PSF: A. J. D. Biddle, Jr.  June 1941 - Dec. 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Let to FDR from Ambassador Biddle 5/27/41 supplementing his letters of 5/12 & 5/15 are the position of "Free France" and enclosing copy of letter and memo together with translations of same handed him by M. Rene Pleven, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs of Free France, and Secretary General of the Council of the French Empire for transmittal to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Let to FDR from Tony Biddle Ritz Hotel London, England 5/26/41 re several conversations he has had with Cardinal Hinsley and Archbishop William Godfrey, the Apostolic Delegate. Encloses strictly confidential memo re high lights of same.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 7-1941
NOTED
Ritz Hotel
London
May 26, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

During the course of the past month, I have had several interesting conversations with Cardinal Hinsley and with Archbishop William Godfrey, the Apostolic Delegate.

For your information, I am attaching hereto a memorandum covering in effect the high points of these discussions.

With warmest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

In the course of my several recent conversations with Cardinal Hinsley and Archibishop William Godfrey, the Apostolic Delegate, they individually emphasized their belief that the "Five-Peace-Points" embodied in the Pope's address to the College of Cardinals on December 24, 1939, comprised sound ideas and basic principles which should be borne in mind, in contemplating any move towards a just and lasting peace.

Further observations by the Cardinal and the Apostolic Delegate on this subject were in substance as follows:

(A) They were both gratified by the support given the Pope's "Five-Peace-Points", as expressed in an open letter published December 21, 1940, in the London Times, and signed by prominent religious leaders of various faiths in England.

(B) They earnestly hoped moreover, that a similar expression of support by prominent leaders of various faiths in the United States, might be brought about. A letter of this character published in the press of the United States, together with that which had already appeared in the London Times, would undoubtedly have a constructive and far-reaching effect.

(C) Judging by the response which they had thus far received from the Clergy in the United States, Cardinal Mooney of Detroit, seemed, to a greater extent than other ecclesiasts
in the United States, to be the one who saw eye-to-eye with them in their ideas concerning the potential bearing of the Pope's "Five-Peace-Points". In fact, Cardinal Mooney had recently written Cardinal Hinsley such an enthusiastic letter on the subject that the Cardinal had made an important reference to it in a recent address to the Clergy here. Moreover, the Cardinal was in great hopes that Cardinal Mooney might take the initiative in rallying further support of the catholic Clergy, and the support of the leaders of the other faiths in the United States.

(D) In my last talk with the Apostolic Delegate, he said he and the Cardinal shared the belief that if President Roosevelt, representing the United States and American possessions with 36,000,000 catholics, and Mr. Churchill representing the British Empire with 20,500,000 catholics, were to see their way clear to lending their moral support to the Pope's "Five-Peace-Points", the effect would be such as to give rise to a movement, with

* The Apostolic Delegate pointed out the following figures:
  Roman Catholics who come under the Holy See:
  Total in Europe - 220,000,000
  Total in entire world - 350,000,000
  Orthodox Catholics - via not under Holy See:
  Total in entire world - 144,000,000
  Total number of Protestants in entire world - 206,000,000
  Total number of Coptic Christians in entire world - 10,000,000
  Total number of Christians in entire world - 692,400,000
  Total number of non-Christians in entire world - 1,880,010,000
an appeal, unlimited in scope – a movement which would go far towards offsetting Herr Hitler’s proposed New German Order. Such a movement might conceivably take the form, in the opinion of the Cardinal and the Apostolic Delegate, of an "Order of Free Nations" within the framework of an economic brotherhood, and based upon the moral and economic principles set forth in the Pope’s "Five-Peace-Points".

(E) The Apostolic Delegate emphasized his opinion that such a movement would go very much further in appealing to the Irish mentality than an Anglo-Saxon-influenced Allied Cause. All attempts to sell the latter cause to the Irish had thus far failed. It was therefore essential to find some alternative formula – and he believed that the idea of an "Order of Free Nations", as above-described, would go far in terms of an appeal to the Irish mentality.

(F) The Apostolic Delegate illustrated his belief on this score – accordingly, he pointed out that the mentality of the Irish ecclesiastics was no less opposed to Nazism than was the mentality of the British people as a whole. However, the fact had to be faced, that characteristic of the people of Éire, the underlying resentment in the minds of the Irish ecclesiastics, took the form of regret that if Nazism were put down by an Allied Front, pivoted on Great Britain, it would be to Great Britain that added prestige would accre". This fundamental attitude, he said, was unfortunately little understood by the rest of the world.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return for my
files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 7-1941
NOTED
JE/22

FRANCE LIBRE

Direction des Affaires Extérieures & Économiques

4, Carlton Gardens, S. W. 1.
Whitehall 5444

Londres, le 26 Mai, 1941.

Ref. X.E. No 58.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Conformément aux instructions du Général de GAULLE, Chef des Français Libres, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence le memorandum ci-inclus, que je vous serais profondément reconnaissant de bien vouloir transmettre à votre Gouvernement.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer les assurances de ma haute considération.

(Signed) R. Pleven

Son Excellence
Monsieur T.R. Drexel Biddle,
Ambassadeur des États-Unis d'Amerique,
Londres.
Ritz Hotel,
London,
May 27, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to supplement my letters of May 12, and May 15, respectively, concerning the position of "Free France", and to refer to correspondence forwarded to the Department by the American Embassy to the Court of St. James, on this same subject - particularly a memorandum under date line of Brazzaville, May 17, 1941.

Yesterday, M. Rene Pleven, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs of Free France, and Secretary General of the Council of the French Empire, handed me another memorandum dated May 26, 1941 (similar in substance to the aforementioned memorandum of May 17, 1941), with the request that I transmit it to you. Accordingly, I am forwarding hereto attached, a copy of the letter and enclosed memorandum, as well as a translation thereof.

In handing me this memorandum, and by way of further clarification, M. Pleven said he felt that any possible American action vis-a-vis French possessions, either in the Western Atlantic or elsewhere, would immediately give rise to the question of the replacement of local French Administration, currently in control, of any given possession involved. Moreover, he felt that, for tactical, among other reasons, any change in local administration should envisage a replacement by other French nationals of already proven loyalty to the Allied cause. In this connection, M. Pleven earnestly hoped that the United States Government might favorably consider the establishment of a provisional "Free French" Administration.

In expressing this hope, he pointed out that "Free France" had a sufficient number of capable and loyal men of administrative
administrative experience to conduct the task. Moreover, he emphasized, what he had stated on previous occasions: that the policy of "Free France", regarding any territory under its control, envisaged the administration of those territories in the capacity of a trustee for the property of French people, until such time as the French people might be in position to express their own desires in the matter.

In conclusion, M. Pleven underlined his belief that the replacement of the local administration of any French possession by a provisional Free French Administration, would go far towards depriving Admiral Darlan of a pretext to play up "Yankee grabbing" amongst the peoples either in France or in South America.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours, 

Tony Rider
(TRANSLATION)

JE/EX

FREE FRANCE

Office of Foreign
and Economic Affairs.

4, Carlton Gardens, S.W.1.
Whitehall 5444

London, May 26, 1941.

Ref. E.E. No. 58

Mr. Ambassador,

According to instructions from General de GAULLE, Chief of the Free French, I have the honor to draw to your attention the enclosed memorandum, which I should greatly appreciate your transmitting to your Government.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high consideration.

(signed) R. Flieven

His Excellency
Mr. A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
Ambassador of the United States of America,
London.
TRANSLATION

1. General de Gaulle, as the Chief of the Free French, and in the name of the Council for the Defense of the French Empire, is aware of declarations recently made by important personalities concerning the possibility of a preventative occupation, by the United States, of different parts of the French Empire (Antilles, Guyane, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Senegal, etc.), an occupation, having as its aim, the assurance of the security of the Western Hemisphere against all endeavors at infiltration and of seizure by the Axis Powers.

2. General de Gaulle recognizes that there exists, in fact, a primary interest of security, not only for the States of the Americas, but for the powers allied in war against Germany, to prevent in the waters of the western Atlantic, all action by the Axis Powers, carried out either directly or by the intermediary of the Vichy Government.

3. The Chief of the Free French is persuaded, on the other hand, that the United States and the other powers of the western hemisphere, understand the anxiety which he feels, as all Frenchmen, to preserve for France, the territories which have formed part of the French patrimony for centuries, whose populations enjoy the status of French citizens, and which again recently have manifested their loyalty to the mother country, their wish to continue the struggle on the side of the Allies, and to rally the Free French.
4. There exists then, a complete accord between the real interests of France, represented by Free France, and the interests of American Security.

5. So far as he is concerned, the Chief of the Free French is entirely disposed to collaborate with the powers of the western hemisphere for the establishment, in the above-mentioned regions, of a provisional regime, which, while maintaining these regions under French sovereignty, will turn aside the German menace from them and, in consequence, from the interested powers.

6. An active and immediate collaboration, on the above-defined basis would not only present the advantage of solving problems especially concerning the western hemisphere, in a satisfactory manner; it would permit besides, the immediate reentry into the war, on the side of Great Britain and of the other allies of France, of a new part of the French Empire, thus reinforcing to a considerable degree, the importance of the participation of France in the common struggle.

7. General de Gaulle believes it his duty to reiterate that, according to very recent and most reliable information, the German menace against the above-mentioned regions, should be considered both grave and imminent.

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London, May 26, 1941.
MEMORANDUM

COPY

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

1. Le General de Gaulle, en sa qualite de Chef des Francais Libres et au nom du Conseil de Defense de l'Empire Francais, a eu connaissance de declarations recemment faites par d'importantes personnalites en ce qui concerne l'eventualite d'une occupation preventive, par les Etats-Unis, de diverses parties de l'Empire Francais (Antilles, Guyane, St.Pierre et Miquelon, Senegal, etc), occupation ayant pour but d'assurer la securite de l'Hemisphere occidentale contre toutes tentatives d'infiltration et de mainmise des Puissances de l'Axe.

