May 29, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a telegram sent to Ambassador Caffery on May 22, together with the Ambassador's reply thereto under date of May 28.

Believe me

 Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
No. 331, May 22, 5 p.m.,
to Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro.
No. 544, May 28, 11 p.m.,
from Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro.

The President,
The White House.
DES
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

May 22, 1941
5 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)

331

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY.

Your 504, May 20, 7 p.m.

Please tell Aranha from me personally that I very deeply appreciate his message and I fully realize the significance of the statements he has made to you.

Please make it clear to him that there is no government anywhere with which this Government regards itself as being on more intimate terms of trust and confidence than with the Government of Brazil. As Aranha knows, I have made it a practice ever since I have occupied this office to communicate to the Government of Brazil all information which this Government received which I have believed would be of value to the Brazilian Government. I also have been most grateful for the information which Aranha has frequently given to you and which has been most valuable to us here.

If this Government has failed at any time to make its position fully clear to the Brazilian Government, although
although I do not think it has, I should be the first to regret it. I wish you would add in this connection that any specific question that Aranha cares to ask you or that his Ambassador here cares to ask me would be immediately answered provided a definite answer is possible. But I know that you will understand that under present conditions questions as to what our policy might be under given contingencies cannot be answered yes or no because the problem is not as simple as that. Answers to questions of that kind necessarily depend upon many considerations and upon future developments.

I shall endeavor to answer certain of the specific questions raised in his message as follows:

The announcement a few days ago by Marshal Pétain of the intention of his Government to negotiate with Germany for a new form of collaboration has raised very serious questions and has naturally created very considerable anxiety. The French Ambassador here has informed this Government that the announcement to which I have referred does not imply any departure from the assurances previously given us, namely, that France would never permit its fleet to pass into German hands and that France would not agree to any form of co-operation with Germany over and above the strict terms of
the Armistice agreement. Marshal Petain also recently reiterated a previous assurance given, namely, that France would never actively engage in the war against Great Britain.

This Government has requested that France's exact position be communicated to this Government officially and in writing. The reply to this request is still awaited.

The first fruits of the new negotiations for collaboration, however, have been evidenced by instructions given by the Vichy Government to the French authorities in Syria which have resulted in air bases and other facilities being made available in Syria to Germany for military operations against Great Britain. This action on the part of the French Government is not only a violation of the terms of the Mandate and of the French Convention with the United States of 1924, but is in the judgement of this Government clearly a form of cooperation with Germany not foreseen in, nor stipulated by, the terms of the Armistice agreement.

We are now awaiting further developments and some positive information as to whether or not similar forms of cooperation have been agreed to by the French Government which would include French territories in northern and
With reference to the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere, this Government has not only stationed in Martinique authorized observers and representatives who are constantly watching the situation, but it has likewise a patrol of naval planes and destroyers which make it possible for us to know both day and night the movements of the French vessels in the French Caribbean colonies. The French High Commissioner in Martinique has informed us specifically that the new negotiations with Germany have not modified in any way the status quo in Martinique. If this is true, there would seem to be no immediate reason to contemplate any inter-American action with regard to the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere and French Guiana is, of course, included in this category.

With reference to the general situation in the United States, the present attitude and intentions of this Government, and the prejudicial effect upon Brazilian public opinion which recent German victories have had, I may make the following statements:

The President has requested the Ambassadors and Ministers of the other American Republics to meet with him at the White House next Tuesday night when he broadcasts an address intended particularly for the people
of the United States and the people of the other American Republics. I believe that this address will answer many of the questions which may be in Aranha's mind and in the minds of many of the Brazilian people.

I think, however, that you should state to Aranha that in our considered judgment the German Government and its allies can never achieve victory so long as they do not obtain mastery of the seas, and particularly of the Atlantic. The United States will never permit the passage of the control of the seas, and particularly the Atlantic, into the hands of powers which are clearly bent solely on world conquest and world domination and which have as their major objective the enslavement of all free peoples, including the twenty-one American nations. This is a fundamental principle in our present policy since we regard it as the prime requisite for the insurance of the defense and security of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere.

With regard to this final point I leave it to your discretion whether to communicate it to Aranha or directly to President Vargas. It is in the highest degree confidential at this time, but the President personally authorized me to communicate through you to President Vargas the fact that a very considerable portion of the
May 22, 1941

the United States fleet is now travelling under secret orders from the Pacific to the Atlantic and that this portion of the fleet will be in the Atlantic by June 8. The developments of the past weeks affecting the Atlantic have caused the President to reach the decision that this part of the fleet must without further delay be utilized in the Atlantic Ocean to safeguard the interests of the United States and its American neighbors.

I shall appreciate it if after you have had your conversation with Aranha or with President Vargas, you will telegraph their reaction and any comment they may make.

HULL

862.20232/206

U:SW:IJ
EH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rio de Janeiro
Dated May 26, 1941
Rec'd 1:47 a.m., 29th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

544, May 28, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE).
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.
Department's 331, May 22, 5 p.m.
I saw President Vargas this evening and he said:
"You can tell President Roosevelt that I am in entire accord with the point of view set out in your telegram."

CAFFERY

CSB

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, J-11/7
By J. Schaub Date FEB 4 1972
REP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

RIO DE JANEIRO
Dated May 28, 1941.
Rec'd 2:30 a.m. 29th.

Secretary of State
Washington.

544, May 28, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
You can tell him furthermore that Brazil will honor its obligations contracted at Panama and Habana. In other words you can count on us.

He said also that he had listened with the greatest interest on the radio to the President's speech which in his opinion was noble, practical, and timely declaration.

(END OF MESSAGE).

CAFFERY

CSB
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a personal letter which I received from Caffery today which I believe will be of interest to you.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Rio de Janeiro,
October 31, 1941

Dear Sumner:

Aranha told me today that without question the moment the Germans moved into Portugal or northwest Africa, the Brazilian Government would ask for immediate military aid from the United States involving the sending of our troops to the Natal region.

With all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

JEFFERSON CAPPERS

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
February 18, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a translation of a confidential cable which the Brazilian Minister of Finance received two days ago from President Vargas.

The reference in the first paragraph is to Argentina.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
(TRANSLATION)

There continue to arrive additional reports on activities of our neighbors to the South now in combination with Nazi agents.

Activities on our frontiers are not limited to the substitution of the police force by an army force armed and equipped for a campaign, but also include the setting up of radio stations, the placing of speed boats armed with machine guns in the Uruguay River, the hasty construction of roads for wheeled vehicles and of landing fields, groups of engineers making maps, building bridges supporting great weight, storing war materials in Posadas.

Gestapo agents disguised as Protestant missionaries trying to penetrate the German colonies of Santa Rosa and various other acts of espionage on our frontier including an attempt to enter our barracks.
My dear Mr. President:

In the event that this telegram has not been brought to your attention, I would like to suggest that you read it.

This message from Aranha is the clearest presentation of the difficulties of the moment in our relations with the Brazilian Army that I have yet seen. It confirms the opinion I expressed to you yesterday that, in order to get what we want in Brazil, we shall have to move very carefully during the next few weeks.

The crux of the problem is to give the Brazilians immediately concrete evidence that we are going to furnish them with the minimum amount of arms they require in their present situation. Once that is done, if we exercise tact in asking for what we need in northeastern Brazil, I think we can obtain our needs.

I am sending a paraphrase of this message to General Marshall for his information.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rio de Janeiro
Dated February 18, 1942
Rec'd 3:45 a.m., 19th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

476, February 10, 10 p.m., (SECTION ONE).
By telegram 471, February 18, 4 p.m.

Aranha showed me confidentially this morning a communication from the War Department to President Vargas commenting adversely on our War Department's proposal to establish military observers (Department's Nos. 138, January 16, 9 p.m.; 172, January 27, 8 p.m.; and 269, February 4, 11 p.m.). The Minister of War observed that this would be a violation of Brazilian sovereignty as well as demonstrating a lack of confidence in the ability and good faith of the Brazilian military authorities. (Although as the Department is aware, I have had no trouble getting naval observers appointed wherever our navy wanted them.)

The President had given Aranha this communication for comment. Aranha showed me the reply he had drawn up for the President, saying that while he disagreed with the reasons set forth by the army he agreed that permission should not be given for the appointment of the military observers and furthermore he believed that Brazil
that Brazil should discourage our sending of so many assistant military attaches here, giving as his reason that other nations might want to do the same.

CAFFERY

KLP
TRB
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-

fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Rio de Janeiro

Dated February 10, 1942

Rec'd 4:09 a.m., 19th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

476, February 10, 10 p.m., (SECTION T.O).

Aranha remarked to me that he was doing this
not from conviction but "every now and then I have
to give in to them on some small thing and this is
one of them. Particularly is this true in the bad
times we are passing through now. I know that this
is an unhealthy situation but I believe that we are
going to be able to make a new start in regard to
relations between our military forces: very secretly
the President has agreed that I am to find a new job
for Goss Monteiro; also as soon as our army people
are really convinced that you are serious about
furnishing them arms (they are not convinced yet)
their whole attitude will be changed."

He then referred to conversations we had months
ago and observed "if your army had followed the ad-
vice I gave them and never again mentioned the question
of sending troops into Northeastern Brazil, they would
be in the happy position now of having us ask for
your troops;
-2- #478, February 18, 10 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from Rio de Janeiro.

your troops; in fact we would have done so at the time of breaking off relations; on the other hand, due to the other tactics your people employed, they have created a situation where we can not ask for the troops, at least not until the danger is much more evident than it is now." (END OF MESSAGE).

CAPPERY

KLP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1942,

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL KING

The matter of the transfer of two P-C boats to the Brazilian Navy is, I know, serious from our own operating point of view but this is a matter of international relations which has to be gone through with regardless of the purely military desirabilities.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our telephone conversation of Tuesday last, in which you authorized me to inform the Brazilian Government that you had given instructions that two PC boats should be made available to the Brazilian Navy, I immediately informed the Secretary of the Navy of your decision in this regard.

I have received today a reply from the Secretary of the Navy, of which I enclose a copy for your information. I believe it would be most helpful if you could inform Admiral King yourself of your decision in this regard and of your desire that the necessary arrangements be concluded promptly.

Believe me
Faithfully yours,

Enclosure

The President,
The White House.
My dear Sumner:

I have received your letter of August 18 relative to the Brazilian situation. Although I have not had any word directly from the President about it, I am assuming that the order to give the Brazilians two of our PC-boats stands. It is hitting us right where we live at a time when we need them cruelly, but I have initiated the necessary steps to see what can be done to carry out the President's wishes.

As we approach wintertime when these little vessels we are now using for escort purposes will no longer be able to stay at sea, I daily grow more anxious over what may happen. We are keeping the Atlantic Coast free from serious inroads by the submarines now but we are certainly going to be short of the requisite sea-going escort vessels capable of meeting the winter storms.

I can readily understand how helpful this proposal to give the Brazilians a couple of our sub-chasers can be right now. I hope that Brazil at last will take the dive off the deep end and declare war.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX

Honorable Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In the event that it has not been brought to your attention directly, I am enclosing Caffery's telegram of November 8 reporting his conversation with President Vargas when Caffery delivered to the President your personal message with regard to the North African operations.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
From: Rio de Janeiro
Number: 4623 Dated: Nov. 8, 47
Code: SC
Caption: Triple Priority

This telegram has been distributed to:
S
U

Please advise the Division of Communications and Records if further distribution should be made.
Rio de Janeiro

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 9, 1942
Rec'd 9:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

4623, November 9, 9 p.m.

Department's 3425, November 7, 11 a.m.

President Vargas asked me to thank the President very sincerely for his message. He asked me to tell him that the news has been received here in Brazil by him, his government and the population in general with enthusiasm and sympathy. He asked me to convey his strong wishes for the success of the operation, the importance of which for reasons which are obvious, it is easy for him to estimate.

CALVERLY

WID
January 6, 1943

My dear Mr. President and friend:

It gave me great pleasure to learn from your letter, handed me by Minister João Alberto Lins de Barros, of your satisfaction with the accomplishments of the United States Technical Mission in collaboration with the Brazilian Technical Commission. I look forward to receiving the full report of their work with great interest.

I have enjoyed talking with Minister João Alberto and am impressed with his energy and understanding of economic problems affecting our two countries. I feel confident that, under his able administration, the integration of the Brazilian and United States economic programs for both the immediate requirements of war and the future will be rapidly advanced.

Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in sending warm regards to you and Senhora Vargas.

With kind personal remembrances, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency

Getulio Vargas,

President of the United States of Brazil.
Rio de Janeiro, 26 de Novembro de 1942

Eminente Amigo
Presidente Franklin Roosevelt.

A comissão chefiada pelo Senhor Lwellin Morris Cook terminou os seus trabalhos no Brasil e está de regresso, depois de uma permanência suficiente para formar idéia exata do que é a vida industrial e comercial brasileira e indicar as providências indispensáveis ao reforçoamento da cooperação entre os nossos dois países. O chefe da comissão e os seus companheiros voltam deixando a mim e a todas as pessoas com que trataram explêndida impressão, pela competência e espírito compreensivo demonstrados durante o exame dos assuntos postos em discussão. Estou convencido de que esses entendimentos, processados em ambiente de grande simpatia e cordialidade, influirão de forma extremamente favorável nas relações econômicas.
entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos.

Em companhia do Senhor Cook, e por sugestão sua, segue o portador desta carta - Ministro João Alberto Lins de Barros - que presidiu a comissão brasileira colaboradora da americana e exerce o cargo de Coordenador da Mobilização Econômica. Vai incumbido de tratar matéria relacionada com a sua função. Apresentando-o, peço para ele o favor de sua assistência e conselho.

De público já tive o prazer de manifestar-lhe e da mesma forma às valorosas forças armadas americanas os meus aplausos e dos brasileiros pelo extraordinário feito que foi o ataque vitorioso à África. Aqui os renovo, cheio de admiração por esse empreendimento militar de que só é capaz um grande povo servido por uma grande organização e dirigido por um grande Chefe.
Minha Senhora cumprimenta-o e se faz lembrar à Senhora Roosevelt, a quem apresento as minhas respeitosas homenagens.

Tenho o prazer de reiterar-lhe os protestos de minha estima pessoal e alta consideração.

[Signature]
A Sua Excelência o

SENHOR FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT

Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América
Eminent Friend
President Franklin Roosevelt.

The commission headed by Mr. Lwellin Morris Cook has terminated its labors in Brazil and is returning, after a sufficient stay to form an exact idea of what Brazilian industrial and commercial life is and to indicate the indispensable measures for strengthening the cooperation between our two countries. The head of the commission and his companions return, leaving a splendid impression with me and all the persons with whom they dealt, because of the competence and breadth of mind demonstrated during the examination of the matters brought up for discussion. I am convinced that these understandings, worked out in an atmosphere of great sympathy and cordiality, will influence in an extremely favorable way the economic relations between Brazil and the United States.

