November 22, 1941

My dear Mr. Bullitt:

Reposing special faith and confidence in you, I am asking you to proceed at your earliest convenience to the Near Eastern area, there to act as my personal representative with the rank of Ambassador.

I desire you to proceed by way of Africa and to use your own judgment with regard to the length of your stay and the points you visit. I further desire that you proceed from that area to India, Burma, the Straits Settlements, and the Dutch East Indies, returning to the United States by way of the Pacific.

If you should have urgent information to communicate to me en route I wish you to use the Naval Radio for this purpose.

If, after making a study of the situation in the Near East, you should consider it advisable to return to Washington by way of the Atlantic, rather than the Pacific, you should act in accordance with your own best judgment.

I desire you to make all your reports and recommendations personally to me.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
William C. Bullitt,
Washington.
JANUARY 3, 1942.
CR 8829

SECRET

FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR BULLITT

IN REPLY TO YOUR CR 8824 OF JANUARY SECOND, FOR THE PRESENT
AND UNTIL YOU HEAR FURTHER FROM ME I BELIEVE IT IS ADVISABLE
THAT YOU REMAIN IN CAIRO AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

(SIGNED) ROOSEVELT

ORIG: PIA.......
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

For your confidential information and return to me. If you want to put any of this information on paper, paraphrase it and do not give the source.

F. D. R.

Two letters from Bill Bullitt, dated December 20 and 27, 1941, reporting on his trip, with several enclosures.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1942

Dear Miss Tully:

I enclose a confidential memorandum about the Pennsylvania situation which I think the President should see in the next day or two.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Pennsylvania Politics

I think you should see David Stern, of the Philadelphia Record, as soon as possible; and then probably talk to some of the Pennsylvania leaders together - David Lawrence and Meredith Meyers, John Kane from Pittsburgh, and Jim Clark (who took Jack Kelly's place) of Philadelphia.

We are headed, in my opinion, for certain defeat unless complete unity is worked out before the primaries. All of the candidates must retire except the one agreed on. I believe that the only man with a chance for success is Billy Bullitt. I do not think he wants it much, but with your support and harmony he would have a fair chance. I have talked to the labor people and believe that labor, at least in the Eastern end of the State, are for him. The Archbishop has intimated that he will oppose Bill as he has been twice divorced, and has written a dirty book.

I am of the opinion that Joe Guffey would rather take a
chance of defeat than have Bullitt elected. Joe should be
"persuaded"; or, if he does not go along, disregarded. I suggest,
however, that the first thing is to see Stern, which should be
done within the next three days. This should be arranged so
that reporters will not see him.

Respectfully,

Francis Biddle
Dear Mr. President:

I am in a quandary! You will recall that when we talked two weeks ago you agreed that for me to run in the primary fight for Governor of Pennsylvania was absolutely out of the question and you said that you would get hold of Stimson and have me put on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee and also the American Section of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As I said to you, I would a thousand times rather do that job than be Governor of Pennsylvania. I feel that I can be infinitely more useful in such a position than in the governorship.

Mao tells me this morning that "Bill need not let any of your plans interfere if he decides to make the race for Governor."

He told me further that if I got into it and should lose this Fall not to worry because there would be recurring need for my services.

Inasmuch as the decision in this matter will have to be made today as the nomination papers will have to be filed on Saturday morning, I would like to know what you really want. My own desire, I repeat, is to stay on direct war work.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

WILLIAM C. BULLITT
June 17, 1942.

Later

Dear Bill:

This moment has come something where you can be of real service. Cordell Hull tells me that it seems advisable for many reasons to bring Johnson home from Australia. As you know, he was very successful in China as Ambassador, but I would rather have a little more active fighting type of person in Australia today. I realize this is not an Embassy, but it is far more important in wartime than almost any Embassy in peacetime. I spoke to Cordell about your going and he is really enthusiastic at the idea, and I hope, and he hopes, that you will agree to do it.

If you do accede, I would want to give you a certain amount of background in regard to Curtin, Evatt and General MacArthur and I feel very sure that you would do a difficult job extremely well. Let me know what you think.

Always sincerely,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
3030 Cambridge Place, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Just to keep the record straight.

I am informed reliably that you have been misinformed with regard to the following incident:

About March 20, the Archduke Otto called on me in Florida and stated that he had an opportunity to establish a channel of military and political information of the utmost importance through a distinguished personage, whom you know, in Hungary. He said that he had requested an interview with you to discuss this matter but had not been able to arrange a definite appointment. He asked me for advice as to how to proceed.

I told him that it was my understanding that Colonel Donovan was in charge of this sort of thing and that I believed that he should take the matter up with Colonel Donovan before making any attempt to discuss it with you.

The Archduke Otto asked if I could arrange for him to see Colonel Donovan and I arranged a meeting at my residence in Washington on March 25.

The Archduke then explained the details of his project to Colonel Donovan, and the Colonel said that he would send a memorandum to you dealing with the subject. I heard no more about the matter until the Archduke Otto telephoned to me saying that he had received no reply, and that he was unable to get in touch with Colonel Donovan because of the Colonel's automobile accident. I telephoned Colonel Donovan who stated to me that the proposal made in his memorandum had been disapproved because of objections made by the Department of State.

The Archduke Otto called on me at 10 A.M., April 11, and I told him that his project had been disapproved. He asked me if I thought there was any other channel by which he could approach you with regard to the matter. I said that Colonel Donovan was in official charge of such matters and since his reply was in the negative I considered it useless for him to try to carry the matter any further. My entire activity in this affair consisted of arranging the meeting between Archduke Otto and Colonel Donovan.

I think we have passed up an opportunity to plant a spy who might be of the utmost value.

Washington, D.C.

April 24, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:

As I said to you the last time I saw you, I believe that only harm to our cause can come from my flying now to the Near East to tell General Auchinleck and his colleagues that they will get no American air units and that shipping to the Near East will be cut down drastically. If, as you suggested, I should go and refuse to discuss war and supply questions with them, the impression produced by my visit would be even worse.

I have completed the work arising from my recent mission to West Africa, Egypt, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Iran; and I can not in honor remain on the Government payroll with nothing to do. I submit to you, therefore, my resignation as your Personal Representative with the rank of Ambassador to all Countries.

To do nothing to help defeat the enemies of our country is intolerable to me and I am, therefore, seeking another field of service.

Good luck.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
BILL BULLITT

Ever so many thanks for yours about Andre Philip and the Herriot problem. I hope something like that will work.

F. D. R.
October 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN FOR

MY FILES.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith, in accordance with your request, the document transmitted with your memorandum of October 31.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
From William C. Bullitt,
October 15, 1942

The President,

The White House.
October 15, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Since you are handling certain matters personally, I think you should know the following:

Andre Philip, a French Socialist Deputy, who was intensely opposed to the Armistice and is now one of General de Gaulle's leading supporters, has arrived in this country. Yesterday I listened while Philip answered the questions of another Frenchman.

Philip stated that he had spent the night secretly with Herriot early in August, having visited Herriot for the purpose of inviting him to leave France and join the de Gaulle movement.

Herriot, Philip asserted, stated to him that he would be glad to leave France and join de Gaulle, as soon as he should have published his letter of protest dated August 31, 1942.

Philip said that, recently, after the publication of Herriot's letter, Herriot had sent him word that since their talk in August he had received 19 invitations to leave France, two from persons alleging that they were representatives of the American Government, several from persons alleging that they were representatives of General de Gaulle, several from persons alleging

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,
alleging that they were representatives of the British Government, the Czech Government, etc., etc. Herriot had added that he felt certain that some of these men must be stool-pigeons either of the Vichy Government or the German Gestapo. He had, therefore, refused to budge and was awaiting a word from someone in whom he had confidence and knew to be the representative of some genuine governmental authority.

Philip stated that he was absolutely sure that Herriot still could be got out of France. He said that Herriot's present guards merely went to sleep in Herriot's barn at night. He added that General de Gaulle was most anxious to have Herriot out, since Herriot had stated to him (Philip), "I am at General de Gaulle's orders".

Philip praised the military abilities of General Giraud and said that he had controlling influence in the existing French Army; but insisted that Giraud was politically nothing more or less than ACTION FRANCAISE.

In accordance with your instructions, I have not discussed the matter of which we spoke on Friday last, October 9th, with anyone. I am, therefore, entirely without information as to the contacts that you may have established with Herriot.

Nevertheless, for what it may be worth, I should like to give you my opinion on the desirability of getting Herriot out of France immediately. To control the French Generals and other leaders, you will need intensely a French political figure of world reputation on our side in North Africa. Herriot, as you know, is my oldest political friend in France and my judgment with regard to his availability may be warped by this fact; but I can not honestly
honestly think of anyone so good in the present circumstances. He would be more acceptable than any other political leader to General de Gaulle, and probably not unacceptable to General Giraud.

Jeanneny might serve if Herriot should be unobtainable. Jeanneny was, as you know, President of the French Senate until the Republic was abolished. He is an old man but still full of spirit and character, - an old war horse of French democracy. In default of Herriot, he might do. If you desire me to do anything about Herriot or about Jeanneny, please let me know, as I shall not mention the matter to anyone unless I hear from you.

When last we talked, you asked me to prepare a draft of a more or less formal proclamation, and a draft of an informal statement. Both documents must be prepared at the last moment, on the basis of the latest information. For example, if Herriot should be here in America or in London, or on board ship, your statements would be couched in different terms than if you should have no one of stature as a French leader.

In any event, however, I think you ought to put somewhere in your Proclamation the following thoughts:

American forces have landed in North Africa. They are an Army not of Occupation, but of Liberation. Their task is to help the French to free all French territory from Nazi domination. Every inch of ground they take will be restored to France.

They will be reinforced in every possible way until all Axis forces shall have been driven from Africa. A service of supply for them and for their French allies, both military and civilian, has been organized on a scale which will relieve the distress and increase the welfare of the populations of North Africa.