2. Le General de Gaulle reconnaît qu'il existe en effet un interet primordial de securite, non seulement pour les Etats americains mais pour les Puissances alliees en guerre contre l'Allemagne, a empecher dans les eaux de l'Atlantique occidental toute action des Puissances de l'Axe, exercée soit directement, soit par l'intermediare du Gouvernement de Vichy.

3. Le Chef des Francais Libres est persuade d'autre part que les Etats-Unis et les autres Puissances de l'Hemisphere Occidentale, comprennent le souci qu'il eprouve, comme tous les Francais, de conserver a la France des territoires qui font partie du patrimoine francais depuis des siecles, dont les populations jouissent du statut de citoyens francais et qui, reconnuent encore, ont manifeste leur fidelite a la Mere Patrie, leur volonte de continuer la lutte aux cotes des Allies et de ralier les Francais Libres.
4. Il existe donc une concordance complète entre les véritables intérêts de la France représentés par la France Libre et les intérêts de la sécurité américaine.

5. En ce qui le concerne, le Chef des Français Libres est tout dispose à collaborer avec les Puissances de l'Hémisphère Occidental à l'établissement, dans les régions sus-visées, d'un régime provisoire qui, tout en maintenant ces régions sous la souveraineté française, en serait d'elles, et par suite des Puissances intéressées, la menace allemande.

6. Une collaboration active et immédiate, sur les bases ci-dessus définies, ne présenterait pas seulement l'avantage de resoudre d'une façon satisfaisante les problèmes concernant spécialement l'Hémisphère Occidental. Elle permettrait en outre la rentrée immédiate dans la guerre, aux côtés de la Grande-Bretagne et des autres Alliés de la France, d'une nouvelle partie de l'Empire Français, renforçant ainsi, d'une manière considérable, l'importance de la participation de la France à la lutte commune.

7. Le General de Gaulle croit devoir rappeler que, d'après les informations les plus récentes et les plus sûres, la menace allemande contre les régions sus-visées doit être considérée comme grave et imminente.

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Londres, le 26 Mai, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thank you very much.

[Signature]

[Initials]
Ritz Hotel,
London,
May 5, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I am forwarding hereto attached a memorandum covering the Norwegian Admiral's remarks concerning the Norwegian Commercial Fleet's general requirements, in the thought that the contents thereof might serve to round out the picture in the making.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM.

CONFIDENTIAL.  

7th May, 1941.

I have just talked with the Norwegian Admiral commanding the Norwegian Naval Forces. He was very proud that Norway had been capable of placing at the disposal of her Ally, Great Britain, about three and a quarter million tons, gross register (or about five and a half million tons, dead weight) of shipping — and that some 30,000 Norwegians were now engaged in operating this Fleet. It was, moreover, a source of real satisfaction to him that Norwegian Naval officers and sailors were operating naval tonnage in the theatre of naval operations.

He went on to say that he sincerely hoped the Government and the people of the United States understood that the Norwegian Naval Authorities and the officials of the Norwegian Commercial Fleet had been doing their utmost to adhere strictly to a policy of conducting their affairs with the minimum degree of embarrassment or trouble to the United States.

The Admiral then stated that last November the Norwegian Government had ordered forty 37 mm guns for their
merchant ships, but that thus far none had been delivered. These he said were urgently needed, especially in view of usually inadequate protection for convoys. Besides, the very presence of these guns would inspire the crews with greater confidence. He added with emphasis that the intensification of submarine warfare now made it urgently necessary that Norwegian tonnage acquire a number of 20 mm Oelikon cannon and half-inch Colts in addition to the aforementioned unfulfilled requirements of last November. The exact number of required Oelikons and Colts was known to the Norwegian Legation in Washington. He regretted, however, that the Legation thus far had not been able to ascertain even an approximate date of delivery on any of these arms. While he understood the difficulties confronting the United States in its generous efforts to supply British and Allied requirements, he earnestly hoped the American Authorities concerned might appreciate the urgency of the Norwegian need of guns, and that they might see their way clear to accelerate deliveries.
My dear Mr. President:

I beg to draw your attention to the attached memorandum covering observations of General Sikorski and several other allied governmental officials, regarding General Weygand's position.

With warmest regards, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidder

The President

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

Observations of General Sikorski and several other Allied governmental officials regarding General Weygand's position.

In discussion with General Sikorski and several other usually well-informed Allied governmental officials this morning, they made the following observations regarding General Weygand's position.

Recent reports had indicated that during General Weygand's visit to Vichy, he had changed his mind several times in regard to Admiral Darlan's proposal that France permit Germany the use of her colonial as well as metropolitan ports and airfields, as bases against the British. While the General had finally refused to acquiesce in full, he had compromised to the extent of one port. This, my informants felt, was probably Tunis. They understood moreover, that while the port of Tunis had served Axis shipping to the extent of supplying fuel and water, there had been as yet, no proof of debarkation of troops having taken place there.

One of my informants took me aside and remarked that he had received a report which indicated that instructions had been sent to Mr. Robert Murphy to bring about a showdown with General Weygand, and that the General's sudden departure for Timbuctoo had given rise to suspicion here that the General had gotten wind of Mr. Murphy's intention, and had cleared out in order to avoid the issue. This report had, moreover, led official circles here to feel that the
General was "wobbling" in his dealings with Allied and American representatives, just as he was "wobbling" in his dealings with Vichy.

General Sikorski subsequently told me in strictest confidence that while Mr. Churchill would like to help General Weygand, he found it difficult to place confidence in him. He felt however, that if the General showed any signs of grace, the seed must be watered - but before pouring on the water, some firm assurances must be had of the General.
My dear Mr. President:

For your information I am attaching hereto a confidential memorandum covering certain information bearing on Morocco and Chad, just disclosed to me by an official of the Free French Forces here.

With warmest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidder

The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
June 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM

Information disclosed by officials of the Free French Forces here, bearing on Morocco and Chad.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

An official of the Free French Forces here has just disclosed to me (a) that reports currently received from secret sources indicate there are now approximately 2000 German agents in Morocco, (b) that a near future attack is expected to be launched vis-a-vis Chad.

In appraising all information at hand, received through confidential channels, both from Vichy and Brazzaville, the authorities of Free France, are led to look for any near-future move against the importantly strategic Chad area, to take the form mainly of a German aerial attack on the aerodromes there.

In disclosing the latter item of information, my informant said that General Larminat, Commanding Officer of the Free French Forces at Brazzaville, had already communicated this to Mr. Mallon, American Consul at Leopoldville, and that the General had at the same time handed Mr. Mallon a list of equipment requirements essential to effective defense of these Chad aerodromes, in the earnest hope of obtaining this equipment in the United States.

My informant went on to say that since the aforementioned interview had taken place, additional reports had been received which had further increased the apprehension of the Free French authorities. Chad, he said, was of utmost strategic
strategic importance to the maintenance of vital aerial arteries between Takaradi and Egypt. Therefore, the defense of the aerodromes in the Chad area was a matter of urgent concern. It was due to this urgency that he and his associates earnestly hoped that our Government might see its way clear to give immediate and favorable consideration to General de Larminat's request for equipment - particularly as regards anti-aircraft guns.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Frankly, I think it probably would be difficult for me to see Mr. Pleven.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from Ambassador Biddle in re Mr. Rene Pleven, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs of Free France, who is expected to come to Washington to confer with Lord Halifax.
My dear Mr. President:

Persuant to cabled instructions from the Department, a visa was granted Mr. Rene Pleven, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs of Free France, and Secretary General of the Council of the French Empire, (previous to France's collapse, he was a member of the Joint Anglo-French Purchasing Commission). By now, according to his schedule, he should have reached Canada with a view to going immediately to Washington to confer preliminarily with Lord Halifax.

Before his departure, M. Pleven told me that, if granted the opportunity to clarify Free France's position during his stay in Washington, he would emphasize the following points:

(a) That Free French policy was non-partisan and envisaged:

1) The Free French movement as a magnet to attract all French factions;
2) Revival of the French fighting spirit;
3) Bringing back the French Empire into the war;
4) Consolidating the French in Africa;
5) Forcing General Weygand's hand, with the hope of inspiring him to positive action on the side of the Allies.

The President
The White House
As I have already pointed out in previous letters and attached memoranda (May 12,15,and 27), I have known M. Pleven since autumn 1939, when I came to France at the close of the Polish-German conflict. I regard him as a thoroughly representative French patriot—since honest, intelligent, and a man possessing the courage of his conviction. I believe that a discussion with him would prove interesting to you.

With warmest regards and all good wishes, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidder.
Dear Tony:

I have received your letter of June 9, 1941, concerning the visit to the United States of Mr. Rene Pleven, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs of Free France.

I have felt it was wiser that I did not receive him personally but he will be seen and heard by members of the Department of State and I am sure that in this way he will have an opportunity of clarifying the position of Free France as he will receive a sympathetic reception at the Department.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Sumner Welles

The Honorable
Anthony J. Brezel Riddle, Jr.,
Caret of the American Embassy,
London.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letter to you from Ambassador Biddle, dated June 9, 1941, concerning the visit to the United States of Mr. Rene Plevin, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs of Free France, together with a suggested reply for your signature, if you approve.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Letter from the Honorable Anthony Drexel Biddle, Jr., of June 9, 1941.

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my letters of May 17 and June 18, 1941, bearing on Russian-German tension, I have the honor to report that I have just had a lengthy talk with General Sikorski on the same subject. It may be recalled that in my previous reports I have pointed out that General Sikorski and a number of his associates have been of the following opinion regarding the potential outcome of Russian-German tension: (a) that while the Russian army had reportedly improved since its conflict against the Finns, it would not be ready for a major conflict for at least another three months; (b) that in spite of large scale counter measures along the Russian side of the Russian-German frontier, Mr. Stalin might be expected to succumb to German pressure for important concessions. I have personally long shared this opinion.

In

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
In today's conversation with General Sikorski, he told me that while this had long been his own opinion, he had now been brought to feel that appraisal of the turn of events in the making, made it necessary not to overlook the implications of his more recent information and reports from various sources. Just before our talk together, he had been discussing the situation with Sir Stafford Cripps. The latter had told the General that since early May, a noticeable change had come over Russian-German relations and that Germany's attitude had thenceforth taken on a serious tone. He then confirmed General Sikorski's report through other channels, to effect that the standard of efficiency in the Russian army had improved since the Russian-Finnish conflict, but that the army would not be ready to wage a major conflict for three months at least. Moreover, the Germans were reportedly confident that they could gain their envisaged objectives in Russia within a matter of weeks.

