano with the provision that minor adjustments of this line may be made in accordance with the distribution of the linguistic groups.

The Committee
The Committee has proposed this solution because:

a. It recognizes this area as Austrian in its history, culture and tradition, and as an area which will probably be predominantly Austrian in population at the end of the war;

b. The retrocession of this region to Austria would aid both in the political and economic reconstruction of an Austrian state;

c. The loss to Italy through this cession would be slight in comparison with the gain to Austria.

5. The Austro-German Frontier:--It is recommended that the Austro-German frontier as of January 1, 1938 be recognized, except for the two small mountain communities in the Sonthofen area which were combined with Germany in 1938 for administrative reasons.

C. Internal Political Conditions

The long-range interest of the United States in the tranquillity of the Danubian region would be best served, in so far as the internal political order in Austria is concerned, by the development of sound democratic self-government.

The essential predicate of such a development will be the elimination of the fascist vestiges of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime and the destruction of Nazi authoritarianism.

It is further believed that the success of democracy in Austria will depend on an adjustment of the political differences between the two sections of the population formerly organized in the Christian Socialist and Social Democratic Parties. Such an adjustment will be fostered by the creation of tolerable economic conditions, by instituting a political structure that would allow a considerable degree of local autonomy, and by restraining, in so far as possible, the exercise of disturbing external influences.

In the further interests of tranquillity, it is recommended that this Government oppose the restoration of the
House of Hapsburg in Austria. Because of the imperialist tradition of the dynasty, a restoration of the monarchy would be interpreted by the neighboring states as a threat to their security.

III. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Character and Duration of Occupation

1. Responsibility for Occupation:—Divergent proposals have been set forth regarding the method of occupation and the allocation of responsibility for Austria. This Government has advocated that Austria, along with the south German zone, should be under occupation of United Kingdom forces. A British proposal assigning the south German zone to the United States includes Austria under American occupation and suggests the advisability of stationing a British division in Austria in order to establish the fact of United Nations occupation in the minds of the Austrians. The Soviet Government has proposed that Austria be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the three powers.

Joint tripartite occupation of Austria would have the decided advantage of effecting at once a clear administrative separation of Austria from Germany. However, for a small country joint occupation would probably be cumbersome and inefficient, and would necessitate a more complicated administrative set-up than required for the accomplishment of United Nations aims in Austria. Such an arrangement might, too, add a further potential source of direct friction between the three powers.

To reconcile the opposing views, it is recommended that Austria be declared under joint occupation, that actual administration and occupancy be left primarily to the power controlling also the South German zone, while the two other powers furnish civil affairs representatives and liaison officers.

2. Occupation Administration:—Although the administration of occupation in Austria will be legally based on the surrender instrument as in Germany, it is recommended that the administration and treatment of Austria under occupation be from the beginning differentiated from that accorded Germany.

If it
If it is accepted that occupancy be left primarily to the power controlling south Germany, provision should be made for a civil affairs administration in Austria, which would be entirely separate from the German zonal administration. On account of the subordination and elimination of many central Austrian administrative agencies under German annexation and the coordination of Austrian provincial administration through Berlin, the occupation authorities should at once reconstruct a machinery of central administration in Vienna. The presumably considerable number of retired or inactive former Austrian officials who did not collaborate with the Nazis should be enlisted to aid in the de-Nazification and reconstruction of Austrian administrative agencies. In general, immediate efforts should be made to obtain the cooperation of Austrians and to return central and local administrative functions to non-Nazi Austrians.

Unless a provisional Austrian government emerges at the time of surrender, with which the three powers might agree to deal, direct military government should be installed in Austria supplanting the German political authorities. As soon as central Austrian administrative agencies have been reestablished, it is recommended that there be formed a provisional Austrian central regime to coordinate administration and participate in the steps necessary for the reconstitution of the Austrian state. At this stage the military government might administer Austria by means of directives to this central Austrian political organ.

Since problems of disarmament, demobilization, and popular resistance will be in no wise as acute as in Germany, it should be possible at an early date to transfer the control of Austria from military authorities to an inter-allied civilian agency, which would be supported by military garrisons as needed. Such an agency would direct the occupation until a duly elected representatives government was ready to reassert control for the Austrian people.

3. Length of Occupation:—To promote the divergence of Austria from Germany, the occupation of Austria should be as brief as is consonant with the accomplishment of essential United Nations security aims.

B. Security
B. Security Functions
under Occupation

1. Demobilization of Austrian Members of the
Wehrmacht:—It is recommended that in demobilizing and disbanding the armed forces of the Reich, Austrian nationals be separated as speedily as possible from their units and permitted to return home as expeditiously as considerations of internal security and transport arrangements will allow.

2. Disarmament and Disposition of Surrendered Arms
and Equipment:—It is recommended that surrendered arms, ammunition and implements of war be scrapped in so far as they are not needed for use by the victors or adaptable to peaceful purposes. In general the principles with respect to disarmament as applied to Germany should be applied to Austria.

3. Dissolution of Military and Para-Military Agencies:
The policies applied to the dissolution of military and para-military agencies in Germany should, wherever applicable, apply also to Austria. A civil police force, composed exclusively of Austrian nationals and adequate to maintain internal order, should be permitted.

4. Immediate Measures for the Control of Austrian
War Potential:—The steps deemed essential for the immediate reduction of war potential in Germany should likewise be taken in Austria. These measures will be especially necessary in view of the heavy concentration of war industries in Austria.

C. Immediate Political
Dispositions

1. Disannexation:—In disjoining Austria from Germany, it is deemed advisable for reasons of administrative convenience to annul Nazi legislation by successive proclamations abrogating stated laws or types of laws rather than to promulgate one blanket decree sweeping away all laws issued in Austria after March 11, 1938. The following legislation, in particular, should be promptly annulled: decrees joining Austria to the Reich, introducing Reich law in Austria, establishing the Nazi Party and the Nazi system of government in Austria; laws regulating citizenship matters;
laws introducing racial discrimination and Nazi eugenic practices; laws changing judicial procedures and the Austrian court system.

The task of military government in Austria will be complicated by the fact that direct return to the entire body of pre-1938 Austrian law is precluded because of the Fascist character of much legislation under the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime. Pre-1938 laws which are unobjectionable from a political standpoint, however, should be continued or revived at the discretion of the occupation authorities. It is considered likewise undesirable to return to the authoritarian Constitution of 1934. Pending the promulgation of a new Constitution by a constituent assembly elected by the Austrian people, it is deemed preferable that the occupation authorities refer, as occasion may warrant, to provisions of the Austrian Constitution of 1920, as later amended.

2. Treatment of the National Socialist Party and of Party Members:--It is recommended that the procedures envisaged for the elimination of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations from Germany be followed in Austria. To the degree that it is found necessary to maintain social services performed by these organizations, those services should be transferred promptly to appropriate Austrian administrative agencies. The property and records in Austria of National Socialist organizations should be impounded.

It is recommended that Party leaders and other active Nazis be excluded from office and made subject to limitation of other political rights in the restoration of government in Austria.

3. Treatment of German Nationals in Austria:--It is recommended that those Germans whose residence in Austria is directly connected with the Nazi exploitation of that state be deported to Germany. Because of the important political considerations involved, the deportation of this category of persons should be arranged at an early date.

4. The Transfer of Other Persons:--The million foreign workers and prisoners of war now in Austria would constitute a particularly heavy and disproportionate burden on the resources
resources of that country; it is recommended, therefore, that attention be given to the possibility of an early transfer of that alien population. The prompt return of Austrian citizens outside Austria would likewise facilitate the beginning of reconstruction.

5. Political Activity and Association:—While it is recognized that the uncertainties of the early days of military occupation may require a complete ban on political activity, it is recommended that, as soon as military conditions permit, the occupation authorities allow the formation of parties and political discussion on the part of those groups demonstrably seeking to establish democratic political life. It is further recommended that the privilege of organization and activity be denied those groups attempting to form para-military units, to advocate National Socialist and related doctrines, to revive the authoritarian Fatherland Front of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime or to restore the monarchy.

D. Economic Dispositions

The decision to restore Austrian independence will imply prompt action on a number of economic matters, notably the restoration of the schilling and the reestablishment of the banking systems. Since the banking and monetary questions are being discussed actively elsewhere, no recommendations on these problems are here offered.

Decision on restitution and reparation will also be of importance, but in view of the fact that the Reparation Committee has not taken up the question of a settlement for Austria, recommendations on this subject are likewise postponed.

It is recommended that the following steps be taken by the occupation authorities:

1. The main economic controls applied to Germany should be imposed immediately by the occupation authorities, subject to progressive relaxation in accordance with the aim of prompt conversion and reconstruction as detachment from the Reich proceeds.

2. All
2. All deposits should be frozen immediately and released selectively as soon as a suitable plan can safely be put into operation. These should be a general moratorium on all debts—to be relaxed as soon as conditions permit.

3. The customs union with Germany should be terminated and provision made by the occupation authorities for border control over trade between Austria and Germany. The suspension of German bilateral trade agreements, in which Austria is included as part of the Reich, will call for the establishment of new trade arrangements between Austria and other countries, including Germany. In the absence of established commercial relations with other countries and governmental machinery for carrying on foreign trade, the occupation authorities should attempt to stimulate foreign trade making use as far as practicable of reliable Austrian personnel. This Government should recognize the need for initiating measures to help finance Austrian trade in the immediate occupation period.

4. All foreign owned property in Austria should be held in custody by the occupation authorities, who should establish an administrative agency to perform the functions which may be necessary in this respect. The occupying authorities, acting as custodian, may at their discretion in special types of instances appoint former owners as agents for the management and operation of their properties under their supervision. In general such action should not be taken if the owners are nationals or residents of other ex-enemy countries; and careful precaution should be exercised in the case of citizens and residents of neutral countries who may appear as claimants to property situated in Austria.

5. Should reparation and restitution by Austria be considered, special commitments on the part of the United Nations with respect to Austria would place Austria in a special category and require different treatment from that accorded Germany.
E. Establishment of Independent Austrian Government

1. When Steps Should be Taken:—It is recommended that as soon as political conditions have become reasonably stable and there is clear evidence of a desire by the Austrian people to act, steps be taken toward the reestablishment of Austrian political life on an enduring constitutional basis.

It may be anticipated that opportunities for the revival of national self-government will appear at an earlier period in Austria than in Germany. A national opposition has persisted under Nazi rule and it should prove easy to collaborate with anti-Nazi elements in the task of political reconstruction at an early stage of the occupation.

2. What Steps Should be Taken:—It is recommended that the determination of Austria's future governmental structure be made by a democratically elected constituent assembly, in view of the fact that there exists no Austrian government-in-exile or other organ recognized as custodian of Austrian sovereignty.

At the earliest opportunity efforts should be made to assist the restoration of local organs of self-government, either de facto or on a juridical basis.

It is suggested that at an early stage of the occupation, and if clearly in accord with the wishes of the Austrian people, a provisional Austrian national assembly might be chosen by general suffrage. This assembly should plan systematically the necessary steps to be taken in the transition from provisional to permanent government and formulate proposals for consideration by the constituent assembly.

At an appropriate time, the provisional government, acting upon the authorization of the inter-allied authorities, should arrange for the free election by universal suffrage of a national constituent assembly to undertake the formation of a national constitution. Intervention by the occupation authorities should be confined to the insuring of fair and orderly elections and the exclusion of active Nazis from suffrage and eligibility to seats in the assembly.
assembly. The Austrian people should be free to determine their own form of government with the proviso that the new regime be essentially democratic in character and that it accept such international responsibilities and obligations as the tripartite powers, acting in the interest of the United Nations, may see fit to impose. There should be no prescription as to the structure, whether federal or unitary, of the new Austrian state; decision in this matter should be left to the Austrian people.

Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany:

CE: HP Leverich
JWRiddleberger
ISO: DC Blaisdell
FMA: EL Dulles (drafting officer)
LRD: AC Vaillemin (drafting officer)
LA: SLW Mellen
TA: SD Merkin (drafting officer)
TS: JODenby
REldridge
LWFul ller (drafting officer)
D Harris (drafting officer)
HMSmyth
HTriv ers (drafting officer)
HCUvedeler (drafting officer)
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

I enclose herewith the promised copy on the treatment of Austria.
SUMMARY:

THE TREATMENT OF AUSTRIA:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I. LONG-TERM INTERESTS
AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES

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12. The Austrian-Italian frontier should be rectified by the cession of the Italian province of Bolzano subject to minor adjustments.

C. Internal Political Conditions

13. The Government should seek to foster in Austria the development of sound democratic self-government. As a part of this process all vestiges of the Fascist and Nazi regime should be eliminated.

14. This Government should oppose the restoration of the House of Hapsburg in Austria.

II. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Character and Duration of Occupation

15. This Government should favor a joint Anglo-American-Soviet occupation of Austria which would, however leave the administration of the country primarily in the hands of the power controlling the projected zone of South Germany. The other two powers should have only token participation in the occupation and administration.

16. The
16. The occupation and control of Austria should be separate from the military government of Germany.

17. Unless a trustworthy provisional Austrian Government has emerged at the time of surrender or conquest, direct military government should be established, but should be supplanted by inter-allied civilian control as soon as conditions permit.

18. If not established at the time of surrender or conquest, a provisional Austrian government should be established as soon as security considerations and the prospect of a regime representative of the major non-Nazi and non-Fascist political groups make it feasible.

19. At the earliest opportunity the occupation authorities should encourage and assist the formation of local organs of self-government.

20. Troops of the United Nations should be withdrawn from Austria as quickly as considerations of security and internal order permit.

B. Security Functions Under Occupation

21. Austrian members of the Wehrmacht should be sent home without unnecessary delay.

22. Regulations similar to those with respect to the disarmament of Germany and to the disposition of surrendered German arms, ammunition and implements of war should be applied to Austria.

23. Austria's armed forces should be limited to a civilian police composed exclusively of bonafide Austrian nationals.

C. Immediate Political Dispositions

24. Nazi and pre-Nazi fascist legislation should be abrogated progressively rather than by means of one comprehensive decree.
25. Measures and procedures similar to those for the elimination of the National Socialist Party and subordinate organizations in Germany should be instituted in Austria. The principles for the exclusion of Nazi leaders and other active Nazis from political life should likewise be applied to Austria.

26. Germans whose residence in Austria is connected with the Nazi exploitation should be promptly deported to Germany.

27. As soon as military conditions permit, political activity should be permitted to those groups demonstrably seeking to establish democratic political life.

D. Economic Dispositions

28. In the interest of preventing economic collapse, economic controls comparable to those applied in Germany should be continued until their progressive relaxation appears feasible.

29. The customs union with Germany should be terminated and a systematic program should be instituted immediately to put the Austrian economy on a viable basis through the revival of foreign trade.

30. All foreign-owned property in Austria should be held in custody until plans for its ultimate disposition are made.

E. Establishment of Independent Austrian Government

31. There should be as speedy a transition as possible from a provisional regime to government on a regularized constitutional basis.

32. A freely elected constituent assembly should determine the character of Austria's future government and internal structure, without interference by the allied powers.
THE TREATMENT OF AUSTRIA

I. INTRODUCTION

The following discussion of the treatment of Austria makes a distinction between (1) the long-range interests and objectives of the United States and (2) the problems of the occupation period. The former involve the establishment and maintenance of Austria on a sound political and economic basis so that that country may not again become either a focus of Pan-German activity or a temptation to powerful neighbors. The second category includes the tasks of instituting military government in Austria, separation from Germany, immediate security dispositions, and the establishment of a permanent government.