Mr. Cook, at his suggestion, is accompanied by the bearer of this letter - Minister João Alberto Lins de Barros - who was chairman of the Brazilian commission collaborating with the American and who holds the office of
of Coordinator of Economic Mobilization. He is charged with treating of subjects relating to his office. While presenting him, I beg for him the favor of your assistance and counsel.

I have already had the pleasure of expressing to you publicly and likewise to the valorous American armed forces my applause and that of the Brazilian people for the extraordinary exploit which was the victorious attack on Africa. Here I renew my congratulations, being full of admiration for this military undertaking of which only a great people served by a great organization and directed by a great Chief is capable.

My wife presents her compliments to you and asks to be remembered to Mrs. Roosevelt, to whom I present my respectful regards.

I have the pleasure of renewing to you the assurances of my personal esteem and high consideration.

GETULIO VARGAS
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your signature, if you approve, a letter to President Vargas of Brazil in answer to his letter to you of November 26, 1942. Upon his return to Brazil Minister João Alberto Lins de Barros will carry the letter to President Vargas.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Letter to President Vargas of Brazil for signature.

The President,

The White House
Department of State

BUREAU
RA
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted 12/31/42

ADRESSED TO

The President
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I merely told Martins that if I went to the West Indies this Winter I hoped much President Vargas could meet me in some central location like Trinidad. Nothing further.

F. D. R.
January 7, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a telegram from Caffery in the event that it has not been brought to your personal attention.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Telegram no. 65
from Rio de Janeiro.

The President,

The White House.
Rio de Janeiro
Dated January 6, 1943
Rec'd 5:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

65, January 6, 5 p.m.
FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

Aranha tells me Martins reports President Roosevelt told him to invite President Vargas "to meet him at Trinidad" (when not known).

President Vargas says he will be glad to do it.

CAPPENY

REP
HJB

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a governmental agency. (BR)

Secretory of State,

Washington.

505, January 31, 2 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

While Aranha, Ingram, Walsh, et cetera were at dinner at my house last night, we received the good news of your safe arrival in Washington in time for us to celebrate a part of your birthday. We all send our warm greetings and again, congratulations. President Vargas could not be more pleased.

CAPPERY

DES
(TRANSLATION)

W5 51

RIO DE JANEIRO BRASGOVT 2356 FEB 5 1943

HIS EXCELLENCY FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN MY OWN NAME AND IN THAT OF MY FAMILY I VOICE MY THANKS FROM THE HEART FOR THE PROFOUNDLY COMFORTING WORDS AND THE FULLNESS OF SYMPATHY WHICH MRS. ROOSEVELT AND YOURSELF SENT ME ON LEARNING OF THE DEATH OF MY SON GETULIO.

GETULIO VARGAS.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT

For translation.

GRACE G. TULLY
Private Secretary

Enclosure
The White House
Washington

RIO DE JANEIRO BRASGOVT 2356 FEB 5 1943 FEB 5 7 45 AM 1943

S EXCELENCIA FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENTE DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DA AMERICA WASHINGTON DC
EM NOME PESSOAL E NO DE MINHA FAMILIA AGRADECO SENSIBILISADO
AS PALAVRAS PROFUNDAMENTE CONFORTADORAS E CHEIA DE AMISTOSA
SIMPATIA QUE JUNTAMENTE COM A SENHORA ROOSEVELT ME ENVIOU
AO AO TER CONHECIMENTO DA MORTE DE MEU FILHO GETULIO
GETULIO VARGAS.
February 15, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I believe that Aranha's suggestion as set forth in the second paragraph of the attached telegram from Caffery is desirable but before taking any action in accordance with that suggestion I should like to know if it meets with your approval.

If you feel the idea is a good one, it will probably be better for me to take the matter up with Halifax here rather than to have it dealt with in London.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) Lerner Miller

Enclosure:
742, February 12, 4 p.m.,
from Rio de Janeiro.

The President,
The White House.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rio de Janeiro
Dated February 12, 1943
Rec'd 5:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

742, February 12, 4 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.
My telegram 471 of January 30.

Aranha has been turning over in his mind ways and means of putting into effect President Vargas' promise to President Roosevelt that he would endeavor to persuade the Portuguese to allow him to send troops to their islands. He has in mind now to send Joao Neves at any early date as Ambassador at Portugal; and have him endeavor to secure the permission from Salazar.

In view of the British Alliance with Portugal Aranha believes it well to endeavor to have the British use appropriate good offices at Lisbon too. He is informing the British Ambassador here and suggests that you approach the British, either Lord Halifax or at London. He will repeat, however, to Charles that Brazil is lined up first with us and only in the second place with other United Nations.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

CAPPERS

JRL

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. SUMNER WELLES

To read and return.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Two letters to the President from Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Janeiro dated 2/9/43 and 2/10/43 re President Vargas reactions to the President's visit.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

I have read with interest the letter from Mr. Caffery to the President of February 9, and in accordance with the President's request I am returning the letter herewith for his files.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure:

To the President
from Mr. Caffery,
February 9, 1943

Miss Grace G. Tully,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Dear Mr. President:

President Vargas was in high good humor on the trip back from Natal. Aranha told me that he had never seen him in such good spirits as he was the afternoon and evening of his return here. He told Aranha that he was highly pleased with the trip, delighted with his conversation with you, and had come back with his feeling of confidence in you even stronger than it was before.

We returned to Rio on Friday evening and his son died the following Tuesday. He was much affected by this; and very appreciative of your telegram.

At the Cabinet meeting on Saturday last, he put through the resolution to join the United Nations as he said he would do.

We.

The President,

The White House, Washington, D. C.
We had more talk on the plane on the way back about the naval matters you spoke to him about; they are progressing satisfactorily.

The only matter that remains is that of the Portuguese Islands and he says that he will endeavor to see that through; although that is a tough one.

It is clear that the good effects of your Natal meeting have been widespread, and notably, of course, in Latin America: the Argentine press comments are illuminating and you may have noticed that Peru "in adhering to the Atlantic Charter" based the action on the Natal meeting.

The thing that pleased President Vargas most was your informal remark that you would like to have him at your "side" during the peace conference. Vargas would like nothing better, and, as a matter of fact, there is something to it - what with his prestige, Brazil's prestige, and the fact that at this moment all Latin-America (except The Argentine), and this perhaps is one of the principal results of the
the Natal meeting, look to Brazil as the spokesman for and champion of the Americas with and under you.

With all good wishes,

Faithfully yours,
Dear Mr. President:

President Vargas is about to appoint a new Ambassador to Portugal, João Neves da Fontoura. This is a very satisfactory appointment from our point of view. Vargas will instruct him to proceed at an early date to Lisbon. At an appropriate date after his arrival there, he will take up with Salazar the matter you mentioned at Natal of Brazilian troops being sent to the Portuguese Islands.

With all good wishes,

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 5/11/43, to the President, enclosing copy of letter which Mr. Welles received from Hon. Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, 4/27/43, with attached copy of Mr. Caffery's despatch of 4/26/43 to the Secretary of State, in re Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes' Trip to North Africa. Copies retained for our files.
May 11, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have received today a personal letter from Jeff Caffery referring to his despatch of April 26 to the Department, of which I enclose a copy for your information.

In view of the fact that Caffery believes that the War Department is pursuing a line which is not in accord with the views you expressed in Natal, may I have an indication from you as to the nature of the reply which I should make to Caffery.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Dear Sumner:

You might have a look at my despatch No. 11004 of April 26th regarding General Gomes' trip to North Africa which does not reflect the views expressed to me by President Roosevelt at Natal. If there has been a change, I should be glad to know of it.

With all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

JEFFERSON CAFFER

The Honorable

Sumner Welles,

Under Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.
Rio de Janeiro, April 26, 1943

No. 11004

SUBJECT: Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes' Trip to North Africa.

ORIGINAL AND TWO COPIES BY COURIER

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes, who just returned from North Africa, remarked to me that General Mark Clark said to him that he would like to see the Brazilian Government send an expeditionary force of five thousand men to North Africa. General Clark thought this would have an excellent effect on the future relations of our forces in North Africa with Spain as the Spanish would never want to enter into action against Latin-American troops in view of the implications on Spain's relations with the Latin American countries. General Gomes said that he told this to General Dutra who said that the force should be larger than five thousand.

Respectfully yours,

Jefferson Caffery.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADmiral Brown:

The President asks if this message has been sent.

Grace Tully

Message, 6-43, to U.S. Military Attache, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, signed "Roosevelt", quoting a message received Gen. Eisenhower for transmittal to President Vargas signed Marshall, thanking President Vargas for his message of congratulations and commending the qualities of Gen. Gomes and the other officers of the Brazilian armed forces in the African Theater.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I read the proposed message to Vargas to the Prime Minister and the latter wants to discuss the procedure with his War Cabinet before going any further. Therefore, I am holding it until I hear further.

F.D.R.
Memorandum for the President

May 20, 1943.

In accordance with our personal conversation I herewith enclose a draft of the proposed message from you to President Vargas.

You will recall your conversation at Natal on this subject when President Vargas is understood to have been disposed to proceed with this matter, but it was abandoned because of the British desire not to go along.

Please advise me as to whether you approve its sending.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. CORDELL HULL:

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Telegram, 9-25-43, to the Secretary of State from Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, re hope of Aranha that Brazil will not be forgotten in the organization of a Mediterranean committee.
I have discussed with the President the subject of your 5684 of December 11, 8 p.m. The President desires that you express on his behalf his profound appreciation of President Vargas' attitude in the matter of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the Soviet Union. You should point out that the President believes this question to be one in which the predominant considerations are the factors of direct concern to Brazil which only the Brazilian Government can evaluate.

The President requests that you add that the fact of recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933 (under certain conditions with which President Vargas is undoubtedly familiar), together with the close and effective cooperation of the two Governments in the prosecution of the war against the Axis, indicate the present attitude of this Government toward the Soviet Union. However, the President wishes you to reiterate that the determining factor must be the peculiarly Brazilian aspect of the matter and that the broad international aspects described in the previous sentence are not repeat not overruling.

You may assure President Vargas that when and if he desires to take affirmative action, President Roosevelt will, of course, be most happy to render all appropriate assistance.
In the course of your conversation with President Vargas, you should take every opportunity of stressing President Roosevelt's likely appreciation of the value and sincerity of President Vargas' support.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached herewith is a telegram from Ambassador Caffery in Rio de Janeiro quoting a statement made to the Ambassador by President Vargas regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the Soviet Union. I have prepared a draft of a telegram, also attached, to Ambassador Caffery, for your approval.

Enclosures:
1. Telegram no. 5684, December 11, 1943, from Rio de Janeiro.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

The President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS

I agree with Cordell. Will you take it up with the Munitions Assignment Board as soon as you can and let me have the enclosed back for my files.

F. D. R.

Transmitting copy of letter which the President received from the Secretary of State, 1/9/44, in re revolution in Bolivia.
My dear Mr. President:

The recent revolution in Bolivia has produced deep anxiety among the other South American countries because of their belief that it had the sympathy and support of the Argentine Government. They are fearful that Argentina may have plans to encourage similar revolutions elsewhere.

I share this concern and believe that we should take all proper and effective steps to support these countries, some of which have declared war and others broken relations with the Axis. The Good Neighbor Policy and our war effort might be seriously jeopardized otherwise.

A step that would have a most healthy psychological effect would be to provide Brazil with certain additional arms and equipment.

In Brazil, it would show the Government and people that we are standing behind them in a realistic way and would permit Brazil to move forward with its preparation to send an overseas expeditionary force.

The effect in neighboring countries would be salutary. In particular, Paraguay and Uruguay, both of which border on both Argentina and Brazil, would feel reassured.

The present military gang in control of Argentina would understand at once the import of this action.

It

The President,

The White House.
It is therefore recommended that you strongly urge the Munitions Assignment Board to assign to Brazil such additional arms and equipment as the War Department may feel it can spare without impairment to combat operational requirements.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Cordees Field
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Lube called in regard to the memorandum you sent Harry about getting munitions to Brazil. Lube said he can handle it tomorrow at a meeting with the International Division of the Army, if you approve of his so doing -- then the O.K. is automatic with the Munitions Board itself.

GGT

FILE MEMO:

The President directed me to call Dr. Lubin and tell him this was O.K. but to be sure and keep the Secy. of State in touch.

GGT
January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

During the last two or three days, I have had several conversations in regard to Argentina, Bolivia and neighbors which make me more disturbed in regard to the future. It is not yet proved in the sense that we have full documentary evidence, but I believe that the plot is more widespread than most people believe; that it has direct ramifications in Paraguay and that a great deal of preliminary work has been done in Uruguay, Chile, and Peru.

Therefore, I am in hearty accord with the thought that this trend should be nipped in the bud and that we should proceed with the Argentine in strong ways.

At the same time, I think it is essential that we make a move at once to build up the strength of Brazil. This should cover American arms and munitions and possibly more Army instructors, so as to give Brazil an effective fighting force near the Argentine border such as two or three divisions of motorized regiments.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that we should let Brazil have some Lend-Lease cargo ships to take the place of the many Brazilian ships which have been sunk.

It would be possible to pursue one of two courses -- either announce the whole thing publicly, or let it leak out -- which would occur in a very short time.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Thank you for your memorandum regarding the assignment of additional military supplies to Brazil. Ambassador Caffery, who will be back in Brazil about January 26, will personally tell President Vargas the good news. Since Ambassador Caffery's conversation with you the War Department has decided to construct two good airports in southern Brazil, one at Florianópolis and the other at Porto Alegre. All of these measures should have a very reassuring effect.

CH
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I have a memorandum from Mr. Lubin saying that the Ground Committee of the Munitions Assignments Board has assigned tanks, armored cars, and various types of guns to Brazil.

I hope this will see things through and do a lot of good.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: ATTACHED LETTER FROM SECRETARY HULL

I have been in touch with the Army and, as the result of
an arrangement reached today, the Ground Committee of the Munici-
tions Assignments Board have assigned the following to Brazil:

| 129 | Light tanks with armament |
| 53  | Medium tanks with armament (M4) |
| 54  | Armored cars, T17, with armament |
| 67  | 37mm Guns (substitute for 57mm) |
| 36  | 75mm Howitzers, pack M141 |
| 129 | .30 cal. Machine Guns, heavy, flexible w/m. |
| 155 | .30 cal. Machine Guns, light, flexible w/m. |
| 133 | .50 cal. Machine Guns, H.B., flexible w/m. |

The necessary ammunition will automatically also be
assigned.