General Sikorski went on to say that the British Government had received from a confidential and usually reliable source in Tokyo, a report to effect that about ten days ago, Herr Ribbentrop had told the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin that he would appreciate the latter's communicating to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, that Germany was now ready to strike out at Russia. He added that the Ambassador might also tell his Foreign Minister that if Japan wished to participate in a thrust against Russia, provided, of course, Japan's Pact with Russia did not embarrass Japan, Germany would welcome a Japanese move.
move vis-a-vis Eastern Russia.

Other reports indicated that the Germans now had between 136 and 170 divisions along the Russian frontier, and between one-half and three-fourths of the German first line air strength. These same reports indicated that only about 8 divisions were now in Jugoslavia, and that about 50 divisions were divided between Germany and France.

General Sikorski then said that a report had reached him through confidential and usually reliable channels, that Field Marshal Goering had recently telephone a close friend of his in Sweden, that he might expect Germany to launch an attack against Russia on Sunday, June 22.

The General said that these same reports indicated that Herr Hitler's plan envisaged knocking out Russia before she might become sufficiently strong to jump effectively on Germany's back, if Germany came to grips with England. Moreover, Herr Hitler was now resuming his classical policy, laid down in Mein Kampf: he would accordingly now play his big card - the role of defending the world against Communism. Once he had gained the upper hand over Russia, he would turn round and offer peace in textual form somewhat along the following lines, including among other terms: (a) United States of Europe; (b) The British Empire for Britain. Germany wanted nothing of Britain, except the return of a "few" of Germany's former colonies; (c) no intention of building up a German battle fleet. Germany would need
need no fleet, for she would regard her colonies merely as warehouses for raw materials. If Germany were attacked, she would merely withdraw into her continental frontiers and defend her own interests.

Commenting on the foregoing, General Sikorski said that if Herr Hitler succeeded in gaining the upper hand over Russia and offered a textual peace along the above lines, meanwhile emphasizing his role as the world's saviour from Communism, he would undoubtedly hope to appeal strongly to certain elements both in England and in the United States. Moreover, in event Herr Hitler declared no intention of constructing a battle fleet, he would do so in the hope of appealing to the tax payers in both countries, with a view to curtailing their respective naval programs, particularly that in the United States. At the same time, this announcement would be aimed at demobilizing vigilance, again, particularly in the United States.

In conclusion, General Sikorski said that while in his opinion British official circles would, from the strategic angle, welcome a clash between Russia and Germany next year, they were not happy over the prospect of its breaking out in the immediate future, realizing as they did, that Russia was not yet ready for a major conflict.

Admittedly thinking out loud, the General remarked that in so far as London's relations with Moscow were concerned, perhaps Germany's seizure of the rest of Poland from Russia might conceivably serve
serve to make London's position clearer cut vis-a-vis Moscow.

Immediately upon my departure from General Sikorski's Headquarters, I communicated the substance of the foregoing conversation to our Military Attache, with the request that in his cable to Washington, he ask the War Department to transmit a copy to the State Department.

With warmest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bedell
My dear Mr. President:

I beg to refer to my letter and attached memorandum of June 17 concerning certain information bearing on Morocco and Chad and as of connected bearing to draw your attention to the attached memorandum regarding an appeal by the authorities of Belgian Congo for plans which led to the British Government's suggestion that Staff talks looking to joint action, be held between the military authorities of Belgian Congo, Free France and Nigeria.

With warmest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Biddle

The President

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

June 21, 1941

In conversation with officials of the Military Intelligence Liaison Bureau of the British War Office, the following came to light:

Through the Belgian Government here, the authorities in the Belgian Congo had drawn attention to the fact that the forces of the Belgian Congo had thus far failed in their efforts to acquire combat planes, while the Free French Forces at Brazzaville had obtained about 12 planes. Moreover, the Congo authorities were most vigorous in their insistence upon acquiring planes for their own forces.

As a result of this representation, the British Government had strongly recommended that the Belgian Congo, the Free French Forces in French Equatorial Africa and the French Cameroons and the forces in Nigeria, hold staff talks looking to joint action. My informants were very hopeful that this suggestion would be acceptable to the Congo as well as the other authorities concerned, for they considered that under the circumstances this might prove a constructive move. They would keep me posted on developments.
Dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

Thank you so much for your charming hospitality during our short stay at the White House when Princess Juliana and Prince Bernhard were here. Both my husband and I very much appreciated your including us, and
We are only too sorry that we were unable to say goodbye and to thank you in person.

Yours sincerely,

Dorothy Van Tol
(Lady in Waiting)

23rd June, 1941.
June 26, 1941

Dear Margaret:

All of your information has been most interesting and I turned a lot of the women's defense information over to Mayor LaGuardia who is hard at work setting up the Office of Civilian Defense.

I think it would be a grand thing if you could write a short book on the substance of your report — and it would be of real interest over here. I am sending you a cable today saying "yes." Poor Missy has been quite ill for a couple of weeks but is a bit better now.

My affectionate regards to you both.

As ever,

Mrs. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Ritz Hotel,
London, W. 1,
England.
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

CABLE

MRS. ANTHONY J. D. BIDDLE JR
RITZ HOTEL
LONDON W 1
ENGLAND

HE SAYS YES AND IS DELIGHTED AT IDEA

MISSY

The White House
Washington

JUNE 26 1941
Dear Mr. President:

I only wish you knew what a real thrill your speech gave us. It was simply superb - one of the best ever and that is saying a great deal because the others have been so splendid.

Last Winter, when I was speaking to the women in America, so many of them asked me what the women in England were doing. Evidently, because I had seen what the women had done in Poland and in France, they assumed that I knew what the women were doing here. Besides, previous to our departure for here, I had many letters asking me the same question. I replied in each case that while I was not yet familiar with the wartime activities of the British women I intended to study them upon my arrival in England. I therefore hoped that some time in the future I should be in a position to send them the information desired.

I now feel qualified to answer questions on all phases of these activities since the Report on the Women's Activities which I sent you a short time ago, brought me in such close contact with all aspects of the work.
I have been wondering, therefore, whether you would permit me to write a short book based on the substance of my Report? I believe it would interest the American women very much to know what sort of war work the English women are engaged in. At the same time, I believe it might prove helpful as I would write it in such a way as to make it complimentary to any program you might desire to launch at home. I would keep to the one theme and would not touch on any matters of political bearing. Moreover, I would have the draft of the book passed by the censors here before sending it over.

If you are willing for me to do this, will you please let Missy send a cable of just "Yes" or "No". You are my Chief and one I am very proud to be working for.

My love to you,

As always,

Margaret Biddle
My dear Mr. President:

I had the pleasure of transmitting personally your letter of May 12, 1941, received today, to General Sikorski. He was deeply touched by what you had written, and asked me to tell you so. He also asked me to express to you his profound appreciation. These words, he said, coming from you, whom he so ardently esteems, are a source of real inspiration and encouragement for him. The General is a sincere man and a fine character, and your letter has not only moved him deeply, but has also had a tremendously stimulating effect on him.

With warmest regards, and my every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle, Jr.

The President

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to report that following British Prime Minister Churchill's forceful declaration on British Government policy, upon the outbreak of Russian-German hostilities, the Belgian, Norwegian and Netherlands Governments immediately readjusted their respective policies to conform with that of the British Government.

As regards the Polish Government's policy, I beg to refer to my cable of June 23, regarding General Sikorski's radio broadcast address of that date, and his disclosures to me, and to my cable of June 26. In subsequent conversation with British Foreign Secretary Eden, he told me that previous to declaring the Polish Government's policy with regard to Russia and Germany, General Sikorski and his associates had consulted the British Government. The British Government moreover, had clearly understood the

The President

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
the delicate position which the new turn in events had brought about, and had accordingly approved the stand which the Polish Government had taken in the matter. Mr. Eden said that in reading over the first draft of General Sikorski's aforementioned address, both he and Mr. Churchill had made only one request of the General, namely, to tone down his references to Russia. The General moreover, had gladly complied.

With warmest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

You would have been touched, had you witnessed General Sikorski's face, when I conveyed to him your cabled message - that it was decided to include Poland in the "Lend-Lease" list. I have rarely seen an expression of such deep gratification. He asked me to tell you that he and his Government were profoundly grateful. This, he said, would mean more to the Poles still continuing the struggle in the field, and to the Poles in occupied Poland, than he could adequately express in words. Every Pole and every citizen of Polish descent of other parts of the world would be externally grateful.

With warmest regards and all good wishes, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
HYDE PARK, N. Y.,
July 28, 1941.

Dear Tony:—

I am delighted that the Queen of the Netherlands is coming over and you can tell her that I do not think that there is any need for her to plan to go to Canada first if the British think it more advisable for her to come via Lisbon and the Clipper. In any event, she will receive a warm welcome in this country.

I am inclined to think she would be more pleased to visit us at Hyde Park rather than in Washington, and I would, of course, have the Princess Juliana and, I hope, the children here at the same time.

I will be relatively free from engagements after the twentieth of this month except that I plan to spend the weekend of August 30th up here for our annual Home Club party and the newspaper men's party, but the two of them combined only take one afternoon, and if the Queen finds that a convenient date, I think she would be amused and interested.

As ever yours,

Hon. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
40 Berkeley Square,
London W.1.,
England.
40 Berkeley Square
London W.1.
July 6, 1941

STRICt;y CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, July 5, I had a lengthy visit with Queen Wilhelmina. Prince Bernhard was also present. At the Queen's request, Prince Bernhard gave me a detailed account of his talk with you and subsequently of his experiences in the United States.

First of all, he expressed his gratitude for yours and Mrs. Roosevelt's great kindness and hospitality to Princess Juliana and himself. He said you were "wonderful" to them both.

He then told me all about the talk which he had had with you after the showing of the movies at the White House. He was amazed by your extraordinary grasp and perspective in connection with world-wide developments.