This program is premised on the view that Austria is a victim of Nazi aggression rather than an integral part of Germany and should be dealt with on a different basis.

II. LONG-RANGE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

A. International Status

1. Political Aspects.--Austria's strategic position in Europe makes its future political status in relation to its neighbors a matter of concern to the international community and therefore to the United States. Austria has been the occasion of threat to general security chiefly for two reasons; first, the lack of internal economic and political stability, and second, the disposition of interested powers to seek to influence Austrian affairs to their own advantage.

The Moscow Declaration of Austria (November 1, 1943) poses the problem of Austria without specifying an ultimate solution. The initial independence of Austria is predicated as a corollary of liberation from Nazi tyranny. The Declaration refers to Austria as the first victim of "Hitlerite domination" and indicates that
Austria's treatment will depend upon its own contribution to her liberation. Thus there exist clear grounds for according Austria a different treatment from that applied to Germany and for permitting the Austrian people a voice in the determination of their future status. Moreover, the Declaration asserts the desirability of collaboration between Austria and her neighboring states in a solution of their common problems. Thus independence is not a prescription against future economic and political relationships with Austria's neighbors which, presumably, might assume the character of special economic arrangements, political federation, or even a merger of sovereignties, provided any such arrangement was approved by the parties concerned and was acceptable to the international organization.

The United States, never having accorded de jure recognition to the union of Austria with the Reich, should favor the prompt restoration of Austria as an independent state.

Independence alone, however, would not be an adequate basis for Austria's future. The continuance of the revived state will depend on a solution of its internal problems and an adjustment of its political and economic relations with its neighbors.

To achieve Austrian revival, it is recommended that this government support all appropriate means of fostering the growth of a more pronounced Austrian national feeling along democratic lines, assuring a viable economy within the framework of European reconstruction, and providing effective protection through international organization or otherwise against external encroachments.

Since future developments in Austria and Central Europe are so uncertain, it is further recommended that there be no definitive prohibition at the end of the war against a future decision of the Austrian people to effect close economic or political relationships with neighboring states.

If Austria is to remain independent, its peculiar strategic and economic position would underscore the responsibility of the international community to make adequate provisions for the security and internal viability of small states.

2. Economic
2. Economic Aspects:--It is to the interest of the United States that Austria be enabled to develop that type of internal economy and those international economic relations that will not place Austria in the position of a special ward of the international community or of any power.

To this end it is recommended that Austria be included in those international organizations and arrangements which are established to lessen economic discrimination and to promote stable financial relations and the expansion of trade on a multilateral basis.

To guard against economic crisis in Austria, the United States should cooperate, through such international economic machinery as may be set up, in extending long-term credits for sound economic projects and in extending financial assistance in case of threatened financial breakdown. Any aid to reconstruction or to conversion of Austrian production should be such as to facilitate the elimination of uneconomic industry.

Since the question of economic union between Germany and Austria is largely contingent on the political desirability of such a union, this possibility need not be examined here. This Government should be prepared, however, to examine any specific proposals for Austria's participation in a central European or Danubian economic federation.

B. Frontiers

1. The Czechoslovak-Austrian Frontier:--The United States should favor the restoration of the 1937 Austro-Czechoslovak frontier.

The American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 favored the establishment of this frontier, which, in the main, followed the old administrative boundaries between Moravia and Bohemia, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other. Some Austrian groups have asked for a cession of about seventy square miles of territory in the regions of Gmünd (Třeboň) and Feldsberg (Mikulov). The population of these regions, according to the 1930 census, was about 61,000, approximately 85 percent of whom were Austrian Germans. Restoration of Gmünd to Austria would threaten the communications of České Velenice to Pilsen and Prague, while restoration of Feldsberg to Austria would cut the railway from
from Sreclav to Znojmo, endanger the Prague-Brno-Vienna route via Sreclav, and cut river communications on the Thaya River.

2. The Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier:--The United States should favor the restoration of the 1940 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government-in-Exile is demanding the inclusion of all territory inhabited by the Slovenes, 27,000 of whom were left in Austrian Carinthia and less than 4,000 in Austrian Styria. Cession of the Klagenfurt Basin to Yugoslavia would probably run counter to the wishes of the Carinthian population consulted at the time of the Klagenfurt Plebiscite of 1920. It would, furthermore, disturb the economic stability of the region and would create economic difficulties for Austria without bringing any corresponding economic benefits to Yugoslavia. Modification of the frontier between Austrian Styria and Yugoslavia would not be justified, since the frontier of 1940 followed closely the ethnic line of division and the several thousand Slovenes north of the line are widely scattered.

3. The Austrian-Hungarian Frontier:--The United States should favor preservation of the existing frontier between Austria and Hungary, leaving the Burgenland within Austria.

In 1922, after a plebiscite, Austria acquired the Burgenland, previously a part of Hungary. The Burgenland covers an area of about 1,532 square miles with a population (1934) of about 292,247, of whom approximately 80 percent (241,300) are German Austrians, 14 percent (40,500) are Croats and 4 percent (10,400) are Magyars. Hungary has not asserted its claim to the Burgenland vigorously, and there is no compelling reason why this territorial question should be reopened.

4. The Austro-Italian Frontier:--It is recommended that the frontier between Austria and Italy be rectified by cession to Austria of the Italian province of Bolzano with the provision that minor adjustments of this line may be made in accordance with the distribution of the linguistic groups.

The Committee
The Committee has proposed this solution because:

a. It recognizes this area as Austrian in its history, culture and tradition, and as an area which will probably be predominantly Austrian in population at the end of the war;

b. The retrocession of this region to Austria would aid both in the political and economic reconstruction of an Austrian state;

c. The loss to Italy through this cession would be slight in comparison with the gain to Austria.

5. The Austro-German Frontier:—It is recommended that the Austro-German Frontier as of January 1, 1938 be recognized, except for the two small mountain communities in the Sonthofen area which were combined with Germany in 1938 for administrative reasons.

C. Internal Political Conditions

The long-range interest of the United States in the tranquillity of the Danubian region would be best served, in so far as the internal political order in Austria is concerned, by the development of sound democratic self-government.

The essential predicate of such a development will be the elimination of the fascist vestiges of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg regime and the destruction of Nazi authoritarianism.

It is further believed that the success of democracy in Austria will depend on an adjustment of the political differences between the two sections of the population formerly organized in the Christian Socialist and Social Democratic Parties. Such an adjustment will be fostered by the creation of tolerable economic conditions, by instituting a political structure that would allow a considerable degree of local autonomy, and by restraining, in so far as possible, the exercise of disturbing external influences.

In the further interests of tranquillity, it is recommended that this Government oppose the restoration of the House
House of Hapsburg in Austria. Because of the imperialist tradition of the dynasty, a restoration of the monarchy would be interpreted by the neighboring states as a threat to their security.

III. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Character and Duration of Occupation

1. Responsibility for Occupation:--Divergent proposals have been set forth regarding the method of occupation and the allocation of responsibility for Austria. This Government has advocated that Austria, along with the south German zone, should be under occupation of United Kingdom forces. A British proposal assigning the south German zone to the United States includes Austria under American occupation and suggests the advisability of stationing a British division in Austria in order to establish the fact of United Nations occupation in the minds of the Austrians. The Soviet Government has proposed that Austria be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the three powers.

Joint tripartite occupation of Austria would have the decided advantage of effecting at once a clear administrative separation of Austria from Germany. However, for a small country joint occupation would probably be cumbersome and inefficient, and would necessitate a more complicated administrative set-up than required for the accomplishment of United Nations aims in Austria. Such an arrangement might, too, add a further potential source of direct friction between the three powers.

To reconcile the opposing views, it is recommended that Austria be declared under joint occupation, that actual administration and occupancy be left primarily to the power controlling also the South German zone, while the two other powers furnish civil affairs representatives and liaison officers.

2. Occupation Administration:--Although the administration of occupation in Austria will be legally based on the surrender instrument as in Germany, it is recommended that the administration and treatment of Austria under occupation be from the beginning differentiated from that accorded Germany.
If it is accepted that occupancy be left primarily to the power controlling south Germany, provision should be made for a civil affairs administration in Austria, which would be entirely separate from the German zonal administration. On account of the subordination and elimination of many central Austrian administrative agencies under German annexation and the coordination of Austrian provincial administration through Berlin, the occupation authorities should at once reconstruct a machinery of central administration in Vienna. The presumably considerable number of retired or inactive former Austrian officials who did not collaborate with the Nazis should be enlisted to aid in the de-Nazification and reconstruction of Austrian administrative agencies. In general, immediate efforts should be made to obtain the cooperation of Austrians and to return central and local administrative functions to non-Nazi Austrians.

Unless a provisional Austrian government emerges at the time of surrender, with which the three powers might agree to deal, direct military government should be installed in Austria supplanting the German political authorities. As soon as central Austrian administrative agencies have been reestablished, it is recommended that there be formed a provisional Austrian central regime to coordinate administration and participate in the steps necessary for the reconstitution of the Austrian state. At this stage the military government might administer Austria by means of directives to this central Austrian political organ.

Since problems of disarmament, demobilization, and popular resistance will be in no wise as acute as in Germany, it should be possible at an early date to transfer the control of Austria from military authorities to an inter-allied civilian agency, which would be supported by military garrisons as needed. Such an agency would direct the occupation until a duly elected representatives government was ready to resume control for the Austrian people.

3. Length of Occupation:--To promote the divergence of Austria from Germany, the occupation of Austria should be as brief as is consonant with the accomplishment of essential United Nations security aims.

B. Security
B. Security Functions under Occupation

1. Demobilization of Austrian Members of the Wehrmacht:—It is recommended that in demobilizing and disbanded the armed forces of the Reich, Austrian nationals be separated as speedily as possible from their units and permitted to return home as expeditiously as considerations of internal security and transport arrangements will allow.

2. Disarmament and Disposition of Surrendered Arm and Equipment:—It is recommended that surrendered arms, ammunition and implements of war be scrapped in so far as they are not needed for use by the victors or adaptable to peaceful purposes. In general the principles with respect to disarmament as applied to Germany should be applied to Austria.

3. Dissolution of Military and Para-Military Agencies: The policies applied to the dissolution of military and para-military agencies in Germany should, wherever applicable, apply also to Austria. A civil police force, composed exclusively of Austrian nationals and adequate to maintain internal order, should be permitted.

4. Immediate Measures for the Control of Austrian War Potential:—The steps deemed essential for the immediate reduction of war potential in Germany should likewise be taken in Austria. These measures will be especially necessary in view of the heavy concentration of war industries in Austria.

C. Immediate Political Dispositions

1. Disannexation:—In disjoining Austria from Germany, it is deemed advisable for reasons of administrative convenience to annul Nazi legislation by successive proclamations abrogating stated laws or types of laws rather than to promulgate one blanket decree sweeping away all laws issued in Austria after March 11, 1938. The following legislation, in particular, should be promptly annulled: decrees joining Austria to the Reich, introducing Reich law in Austria, establishing the Nazi Party and the Nazi system of government in Austria; laws regulating citizenship matters;
laws introducing racial discrimination and Nazi eugenic practices; laws changing judicial procedures and the Austrian court system.

The task of military government in Austria will be complicated by the fact that direct return to the entire body of pre-1938 Austrian law is precluded because of the Fascist character of much legislation under the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime. Pre-1938 laws which are unobjectionable from a political standpoint, however, should be continued or revived at the discretion of the occupation authorities. It is considered likewise undesirable to return to the authoritarian Constitution of 1934. Pending the promulgation of a new Constitution by a constituent assembly elected by the Austrian people, it is deemed preferable that the occupation authorities refer, as occasion may warrant, to provisions of the Austrian Constitution of 1920, as later amended.

2. Treatment of the National Socialist Party and of Party Members:—It is recommended that the procedures envisaged for the elimination of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations from Germany be followed in Austria. To the degree that it is found necessary to maintain social services performed by these organizations, those services should be transferred promptly to appropriate Austrian administrative agencies. The property and records in Austria of National Socialist organizations should be impounded.

It is recommended that Party leaders and other active Nazis be excluded from office and made subject to limitation of other political rights in the restoration of government in Austria.

3. Treatment of German Nationals in Austria:—It is recommended that those Germans whose residence in Austria is directly connected with the Nazi exploitation of that state be deported to Germany. Because of the important political considerations involved, the deportation of this category of persons should be arranged at an early date.

4. The Transfer of Other Persons:—The million foreign workers and prisoners of war now in Austria would constitute a particularly heavy and disproportionate burden on the resources
resources of that country; it is recommended, therefore, that attention be given to the possibility of an early transfer of that alien population. The prompt return of Austrian citizens outside Austria would likewise facilitate the beginning of reconstruction.

5. Political Activity and Association:—While it is recognized that the uncertainties of the early days of military occupation may require a complete ban on political activity, it is recommended that, as soon as military conditions permit, the occupation authorities allow the formation of parties and political discussion on the part of those groups demonstrably seeking to establish democratic political life. It is further recommended that the privilege of organization and activity be denied those groups attempting to form para-military units, to advocate National Socialist and related doctrines, to revive the authoritarian Fatherland Front of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime or to restore the monarchy.

D. Economic Dispositions

The decision to restore Austrian independence will imply prompt action on a number of economic matters, notably the restoration of the schilling and the reestablishment of the banking systems. Since the banking and monetary questions are being discussed actively elsewhere, no recommendations on these problems are here offered.

Decision on restitution and reparation will also be of importance, but in view of the fact that the Reparation Committee has not taken up the question of a settlement for Austria, recommendations on this subject are likewise postponed.

It is recommended that the following steps be taken by the occupation authorities:

1. The main economic controls applied to Germany should be imposed immediately by the occupation authorities, subject to progressive relaxation in accordance with the aim of prompt conversion and reconstruction as detachment from the Reich proceeds.

2. All
2. All deposits should be frozen immediately and released selectively as soon as a suitable plan can safely be put into operation. These should be a general moratorium on all debts--to be relaxed as soon as conditions permit.

3. The customs union with Germany should be terminated and provision made by the occupation authorities for border control over trade between Austria and Germany. The suspension of German bilateral trade agreements, in which Austria is included as part of the Reich, will call for the establishment of new trade arrangements between Austria and other countries, including Germany. In the absence of established commercial relations with other countries and governmental machinery for carrying on foreign trade, the occupation authorities should attempt to stimulate foreign trade making use as far as practicable of reliable Austrian personnel. This Government should recognize the need for initiating measures to help finance Austrian trade in the immediate occupation period.

4. All foreign owned property in Austria should be held in custody by the occupation authorities, who should establish an administrative agency to perform the functions which may be necessary in this respect. The occupying authorities, acting as custodian, may at their discretion in special types of instances appoint former owners as agents for the management and operation of their properties under their supervision. In general such action should not be taken if the owners are nationals or residents of other ex-enemy countries; and careful precaution should be exercised in the case of citizens and residents of neutral countries who may appear as claimants to property situated in Austria.

5. Should reparation and restitution by Austria be considered, special commitments on the part of the United Nations with respect to Austria would place Austria in a special category and require different treatment from that accorded Germany.

E. Establishment
E. Establishment of Independent Austrian Government

1. When Steps Should be Taken:--It is recommended that as soon as political conditions have become reasonably stable and there is clear evidence of a desire by the Austrian people to act, steps be taken toward the reestablishment of Austrian political life on an enduring constitutional basis.