The arrangement is to have one-half of these materials at
the depots ready for packing on February 1, and one-fourth on March
1 and April 1.

I am notifying the Secretary of State of these facts.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
The Department of State
Washington
January 8, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

The recent revolution in Bolivia has produced deep anxiety among the other South American countries because of their belief that it had the sympathy and support of the Argentine Government. They are fearful that Argentina may have plans to encourage similar revolutions elsewhere.

I share this concern and believe that we should take all proper and effective steps to support these countries, some of which have declared war and others broken relations with the Axis. The Good Neighbor Policy and our war effort might be seriously jeopardized otherwise.

A step that would have a most healthy psychological effect would be to provide Brazil with certain additional arms and equipment.

In Brazil, it would show the Government and people that we are standing behind them in a realistic way and would permit Brazil to move forward with its preparation to send an overseas expeditionary force.

The effect in neighboring countries would be salutary. In particular, Paraguay and Uruguay, both of which border on both Argentina and Brazil, would feel reassured.

The present military gang in control of Argentina would understand at once the import of this action.

It is therefore recommended that you strongly urge the Munitions Assignment Board to assign to Brazil such additional arms and equipment as the War Department may feel it can spare without impairment to combat operational requirements.

Faithfully yours,

(signed) CORDELL HULL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUBIN
SUBJECT: WAR MATERIALS FOR BRAZIL

In addition to the tanks, guns and other materials assigned to Brazil last week, the Munitions Assignments Board has just approved the transfer to Brazil of six training planes, which, apparently, the Brazilians wanted very badly.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. DUBIN
SUBJECT: MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS TO BRAZIL

January 24, 1944

You might be interested to know that additional assignments have been made to Brazil for the month of February. The items are listed in the attached which is a copy of my letter to the Secretary of State.
January 24, 1944

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In making its regular monthly assignments for the month of February 1944, the Munitions Assignments Board filled in a number of the gaps on the new Brazilian Program, a first report on which was sent to you some days ago.

The items assigned out of February production include the following:

Rocket Launchers (Bazookas) & Ammunition
Ammunition for the small arms assigned two weeks ago
Miscellaneous automotive equipment (motor cycles, jeeps, cargo trucks, wreckers, and service vehicles)

Helmets
Miscellaneous signal equipment
Miscellaneous engineer equipment
Explosives
Bleaching material.

Very sincerely,

Isador Lubin

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
February 10, 1944.

My dear President Vargas:

Mrs. Roosevelt is starting early next month to visit our soldiers and sailors who are on duty in many places south of the continental limits of the United States. She is going down by way of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Antigua, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and the Guineas to Belem, Natal and Pecife. She has wanted most anxiously to go on as far as Rio but because it is most desirable that she be back in Washington in three weeks, I have felt that she ought not to spend two or three extra days in going to Rio at this time.

On the return she plans to visit Curacao, Barranquilla, Salinas (Ecuador), the Galapagos Islands, Panama, Guatemala, Jamaica and Cuba.

I know you will understand how difficult it would be for her to visit the Capital of Brazil and I am wondering whether, if Madame Vargas is free around the fourteenth or fifteenth of March, she could find it possible to join my wife at Belem or Natal or Pecife to spend a day or two with her in Brazil, I think my wife is writing to Madame Vargas.

I think it would be a wonderful thing if our wives could spend a few days together.
I much wish that I could go with her but, as you know, I am in the midst of arranging operations to be conducted in Europe and in the Pacific, and I do not dare to be away for more than a day or two at a time.

Incidentally, I feel that things are on the whole going well -- only I wish that Argentina would behave herself!

Also, do not forget that I count on your coming to the United States to visit me at Washington and Hyde Park. It would be delightful to see you again.

With my warm regards,

Your old friend,

His Excellency
Getulio Vargas,
President of the United States of Brazil,
Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

MILITARY AVIATION AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL

Under your directives of January 7 and February 1, 1944, Ambassador Caffery is negotiating for our postwar military use of air bases in Brazil.

These negotiations disclose that President Vargas appears ready to give us what we desire provided that we give Brazil benefits of protection analogous to the security benefits we derive from our continued use of Brazilian bases. President Vargas wants 1) a continuing guarantee of assistance to Brazil in the event of attack not only by an extraregional power but by any other country of this hemisphere and 2) a continuing flow of armament to Brazil.

Both of these desiderata are primarily directed against one potential enemy, Argentina. President Vargas believes that the all-out cooperation of Brazil with the United States during the war has aggravated the long-standing tensions between Brazil and Argentina. He thinks that the United States should help make Brazil secure, just as by granting us permanent military use of the air bases he is helping to make the United States secure.

With your approval, I propose to meet President Vargas' request as follows:

One. Abrogate the politico-military agreement of May 27, 1942, which was in effect an outright alliance with Brazil, and replace it with a new agreement placing our intention to assist Brazil in the event of aggression upon it within the general framework of our inter-American undertakings regarding hemisphere defense, security, and solidarity.
Two. Provide Brazil in the future with armament in accordance with the following general propositions, which in essence are identical with those contained in my letter to Admiral Leahy of February 29, 1944 (copy attached):

(1) That it is to the interest of continental security that the Brazilian Army be maintained on an efficient basis;

(2) that the Brazil - United States Joint Defense Commissions be continued at Washington and Rio;

(3) that the Commissions make recommendations regarding Brazilian needs for equipment and similar military technical matters;

(4) that the equipment be furnished under a new agreement to replace the existing lend-lease agreement;

(5) that familiarization and refresher courses for Brazilian officers in the United States, and vice versa, be continued as part of military cooperation for hemisphere security.

The main virtue of such an arrangement would be its applicability in varying degrees to other American republics.

I am studying the necessity and desirability of submitting the agreement to the Senate for its consent and ratification.

Enclosure:

To Admiral Leahy,
February 29, 1944.
My dear Admiral Leahy:

I acknowledge herewith receipt of your letter of December 30, 1943, with which you enclosed a copy of a report by the Joint Advisory Board on American Republics. I note that this report has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This Department has given the report most careful consideration. We are in entire agreement with the view implicit in it that the continuance of close military and naval collaboration among the American republics is desirable in the future in order to ensure the security of the continent from external aggression. The Department also concurs in the opinion that the defense of the hemisphere and the effectiveness of collaboration would be materially furthered by the standardization of certain types of equipment, particularly combat matériel, among the armed forces of the American republics members of the inter-American system. Since the other American republics must import the greater part of their military matériel, we would therefore favor from the viewpoint of military considerations appropriate measures designed to equip their armed forces in the greatest possible proportion with United States-manufactured matériel.

I am pleased to inform you that the Department concurs with the recommendations contained in paragraph 5(a) of the Joint Advisory Board report, respecting the policy to be pursued henceforth in regard to the furnishing of military supplies and equipment to other American republics under existing Lend-Lease agreements. I believe it would be desirable in this connection for the State, War and Navy Departments to cooperate in the drafting of a statement of this new policy, together with the reasons for its adoption. This statement should be placed in the hands

Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
2166 Florida Avenue,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaeffer Date: FEB 4 1972
hands of all officials of this Government concerned with problems relating to the procurement of Lend-Lease supplies for the other American republics, for their general guidance and for use in conversations they may hold with representatives of other American republics on this subject.

The Department appreciates the need for revising existing Lend-Lease agreements with the other American republics and is in accord with the recommendation of the Advisory Board that revised agreements be negotiated at the earliest possible date.

While realizing that revision must be formalized prior to June 30, 1944, unless Congress takes action before that date to extend the Lend-Lease Act, I believe that the agreements cannot be revised until after the situation has been thoroughly and carefully studied. For that reason, I consider it highly desirable that exploratory bilateral joint staff conversations with certain of the other American republics be undertaken immediately. These conversations should, in my opinion, cover the following points:

a. The nature of the armed forces which the respective states contemplate maintaining after the present emergency;

b. Questions relating to the procurement of armaments and matériel for the armed forces of the American republics;

c. Matters relating to the work of United States military, naval and air missions in those countries where they are now established, and to the possibility of sending such missions to countries which do not now have them; training and technical educational facilities in the United States which it may seem desirable to make available to military and naval personnel from the other American republics.

It will be very difficult to reach agreement with all of the republics on these points, especially on (a) and (b). Few attributes of sovereignty are as highly prized by states as that of determining the size, strength and organization of their armed forces, and the same is true of the freedom to purchase equipment wherever they may choose.

I realize
I realize that in view of the President's letter to Secretary Hull of January 7, 1944, concerning air bases, the question of future arrangements respecting the maintenance and use of certain operational facilities for purposes of hemisphere defense cannot be appropriately discussed with military representatives of the other American republics at the present time in as much as no decision has as yet been reached regarding fundamental questions of policy in this connection. However, it is my opinion that this problem is one which those officers who will carry on staff conversations should have constantly in mind as a part of the background of their discussions. It is my hope that before long the situation will be such that conversations on this subject can be held with the other American republics.

This Department, while wishing to allow adequate latitude in the staff conversations, considers it appropriate to state its belief that, in approaching the military and naval authorities of the other American republics, the United States representatives should express themselves approximately along the lines set forth below:

a. The United States military (or naval) authorities, realizing that the threat of aggression upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the American republics has been largely removed, but mindful of the importance of joint action for mutual protection in the future, believe it timely to consider the problem of the postwar military security of the hemisphere. They wish to do so in accordance with the principles of inter-American collaboration embodied in the "Declaration of Lima" and underlying both Resolution XV of the Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Havana and Resolution XXXIX of the Third Meeting at Rio de Janeiro.

b. When the security of the hemisphere was endangered in 1940, military officials of the United States and of most of the other American republics held discussions regarding the best means to meet the common dangers which confronted them. The military authorities of the United States believe that the time has now come to re-examine, in the light of changed conditions, the arrangements which resulted from those discussions and again to exchange information regarding future hemisphere defense. To this end they are holding or will shortly hold bilateral joint staff conversations with each of the republics, except Argentina and Bolivia.

c. It
c. It is the belief of the United States military authorities that the American republics should be assured of the minimum supply from a secure source of arms adequate for them to share in the defense of the continent and to carry out responsibilities within a general security system.

(1) The amount and character of arms necessary for this purpose should be the subject of inter-American understanding, subject to the considerations set forth in (d) below.

(2) Adequate control of the supply of arms should be established in such a manner as to contribute to the further growth of collaboration and mutual confidence.

d. The staff conversations should be conducted in the light of, and any understandings reached in or as a result of these conversations with other American republics should be subject to the overriding considerations of, any eventual system of general security and arrangements for international regulation of armaments which may be brought about.

e. In order to accomplish these purposes the military authorities of the United States wish to discuss the nature of the forces to be maintained in each of the republics and to reach understandings regarding other forms of military cooperation, as, for example, the manner in which arms might be supplied by one republic to another, military missions, etcetera.

(1) In the interest of further collaboration, the United States would consider continuing to furnish arms to the other republics under mutually satisfactory terms.

(2) The United States believes that true integration of the inter-American defense system would be facilitated by the adoption of standard equipment by the armed forces of the American republics and to attain this objective is prepared to cooperate with the other American republics.

In the event that the question of the mutual use of certain operational facilities for purposes of future
hemisphere security is broached by representatives of any of the other American republics, I believe that the United States representatives should merely state that they assume that this Government is studying this matter but that they are not informed in the premises.

I believe that the War and Navy Departments jointly should make the decision as to whether Army and Navy staff conversations along the above lines should be conducted jointly or separately. Both Departments will naturally wish to have their conversations carried on by the best qualified officers who can be made available. It is of the utmost importance that the officers who are to engage in such conversations discuss the problems thoroughly with the proper officers of the Department prior to their departure, as well as the selection of the countries to be visited and the order in which the visits might take place. The Department will be pleased to have the Embassies in the field prepare the ground with the respective Governments for these visits.

I shall be glad to make specific recommendations regarding the revision of the existing Lend-Lease agreements once the Department has had an opportunity to study the results of these proposed conversations.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you get together and
draw up a nice personal letter
for me to send to President Vargas?

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I have received from the hands of Vice Admiral Ingram your very interesting and cordial letter of April 13, 1944 in which you set forth the need of the Brazilian Navy to strengthen its resources in order to meet the requirements of hemispheric defense. I was much impressed with your clear exposition of the strategic factors relating not only to the safety of South American waters but to Brazil's responsibilities as well in the more comprehensive problem of hemispheric security.

I have noted with particular satisfaction the words of high praise in which you have referred to Vice Admiral Ingram and to the manner in which he has collaborated with the Brazilian Navy in the South Atlantic. It is gratifying to know that in his work in Brazil Vice Admiral Ingram has been true to the traditions of the American Navy.

I have discussed your letter in considerable detail with Vice Admiral Ingram. I can assure you that Brazilian requirements of additional warships are being given the most careful consideration by the appropriate officers of the United States Navy.
While, as you point out, your request for naval ships is not great in comparison with the size of the United States Navy and its construction program, I feel certain that through your appreciation of the scope of the struggle in which we are presently engaged you will be aware of the fact that we are now employing our ships, particularly such types as cruisers and aircraft carriers, to the utmost. The extent of our construction program must be considered in the light of the stupendous and still uncertain demands of future operations. As you are aware, however, four ships of the destroyer escort type will shortly be transferred to Brazil under Lend-Lease. Furthermore, you may rest assured that the full naval requirements of Brazil will receive primary consideration at the first favorable moment.

I am not unmindful of the important role which Brazil must continue to play in securing this Hemisphere against possible future aggression. It necessarily follows that Brazil must be equipped in such a manner as to discharge so vital a responsibility promptly and effectively, should occasion arise. While it is with deep regret that I have to inform you that the strategic situation will not permit the transfer to Brazil at this time of the floating equipment requested, I suggest that conversations be undertaken between representatives of the armed forces of Brazil and the United States to make plans for the required degree of coordination.
and unity of action in both the immediate and the long-range future.

When such staff conversations are held, it would appear desirable to consider, not only naval strength, but also the strength of ground and air forces. All three branches of the armed forces should be given consideration, in order that total fighting strength may be determined on the basis of the guiding principle of hemispheric defense. It seems obvious to me that some voluntary control along these lines is a condition precedent to laying the foundation for future peace. I make this suggestion because I want you to be assured that the United States has a direct interest in seeing that Brazil is adequately equipped to carry out its part in any arrangements that may be agreed upon.

History will surely take note that the turning point of the war in the European theater was coincident with the action of your government in providing bases and facilities which contributed so materially to the African campaign. I am deeply conscious, not only of the generous manner in which these bases and facilities were made available, but also of the efficient cooperation between the armed forces of Brazil and those of the United States in driving the enemy from the South Atlantic. It is my desire, therefore, that Your Excellency, and through you the people of Brazil, understand the appreciation of this Government, and of the American
people, for the very vital aid that Brazil has contributed
to our common fight against the Axis powers.