In

The President

The White House.
In fact, he had never talked to anyone who possessed such a clear view of the whole situation. He was delighted, moreover, that you would welcome a visit from Queen Wilhelmina and that you considered that conversations with her would be mutually useful, in terms not only of the present, but also of the future.

At this point, the Queen enthusiastically expressed her sense of gratification over your attitude in the matter, and said that she would, in the early part of this week, discuss in strictest confidence with Mr. Eden, her proposed plans to visit the United States. She would also discuss with him the questions of route and of transportation. Furthermore, she would keep me posted as to the results of her discussion with Mr. Eden.

The Queen is frankly overjoyed at the prospect of meeting with you, and I am aware she will lose no time in making travel arrangements. In order to minimize the possibility of embarrassment which a direct visit from the Chief of a belligerent state, to the United States, might cause you, she thought that perhaps it might be more discreet if she went first to Canada, and thence quietly into the United States. However, she would be guided by whatever suggestion you might care to make on this point.

Before
Before ending our talk, the Queen asked me to convey to you and to Mrs. Roosevelt, an expression of her most profound gratitude for your great kindness to her children.

She is indeed a fine woman - a combination of force and gentleness of mind and action. Her ideals are high - her appraisals realistic, and her approach to problems of the day, courageously intelligent. Moreover, she is good company, and charmingly feminine. I have visited both her naval and land forces here and find amongst them a deep affection and admiration for her.

The more I see of the Queen, her Government and her Forces, the better I like and respect them. They are grand people.

With warmest regards and with my every good wish,

I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Biden
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a note dated July 24, 1941 from the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Ciechanowski, together with a translation of the French portion thereof defining the attitude of the Government of Poland with regard to various acts of the German and Soviet Governments and particularly the policy which the Government of Poland is now prepared to follow on certain conditions with reference to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Ciechanowski requested that this note be brought to your attention.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From Polish Ambassador, July 24, 1941, with translation.

The President,
The White House.
Sir,

By order of my Government, I have the honor to make the following communication:

"Vu la conversation qui a eu lieu samedi le 5 juillet 1941 entre le général W. Sikorski, Président du Conseil des Ministres Polonais et M. A. Zaleski, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, d'une part, et M. Maisky, Ambassadeur de l'U.R.S.S., d'autre part, en présence de Sir Alexander Cadogan, Principal Sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique, le Gouvernement Polonais tient à souligner ce qui suit:

"L'agression par le Reich Allemand de la Pologne en date du 1 septembre 1939 avait été immédiatement précédée par la conclusion d'un accord germano-soviétique en date du 23 août 1939 lequel contenait apparemment des clauses dirigées contre l'existence de l'État Polonais.

"L'invasion du territoire polonais par les troupes soviétiques en date du 17 septembre 1939 a été suivie par la conclusion du traité germano-soviétique en date du 28 septembre 1939. Cet accord partageait le territoire

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.
de l'État Polonais entre de Reich et l'U.R.S.S. et proclamait la suppression de cet État. Il a été suivi, à son tour, d'une série d'autres actes internationaux conclus entre le Reich et l'U.R.S.S. ou entre chacune de ces Puissances et des États tiers, affectant tous l'indépendance et l'intégrité de la Pologne.

"Le Gouvernement Polonais a toujours considéré ces accords et actes comme nuls et non-avénus, et il tient à rappeler qu'il a élevé à leur occasion, à des dates diverses, des protestations solennelles. Ces protestations ont été portées à la connaissance des Gouvernements des Puissances alliées et neutres.

"Le Gouvernement de la République a également le devoir de souligner qu'en exécution de ces actes illégaux le Gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. a non seulement accompli depuis cette agression d'innumérables attentats à la souveraineté de l'État et à la propriété publique en Pologne, mais qu'il a en outre cru devoir prendre des mesures affectant gravement les libertés individuelles et la propriété privée de larges masses de ressortissants polonais.

"Le Gouvernement Polonais n'entend pas énumérer ici les protestations dont il s'agit, et il se borne à souligner le contenu de la Note en date du 5 mai 1941, qui a été adressée par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Pologne à L.I.E.E. les Ministres des
Affaires Étrangères des Puissances alliées et neutres, au sujet de l'occupation allemande et soviétique de la Pologne au cours de 1939 et 1940.

Mais, désirant faciliter la tâche des pays alliés qui, contrairement à la Pologne, n'ont pas eu à subir d'agression de la part de l'U.R.S.S., le Gouvernement Polonais veut faire son possible afin de leur éviter toutes complications dans leurs relations avec l'U.R.S.S.

"À cette occasion, il y a lieu de rappeler le point de vue formulé dans la lettre du 27 novembre 1939 que le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Pologne adressée à S.M. Lord Halifax à la suite de conversations qui venaient d'avoir lieu entre eux, à Londres:

"... We had agreed in London that it was premature to take up any definite attitude towards Soviet Russia with regard to their action in Poland and in the Baltic States. We further agreed that, at this stage of the war, it was essential to concentrate all our united forces against Germany, to single out Germany as Enemy No. 1, fully responsible for the aggressive war forced upon the three Allies, for bringing Soviet Russia into action and for all the far-reaching consequences, the moral, material and territorial damages resulting from the war and from the joint action of Germany and Soviet Russia."

"Étant donné que l'Allemagne a dernièrement imposé la guerre à l'U.R.S.S. et qu'en conséquence celle-ci s'est trouvée contre son gré parmi les nations qui luttent pour la liberté, le Gouvernement Polonais tient à déclarer que non seulement il est décide
décidé à continuer cette politique vis-à-vis de l'U.R.S.S., mais qu'il serait enclin à voir ses relations avec l'U.R.S.S. redevenir normales, à condition toutefois que celle-ci:

"(1) s'engage à respecter intégralement aux traités germano-soviétique du 23 août et du 28 septembre 1939 ainsi qu'à tous les accords et actes consécutifs ayant trait à la Pologne. Il sera implicitement entendu que tous les traités et arrangements qui liaient l'U.R.S.S. à la Pologne avant l'agression allemande du 1 septembre 1939 seront rétablis.

"D'autre part, il sera entendu que les biens enlevés par les autorités de l'U.R.S.S. en Pologne seront restitués en nature et que les dommages résultant pour la Pologne et ses ressortissants de l'inexécution des dits traités et arrangements trouveront leur pleine réparation; et enfin que les relations diplomatiques entre la Pologne et l'U.R.S.S. seront par la suite rétablies.

"(2) s'engage à libérer immédiatement:

a) les personnes qui, étant ressortissants polonais au 16 septembre 1939 sont détenues par les autorités soviétiques pour des raisons politiques,

b) les ressortissants polonais qui ont été consacrés dans l'armée soviétique,

c) les prisonniers de guerre polonais internés dans divers camps à l'intérieur du territoire de l'U.R.S.S.

d) les ressortissants polonais (hommes, femmes et
et enfants) qui ont été déportés en masse des diverses régions occupées de la Pologne en U.R.S.S. de même qu’à consentir à ce qu’une assistance puisse leur être accordée.

"Sur ce point (2), il serait indispensable qu’une organisation de secours qui collaborerait efficacement avec les autorités polonaises, puisse être autorisée dès à présent à fonctionner sur le territoire de l’U.R.S.S. ayant pour tâche de porter secours aux prisonniers de guerre, aux détenus politiques et aux déportés civils en attendant que leur évacuation de l’U.R.S.S. devienne réalisable.

"Le Gouvernement Polonais est en droit de croire qu’il est dans l’intérêt moral et politique de l’U.R.S.S. de renouer ses relations avec la Pologne dans les conditions définies ci-dessus et ajoute qu’il n’est guère probable que l’U.R.S.S. veuille continuer à se prévaloir de traités qu’elle avait conclu avec son propre agresseur et relatifs à un territoire que l’U.R.S.S. ne semble même plus occuper de fait.

"Si l’U.R.S.S. adoptait une telle attitude, elle renforcerait sans aucun doute sa position morale vis-à-vis des démocraties qui combattent dans cette guerre et - ce qui n’est pas moins important - vis-à-vis des populations de l’Europe orientale lesquelles y verreraient la volonté réelle de l’U.R.S.S. d’abandonner des méthodes politiques semblables à celles qui ont inspiré
inspiré et inspirent les agressions allemandes.

"Le Gouvernement Polonais désire, afin d'éviter toute malentendu, souligner dès à présent qu'en posant ainsi le problème, il n'entend renoncer, de quelque manière que ce soit, aux droits indiscutables de la Pologne en ce qui regarde ses territoires d'avant le 1 septembre 1939.

"Si ce Gouvernement n'a pas d'objection à ce que l'U.R.S.S., s'abstienne de faire en ce moment une déclaration officielle et précise en ce qui concerne le retour au Traité de Riga de 1921, son attitude est dictée par les considérations suivantes:

1) le Gouvernement Polonais désirerait faciliter en ce moment la tâche à ceux de ses Alliés qui entendent maintenir de bonnes relations directes avec l'U.R.S.S.;

2) il entend éviter de créer l'impression qu'il existe entre les États qui sont en guerre avec l'Allemagne des difficultés insurmontables.

3) Le Gouvernement Polonais a lieu de croire qu'en ce qui concerne le Traité de Riga de 1921 le Gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. peut avoir en vue certaines clauses de ce Traité qui, sans avoir trait aux frontières elles-mêmes et revêtant un caractère technique et transitoire, auraient perdu aujourd'hui, au sens des intérêts de l'U.R.S.S., leur actualité et pourraient, en conséquence, être modifiées.

4) Il se rend compte du fait qu'il est très peu probable que les armées de l'U.R.S.S. puissent réoccuper elles-mêmes des territoires quelconques appartenant à la Pologne et venant d'être l'objet de l'invasion allemande.