It may be anticipated that opportunities for the revival of national self-government will appear at an earlier period in Austria than in Germany. A national opposition has persisted under Nazi rule and it should prove easy to collaborate with anti-Nazi elements in the task of political reconstruction at an early stage of the occupation.

2. What Steps Should be Taken:--It is recommended that the determination of Austria's future governmental structure be made by a democratically elected constituent assembly, in view of the fact that there exists no Austrian government-in-exile or other organ recognized as custodian of Austrian sovereignty.

At the earliest opportunity efforts should be made to assist the restoration of local organs of self-government, either de facto or on a juridical basis.

It is suggested that at an early stage of the occupation, and if clearly in accord with the wishes of the Austrian people, a provisional Austrian national assembly might be chosen by general suffrage. This assembly should plan systematically the necessary steps to be taken in the transition from provisional to permanent government and formulate proposals for consideration by the constituent assembly.

At an appropriate time, the provisional government, acting upon the authorization of the inter-allied authorities, should arrange for the free election by universal suffrage of a national constituent assembly to undertake the formation of a national constitution. Intervention by the occupation authorities should be confined to the insuring of fair and orderly elections and the exclusion of active Nazis from suffrage and eligibility to seats in the assembly.
assembly. The Austrian people should be free to determine their own form of government with the proviso that the new regime be essentially democratic in character and that it accept such international responsibilities and obligations as the tripartite powers, acting in the interest of the United Nations, may see fit to impose. There should be no prescription as to the structure, whether federal or unitary, of the new Austrian state; decision in this matter should be left to the Austrian people.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1944.

NOTE FOR QUEBEC FILE:

Her Majesty, Empress Zita's address in Quebec is:

239 St. Louis Rd.
Quebec City,
Telephone - 22872

New York Phone - Circle 71788
Lady-in-waiting - Countess Kurseeenbrock

(Mother of Otto of Austria)
Dear Mr. President,

It was indeed a great pleasure for me to have seen you again this afternoon.

I want to tell you how much I enjoyed talking to you and how grateful I am for the words of encouragement and for your promise to act to safeguard the lives of the Hungarians and Austrians from the Communist danger. Your words have taken a heavy burden off my heart.

May God help and protect you, dear Mr. President, in this noble task, which will secure you the undying friendship and gratitude of my countries.

With kindest regards to Mrs. Roosevelt.
I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

Quebec, September 15th, 1944.
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Hyde Park, N.Y.
U.S.A.

White House
Washington D.C.
Empress Zita of Austria,
239, St. Louis Road,
Quebec, Canada.
Sept. 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

You said you wished to take this up on your return either with the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State.

G. G. T.
Dear Mr. President,

Following our conversation of yesterday afternoon, which was so very encouraging for my mother and myself, I have thought, that the urgency of the Hungarian situation demands it, that I send you at once even before you leave Quebec, the text of a message from me to the Hungarian Government together with some suggestions that came to me while thinking over our conversation.

Consequently I enclose the text of the message. If you should approve of it, and if you think that it might be useful, would you have the kindness to have it sent to the following places, so that it might get surely to its destination:

Prince Charles de Bar, c/o José de Saldanha da Gama, Villa Bela, Dafundo, near Lisbon, Portugal;

Mr. de Bakach-Bessenyey, Hungarian Minister Berne Switzerland, c/o Mr. Leland Harrison, U.S. Minister in Switzerland (I know that the U.S. Minister has friendly relations with the Hungarian Minister);

Baron Apor, Hungarian Minister to the Vatican, c/o Mister Myron Taylor.

If the message is sent to all these places we have a fair chance that it will be in Budapest very soon.

As far as the negotiations for the surrender of Hungary are concerned, I feel that the person of Horthy might be a definite handicap, not only because of his personal shortcomings and because the Russians hate him more than anyone else, but also because his name might create an uproar among U.S. and British Liberals. I therefore
would suggest, that insofar as a handing over of the power in Hungary might be discussed, it would be a good thing if the power would be given by the present Government to Cardinal Seredi, Primate of Hungary and personal friend of the Pope. Cardinal Seredi is very popular in Hungary, is a leading member of the Hungarian Senate, has a good anti-nazi record and is generally respected while politically not committed. Constitutionally he is one of the highest ranking dignitaries of the Hungarian State. He would be by far the best man for any transition, would have the Vatican-backing and would be a safe bulwark against Communism.

In order to expedite the negotiations for a surrender of Hungary to America and Britain, I most seriously feel that written messages through intermediaries, who not always clearly understand the burning urgency of the matter, is not enough. Personal contact could work miracles today. I therefore would offer you the following suggestion: as the French-Swiss border is today under U.S. military control, would it not be possible, that in the utmost secrecy I could leave at once for one of the places along that border, There I could meet Mr. Bakach-Bessenyei, and work with him in order to bring the Budapest Government at once to do the reasonable thing. We could contact Budapest through Switzerland. As I know the present Hungarian Government I sincerely believe that there is a better than even chance that they might accept my advice, if it can be given to them directly.

In finishing this letter I want to tell you again from all my heart my thanks for your friendship to my people. The hour yesterday with you was most gratifying. I pray to God that He might keep you for all of us for a long time to come, because in your hands peace and international justice is secure.

Believe me, dear Mr. President, to be

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
September 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM

on Transylvania

Rumanian surrender has unexpectedly raised the problem of Transylvania. Soviet-Russia is willing to accept the Rumanian demand for the possession of all of Transylvania, if Rumania actively participates in driving the Nazi forces out of her territory. The acquisition of Transylvania by Rumania, against the cession of Bessarabia and Bukovina to Russia, constitutes for the rest of the world a flagrant case of territorial barter, condemned by the Atlantic Charter. It also is in direct contradiction to the interests of a future lasting peace. Momentary Rumanian military support, of a dubious value, and exacted under duress, should thus decide in a permanent way the future of that contested land, whereas it could only be satisfactorily settled by a careful consideration of all the major interests involved.

These basic facts, pertinent to the Transylvania problem, are the following:

1.) The character of Transylvania is determined by the outstanding fact, that she is inhabited by an ethnically "mixed-population". No frontline can be drawn, that would separate Transylvania into ethnically homogenous parts. The way of living within Transylvania and most of her political and cultural traditions have been derived from the mixed character of her population. Neither of her two neighbors (Hungary or Rumania) can incorporate Transylvania into their "national-state" in a permanent or acceptable way.

2.) Despite her ethnically mixed population, politically - up to recent years - Transylvania has always been a united territory. The Vienna
award of 1940, dividing her up into two halves, did not aim at a satisfactory solution, but at the deepening of antagonism, existing between Hungarians and Romanians, in order to divide them and then subject them both to Nazi domination. Like the verdict of Solomon, this settlement was bitterly opposed by all interested in the welfare of Transylvania. Her prosperity and even her livelihood depend on the unity of her interdependent agricultural and industrial regions, the mountains, valleys and plains, which have to exchange their products freely. Towns, trade and industry in Transylvania were located and developed with the view to best perform these functions. Irrespective of ethnical differences, Transylvania is a single unit; only united can she serve, as a "Hinterland", her self-supporting economy and her colorful, high-standard civilization. Her past achievements furnish ample evidence to this statement.

3.) Since the dawn of her history, Transylvania has always been part of the western - the Roman Catholic and Protestant - world. On the other hand, Rumania is a typically Byzantine (Pravoslav) country, imbued with Oriental traditions. Discrepancy of ideals and of the way of living, constitutes a more fundamental demarcation-line in Eastern and Central-Europe, than national boundaries. East and West can never be merged within the same political system. After the first world-war, while under Rumanian rule, Hungarians and Romanians, in Transylvania, have never ceased to claim political autonomy for Transylvania. Having always lived in a Western system, they wished to liberate themselves from Oriental influences and corruption. The very same difference separates the Western Croats from the Eastern Serbs in Yugoslavia. Their mutual hatred inevitably arose from forced unification.

4.) Independent Transylvania, the Eastern-most bastion of Western civilization, has a brilliant record: for many troubled centuries she was
known as the cradle of religious and political liberty. In the middle of
the XVIth century, she was the first among all the states of Europe to
proclaim religious liberty. While independent, Transylvania was also success-
ful in maintaining national liberty of the three historic races (Hungarians,
Székelys and Saxons), by granting them political autonomy and equality of
rights within Transylvanian unity. This liberal system brought about Tran-
sylvanian solidarity, which enabled independent Transylvania to resist suc-
essfully for three centuries the constant attacks of two great Powers
(Germany and Turkey), aimed at her subjugation.

5.) Transylvanian self-defense saved Central-Europe from Turkish
destruction, but had decimated the Hungarians within Transylvania. They were
replaced by refugees from the Balkans, mostly Romanians, who were granted
work and livelihood and were exempted from participation in national defense.
They settled down, rapidly increasing in numbers. These prolific new-comers
constitute now a slight majority (51%) of the Transylvanian population. This
is the only fact on which the Romanian claim for the possession of Tran-
sylvania is based. Romanian contribution to Transylvanian culture and
economic progress remained at all times very slight, towns, trade and industry
in Transylvania have continued to remain Hungarian. Transylvania thus has
remained an essential and valuable part of the Western-world.

6.) Geographically Transylvania is a perfect and almost closed
unit, surrounded by high, densely forested mountains, with an access only
from Hungary (in the North-East toward Szatmár). Her strategic role is of
paramount importance for the defense of Central-Europe and the Balkans.
The defense of Southern-Europe depends in the West on Bohemia, the Sudeten-
Mountains guarding it against German invasion, and on Transylvania in the
East against attack by Russia. Three Russian campaigns in the XIXth century
against Turkey have proven, that the Galati-gap between the mouth of the Danube and the Carpathians cannot be safely used for the conquest of the Balkans, as long as Transylvania is not subjected to Russia. Not alone Budapest, but Belgrade, Salonika and the Lardanelles are all protected by Transylvania. In the possession of Russian-dominated Rumania, Transylvania becomes the guardian of the Russian route of invasion to the Balkans (through Pocerni), endangering the independent statehood of all the Balkan nations. With Russian predominance established west of the main range of the Carpathian Mountains, over Transylvania, the Central-Valley of the Danube, up to the Alps and to the Adriatic Sea becomes also an easy prey of the Soviets. This advantage probably accounts for Russian generosity in her dealings with Rumania. Acceptance by the Anglo-Saxon Great Powers of the above-said barter, would constitute a major political mistake, committed in obvious contradiction to basic principles proclaimed by them, endangering the future peace before it's conclusion.

The only satisfactory and equitable solution of the Transylvanian problem is: the reconstitution of Transylvania as an independent state. All the races, living in Transylvania, would gladly accept this solution. At the same time, within Transylvanian unity, the traditional autonomy of the three Transylvanian nations: Rumanians, Hungarians (including the Székelys) and Saxons should also be secured by international obligations and guarantees. Transylvania then should become an independent member of a reorganized Danubian Federation, large enough to assure a livelihood, progress and security to all concerned. There is no other constructive or unbiased solution for this most intricate Central-European problem.
BY CODED CABLE.

To:

Prince Charles de Bar, c/o José de Saldanha da Gama, Villa Bela, Dafundo, near Lisbon, Portugal.

Mr. de Bakach-Besseney, Hungarian Minister, c/o Mr. Leland Harrison, U.S. Minister, Berne Switzerland.

Baron Apor, Hungarian Minister at the Holy See, c/o Mr. Myron Taylor.

Please communicate urgently to the Hungarian Government by any means that might be available to you the following message: In view of the dangerous development of the Hungarian situation and the imminent Soviet invasion of our national territory I feel it my duty to make a most urgent appeal to the Government in order that it should act before it is too late stop I am convinced that if the Hungarian Government now immediately would enter in contact with the Americans and British in order to accept their offer of unconditional surrender and to collaborate with the Allied forces against the Germans Hungary can still escape the Communist domination stop By this way only the life, honor and integrity of the Hungarian nation and people can be saved stop Our country can obtain today better conditions than it would if it continued the fight alongside with the Germans stop I am also convinced, that by continuing on the side of the Germans the Hungarian Government will bring Communist domination over Hungary stop I say all this in full knowledge of the situation stop As a Hungarian patriot and having before my eyes exclusively the interest of the Nation I call on Admiral Horthy and the Government to contact at once, without an hour's delay the American and British with an offer to negotiate surrender on their terms stop This could be done as well through Bakach-Besseney as through Apor or Wodianer stop This is almost certainly the last chance for Hungary to escape Communism stop It is the duty of the Government to save our nation from this dreadful danger stop 

Signed: Otto stop

Identical messages have been sent to Archduke Charles Louis, Bakach-Besseney and Apor stop Message ends.
Quebec, September 16th, 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

Enclosed please find an urgent letter for the President in connection with yesterday's conversation. Owing to its urgent nature I would be most grateful if you would have the kindness to get it to the President prior to his departure from Quebec, because the President might decide to act on the matter. It concerns Hungary.

It was so nice to have seen you yesterday at least for a second. I was so glad to talk with the President.

Hope to see you soon again in Washington.

With my best regards, I am, dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

P.S. I enclose also beside the letter to the President a memorandum on the Transylvanian question. I thought that occasionally it might interest the President.
Washington, September 13th, 1944.

Dear Mr. President,

It is with painful surprise that I read in the press of September 12th the statement of Secretary of State Mr. Hull.

Secretary Hull has always been a friend of Austria. It is therefore not astonishing that he was one of the most popular figures in Austria, respected by everyone. His words carry great weight.

If we consider Mr. Hull's statement, it falls in two parts: First a historic review of the case of Austria and second an appeal to Austria to rise at once.

For the first part Secretary Hull, although usually so clear-sighted and well-informed, seems to have overlooked certain facts.

The idea that Austria should have to "atone" for a participation in the war at Hitler's side is hard to understand for Austrian patriots. Austria's sovereignty did not exist when the war broke out. Austria was occupied territory and it is hard to see how any form of responsibility for this war can be laid on Austria or her people. Not one Austrian had anything to say in this matter.

Then Mr. Hull continues by saying that Austria did not fight in March 1938. This is only partly correct, but anyhow it seems to be forgotten that Austria alone for five years resisted Nazi aggression, that the only Head of Government who was killed in fighting the Nazis was the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss. Several members of Schuschnigg's Government were shot after the German occupation while the remaining members were thrown in prison. Secretary Hull then goes on saying that: "at least a part of the Austrians ... received Hitler with acclamation". The "at least" seems to intimate that there might have been a large group, which every observer including
the U.S. Diplomatic Representative in Austria at that time
would be able to deny. We had our Quislings, but so had all
other nations with the exception of the Poles. In the same
paragraph it is also said that there was no general resistance
movement to hamper Nazi control in Austria. I do not intend
here to describe in detail the Austrian resistance. Suffice it
to say that many neutral observers have talked about the spirit
of the Austrian people and their resistance and that in several
instances they were determining factors to bring about material
advantages for the United Nations (Battles of Narwick in Norway
and at Murmansk in Russia). The resistance of the Austrians
we believe has been as successful as the one of the Norwegians,
Danes or Dutchmen who have not been called upon as yet to open
opposition against the Nazis, while Allied Armies are still far
from their country or not close enough for an effective support
to such an enterprise.

The Austrians are not conscious of any guilt
and they cannot feel responsible for Hitler's war. The Austrians
will resent to be treated as if they had been helping the Germans.
Having been given no help in their underground struggle by the
United Nations, they will suffer from the accusations levelled
against them.

The second part of the statement of the Secretary
tells Austria that the time is almost up to make a contribu-
tion to her own liberation.