With renewed assurances of my high esteem and best
personal wishes, I am

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency,
Getulio Vargas,
President of the Republic of Brazil.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum to me and to the Under Secretary of State, dated May 20, 1944, I am transmitting herewith a proposed reply to the letter from President Vargas of Brazil, also attached.

The State Department has collaborated in the preparation of the reply and Mr. Stettinius has expressed his approval thereof.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum to me and to the Under Secretary of State, dated May 20, 1944, I am transmitting herewith a proposed reply to the letter from President Vargas of Brazil, also attached.

The State Department has collaborated in the preparation of the reply and Mr. Stettinius has expressed his approval thereof.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Date: 2-16-70

[Signature]
Petrópolis, 13 de abril de 1944

Eminente Amigo

Presidente Franklin Roosevelt

O Almirante Ingram, da grande Marinha Americana, é um conhecedor profundo das necessidades de segurança do Atlântico Sul e, especialmente, do litoral brasileiro e da sua defesa. Vem de longa data colaborando com a Marinha Brasileira e durante o período de ameaça mais aguda à navegação dos nossos mares assumiu a direção geral dos serviços de patrulhamento. A sua ação eficiente e as suas altas qualidades de comando tornaram-no um chefe estimado pela alta oficialidade brasileira. Tudo isso o credencia, portanto, para ser, junto ao Eminente Amigo, o embaixador cordial e bem informado do que carecemos e do modo por que podem os Estados Unidos cooperar com o Brasil relativamente à segurança marítima e manutenção da paz entre as Nações Latino-Americanas.

Segundo o plano do Almirantado e do nosso Ministro da Marinha, conhecido e aprovado pelo
nosso comum amigo Almirante Ingram, cifram-se as nossas mais urgentes necessidades na cessão, pelo lend-lease ou pela forma que parecer mais conveniente, de certo número de vasos de guerra: 2 cruzadores pesados e 2 cruzadores leves, 3 contra-torpedeiros condutores de flotilha, 12 unidades menores do tipo de 1500 toneladas, 2 porta-aviões, 4 varredores de minas, 1 tender de contra-torpedeiros, 1 tender de redes, 1 navio lança redes e 3 reboadores de alto mar. Da alta decisão de Vossa Excelência depende a consecução desse desiderato, desejo legítimo dos marinheiros do Brasil, que, de forma exemplar, veem cooperando com a esquadra norte-americana nas operações contra o inimigo comum.

Ha um fato histórico de acentuado relevo político continental que convem relembrar nas presentes circunstâncias. Faz sete anos Vossa Excelência, com o dom de previsão dos verdadeiros estadistas, sentiu que a guerra mundial estava próxima e não era possível deixar a América do Sul à mercê dos inimigos potenciais. Ofereceu Vossa Excelência, naquela oportunidade, para o adestramento dos marinheiros brasileiros, navios fora de uso na esquadra norte-americana e que, sem fazer falta aos Estados Unidos, constituíssem um pequeno núcleo de treinamento para as nossas forças navais
completamente desaparelhadas. A República Argentina ve
hou essa operação natural e de todo ponto aconselhável
e, para não criar agravos nem afetar a política de boa
vizinhança, não foi ela executada, o que seria a antecipi-
cação do lend-and-lease, fórmula providencial da políti-
ca exterior do seu Governo para auxiliar as nações ami-
gas em perigo eventual ou atual. Os acontecimentos pos-
teriores vieram confirmar a sabedoria e a previsão de
Vossa Excelência. No momento trágico e decisivo, quan-
do a unidade continental exigia o concurso de todos, foi
precisamente a Argentina quem rompeu a frente única. O
bom vizinho, que assim se proclamava para impedir um a-
to de simples e livre convénio, deixou-nos só no campo
de luta. Em nada pudemos, nos dias trágicos que antece-
deram e sucederam Pearl Harbor, contar com êle. En-
quanto isso, a velha e pequena esquadra do Brasil, ca-
ingo aos pedaços, contando mais com a bravura e perícia
do seu pessoal do que com o material, arrastou-se nos
mares, comboiou navios mercantes e transportes de tropa,
defendendo a navegação aliada e a sua própria, também ao
serviço dos Estados Unidos, contra os submarinos e cor-
sários do Eixo.

Tudo o que ocorreu desde 1937 trans-
formou a promessa amiga do Presidente Roosevelt ao Bra-
sil em reivindicação histórica. O Chefe de Estado que,
naquela época, teve um pensamento generoso de congrena-
ça\-\-\-camento e sacrificou a sua promessa à visão ampla da
unidade continental, tornou-se depois o homem – chave
na luta política mundial que deflagram a maior guerra
de todos os tempos – a verdadeira guerra dos continen-
tes. Quem sofreu a afronta de ver as aspirações jus-
tas do seu país vetadas por um terceiro que não tinha
motivos para fazê-lo, sem ao menos a alegação de não
dispôr de iguais elementos de guerra naval, é o mesmo
que atendeu ao apelo do Presidente Roosevelt e cedeu
bases aéreas através das quais os Estados Unidos pude
ram socorrer com eficiência os seus aliados no momen-
to de maior risco, quando as bandeiras eixistas domi-
navam as costas do Mediterrâneo, mudando assim frana-
mente o curso da guerra e reabrindo a rota do Orien-
te.

O que o Brasil agora pleiteia não
representa muito, nem para as nossas necessidades, nem
para o ritmo de construção da Marinha Americana. É
na realidade, convém notar, pouco mais do que nos fô-
ra oferecido naquela circunstância de 1937. A prome-
sa inicial compreendia cruzadores e mais tarde, para
atender às nossas exigências ocasionais, se transfor-
mára em oferta de contra-torpedeiros, em face das pon-
derações dos chefes navais norte-americanos, que pre-
feriam entregar destroyers sem comissão nos portos do Pacífico. Sobreleva acentuar, ainda, que estes navios, cedidos ao Brasil, aliado e colaborador dos Estados Unidos antes e depois da guerra, são, bem pensando, uma forma de aumentar a segurança do continente americano, porque a prova da nossa cooperação leal e franca já está feita. Em quaisquer novas emergências seguiremos a nossa tradição de política exterior ao lado da Nação Americana e pronto a colaborar na defesa do continente e a garantir a paz entre as nações latino-americanas.

À lúcida compreensão de Vossa Excelência não escapará o alcance deste ajustamento prático inicial dos nossos recursos de vigilância maritima. Diante das incertezas do futuro e das duras provações que estamos sofrendo – os Estados Unidos e os demais países civilizados - seria oportuno pensar numa cooperação permanente, em que não sómente as nossas chancelarias, mas também os elementos militares, navais e aéreos das duas Nações, pudesse estabelecer maior e mais forte colaboração. Estou certo de que o Almirante Ingram, tão ao corrente da situação da Marinha Americana e da nossa futura participação nas tarefas de guardar a paz, poderá explicar, com maior
minúcia, os elevados objetivos que temos o direito de pretender para o maior progresso de toda a América e maior segurança das nações amigas.

Reitero ao Eminente Amigo as expressões de minha grande estima e alto apreço pessoal.

[Signature]

AS/
TRANSLATION

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC — Petropolis, April 13, 1944.

Eminent Friend
President Franklin Roosevelt

Admiral Ingram, of the Grand American Navy, is a deep connoisseur upon the South Atlantic safety requirements, especially upon the Brazilian coast and its defense. Since a long time, he and Brazilian Navy are working together and, all the time long the most acute menace to the navigation of our seas, he assumed the patrol services general control. His efficient action and fine qualities of Command made him a Chief esteemed by the higher Brazilian officers. All that entitles him to be, therefore, in the presence of the Eminent Friend, the hearty and full informed ambassador about our needs and how it would be possible to the United States cooperate with Brazil in reference to the maritime safety and maintenance of peace among the Latin-American Nations.

In accordance with the Admiralty and our Navy Minister's plan, know and approved by the friend of us Admiral Ingram, our more pressing requirements are the cession, under the lend-lease or through other means, judged more convenient, of a certain number of warships: 2 heavy cruisers and 2 light cruisers; 3 destroyers leaders of flotilla; 12 smaller uni-
ties, 1500 tons type; 2 aircraft carriers; 4 mine-sweepers; 1 destroyer tender; 1 net tender; 1 net layer and 3 fleet tugs.

The realization of that desideratum depends on the high decision of Your Excellency, being such a thing a just wish of the Brazilian sailors, who, exemplarily, have cooperated with the North American Squadron, and so continue, in the operations against the common enemy.

There is a remarkable and historical fact in the continental policy, good to remember at the present circumstances. Seven years ago, Your Excellency, with the power of forecast, proper to the real statesmen, perceived that the world war was near and it would be not possible to leave South America at the mercy of the potential enemies. At that opportunity, for instruction to Brazilian sailors, Your Excellency offered ships out of commission in the North American Fleet, unnecessary to United States, in order to constitute a small nucleus to train up our naval forces quite unprovided. Argentina Republic counteracted that natural and wise step, not realized in order to avert grievances and preserve the good-neighbour policy. Such a step would be the anticipation of lend-and-lease, providential formula to the foreign policy of Your Excellency Government, aiming to help the friendly nations in actual or eventual danger. Later events confirmed the wisdom and prevision
from Your Excellency. At the tragic and decisive moment, when the continental unity required the general cooperation, Argentina broke the unique front, just at that moment. The good neighbour, so proclaimed by himself, intending to hinder an act of simple and free agreement, left us alone on the battlefield. During the days before and after Pearl-Harbor, we could not rely upon him. In the meanwhile, the old and small fleet of Brazil, in a precarious condition, depending more on the bravery and skill of the crews than on the material, hardly crossed the seas, escorted merchant and troop-ships, defending the allied and our own navigation, also at the United States service, against submarines and corsairs of the Axis.

All occurrences since 1937 changed the friendly promise from President Roosevelt to Brazil in a historical revendication. The Chief of State who, at that time, had a generous thought of cohesion and sacrificed his promise at the wide sight on the continental unity, became after the key-man in the world political struggle that deflagrated the greatest war of all times — the real war of the Continents. Who was affronted, seeing the just wishes of his country counteracted by a third who had no reasons to do so, including an unmade allegation on inferiority around resources for naval war, is just the same who attended the appeal from President Roosevelt and
conceded air bases through which United States could efficiently assist the allies at the most dangerous moment, when the flags of the Axis were dominating the Mediterranean coasts, changing openly, therefore, the course of the war and opening the rout to the Orient.

Now, what Brazil pleads is not so much, nor for our needs neither for the rhythm of construction in American Navy. Really it is — notice — a little more than that was offered to us at 1937 circumstances. The original promise included cruisers, and later, to supply our occasional requirements, it was converted in an offer of destroyers, because of the ponderations from the North American Naval Chiefs who preferred to deliver destroyers out of commission in ports of the Pacific. It is noticeable that, on the other hand, these ships conceded to Brazil, cooperator and ally of United States before and after the war, are means that increase the safety of the American Continent, since the proof of our loyal and spontaneous cooperation is already made. At any new emergency we shall follow our traditional foreign policy by the side of the American Nation, ready to cooperate in the defense of the Continent and to support the peace among the Latin-American nations.

To the lucid comprehension of Your Excellency the reach of this initial and practical adjustment of our maritime vigil-
lance resources will be clear. Before the uncertainties of the future and the hard probations we are suffering - United States and the other civilized countries - it would be opportune to think of a permanent cooperation, including not only our chancelleries but also individuals from the Army, Navy and Air Forces of our two nations, could settle a greater and stronger collaboration. I am sure that Admiral Ingram, well informed on the situation of the North America Navy and on our future participation in the tasks to preserve the peace, is in position to explain, minutely, the high objectives we have the right to pretend for greater progress of all America and greater safety of the friendly nations.

I renew to the Eminente Friend the expression of my great esteem and high personal regards.

(S.) Getulio Vargas.
Revised
TRANSLATION

April 13, 1944.

Eminent Friend,

President Franklin Roosevelt:

Admiral Ingram, of the great American Navy, is a profound authority on the security requirements of the South Atlantic and, especially, of the Brazilian Coast and of its defense. For a long time he has been collaborating with the Brazilian Navy and, during the period of most acute threat to navigation in our waters, he took over the general direction of patrol services. His efficient action and his high qualities of leadership have made him a Chief esteemed by the Brazilian High Command. These are his credentials, therefore, to my Eminent Friend, as friendly Ambassador, well informed of what we require and of the ways in which the United States can cooperate with Brazil in relation to maritime security and the maintenance of peace among the Latin-American nations.

According to the plan of the Navy Staff and of our Ministry of Marine, known to and approved by our mutual friend Admiral Ingram, our most urgent requirements are considered to be the cession, by lend-lease or by other means which may seem most appropriate, of a certain number of warships: two heavy cruisers and two light cruisers, three escort destroyers, twelve smaller units of the 1500-ton type, two aircraft carriers, four mine sweepers, one destroyer tender, one mine tender, one mine layer and three seagoing tugs. Upon the high decision of Your Excellency depends the attainment of this desideratum, legitimate aspiration of Brazilian sailors, who, in an exemplary manner, are cooperating with the American fleet in operations against the common foe.

There is a historical fact of outstanding political and continental importance which it is appropriate to consider under the present circumstances. Seven years ago, Your Excellency, with the gift of foresight of true statesmen, felt that world war was near and that it was not
not possible to leave South America at the mercy of potential enemies. On that occasion, Your Excellency offered, for the training of Brazilian seamen, vessels of the American fleet which were not being used and which, without any deprivation of the United States, would constitute a small training nucleus for our entirely unequipped naval forces. The Argentine Republic objected to this natural and, from all points of view, desirable proposal and, in order not to create incidents or affect the Good Neighbor Policy, it was not carried out, although it would have been in anticipation of lend-lease, far-sighted formula of the foreign policy of your Government to assist free nations in eventual or actual danger. Later events confirmed Your Excellency's wisdom and far-sightedness. In the tragic and decisive moment, when continental unity demanded the adhesion of all, it was Argentina herself that broke the common front. The good neighbor, which had so proclaimed itself in order to prevent an act of simple and free agreement, deserted us on the field of battle. In no way, in the tragic days which preceded and followed Pearl Harbor, have we been able to count upon her. At the same time, the antiquated and tiny fleet of Brazil, ill-conditioned, counting more on the bravery and skill of its personnel than on its equipment, took to the open seas, convoyed merchant vessels and troop transports, in the defense of allied and its own navigation, also at the service of the United States, against the submarines and raiders of the Axis.