5) Le Gouvernement Polonais sait, hélas, de sa propre expérience que les obligations stipulées par le Gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. ne sont considérées valables par ce dernier que pour autant que ce Gouvernement ne possède ni l'intégrité ni la force pour les transgresser.
"Le Gouvernement Polonais est obligé de confirmer - ainsi qu'il avait été déclaré du côté polonais dans la conversation susmentionnée de 5 juillet 1941 - qu'il n'est pas seulement incompétent pour renoncer de son propre gré à une partie quelconque du territoire de la Pologne, mais qu'il se garderait, en outre, de vouloir donner l'impression qu'il serait enclin à transiger sur les droits de la République à son intégrité territoriale.

"En effet, il y a lieu d'insister qu'une telle attitude:

1) préparerait en quelque sorte le voie au Reich Allemand, selon les informations reçues par le Gouvernement Polonais, s'efforcerait déjà à ménager à son profit l'opinion publique polonaise par des soi-disant concessions accordées à l'Est. Or, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que l'Allemagne serait en raison de son avance militaire non seulement à même de faire de telles promesses, mais encore d'y faire face le cas échéant.

2) Si de tels sacrifices territoriaux au profit de la Russie Soviétique étaient demandés à la Pologne, cela resterait sans aucun doute en danger la foi des pays de l'Europe Centrale et balkanique dans le degré de sincérité avec laquelle les Alliés luttent pour la cause de la justice et le respect des traités.

3) Le Gouvernement Polonais, en luttant aux côtés des Alliés et s'efforçant d'augmenter considérablement les forces militaires polonaises par la création d'une puissante armée formée de volontaires recrutés en Amérique et de prisonniers de guerre actuellement internés en U.R.S.S., ne saurait en aucune mesure s'attendre à ce que ces forces veuillent participer un jour à la reconquête des territoires polonais des mains des Allemands pour qu'une partie de ces territoires soit ensuite rétrocédée à la Russie.

"Le Gouvernement Polonais se voit obligé de souligner
souligner que si les soldats polonais devaient, ne fût-ce que pour un instant, avoir la suspicion que telles seraient les intentions cachées des Alliés, ce Gouvernement ne serait pas en mesure de leur réclamer le sacrifice du sang qu'ils versent déjà journalièrement pour la résurrection de la Patrie et pour la cause commune des Alliés.

"Aussi, le Gouvernement Polonais doit souligner que tout en désirant collaborer efficacement avec l'U.R.S.S. dans la lutte commune contre le Reich Allemand, il interprétera dans le présent comme dans l'avenir les relations entre la Pologne et l'U.R.S.S. dans le sens des considérations ci-dessus."

I have the honor to add that the above text was presented to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs by M. August Zaleski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, in London, on July 9, 1941.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Sir:

By order of my Government, I have the honor to make the following communication:

"In view of the conversation which took place Saturday, July 5, 1941, between General W. Sikorski, President of the Council of Ministers of Poland and Mr. A. Zaleski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and Mr. Maisky, Ambassador of U.S.S.R., on the other, in the presence of Sir Alexander Cadogan, Principal Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Government of his Britannic Majesty, the Polish Government wishes to emphasize the following:

"The attack by the German Reich on Poland which occurred on September 1, 1939, was immediately preceded by the signing of a German-Soviet agreement on August 23, 1939, an agreement which apparently contained clauses which were directed against the existence of the Polish State.

"The invasion of Polish territory by Soviet troops which occurred on September 17, 1939, was followed by the signing of a German-Soviet treaty dated September 28, 1939. This agreement divided the territory of the Polish State

The Honorable

Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State
State between the Reich and the U.S.S.R. and proclaimed the end of that State. It was followed, in turn, by a series of other international acts concluded between the Reich and the U.S.S.R. or between these Powers and third Governments, all of which acts affected the independence and integrity of Poland.

"The Polish Government has always considered these agreements and acts as null and void and wishes to call to mind that, at different dates, it registered a solemn protest against them. Such protests were brought to the attention of the Governments of the allied and neutral Powers.

"It is also the duty of the Government of the Republic to stress that, in carrying out such illegal acts, the Government of the U.S.S.R. has not only committed, since such aggression took place, innumerable outrages against the sovereignty of the State and against public property in Poland, but that, in addition it saw fit to take measures which seriously affected the individual liberties and the private property of large masses of Polish nationals.

"The Polish Government does not intend to enumerate herein the protests in question and it limits itself to stressing the contents of the Note of May 3, 1941, which was addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland to
to Their Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the allied and neutral Powers with reference to the German
and Soviet occupation of Poland during 1939 and 1940.

"However, desirous of facilitating the task of the
allied countries which, unlike Poland, were not subjected
to aggression by the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government wishes
to do whatever lies within its power to prevent any complica-
tions in their relations with the U.S.S.R.

"In this connection, attention should be called to the
point of view formulated in the letter of November 27,
1939, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland
addressed to His Excellency Lord Halifax, following
conversations which took place between them in London:

"...We had agreed in London that it was premature to
take up any definite attitude towards Soviet Russia with
regard to their action in Poland and in the Baltic States.
We further agreed that, at this stage of the war, it was
essential to concentrate all our united forces against
Germany, to single out Germany as enemy No. 1, fully
responsible for the aggressive war forced upon the three
Allies, for bringing Soviet Russia into action and for
all the far-reaching consequences, the moral, material
and territorial damages resulting from the war and from
the joint action of Germany and Soviet Russia".

"In
"In view of the fact that Germany has recently resorted to war with the U.S.S.R. and that, consequently, the latter has found itself against its will among the nations which are fighting for liberty, the Polish Government wishes to state that not only is it determined to continue this policy with respect to the U.S.S.R., but that it would be inclined to see its relations with the U.S.S.R. again become normal, provided however that the latter:

"(1) undertakes to renounce completely the German-Soviet treaties of August 23 and of September 28, 1939, as well as all subsequent agreements and acts pertaining to Poland. It shall be implicitly understood that all the treaties and agreements which bound the U.S.S.R. and Poland prior to the German aggression of September 1, 1939, shall be reestablished.

"Moreover, it shall be understood that the property taken away by the authorities of the U.S.S.R. in Poland shall be restored in kind and that the damages resulting to Poland and its nationals by reason of the non-execution of the said treaties and agreements shall receive full reparation, and, finally, that diplomatic relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. shall be reestablished later on.

"(2) undertakes to free immediately:

   (a) those
(a) those persons who, being Polish nationals as of September 16, 1939, are detained by the Soviet authorities for political reasons,

(b) Polish nationals who have been conscripted into the Soviet Army,

(c) Polish prisoners of war interned in different camps in the interior of the territory of the U.S.S.R.

(d) Polish nationals (men, women and children) who have been deported en masse from the various occupied regions of Poland to the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. shall also agree that all possible assistance may be rendered to them.

"On this point (2), it will be obligatory that a relief organization which will collaborate officially with the Polish authorities may be authorized at once to function on the territory of the U.S.S.R. This organization will have as its task the rendering of aid to prisoners of war, to persons held for political reasons and to deported civilians, pending such time as their evacuation from the U.S.S.R. becomes possible.

"The Polish Government is entitled to believe that it is to the moral and political interest of the U.S.S.R. to renew its relations with Poland under the conditions defined"
defined above and adds that it is scarcely probable that the U.S.S.R. wishes to continue to take advantage of treaties it had concluded with the aggressor and which relate to territory which the U.S.S.R. apparently no longer occupies in fact.

"If the U.S.S.R. should adopt such an attitude, it would without any doubt strengthen its moral position vis-a-vis the democracies which are fighting in this war and - what is no less important - vis-a-vis the populations of Eastern Europe, which would see in this the genuine will of the U.S.S.R. to abandon political methods such as those which have inspired and still inspire the German aggressions.

"The Polish Government desires, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to emphasize at this time that in stating the problem in this way, it does not mean to renounce, in any manner whatever, the unquestionable rights of Poland with respect to its territories prior to September 1, 1939.

"If this Government has no objection to the U.S.S.R. refraining from making at this moment an official and precise statement as regards a return to the Treaty of Riga of 1921, its attitude is dictated by the following considerations:

1) The
1) The Polish Government would like to facilitate at this time the task of those of its Allies which intend to maintain direct friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.;

2) It aims to avoid creating the impression that insurmountable difficulties exist between the States which are at war with Germany;

3) The Polish Government has grounds for believing that as regards the Treaty of Riga of 1921 the Government of the U.S.S.R. may have in view certain clauses of that Treaty which, without having a bearing on the boundaries themselves and having a technical and transitory character, may have lost their importance today, in the sense of the interests of the U.S.S.R., and might, consequently, be modified.

4) It takes account of the fact that there is slight probability that the armies of the U.S.S.R. can themselves reoccupy any territories belonging to Poland which have been the object of the German invasion.

5) The Polish Government knows, unfortunately, from its own experience that obligations stipulated by the Government of the U.S.S.R. are not considered binding by the latter except in so far as that Government has neither reason nor the power to transgress them.
"The Polish Government is obliged to confirm - as had been declared on the Polish side in the above-mentioned conversation of July 5, 1941 - that it is not only without competence to renounce at its own will any part of the territory of Poland, but that it would be careful, furthermore, to avoid giving the impression that it would be inclined to compromise on the rights of the Republic to its territorial integrity.

"As a matter of fact, there is reason to insist that such an attitude:

1) would to a certain extent prepare the way for the German Reich which, according to information received by the Polish Government, is already said to be trying to influence Polish public opinion in its favor by some so-called concessions in the East. Now, it must not be lost sight of, that Germany, because of her military advance, would not only be in a position to make such promises, but also to carry them out if need be.

2) If such territorial sacrifices to the advantage of Soviet Russia were demanded of Poland, that would undoubtedly endanger the confidence of the countries of Central and Balkan Europe in the degree of sincerity with which the Allies are fighting for the cause of justice and respect for treaties.

3) The
3) The Polish Government, while fighting at the sides of the Allies and striving to augment considerably the Polish military forces by the creation of a powerful army formed of volunteers recruited in America and prisoners of war now interned in the U.S.S.R., cannot in any measure expect these forces to be willing to participate some day in the reconquest of Polish territories from the hands of the Germans in order that a part of such territories should then be retroceded to Russia.