You know that nobody is more eager than I to see
Austria participate in her own liberation. I must say that
in this endeavour neither I nor any other Austrian got any real
support from the side of the United Nations. All other resis-
tance movements got at least financial, political or military aid.
We did not get any.

If one considers the situation of Austria to-
day, we know that any uprising at this time would be suicidal.
The total mobilization by the Germans, which was not carried out
in other occupied countries, owing to their status as sovereign
states at the beginning of the war, has scattered all our manhood
in every corner of Europe. In Austria itself remains the older element. Our armament, as you no doubt know, is reduced to below the bare minimum. At this time, the armies of the United Nations are still very far away from the Austrian border, the closest point is still over 200 miles. Nobody encouraged an uprising in France or Belgium while Allied troops had not yet penetrated their national territory. On the contrary Allied broadcasts even called on these nations to remain quiet. At the same time, Allied military liaison with Austria advised us to wait. So what should we do? On one side we are menaced with dangerous consequences if we do not rise at once; on the other hand, if we do anything, we shall exhaust our small reserves and will be of no use when the Allies come into striking distance of Austria.

If nevertheless it should be your opinion, as Commander in Chief, on the basis of your wide information and experience, that the time of rising for Austria has arrived, I would be most grateful if you could let me know. Although I personally very much feel that such a move would still be premature, I would advise my countrymen to do to the best of their ability such things as you, as Commander in Chief, would feel to be expedient and good for the defeat of Germany. In that case I must ask you to order that at least some essential arms and munitions be given to the Austrians. At the same time I deem it necessary that the Austrians, fighting the Germans, be given a belligerent status by the United Nations. I would also most earnestly request from you to give me the material possibility to get at once over to Europe in order to join my people in this move. I would not like to see my people going into a desperate fight against the Germans without having at least the honor to share with them whatever may come.

Believe me, dear Mr. President, to be

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

[Name of Austria]
MEMORANDUM:  
RE:  
HUNGARY.

1.) The armistice terms, granted by Russia to Rumania, have helped Rumania to come to terms with the Allies, but have barred the exit from the Axis-camp for the Hungarian nation. No Hungarian Government can be found or be kept in power, which would voluntarily abandon the Hungarian-inhabited part of Transylvania to the Rumanians. Wholesale murder and expulsion of the Hungarian population from Transylvania will inevitably drive the Hungarians into desperate resistance, leading to the final catastrophe of the Hungarian nation.

2.) The guilt of Rumania in the present war is distinctly graver, than the responsibility of Hungary, for:

a). Of all South-Eastern European nations, Rumania was the first to become a Nazi-Satellite. She has also gone forthest in the prosecution of Nazi doctrines and practices, including racial persecution. - Hungary, on the other hand, was a haven for European refugees (also Jews), up to March 19th, 1944, when Hitler completely took over Hungary imposing by force and against the wish of the people a Nazi Government. At the first opportunity, however, this Nazi Government (of Sztojay) was dismissed. The present Hungarian Government is not composed of Nazis.

b). Rumania has asked voluntarily for German military occupation (in 1941), at a time, when she was not yet directly exposed to German military pressure. She has endangered the situation of all her neighbors, most of all: Hungary's, which consequently found herself in a Nazi pincer.

c). Rumania has given full military aid all the time to Germany. - Hungarian military assistance remained limited in numbers and reduced in scope, mostly to policing functions in the rear of the German Army. Hungary has also tried the utmost to withdraw all her troops from all fronts. By doing so, she has provoked the wrath of Hitler and German military intervention.

d). Rumanian economic aid given to Germany was much more
valuable and more extensive, than the economic assistance extorted from Hungary.

3. In view of this record equity and the interests of a lasting peace demand that Hungary be given as much chance as has been granted to Rumania. A solution, satisfactory to the Allies and acceptable to Hungary, could be found on the following lines:

a). Hungary accepts "unconditional surrender" to the Allies.

b). Hungary gives military aid to the Allies, by participating in the liberation of Austria, or Yugoslavia, or both. By coordinating with the advance of the Allied Armies the withdrawal of her troops from the Carpathians in a Western direction, Hungary could also cut the German lines of supply and of retreat, thus helping to trap the German forces in the Balkans. In conformity with military exigencies, Hungary declares war on Germany.

c). If Hungary carries out these obligations, no Rumanian troops will be allowed to enter into the territory of Hungary (including the Hungarian part of Transylvania). The solution of all Hungarian territorial problems will be reserved to the coming Peace Conference. Meanwhile no irretrievable damage shall be inflicted on Hungary and no "faits accomplis" shall be created by the neighboring countries. America, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. shall watch that no massacre of Magyar population shall take place.

4. Should such a policy be acceptable or any other honorable solution be found, I herewith declare myself prepared to do my utmost to bring about the acceptance of the Allied terms by Hungary. Irrespective of my future role, my sole desire at present is to accomplish a sincere reconciliation of the much suffered Danubian nations, indispensable to a lasting peace.
To
the President of the U.S.
The Citadel.

From: Otto of Austria.
Washington D.C.,
September 22nd 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

Would you please have the kindness to transmit the hereby enclosed letter to the President.

With my very best wishes

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
Dear Mr. President,

As I had already the pleasure to tell you during the conversation of Friday last, I believe that direct messages to the Hungarian Government could be instrumental in bringing that Government to the understanding that it should surrender now to the Anglo-Saxon Powers. I believe I indicated to you my feeling that the personal friendship which existed between Regent Horthy and the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, General Henyey on the one side, and Mr. Tibor Eckhardt, the president of the Hungarian Peasants Party - now living in this country - on the other side, could be put to good use as far as a message to Henyey is concerned.

Without telling Mr. Eckhardt anything of our conversation, I nevertheless asked him to put at my disposal a message whose broad outlines I indicated to him. Eckhardt does not know by what means I intend to send this message. He does know the draft of the cable which I sent you a few days ago, but he does not know how or through whom it will be sent and will reach Hungary.

I enclose hereby the draft of a message by Mr. Eckhardt to Mr. Henyey. If you approve of it, I would be very grateful if you could give the necessary instructions for cabling it to the three addresses mentioned on it. I do believe that a message coming from a close friend might have a considerable effect upon General Henyey. Eckhardt will naturally never know that I sent this cable to you.

After thinking over considerably what you told me in Quebec, I continue to feel that the chances of an early surrender of Hungary to the Anglo-Saxon Powers would be considerably improved if I could have as soon as possible a personal talk with Mr. de Bakach-Bessenyei, as I took the liberty to suggest to you in my letter of September 16th. I would be most grateful to you if you could
have the great kindness to make this matter soon an object of your consideration.

Again I want to tell you how glad both my mother and myself were of the talk with you on September 15th. Your warm sympathy for Hungary and for Austria has indeed been a most gratifying experience.

Believe me, dear Mr. President, to be

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
BY CODED CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING THREE ADDRESSES:

1) to Prince Charles de Bar, c/o Jose Saldanha da Gama, Villa Bela, Defundo, near Lisbon, Portugal.

2) to Mr. de Bakach-Bessenyei, Hungarian Minister, c/o Mr. Leland Harrison, U.S. Minister, Bern, Switzerland.

3) to Baron Apor, Hungarian Minister at the Holy See, c/o Mr. Myron Taylor.

Please communicate to General Heney, Hungarian Foreign Minister, by any means that might be available to you urgently the following message:

I request you to report confidentially and urgently to Regent Horthy the following most important message for which I assume full responsibility:

Archduke Otto's recent cable outlines our last unexpected chance to avoid complete disaster. But what seems acceptable today might become impossible if situation deteriorates. Thus no time should be wasted; Plenipotentiaries should bring final Hungarian decision immediately to Bakach-Bessenyei or to Apor or to Lisbon. Hungary must accept two obligations:

1) Unconditional surrender to United States and Great Britain alone, stop
2) Active military assistance to the Anglo-Saxon armies for the liberation of Austria stop

What Roumania did for the Russians, Hungary has to do for the Anglo-Saxons at the first opportunity which will be outlined later. Meanwhile Hungary should conserve her military power, her internal order and territory in order to become an active asset on the Allied side. Only by carrying out these principles can Hungary retain her place in the Western world. Please act urgently. Stop retaliation for March invasion is morally justified, politically indispensable. Stop Further hesitation will bring final ruin. Stop Signed: Tibor Eckhardt stop Message ends. stop
Washington D.C., September 25, 1944

Dear Mr. President,

I just learned that on September 8th a directive was sent by the Department of State concerning the handling of Hungarian peace feelers that might come. This directive having been sent out before the Quebec Conference is consequently somewhat in contradiction with those things you had the kindness to tell me concerning Hungary.

May I therefore take the liberty to suggest - insofar as you feel it to be good - that these directives be authoritatively interpreted to the United States Diplomatic Agents in Europe and Turkey in a sense which fully corresponds to your intentions concerning the handling of the Hungarian situation.

With my warmest regards I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]
Washington D.C.,
September 25th 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

I have again to ask you to have the kindness to transmit the hereby enclosed letter to the President.

I hate to impose again on the Presidents and your time, but unfortunately the message I want to convey to the President is rather urgent.

With my best regards

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
Washington D.C., September 27th 1944.

Dear Mr. President,

Through the help of a neutral country I received yesterday evening a telegram from Budapest signed by three of the most prominent members of the Hungarian Parliament, in which they inform me that owing to the changed internal situation of Hungary important news might be forthcoming from Budapest any time. They furthermore invite me, in the interest of future events, to come at once to some neutral European country. From this telegram I deduce that a genuine Hungarian movement in the sense on which you talked to me in Quebec might be forthcoming almost any time.

Having received also several appeals from Austria to be closer at hand, I have decided to follow-as it is my duty-these appeals and to leave as soon as possible for Portugal. There is a chance that I might be able to leave already on Monday next, October 2nd. Needless to say, I will keep my departure as a strict secret, even towards my friends here.

You will certainly understand that just prior to leaving I would like to have one last opportunity to see you at least for a few minutes. Naturally, I am only to well aware how busy you are. Nevertheless, if you should find some time to receive me before Saturday evening, I would be most grateful if you could let me know through Miss Tully.

If on the other hand this should not be possible, I want to tell you already through this letter my profound gratitude for all you did during these last years for my family and myself. It was grand to have had you as friend and also to see and witness your deep understanding and warm sympathy for Austria and for Hungary.
My brother Felix, who will remain here, will continue to report to you on any move on the Austrian or Hungarian field. May I request from you the favor that you will show him the same kindness as you have always shown to me.

I pray to God that He might protect you and keep you for a long time as a leader and an inspiration not only to your own people, but also to all the nations of the world.

Believe me to be, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
Washington D.C.
September 27th 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

I regret very much to be obliged again to ask you to transmit the enclosed letter to the President. I most certainly know how busy you all are, but unfortunately the events are stronger than my good intentions.

With my best regards,

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

(J. J. Astoria)
MEMORANDUM TO MISS GRACE TULLY

As agreed in our conversation yesterday afternoon, we are pressing on the Otto matter and hope that he will be on his way promptly. Arrangements are being made through the Navy which has control of air facilities in Lisbon.

[Signature]

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 20, 1944
Very Urgent.

The Broadmoor, 3601 Connecticut Avenue, Washington D.C.
Teleph. Woodley 6900, Ext. 315 and Emerson 3978, October 18th 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

Will you please excuse me for writing to you in this matter, but as it is very urgent and important for Archduke Otto of Austria, I feel it my duty to do so.

I shall be as brief as possible:

As you certainly know, Archduke Otto of Austria wants to go to Europe because he feels that it is his duty to be near his people. He would already have left, were it not for the fact that he could not — even not now—obtain the necessary priority in order to take a plane (Pan American Airways) to Lisbon.

The normal way for going to Lisbon at the present time is to board a Pan American Airways Clipper, in which naturally each passenger pays its seat. But under the present regulations only such passengers are allowed to pay a seat and to board a Clipper, who have a priority. These priorities are issued by the Department of State, or by the Navy Department or by the War Department. As soon as one gets a priority, it is easy to get a seat on the Clippers for Portugal.

Archduke Otto asked the Department of State, which had no objection to give him an Exit Permit, for such a priority, just as the Department of State had given one to his brother Charles Louis a few weeks ago. But the Department of State, I was told, hesitates to give to Archduke Otto such a priority, fearing eventual attacks in one or two papers of New York.

Under these circumstances, the Belgian Ambassador applied for Archduke Otto of Austria, under the name "Duc de Bar" for a priority, in order that he might be able to go by Clipper to Lisbon. The Belgian Ambassador did so on account of the close relationship of Archduke Otto with the Belgian Royal family. — But the Department of State still seems to hesitate.

Unfortunately, the matter, going on now since more than three weeks, becomes absolutely urgent. Archduke Otto, who feels it his duty not to delay any more his departure, will under these circumstances board one of the small Portuguese boats which are going from here to Lisbon in a journey lasting two weeks or more.
But, besides the fact that such a journey would be a very long one under the present circumstances, there is another fact to which I want to draw your attention:
These Portuguese boats are very often, on their journey across the Atlantic, arrested by German U-boats, and they are searched and passengers, whom the Germans consider to be their enemies, are simply taken from board and brought to Germany. As you will kindly remember, this happened as late as September 1944, and happened on many occasions.

The fact that Archduke Otto is soon going to Portugal is already known to a great part of the press, owing to some leakage for which the Archduke is not responsible, because he wanted his entire journey to be kept secret.
Under these circumstances it is certainly to be expected that the Germans will closely watch every ship going to Portugal, because they would be very much interested to capture the Archduke, and they will probably search every Portuguese ship for him.
You realize certainly the situation, dear Miss Tully, and therefore I am writing to you asking you if you could have the kindness to obtain from the President that the Archduke is given the assurance that he will get a priority for a Pan American Airways Clipper to Lisbon.

The matter is very urgent because tomorrow, Thursday morning the Archduke will make his definite booking for a Portuguese ship, and already on Saturday, October 21st he would board this ship - id est in three days - if he cannot have before this time the assurance that a priority will be given to him.

I do not think that there is anything to be thought of eventual press-attacks against the Department of State: the fact that the Belgian Ambassador asked for this priority puts the entire responsibility for granting it on the Belgian Ambassador.

It was told to me confidentially in the Department of State that if there were any hint of the White House to give a priority for the Archduke, they would give it with pleasure.

Knowing how kind the President has always been to Archduke Otto and his family, I am certain that the President does not want the Archduke to be deprived of the possibility to go by Clipper to Lisbon, under the present serious circumstances.

But please, dear Miss Tully, will you please kindly let me know an answer this afternoon, today, October 18th, about at 5 p.m., in order that the ship-booking can be cancelled in time. Otherwise the Archduke would pay tomorrow morning for the ship.

The Archduke does not know anything about this letter, but I, who have been for exactly 22 years with him, feel it my duty to appeal to the President through your kindness.

With my sincerest thanks in advance and with my best regards I am, dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

Henry Count Degenfeld.
Dear Miss Tully,

First of all, I want to thank you wholeheartedly for your great kindness in bringing the matter of my priority for Europe immediately before the favorable consideration of the President. This was really very kind of you.

I want also to repeat to you a request I made yesterday through Mrs. Brady. I probably did not make myself sufficiently clear, so I put it down in writing.

As you know, the situation in Hungary is one of utter confusion. Immediately after my arrival in Europe I shall no doubt be asked to give advice on the lines to follow, not only to the Hungarian diplomats abroad, but also to people inside Hungary. As I do not want to give them any advice or directive which would be contrary to the policy of the President, I would be most grateful if it were possible that I could talk today over the telephone for a few minutes with the President on the Hungarian situation.