All that has happened since 1937 has transformed the friendly promise of President Roosevelt to Brazil into historical vindication. The Chief of State who, on that occasion, had a generous thought of conciliation and sacrificed his promise for the purpose of continental unity, became later the key-man in the world political struggle from which grew the greatest war of all time - a true war of the continents. He who suffered the affront of seeing the just aspirations of his country opposed by a third who had no reasons for such action, without even the allegation that he did not dispose of equivalent elements of naval warfare, (i.e., without even complaining that he did not possess naval strength comparable to that of Argentina), is the same one who answered President Roosevelt's appeal and granted air bases across which the United States was able, with efficiency, to deliver assistance to its allies in the moment of greatest peril, when Axis banners were dominating
dominating Mediterranean shores, thus completely changing the course of the war and reopening the route to the Far East.

What Brazil is now asking for does not represent very much, either for our own requirements or in relation to the pace of construction of the American Navy. It is, in reality, it should be noted, little more than what was offered to us on that occasion in 1937. The original promise included cruisers and later, in order to provide for our eventual requirements, was converted into an offer of torpedo-boat destroyers by reason of the decisions of the American Naval High Command which preferred to deliver decommissioned destroyers than in Pacific ports. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that these vessels, ceded to Brazil, ally and collaborator of the United States before and after the war, represent, in a clear way of thinking, one way of increasing the security of the American continent, because the proof of our loyal and open cooperation has already been given. In any new contingencies we shall follow our traditional foreign policy at the side of the American nation, ready to collaborate in the defense of the continent and to guarantee peace among the Latin-American countries.

The effect of this initial practical adjustment in our resources for maritime vigilance will not escape the clear understanding of Your Excellency. In the face of the uncertainties of the future and of the difficult trials which we are sustaining - the United States and other civilized countries - it would be opportune to give thought to permanent cooperation in which not only the foreign offices but also the military, naval and air forces of the two nations could establish greater and stronger collaboration. I am sure that Admiral Ingram, so well informed of the situation of the American Navy and of our future participation in the tasks of keeping the peace, will be able to explain in greater detail the high objectives to which we have a right to aspire for the greater progress of all of America and the greater security of friendly nations.

I reiterate to my Eminent Friend the expressions of my highest esteem and personal appreciation.

Getulio Vargas

Translated by:
BA:POChalmers:FCS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you get together and
draw up a nice personal letter
for me to send to President Vargas?

F. D. R.

Original of this memorandum, together with
letter in Spanish and translation of same from
Hon. Getulio Vargas, 4/13/44, to the President,
asking for various warships, etc., under Lend-
Lease, sent to the Secretary of the Navy; copy
of the memorandum and explanation of enclosure
sent to the Under Secretary of State.
June 21, 1944

Dear Jeff:

I have just been informed of the successful conclusion of the long and sometimes tortuous negotiations of a military aviation agreement with Brazil.

I am fully aware of the many difficulties and setbacks you have encountered and of the skill with which you have kept things in line and brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

I feel that this is a model setting a pattern for the maintenance through cooperative measures of security of the Hemisphere after the war. I also feel that other nations may draw a useful lesson from this example of projecting war-time military cooperation into peace-time cooperation. I am satisfied that the results will be beneficial not alone to the United States and to Brazil, but also to the Western Hemisphere, and to the maintenance of general world peace.

Please convey my congratulations and warm good wishes to President Vargas and to Aranha and deliver to the President at a suitable opportunity the letter which accompanies this one.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Enclosure:
Letter to President Vargas

The Honorable
Jefferson Caffery,
American Ambassador,
Rio de Janeiro.
June 21, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I have just learned with great pleasure of the signature in Rio de Janeiro by representatives of your Government and by the American Ambassador near Your Excellency of the agreement regarding strategic airports and reciprocal privileges in Brazil and the United States of military aircraft of the two countries.

I should like to express my deep personal satisfaction that Brazil and the United States are again showing the way in useful cooperation. Although the agreement is between Brazil and the United States, the benefits of it will not be confined to the two countries. The assurance of hemisphere security and of maintenance of peace in the world is carried a long step forward by this first model agreement designed for the period after the war.

The next step in this joint collaboration of your country and the United States should, in my view, include military staff discussions for the continued association in security and defense activities of the armed, navies and Air Forces of the two countries. These discussions should cover questions of equipment and matériel, as well as surface craft and aircraft. Another step which I have already authorized Ambassador Caffery to discuss with you is a model security agreement to assure collaboration against aggression directed against either country, or the Hemisphere.

I believe

His Excellency
Getulio Vargas,
President of the United States of Brazil,
Rio de Janeiro.
I believe that these discussions should include examination of Brazilian participation in extra-continental arrangements such as Mr. Caffery was authorized to mention to you, personally and confidentially.

Perhaps you could give me your own views in order that representatives of our two Governments may map out a program of action.

Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in sending you and Madame Vargas our warm personal good wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your directives of January 7 and February 1, 1944 and to your personal instructions of last January to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery to negotiate with the Brazilian Government an arrangement by which we might enjoy military use of certain Brazilian air bases after the war.

I am happy to inform you of the signature of an agreement in this sense on June 14 by Foreign Minister Aranha and Ambassador Caffery.

The Brazilian Government asks that the agreement be kept secret until the two Governments decide otherwise.

I am sending you herewith an informal copy of this agreement. I am also sending a copy to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, with whom we had previously exchanged views.

In brief, the agreement allows our service aircraft to make free use of eight strategic air bases in north and northeast Brazil for a period of ten years, or longer if not denounced by either Government. It provides for our maintenance of service personnel for our aircraft at those airports and calls for establishment of a joint commission to superintend, maintain and operate these airports. Provision is also made for the use in each country of other airports by military aircraft of the other country.

Owing in part to a series of untimely comments by persons and periodicals in the United States, Brazil and Argentina regarding our intentions in respect of these airports after the war, President Vargas and his service

The President,
The White House.
service ministers have had to proceed with extreme caution. The course of the negotiations was often difficult as a result. However, Ambassador Caffery has handled the situation with consummate skill, subtle tact and endless patience.

Accordingly, I attach a suggested letter for your signature, if you approve, to the Ambassador.

Because there is a feeling among some of the Brazilian Ministers and military authorities that this agreement provides far greater advantages to us than to Brazil, I also think that a letter from you to President Vargas, along the lines of the attached draft, would be useful.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Attachments:

1. Copy of aviation agreement
2. Letter to Ambassador Caffery for signature
Department of State

BUREAU OF \text{BA}
DIVISION ENCLOSURE TO
Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO
The President,
The White House
Whereas, the United States of America and the United States of Brazil at the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima reaffirmed their purpose to defend the principles of continental solidarity and absolute sovereignty against all foreign activity that might threaten them; and

Whereas, the United States of America and the United States of Brazil in pursuance of resolution XV of the second meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Habana entered into various agreements deemed necessary to organize cooperation for continental defense and mutual assistance against extra-continental threats of aggression; and

Whereas, among the several agreements entered into and measures adopted through mutual consultation by the United States of America and the United States of Brazil none has been more effective in fortifying the continent against external aggression and in strengthening the extremely close political and military relations, which have always existed between the United States of America and the United States of Brazil, than the Joint Brazil-United States air, military and naval arrangements entered into in connection with the present conflict; and

Whereas, prudence and the responsibilities within the system of their own and the continental defense freely assumed by the United States of America and the United States of Brazil demand of the two countries that they take the necessary measures to promote their mutual security and to defend their territories and areas of mutual interest against possible threats of aggression following the cessation of hostilities, and that the two governments commit themselves to strengthen the close political and military cooperation already existing between the two countries; and

Whereas, because of the great development in aerial warfare that has already taken place and that may be expected in the future, the foregoing defense policy requires, as a first step (without prejudice to similar understandings regarding other military departments) from the standpoint of the protection of both countries and the continent, the continued maintenance of strategic military airports for the joint use of both governments, without in any manner implying the permanency of the Armed Forces of the United States of America at the air bases in question which are enumerated in exhibit No. 1 to this document; and

Whereas, of the factors of location, military strength and resources which determine the military value of an airport, Brazil is able to furnish, among other things, certain strategic locations, adequate personnel for defense and certain resources, and the United States is able to furnish, among other things, the material of the military strength factor and many resources that will not be available in Brazil for some years, and it therefore would be to the mutual advantage of both countries for each to contribute the elements which each is best able to supply in order that they may together maintain bases for their mutual defense; and

Whereas,
Whereas, the Government of the United States of Brazil is the sole owner of the airports enumerated in Exhibit No. 1 to this document and under the terms of Decree No. 3462 of July 23, 1941, these airports will be under its exclusive command, flag, symbols and military regulations;

Therefore the Governments of the United States of America and of the United States of Brazil, firmly resolved to take every measure toward contributing to the maintenance of world peace and to defense against any aggression, agree upon the following terms for continuation of their military air cooperation in the post-war period.

Article First: The territories affected by the present agreement are:

(A) In the case of the United States of America, continental United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands;

(B) In the case of the United States of Brazil, continental Brazil and Fernando Noronha Island.

Article Second: For the purpose of the present agreement "military aircraft" are defined as aircraft of the army, navy or air forces of either government, and civil aircraft operated in military traffic under contracts with the armed forces of either government, in no case as common carriers;

Article Third:

(A) The Airports and their appurtenances described in Exhibit No. 1, and facilities necessary for their operation (hereinafter referred to as the "strategic airports"), and any other airports located either in the territories described in Article First or elsewhere outside the continent which, by future agreement between the two Governments may be designated as strategic airports, may be freely used by the military aircraft and personnel of both Governments in accordance with the laws of the respective countries and in compliance with the present agreement. The exact boundaries of the aforesaid airports described in Exhibit No. 1, their appurtenances and facilities shall be determined by a Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports hereinafter provided for, with the approval of the Minister of Aeronautics.

(B) The radio, meteorological, communications, repair, storage and other equipment and facilities constructed or installed at any strategic airport, or which may hereafter be constructed or installed thereof, together with any gasoline storage facilities, equipment and pipe lines now or hereafter constructed or installed at or in the vicinity of any strategic airport for use in connection with its operation, may be freely used by the air forces of each country during the life of this agreement. Such equipment and facilities shall be considered an integral part of such strategic airports.

(C) Either
Either government may maintain at each strategic airport such personnel as may be necessary for the servicing and maintenance of the airport and of such of its military aircraft as may from time to time be located at or making use of the airport.

Article Fourth: In view of the joint use for defense of the strategic airports and facilities contemplated by the present agreement, the two Governments agree that each should participate in the responsibility for the maintenance of the strategic airports and facilities. In order to discharge their joint responsibility and to provide for the efficient maintenance of the said airports, although the airports continue to belong to the Government of Brazil and subordinate to the Ministry of Air, the two Governments hereby establish a Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports composed of equal numbers of representatives of the Brazilian Air Force and of the Armed Forces of the United States of America. The Commission shall determine its procedure.

Article Fifth: The two Governments agree that:

(A) The Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports, which will have its headquarters at the Ministry of Aeronautics, shall superintend the operation and maintenance, and shall prescribe regulations for the use, of each strategic airport and its facilities;

(B) The Commission shall recommend to the two Governments a formula for the equitable distribution between the two Governments of the costs of maintenance and operation of the strategic airports;

(C) The Commission will propose additional equipment and facilities which it may be advisable to construct or install at any of the strategic airports by and at the expense of either Government subject to the approval of the Governments;

(D) The Commission shall formulate plans for expansion of the training already initiated in Brazil and in the United States for the preparation of Brazilian technicians in the operation of airports and facilities. The Government of the United States of America will make available suitable facilities at its disposal to provide such training.

Article Sixth: The use of the strategic airports and facilities by civil aircraft as now and hereafter permitted by the Brazilian Government shall not be affected by this agreement, but operations of such aircraft shall be subject to the provisions of Paragraph (A) of Article Fifth.

Article Seventh: The military aircraft of each Government shall, subject to the limitations of the present agreement, be permitted to fly into, over and away from the territory under the jurisdiction of the other Government. Subject to the provisions of the present agreement and to the laws of the respective countries, the military aircraft of each Government shall further be accorded the right to land at and take off from airports, and to use all airport and navigational facilities, within the territory of the other open to its own military aircraft.
Article Eighth: The military aircraft of each government and the military, naval, air forces and other official personnel and official supplies, equipment and material carried on such aircraft, while within or over the territory of the other country, shall not be exempt from the laws in force in that territory, except as otherwise provided in this agreement.

Article Ninth: Each government reserves the right, for considerations of military security or in the interest of public safety or for other sufficient reasons, to restrict or prohibit, over zones each government may from time to time define, air traffic by military aircraft of the other government. Each government shall promptly communicate to the other information regarding such zones and regulations it may adopt in connection with them.

Article Tenth: No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost shall be charged by either party on material, equipment, supplies or goods brought into its territory for the use of the other party, under the present agreement, or for the official use but not for private and personal use of its armed forces or its civilian personnel on the territory by reason of employment under the present agreement.

Article Eleventh: No member of the armed forces of either party and no civilian personnel of either party resident on the territory of the other by reason of such employment under the present agreement shall be liable to pay income tax on income derived from the government by which he is employed, unless he is a national of the country on whose territory he is serving.

Article Twelfth: The present agreement shall become effective upon signature and shall run for ten years, unless the two Governments agree to the contrary. It shall thereafter remain in effect until twelve months after the day on which one of the governments advises the other of its intention of terminating it.
MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss Tully:

The attached photostat copy of the recent U.S.-Brazil military airport agreement was informally referred by the President to Admiral Leahy "for whatever action that is necessary."

This has been studied by the J.C.S. and Admiral Leahy is advised that no action at present appears necessary, and that the possibility of necessary post-war action is under study by a committee. To date Admiral Leahy has not discussed the matter with the President.

The attached papers are returned to your files.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Lt. Commander, USN
Aide
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  

June 29, 1944  

In reply refer to BA

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my letter to you of June 19, 1944 informing you of the signature in Rio de Janeiro of a military airport agreement, I take pleasure in transmitting herewith a photostatic copy of the original signed agreement together with an English translation thereof.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch no. 16411, June 14, from Rio de Janeiro enclosing photostatic copy of original signed agreement and English translation.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

To

Letter drafted: 6.26-44

Addressed to: The President
Published in

*Foreign Relations of the United States*

1944 Vol. VII The American Republics
pp. 560-566.
Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1944.

SUBJECT: Transmitting Text of Secret Military Aviation Agreement.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

SIR:

With reference to my telegram No. 2175 of June 14, 5 PM, reporting the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the military aviation agreement, I have the honor to transmit herewith the original of the Portuguese text handed me by Aranha and copies of the English text which I handed to Aranha, together with the text of the covering notes which was suggested by Aranha and to which I took no objection.