Frenchmen
Frenchmen! The young Americans who have crossed the Atlantic to help you drive out your enemies are the sons of the Americans who fought for the freedom of France in 1917 and 1918. Like their fathers, and like yourselves, they believe in liberty, democracy and peace. Like all Americans, they wish to see France once more free and strong.

They know that although the body of France is in chains the soul of France has never surrendered to the Nazis. They know that their place is beside you and your place is beside them in war and in peace.

Together with the youth of all the United Nations, you have the world to remake. The order of the day is the text of the MARSEILLAISE:

"ALLONS, ENFANTS DE LA PATRIE!"

Whenever you get ready to do something final on this, remember that literal translations are no good. I'll be glad, if you want, to put whatever you want into French that rings.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

P. S. A simultaneous message to French Veterans from Pershing might be useful.

J. P. B.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

I think this is so important, from former Ambassador Bullitt, that you should talk with him and get the information to Eisenhower and Bob Murphy.

Please let me have this original back for my secret files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Read to King & Marshall
27 November information
sent to Eisenhower & Murphy
by cable

WASH
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Flandin

The last time I saw you, I said I thought our people in North Africa should avoid Flandin like the plague. I think I should have put my statement in more specific form, since Daladier had absolute proof that Flandin had received money from Hitler for acting as a German agent.

If my memory is correct, the facts are as follows: Early in 1940, sometime before the German attack on Belgium and France, the French received word from a secret service agent that Flandin, who was supposedly taking a holiday on the Riviera, had crossed into Italy secretly and spent two days.

An investigation by Daladier's most trusted agent proved that Flandin had crossed the Italian frontier by automobile by an obscure mountain road and had gone to a small town in Italy where he had met one agent of the Italian Government and two agents of the German Government. He had spent the night there, and actually had talked by telephone with Hitler himself.

Daladier had a most careful investigation made, and discovered that Flandin had received payments from the German Government through a bank in The Netherlands. Daladier was in favor of having Flandin shot as an enemy agent; but President Lebrun was horrified at the idea of shooting a former Prime Minister and thought that the effect on French public opinion would be disastrous, since it would shake confidence in all men at the top in public life.
Action was therefore postponed, and the German attack on France ended the matter.

I do not say that Flandin is now a German agent, but the Germans and Italians are in a position to blackmail him into doing anything, and he may be in North Africa as a direct agent of the German Government. Since Flandin speaks perfect English and has the manners of an English gentleman, he may be able to inspire a certain amount of confidence in some of our people or the British in North Africa. Murphy knows nothing about this episode in Flandin's career.

I think that Flandin either should be expelled from North Africa or watched day and night.

If you want further details on this matter, I can get them.

[Signature: Bill]

William C. Bullitt.

November 25, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

I think this is so important, from former Ambassador Bullitt, that you should talk with him and get the information to Eisenhower and Bob Murphy.

Please let me have this original back for my secret files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure
Secret memo for the President from Ambassador Bullitt 11/25/42 re Flandin (2447 Kalorama Road, N. W., Washington, D. C.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
January 29, 1945

Dear Mr. President:

The appended will take thirty minutes of your time.

It is as serious a document as any I have ever sent you. I hope you will read it.

I warn you its conclusion is that you ought to talk with Stalin as soon as possible.

Good luck,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:

I submit installment number three of my answer to your order of November 19, 1942.

It is based on two assumptions: 1. That we shall continue to fight until Germany, Italy and Japan are utterly defeated and physically occupied by our troops and those of the other United Nations; 2. That our aim is to establish a world of liberty, democracy and peace.

In your letter of November 19, 1942, you said that, in preparing for civil administrations in occupied territories in Europe, "there can be no general rule because every one brings in different problems."

Nevertheless, it is possible, I think, to lay down two general policies that are sound:

1. to refuse to recognize as a de jure government any de facto regime set up by us in any occupied or liberated country until the people of such country shall have had a chance to express their will.

   (This policy is sound in democratic principle because we give a people the right to choose its own government. It is sound in expediency because any de facto regime will try to please us in the hope of obtaining our support in the struggle to become the recognized de jure government.)

2. to choose to head de facto administrations in countries which we liberate or occupy, men who will (a) give us immediately maximum possible military assistance; (b) favor the major policies of the United States.
(The de facto administration will influence greatly the nature and composition of the final de jure government, since the de facto administration will be more favorably placed than any other party or faction in appealing for popular support at an election or referendum. After the war, we shall need in Europe de jure governments that will share our views on world affairs. Hence we must try to create de facto administrations that hold our point of view.)

In what countries in Europe may we reasonably hope to set up de facto administrations, followed by de jure governments, that will work for a world of liberty, democracy and peace?

The answer to this question lies largely in Stalin's hands. He may set up Soviet governments in many of the countries in which we now expect to set up democratic governments.

We have little first-hand, detailed information about Stalin's views and aims. We have only statements by Molotov and Lozovsky, and the impressions of travellers, like Willkie. Many people, including President Hoover, have said lately that Stalin has changed his political philosophy. He is said to share your views expressed in the Atlantic Charter, and to favor the Four Freedoms. It is stated that he has abandoned all idea of world communism and is ready to dissolve the Comintern. He is said to want no annexations but to be interested only in security. He is reported to be determined to have the Soviet Union evolve in the direction of liberty and democracy, freedom of speech and freedom of religion.

We ought to pray God that this is so; for if it is so, the road to a world of liberty, democracy and peace will be relatively easy - and if it is not so, the road will be up-hill all the way.

If Stalin is for our war aims, no power on earth will be able to prevent the establishment of a good peace.

- 2 -
It is, therefore, in our national interest, to attempt to draw Stalin into cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, for the establishment of an Atlantic Charter peace. We ought to try to accomplish this feat, however improbable success may seem.

It may be that Stalin, having "liquidated" the old communists to whom Communism was a religion, having been shocked by the consequences of his own collaboration with Hitler, having probed (as we can not) the depth of the wound inflicted on the Soviet Union by Hitler's armies, having remembered that the Tsar's armies, after two years of war, drove back the Austrians and the Germans 350 miles and then collapsed - it may be that Stalin, chastened, has changed.

The persons who hold this to be true say that we can obtain Stalin's full and frank cooperation, if only we will overcome his distrust of the United States and Great Britain by increasing our war aid to the Soviet Union, establishing a second front in western Europe, and promising help to rebuild the devastated areas of the Soviet Union after the war. They say that Stalin will trust us and work with us hand-in-hand, if we trust him and give him these things.

This view of Stalin is not only the view of several recent travellers in the Soviet Union but also the view being propagated by the Comintern. It is the communist party line in Great Britain, the United States and all other countries where there are communist parties. It is the line of the fellow travellers and many "liberals". Since Stalin personally sets the party line, it is what Stalin wants us to believe about him. Is it what he is? Or only what he wants us to think he is?

The most careful search for factual evidence to support the thesis that Stalin is a changed man reveals none. And since the thesis implies a conversion of Stalin as striking as the conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus, we have to keep our fingers crossed, and approach the question of Stalin's intentions with the same admirable realism with which Stalin approaches all questions affecting the Soviet Union.
We have to remember that what we are now asked to believe is just what we were asked to believe when the United Front policy was adopted by the Comintern Congress of 1935 - and that it was stated frankly in the proceedings of that Congress, (which records we have,) that this was merely a method of hood-winking the world outside the Soviet Union. We have also to remember that all the things we are asked to give and do in order to make Stalin lose "distrust of us" will be of the greatest concrete benefit to the Soviet Union whether Stalin is for us or against us. We have to look for evidence of conversion.

We find no evidence; but we find in all democratic countries an intense wish to believe that Stalin has changed, - a wish we share. Therefore, we have to suspect that this view is a product of the fatal vice in foreign affairs - the vice of wishful thinking.

In point of fact, the extraordinary valor with which the peoples of the Soviet Union have fought against the Nazis has rendered the Russians so popular in both the United States and Great Britain that all possible virtues are being attributed to the Soviet Government, and both basic Russian Nationalist policy and Soviet Communist policy are being overlooked in a warm sentimental wave of enthusiasm. Wishful thinking has produced the following logic: Because the Red Army has fought magnificently, the Soviet Union is a democratic state which desires no annexations and is devoted to the Four Freedoms: Because Stalingrad has been defended with superb heroism, there is no O.G.P.U.

The reality is that the Soviet Union, up to the present time, has been a totalitarian dictatorship in which there has been no freedom of speech, no freedom of the press, and a travesty of freedom of religion; in which there has been universal fear of the O.G.P.U. and Freedom from Want has been subordinated always to the policy of guns instead of butter.

Again and again our diplomatic representatives in Moscow have been assured by the Soviet Government that the absolute monopoly of foreign trade will not be abandoned because its abandonment would mean the collapse of the whole Soviet system of State-directed economy. We know, therefore,
that areas annexed by the Soviet Union, will be withdrawn, as heretofore, from the area of normal trade between nations, which it is our policy to extend.

Stalin has subordinated "world revolution" to the interests of the Soviet State; but he still maintains in each country in the world, either openly or secretly, a fifth column of Soviet agents - in the form of public or underground Communist Parties. Stalin directs their activities in the interests of the Soviet State, using them for espionage, propaganda, character assassination of opponents, and political influence through fellow travellers or dupes.

Stalin places first the welfare of the Soviet State, and treats softly, therefore, in extending communism to other countries; but there is no evidence that he has abandoned either the policy of extending communism or the policy of controlling all foreign communist parties. Under Lenin the primary task of each national communist party was to foment world revolution. Under Stalin the primary task of each national communist party is to serve as fifth column for the Soviet State. World revolution is a secondary objective.

Stalin lets no ideological motives influence his actions. He is highly intelligent. He weighs with suspicious realism all factors involved in advancing the interests or boundaries of the Soviet Union. He moves where opposition is weak. He stops where opposition is strong. He puts out pseudopodia like an amoeba rather than leaping like a tiger. If the pseudopodia meet no obstacle, the Soviet Union flows on.