"The Polish Government sees itself obliged to emphasize that if the Polish soldiers should have, even for a moment, the suspicion that such were the hidden intentions of the Allies, this Government would not be in a position to demand of them the sacrifice of the blood which they are already shedding daily for the resurrection of the home country and for the common cause of the Allies.

"Therefore, the Polish Government must emphasize that while desiring to collaborate effectively with the U.S.S.R. in the common struggle against the German Reich, it will interpret the relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R., both in the present and in the future, in the sense of the above considerations."

I have the honor to add that the above text was presented to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Affairs by Mr. August Zaleski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, in London, on July 8, 1941.

Accept Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

J. CIECHANOWSKI
Private and Confidential

My dear Mr. President:

I was delighted to receive your letter of July 28, containing a message for the Queen of the Netherlands. I promptly delivered it personally to the Queen. She was very happy indeed, thus to learn that you were pleased over the prospect of her going to the United States, and she wished me to emphasize her sense of gratitude for your thoughtfulness of her and her children, and for your gracious invitation to visit you at Hyde Park. She said she would write you a letter, which has recently come to my office, and which I take pleasure in forwarding you herewith.

There

The President

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
There were many important matters about which she was most desirous of speaking to you. She was moreover, aware from what Prince Bernhard had told her of his conversation with you, that you too, would welcome an opportunity for an exchange of views. She had been therefore looking forward with the utmost interest and pleasure to talking with you. It was therefore with real disappointment that she now found that the current critical turn of events required her presence with her Government here. She sincerely hoped however, that developments might turn for the better before long, and would, accordingly, permit her to go over for a visit.

She said that if there were any matters of a pressing nature which you might meanwhile wish to discuss, she would be only too happy to send a confidential and capable representative, in her behalf, to you. She then asked me whether I thought you might wish this. I said that I had the impression that you would prefer to talk personally to her, even if she were forced to delay her visit. However, I suggested that she mention this in her proposed letter to you.

I am
I am increasingly impressed by her alertness to world developments. She follows the course of events with an admirable intelligence and perspective. At this moment, she is engaged with her Government in preparing an estimate of post war requirements of her country. Her Ministers tell me that her practical and clear judgment in the matter are most helpful to them.

With my warmest regards and my every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle
My dear Mr. President:

On the night of September 1, eight of the Allied Governments participated, through their respective representatives, in a broadcast to the United States. King Haakon broadcast the address in behalf of his Government.

Before stepping to the microphone, he told me he earnestly hoped that by some good fortune, you might be listening in. He wanted, at any rate, to have you know the contents of his address - and he therefore asked me to apprise you thereof.

Accordingly, the King said in effect that Hitler and Hitlerism were hated from the bottom of the hearts of

The President

The White House.
of the great majority of the people in the occupied countries of Europe. America would certainly agree that a united Europe, led by a despised nation, was an impossibility. "The Germans can never be qualified to rule other people because they completely lack the gift of understanding the mentality of other nations. The way the Germans have acted in Norway is the best proof of this. They pretended to come to our country as friends. Perhaps some of them believed this. That only proves their inability to fathom other people's feelings.

"The Germans in Norway now at last seem to understand that they have been wrong - that the Norwegian nation never asked for, and never wished for, the sort of German friendship practiced in our unhappy country today. The Norwegian people are fighting a stubborn and tough passive resistance against the aggressors. They need all the sympathy and assistance it is possible to give."

In concluding his broadcast, the King expressed the warm thanks of Norway to the United States for their sympathy and valuable, and ever-increasing assistance.

As
As the King arose to leave the broadcasting room, he came over to me and whispered: "I do hope the President will like what I said."

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bridle Jr.
MEMORANDUM ON POLES IN U.S.S.R.

The following highly confidential information was received from London yesterday.

1. The Polish Army, now forming in the U.S.S.R., has been granted all freedom of religious expression.

2. Polish civilians, who had been deported to Siberia, have recently been released. However, about 500,000 have been transferred to Soviet Central Asia, mainly near Tashkent in the Uzbek S.S.R. and in the Kirghiz A.S.S.R. The Russians are reported to be trying to force these Poles into labor camps and appear to be making difficulties against their enlistment into the Polish Army.

It is desirable to call to the attention of the U.S. press the potentiality of the Polish Army now forming in the U.S.S.R. and of each additional Pole fighting against Germany.
My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to forward you the enclosed letter which the King of Albania has asked me to transmit to you in his behalf.

Following his and the Queen's invitation, Margaret and I had a long visit with them the other day. The Queen impressed us both as a charming, intelligent and serious young woman. She has had, as you no doubt remember, some very trying experiences, especially on the occasion of their sudden evacuation from Albania. Her child was only three days old at that time, and both she and her child had to be rushed through the country, over rough roads, in what I gather

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.
gather was an equally rough-riding vehicle. Nevertheless, she appears to have come through it all with a stout heart and a courageous smile.

The King talked at length, reviewing the circumstances which led up to the conquest of Albania and subsequent events which led to the spreading of war in Europe. He talked most intelligently and with a very clear perspective. Notwithstanding his unhappy experiences, he is calm and philosophical. Moreover, I find that he is an intense student of all phases of world developments and appears to have a very realistic grasp of the situation.

Needless to say, both the King and Queen are your devoted admirers and follow your activities with real interest.

With warmest regards, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle
My dear Mr. President:

Following Norwegian Minister Wilhelm Morgenstierne's arrival here, the Norwegian Government had a series of meetings which he was invited to attend.

In addressing these meetings, Wilhelm emphasized remarks you had made to him just before his departure. In connection with one of your remarks, Foreign Minister Trygve Lie recalled to the minds of his associates, that immediately following my arrival here, I had, at your request, conveyed to the King and to them, the same message. This he said was therefore the second time that you had expressed the same wishes, and he earnestly urged his associates to vote

The President

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
vote him a free hand in seeing that the matter was
carried out in full. Their unanimous approval resulted
in his having already obtained the King's consent and
full support, as well as Olaf's enthusiastic participa-
tion in the plan.

Accordingly, Minister Lie wishes me to tell you
in strictest confidence that while formal governmental
action on the final details will not have been accom-
plished for several days, it has been decided in
principle that Olaf will proceed to the United States
to engage in an extensive tour of the Norwegian-
American communities, with a view to enlightening
them on the realities of world developments. Moreover,
all arrangements will be in the hands of Wilhelm
Morgenstierne, who will accompany Olaf throughout the
proposed trip.

In disclosing the foregoing, Minister Lie said
that in considering the constructive purpose of his
son's trip, the King was genuinely gratified that he
had made the decision to send him over. Lie added that
this decision was for him personally, a source of real
gratification. This whole plan of course, will be
treated in utmost secrecy.

With warmest regards, and my every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidder
My dear Mr. President:

Our mutual friend, Arthur Murray, has asked me to forward this letter to you with his compliments.

With warmest regards and all good wishes, I am

Faithfully yours

Tony Biddles

The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
October 22, 1941.

Dear Margaret:—

I thought I would take advantage of quick delivery by Offie to send you this little note and some hairpins for your lovely locks. A little bird tells me that if you don't get these soon, you will have to let your hair hang down your back!

I think it is fine that you and Tony are going to have Offie with you and do let me hear from you often.

My affectionate regards to you and Tony.

As ever,

Mrs. A. J. Bredzel Biddle,
The Ritz Hotel,

Enclosure.
October 22, 1941.

Dear Margaret:

I thought I would take advantage of quick delivery by Offie to send you this little note and some hairpins for your lovely locks. A little bird tells me that if you don't get these soon, you will have to let your hair hang down your back!

I think it is fine that you and Tony are going to have Offie with you and do let me hear from you often.

My affectionate regards to you and Tony.

As ever,

Mrs. A. J. Drexel Biddle,
The Ritz Hotel,

Enclosure.
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Mrs. A. J. Drexel Biddle
Ritz Hotel
London England

CABLE

OK on broadcasts. Best to you both.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

October 28, 1941
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE:

Send her a telegram saying I think it is all right for her to say yes.

F.D.R.
Ritz Hotel,

2nd October, 1941.

Dear Mr. President,

I hope that by the time you receive this letter, you will have received my book "The Women of England". I asked the publisher to send you the first copy that comes off the press. I know how terribly busy you are but I do hope that you will have time to glance through the book.

In line with this same subject - the women - I have been asked to broadcast on a weekly women's program to the United States - the idea being not to appear in the nature of propaganda but rather through the human interest account, such as interviewing women in the different categories of life in an effort to interpret a cross-section of England to a cross-section of the United States. The whole object would be to bring about a greater understanding - hence a greater mutual interest.
Gordon, you mentioned our photo together - Sally in uniform and I in "civilian" - that they ought to secure volunteer workers for the American Red Cross Committee here. Several of the American women in London who have not done very much up to date are now interested in the uniform and are suggesting that they

In your letter to Sally, you mentioned that you would appreciate it so much if you would ask Mary to send me a copy of your book, "My Boy," which I believe is a very helpful step as far as the women in America are concerned. I would like to work for the Red Cross here.

We had a long visit with the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and her husband the other day and I have quite lost my heart to her. I think she is such a really nice person.

Tony is busier and busier and is thoroughly enjoying every minute of his activity. You certainly have given us a varied and very interesting life, full of opportunities, and we do appreciate it.

I do hope that Missy is better. We think of her so often and are terribly sorry to hear she has been having such a long illness.

With my love to you,
would like to work for the Red Cross here.

We had a long visit with the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and her husband the other day and I have quite lost my heart to her. I think she is such a really nice person.

Tony is busier and busier and is thoroughly enjoying every minute of his activity. You certainly have given us a varied and very interesting life, full of opportunities, and we do appreciate it.

I do hope that Missy is better. We think of her so often and are terribly sorry to hear she has been having such a long illness.

With my love to you,

Affectionately,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

In view of the fact that you received the Polish Ambassador personally and discussed these questions with him, I see no reason why you should send any reply to his letter of October 31.

In accordance with your request, I am sending these papers back for your files.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Mr. President,

Following instructions from Prime Minister General Sikorski, I had the honor to ask that I might be received by you in order personally to submit some details concerning a stalemate which appears to have arisen in connection with the formation of the Polish armed units in Soviet Russia. I have yesterday discussed this matter with Mr. Atherton at the Department of State.