I would be glad at the same time to tell also personally to the President my warmest thanks for his great kindness.

I would be most grateful if you could let me know here at the Broadmoor at my private telephone - Emerson 3978 - , when and how such a conversation could take place.

I know that this day is almost the worst of the year for such purposes, as the President is about to leave for New York. But I hope you will understand that I would not have made this request.
without feeling very much its urgency.

With my renewed thanks to you,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

[Note: The signature is not legible in the image provided.]
Dear Mr. President,

Leaving this country within the next two or three days, I want to tell you again my warmest thanks for all your kindness which you have shown to me also in these last few days.

Please be assured that in the future - whatever that future may bring - you will always be able to count that I will do whatever I can to further your plans and your ideals, because I believe in these and in the leadership you have given and will give to all of us.

I pray to God the Almighty that He may protect and help you in the years ahead and that your inspiring leadership may remain with us for many years to come.

I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

Washington D.C., October 26th 1944.
Washington D.C.  
October 26th 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

Enclosed please find a note for the President. I would be most grateful to you if you could hand him that note when he returns from his trip to Chicago.

I want to tell you again before my departure all my gratitude for your kindness and the hope that we shall meet again in a not too distant future.

With my best regards,
dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM: Re: The Allied occupation of Austria.

In view of the fact that the present misery in Austria and a solid Russian backing have tended to increase the communist danger in Austria, the idea of a tripartite occupation of that country seems to be increasingly dangerous. On the other hand, it seems almost impossible to eliminate now Russian participation in the Austrian occupation without some form of compensation.

If press-reports are correct, a tripartite occupation of Berlin seems also to be planned.

As Berlin is obviously less important to the Allied cause than Austria, there may perhaps be a way out: Would it not be possible to offer Russia the sole occupation of Berlin, if on the other hand American and British forces would be the sole occupants of Austria?
October 26, 1944.

Dear Count Degenfeld:

I want to send you this little note to tell you how much I appreciated your very nice letter to me. I am glad everything worked out so well for Archduke Otto. Please remember me most kindly to him.

With every best wish,

Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

Henry Count Degenfeld,
The Broadmoor,
3601 Connecticut Avenue,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Miss Tully,

Will you please have the kindness to transmit to the President, whenever you think it suitable, my personal sincerest thanks for his great kindness in arranging in such a noble way the matter of the priority for Archduke Otto of Austria. I knew that he would find the best solution in this difficult situation, as soon as he was informed about it.

But I am also deeply indebted to you personally, dear Miss Tully, for having taken this matter up in such an excellent manner and for having been so very kind to bring it immediately to the attention of the President, together with your warm recommendation. Will you therefore please also accept my warmest and most heartfelt thanks and will you please be certain that I shall forever in the future remember your personality as one of the outstanding friends of Otto of Austria in this country.

I want to inform you that in the meantime it has been arranged with the State Department that Archduke Otto will leave by Clipper on or about October 29th, his priority given under the name of "Duke of Bar".

Otto of Austria will therefore stay here in Washington until Friday, October 27th in the morning and on this day go to New York.

With my renewed warmest thanks and with my best regards
I am, dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

Henry Count Degenfeld.
November 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HON. E.R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Dear Ed:

I think it is quite all right for you to appoint Mr. John G. Erhardt as Political Adviser to the Commanding General in Austria whenever we get there.

"F.D.R."

F.D.R.

Transmitting carbon of Mr. Hull's memorandum of 10/17/44 to the President, the original of which has been retained for our files.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

From all I can hear about this man he is all right.

I suggest you send the attached note to Stettinius.

encl.
Memo of Oct. 14th from the Secy. of State to the President re the appointment of John G. Erhardt as Political Adviser to The American Commanding General in Austria.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Do you know of some way
of checking on this man?

F. D. R.

Transmitting carbon of memorandum which
the President received from the Secretary
of State, 10/14/44, the original of which
has been retained for our files, in re
Mr. John G. Erhardt.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Although the occupation of Austria is to involve none but token American forces, present plans reserve to the United States a full voice in the tripartite control and administration of Austria, probably through a control commission at Vienna similar to the one proposed for Germany. This will call for the appointment of a Political Adviser to the Commanding American General in Austria, as has been done in the case of SCAEF for Germany. The British have already made their corresponding appointment (Mr. Mack) and have expressed the hope that we will also do so soon. Recent telegrams from General Maitland Wilson express urgent need for formation of a nucleus control group in planning for the occupation of Austria.

It is therefore desirable to designate an officer to serve with the personal rank of Minister as Political Adviser to the Commanding American General in Austria. I should like to submit for your consideration the name of Mr. John G. Erhardt, a Foreign Service officer of Class I. He is admirably qualified by long experience in European affairs including service from 1933 to 1937 as American Consul General at Hamburg where he became thoroughly familiar not only with the language, but also German controls and practices, the severance of which from Austria will constitute an immediate problem of the occupation.

Do you approve his designation to this post with the personal rank of Minister?
AUSTRIA

SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ZONES OF OCCUPATION

NOVEMBER, 1944
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Yours of November 30th in regard to Austria, the answer is "yes" -- you have my permission.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Postwar Occupational Control in Austria.

The Soviet Government has proposed in the European Advisory Commission that Austria, for occupational purposes, be divided into three zones to be occupied by American, British and Soviet forces as indicated on the accompanying map.

American plans for the occupation of Austria have contemplated the use of not more than one division of American troops to be restricted to the city of Vienna alone. The Soviet proposal would require a further allotment of at least four divisions. The War Department informs me that this would require a reconsideration of the whole program of the employment of American forces after the defeat of Germany.

May I have your permission to instruct Ambassador Winant to state to the European Advisory Commission that this Government does not wish to extend its undertaking with regard to the number and location of American troops to be used in Austria?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have yours of December sixth about zones in Austria. Please take this up with the Joint Staff. I would be willing to accept a zone next to Bavaria -- in other words, touching the German zone which has been allocated to us.

F. D. R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Zones of Occupation in Austria

Upon the receipt yesterday of your reply to my memorandum concerning zones of occupation in Austria, I instructed Winant to state in the European Advisory Commission that this Government does not wish to extend its undertaking with respect to the number and location of American troops to be used in Austria.

I believe, however, that you should see the attached telegram, dispatched by Winant before the receipt of our above-mentioned instructions, in which he presents the reasons which have led him to urge a change in our position.

Attachment:

Telegram No. 10732,
December 4, 1944,
from London.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schraub Date FFR 1972
London

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Dated December 4 1944
Rec'd 10:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
10732, December 4, midnight

I hope the Department has had time to consider the new political factors involved in the Soviet proposal for zones of occupation in Austria (my 10441 and my 10442, November 27, 3 p.m. also please read my 10348 November 24, 7 p.m. addressed to Dunn, which crossed with Department's 9838, November 22, 9 p.m.). In the discussions so far in the European Advisory Commission I have avoided taking an irrevocable stand in order to allow time, if desired, for fresh consideration of this question in Washington.

In view of my strong stand of last June and July, when I made it plain that we envisaged providing only a small contingent, approximately of the size planned for Berlin, to be stationed in Vienna, it is doubly significant that the Russians, in spite of their earlier oral acceptance of our position, are now pressing us so strongly...
so strongly to accept a zone in Austria. The British have likewise reiterated the view that Allied occupation and control of Austria would operate more effectively if we took an equal share (at the latest EAC meeting Strang stated that his government was proceeding on the assumption that, once German resistance is ended and the initial pacification of Austria is completed, one division will be adequate to maintain order in the United Kingdom zone).

I feel you should also know that the Russians insist on completing agreement on zones before discussing concrete arrangements regarding control machinery in Austria. In the EAC Gousev has stated that it is not practicable to consider control machinery until it is decided whether to have two or three zones. Gousev in private has strongly stated the Russian view that we would not be taking an equal responsibility for the fulfilment of the Moscow declaration on Austria unless we occupy a zone. From the discussion so far I have a definite impression that unless we have a zone in Austria it will not (repeat not) be possible for us to secure really equal participation in control. Without a zone of responsibility, the United States members of the control body may prove to be little more than advisers.
-3-#10732, December 4, midnight, from London.

advisers or even onlookers, as the British and the Russians will share effective control of the entire country except for our one third participation in controlling Vienna.

The discussion of the Bulgarian armistice has shown the importance of adequate physical participation in the occupation of enemy countries in which we wish to make our views felt and see our interests respected. In connection with the British assumption that one division will be sufficient for policing their zone, I note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have assumed that after defeat or collapse of Germany SACMED would be able to occupy all of Austria with four divisions and a small air force (CCS 481/6, September 8). With the decision to accept a southern zone in Germany the logistic difficulty on occupying a zone in Austria seems pretty much to have disappeared, since any American zone in Austria, whether equal in size to the other two zones or smaller, would be contiguous to our zone in Germany.

At bottom we need to weigh the military disadvantage of providing a small force to occupy a part of Austria against the political difficulties of trying to exert an equal influence on the reconstruction of Austria.
-4-#10732, December 4, midnight, from London.

Austria while limiting military participation to a small contingent stationed in one third of Vienna. I should very much appreciate the Department's views on these aspects of the problem. The next meeting of the commission has been postponed to December 7, to allow Massigli time to secure French views regarding the occupation of Austria.

WINANT

JMS
DSH-575  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
NIAC'T 10834, December 8, 6 p.m.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

I have received the Department's 10190 (December 5, 10 p.m.) instructing me to state in the European Advisory Commission that our Government does not wish to extend its undertaking with respect to the number and location of troops to be used in Austria. (Please read my 10348, November 24, 7 p.m. to Dunn, and also my 10732, December 4, midnight).

I hesitate to again trouble you with this question but I feel, after the most careful consideration, that recent developments have warned us that this is more than a local Austrian question and that the issues involved dig deep into the background of future world security.

Several months

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-79

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972
Several months ago, when the question of the Austrian protocol first came up before the European Advisory Commission, I was able, by your consenting to furnish a small token force for Austria, to get both Strang and Gousev to agree to our stationing this force in one of the three areas of Vienna without our taking over a zone elsewhere in Austria, and with the further understanding that there would be complete tripartite control within Austria. We believed at that time that this would satisfy our obligation under the Moscow declaration on Austria.

It was because of our delay in settling the assignment of the German zones that the Russians refused to complete agreement on Austria at that time. They have now come forward with a very different proposition, as outlined in my 10441 (November 27, 3 p.m.), for an American zone in western Austria, contiguous to our zone in southern Germany.

In the intervening period since July armistice terms have been worked out for Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria. The first two were settled in Moscow and the latter, which was being handled in the European Advisory Commission, was interfered with by British intervention.
intervention in Moscow. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, while in Moscow, also discussed Greece and Yugoslavia. Among other comments made there, you will recall the acceptance by Molotov and the British of British control in Greece; Molotov's frank statement of 80% Soviet control and 20% Anglo-United States control in Rumania and Bulgaria, with a similar proportion suggested for Hungary; and 50% Soviet and 50% Anglo-United States control in Yugoslavia.

It is important to note that in the case of Bulgaria, prior to Russia's declaration of war and her 5 hours state of war, we had an agreement for Anglo-American control over the fulfillment of the armistice terms. Delays by all parties interfered with the consummation of this agreement. After Russia's declaration of war Soviet demands for increased control grew daily in direct proportion as they extended their occupation. In other words, actual physical occupation has been the constant and determining factor in apportioning the degree of control.

Certain implications of Soviet dominance in Rumania and Bulgaria can already be seen.
Department's circular information telegram of December 1, 9 p.m., describes our reaction to the Russians moving American owned oil equipment out of Rumania. Department's 10192 (December 5, midnight) outlines the difficulties arising from exercise of Soviet predominance in Bulgaria and in Bulgarian politics.

The question of dominant control during military operations and until the surrender of Germany can be defended within limits. This would not run contrary to our own insistence on top military control by our Supreme Commanders in Africa, Sicily, Italy and Western Europe. But it is the insistence of the Russians that their control shall continue after the surrender of Germany and until the conclusion of peace that disturbs me most as I believe this interim period will seriously influence the pattern of post war settlement.

Certainly we can draw at least two lessons from the experiences of these last few months. One is that, from a Soviet point of view, occupation is directly related to control, or, to put it in common law language, possession is 9 points of the law. Two, it is also clear that failure to work out in advance agreed arrangements...
agreed arrangements with the Russians and the British in areas in which we share responsibility, as in Germany and Austria, will inevitably lead to a grab as grab can policy.

I note that the main reason for the decision not to accept a zone in western Austria is the desire of our government "not to extend its undertaking with respect to the number and location of American troops to be used in Austria". I should like to suggest that we could enlarge the geographical area in which the American contingent would be stationed without (repeat without) increasing the size of our force. In this connection a distinction needs to be drawn between the period of active military operations and the period of peaceful occupation. The commitment of forces in the operational period must naturally be determined by the conditions encountered in overcoming the enemy's resistance as judged by the Commander in the field. Presumably Austria will be occupied first by SACRED or Soviet forces, probably by the latter.

On the other hand, the period of peaceful occupation, to which the proposals before the European Advisory Commission
Advisory Commission relate, calls for a military force to serve as a kind of reserve police force in case the reconstructed Austrian police operating under Allied control should prove inadequate to maintain order.

The British envisage providing approximately one division in the period of peaceful occupation, to occupy one third of Austria together with one third of Vienna. I understand that we intend to provide one division for the occupation of one third of Vienna alone (CCS paper 481/11 of November 23). We might also want to take advantage of airfields in western Austria for policing Germany from the periphery.

The question is whether it would not be militarily more convenient and politically more effective to use approximately the number of troops we have already allotted for garrisoning one third of Vienna, in order to occupy a zone as well. We could shorten the size of the zone suggested in the Soviet plan. For the period of peaceful occupation the question is one of extending the location but not necessarily the number of American troops.

To understand the Soviet eagerness to have us take a zone in Austria we must go back to Eden's discussions.
discussions in Moscow on percentages of control in the various countries. The Russians, being literal minded folk, consider that in Austria we, the British and themselves are supposed to have one third each of the responsibility, both by virtue of our contributions to the common victory and because of the Moscow declaration on Austria. If we now confine our direct responsibility in Austria to occupying one third of Vienna, the Russians will draw the conclusion that we do not want one third of the responsibility for Austria as a whole. As a result, we will probably be confronted with control machinery proposals which, while leaving us with one third of the responsibility in the eyes of American and world opinion, will give us much less than one third of effective power and influence in Austria. In a very tactful way, Gousev has been putting us on notice to expect this. Hence, in view of our leading position in the conduct of the war and the settlement of the peace, and in view of Austria's key position in Central Europe, or refusal to take a zone of occupation may be interpreted as a sign that we are willing to leave this area to the free play of Soviet and British interests.

When Soviet
-8-, NIACT, 10864, December 8, 6 p.m., from London.

When Soviet and British bloc politics threaten to dominate the scene, it is perhaps wiser for us to stay on the job and to work against the bloc concept which, if left unchecked by strong outside influences like our own, may pull Europe to pieces, both in its international relationships and within the individual countries, as we unfortunately see happening in Greece.