Respectfully yours,

Jefferson Caffery.

Enclosures:

1. Original Portuguese text of Note from Minister for Foreign Affairs dated June 14, 1944 together with aviation agreement.

2. English text of note to Minister for Foreign Affairs dated June 14, 1944 together with aviation agreement.

File No. 879.6
JC:LEF
Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 16411 of June 14, 1944 from the Embassy at Rio de Janeiro.

ENGLISH TEXT

Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1944.

Excellency:

I have the honor to confirm the agreement which has been reached by the Governments of Brazil and the United States of America, the text of which, consisting of nine pages, and one exhibit consisting of four pages, all of them initialed, I herewith transmit to Your Excellency. The present agreement will be kept secret until decision to the contrary by both Governments.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

His Excellency

Dr. Oswaldo Aranha,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Rio de Janeiro.
WHEREAS the United States of America and the United States of Brazil at the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima reaffirmed their purpose to defend the principles of continental solidarity and absolute sovereignty against all foreign activity that might threaten them; and

WHEREAS the United States of America and the United States of Brazil in pursuance of Resolution XV of the second meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Habana entered into various agreements deemed necessary to organize cooperation for continental defense and mutual assistance against extra-continental threats of aggression; and

WHEREAS among the several agreements entered into and measures adopted through mutual consultation by the United States of America and the United States of Brazil none has been more effective in fortifying the continent against external aggression and in strengthening the extremely close political and military relations which have always existed between the United States of America and the United States of Brazil, than the joint Brazil-United States air, military and naval arrangements entered into in connection with the present conflict; and

WHEREAS, prudence and the responsibilities within the system of their own and the continental defense
freely assumed by the United States of America and the United States of Brazil demand of the two countries that they take the necessary measures to promote their mutual security and to defend their territories and areas of mutual interest against possible threats of aggression following the cessation of hostilities, and that the two Governments commit themselves to strengthen the close political and military cooperation already existing between the two countries; and

WHEREAS, because of the great development in aerial warfare that has already taken place and that may be expected in the future, the foregoing defense policy requires, as a first step (without prejudice to similar understandings regarding other military departments), from the standpoint of the protection of both countries and the continent, the continued maintenance of strategic military airports for the joint use of both governments, without in any manner implying the permanency of the armed forces of the United States of America at the air bases in question which are enumerated in Exhibit No. 1 to this document; and

WHEREAS, of the factors of location, military strength and resources which determine the military value of an airport, Brazil is able to furnish, among other things, certain strategic locations, adequate personnel for defense and certain resources, and the
United States is able to furnish, among other things, the materiel for the military strength factor and many resources that will not be available in Brazil for some years, and it therefore would be to the mutual advantage of both countries for each to contribute the elements which each is best able to supply in order that they may together maintain bases for their mutual defense; and

WHEREAS the Government of the United States of Brazil is the sole owner of the airports enumerated in Exhibit No. I to this document and under the terms of Decree No. 3462 of July 25, 1941 these airports will be under its exclusive command, flag, symbols and military regulations;

THEREFORE the Governments of the United States of America and of the United States of Brazil, firmly resolved to take every measure toward contributing to the maintenance of world peace and to defense against any aggression against their territories and also to keep danger from continental shores, agree upon the following terms for continuation of their military air cooperation in the post-war period.

ARTICLE FIRST

The territories affected by the present agreement are:

(a) In the case of the United States of America,
continental United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands;

(b) In the case of the United States of Brazil, continental Brazil and Fernando Moronha Island.

ARTICLE SECOND

For the purposes of the present agreement "military aircraft" are defined as aircraft of the Army, Navy or Air Forces of either Government, and civil aircraft operated in military traffic under contracts with the armed forces of either Government, in no case as common carriers.

ARTICLE THIRD

(a) The airports and their appurtenances described in Exhibit I, and facilities necessary for their operation (hereinafter referred to as the "strategic airports"), and any other airports located either in the territories described in Article First or elsewhere outside of the continent which, by future agreement between the two Governments may be designated as strategic airports, may be freely used by the military aircraft and personnel of both Governments in accordance with the laws of the respective countries and in compliance with the present agreement. The exact boundaries of the aforesaid airports described in Exhibit No. I, their appurtenances and facilities shall be determined by a Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports hereinafter provided for, with the approval of
the Minister of Aeronautics.

(b) The radio, meteorological, communications, repair, storage and other equipment and facilities constructed or installed at any strategic airport, or which may hereinafter be constructed or installed thereat, together with any gasoline storage facilities, equipment and pipe lines now or hereafter constructed or installed at or in the vicinity of any strategic airport for use in connection with its operation, may be freely used by the Air Forces of each country during the life of this agreement. Such equipment and facilities shall be considered an integral part of such strategic airports.

(c) Either Government may maintain at each strategic airport such personnel as may be necessary for the servicing and maintenance of the airport and of such of its military aircraft as may from time to time be located at or making use of the airport.

ARTICLE FOURTH

In view of the joint use for defense of the strategic airports and facilities contemplated by the present agreement, the two Governments agree that each should participate in the responsibility for the maintenance of the strategic airports and facilities. In order to discharge their joint responsibility and to provide for the efficient maintenance of the said airports, although the airports continue to belong to
the Government of Brazil and subordinate to the Ministry of Air, the two Governments hereby establish a Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports, composed of equal numbers of representatives of the Brazilian Air Force and of the armed forces of the United States of America. The Commission shall determine its procedure.

**ARTICLE FIFTH**

The two Governments agree that:

(a) The Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports, which will have its headquarters at the Ministry of Aeronautics, will be able to superintend the operation and maintenance, and shall prescribe regulations for the use, of each strategic airport and its facilities;

(b) The Commission shall recommend to the two Governments a formula for the equitable distribution of the costs of maintenance and operation of the strategic airports;

(c) The Commission will propose additional equipment and facilities which it may be advisable to construct or install at any of the strategic airports by and at the expense of either Government subject to the approval of the Governments.

(d) The Commission shall formulate plans for expansion of the training already initiated in Brazil and
in the United States for the preparation of Brazilian technicians in the operation of airports and facilities. The Government of the United States of America will make available suitable facilities at its disposal to provide such training.

ARTICLE SIXTH
The use of the strategic airports and facilities by civil aircraft as now and hereafter permitted by the Brazilian Government shall not be affected by this agreement, but operations of such aircraft shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article Fifth.

ARTICLE SEVENTH
The military aircraft of each Government shall, subject to the limitations of the present agreement, be permitted to fly into, over and away from the territory under the jurisdiction of the other Government. Subject to the provisions of the present agreement and to the laws of the respective countries, the military aircraft of each Government shall further be accorded the right to land at and take off from airports, and to use all airport and navigational facilities, within the territory of the other open to its own military aircraft.

ARTICLE EIGHTH
The military aircraft of each Government and the
military, naval, air forces and other official personnel, and official supplies, equipment and material carried on such aircraft, while within or over the territory of the other country, shall not be exempt from the laws in force in that territory, except as otherwise provided in this agreement.

ARTICLE NINTH

Each Government reserves the right, for considerations of military security or in the interest of public safety or for other sufficient reasons, to restrict or prohibit, over zones each Government may from time to time define, air traffic by military aircraft of the other Government. Each Government shall promptly communicate to the other information regarding such zones and regulations it may adopt in connection with them.

ARTICLE TENTH

No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost shall be charged by either party on material, equipment, supplies or goods brought into its territory for the use of the other party, under the present agreement, or for the official use but not for private and personal use of its armed forces or its civilian personnel on the territory by reason of employment under the present agreement.
ARTICLE ELEVENTH

No member of the armed forces of either party and no civilian personnel of either party resident on the territory of the other by reason of such employment under the present agreement shall be liable to pay income tax on income derived from the Government by which he is employed, unless he is a national of the country on whose territory he is serving.

ARTICLE TWELFTH

The present agreement shall become effective upon signature and shall run for ten years unless the two Government agree to the contrary. It shall thereafter remain in effect until twelve months after the day on which one of the Governments advises the other of its intention of terminating it.
EXHIBIT I

The airports and appurtenances constituting the strategic airports referred to in the foregoing agreement are as follows:

AMAPÁ LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport located approximately 6 miles from the village of Amapá (lat. 2°06'N, Long. 50°51'W).

BELEM LANDPLANE AND SEAPLANE BASE
The landplane and seaplane airport known as VAL DE COSTA FIELD located approximately 6 miles north of Belém (Lat. 1°23'S, Long. 48°28'W).

SÃO LUÍS LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as TIRIRICA FIELD, located approximately 5 miles southwest of São Luís (Lat. 2°35'S, Long. 44°13'W).

FORTALEZA LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as ADJACENT FIELD, located approximately 1 mile east of Fortaleza. (Lat. 2°44'S, Long. 38°40'W).

NATAL LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as PARNAMIRIM FIELD located approximately 9-1/2 miles southwest of the city of Natal (Lat. 5°53'S, Long. 36°14'W).

NATAL SEAPLANE BASE
The seaplane airport located approximately 1/2 mile
north of Natal on the Rio POTENGI (Lat. 5°46'S. Long. 35°12'W).

**RECIFE LANDPLANE BASE**
The landplane airport known as ISURA FIELD located approximately 9 miles southwest of Recife (Lat. 8°06'S. Long. 34°59'W).

**FERNANDO DE NORONHA LANDPLANE BASE**
The landplane airport located on the Island of FERNANDO DE NORONHA (Lat. 3°51'18"S. Long. 32°25'56"W).

**BAIA LANDPLANE BASE**
The landplane airport known as IPITANGA AIRFIELD located approximately 15 miles northeast of Sã Salvador (lat. 12°54'S. Long. 39°20'W).

**BAIA SEAPLANE BASE**
The seaplane airport known as ARATU SEAPLANE BASE located approximately 12 miles south of Sã Salvador on Itapagipe Bay (Lat. 12°34'S. Long 38°30'W).

**APPURTENANCES**
All appurtenances, located at or in the vicinity of each of the above named airports, which have been constructed or installed under the supervision of the United States Army or Navy or for their account and which the United States Army or Navy has heretofore used or is now using by arrangement with the Brazilian Government for purposes relating to the present conflict, including
without limiting the generality of the foregoing description all of the following: runways, taxiways, and parking, fueling and repair aprons; seaplane ramps; lighter-than-air landing and take-off mats and mooring out circles; hangars and nose hangars; airport lighting equipment; meteorological equipment; radio transmitting, radio receiving, radio range and direction finding buildings and equipment; operations, administration and office buildings; warehouses, depots and magazines; helium storage buildings, surface and underground petroleum storage tanks and fueling facilities; barracks, mess halls and recreation buildings for officers and enlisted personnel and for civilian personnel; refrigerator buildings; hospitals and infirmaries and all buildings used in connection with their operations; chapels, auditoriums, and motion picture theaters; and all related buildings, structures and installations constructed or installed in the manner and for the purposes above stated.

Also all facilities for the storing, transportation and delivery of petroleum which by arrangement with the Brazilian Government have been constructed or installed under the supervision of the United States Army or Navy by Standard Oil Company of Brazil for the purpose of supplying petroleum to the airports at Belém, São Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, Fernando de Noronha, Recife and Baía, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing description all of the following: surface
and underground petroleum storage tanks, whether located at said airports or at the seacoast or at other points; pipe lines for transporting petroleum from ship, railroad or other point to storage tanks and from storage tanks to the airports; docks, railroad sidings and loading platforms; drum filling, dumping, and cleaning houses; garages, shops and warehouses; water tanks, water pipe lines and other installations for fire protection; office and administrative buildings; service stations, testing laboratory, generator houses; and all related buildings, structures and installations constructed or installed in the manner and for the purpose above stated.
Rio de Janeiro, em 14 de Junho de 1944.

Excelentíssimo Senhor Jefferson Caffery,
Embaixador dos Estados Unidos da América.

Tenho a honra de confirmar o acordo a que chegaram os Governos do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos da América, cujo texto, constituído por sete páginas e um Anexo com quatro páginas, todas rubricadas, junto remeto a Vossa Excelência.

2. Com esta nota e a resposta correspondente de Vossa Excelência entrará em vigor o presente acordo, que permanecerá secreto até decisão em contrário de ambos os Governos.

Aproveito a oportunidade para reiterar os protestos da mais alta consideração com que me subscrevo

De Vossa Excelência

[Assinatura]

L.B.
CONSIDERANDO que os Estados Unidos da América e os Estados Unidos do Brasil na Oitava Conferência Internacional de Estados Americanos em Lima reafirmaram o seu propósito de defender os princípios de solidariedade continental e absoluta soberania contra qualquer atividade do exterior que possa ameaçá-los;

CONSIDERANDO que os Estados Unidos da América e os Estados Unidos do Brasil em cumprimento da Resolução XV da segunda reunião dos Ministros das Relações Exteriores das Repúblicas Americanas em Havana celebraram vários acordos julgados necessários para organizar a cooperação para a defesa continental e assistência mútua contra ameaças de agressão extra-continental;

CONSIDERANDO que, dentre os diversos acordos celebrados e medidas adotadas por meio de consulta mútua pelos Estados Unidos da América e os Estados Unidos do Brasil nenhum tem sido mais eficaz para o fortalecimento do continente contra agressão do exterior, e para o estreitamento das relações políticas e militares muito íntimas que sempre existiram entre os Estados Unidos da América e os Estados Unidos do Brasil, do que os entendimentos mútuos aéreo, militar e naval Brasil-Estados Unidos realizados em consequência do atual conflito;

CONSIDERANDO que a prudência e as responsabilidades, dentro do sistema de defesa própria e continental livremente assumido pelos Estados Unidos da América e pelos Estados Unidos do
do Brasil, exigem que os dois países adotem as necessárias medidas para promover a sua segurança mútua e defender seus territórios e áreas de interesse mútuo contra possíveis ameaças de agressão, após a terminação das hostilidades, e que os dois Governos se comprometem a reforçar a íntima cooperação política e militar já existente entre os dois países; e

CONSIDERANDO que, devido ao grande desenvolvimento já alcançado pela guerra aérea e os que se podem esperar no futuro, a mencionada política defensiva requer, como primeiro passo (sem prejuízo dos entendimentos da mesma natureza dos outros departamentos militares), do ponto de vista da proteção dos dois países e do continente, a manutenção contínua de aeroportos militares estratégicos para o uso conjunto dos dois governos sem que de maneira nenhuma isso implique na permanência de forças armadas dos Estados Unidos da América nas bases aéreas em apreço, que vão enumeradas no Anexo No.I a este documento; e

CONSIDERANDO que dos fatores de localização, poderio militar e recursos que determinam o valor militar de um aeroporto, o Brasil está em condições de suprir, entre outras coisas, certas localidades estratégicas, o pessoal adequado para fins de defesa, e certos outros recursos, e os Estados Unidos estão em condições de suprir, entre outras coisas, o material para o fator de poderio militar e muitos recursos que provavelmente não estarão disponíveis no Brasil durante alguns anos, e que portanto seria de mútua vantagem para os dois países o contribuírem com os elementos que cada um pode da melhor maneira suprir afim de que juntos possam manter bases para a sua mútua defesa; e

CONSIDERANDO que o Governo dos Estados Unidos do
do Brasil é o proprietário exclusivo dos aeroportos enumerados no Anexo No. I a este documento e, nos termos do Decreto n.° 3.462 de 25 de Julho de 1941, ficarão os mesmos sob seu exclusivo comando, bandeira, símbolos e ordenanças militares.