In view of the urgency of the problem which involves the possibility of a speedy organization of Polish Armed Units, likely to attain the figure of about 150,000 eager Polish soldiers, I am taking the liberty of sending you the enclosed memorandum.

General Sikorski informs me that the British Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed by his Government to give full support to the Polish Ambassador's endeavors in this matter.

General Sikorski would be most grateful if you, Mr. President, would grant your invaluable support by influencing the Soviet Government to agree to a favorable solution of this problem so vital to Poland and, in fact, of great importance to the common cause for which we are fighting.

Allow me, Mr. President, to express my thanks for
for all that you may wish to do in this matter, and please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Enclosure:

As above.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Does this require any written reply? Please send back for my files.

F. D. R.

(Enclosure) The original of the attached, together with a letter from the Polish Ambassador.
The Polish Ambassador has been instructed by General Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, to lay before the President the present situation which has arisen in Russia in connection with the endeavors of the Polish Government to form units of the Polish Army composed of interned Polish military and civilian Poles of military age deported to Russia at the time of the Soviet occupation of Polish territory.

General Sikorski is of the opinion that the common cause requires the utilization of all available man-power, and especially those valuable Polish soldiers at present in Russia, on such fronts where they could most easily be organized and armed, and where there is the greatest need of having considerable armed reserves.

The most recent conversations between the Polish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kot, and the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotoff, cause apprehension to the Polish Government regarding the formation of Polish Armed Forces.
Forces in Soviet Russia.

These conversations confirm the impression that the Soviet Government tends to limit the Polish Armed Forces to two Divisions using the very numerous remaining former Polish war prisoners and volunteers for work in factories, mines and agriculture. The reason given is the alleged lack of labor in the U.S.S.R.

In the course of the last weeks the transports of former Polish war prisoners in Russia are not being directed to the Polish Training Camps but are being directed via Tashkent to cotton plantations and irrigation and construction works in Uzbekistan, and particularly in the Districts of Nukus and Novourgencz on the Amur Daria river, where the U.S.S.R. authorities intend to settle 100,000 Poles. It also appears that many Polish prisoners of war have not yet been liberated from prison camps.

Such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Government is not in conformity with the Military Agreement signed with Poland on August 14, 1941.

General
General Sikorski is of the opinion that this negative attitude of the U.S.S.R. Government and their claim of not being able to supply equipment and armament for the Polish Armed Forces has been greatly facilitated by the fact that at the Moscow Conference the delegates of Great Britain and the United States, when agreeing to supply heavy armament, tanks and anti-tank guns exclusively to the Soviet Army, did not explicitly designate any of this armament for the Allied Polish Army being formed in Russia.

So far the Soviets have inadequately armed only one Polish Division. The Soviet Government puts forth as an argument lack of material and their inability to arm any further units and even to supply food to the Polish Army.

In view of this situation General Sikorski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, instructed the Polish Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. to communicate to Mr. Stalin his intention of coming to Soviet Russia, if the Soviet Government agreed in principle to certain conditions, the application of which could be usefully discussed by the Commander-in-Chief with Mr.
Mr. Stalin. These conditions are as follows:

The liberation from prisons and camps of forced labor of all Polish citizens at present in the U.S.S.R. and guaranteeing them human conditions of existence.

All Polish citizens fit for military service to be utilized in Polish camps for the formation of additional Polish armed units by the Polish High Command.

Owing to the inability of supplying equipment and the difficulties connected with the feeding of such a large amount of people by the Soviet Government, this entire Polish Army to be concentrated until ready for action in a locality where it could be easily taken care of by Great Britain. The most convenient locality would be Iran or, as a last resource, the Caucasus could be taken into consideration.

Taking into account Polish and Soviet interests, the British Government expressed their readiness to undertake to equip and feed the Polish Army on condition that it should be located in a place accessible for deliveries of food.
food and material.

About 15,000 to 20,000 Polish soldiers to be evacuated from the U.S.S.R. to Great Britain and Egypt.

The Polish Government considers that all available man-power, especially qualified soldiers, should be used wherever they are most needed and that the utilization of such valuable trained material on farms and irrigation projects would be unjustified waste, inconsistent with war needs.

Ambassador Biddle has been informed of the above situation and has been supplied with all the data at the disposal of the Polish Government at this time. Apart from that the Polish Prime Minister has informed the Polish Ambassador in Washington that he has discussed these matters with Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Anthony Eden. Mr. Eden was to try to influence Ambassador Maisky in accordance with the views of the Polish Government on this subject.

Likewise
Likewise, the British Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed by his Government to obtain the U.S.S.R. consent for the evacuation of all Polish military formations to Iran, the British Government declaring that they are ready to undertake the responsibility for their full equipment and armament.

The Polish Ambassador in Washington is instructed by his Government to appeal to the President to lend his valuable support to the endeavors of the Polish Government. Prime Minister General Sikorski believes that, in view of the extensive aid which the United States is at present giving to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government would undoubtedly give serious consideration to the expression of such support on the part of the President in the matter of the formation of the Polish armed units, in accordance with the fair and legitimate demands of the Polish Government.

October 30, 1941.
The Polish Ambassador has been instructed by General Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, to lay before the President the present situation which has arisen in Russia in connection with the endeavors of the Polish Government to form units of the Polish Army composed of interned Polish military and civilian Poles of military age deported to Russia at the time of the Soviet occupation of Polish territory.

General Sikorski is of the opinion that the common cause requires the utilization of all available man-power, and especially those valuable Polish soldiers at present in Russia, on such fronts where they could most easily be organized and armed, and where there is the greatest need of having considerable armed reserves.

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Mr. Stalin. These conditions are as follows:

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October 30, 1941.
November 13, 1941

Dear Miss Tully:

The attached telegram for the President from Mrs. Margaret Biddle concerns a matter in which I understand Mrs. Roosevelt may be interested. There will, of course, as far as we can tell now, be no passport difficulties, but the British should be prepared to arrange transportation both coming and going.

Mrs. Shipley of our Passport Division tells me that one of the similar Anglo-American organizations here is planning a banquet Monday night and if the plan outlined in the attached telegram is approved, they would very much like to invite the representatives of the American organizations mentioned in the attached telegram. This information comes to me from Mrs. Shipley, to whom I shall be glad to pass on any reply that you may wish to make.

Cordially,

Miss Grace Tully,  
The White House.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

5391, November 11, 1941 9 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MARGARET BIDDLE.

A representative committee of British women has invited the following American women's organizations to send over to Britain one representative each to be the guests of the British women in order to afford them the opportunity to observe British women's efforts in civil defense and all other fields:

League of Women Voters; General Federation of Women's Clubs; American Association of University Women; National Federation of Business and Professional Women; National Women's Trade Union League; Young Women's Christian Association; Women's National Democratic Clubs; Women's National Republican Clubs; Women's Auxiliary of the American Legion; National Committee of Church Women; National Council of Catholic Women; National Council of Jewish Women; Associated Country
Country Women of the World; Assistant Director of Civilian Defense (Miss Eloise Devison).

This idea would supplement and follow up our plan for interesting and informing American women as to the roles they can effectively play in our own civil defense program. I personally would choose the program to be followed here in view of what I think most interesting and applicable to our country's defense effort. John Winant, Tony and I feel that if these women could come over to study women's part in war it will have a far-reaching and helpful effect in America.

In event you approve, it will help and I would greatly appreciate it if you would see that the State Department is forewarned of this invitation so that if and when inquiries are made of the Department they would understand the situation. I sincerely hope you will see your way clear to suggest to the Department that passport and passage facilities be worked out for these fourteen women.

With affectionate regards.

WINANT

L.S.
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated November 17, 1941 from the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Ciechanowski, embodying certain information communicated to the Polish Foreign Office in London by the Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union with regard to the extent to which the Soviet Government has lived up to its undertakings with the Polish Government to ameliorate the situation of the Polish people now in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Ciechanowski requested that this memorandum be brought to your personal attention in view of his recent conversation with you on this subject.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Polish Ambassador's memorandum dated November 17, 1941.

The President,

The White House.
The President
MEMORANDUM

The Soviet Government had agreed to comply with the following requests of the Polish Government:

I. Immediate release of all Polish citizens from prisons, concentration camps and camps of compulsory labor;

II. The establishment of settlements for Polish deportees to be fixed in understanding with the Polish authorities;

III. Provision of facilities for improvement of the critical material and cultural situation of the deportees;

IV. Granting of facilities for aid and assistance from foreign sources and the distribution of such help by the Polish authorities,

According to the latest information received from the Polish Embassy in U.S.S.R. with reference to the situation of the Polish civilian population (Polish deportees) in Russia, the following developments have taken place during the last few weeks:

1. A great majority of the deportees are still being kept in compulsory labor camps.

2. Free railway transportation is being granted only to persons released from prisons and concentration camps. As to the remainder of deportees, which
which means a great majority of them, such free railway transportation is being denied on the grounds, that the expenses should be covered by the Polish Government. As the Polish Government has no funds to finance the transportation, of such a considerable number of people, who have been deported to Russia against their will by the Soviet Government, the Polish authorities suggested that an appropriate credit or loan to that effect be granted to the Polish Government by the Soviet Government. So far no answer has been received to this suggestion.

As a result of recent war developments in Russia a new migration of Polish people is taking place southward. All these Poles are completely destitute, without any means of subsistence and receive no assistance from the Soviet authorities.

3. Hitherto, the Soviet Government has not fulfilled its promises to release the sick, aged and children from compulsory labor and to provide for them a minimum of food supplies and essentials. It is pointed out that about 100,000 people are being directed to Uzbekistan for labor in very hard conditions.

4. As far as foreign help is concerned, the situation is still unsettled in spite of the assurances of the Soviet authorities. It is impossible to obtain
obtain Soviet visas for relief expeditions from British India to Tashkent. The collaboration of the Soviet Government with the American Red Cross has not yet materialized.

Under these circumstances it has been impossible for the Polish authorities in U.S.S.R. to establish permanent centers of aid and assistance to the Polish deportees.