I have grave doubts as to the ultimate wisdom of leaving British interests pitted against Russian interests in Austria. The basis of our policy of tripartite control in Germany, instead of permitting an Anglo-American force of occupation and a separate Soviet force, rests on the concept of the three powerful military countries, which will be responsible for the defeat of Germany, having authority and responsibility. If we had failed to share this responsibility on a tripartite basis it would have been sure to create suspicion and ill will on the part of the Soviet Government. We have felt all along that even civil government was substituted for military government in this part of Europe and our forces were largely withdrawn, we did not want to leave behind a legacy of conflict between an angry Russia and a weak Britain.
Britain. Trouble in Austria might spread to Germany and interfere with the constructive approach we have adopted.

At bottom both the British and the Russians feel that our full and equal participation in Austria would help not only to steady developments there but also to work out relations between our two major Allies in a sensitive area.

As I understand it, we have two primary interests in the smaller states. One is to support their sovereignty and freedom, and the other to see that nothing can again take place in any part of the world that might disturb the peace of the world. Twice in 25 years we have been drawn into world war because of disturbances in European areas far distant from us and in which we had exercised little influence. In neither instance did we control the events which ultimately involved us in war.

In view of all these considerations, I earnestly hope you will review the question of our accepting a zone of occupation in Austria. Until I hear from you I shall avoid committing us on this matter.

WINANT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1944

Dear Audrey:

Will you call up Count Degenfeld and tell him how sorry I am that nothing can be done about getting priority for him? We have to leave it entirely up to the State Dept. Tell the Count to tell the Archduke how appreciative the President is of his nice letter and also the letters from Archduke Charles and Archduke Rudolf. Tell him off the record I am not in town and perhaps I could see him when I return.

Grace
Dear Miss Tully,

I just received from Lisbon, from H.M. Archduke Otto of Austria, the hereby enclosed letter together with the instruction to send it immediately to you and to ask you to have the kindness to transmit it to the President.

From the circumstances under which this letter arrived, namely from the date of the accompanying letter to me, I deduct that the letter of Archduke Otto of Austria to the President has been very much delayed. I am certain that Otto of Austria will regret it deeply.

Thanking you in advance for your kindness, and with my sincerest regards I am, dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

Henry Count Degenfeld
Aide to H.M. Archduke Otto of Austria.
Dear Mr. President,

It was with genuine pleasure that I learned your triumphant re-election. Not that I had doubted for one minute that the American people would continue to put its whole trust in you. Nevertheless the certainty is good and I want to congratulate you with all my heart. Not only in America, but also in all the occupied countries will the news of your re-election cause great rejoicing. We all are grateful to God that you will continue your leadership for all of us in the difficult years to come.

Since I arrived here, I have received many direct reports from home. The news from Hungary are depressing and the nation is decimated between the Nazi barbarians and the Communists, who take the power behind the Russian lines. The survival of the nation itself is in question. As far as Austria is concerned, there is much more and much better organized resistance than I had expected. I think that it will be possible to make a valuable contribution, if we receive some help from the outside. In a short while I shall be able to make practical suggestions on that ground and I shall take the liberty to send them to you. These suggestions will be on the line of possible contributions to the defeat of Germany and to the prevention of a communist dictatorship after victory.

In view of these forecoming letters, may I ask you to have the great kindness to let me know soon either through Ambassador Norwebb in Lisbon or through the military line to Lisbon, by which way I could communicate with you personally in a rapid and sure way, so that I could know, that my letters from Europe would come safely into your hands.

I pray to God, that He should protect and help you in your new term as President, and with my renewed congratulations, I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

Lisbon, November 8th, 1944.

[Signature of Austria]
Dear Miss Tully,

I am writing to you first of all in a matter in which I want it to leave it entirely to you and to your experience and advice if you think you could be of help in it.

I have been instructed by H.M. Archduke Otto of Austria, before his departure, to come to Lisbon in the midst of December, or about that time, and this instruction has now been confirmed. As I know that there is very much to do for me in Lisbon, where I would continue to be with Archduke Otto of Austria, and as the journey by the Portuguese ships is very slow and I would perhaps only towards the end of January be in Lisbon, much to late, I applied through the Department of State for a priority for the Pan American Clipper to Lisbon. I had not yet any definite answer, but the Department of State seems to hesitate and I fear the Department might refuse the priority. On the other hand, I know that there are generally only very few passengers for Portugal for these Clippers, most of the passengers going only to the Bermudas, and I think it might therefore be possible to receive a priority for me on one of the Clippers going between December 17th and 24th to Lisbon.

In this situation I am writing to you and asking you if you think it possible that there might be given a hint to the competent Division of the Department of State from the White House, in order that I might get a priority. I would not ask you for it if I would not think it very necessary for the service of Archduke Otto in his work for the earliest liberation of Austria and for the cause of the United Nations. May I add that in a very short time Archduke Felix, who will soon be back in Washington from his journey to the Middle West, will send you a lot of interesting informations on some aspects of the situation in Europe, informations which he received from his brothers.

Finally, I want to ask you, dear Miss Tully, when I could come to see you personally for a few minutes, if your time would permit it. I would only like to take leave of you before my departure for Europe, having had so often the pleasure to telephone and to write to you.
and remembering always with sincerest gratitude all your kind help to Archduke Otto of Austria.

With my best regards and my sincerest wishes I am, dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

Henry Count Degenfeld.
Dear Mr. President,

At this moment we have learned through the radio the splendid news of your re-election and we hasten to tell you our best and warmest congratulations on this occasion.

Having worked closely in these last months with the Austrian and Hungarian Forces of the Interior, we know what deep happiness your triumph will mean to our people. They know that they have in you a devoted friend and defender.

We pray to God the Almighty that He may bless you and help you to be our guide and inspiration in the trials to come and in the better future for which you have so valiantly worked. Our people at home, just as we, have full confidence in you and in the leadership which you will give us for the attainment of a just and Christian peace.

Believe us to be, dear Mr. President

Yours very sincerely

Archduke Charles of Austria.

Archduke Rudolf of Austria.
Mr. P. —

Don't all right to ask State Dept. to accept messages from Archduke Otto to be sent by Prince to you? Yes? Is.
The Broadmoor, Washington D.C. 
December 19th 1944.

Dear Miss Tully,

My brother Otto has written to me in the following matter which I think is important:

My brother has important informations and matters which will undoubtedly interest the President and he would like to know by which way he could communicate with the President personally in a quick and safe way. There might also be cases when the President would like to send my brother his advice.

The easiest way to communicate would be through either the military or the diplomatic pouch from Lisbon to this country. As you know, neither the Military Attache nor the Ambassador are authorized to let anybody correspond through these facilities without express order of the President. Could it possibly be arranged that the White House directs either General Clayton Bissel and through him the Military Attache in Lisbon, or maybe the Department of State and through them the U.S. Ambassador in Portugal, that they accept letters from my brother addressed to the President personally? I believe that the military way is the faster of the two and I know that it has been handled before with much discretion.

I would indeed appreciate if you would kindly let me know the decision of the President.

I am scheduled to go to Quebec soon and spend there the Christmasdays with my mother, but Count Deconfeld will stay on in Washington, in case you should like to discuss the matter orally, until his departure for Portugal has been arranged.

With my very best wishes for Christmas and the New Year I remain, dear Miss Tully,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
Lisbon,
January 10th, 1945.

Dear Mr. President:

Today Ambassador Norwell informed me, that he had received your instructions, that he should accept my letters addressed to you and send them straight to you. He further informed me, that you had authorized, that I could enclose letters for my brother. I want to tell you, dear Mr. President, how very grateful I am for this new sign of your friendship, which will enable me to be in touch with you on the most confidential matters. At the same time let me wish you a very happy New Year: may 1945 see the fulfillment of all your wishes and bring the beginning of the realization of your plans for world-peace.

Since I last wrote you I have been able to establish various contacts, mostly with military elements inside Austria. These contacts have given me a picture of the real situation inside the country. Our great difficulty has been the communication from here to Switzerland, because lacking any diplomatic courier system I have always to wait for persons to travel on other business, which sometimes delays me for weeks.

With the people in Austria I have been studying the means of bringing Austria into positive action on the allied side, in order to enable the American and British forces to get to Austria first. This is a powerful motive because while people are all pro-allied, they are very much afraid of the Russians. At this time we are examining the following problems: 1 - are we strong enough to be of real assistance to the Allied cause; 2 - if yes, what is the practical help we need in matters of arms, munition, radio-equipment and eventually money; 3 - what detailed plans can we offer for the contribution we can make and the help we would need. While I begin to have a pretty good idea of what the answers shall be, I would like at this time still to refrain from saying anything, because above all I want to say only things for which I can vouch absolutely. Nevertheless I hope to be able to give you soon a serious plan. If there are delays, - and unfortunately there are more delays than I expected on arriving here - they are due, as I said, more to technical difficulties
outside of Austria, than to German action or efficiency.

The press says, that you will soon meet Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. May I ask you not to forget Austria and Hungary on that occasion. The people of both countries are worth it and you should see, as I do, what a deep faith they have in you. It would be a pity to see them fall into the destructive sphere of communism. Especially Austria is clearly a western country, which should not belong under Russian influence.

With my renewed thanks and my best wishes for you, I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]
To
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Lisbon,  
January 17th, 1945.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you this time just in order to inform you, that I am moving to Paris in the near future for the purpose of shortening the distances to Austria. The decision was precipitated by the fact, that I have secret reports at hand which seem to indicate, that misled by certain excesses of propaganda a premature movement might be initiated in Austria which, to my opinion, would do more harm than good, because it would permit the Germans to crush the resistance when the Allies are still much too far. If I can do it, I would like to prevent a repetition of the useless tragedy of Warsaw. I believe that we should conserve the forces until they can really give practical and useful help to the common cause.

May I ask you to have the great kindness to let Ambassador Caffery in Paris know, that he could take letters for you from me under the same conditions as Ambassador Norweb does here in Lisbon.

Following your kind authorization, I enclose here-with a letter for my brother Felix. Again accept my warmest thanks for making it possible for me to do this.

I pray to God, that He may bless and help you during the conferences of the coming days in your arduous task to bring about a just and lasting settlement according to your principles in which we over here have such a deep faith.

With my most respectful regards I am, dear Mr. President

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]  
[ Otto of Austria]
Miss Grace Tully  
3000 Connecticut Avenue  
Washington 8, D.C.

Dear Miss Tully,

Many thanks for having forwarded me the other day a letter from my brother.

Would you please be so kind and express to the President my very best thanks for having granted that facility and tell him how much my brother and myself appreciate his thoughtfulness.

With kindest regards, I am, dear Miss Tully,  
yours very sincerely

Archduke Felix of Austria
Miss Grace Tully
3601 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Miss Tully,

My brother Otto requested me, before leaving, to forward to you all interesting informations I would receive from Europe. Lately I received such news, and had them copied to be send to a limited number of friends. I thought they might interest you and so I am enclosing some informations from November and December.

I believe that these news are very accurate, since they were compiled in Europe from different sources. They are not of recent date because of the delay in reaching me from Europe.

If you believe that one or the other item might interest the President, I would very much appreciate if you showed it to him. These last news are mostly of interest to people thoroughly familiar with the names and internal condition of Hungary.

I shall forward you some more news as they come in.

With my best regards, I remain, dear Miss Tully,

yours very sincerely,
Nov. 27.- Budapest - The Hungarian Minister to Berlin, Sandor Hoffmann, has been recalled.

Nov. 27.- Budapest - According to serious rumors here, Mr. Karoly Rassay M.P. has fled to the Russian lines. He is supposed to be in Debrecen.

Nov. 27.- Budapest - The Szallasi Government has transferred its headquarters to Szombathely.

Nov. 27.- Budapest - It seems to be certain now, that Horthy Miklos Jr. (son of Regent) was shot two weeks ago by the Gestapo. Horthy Sen is with the rest of his family in forced residence in Munich.

Nov. 27.- Bern - Radio Budapest has discontinued its broadcasts since the 24th. Reason unknown.

Nov. 28.- Budapest - Professor Szentgyoergyi has been appointed mayor of Szeged.

Nov. 28.- Vienna - Since the day before yesterday no passenger train has circulated on the line Graz-Vienna. Railroad officials give military reasons as explanation. On the other hand still unconfirmed reports from Graz say that the interruptions are due to major acts of sabotage in the region of the Semmering, Gloggnitz and Muerzschlag report that no freight train has left these stations within the last thirty hours (Note: Before this report was completed on December 3rd, A.M. only one more report had come in on the matter stating that on Dec. 1st, at noon, limited freight traffic had been resumed.)

Nov. 28.- Budapest - It is announced that a committee of Hungarian Independence has been formed in Oroshaza. Among the members: Janos Csizmadia, M.P., of the Agrarian Party; Andras Fehl member of the Legislature of the Comitat Pest; Varga Istvan; Farinovics Elek; Toth Sandor; Gyulanyi Gyorgy; Stern Istvan; Szoellboessy Janos; Ivanyi Istvan; Fuest Ekel; Kovacs Antal; Goembkoete Sandor etc. Mr. Csizmadia furthermore founded the "Nemzeti Osszetartas Part."

Nov. 29.- Vienna - Yesterday Szallasy was in this city, coming from Szombathely. Among other engagements a meeting with the Hungarian Prime Minister Horia Sima took place. They conferred for 2 hours.

Nov. 29.- Budapest - A new secret broadcasting station called the Hungarian Soldier's Station started operations. This station operates on behalf of the Nazis from Brunn and its director is an unemployed actor by the name of Halasz. He pretends to broadcast from the front.
Nov. 29 - Budapest - The looting of Hungarian art treasures is setting along without letoff. After the museums, the tapestries of the Royal Castle have been given to Minister Jurasek.

Nov. 30 - Vienna - In the last days several German officers of this garrison have been arrested. Reason unknown.

Nov. 30 - Vienna - The secret archives of the Hungarian Government (Szallasy) have been brought to this city.

Nov. 30 - Budapest - Capt. Miklos Bonazos, son of the former minister of Interior has passed to the Russian lines together with his whole outfit.

Dec. 1 - Bern - In the evening of Nov. 26, some disturbances have taken place in the Florisdorf Lokomotivfabrik in this city. Reason: Removal of machinery and other mechanical equipment from the plant to Regensburg (?) Germany (Regensburg was mentioned by German authorities, therefore the destination might also be some other German city). Several Austrian workers were arrested.

Dec. 3 - Vienna - The SS troops guarding the Bezirk (district) of Mattarei, have been shipped away, presumably to the Hungarian front. This is the third report of it's sort in a few days, that the Germans have removed police forces in some districts, in order to send them to the front.

In this period many important informations have reached here (some place in Europe) but owing to lack of time they cannot be included in this compilation. However two more reports (over all reports) from couriers will be given here. These reports were made at the beginning of December in a neutral country.
REPORT ON HUNGARY: (The informant left Budapest in the middle of No-

The Szallasi-Regime came into power amidst an orgy of atrocities. Within the first hours SS formations, some members of the German minorities, went into the Ghetto around Bob and Rombach utca and killed with Machine guns every Jews they met. Owing to this the non-Jewish opponents of the regime came off at first without being executed. They were arrested by the Germans and mostly taken to Germany, first to Mauthausen and then to the concentration camp of Dachau. When these first atrocities (which lasted about three days) finished, a sort of deadly silence fell over the country. The number of execution from then on were very limited. Unlike the Germans, the Hungarian Nazis become weaker with the Russian advances.

The proclamation of Horthy's surrender was accepted with very little enthusiasm. In most peoples opinion it should have been handled differently and indeed much earlier. As it was the German armies were already entrenched in Hungary and the surrender made it possible for the Hungarian Nazis to take over and entrench themselves. If the Government had surrendered many months ago, this would not have happened. But as things stood now, the Government would have done better to stay in power and have her troops retreat. This would have given more difficulties to the Germans.