Even if Stalin has not changed, - as we pray he has, - if we can play on this characteristic behaviour pattern of his with sufficient skill and force, we may be able to set up throughout Europe the sort of democratic administrations we want. We have to demonstrate to Stalin - and mean it - that while we genuinely want to cooperate with the Soviet Union, we will not permit our war to prevent Nazi domination of Europe to be turned into a war to establish Soviet domination of Europe. We have to back democracy in Europe to the limit, and prove to Stalin that, while we have intense
admiration for the Russian people and will collaborate fully with a pacific Soviet State, we will resist a predatory Soviet State just as fiercely as we are now resisting a predatory Nazi State.

The wishful thinkers just now are fond of arguing that "Stalin has become a Russian nationalist, interested only in security for his country, therefore, the Soviet Union will become pacific". They forget conveniently that the Russian nationalist State was never pacific. Tsarist Russia was, and the Soviet Union today is, an agglomeration of conquered peoples. Since the time of Peter the Great, the Russians have extended their rule ruthlessly over one people after another. Primary school books in the Soviet Union are issued in 156 different languages and dialects.

The Russians are an immensely endowed people, physically strong, intellectually gifted, emotionally rich. The Ukrainians are even more gifted than the Russians. They were overcome by the Russians by force of numbers. The Russians win their battles both in the field and in bed. No race on earth, not even the German, has shown such burgeoning energy as the Russian during the past hundred years. They have conquered one sixth of the earth's surface. They are still bursting with expansive energy.

Even their unsuccessful wars point the moral. They fought the Crimean war to get Constantinople, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. They fought the Russo-Japanese war to get Manchuria and Korea. The world war of 1914 grew out of the clash of Russian and German power politics in the Western Balkans. And the Tsar wanted Narvik!

Even if Stalin had become a mere Russian nationalist, - which he has not, - that would be no guarantee of pacific behaviour; indeed, it would be a guarantee of aggressive imperialism.

What are Stalin's present aims? He has avowed, through Molotov, Lozovsky and others, the following:

1. To annex Bessarabia. (We can not object to this.)
2. To annex Bukowina and the heights of the Carpathians.
   (This would give the Soviet Union easy military access to the Hungarian plain and to southern Poland.)
3. To annex an undefined area in Eastern Poland. (This in spite of the fact that the attempt of the Red Army to stand on the line of the Bug against the Nazi Army brought disaster.)

4. To annex Lithuania. (And thus extinguish the liberty of a brave and fine Catholic people.)

5. To annex Latvia. (And destroy a heroic small people of Western civilisation.)

6. To annex Estonia. ( " " " )

7. To reoccupy the areas seized from Finland after the Soviet Union's aggression in 1939. To acquire Petsamo. To demilitarize Finnish Karelia: thus making it possible for the Soviet Union to invade Finland with ease at any time. (Lozovsky has gone as far as to state to members of our Embassy that the Soviet Union will annex all Finland.)

These are Stalin's minimum aims in Europe: the aims he considers respectable enough to avow: the aims for which he will struggle fiercely.

The ground is being prepared by familiar Soviet tactics for the achievement of further aims, if and when the right moment comes:

A. **Rumania** - Soviet officials have not bothered to conceal their intention to use the defeat of Rumania and the suffering of the Rumanians to install a Soviet Government in Rumania. Litvinov, for example, has always been fond of saying that it was silly to bother about Bessarabia, since there was no point in taking two bites to the cherry, and the whole of Rumania was certain to enter the Soviet Union someday as a Soviet Republic.

B. **Bulgaria** - Great popular enthusiasm for Russia, plus defeat, is counted on to pave the way for the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Soviet Union by the Anschluss methods used in 1940 against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - a combination of 8th column communist activity and Soviet threats.
C. Yugo-Slavia - The "partisans" now fighting, plus the familiar methods, will it is hoped prepare the way for the setting up of a Soviet Government in Yugo-Slavia.

D. Czecho-Slovakia - Beneš has made a deal with the Soviet Union, said to be based on a Soviet promise to let Czecho-Slovakia have the Ruthenian tip of Slovakia, (now in Hungary's possession,) in return for a promise by Beneš to do nothing in foreign relations without previous consultation with the Soviet Government and consent of the Soviet Government. Beneš now is behaving as if he were a Soviet agent, just as, in Moscow the Czechoslovak Minister acts as an agent of the O.G.F.U.

E. France - Stalin's present policy is to set up a De Gaulle government based on support of certain elements of the Right and the Communists; to crush the democratic elements between; and eventually to have the French communists dominate De Gaulle. Stalin and De Gaulle have made a deal, and De Gaulle has announced officially the adherence of the French Communist Party to his "National Committee".

F. Germany - Stalin in both public and private utterances has made clear his policy towards Germany. In his speech of November 6, 1942 Stalin said:

"We have no such task as the annihilation of Germany. Our first task is precisely this to annihilate the Hitlerite State and its instigators. We have no such task as the annihilation of every organized military force in Germany, because any literate man will understand that this is not only impossible in respect to Germany, as also in respect to Russia, but also inexpedient from the point of view of the victor."

By making a distinction between the Hitlerite State and Germany, Stalin is following the tactics used so successfully on German public opinion in 1918 by Woodrow Wilson. Just as Wilson's objective was to set up a democratic government in Germany which would cooperate with the Western democracies, so Stalin's objective is to set up a Soviet Quisling government in Germany, (which at the outset probably would not be totally communist,) which will cooperate with the Soviet Union. The Communist
organization in Germany is strong; and strong is the propaganda appeal of the statement: "We Germans can save ourselves and our country by embracing communism."

G. Poland - The eventual reduction of Poland to the status of a small Soviet Republic is another bit of the Soviet picture. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Northern Iran, etc., are remote aims.

All these aims, from A to H, are desirata not musta on Stalin’s program. If any one of them can be achieved without provoking too much opposition, the amoeba will flow in. If strong opposition should be met, which might be injurious to the Soviet Union, the aim would be shelved. That there will be no strong opposition, is the view now held widely among Governments in Exile in London, among many groups in England, and among a great number of men of all nationalities who know Europe.

Characteristic is the opinion expressed in a letter transmitted to me a few days ago: "It is my belief, that the Sovietization of at least Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the entire Balkan Peninsula including probably European Turkey, will be a fait accompli by the time of the final peace settlements; also that at no stage before, during or after, will the English-speaking world have much to say in the matter or any effective way of saying it. ...It is almost impossible not to assume that Europe, perhaps as far west as the Rhine, perhaps even beyond, will be dominated by the Soviet Union, that is to say Sovietized".

The argument for this view is the following:

When Germany surrenders, the United States and Great Britain will still have on their hands a war with Japan, which may be long. There will be no single power or coalition in Europe to counter-balance the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union will be in a position to devote all its strength to overrunning Europe because the Soviet Union will not be at war with Japan. Moreover, the United States
and Great Britain will be able to shorten their war with Japan greatly, if the Soviet Union will accord them use of Soviet airfields in Siberia for bombing Japan. They will be able to shorten the war against Japan still further if the Soviet Union will go to war against Japan. The United States and Great Britain will be suppliants of the Soviet Union. From the moment that Germany lays down her arms, therefore, the whip in all negotiations will be in the hand of the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances the United States and Great Britain will not have enough physical force or enough psychological preparation to resist the Soviet Union in order to establish a democratic order in Europe or even to get a compromise agreement from the Soviet Union.

While the United States and Great Britain are engaged in defeating Japan, the Red Army, accompanied by a mob of fraternizing common soldiers from the German and all other Axis armies, and a swarm of propagandists, now ready in Moscow, will sweep through Europe from east to west, being welcomed by the Soviet 5th columns already organized in every European country. Then will follow the familiar comedy. There will be no talk of "annexation by the Soviet Union." There will be a "freely chosen form of government," (Soviet); "free expression of the people's will", (under occupation by the Red Army,) and out will be trotted again all the obscene lies that accompanied the "freely expressed desire of the Baltic Republics, to be received into the Soviet Union".

If we object or criticize, Stalin will reply: "I believe in the Atlantic Charter. How can I refuse to include in the Soviet Union the national racial groups of Europe, who are begging me to accept them - especially as this is the only way to harmonize all conflicting national interests in Europe.
in the supreme and sacred interest of Peace? And all the agents of Stalin in America and Great Britain, the 5th column of Communists, the fellow travellers and the dupes will shout "Selah!"

This is what will happen unless the United States and Great Britain prevent it happening. We shall have fought a great war not for liberty but for Soviet dictatorship.

If this prognosis should be justified by the event, we should not have to develop many "views on the machinery of preparation for civil administration in occupied territories". There would be few occupied territories in Europe in which we would have anything to say about "civil administration".

How can we make sure that this will not happen - and achieve our own aim of peace in a world of freedom and democracy?

When Germany collapses we must (1) be in position to prevent, by one method or another, the flow of the Red amoeba into Europe; (2) set up in occupied or liberated countries in Europe democratic administrations which, working together, will be strong enough to provide the requisite defense against invasion by the Soviet Union.

No single state in Eastern Europe can be made strong enough to resist the flow of the Soviet Union without the support of other states. A combination of feeble states will be inadequate. An agglomeration of weaknesses is not strength.

We are obliged, therefore, in setting up administrations in occupied and liberated countries, not only to set up democratic administrations but also to lay the ground work for a combination of democratic governments in Europe strong enough to preserve democracy in Europe and keep the Bolsheviks from replacing the Nazis as masters of Europe.

This task is an enormously difficult one, which will demand not only the united and directed efforts of all agencies of the American Government but also the full cooperation of the British Government.

The British unfortunately - as well as some Americans - are in the
grip of an idea which, if adopted as a policy, would result in such enfeeblement and enragement of Europe that Soviet domination would be easy. Many British officials are saying now that they intend to disarm totally every nation on the Continent of Europe, keep this disarmed Europe disunited, and maintain peace in Europe by having Europe guaranteed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union—all fully armed.

This is not the old British policy of the Balance of Power in Europe but a new one of the Balance of Impotence.

Its source is the shock the British got from being bombed, and the determination of the British never to be bombed again from nearby bases.