PORTANTO os Governos dos Estados Unidos da América e dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, firmemente resolvidos a tomarem todas as medidas no sentido de contribuir para a manutenção da paz mundial e para a defesa contra quaisquer agressões aos seus territórios e mais afastar o perigo do litoral do continente, acordam nos seguintes termos para a continuação da sua cooperação aéreo-militar no período de após-guerra.

ARTIGO PRIMEIRO

Os territórios compreendidos pelo presente acordo são:

(a) No caso dos Estados Unidos da América, os Estados Unidos continental, Porto Rico, e as Ilhas Virgens;
(b) No caso dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, o Brasil continental e a Ilha de Fernando Noronha.

ARTIGO SEGUNDO

Para os fins do presente acordo, "aeronaves militares" são definidas como aeronaves do Exército, Marinha ou Forças Aéreas de cada Governo e aeronaves civis empregadas em tráfego militar em virtude de contratos com as forças armadas de cada um dos Governos, porém em caso algum como transportes comuns.

ARTIGO TERCEIRO

(a) Os aeroportos e seus pertences descritos no Anexo I, e as facilidades necessárias para a sua operação (dora-
(doravante denominados "aeroportos estratégicos"), e quaisquer outros aeroportos localizados quer nos territórios descritos no Artigo Primeiro ou noutra local fora do continente que, por acórdão futuro entre os dois Governos, possam ser designados como aeroportos estratégicos, podem ser livremente utilizados pelas aeronaves e pessoal militares de ambos os Governos obedientes às leis dos respectivos países respeitado o presente acórdão. Os limites exatos desses aeroportos descritos no Anexo I, seus pertences e facilidades serão estabelecidos por uma Comissão Técnica de Conservação de Aeroportos, prevista no presente acórdão, com aprovação do Ministro da Aeronáutica.

(b) Os aparelhos e facilidades de rádio, meteorologia, comunicações, reparos, depósito e outros, construídos ou instalados em qualquer aeroporto estratégico, ou que possam futuramente ser nele construídos ou instalados, juntamente com as facilidades para a armazenagem de gasolina, aparelhagem e encanamentos atualmente ou no futuro construídos ou instalados nos aeroportos estratégicos ou suas proximidades para fins de sua operação, podem ser livremente utilizados pelas forças aéreas de cada país durante a vigência dêste acórdão. Os equipamentos e benfeitorias serão considerados como parte integrante dos referidos aeroportos estratégicos.

(c) Qualquer dos dois Governos poderá manter em cada aeroporto estratégico o pessoal que se tornar necessário ao abastecimento e manutenção do aeroporto e das suas aeronaves militares que possam de tempos a tempos estacionar em tal aeroporto ou dêle se utilizar.

ARTIGO QUARTO

Em vista do uso conjunto, para fins de defesa, dos aeroportos estratégicos e facilidades previstos no presente acórdão, os dois Governos concordam que cada um deverá participar da
da responsabilidade para a manutenção dos aeroportos estratégicos e facilidades. A fim de desempenhar a sua comum responsabilidade e providenciar para manutenção eficiente dos referidos aeroportos, embora os aeroportos continuem pertencentes ao Governo brasileiro e subordinados ao Ministério da Aeronáutica, fica estabelecida pelos dois Governos a constituição de uma Comissão Técnica de Conservação de Aeroportos, composta de igual número de representantes da Força Aérea Brasileira e das forças armadas dos Estados Unidos da América. A Comissão determinará o seu regimento.

ARTIGO QUINTO

Os dois Governos concordam que:

(a) A Comissão Técnica de Conservação de Aeroportos que funcionará no Ministério da Aeronáutica, poderá superintender a operação e manutenção, e prescreverá as regras para o uso, de cada aeroporto estratégico e as suas facilidades;

(b) A Comissão recomendará aos dois Governos uma fórmula para a distribuição equitativa, entre os dois Governos, das despesas de manutenção e operação dos aeroportos estratégicos;

(c) A Comissão proporá a aparelhagem e facilidades adicionais que convenham ser construídas ou instaladas em qualquer dos aeroportos estratégicos por qualquer dos dois Governos por sua conta própria, dependendo da aprovação dos Governos;

(d) A Comissão formulará planos para a expansão do treinamento já iniciado no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos para o preparo de técnicos brasileiros para a operação dos aeroportos e facilidades. O Governo dos Estados Unidos da América fará disponível as facilidades adequadas de que dispõe afim de fornecer esse treinamento.
treinamento.

ARTIGO SEXTO

A utilização dos aeroportos estratégicos e facilidades por aeronaves civis já permitida e no futuro pelo Governo brasileiro não será afetada pelo presente acordo, ficando, porém, as operações de tais aeronaves sujeitas às disposições do parágrafo (a) do Artigo Quinto.

ARTIGO SÉTIMO

Será permitido às aeronaves militares de cada Governo, de conformidade com as limitações do presente acordo, sobrevoar, descer e sair do território sob a jurisdição do outro Governo. Observadas as disposições do presente acordo e respeitadas as prescrições legais de cada país, as aeronaves militares de cada Governo terão ainda o direito de pousar e decolar de aeroportos e de utilizar todas as facilidades aeroportuárias e de navegação dentro do território do outro país à disposição de suas próprias aeronaves militares.

ARTIGO OITAVO

As aeronaves militares de cada Governo e as forças militares, navais e aéreas e demais pessoal oficial, e fornecimentos, equipamento e material oficiais transportados em tais aeronaves não ficarão isentos, enquanto dentro de ou sobre o território do outro país, das leis em vigor naquele território exceto por disposição em contrário no presente acordo.

ARTIGO NONO

Cada Governo reserva o direito, por considerações de segurança militar ou no interesse da segurança pública ou por outros motivos suficientes, de restringir ou proibir o trâfego de aeronaves militares do outro Governo sobre zonas que cada Governo possa a tem-
tempos a tempos definir. Cada Governo comunicará imediatamente ao outro as informações referentes a tais zonas e os regulamentos que possa adotar com respeito às mesmas.

**ARTIGO DÉCIMO**

Nenhuma taxa, direito ou imposto de importação, tributo, consumo ou outro será cobrado por qualquer das Partes sobre material, equipamento, fornecimentos ou mercadorias transportadas para o seu território para o uso da outra Parte, sob o presente acordo, ou para o uso oficial, mas não para o uso pessoal e particular, das suas forças armadas, ou pessoal civil no território por motivo de emprego sob o presente acordo.

**ARTIGO DÉCIMO-PRIMEIRO**

Nenhum membro das forças armadas de qualquer das Partes e nenhum pessoal civil de qualquer das Partes que reside no território de outra Parte por motivo de emprego sob o presente acordo ficará sujeito ao pagamento de imposto sobre a renda derivada do Governo pelo qual é empregado a não ser que seja nacional do país em cujo território esteja servindo.

**ARTIGO DÉCIMO-SEGUNDO**

O presente acordo entrará em vigor por ocasião da sua assinatura e continuará em efeito durante dez anos, salvo entendimento em contrário dos dois Governos. Depois desse prazo permanecerá em vigor até passados doze meses após a data em que um dos Governos notifique ao outro a sua intenção de dá-lo por terminado.
ANEXO I

Os aeroportos e pertences que constituem os aeroportos estratégicos a que se refere o Acórdão que a este precede são os seguintes:

BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM AMAPÁ

O aeroporto para aeroplanos sito aproximadamente a 6 milhas da vila de Amapá (Lat. 2°06'N. Long. 50°51'O).

BASE DE AEROPLANOS E HIDROAVIÕES EM BELEM

O aeroporto para aeroplanos e hidroaviões denominado CAMPO VAL DE CAES, sito aproximadamente a 6 milhas de Belém (Lat. 1° 23'S. Long. 48°28'O).

BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM SAO LUÍZ

O aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO TIRIMAGAL, sito aproximadamente a 5 milhas ao sudoeste de São Luiz (Lat. 2°35'S. Long. 44°13'O).

BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM FORTALEZA

O aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO ADJACENTO, sito aproximadamente a 1 milha ao leste de Fortaleza (Lat. 3°44'S. Long. 38°40'O).

BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM NATAL

O aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO PARNALTRIM, sito aproximadamente a 9 1/2 milhas ao sudoeste da cidade de Natal (Lat. 5°53'S. Long. 35°14'O).

BASE DE HIDROAVIÕES EM NATAL

O aeroporto para hidroaviões sito aproximadamente a 1/2 milha ao norte de Natal no Rio POTENGI. (Lat. 5°46'S. Long. 35°12'O).
BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM RECIFE

O aeroporto para aeronaves denominado CAIPI IBIURA sito aproximadamente a 9 milhas ao sudoeste de Recife (Lat. 8°6'S. Long. 34°59'0').

BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM FERNANDO DE NORONHA

O aeroporto para aeronaves sito na Ilha de FERNANDO DE NORONHA (Lat. 3°51'18"S. Long. 32°25'56"0').

BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM BÁIA

O aeroporto para aeronaves denominado CAIPO AÉREO DE IPITANGA, sito aproximadamente a 15 milhas ao nordeste de São Salvador (Lat. 12°54'S. Long. 39°20'0').

BASE DE HIDROAVIÕES EM BÁIA

O aeroporto para hidroaviões denominado BASE PARA HIDROAVIÕES ARATU, sito aproximadamente a 12 milhas ao sul de São Salvador na Baía de Itapagipe (Lat. 12°34'S. Long. 38°30'0').

PERTENCÊNCES

Todos os pertencentes situados em cada um dos aeroportos acima mencionados ou nas suas proximidades que foram construídos ou instalados sob a supervisão do Exército ou Marinha dos Estados Unidos, ou por sua conta, e que o Exército ou Marinha dos Estados Unidos têm utilizado até o presente ou está atualmente utilizando por entendimento com o Governo Brasileiro para fins que se relacionam ao atual conflito, inclusive, sem limitar à generalização da descrição acima, o seguinte: pistas, para rolagem e estacionamento, pontões de abastecimento e reparos; rampas de hidroaviões; pontões de aterrissagem e decolagem de dirigíveis e círculos para amarrar; hangares e barracas de reparos; aparelhagem para iluminação dos
dos aeroportos; aparelhagem de meteorologia; construções e equipamento de rádio transmissão, rádio recepção e rádio goniometria, edifícios de operações, administração e escritórios; armazens, depósitos e salões; edifícios para armazenagem de gás; tanques para a armazenagem de petróleo na superfície da terra ou subterrâneos e facilidades de abastecimento; quartéis, refetuários e edifícios de diversões para os oficiais e soldados e pessoal civil; edifícios de refrigeração; hospitais e enfermarias e todos os edifícios utilizados com respeito às suas operações; capelas, auditórios e cinemas; e todos os edifícios, construções ou instalações congêneres construídos ou instalados na maneira e para os fins acima expostos.

Outrossim, todas as facilidades para a armazenagem, transporte e entrega de petróleo que, por entendimento com o Governo brasileiro, têm sido construídas ou instaladas sob a supervisão do Exército ou Marinha dos Estados Unidos pela Standard Oil Company of Brazil para o fornecimento de petróleo aos aeroportos de Belém, São Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, Fernando de Noronha, Recife e Baía, inclusive, sem limitar a generalização da descrição acima, o seguinte: tanques de superfície ou subterrâneos para a armazenagem de petróleo, quer situados nos aeroportos em apreço ou no litoral ou em outros pontos; encanamentos para o transporte de petróleo de navios, estradas de ferro ou outro ponto para os tanques de armazenagem e dos tanques de armazenagem para os aeroportos; cais, desvios e plataformas de carga; barracões para o enchimento, esvasiamento e limpeza de tambores; aparelhagem para carregamento e esvasiamento; bombas e instalações de bombas, garages, oficinas e armazens; tanques para água, encanamentos para água e outras instalações para proteção contra fogo; edifícios de administração e escritórios; postos de serviço; laboratório de análises; usinas geradoras e todos os edifícios,
edifícios, construções e instalações congêneres construídos ou instalados na maneira e para os fins acima expostos.
Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of the 21st ultimo regarding the conclusion of the negotiations of the Military Aviation Agreement with Brazil, gave me a great deal of pleasure and I appreciate more than I can say your thoughtfulness in writing it.

I conveyed your "congratulations and warm good wishes" to President Vargas and Aranha, and I delivered to President Vargas the letter which accompanied the one you wrote me. He was delighted with it.

He called a meeting yesterday of his National Security Council, which comprises all of the Cabinet, all of the Chiefs of Staff and a few other notables - the first time the Council has been called together since Brazil's declaration of war - and read your letter to them. This was followed by a general discussion of Brazil's relations with the United States and it was unanimously agreed that your letter was to be regarded as a sort of Charter of those relations.

With many thanks and all good wishes,

Respectfully yours,

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2980, August 19, 2 p.m.

Aranha sent word to Vargas through "Benjamin" that he did not want the letter mentioned in the first paragraph of my telegram 2955, August 18, 3 p.m.

Aranha tells me this morning that he will wait until Monday for President Vargas to act. I asked him just exactly what he wants President Vargas to do. His reply showed that he does not have in mind any one particular definite step but what he wants is for the President to take some definite action against the Marcondes group.

I continue to tell Aranha that his resignation would prejudice his country's interests.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Brazilian Transport Crisis

You have been told informally about the crisis in Brazilian transport. It is now approaching the breakdown stage. We sent observers, including a competent man from O.D.T., who confirmed this conclusion: see more formal memorandum attached. Vargas has now sent a special representative here about it.

Bluntly, they need 7,000 trucks and 1,500 diesel motor buses, to be delivered before July 1. A thorough personal study demonstrates to me an absolute necessity to get this done. Nor have we time to repeat the six months' wearisome procedure which produced nothing. The Secretary sends the attached request for a directive from you. This will not cut into military supplies, though it may slow up the American domestic program.

I cannot promise that O.D.T. will not oppose. But this is not a situation we can fool with; Caffery and others say the stake might very well be the continuance in power of the Brazilian Government.