The food situation in the large cities is simply desperate, since the Germans have carried away all the supplies. Out in the country the situation is better. The Nazi terror is also less felt.

Politically, on the open, only the Nazi party is active. Underground the socialist Small Farmers and the Catholics are doing some work. There have been number of legitimist pamphlets (monarchist) which seem to come from the adherents of the late Griger Miklos or from the Szechenyi Gyorgy group. Some guerilla activity in the Bakony where political refugees together with soldiers try to hold off in hard fighting the Germans. They act in small units. A few Poles who have lived in Hungary since 1939 joined them.

The general feeling of the people is one of fear of impending doom. The confusion is great and the majority of people just live from day to day.

Militarily most people believe that all of Hungary will be occupied by Russia not later than spring. The Germans will quit their fight in Hungary as soon as their new defense line on the Austrian border (Leitha Line) is ready. It is believed that the line will be completed by March.

Budapest will be more destroyed than Warsaw and the number of civilian casualties is estimated at about 100,000. The Germans did not allow the civilian population to leave the town from November on.
REPORT ON AUSTRIA
(Informant left Austria at the end of November.)

The crisis in the German leadership goes on (see last report). It seems now very probable that Baldur von Schirach (Gauleiter of Austria) will be removed before the Germans retreat to the Loithaline. Nobody seems to know who will take over. Under no circumstances will an Austrian Nazi get the nomination. All other provincial Gauleiters will probably stay, although their powers have already been greatly reduced. It is SS General Moissner who is the real chief.

The Germans are evacuating Vienna, Wiener Neustadt and the whole industrial belt of lower Austria. The machinery is removed and labor is progressively shipped to Bavaria and Bohemia. The first group of workmen left Wiener Neustadt and Neunkirchen about the middle of November. The first to be removed are the foreign workers (Poles and French). Other departures are expected soon.

This had a most disquieting effect on German residents in Austria, who are starting to send their families back to Germany (German residents are mostly from the bombed areas of North Germany - Note). The aspect of Austria today is the one of a fortress getting ready for a siege. Everything seems to indicate that they are ready to try to hold Austria as long as they can, sacrificing everything to stop the Russians.

The food situation has slightly improved (probable reason is that the army has surpluses after plundering Hungary and that many people have left Austria, like the workmen and the German residents.) On the other side there is no heating at all. Even factories have difficulties obtaining coal. The railroad service is increasingly bad. This too increases the supply problems. All bus services for civilians have been discontinued - even where no other transportation facilities are existing.

The general feeling is very hard to analyze. Most people say that they do not expect any Russian occupation to last very long, as it is public knowledge in Vienna and in the rest of the country that Austria belongs to the British-American sphere of influence. The sympathy for the Americans is great: they are still very popular. The pleasure of Vienna on the re-election of Roosevelt for instance was so clear, that everybody could see it right away in the streets. The American election-night - which for Vienna began well after midnight - was spent by all who could afford it at the radio. The next day Vienna was happy, and some illegal flags appeared on streetcorners and squares.

Now that Vienna and the Eastern half of Austria became military zone, with a consequent heavy occupation, the activities of the illegal parties have to be more subtle. They are still very strong, although most of the numerous acts of sabotage are done by independent people. In Vienna three groups are active: the Communists, the Austro-Marxists, the United Legitimists and Catholics that indifferently take the name of Reichsbund, Christlichsoziales, Bauernbund (outside Vienna), Christliche Arbeiter. The United Legitimists and Catholics now operate on a completely unified program and are by far the strongest. The Communists have the most money and a very well organized outside support. This very often gives them the edge. In Western Austria the situation is by far better, because the Germans are not so strong. The Nazi Party is very inactive.

The losses of the Austrians in the German army are very heavy. They are much worse than in the last war, although an accurate estimate is impossible.
December 4 - Vienna - The news according to which the Partisans of Marshal Tito have been able to occupy some Austrian territory-novs which was broadcast yesterday over the free Yugoslav Station - is not accurate. There have been no Tito forces in Austria and everything done on the Austrian territory is done by exclusively Austrian forces. The statements of Tito are considered here as made in order to justify any claims on Austro-Slovenian territory he might make at the peace conference. This is very disquieting for the population for Southern Carinthia, a population that has behaved extremely well all during the war.

Dec. 5. - Budapest - This morning was officially announced the creation within the Hungarian army of German minority SS units. These units wear the Hungarian uniform and on it the sign of the SS. Their main duty will be the policing of the Hungarian units from inside of their own army.

Dec. 5 - Vienna - The Tito Hq. has announced officially that they have formed an Austrian Unit within their ranks. The information of the plan to establish such a unit has reached us already some time ago. It was negotiated with Tito by a certain Larsen, recte Kohn, who is an Austrian Communist on the staff of Koplenigg (head of the Moscow-sponsored Austrian Committee in Russia). This Larsen lived in Moscow and has been recently brought to Yugoslavia by the Russian forces. He will probably act as a sort of political and reconstruction commissar on the staff. His assistants are mostly men from the former International Brigade in Spain. The unit will also serve to arm the Austrian Communists. The nearest Communist unit to the Tito line is the Communist underground cell in Bleiburg, which was established already in the winter of 1938 by Fratkin-Schmuk on his trip thru Austria. (Note: London Radio on it's 12:15 broadcast carried already the news of the new unit.

Dec. 5. - Vienna - It is learned from a generally reliable source that the Gauler has on his desk since several days a petition by leading Austrian Nazis requesting that Vienna be declared open city. It is most unlikely that the Germans will consent.

Dec. 5 - Lisbon - Since this morning the short wave broadcasts from Budapest have been operating again. At 11 a.m. the scheduled broadcast for South America in both Hungarian and Spanish could be heard. The Radio announced the severance of relations between the Szallasi Government and Franco. (Note: relations between Franco and the Szallasi Government have never existed). The whole broadcast by Baron Kemeny was just a succession of news one more absurd than the other without any political line or sense. The news are regarded as the most hysterical program on the air yet.
Dec. 6. - Budapest - Great fear and consternation was caused in the ranks of the Szallasi Regime by the news, unconfirmed as yet, that the Russians have publicly executed some prominent collabora-
tionists of the Szallasi Regime.

Dec. 6. - Budapest - From a source close to Imrely we learn, that there is a deep split inside of the Szallasi Regime. Opposing Szallasy is a group comprising Remenyi-Schneller, Jurcsik and Rajnics and supported by Kalozsvary Boross, the chief of Press. Baky is floating between the two groups. Rajnics is quite outspoken and declares that he is not a Hungarian, but a member of the Nem-
zati Front, which is a party of the right, but not an extremist crowd. Szallasi is completely supported by Csia, Beregffi-Bergers, Kacsai, the propaganda Minister, and more or less by the other mem-
ers of the cabinet. Meecor, who definitely was more in sympathy with Rajnics, has been eliminated by his appointment as Minister to Berlin. The Germans are rather neutral in the matter and just leave them fighting. The one man who enjoys their friendship is Beregffi-
Berger, who is not a Hungarian but a German. Imrely feels that Szallasi will fall very soon, and that his time will come then. But Imrely has not as yet made up his mind as to whether he will accept any office personally. He would probably prefer to leave the front row to Rajnics and to be the power behind the scene.

Dec. 6. - Budapest - This morning on the basis of a judgment of the military court of this city Mr. Talmady Nagy Andras, member of Parliament, was executed by hanging. The charges were: Rebellion and understanding with the enemy. Particulars could not be learned.

Dec. 6. - Budapest - According to persistent rumors here, Mr Tildy Zoltan, member of Parliament for the agrarian party has succeeded to escape from prison. It is even rumored that he has been able to join the Russian lines. (Please keep confidential until verified.)

Dec. 6. - Bern - In its broadcast of 11:15 a.m., in German lan-

Dec. 6. - Budapest - All schools have been closed in the German occupied part of the country by order of the Government because of lack of coal.

Dec. 7. - Vienna - With January first approximately 50% of the Restaurants of Vienna were notified today would have to close. The order was issued by the office of total mobilization. The real reason seems to be, that after a temporary improvement in food condi-
tions, the most drastic food shortage should be expected any time.
after February 15. The reason is presumed to be the increasing difficulty of transportation - used now only for military necessities as well as the tremendous flow of refugees coming from the East.

Dec. 7. Vienna - In the last days Units of the Hitler Youth have come thru here on their way to the Hungarian front. They are mostly youngsters of 14 and 15 and came from Germany. If used on the fighting front or for security service behind the lines could not be ascertained.

Dec. 7. Vienna - Numerous Hungarian girls and women are now daily shipped here on their way to "service" with the German units in Germany. They mostly belonged to the Egyesult Rendi Tabor of Mrs. Kereczte Fischer Ferenc, and have been suspected of sympathy with the enemy. They have been simply conscripted.

Dec. 7. Vienna - The older brother of Szallasi is now in this city with a hungarian economic mission. He is selling on the black market the suppliers of the Hungarian Ministry of War. He mainly has been selling all sort of first quality military textiles, woolens and even underwear. The materials are brand new and not even too expensive. Some shoes were also available, partly even in pre-war quality. Most of these goods were sold to private persons, but some went into the local trade.

Dec. 7. Budapest - The new Hungarian Supreme Court of Justice, which will judge the politicians, officials, diplomats and officers, is composed of the following persons: President: Baky László, members: Budinoszky, Kozmovszky, Haj, Brunner, Mozosturi.

Dec. 7. Budapest - In no section of the town is there any electric or gas service. Every house on the Vaci utca has received already at least one artillery shot.

Dec. 7. Budapest - Great excitement has been created in town by the serious rumour, that the Holy Crown (the 950 years old Crown of Saint Stephen) has been removed by order of Szallasi and has been shipped to Nuernberg, were it was placed in a vault near the old so-called German Imperial Crown (brought from Vienna to Nuernberg after the occupation of Austria in 1938).

N.B. Additional information received seems to confirm the rumour of the removal of the Hungarian Holy Crown.

Dec. 7. Budapest - With the departure of the Government the fate of the city was put into the hands of a Bellegy Foeperanask - General Kunde, a svab terrorist from Tolna.

Dec. 8. Budapest - The Supreme Court under the presidency of Baky László condemned yesterday Major Gyoorffy to be hanged. The sentence was executed this morning.

Dec. 8. Vienna - In the last days several German re-inforcements for the Hungarian front have crossed here. Among them is: the 44th, 47th, 71st and 226th German Division. Other units, whose numbers could not be ascertained, have also crossed this country. It can be
assumed that roughly nine German Divisions of reinforcement have been going recently to the Hungarian Front in the sectors where they have to cross Austria. How many went through Bohemia is not known. It is also reported from Marburg that units from the German Balkan Army have been arriving. Contrary to the general belief these troops are by no means in a bad shape. They have most of their light and heavy armament and it can be expected that they will be soon used either in Croatia or in Hungary. In order to disrupt this military movement a Unit of Freiheitsbund der (Christian Socialist Militarized Unit) made a raid on the main line of the railroad, 4 kilometers North of Spielfeld. A freight train was derailed, but the damage was not up to expectations, so that the traffic could be resumed within 17 hours.

Dec. 8. - Budapest - According to persistent rumours here, the visit of the Hungarian Ministers to Hitler was not as harmonious as expected. It seems that Baron Kemeny had kept some sort of national sense and that on two occasions he proposed to refuse certain German demands. Szalasi seems to have been very discontented with his collaborator, while Ribbentrop very much complained about the resistance of Kemeny. All Budapest expects the dismissal of Kemeny soon.

Dec. 8. - Budapest - There is since this morning a secret radio operating on the wavelength of Budapest, which interrupts the Budapest broadcasts in the sense of Russian propaganda.

Dec. 8. - Vienna - Baldur von Schirach has returned from Berlin. This seems to contradict earlier rumpures that he would not return to his post. To his entourage he said on his arrival that he had had talks with the different leaders in Berlin and that he was satisfied that, whatever should be the turn of the war, Vienna would not come to suffer the fate of Aachen or Budapest. This is interpreted by leading Nazis as to mean that in due time Vienna would be declared an open city.

Dec. 8. - Vienna - In the last Allied raid on the factories of Vienna, the losses of the civilian population were extremely heavy. Many foreign workers, mostly Hungarians, Czechs and Croats, were killed.

Dec. 8. - Budapest - It is now General Friessner - a professional soldier - who is in command of the Hungarian front.

Dec. 9. - Vienna - Concerning the interruption of the railroad service between Vienna and Graz at the end of November in the Semmering area, it is now securely established, that this was due to an act of sabotage. It could not be ascertained who had been the author of the action. He did not belong to one of the major parties or resistance organizations. The action occurred during the night, about 1800 meters from the small station of Klam (near the Semmering). Two German S.S. men were
found with their throats cut. The explosion itself was the result of a very high explosive bomb and could have been provoked by not less than four persons. According to some witnesses, a German military car was seen not too far away from the place of the accident in the late hours of the evening. This is the more suspicious, as the previous day a military car and 150 liters of gasoline had been stolen at the airfield of Wionar Neustadt. The car has not yet been found. The Germans naturally try to hush up the whole matter. The press has not been allowed to publish any sort of reports.

Dec. 9. - Vienna - According to rather reliable information, one of the signers of the petition that Vienna be declared an open city is none other than the Nazi Buergermeister Blechke.

Dec. 9. - Budapest - Two Hungarian Lieutenant-Colonels, Kata-
lenyi and Batay, together with their respective outfits, have gone over to the Russians.

Sopron-Dec. 9. Today in the session of the supreme Court, several heavy condemnations occurred, and they are hereby brought now.

in the order of their proclamation: Ullstein-Rovicsky Antal, death and total confiscation of his property; Volnol Janos, death and confiscation; Ambro, Death and confiscation; Bethlen: life imprisonment; Ujvary, death and confiscation; Eckhardt Tibor, death by hanging and confiscation of all property; Pelenyi Janos, death and confiscation; Lipthay, 15 years hard labour: During the evening other sentences should be forthcoming, as the court remains in session and each trial takes no more than 5 to 10 minutes.

December 10. - Vienna - The number of refugees arriving new daily in Vienna begins to be quite a problem to the authorities. Up to this moment the necessary supplies were shipped from Hungary, but this source becomes more and more doubtful. Negotiations have begun between the Hungarian Cabinet represented by palffy and Jurcsok and the German authorities, in order to find a solution to the question.

Dec. 10. - Vienna - Tonight for the first time, thanks to the direction of the wind, it was possible outside of the city to hear faintly the rumbling of the guns, probably from the Budapest area.

Dec. 10. - Sopron - Speaking to the representatives of the press, after the first session of the Supreme Court, in a light mood, Minister Rajniss especially underscored the importance of the condemnation to hanging of Eckhardt Tibor. He said that Eckhardt was the most despicable type of cowardly traitor that could be found. At no time had Eckhardt in his parliamentary and diplomatic career thought of the interests of the Hungarian nation, but always had served loyalty the interests of the Jews and the Anglo-Saxons. He hoped, Rajniss added, to be witness at
the execution of Eckhardt, because that would be a real and supreme act of justice.

Dec. 10. - Sopron - the elder brother of Ujvary, an army officer, has been arrested and deprived of his military ranks.

Dec. 10. - Sopron - The hanging of Mr. Bajcsay-Zabilinszky Endre, member of Parliament, and of Mr. Baranyay Lipot, former director of the National Bank of Hungary, both condemned to death, should be expected within the next days.