With that determination we have to sympathize and do more than sympathize. Since the fall of France in 1940, the people of the United States have learned that we cannot afford to let Great Britain and the British Empire be conquered by a foreign enemy. It is not too much to say that, tacitly and unconsciously, the people of the United States have accepted the policy that in the foreseeable future we will not let Great Britain be conquered without fighting to prevent her defeat. We have, therefore, a duty to oppose, in the name of closest friendship, any policy that will endanger Great Britain, and eventually ourselves, even if the British Government unwisely should consider it in the interest of Great Britain.

Control of the Continent of Europe by the Soviet Government would be no less dangerous to Great Britain than control of the Continent of Europe by the German Government, and the policy of the Balance of Impotence would promote rather than prevent control of the Continent of Europe by the Soviet Government for the following reasons:

A guarantee of Europe by the Soviet Government would have practical value only if adequate force should stand behind the eastern frontier of Europe ready to resist the Red Army. The onward flow of the Soviet Union has never been impeded by any written agreement—from the early days of the Bolshevik revolution, to the days of the non-aggression Treaties with Finland and Poland, broken by Stalin in 1939, and the non-aggression Treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, broken by Stalin.
in 1940. Soviet invasion finds barriers in armed strength, not in Soviet promises.

Indeed, the Baltic States, Finland and Poland knew so well that a Soviet guarantee would serve merely to open their frontiers to the Red Army, that they repeatedly rejected proposals of guarantees by the Soviet Union. The event proved they were right.

It is not difficult to imagine how rapidly a disarmed Rumania or Bulgaria would be absorbed by the Soviet Union. It is extremely difficult to imagine American troops after this war being sent abroad in time to defend effectively Jassy or Plovdiv. It is equally difficult to imagine British troops getting there in time - or at all. The policy of the Balance of Impotence is in fact the policy of putting a child in a glass cage with a boa constrictor, with two men outside comforting the child by saying: "Don't worry! All three of us have promised not to swallow you."

Any effort by Great Britain and the United States to disarm Europe totally without disarming the Soviet Union would create, furthermore, such resentment against both democratic powers that the democratic elements in Europe would be discredited and the victory of communism in every country in Europe facilitated. Molotov by misuse of your remarks to him about disarming France already has managed to make De Gaulle and his men hate you and the United States.

Stalin has declared his opposition to the disarmament even of Germany. He would similarly declare himself against the disarmament of France, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, etc. He wants them armed, - but with Soviet Quislings Governments controlled from Moscow.

The nations of Europe are composed of old and proud warrior peoples who will be on the side of those who promise to leave them their arms, unless there is General Disarmament. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union reject General Disarmament.

Imagine the reaction in France if, after a French Army had entered Berlin fighting side by side with the American and British Armies, we should
propose to disarm France as completely as Germany. The French would fight rather than submit - in league with the Russians or alone. You would have a communist government in Paris.

In addition, the Balance of Impotence policy would produce a moral revolt against the British and ourselves throughout Europe. Laval has been saying for months that this was the "peace" the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union intended to impose on Europe. This has been denied by every man in Europe who is on the side of the Western Democracies in this war. If we reveal that we intend to disarm Europe and leave the Soviet Union armed, we shall wreck any reputation for decency or common sense that we have in Europe. We cannot in honour place Christian civilization in Europe at the mercy of communist dictatorship.

The final answer to the Balance of Impotence Policy is that it is too disreputable to be avowed in time of war, and no policy too disreputable to be brought into light of day and exposed to public discussion can acquire the support of world public opinion or form the basis for world peace.

If the Soviet Union as well as Europe could be disarmed, an argument might be made, (an unwise argument at best,) for establishing an Anglo-Saxon armed dictatorship over all the earth. But the Soviet Union can not be disarmed. Since this is so, Europe cannot be made a military vacuum for the Soviet Union to flow into. Europe must be made not a military cipher but a large digit capable of defending itself against the Soviet Union.

Since it is our policy, - and rightly our policy, - to disarm and keep disarmed completely both Germany and Italy and to destroy their war industries, the two most populous nations of Europe will be withdrawn from the total of military strength in Europe. It is doubtful that a combination of all the other nations of Continental Europe can be made strong enough to withstand assault by the Soviet Union without British support. The balance of power which it is the interest of Great Britain and ourselves to seek is the balance between an integrated Europe, (with Germany and Italy disarmed,) and the Soviet Union.

An integrated democratic Europe, pacific but armed, is a vital
element for the creation of world peace. How can such a Europe be achieved?

The first prerequisite is complete agreement between Churchill and yourself that it is desirable to create such a Europe. If you should have persuaded yourself that to adopt the Balance of Impotence policy is merely to adopt Soviet dictatorship over Europe, it ought not to be difficult for you to persuade Churchill.

If you can not get Churchill to work for an integrated Europe, there will be no integrated Europe. We are not strong enough in force or brains to achieve such an aim against the will of the British. The most intimate cooperation between ourselves and the British is, indeed, the sine qua non of every step towards peace. We shall, of course, compete in trade; but competition between us in major policies will be fatal to us both, and fatal to liberty and democracy in the world.

To state that the aim of the British and ourselves should be the creation of an integrated, democratic Europe, without dealing in detail with all difficulties, is to appear utopian. You know that I know the difficulties in detail. I shall not deal with them in detail because I do not want to turn this installment of a report into an encyclopaedia which you would never read. I am ready to express my opinions in detail any time you want them.

British objections on the military side might be met in part by general abolition of submarines, and a number of limitations on European air power. But in point of fact, no agreements about air power can give Great Britain anything like complete security from bombing. At best they can give some security against bombing from nearby bases. Within a very few years - perhaps before the end of this war - bombing planes will be able to carry 20 tons of bombs 10,000 miles. Great Britain will always be open to bombing by long distance bombers from either the Soviet Union or the United States, no matter what is done about the Continent of Europe. Great Britain's only fully effective defense against bombers will be to have more and better bombers than any possible enemy. The enemy then will not dare to start the show.
Europe, integrated and democratic is an essential element for the
construction of durable peace. If such a Europe can be achieved, it should
become - as a unit - one of the Powers which unites with the United States,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, etc., in world-wide agreements for
the maintenance of peace.

These world agreements will be futile unless the substructure is
sound, - just as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were
futile because the substructure provided by the Treaty of Versailles was
unsound. It was obvious when that Treaty was signed that the Treaty was
the dog and the League of Nations the tail, and that the tail would not
wag the dog.

World-wide peace agreements or mechanisms will always be futile
unless the substructure is sound. They will always acquire applause for
their authors because mankind longs for peace; - Mr. Kellogg and Mr. Briand
were once considered great men - but they will evaporate into nothing under
the stresses and strains set up by a bad basic settlement.

If the settlement fits the facts well, the super peace organization
will stand a chance of maintaining peace. If the harness strapped on the
nations of the world by the terms of peace galls too tolerably, the donkey
will kick the cart to pieces.

If it is agreed that it is in the interests of the United States,
Great Britain - and peace - to establish an integrated, democratic Europe
strong enough to defend itself against the Soviet Union, with the aid of
Great Britain, and more remotely the United States, we should agree then
as quickly as possible with the British on the strategy and tactics neces-
sary to achieve our aims.

We should do this quickly. In the battle for peace time is running
against us.

We shall never again have as much influence on Great Britain and
the Soviet Union as we have today. Today they are dependent on us for
their lives. We are the lady bountiful. They are the beggars. Our in-
fluence over Great Britain and the Soviet Union will decrease in direct
proportion to our approach to victory over Germany. On the day Germany surrenders, our influence over the Soviet Union will reach zero - unless the Soviet Union should be in war with Japan.

The first aim of our peace strategy should be to get the Soviet Union to go to war with Japan.

Soviet Policy in the Far East is firmly based on the conclusion that it is contrary to Soviet interests to be at war on two fronts.

The Soviet Government today would prefer not even to discuss the use of Soviet fields in the Maritime Provinces of Siberia by American bombers. We should have to take a strong position on future aid to the Soviet Union even to compel the opening of discussions. If we should force the opening of discussions, - which we should do in our national interest, - the Soviet Government probably would try to drag out the talks, and ask us to create the right atmosphere by accepting Soviet aims in Europe. The Soviet Government, indeed, probably would try to string out the talks until it had taken what it wanted in Europe and until we had reduced the Japanese fleet and air force to impotence.

The objective of the Soviet Government would be to weaken our resistance to the sovietizing of Europe by compelling us to defeat Japan the hard way - by direct naval assault, island by island through the Pacific.

When we have Japan on its last legs, then, of course, the Soviet Union will rush to the rescue of the victor, and propose that we should turn over to the Soviet Union bombers to be used by the Red Army Air Forces from fields in the Maritime Provinces against Japan. The final Soviet step probably would be the invasion of Manchuria by the Red Army and the organization (naturally by the "freely expressed will" of the local Chinese population,) of the Soviet Republic of Manchuria. A similar comedy probably would be played in Korea. And both Soviet Manchuria and Soviet Korea would "implore" Stalin to admit them to the Soviet Union, and graciously he would accept them. The comedy would not be needed in the case of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands which the Soviet Union would annex. Hostilities between China and the Soviet Union over Manchuria and Korea might not break out at once.
If we continue our present policy of giving Stalin all possible aid while asking nothing from him in return, we shall probably find ourselves in this position in the Far East just as we shall probably find ourselves in the European position previously described.

Our bargaining position will be hopeless after the defeat of Germany; but it is still good. While it is still good, I think, you should invite Stalin to visit you in Washington. If he will not come to Washington, you should invite him to meet you in Alaska. Weather conditions probably would make early June the earliest practicable date for a meeting in Alaska. The earlier the date, the stronger will be your bargaining power.

I am certain that you yourself should handle this negotiation with Stalin. No other American could make the impression on him that needs to be made, And Stalin must be the negotiator on the other side. No Soviet official, not even Molotov, dares to commit his boss on anything important, and the negotiation must be for high stakes.