Enclosure: Memorandum.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Brazilian transportation situation, under the stress of war demands and aggravated by lack of materials for maintenance and replacement, has reached the stage where assistance to the required extent cannot be given under existing procedures. While the problem involves highway transport, railways, shipping, and fuel, this memorandum relates only to the most urgent phase, that of motor transport.

At the request of this Department, a highway transport engineer, selected by the Office of Defense Transportation, proceeded to Brazil and has prepared an objective report listing the minimum of new equipment necessary to avert a collapse. He has reported, in substance, that the situation is "ominous." This confirms what the Embassy has reported and what the Brazilian Government has been at pains to emphasize. President Vargas is deeply concerned and has discussed the matter at length with Ambassador Caffery. There is attached a schedule of proposed motor chassis equipment representing the lowest possible estimate of equipment required, not to maintain Brazilian economy but simply to stave off a breakdown. It should be noted that timing is no less important than quantity.

The materials requested are in critically short supply, but this must be weighed against the consequences of a major breakdown in Brazil which would have most serious repercussions not only in Brazil but throughout Latin America as well. I should like to have your authority (a) to take the necessary steps to assure receipt by Brazil of the materials set forth in the attachment within the indicated time limits, and (b) to prevent any interference with this schedule.

Enclosure:

Schedule. C. H.
BRAZIL

(Note: The chassis described below are to be furnished without tires, tubes, batteries, cabs, bodies or seat cushions. Provision should be made, however, for reasonable quantities of spare parts.)

I. 1500 standard type bus chassis, diesel-powered.

Delivery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By January 31, 1945</td>
<td>300 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; March 31</td>
<td>500 &quot; (additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; June 30</td>
<td>700 &quot; (additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1500 units</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. 7000 commercial truck chassis (medium), with standard gasoline engines (Chevrolet, Ford or International).

Delivery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By March 31, 1945</td>
<td>4000 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; June 30</td>
<td>3000 &quot; (additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7000 units</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. 6500 commercial truck chassis (medium), as in II above, for delivery during the third and fourth quarters of 1945.

IV. Spare parts, to the reasonable extent necessary to maintain existing equipment.

V. Increased allocation of fuel, as may be reasonably required for efficient operation of existing and additional equipment, to be determined under established procedures.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EARLY

I think you will want to take a look at the attached paraphrase of a cable from our Embassy in Rio summarizing an interview Aranha has given to the Time correspondent there. It is full of dynamite.

x2442
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: November 2, 1944
NUMBER: 3930

US URGENT

There follows the summary which was asked for in message from the Department dated November 21, No. 3313.

It is reported that Arenga has been very critical of the policy of Mr. Hull towards Argentina for the reason that he felt it was a mistake to apply policy of pin pricking and because it was alienating the friendship of the Argentine people. Arenga told the interviewer that this policy might drag Brazil into the war and he stated that we should make a big point of showing our liking for the Argentine people as contrasted with their Government, that we should deal kindly, and that we should make friends with Argentina.

He is reported to have made the claim that he could settle the whole thing in three days, if he were given the task.

Although he thought that Mr. Welles might have been correct in his views, he was critical of him for disloyalty to his Department. He was reported as being worried about the Germans going into Argentina after the war, but he did not appear to show much concern over the ideological aspects of the present regime in Argentina. His belief that

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauside Date FEB 4 1972
Argentina's 13,000,000 people were as powerful as the 45,000,000 in Brazil was expressed, also his envy for the richness of the country.

The United States was criticized by Aranha for continuing to send materials and machines to Argentina; he pointed out that the only material which Argentina lacked seriously was rubber, the one article which Brazil had agreed not to furnish her. When Brazil had agreed not to ship rubber to Argentina, the United States had bound itself to suspend its shipments to Argentina also, according to Aranha.

Aranha referred in the interview to a previous explanation made to Admiral Ingram when Admiral Ingram expressed regret at his resignation and states that the incident of the closing of the Society of Friends of America and events subsequent thereto were solely designed for the purpose of demoralizing him and that he was not going to be demoralized by anyone at all, Vargas included; the fact was that he could not work with the men now surrounding Vargas.

Aranha is reported to have made reference to practical considerations which made Vargas take on Fascist ways in 1938 which he himself (Aranha) always stood out for United States support because of ties that were traditional. Aranha ran the risk of being shot he was told, and he said that he realized that he would be shot in front if Germany won and in the back if it lost. This is what happened to Willkie and Welles, he said.
The National elections may be put off, Aranha claims, and the device of declaring war on Japan is an act which would run against the Brazilian tradition of not declaring war unless Brazil is attacked; here he made reference to a conversation with Marcenades Filho who indicated that it was his opinion that the war would not be over until Japan had been defeated.

Aranha in the interview is reported as being favorable toward Roosevelt for President of the world, but that he would not vote for him for a fourth term because he believes that other trees in a forest cannot grow when there is one big tree in the forest. This is obviously aimed at Vargas, the reporter continues, and I made the suggestion that the United States was not the best example of this effect; he emphatically agreed with me.

DONELLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS:

Who have you got in mind for Ambassador to Brazil? I have no candidates.

In considering the matter, think of Bob Scotten, now Ambassador to Ecuador. He was Chargé in Brazil at one time.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You will remember that I told you Ed Flynn telephoned to remind you that he spoke to you about Bob Scotten, who is in Ecuador. He was Charge in Brazil at one time. He thought it would be a good thing if you could appoint him in Caffery's place there.

G.G.T.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

Subject: Conditions in Brazil

I return herewith the enclosures on labor conditions in Brazil which were forwarded to me on December 5 to read and return.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date: FEB 4 1972
It is extremely gratifying to see the strong stand of Senator Kilgore on the Rye Conference. I had heard down at Allied Labor News of the make-up of the Conference and the arrival of Alex Grandro Shaw. It was slightly hair raising. One correspondent who sat through it told me that without turning your head you could see Nazis to right and left. the fight against cartels is an important one and PM is doing a good job in educating people on it. There is still one extremely important point that is at the heart of it all. How to get the British over their determination to go on with the old system. I think the point I made in my last letter becomes clearer and clearer.

Arthur Horner who is a powerful union man in Britain as head of the mine workers says that unless drastic steps are taken 10 or 15 million Britons must emigrate with the closing down of their plants. Britain will not joyfully commit suicide. It is right that a forward looking world should deprive her of her Empire in the old sense but some sort of trade agreements must be made which reassure her that she won't be swamped in "Free Competition". Without British agreement, Teheran falls apart and with it everything else. To get British agreement on everything including air routes now being discussed an attitude much less obtuse than Mr. Berle's must be sought. Mr. Berle does not mind scrapping Teheran. He has made that quite clear for a long time. Mr. Sumner Welles was all wrong on the Argentine and I sincerely hope the "Liberal" suggestion of making him successor to Mr. Hull never comes to pass but in order to prevent the British from having the same attitude on the Argentine, etc., there must be a Trade Conference in the nature of Mr. Kilgore's suggestion. The only way to stymie behind the scenes agreements between the worst of our own, British and German industrialists is to put Britain in a position where Churchill is free to act in a progressive manner. Not a simple affair but the most pressing. Right now in Brazil, for instance, interesting Economic developments have come to the surface lately which show the hand of the British there as also "Anti Yankee". This will continue unless there is an economic reason for stopping it. No moral, high sounding phrases make any difference. The News out of Montevideo is that because Brazil is balancing her budget and measuring the National Debt, Walter Sarmiento - who returned there from here, published a statement that the $15 billion debt could not be set with an inflationary situation which he criticized. He sharply criticized the Finance Minister for inflation. Their imports being greater than exports, etc., they either have to borrow abroad again, restrict import or raise internal loan. He was for the last. The Finance Minister complained to Vargas. Sarmiento emphasized the dependence of Brazil on U.S.
rather than France and Britain. Sweden leans toward us but there is increasing evidence that Vargas and his Finance Minister lean toward Britain.

It is being emphasized that we have no ambassador there and that theirs has not returned to us.

The British Ambassador has just made an ostentatious visit to San Paulo leading Industrial State, was received with banquets and official celebrations. Also Canada's representative Jean Desy went in the same way to Rio Grande (?) on an official visit.

Why, says the correspondent from Brazil, this diplomatic tourism unless it has an economic meaning. He also points to the agreement between Vargas and the British raising exchange value from 65 to 80 on the Pound Sterling and at the same time Brazilian credit is being frozen in England.

This, I believe, may be compared to the Rumanian-Roca agreement in Argentina in 1932. It is quite significant. There are comments made constantly, verbal and written, down there to the effect that the conservation of Britain and (?) is closer to Brazil. That neither have had an election in seven years, etc.

On the good side there was great popular rejoicing over our election for the same reason. I saw the text of a touching message sent the President by the popular movements and probably never seen by him. They rejoiced in the Democratic victory.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Copy of ltr of 11/27/44 to Mrs.
Roosevelt from Josephine T. Adams,
441 W. 21st St., N.Y.; original re-
tained in file.
FOR THE PRESIDENT.
Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

November 27, 1944.

441 West 21st Street
New York City, N. Y.
Sincerely yours,

/sgd/ Josephine Truslow Adams.
Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

It is extremely gratifying to see the strong stand of Senator Fiteg on the Kys Conference. I had heard from the Allied Labor News of the make-up of the Conference and the arrival of Alejandro Shaw. It was played by twin annoyances. One correspondent who sat through it told me that without turning your head you could see Nazis to night and left. The fight against Cartels is an important one and C.I.O. is doing a good job in educating people on it. There is still one extremely important point that is at the heart of it all. How to get the British over their determination to go on with the old system. I think the point I made in my last letter becomes clearer and clearer.

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forward-looking world should defend itself of
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in "free competition." Without British agreement
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To get British agreement on every thing including
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Conference in the nature of Mr. Kilgore's
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Conservatism of Britain and Churchill is
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On the good side there was great popular
rejoicing over our election for the same reason.
I saw the text of a touching message sent the
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the Democratic victory.

Sincerely yours
Josephine Amelia Adams.
Anglo-American Problems
by EARL BROWDER

WHILE most American newspapers are discussing international affairs on the assumption that problems to be settled between our country and the Soviet Union are in the spotlight, they are merely hiding from the public the really acute inter-Allied differences which are between Britain and the United States.

Illustrative of the nature of the Anglo-American differences, is the problem of Argentina. The hard fact is that the British have assumed protection of the semi-fascist military dictatorship there, and are preventing the effective application of American policy for restoration of democratic government in that country. As Nazi influence evaporates the British take over again the hegemony of these same circles which played the Hitler game, and use them for their own purposes. This tendency is witnessed not only in Argentina and other South American countries but also in Europe. Along with this, British imperialist control in Asia and Africa tends to harden and become more uncompromising as victory in the war in Europe approaches. Innumerable points of friction between Britain and America are flaring up and threatening to crystallize into major conflicts of policy.

ON THE surface it appears that America has an invulnerable moral position on most particular questions involved in this developing conflict, while Britain appears as the power obstructing forward-looking solutions. But the matter is not so simple. In the last analysis it is the United States which must give the only answer that solves these problems, and this answer has been consistently refused so far. It is the answer to Britain's question as to what will happen to her industries in the postwar world.

Up to this moment America has answered Britain to the effect that she must take her chances in unlimited free competition in all markets with America's mass production industries. For Britain this answer is a sentence of death to her industrial position in the world. And British industrialists, backed by their government and most of the people, are not going to accept a death sentence. They are preparing to fight for a position in the world market, and as they are at a distinct disadvantage in fighting economically in free competition with America, they are therefore seizing every political instrument at hand with which to conduct the struggle. They are preparing to tighten, rather than relax, the ties of the Empire over the world in relation to trade monopolies. They are entering into collaboration with those groups which, as in Latin America, are operating on the basis of fighting "Yankee imperialism," regardless of their past ties with the Nazis. For the same reasons they cling to Franco in Spain. All of this is part of a desperate determination at all costs to maintain a position in the postwar world markets against the threat of destructive American competition.

SO LONG as America continues to refuse the slightest guarantee of security to the British postwar market position, so long all American criticism of British policy will fail to modify it favorably, but will, on the contrary, drive the British to more stubborn old-style imperialist reaction.

It is time for this problem to be more widely and intelligently discussed in America. It is time that the question be faced practically, without the fog of moral flub-dub with which it is surrounded at present. If we want the British government and people to take a forward-looking and progressive stand, America must show them how that is possible without closing down their industries and sending 10 or 15 million British workers into emigration to other lands.

That is the kernel of Anglo-American problems, and until the U.S. faces the question frankly and gives an answer the British can accept, our mutual relations will continue to go from bad to worse. And that will threaten the breakdown of all plans for a durable peace and postwar prosperity.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Brazilian Political Conditions

The enclosed telegram from our Embassy in Rio de Janeiro describes the rather uneasy political situation in Brazil at this time.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 4522 from Rio de Janeiro, December 23, 1944.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (CONFIDENTIAL) Rec'd 1:39 a.m., 24th

Rio de Janeiro

Dated December 23, 1944

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4522, December 23, 5 p.m.

Mello Franco has been recently in Sao Paulo and while there the police (my 4504, December 22, 4 p.m.) allege he contacted individuals known to be conspiring against the government. The government charges that the other 4 persons arrested are involved in the distribution of anti-Vargas propaganda and "stirring up a war of nerves against the administration." There have been no other arrest of prominent citizens.

Great pressure is being brought to bear on the government for the release of Mello Franco and the others and it is believed that they will not be detained for any length of time. The government claims that it has been long suffering in this matter and now apparently desires to impress upon its enemies that it is aware of their activities and that it is prepared to take "tough" measures. Outwardly complete calm reigns here and the government insists that plans for the impending elections are being completed.
2-4522, December 23, 5 p.m., from Rio de Janeiro

are being completed. Marcondes, the Minister of Justice, left this morning for his home in Sao Paulo and will return to Rio on January 2. A reliable source reports that he is preparing the electoral code and amendments to the constitution and both will be promulgated by decree law early next month.

Aranha and his racing partner Feizoto de Castro purchased a Rio de Janeiro newspaper "A VANGUARDA" yesterday. It is believed that Aranha does not intend to support the government on the other hand Flores da Cunha, a leading anti-Vargas gaucho politician who was until recently close to Aranha, has made his place with Vargas.

The "political pot" is beginning to boil and surprises and alignments pro and against Vargas are taking place. In all this the Army is calm but not detached. For example the assistant chief of the general staff said yesterday "the army is very political minded and greatly interested in the elections. If Vargas holds the elections now he will be elected; if he waits until the war is over he may be defeated." Incidentally the President is signing tomorrow one of the longest army promotion lists in several years.

DONELLY

MJF