Dec. 10. - Budapest - Colonel Liposey, Huzsar, was hanged this morning here. The execution of the following officers, also by hanging, is expected within the next hours: General Lakatos, former Prime Minister; General Neday, former Assistant to Count Teleki; General Mereny; General Rapsich. All four are at this moment in the cellars of the National Bank.

(N.B.: Until closing this report it could not be definitely ascertained whether the above mentioned generals were already executed. But all rumours seemed to indicate that the execution took place in the cellars of the National Bank in the late hours of the tenth. Nevertheless, no secure information can be expected before the Russian entry into Budapest.
Dec. 11, - Sopron - Here is a partial list of those condemned during the trials of the supreme Court in Sopron. This list is by no means complete. The total list of condemned men is 214, but the most prominent only are mentioned here. It should also be borne in mind that many trials have been adjourned, for what reasons is not at all clear. Among those adjourned are, for instance: Varga Bela, M.P., Sigray Antal, Chorin Ferenc, Reßinger Ferenc etc. Unfortunately in our list the Christian name has been omitted on several occasions, and this renders identification most difficult.

These are the names:
Apor Gabor, Minister to the Vatican, death by hanging and confiscation,
Ambro, Minister to Madrid, death and confiscation,
Barcza, formerly London, now Switzerland, death and confiscation,
Bethlen, Counsellor in Madrid, life imprisonment and confiscation,
Baranyay Lipot, director of the National Bank in Hungary, death by hanging,
Bede, death and confiscation,
Bakach-Besseneyey, Minister to Switzerland, death and confiscation,
Binder, death,
Draskovich, death and confiscation,
Draskovich, life imprisonment,
Esterhazy (Maric or Janos ?) death and confiscation,
Eckhardt Tibor, now U.S.A., death and confiscation,
Eroedi, death,
Falta, death,
Gasper, death,
Bobrik Arnold, Paris, death and confiscation,
Gyocy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, death and confiscation,
Homonay, M.P., death,
Hedry Istvan, now U.S.A., death on one account, 15 years hard labour on another, confiscation,
Hollan, Charge d'affaires in Madrid, life imprisonment,
Hertelendy, now South America, death,
Kallay Miklos, former Prime Minister, death,
Luby, life imprisonment,
Medgyessy, death,
Nagy, death,
Nagy, death,
Polanyi, death,
Pandy, life imprisonment,
Pallavicini, death,
Petrenyi, death,
Pereczel, death,
Pelenyi Janos, death by hanging and confiscation,
Parcher, Charge d'affaires in Stockholm, death,
Rubido Zichy, Ivan, in prison in Hungary, death,
Rothkugel, death,
Szentkay, 15 years hard labour and confiscation,
Szabo, Stockholm, death,
Szentmiklosy, death,
Szegedy Mazaak, in prison in Hungary, death,
Telek, death,
Toeroek, Consul, life imprisonment,
Ujvary, Consul General in Ankara, death,
Ullein-Revizky, Stockholm, death and confiscation,
Ujpetery, Charge d’Affaires in Lisbon, death,
Wodianer, Lisbon, death,
Wodianer, Bela, Lisbon, 15 years,
Voermle, Ankara, death and confiscation,
Walter, life imprisonment,
Zilahi Sebess, death,
Zsilinszky Endre, M.P., death by hanging.
It has been noted that of all the Hungarian diplomatists abroad, only Mr. Balazs Antal, now in U.S.A., has not been brought to trial.
Addenda: Count Somesey, Buenos Aires, 10 years hard labour. - The trial against Count Palffy was adjourned for further supplementary information. His trial will probably be coupled with the one against Sigray, Caekonije and Apponyi.

Dec. 11 - Budapest - German authorities are inviting the population to evacuate the city. How it should be done is not said.

Dec. 12 - Budapest - The execution of Bajosy Zsilinszky has been postponed sine die.

Dec. 12 - Budapest - The price on the head of Kallay Miklos has been fixed by the Government at 500,000 pengoes (at the peace-time exchange rate about 100,000 Dollars) and all the properties owned by Kallay.

Dec. 12 - Vienna - Several leaders of the Illegal Railroad Trade Union have been rounded up in the last days in Vienna, Bruck a.d.Laitha, Bruck a.d.Mur, Salzburg and Villach. There are suspicions on the German side that they have furnished the Allies with informations concerning the rolling stock and the freight-train schedules in Austria.

Dec. 13 - Vienna - Today at 12,35 the broadcast of Radio Wien was interrupted for two minutes during which a voice, after some silence, said: Austrians, there is time to act. Austria can only be free by its own will.... The voice was interrupted by march-music.

Dec. 13 - Vienna - During the past week, the Germans have increased their action of repression against the underground forces in several parts of the country. It seems as if the Germans were expecting some outbreak in the near future.

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NB. Because of the great volume available this time, the news brought in this number are only a very small part of the informations received. If time is available, a general report on Austria, which has just come in, will be added.
( This report has not arrived as yet ). -
Paris,
February 2, 1945.

Dear Mr. President:

Three days ago I arrived here in Paris and was informed, that you had had the kindness to direct Mr. Caffery, that he should transmit my letters directly to you. Thank you very much for acting so promptly on my request. I am living here in the greatest secrecy, in order to prevent, according to the wish of the French Government, that the press should know of my presence in France.

Concerning Austria, the situation which I found is as follows: there are number of resistance organizations in that country, which operate unfortunately very independently each one from the other. A co-ordinator is lacking. This situation is very cleverly exploited by the Communists, who are preparing an uprising a la Warsaw, in which the non-communists would do the fighting and the communists would take the credit. Such an uprising would be doomed, thus decapitating the non-communists while leaving the communist groups intact. There are already maquis-groups fighting in Tyrol, Southern Tyrol (formerly a part of Italy), Carinthia and Steiermark, although their number was decimated by the bitter cold of this winter. Only one day of last month 94 of our people froze to their death in one section of Tyrol. "All these difficulties are furthermore greatly increased by the fact that almost all our communications have to run through Switzerland. Are contacts with Switzerland are most difficult, especially because the Swiss authorities are more than un-cooperative. As to communications through Italy, it has been proven that these are practically excluded.

The first duty in the presence of this situation was to try to co-ordinate the actions of at least as many as possible independent organizations. As it seemed from the outset impossible to get an agreement on a person inside of the country, several organizations accepted the thought that the general lines be given to them by somebody designated by me. I thereupon decided to have my brother Charles act as coordinator, because in the past he gave me many proofs of his ability to harmonize divergent tendencies, and because furthermore I have unfortunately nobody really capable in Switzerland. The problem now is to bring my brother to Switzerland, from where he eventually will proceed to Austria. I am just now trying to procure him a false passport, on which he can travel to Switzerland. Such passports are given
either by G2 of the U.S. Army or by the French. Although I have not yet any definite answer, I sincerely hope that in the near future one of the two organizations will be willing to help, the more so as for them no danger is involved, because they can be sure of our total discretion.

Once Charles is in Switzerland, the problem of communications between that country and Paris will arise. May I ask you here, whether his communications for me concerning these underground matters could go through American channels. I understand, that there is a very frequent diplomatic pouch between Bern and Paris. If we could get the use of this pouch, our problems of communication through Switzerland would be greatly eased and our work speeded up.

Finally there are no American officials here who could act on the many daily details which arise out of the Austrian activities. It is said, that some competent officials are in Rome. This seems to be a rather regrettable situation, as there are no good contacts with Austria from Rome - that country being separated from Rome by a fighting front - while on the other hand all really good contacts run through Switzerland to France. The real decisions concerning Austria can be made more easily here than in Rome. Under these circumstances, may I make the suggestion, whether it would not be possible that an American official or military man be nominated here, who with special competence on Austrian affairs could have the authority to make the necessary contacts with the U.S. military and civilian authorities on the European Theatre of War, could also help to co-ordinate the activities on Austria of the different agencies as for instance the OWI and could finally request all those smaller helps from the authorities - especially the military ones - for which it would be a pity to bother you. I am thinking here of a man who could do the same job for Austria as Colonel Vanderstricht did for France.

In concluding this letter I want to tell you in the names of my brothers Charles and Rudolph as well as in my own name our best wishes for you birthday. I know that we are belated in doing this, but we just want you to know that on January 30th we remembered you and asked the blessings of the Almighty for you.

With my warm regards I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

[Title of Austria]
To
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the U.S.
The White House
Washington, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I am enclosing herewith a sealed letter addressed to the President received by pouch from Paris.

George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schumle Date FEB 4 1972
March 22, 1945.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINUS, JR.

WHAT DO YOU THINK?

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 2-19-45 from Otto of Austria, Paris, re report of brother Charles of preparation of active guerilla action in the mountains and need of arms, etc. for this; also need of men to instruct in use of arms and guerilla tactics.
NPx 83-13 (1) to NPx 83-13 (4C)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

CHIP BOHLEN:

Will you be good enough to send the following message as suggested by the State Department?

Grace G. Tully
TOP SECRET

DRAFT TELEGRAM

AMBASSADOR,
PARIS.

By direction of the White House please inform the Archduke Otto that his proposal for the use of Austrian prisoners is hardly practicable along the lines as presented in the Archduke's letter of February 19 to the President. The general question of relations with the Austrian underground, however, is being given further study.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, I-1272
By J. Schaubel Date

FEB 4 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Archduke Otto's Request for Austrian Prisoners for Underground Work

The proposal of the Archduke Otto as outlined in his letter of February 19, sent to Mr. Stettinius with your memorandum of March 22, is briefly that his brother Felix should be permitted to interview Austrians held as prisoners of war in the United States, and choose a certain number (some 20 in the first group) for underground work in Austria, these men then to be sent by plane to France for a three-week training. The Archduke also asks for American officers for training the group, as well as an American officer as liaison with him, the Archduke, and services and supplies, or the equivalent in funds, for the equipment and maintenance of the Austrian group. He requests your reply by telegraph to Paris.

From the political point of view we look on this project with misgivings. Our experience has shown that the Archdukes have a tendency to capitalize, to the advantage of their personal program, on enterprises which inherently might have had considerable merit if undertaken without these personal attachments. We think that in contemplating a project of this kind we must be prepared to face an eventual disclosure of the Habsburg leadership of it, which, as I think you will agree, would prove to be an embarrassment both in our diplomatic and our foreign political relations.

I should not like to speak for the military on the technical factors involved, but I may say that State Department officers who work regularly on prisoner of war problems think that the War Department may already have done considerable screening of prisoners with such work in mind, and that if Archduke Felix were to circulate among unsegregated German and Austrian prisoners there might be both incidents on the spot and public knowledge of the activities.

I wonder too whether an American officer could be detailed to the Archduke Otto without risking some publicity and speculation on the political import.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
Of 4 1972
By J. Schucke Date FEB
Of course the War Department may find it feasible to use Austrian prisoners for the work proposed by the Archduke, under some scheme in which the Archdukes themselves would play a less prominent part. Subject to such recommendations as the military may make, I would, however, suggest a telegram to Paris along the lines of the attached draft.

Enclosures:

1. Draft telegram to Paris; and
2. Letter from Archduke Otto

Dear Mr. President:

I regret very much to have again to impose upon your kindness, but I do hope that you will understand that only the absolute necessity forces me again to turn to you.

The first reports of my brother Charles, as well as personal conversations with resistance leaders of inside Austria have given me the impression - I do not yet use the word certitude only because I try to be as cautious as possible - that it will be possible to prepare active guerilla-actions in the mountains as soon as the snow has disappeared and as soon as the conditions for such an action are fulfilled. For that purpose we shall need small arms, that can be dropped in certain areas by parachute. We will need furthermore men, to instruct our people in the use of these arms and in the latest progress of guerilla tactics. For that purpose we will need people of our own, who can talk with their nationals in their language, who know the customs of the place. These men should not be intelligence service people but clearly instructors and later on be able to act within the resistance forces.

It became clear to me, that with very few exceptions emigres could not be used, because they have been away too long.

In a night-long conference on the problem - after having eliminated the possibility to send people out from Austria for the reason that we need everyone in the country - we decided that we should try to get the permission to use reliable prisoners of war for that purpose. The idea was sustained by the fact, that the Russians have already parachuted several hundred communist-trained austrian prisoners of war into the country in order to organize and lead the Austrian Communist Party, which operates under the name of Freedom Front. It was also decided, that these prisoners, if obtainable, should receive their training if possible here in France. A request made by me to the French is under favorable consideration and I am certain that they will give us as trainers officers from their own Forces of the Interior, who have done already the same thing before.

Now I know of several Austrian prisoners of war in American camps in Arkansas, Mississippi and Kentucky, who are considered to be
reliable and who have expressed their willingness to serve the cause of Austria. If therefore you should decide to fulfill our request and to give orders accordingly to the military authorities, may I suggest the following procedure: As soon as the decision is made in a favorable sense, my brother Felix, who has the names of the reliable prisoners should be authorized to proceed at once in great secrecy to these camps in order to speak with the soldiers and officers whose names he has. During that talk, other names can be added to the list by the reliable prisoners of war. If they volunteer for the duty, they should leave camp without delay and be brought to the Eastern Seaward. If possible I would be most grateful, if the first batch could be sent by plane to France, so that their training could start at once. I would be also very grateful if I could be informed of their arrival in advance, so that I could be at hand when they come in. As soon as they are trained, which is estimated at three weeks, we could have them proceed to Austria through channels which we have.

I am in such a great hurry - and make this request before even being able to submit any concrete plans for further action - because the snow will be melting towards the third week of march, at which time we would need the first trained people. I want also to insist once again, that the Russians are doing these things in a great way, which no doubt entitles our side to do at least the same. I suggest for the job in America my brother Felix, because I am sure of his absolute discretion and his experience of the mentality of our people. I add also a note for him, in which I give him detailed instructions. As to the number of men needed I feel that even a few - we have the names of roughly twenty absolutely reliable men - would help, but that these men with their camp-experience shall be able to give us more people, as to the Agency to handle the matter, may I respectfully suggest that it could be the Army and not the OSS. Our people have had a rather unpleasant experience with the OSS in Switzerland and have found that representatives of that agency are sometimes lacking the necessary caution. In this connection I would be most grateful if on these matters an American Officer from the Headquarters here could establish liaison with me already now, so that everything should be ready once the men arrive. They know at the American Embassy always were to reach me. - Finally, and I regret to have to raise the question, comes the fact that we have not the funds to provide for these people while they are here. The French give us the officers, some of my collaborators and myself will give them the necessary knowledge of necessities of our special work in the mountains, I hope that the U.S. Army will find it possible to spare somebody to train them in small arms, so that this side is provided for. What I would ask is whether it be possible
that their equipment and living be provided by the U.S. Army.

May I ask also, whether it would be possible for you to let me know by cable through your Embassy here, naturally without any details, whether you can accede to my request or not.

I am now working on a preliminary report on military, political and economic matters of Austria today, which I shall send you as soon as possible.

As to the general plan and to the suggestions which will derive from it, I must wait till my brother Charles will have returned. Then only do I hope to have all the necessary information and to see exactly how and on what conditions we can act.

Once again I want to tell you, dear Mr. President, my warmest thanks for all your kindness and interest in the cause of my country. I certainly am sorry to have to impose upon you so often and I hope, that your kindness and friendship will understand the great necessity under which I act.

With my warmest regards and all my best wishes to you, I am, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

[Signature]

Wolfgang of Austria