By using the old technique of the donkey, the carrot and the club you might be able to make Stalin move in the direction in which we want him to move.

You would have a substantial carrot: War aid of all sorts to the Soviet Union; post-war aid for rebuilding the Soviet Union; genuine security for the Soviet Union through agreements to maintain peace between the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Integrated Europe, China, etc.

Your club would have lead in it, not cotton: You could intimate that you might have to turn our major war effort against Japan instead of Germany; intimate a possible diminution or cessation of war aid to the Soviet Union at the end of the present protocol; intimate that you would find it too difficult from the point of view of domestic politics to agree to post-war aid for rebuilding the Soviet Union; intimate, also, full opposition to predatory Soviet policy in Europe and Asia.

Speed, in beginning these negotiations with Stalin, is of the essence. Your carrots and your club will slip gradually out of your hands.
You and I have talked often of the manner in which power over Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando slipped from Wilson's hands between October 1918, when he was the most powerful man in the world because Great Britain, France and Italy were dependent for their lives not only on troops and munitions from America but also on money, ships, food, and supplies of all sorts from America, and the spring of 1919 when Wilson stood before them impotent.

There is, I think, a tremendous lesson in the scene in Wilson's bedroom on April 7, 1919, when he said to the friends he had called to his bedside that he had ordered the GEORGE WASHINGTON to come to Brest in case he wanted to go home, and was about to order the Secretary of the Treasury to stop all loans or credits to the Allies; and that he intended to say to Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando that he would not sign the Treaty unless it should be rewritten, since, by a process of Jesuitical exegesis, they had interpreted the 14 points into a Treaty not of peace but of war; and that, if they would not rewrite the Treaty, he would leave for America and denounce them as the enemies of peace.

And then — the telegram from Carter Glass saying that he had just given all loans asked for by England, France and Italy to cover their needs for the next three months; and Tumulty's telegram saying that for Wilson to leave Paris would be regarded by the country as petulance and desertion; and the violence of the Senate; and attacks on him by all the French and British press.

Poor Wilson finally had to face the fact that he had no weapon left but one he hated to use because by destroying the Treaty he would also destroy the League, which he loved. His backbone was broken and he never made his fight. He was reduced to accepting the Treaty and pretending, since he had signed it, that it was the Treaty he had set out to seek, and that even if it was not quite right the League of Nations would make it right: the tail would wag the dog. Then the defeat of the Treaty by a combination of liberals, who hated the Treaty because it was just what Wilson had said it was on the night of April 7, 1919, and isolationists who hated Wilson and
and the League. Before the Peace Conference, Wilson thought that his power lay in his moral authority. In those tragic April days of 1919, he awoke to the appalling fact that his power had been the physical power of the United States to fill the desperate physical needs of the Allies, and that since those needs had been filled and were no longer desperate - his power was gone.

Men, at some times are masters of their fate. You have your power now - and while you have it you must use it. You will lose it the day Germany collapses. Wilson could have written his own ticket before the Armistice of 1918. You may be able to write yours - now.

If you can get Stalin to agree (1) to make war on Japan, or let us use the air fields of the Maritime Provinces, (2) to promise in writing not to annex (by the familiar process) any European country, (3) to dissolve the Comintern, you will have delivered a greater stroke for liberty, democracy and peace than any you have yet struck.

But even if Stalin rejects your proposals, you will have gained much for yourself and future Presidents. The Communists of the United States and the world, and their fellow travellers and dupes, will never be able to use as propaganda against democracy the argument that the Soviet Union was never offered full friendship and cooperation by the United States. That will be a powerful argument against the Government of the United States unless you see Stalin and make your proposal.

The acid test of Stalin's good faith will be his dissolution of the Comintern which sits in Moscow and, on his orders, directs the Soviet 5th columns throughout the world. If Stalin should start Litvinov's line about the Comintern not being controlled by the Soviet Government, you would know at once that he had no intention of making agreements with you except for the purpose of binding you, not himself. His promises would be of as little value as those Litvinov signed at the White House on November 16, 1933.

Even if Stalin dissolves the Comintern and makes war on Japan, we should not make it too hard for him to hold to his promise not to annex European states. In fact we should make it as hard as possible for him
not to honour his promise. If we make a vacuum or leave an open weakness on the European frontier facing the Soviet Union, the amoeba will flow in by the simple process of the Red Army walking in. There will be no "annexations". The boys will just see to it that the invaded country votes to join the Soviet Union.

Whether you succeed or fail to get an agreement from Stalin, therefore, we should not supinely accept as inevitable the irruption of the Red Army into Europe. And we should define as Europe the Europe of 1938, minus Bessarabia which should go to the Soviet Union.

There is only one sure guarantee that the Red Army will not cross into Europe - the prior arrival of American and British Armies in the eastern frontiers of Europe. To state this is to state what appears to be an absurdity, if the assumption is made that we can reach the eastern frontiers of Europe only by marching through France, Italy and Germany. It may, however, be possible to reach this frontier before the Red Army, if we make our attack on the Axis not by way of France and Italy but by way of Salonika and Constantinople.

The worst basis for military decisions is political expediency. Certainly no sound strategic conception should be altered for political reasons. But there is a large body of military opinion in Washington that favors - on purely military grounds, - striking at the Axis by way of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania rather than by way of France and Italy. And if military considerations are equal, the strategic plan that promises political success is to be preferred to the strategic plan that promises political disaster.

This is a question for you and Churchill, and your military advisers to decide.

One aspect of the question, and one only, is within the range of the work that I am doing for Frank Knox; the shortage of escort vessels. That shortage is so abysmal that, - even if we should want to - we could not send, supply and maintain a large expedition to Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria.
and Rumania, until next October, November or December. In any event, because of the possible political advantages, I think you should direct the planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study this project.

If such an expedition should be carried out successfully, it would be of major political assistance as far north as the Priepet marshes of Poland. Northeastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland would still lie open to absorption by the Soviet Union.

It is not difficult to imagine a combination of political negotiations and military force being applied to the Finns, by the British and ourselves, which might draw Finland out of the war without involving the absorption of Finland by the Soviet Union.

It is much more difficult to imagine a method of preventing the overrunning of Northern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

On these problems (and a host of others,) you will need the united labors of the best brains you have in the military, political, economic, and relief fields. I think you should order the study to be made at once.

To win the peace at the close of this war will be at least as difficult as to win the war. The hardest thinking, the most careful planning, and most concentrated efforts are necessary now if we are to establish a world of liberty, democracy and peace. We must define our aim, plan our work and work our plan, by unified and directed activity on the part of every agency of the Government that has a contribution to make to our total effort.

Wisely you have asked many departments of the Government and many agencies and private organizations and individuals to study the problems of peace. But today in the field of peace it is as if, in the field of war, the War and Navy Departments should be attempting to run the fight against the Axis with no General Staff, no Joint Staff, no Combined Staff, leaving every difficult decision, even of detail, to you.

The Department of State, to be sure, has been entrusted with the duty of making plans for peace — and rightly. Hull has an old line American wisdom which is so great that I have not known him to go wrong once in the
past ten years on a fundamental decision. Moreover, his prestige in the nation is unique. He is far more trusted than any other member of your administration. And he has an influence with the Senate which is very great and will be vital in obtaining the consent of the Senate to post-war agreements.

But Hull's authority in his own Department has been nibbled at so long by various subordinates that there are within the Department of State four mutually antagonistic organizations functioning in semi-independence. The first step toward getting the same drive into our fight for peace that we now have in our fight for victory is to give Hull orders to dismiss any and every member of his Department or the Foreign Service that he chooses to get rid of and to strengthen his Department in every possible way; and to take on his own shoulders - with responsibility to you alone - the fight for peace. There are plenty of good men in the Department and the Foreign Service, and in other government departments and the country, to form a really great staff. It is late in the day to do this. It is not yet too late. It soon will be too late.

Just as all the government departments and agencies that have to do with war-making, work in one way or another under the Joint Staff - so also all the government departments and agencies that have to do with getting the kind of peace we want should be working, in one way or another under Hull. Into the general plan should be fitted the policies of Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, B.E.W., Lend-Lease, O.S.S., O.W.I., Maritime Commission, Governor Lehmann's Relief and Rehabilitation organization, etc.

You and Harry would still have the colossal task of handling overall war and peace policies, domestic and foreign. But you would have a peace staff just as you now have a war staff. You can not win peace off the cuff. You can no more win it without a peace staff than you could win the war without a military and naval staff. You ought to order Hull to turn his Department into a dynamic peace staff.
My recommendations therefore, are:

1. Agreement with Churchill that the Balance of Impotence Policy for Europe is contrary to the interests of both the United States and Great Britain.
2. Agreement with Churchill to adopt the policy of an integrated, democratic Europe.
3. Conversations between you and Stalin.
4. Immediate study of attack on the Axis by way of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania.
5. Immediate order to Hull to reorganize the Department of State.

Detailed recommendations for setting up machinery for installing democratic administrations in countries in Europe which we may occupy or liberate, I reserve for the next installment of my answer to your letter of November 19, 1942.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Washington, D. C.
January 29, 1943
May 12, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Hereewith a memorandum on our major political-military strategy.

I feel deeply that Churchill's visit gives you an opportunity to take the world leadership that at this moment should belong to the President of the United States.

Yours very sincerely,

William C. Bullitt

The President,
The White House.
Our national interests in this war are: (1) to defeat Japan, Germany, Italy, and their allies, as quickly as possible with as small American losses as possible; (2) to achieve a world settlement that will give us additional physical security, and give the entire world a possibility of enduring peace.

Our major military strategy to achieve those aims is based on the following theorem:

The basic strategy of the United Nations aims to hold Japan in check so that she cannot overwhelm the Chinese or launch an offensive against Russia, India, or Australia; and, while doing this with the minimum forces required, to concentrate all remaining forces for the destruction of the armed power of Germany. This strategy is dictated by the fact that the largest single land force on the side of the United Nations - the Red Army - is committed to the struggle against Germany and cannot be shifted elsewhere. Sound military judgment therefore demands that all additional strength be concentrated to bring the fight with Germany to a conclusion, leaving Japan to be dealt with later by the full strength of the United Nations.