On the contrary, latest information goes to show that even some of the official delegates for Relief of the Polish Embassy in U.S.S.R. are being arrested and are receiving no protection or assistance from the local Soviet authorities.

Washington, November 17, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:

I want you to know that I deeply appreciate the honor that you have paid me by appointing me Minister to the Yugoslav and Greek Governments, as well as Minister to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, established here. The added confidence which you have thus shown in me is a source of real gratification, pride and encouragement. I assure you moreover, that I shall do everything in my power to justify this confidence and friendship, which I value so highly.

On the occasion of my presentation of credentials, King Peter emphasized his most profound gratitude for your continued recognition of his Government as well as for your past evidences of sympathy and friendship. There was not a Yugoslav throughout the world, he said, who

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
who did not wholeheartedly share his feelings toward you.

Upon presenting my credentials to Dr. Benes, on the Czechoslovak National Day, he likewise requested me to convey to you an expression of his and his compatriots' deep gratitude for your recognition of his Government, and for other proofs of your valued friendship and great kindness.

Moreover, he recently asked me to tell you that information which he had received from reliable secret sources in Prague and in Berlin, indicated that in about three months there might be expected to be signs of the commencement of a move by the military leaders of Germany to take over from the Nazi regime; for some weeks, Benes had been receiving secret advices from his agents in Prague and other important centers in Czechoslovakia, pointing to this. He considered these reports especially interesting, since in most cases they quoted the German Reichwehr officers of occupation, who had shown an inclination to "open their mouths rather widely". Only in recent days moreover, Dr. Benes had received reports of like character from secret sources in Berlin. They had gone on to say that a division of opinion had come about between the Reichwehr and the Nazi regime at the time the decision was made to attack Russia.

The plan of attack that the Nazi element had ordered, envisaged
envisaged a front from the Arctic to the Black Sea; the Reichwehr's plan called for a drive on Southern Russia, aiming, (a) at the capture of the Caucasus oil fields and (b) at the Caucasus as a potential springboard for further action in the Middle-East.

The underestimated forces of Russian resistance and severe German losses in personnel and equipment had since then served to widen the cleavage between high Nazi and military circles. Hence, the information which Benes had at hand pointed to the possibility of an open split between these elements sometime, say, between early March and May. Dr. Benes concluded with the remark that the aforementioned informations had confirmed the impression which for sometime he had been gaining, that Hitler was headed for a fall with mathematical precision, and that his fall was closer at hand than many political leaders on this side had any idea of.

In my audience with the King of Greece, he also requested me to convey to you an expression of His, of His Government's, and His people's deep sense of gratitude for your recognition of His Government and for all your great kindness. He is looking forward with real pleasure and interest to going to the United States shortly after January 5th.

Again, I want you to know how happy and proud I am.
am of your confidence, and that I shall leave no stone unturned towards justifying it. Margaret is just as delighted and interested as I am, and joins me in these assurances.

With warmest regards and all our good wishes, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Briscoe
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

TONY BIDDLE

I mentioned your name to a caller today saying "Ambassador Biddle." The caller said "you mean old Doctor Biddle. He has nine, eleven or fifteen well-known patients whom he has to visit every day, hold their hands look at their tongues, and take their pulses. He must be a remarkable Doctor because they all have different diseases and he pleases them all."

From now on, you are formally designated as "Old Dr. Biddle, the family friend."

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR SUMNER WELLES:

Please send enclosed to
Tony Biddle.

F.D.R.
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR BIDDLE:

The Norwegian family mail seems to take on an average of a month or six weeks to get here via the Norwegian Legation.

Without speaking to the Norwegian Government about it will you ask the Crown Prince and the King whether they would care to send their family mail in a large envelope sealed in my care via our State Department pouch? This might save delays. Is there any possibility of visit soon? It would give us all much pleasure.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date
My dear Mr. President:

At the request of Ambassador Biddle, I am bringing the attached telegram from him to your personal attention.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.
Norwegian Series #15
from Biddle

The President,

The White House.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated December 15, 1941
Rec'd 6:00 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

December 15, 9 p.m.
FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.
Norwegian series No. 15 FROM BIDDLE.

I should greatly appreciate your saying to the President that I shall take up mail question at early meeting with the King.

Two. Crown Prince is now in Lisbon awaiting early Clipper passage to the United States. For reasons of security, he earnestly hopes his flight be treated in strictest confidence.

WINANT

NK
My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of December 17 regarding the telegram sent on December 16 by Ambassador Biddle stating that the "Russians have consented to take part in the proposed conference", I am enclosing copies of the earlier telegrams dealing with this matter.

In brief, the proposed conference now scheduled to be held the latter part of this month is a conference to protest against the action taken by the Germans against the civilian population in the occupied countries and to declare that those individuals responsible for the crimes committed against the civilian population in these regions shall be duly punished therefor.

Under present conditions I see no reason why the United States should not participate. If you agree, we

The President,

The White House.
will send appropriate instructions to Ambassador Biddle.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
Polish Series:
No. 44, November 26,
No. 54, December 15,
No. 55, December 16.
ALH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  (br)

London
Dated December 16, 1941
Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
December 16, 8 p.m.
Polish Series 55.
FROM BIDDLE
By 54, December 15, 7 p.m.
Polish Foreign Office now states Russians have consented to take part in proposed conference.

WINANT

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington,

RUSH
December 15, 7 p.m.
Polish series 54 from Biddle

Polish Government at instance of allied governments established in London has again approached me regarding participation in conference described in my 44, November 26, 2 p.m.

They now propose holding meeting in late December and express hope that in view of changed international situation American representative to allied governments may take part "in some capacity as the representatives of Great Britain, Soviet Russia and China, i.e. as their guest, not an actual participant".

I understand British Government is prepared to be represented but neither USSR nor China has yet accepted.

I have indicated doubt as to advisability of our participation but request instructions.

WINANT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
November 26, 2 p.m.

Polish series number 44 from Biddle.

Acting Foreign Minister Raczynski informs me that as a result of consultations between the Allied governments now established in London it is proposed to issue a joint declaration based on the statement made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on October 25, 1941, protesting against the violence committed against the civil population in the Occupied Countries.

The text of the Joint Declaration which has been agreed upon by the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Greece and the National French Committee is in substance as follows:

They all commit themselves to a common declaration. Since the beginning of the present conflict, Germany, by her policy of aggression, has established a regime of terror in the occupied countries, characterized by imprisonment, mass deportation, execution of hostages and massacres. The allies and associates of Germany
of Germany are also involved in these crimes and in some cases even the nations of the occupied countries have participated in them.

Recalling that international law and specifically the terms of the Hague Convention of 1907 forbid any belligerent in an occupied country from violence against the civil population, breaking of existing laws and overthrow of national institutions, the signatories of the declaration affirm that the violences committed against the civil population have nothing in common with the concept of an act of war or of a political offense; take note of the declarations made on October 25 by the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister; place among the principle aims of the war the punishment by means of organized justice of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered, perpetrated or participated in them; and intend to see that those culpable or responsible, of whatever nationality, shall be sought out, tried and judged and that the execution of the sentences shall be assured.

It is proposed to issue this declaration at a meeting to be held at Saint James's Palace on or about December 2, 1941.
about December 2, 1941. The idea is to hold the ceremony as soon as possible after the Berlin Anti-Comintern Conference. The meeting is to be open to the press. Count Raczyński adds that it is also planned to have "the great powers friendly to the continent" represented at the meeting; namely, Great Britain, the Dominions and the Soviet Union.

I understand the British Government is prepared to give the meeting its blessing and has agreed to be represented on condition that the Soviet Government perceives no objection to the meeting and also has its representative attend.

In that case I understand Mr. Churchill or Mr. Eden will speak as the representative of Great Britain. All the representatives of the friendly governments will be invited to speak briefly after the various signatories have expressed their views.

Count Raczyński tells me he has been requested by the other allied governments established in London to ascertain whether they may invite to this meeting the American envoy accredited to them. They hope, he states, that I may be present and make a brief statement along the lines of the President's statement of October 25 in condemnation of the German new order.

I told
November 26, 2 p.m., from London

I told Count Raczyński that I seriously doubted whether it would be feasible for me either to attend such a meeting or to speak but that I should request instructions.

WINANT

WSB
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

To what does this refer?

F.D.R.

Cable London, Dated Dec. 16, 8 p.m.
Polish Series 55. & Dec. 15, 7 p.m.
Polish Series 54 from Biddle
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
TO THE KING FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Message conveyed by Prince
Olav of Norway on behalf of King
Haakon, dated Dec. 20th.
In reply refer to
PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./7386

December 29, 1941.

My dear General Watson:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram dated December 24, 1941, received from the American Embassy in London transmitting a Christmas message for the President from the Honorable Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., and Mrs. Biddle.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Chief of Protocol.

Enclosure:
Copy of telegram.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
PL.IN
London
Dated December 24, 1941
Rec'd. 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6203, Twenty-fourth.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

"Our Christmas present to you is complete set of first editions of all of the Prime Minister's books. We are having them bound in leather and you will ask the author to autograph them for you upon his return. We hope to send them to you early in the new year. Our love and Christmas greetings.
Margaret and Tony Biddle."

WM.NT

NK
My dear Mr. President:

Nothing has given me such a real kick as your memo of December 12. To have been formally designated "Old Doctor Biddle, the family friend" by the man I consider the "world's Number One for all time" — and at a moment when he was up to his neck in making plans of historic bearing, has touched me deeply. The fact, moreover, that you consider that my treatment of your patients qualifies me as "Doctor" is for me a source of real gratification and encouragement. It spurs me on to bigger and hotter applications and bigger and better pictures. Only today I injected the whole ward with your Joint Declaration, and am happy to report that the patients all reacted nicely. By tonight you will have had my cables stating that they all came through in good shape and that
that their respective representatives in Washington would be prepared to sign this history making document. Every day that passes I become more proud of being a member of your official family circle, hence you may well picture the extent to which this sense of pride has been boosted by my designation as "Old Doctor Biddle, the family friend."

My very warmest and best Greetings for the New Year

Faithfully,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House,
Washington.