This theorem is based on two false assumptions: (1) that, after the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union and Great Britain will turn all their strength immediately against Japan; (2) that the war aims of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States are identical.

Unfortunately, the probability is that, after the defeat of Germany, we shall get no help from the Soviet Union and only conservative assistance from Great Britain in our war against Japan. (When Japan is on her last legs the Soviet Union will probably invade and annex Manchuria.)

Furthermore, it is certain that, if we have a hard war to fight against Japan while the Soviet Union is at peace and Great Britain fighting only conservatively, we shall have no decisive voice in the settlement in Europe. (We shall be asking the Soviet Union for support against Japan, and the whip in all negotiations will be in the hand of Stalin.) Europe will be divided into Soviet and British spheres of influence - according to present Soviet and British plans - and further wars in the near future will be rendered inevitable.
Therefore if we fail to get pledges now from both Great Britain and the Soviet Union that they will (a) go to war with all their forces against Japan as soon as Germany is defeated; and (b) establish a united democratic Europe, we shall lose all possibility of achieving an enduring peace; and - after having sacrificed the flower of our army and air force in combat against Germany, - we shall face without much support a Japan that will have had two more years in which to increase her strength by organizing for war purposes the territories she has captured. This she is doing rapidly. Thus we shall achieve the maximum of American losses and the minimum of satisfactory settlements.

In view of these facts and probabilities, we must ask ourselves if there is not a major political-military strategy which might produce results more in accord with our national interests than the major strategy now envisaged - and at less expense in American blood.

We are pledged to clean out the Mediterranean by wiping the enemy from North Africa and such islands as are deemed necessary to ensure relatively safe passage of merchant shipping from Gibraltar to Port Said. We have no other outstanding promises or commitments. After opening the Mediterranean we shall be free in honor to turn the major portion of our war effort against either Germany or Japan.

We know that in all human probability: (1) Germany, whose inferiority in the air is now marked, cannot knock out either the Soviet Union or Great Britain even though we turn away from Europe to the Far East a sufficient proportion of our strength to defeat Japan - without of course withdrawing essential minimum support from Great Britain and Russia; (2) As soon as we shall have cleaned out the Mediterranean we can use that sea for a movement from west to east. We and the British can attack the Japanese in Burma next October with forces sufficient to reestablish minimum essential communications with China. At the same time - in fact right now - we can establish a strong American air force in China for the bombing of Japanese shipping in Chinese ports and along the Chinese coast.
We can, in cooperation with the Chinese, Australians, New Zealanders and British, defeat Japan, and then turn our full strength to the task of assisting the British and the Russians to finish the Germans— who would be far weaker than this autumn.

In view of these facts and possibilities, it would be in line with American interests to put our position to Churchill in the following manner:

1. If we are to continue the policy of turning our major forces against Germany, he and Stalin must agree explicitly (A) that after the defeat of Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union will immediately turn their full strength against Japan; (Churchill will be glad to agree. Stalin is the question.) (B) that Europe is to be organized as a democratic unit which will take its place along with the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China as one of the great guarantors of world peace, and that the states of Europe are not to be over-run and are not to be placed in tutelage in British and Soviet spheres of influence.

2. If we cannot obtain explicit engagements from Churchill and from Stalin on these points, we shall be obliged to turn our major offensive effort against Japan although continuing essential minimum support to the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

3. If, after the defeat of Japan, Great Britain and the Soviet Union should still be at war with Germany, we, of course, would turn all American forces immediately against Germany.

If this line should be followed in conversations with Churchill, and later with Stalin, either we would get explicit promises of British and Soviet support against Japan and promises with regard to a settlement in Europe which might make peace conceivable, or we would be free to turn against Japan our full military strength unimpaired by the grave losses which would be incurred if we should first attack Germany — and on returning to the European theater with all our forces we would have a decisive voice in the European settlement.
You will recall that in the long memorandum I sent you on January 29th, 1943, which we discussed later at luncheon, I suggested that, after getting satisfactory promises from Churchill and Stalin with regard to European settlements, you should consider the advisability of invading Europe by way of Turkey, Thrace, Bulgaria and Rumania in order to make it difficult for Stalin to break his promise and overrun Central Europe. I still believe that this suggestion merits serious consideration; but it should be adopted only after you have prior agreements with Churchill and Stalin on Europe and the Far East; otherwise every American interest demands the defeat of Japan before the defeat of Germany. Indeed, it is so clearly in our national interest to attack and defeat Japan before attacking on the continent of Europe that political considerations alone justify giving Churchill and Stalin a chance to meet our Terms for attacking first in Europe.

The most curious phenomenon of the present period is the fact that at a time when our military strength is increasing prodigiously our world political leadership is disappearing. You remember Napoleon's remark that Wellington won at Waterloo because he did not realize he was beaten. We are in the opposite case. We are losing our world leadership because we do not realize that we have won power over the world. We are not exerting our will to achieve our aims - which happen to give the world a better chance of peace than the aims of any of our Allies. We can achieve our aims in our way - if you will.
2447 KALORAMA ROAD, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 11, 1943.

Dear Grace:

Here is a final word for the President. I hope you will be able to get him to read it before he sees Churchill. I am flat on my back again with the broken foot. Can you dine Friday?

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

Miss Grace Tully,

The White House.
Washington, D. C.,
August 10, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

The impending visit of Mr. Churchill offers a chance - perhaps the last chance - to initiate with regard to the problems of Europe a policy in accord with the vital interests of the United States and Great Britain.

The chief of these interests is lasting peace. And the objective of our policy toward Europe must be the creation of conditions that will offer some possibility of establishing lasting peace.

Domination of Europe by Hitler's Nazi dictatorship has been judged rightly to be an intolerable menace to Great Britain and the United States and their free institutions. Domination of Europe by Stalin's Communist dictatorship would be as great a threat to Great Britain and to the United States.

If

The President,

The White House.
If Germany is to be defeated without such cost in American and British lives that victory might well prove to be a concealed defeat, (like the French victory in the war of 1914), the continued participation of the Red Army in the war against Germany is essential.

The problem presented today to American and British statesmanship is, therefore, the problem of preventing the domination of Europe by the Moscow dictatorship without losing the participation of the Red Army in the war against the Nazi dictatorship.

In frankness, we must admit that we have not given this urgent political problem the attention it deserves and have not worked out with the British and the Russians any common plan for its solution. To delay further is to risk political catastrophe in Europe.

We can no longer reasonably hope to come to an agreed and honorable solution with the Soviet Union. Stalin again has avoided meeting you and it is difficult to believe that in his evasion there is not a desire to avoid being obliged to answer direct questions as to his intentions in Europe. For six weeks he has refused to receive either the American Ambassador or the British Ambassador in Moscow. And he has caused his Ambassadors to Washington and London to absent themselves
from their posts, so that serious discussion of serious questions between Washington and Moscow, and London and Moscow, at this moment is impossible.

Stalin, however, without committing himself directly, has indicated in various ways his intentions with regard to various European countries.

In considering his intentions it is well to remember that he has three distinct methods of bringing peoples under his authority: (1) Invasion by the Red Army; (2) Threat of invasion by the Red Army; (3) Communist revolution. It is also well to remember that he has his fifth columns in every country of Europe and that he has in Moscow organized groups or committees ready to operate in every country in Europe.

Stalin's intentions with regard to Europe seem to fall into the following pattern:

(1) He has declared the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia to be integral parts of the Soviet Union.

(2) The terms for peace with Finland which he gave us, especially the impossible demand that Finland must pay half the cost of the war - seem to indicate that he does not desire peace with an independent Finland but the total defeat of Finland and its annexation.

(3)
(3) Stalin's intentions with regard to Poland seem fairly clear. The setting up of the communist "Free Polish Committee" in Moscow, the creation of a communist "Free Polish Army" in the Soviet Union, and the secret activities of Soviet agents in Poland, (with regard to which we have full information), add up to an intention to establish a Polish state controlled from Moscow either by the establishment of a Soviet Quisling Government in Poland or by the inclusion of Poland as a state in the Soviet Union.

(4) We have less evidence with regard to Stalin's intentions concerning Rumania but there are numerous small pointers which indicate that he intends to bring Rumania under his authority by communist revolution coupled with an advance of the Red Army.

(5) Stalin's interest in the Yugoslav Partisans, his strong position in Bulgaria, his relations with Benes and the Czech underground, and his interest in seeing to it that any Government set up in France should be based in part on communist elements, are too well known to require discussion. Less well known are reports from Hungary and Austria indicating intense communist activity.

(6) The Manifesto of the "Free German Committee" in Moscow has clarified Stalin's policy with regard to Germany.

Conditions
Conditions in Moscow are such that this Manifesto could not have been prepared or issued except on Stalin's order. It does not bind Stalin but it indicates the development of events in Germany that he hopes for: The overthrow of Hitler and the Nazis; the establishment of a "strong democratic power that will be implacable, that will ruthlessly suppress any attempt at new plots against the rights of free people or against European peace"; immediate cessation of military operations; recall of troops to the frontiers of Germany without their being disarmed; a request for peace negotiations. The Manifesto contains also the statement: "In this manner it (i.e. the new German Government) will attain peace and again place Germany on an equal footing with other nations."

The catch in this proposal is, of course, in the use of the word "democratic". To the communists the word democratic means the exact reverse of its meaning to us. To us it connotes freedom, the Bill of Rights, "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." To the communists it means a totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet type - a government of the people, by the dictator, for the people. To the communists, our democracy is a government of the people, by the capitalists, for the capitalists. It is an extraordinary fact that we have
have let the communists steal our best word and give it a new meaning in the minds of the masses of Europe.

This is not to say that Stalin desires to set up a communist regime in Germany immediately after the defeat of Germany. On the contrary, he seems to wish to set up, in the first instance, a sort of Kerensky regime to bear the onus of the surrender - a government sufficiently controlled by communists to guarantee its failure, and the eventual installation of a frankly communist government controlled by Moscow.

It should be clear even to the most wishful thinker that, if Moscow-controlled governments should be installed in Germany and in central and eastern Europe, any serious attempt by Great Britain to keep the Soviet Union from controlling the remainder of Europe would lead either to collapse into communism of the remaining capitalist countries of Europe or to war between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

A Europe divided into a Soviet sphere of influence, which would be communist, and a British sphere of influence, which would be capitalist, would produce at best an uneasy armistice but no peace. Europe would be another "house divided against itself."

Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, various British officials have indicated to us that they favor throwing to Stalin just as many of the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe as he insists on swallowing - in a new policy of appeasement. Chamberlain tried to appease Hitler and discovered that one cannot appease the unappeasable. Various British officials now want to try to appease Stalin. Hitler's aim was to spread the power of the Nazis to the ends of the earth. Stalin's aim is to spread the power of the communists to the ends of the earth. Stalin, like Hitler, will not stop. He can only be stopped.

How can Stalin be prevented from dominating Europe without provoking a separate peace between the Soviet Union and Germany and eventual armed conflict between the American and British armies, and the Red Army?

This question cannot be approached realistically without keeping in mind the fact that, at present, just as Americans and British shrink from the idea of armed conflict with the Soviet Union just so the Soviet Government shrinks from the idea of armed conflict with Great Britain and the United States. Stalin will think a long time before ordering his troops to fire on either American or British soldiers.

If, therefore, the British and American armies get into eastern and central Europe and establish themselves there
there before the Red Army gets in and handle the situation firmly and intelligently, there is small chance that the Red Army will attempt to get in.

War is an attempt to achieve political objectives by fighting; and political objectives must be kept in mind in planning operations. Our political objectives require the establishment of British and American forces in the Balkans and eastern and central Europe. Their first objective should be the defeat of Germany, their second, the barring to the Red Army of the way into Europe.

In no other way can the Red Army be kept from flowing over Europe. And any other military plan must be considered with full realization that it connotes the abandonment of eastern and central Europe to domination by Moscow, - with disastrous eventual consequences to Great Britain and the United States.

Our most recent information indicates that the Hungarian Government is prepared not only to welcome American and British armies but also to cooperate actively with them in expelling the Germans from Hungary. Both Bulgaria and Rumania are seeking a way of escape from the doom they see approaching. The Serbs and the Greeks are praying for our coming. The establishment of our armies in southern Italy will open the way across and up the Adriatic to the Balkans.
An advance northward from the Balkans would offer an opportunity to install democratic governments in both Poland and Germany.

However much the Moscow "Free German Manifesto" may appeal to some Germans, its effect will be weakened by the mere fact that it comes from Moscow, since there is in Germany a terrible fear of invasion by the Red Army and an equally terrible fear of the installation of a Communist Government in Germany. Everyone in Germany knows that when the Soviet Government establishes its authority over a country it is its habit to exterminate the vigorous, intelligent leaders in all branches of life, - a tenth to a twentieth of the population - as was the case in Eastern Poland and the Baltic States. The leading Germans of every walk of life know that either invasion by the Red Army or the installation of a communist government in Germany means extermination for them and their families. In spite of the attractive features of the Moscow "Free German Manifesto", they are, therefore, apt to prefer to throw themselves on the mercy of the British and Americans rather than risking a deal with Moscow.

It is not inconceivable that if we should have occupied Hungary and Rumania and should be advancing into Southern Poland, Slovakia and Austria, and if Hitler should be overthrown,
overthrown, the German Army leaders would prefer to hold on the eastern front, north of the Priepet Marshes, as they did in 1918 and 1919, and fall back rapidly before us until we should have occupied a line all the way to the Baltic.

The British have a moral obligation of the most solemn nature to prevent, if possible, a further slaughter of the Poles by the Russians. We, too, can not be indifferent to the fate of that courageous and ill-starred people. We cannot, indeed, stand by and wash our hands of responsibility for the fate of any of the peoples of Europe. Pontius Pilate washed his hands and the world has never forgiven him. We and the British will not be forgiven if we let the Poles and the other peoples of Europe be crucified.

The first step toward preventing Soviet domination of Europe is the creation of a British-American line in Eastern Europe. The second is the setting up of democratic governments behind our lines and the prevention of communist revolts. We should decide as rapidly as possible what men we can count on to set up such governments, and we must keep in mind that all governments we set up must be progressive governments with the most advanced programs of social justice. We shall find our strongest supporters among believers of all the Christian Churches.

We must also make clear our position toward the whole problem of Europe. No one in Europe today has the slightest
idea what our program is. This is natural since we have no program. Stalin has a clear program and a vast organization working day and night to carry it out.

We cannot beat something with nothing. We must state our case. And we should state it in words that will echo in the hearts of those who may support us. The situation in Italy demands an early statement of our intentions. We should make our statement to Italy, a statement to all the peoples of Europe.

This statement should be made to the peoples of Europe by yourself, on behalf of the people of the United States. Its effect would be enhanced if in one way or another Mr. Churchill should endorse it.

It might contain some of the following thoughts:

The forces of the United States now stand in Europe. And on behalf of the people of the United States, I wish to let the peoples of Europe know why our forces are in Europe and what we intend.

Every European, like every American, knows that we were forced into this war by Japan's attack and by the German and Italian declarations of war against us. Every European, like every American, knows that we do not covet a single inch of earth in Europe or a single economic advantage and that we seek no indemnities.
from any nation. Every European should know, as every American knows, that we are setting aside vast supplies to succor and aid the suffering peoples of Europe as soon as those who declared war on us surrender. The people of Sicily already have tasted proof of this, and for the first time in many years have enough to eat and adequate medical care.

We come to Europe not to destroy peoples but to liberate them. We shall destroy Hitler and his accomplices. And we shall give the peoples of Europe a chance to root out every vestige of his foul doctrine that the end justifies the means, and his fouler doctrine that human beings are mere instruments, mere means to an end. For we believe that human beings, all human beings of all races, are ends in themselves, immortal souls, children of Almighty God.

We shall consider null and void every conquest in Europe since Hitler began to plunge the German people and the world into disaster by his invasion of Austria. In reconstruction, we shall try to be guided by the great Commandment, "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you."

We, as a nation, will never subscribe to the
materialistic doctrine that might is right or that great peoples should have special privileges which are denied to the small. Neither can we acquiesce in any proposal for dividing the continent of Europe, which since the days of the Roman Empire has been the greatest civilizing influence of the western world, into "zones of influence" or "areas of special interests". We shall oppose all attempts to force any European nation against its will to abandon its independence and we will not participate in any scheme which might call for the enslavement of any European people which prior to Hitler's aggressions showed itself to be a worthy member of the family of nations.

We wish for Europe only what we have ourselves: freedom and democracy in a community of sovereign states, in which disputes are settled by a Court of justice and not by armed force, in which every man is equal before the law, in which every man lives without fear of secret police and firing squads.

Until the nations of Europe that declared war on us shall have surrendered, we shall bring against them forces that will increase in striking power every day. The Nazi and Fascist leaders who took the sword will perish by the sword. But we have no wish to destroy the German people or to destroy Germany. And we have no wish to destroy the
Italian people or to destroy Italy. We demand surrender, not destruction. Until surrender comes, we shall destroy every point of military value, as we have destroyed the port of Hamburg. It rests with the peoples of Europe, especially the peoples of Germany and Italy, to choose how much or little their cities shall be destroyed and how many of their own lives shall be lost.

We do not enjoy destroying the cities of Europe, and we do not enjoy killing Europeans. We, Americans, are the children of all the races of Europe and we think of Europe not as a geographical expression but as a spiritual entity, the source of our own way of life. To us, every war in Europe is a war between our own relatives.

We hate no people in Europe. We do hate dictators. And we hope that at the end of this war all the peoples of Europe will have learned to hate dictators, and will have learned - as we in America have learned - that men of all races can work together as brothers for the common good of all.

Yours very sincerely,

William C. Bullitt.
Who is
WILLIAM C. BULLITT
?
**Where Was Bullitt . . . WHEN**

IN 1916—In Philadelphia, under Republican administration, the Mayor was forming a Home Defense Committee, but Bullitt was 4200 miles away in Berlin, a guest of the Kaiser’s German Army.

IN 1923—In Philadelphia, under Republican administration, the cornerstone was being laid for the $4,500,000 free library on the Parkway, but Bullitt was 3800 miles away in Paris, getting a divorce.

IN 1926—In Philadelphia, under Republican administration, the Delaware River bridge was being opened to traffic, but Bullitt was 5200 miles away, writing a book that defamed Philadelphia.

IN 1933—In Philadelphia, under Republican administration, the new Tuberculosis Hospital was opened, but Bullitt was 4900 miles away, giving a champagne party at which a trained seal served glasses from its nose.

IN 1936—In Philadelphia under Republican administration, the Delaware River bridge high speed transit line was open, but Bullitt was 3800 miles away throwing a party with 490 bottles of champagne.

IN 1941—In Philadelphia, under Republican administration, Cramp’s shipyard reopened, Council appropriated $500,000 to guard vital city services, but Bullitt was 310 miles away on his New England estate, pursuing life as a gentleman farmer.
WILLIAM CHRISTIAN BULLITT was born on January 25, 1891, in his family's ancestral mansion in Rittenhouse Square.

A year before his birth, his paternal grandfather, John Christian Bullitt, reckoned then as one of the ten wealthiest men in the nation, had died. It is from his share in that ancestor's estate that the present Bullitt derives the bulk of an income.

The Bullitt fortune was prudently left as the present William C. Bullitt's heritage in what the legal profession calls a "spendthrift trust." That is, the present William C. Bullitt, while he may enjoy his share of the income from the considerable estate, is not permitted to get his hands on any part of the principal. That is a move often taken by wealthy men to prevent extravagant dissipation of their estates by heirs who lack proper appreciation of the principles of thrift and sound management of unearned money.

William C. Bullitt as a boy attended the exclusive Delancey private school in Philadelphia, and from there matriculated at Yale. Upon his graduation he spent a year at Harvard Law School. However, he abandoned the study of law.

In 1914 he went to Russia with his mother, and they were in that country at the outbreak of World War I. Upon his return to the United States, he became an intimate of the late John Reed, a Communist leader, who later was indicted.
for sedition, fled to Russia a fugitive from justice and became ghost writer for Lenin, the revolutionary chief of the Soviet.

**Married His Friend’s Wife**

After Reed’s death in Moscow, Bullitt took his friend’s widow, Louise Bryant Reed, Communist and feminist, as his second wife. His first wife, whom he married in 1916, and who divorced him in 1923, was Ernesta Drinker, beautiful and social daughter of a noted educator. The war was raging then in Europe, and the newlyweds spent their honeymoon touring Germany as guests of the German high command. At that time Bullitt gave early evidence of a mind given to hasty and not always clear impression. He wrote:

“The Kaiser, from the beginning of the war, has stood on the side of decency and common sense.”

Perhaps in view of those singular sentiments, it is understandable how Bullitt, then 26, chose a swivel chair instead of a gun when a year later, in 1917, the United States entered the war against what he termed “decency and common sense.”

Nearly twenty-five years later, on the floor of the United States Senate, Idaho’s Senator Worth Clark recalled Mr. Bullitt’s pacificistic verbosity. Senator Clark said:

“Fought” The War in a Swivel Chair

“... he (Bullitt) will find a safe place for himself to hide out during the progress of the war. That is what he did during the last war. After the last war broke out, after shouting for war at the top of his lungs, he being 26 years old at that time, he found himself a safe ‘coffee cooling’ job in the State Department, where he remained during the progress of the war.”
Wm. C. Bullitt marching in Warsaw in 1935 with General Herman Goering, Air Minister of Germany, at a public function.
Senator Clark could have had no inkling at that time that Mr. Bullitt was to be selected by the Philadelphia Democratic machine as its candidate for Mayor while American troops in World War II were storming the boot of Italy.

**He Approved Nazi Conduct**

Bullitt’s admiration for the German militarists evidently was more consistent than other of his fancies, for as long as 24 years later — in 1940 — he once more voiced his approval of German army conduct. Under date of July 13, an Associated Press dispatch in a Philadelphia paper bearing a Madrid date line read: “Bullitt Applauds Germans’ Conduct.” Mr. Bullitt’s “applause” was contained in an interview he gave upon his arrival back in the United States after he had aided the Nazi forces occupy Paris. A storm of criticism from all over the country was evoked by his remark.

Upon his return from the 1914 visit to Russia and just before his first marriage, young Bullitt obtained his first and only job he ever had in Philadelphia. He became a $10.00 a week reporter for the Philadelphia Public Ledger.

At the entry of the United States into World War I, through contacts he had made as a newspaperman, Bullitt obtained a job in the State Department. His work there threw him into contact with President Wilson, and the latter’s adviser, Colonel Edward House. Through their friendship he rose rapidly to a position of such trust that he was taken to Europe for the peace conference.

**Bullitt Violated Confidences**

There he perpetrated a shabby episode in his spotty public career by double-crossing the man who had trusted him, violated in a burst of petulant ill-temper secrets learned in the
course of his confidential duties, and upset his chief's project of establishing his League of Nations peace program.

Briefly the circumstances were: House and Wilson sent Bullitt and the late Lincoln Steffens, radical magazine writer, to Russia to learn whether or not the Russian revolutionary regime was sufficiently strong and established to be brought into the peace negotiations. After a five days' investigation of that vast and sprawling nation, the two returned to Versailles, with fantastic peace proposals purportedly from Lenin.

The day following his return, Bullitt had breakfast with the British premier, Lloyd-George. That wily statesman soon inveigled the freshman diplomat into revealing to him all the details of the report. When Wilson learned, later the same day, that his young emissary had given his report first to the head of another power, he was so angry he never again spoke to Bullitt.

The sulky young man thereupon took himself off to Cannes, on the French Riviera where, he said, he would wait and "watch the world go to hell."

Revealed Secrets of Dying Wilson

Bullitt returned to America smarting over his fiasco. When President Wilson was touring the country on behalf of the League of Nations just before his last illness, Bullitt voluntarily revealed secrets of the peace negotiations and confidential conversations with principals generally credited with upsetting those negotiations. Thirteen days later, his former friend and benefactor, President Wilson, was stricken mortally ill from the strain he had undergone. The messenger boy had babbled the boss' secrets.

Bullitt as a result went into oblivion for twelve years, during which time he never worked with the exception of a brief fling of less than a year with a movie magazine.

In the New York Times of September 23, 1919, that paper's
Joseph C. Grew, U. S. Ambassador to Japan, implacable opponent of Japan’s aggressions, and Bullitt who advocated the surrender of Russian territory to Japan, which would have been contrary to American interests and would have shut off Russia from access to the Pacific Ocean.
trusted and highly accurate staff correspondent, Edwin L. James, wrote:

"Walking along the Seine one morning with an experienced diplomat with whom I had been discussing the affair of Bullitt and he had finished telling what he knew of the young man's trip to Russia, the fiasco of his plans, and his subsequent action, he then added:

"'Here endeth the first lesson — but not the last, for a man who has leagued with Lenin, subscribed to the progress of world revolution, given courage to the enemy, and betrayed the confidence of his friends, may be safely expected to engage on some other high enterprise.'"

The diplomat's words were prophetic. The young man who "gave courage to the enemy, and betrayed the confidence of his friends" today is a candidate for the high enterprise of Mayor of Philadelphia!

**Scorned for His "Treachery"**

The conservative New York Times, commenting editorially, called Bullitt’s revelations of the peace negotiation secrets "treacherous and indiscreet." In another editorial, the Times said:

"He (Bullitt) is one of that altogether numerous class of worshippers at the shrine of radicalism and social revolution who have been summoned to fill posts in Washington or to assume duties abroad, upon whose selection for such trusts sober-minded Americans have looked with increasing amazement and concern."

A reliable reporter for the Times quotes Bullitt as having said:

"There is but one remedy, and this is world revolution."
Bullitt thereupon accused that reporter of having “misquoted” him—a grave and serious charge to bring against a newspaperman of standing. The Times, however, never retracted the statement.

**Accused of**

**Too Much Talk**

Even a leading light of the New Deal acknowledged on the floor of the United States Senate that Mr. Bullitt—to put it charitably—was given to being talkative. Senator Ashurst on August 20, 1940, said of him:

“To imagine Bill Bullitt keeping quiet would be to imagine a fat sylph or an iron balloon.”

Added to the storm of contemptuous malediction which descended upon the talkative diplomat came a grave but weighty denunciation from his former immediate superior, former Secretary of State the late Robert Lansing. In his book, “The Peace Negotiations,” Mr. Lansing said:

“As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsible position with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeating a conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I make no comment.” (Chapter XIX.)

**Became Aimless**

**World Wanderer**

When Bullitt returned to obscurity in his prime of life, after his first disastrous fling at world affairs, he became a vagrant world wanderer. He lived variously in Washington, in New Hampshire, in Ashfield, Massachusetts, in a home he built in Vermont, in Paris, in Turkey, and on The Riviera.

It was while he lived in Paris that his first wife divorced him in 1923. That same year, he married Louise Bryant, Communist widow of John Reed, whose body lies buried in the Red Square at Moscow. They were married in Rome, and divorced in Philadelphia in 1930.
Wm. C. Bullitt's magnificent chateau in Chantilly, France.

Wm. C. Bullitt attends an "Old French Style" Bullfight at the Nimes Arena.
Loui se Bryant Reed Bullitt died in Paris in 1936 after a long illness, and Bullitt then sued a Philadelphia institution which had been trustee of a fund he had set up for her, charging it had been negligently invested, and demanding its return in cash.

**Lived in Turk Vizier’s Palace**

While married to Louise Bryant, and living in Turkey in a palace formerly occupied by the Grand Viziers along the Bosphorus, Bullitt wrote his notorious novel “It’s Not Done.” Because it was concerned mainly with scandal and pornography, Bullitt’s book was to rise up to haunt him years later when he aspired to become a candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania in 1938.

At the suggestion of President Roosevelt and U. S. Senator Joseph F. Guffey, Bullitt’s name was advanced for the Democratic nomination for Governor of Pennsylvania in that year. However, he was shelved when Matt McCloskey, Democratic financial angel, and John B. Kelly, Philadelphia city chairman, objected on the ground that a man could not be elected who “had been twice divorced, a man who had run all over Europe, and a man who had written a filthy book.”

Once more in 1942, the administration in Washington made a determined effort to foist its favorite playboy on to the citizens of Pennsylvania as Governor. On that occasion, Pennsylvania Democratic leaders were summoned to New York City on March 30, 1942, to confer with National Chairman Edward J. Flynn on the possibility of slating Bullitt as candidate for Governor. They met at the Hotel Commodore, but the Pennsylvania leaders once more showed a canny coldness toward espousing the cause of the erratic international gadabout.
His Book Rated with Quack Ads

The late General Hugh Johnson, noted columnist, and a former New Deal co-worker with Bullitt, wrote what perhaps was the most pungent and expressive comment upon the Bullitt book. Johnson said in his syndicated column:

"It could still sell if it were advertised along with the rupture cures and physical culture courses in the pulp magazines under the title 'What a Young Bride Ought to Know.'"

However, between the erotic passages in the book, the author found space to give voice to some of his deep and secret ambitions and hopes, as well as to set down some of his political philosophies. For example, on page 52, he wrote:

"There never has been a decent civilization that hasn't been imposed by a few aristocrats, and I'd like to show how it could be done in the United States."

He didn't voice that arrogant sentiment only once. It appears also on page 21, paragraph 7, where Mr. Bullitt wrote:

"Every civilization ever made has been imposed by a few aristocrats."

Wished Aristocrats to Run the World

Again on page 120, he struck a high flight of fancy he now hopes to bring to reality when he wrote:

"I'm going to run the town . . . and do everything in politics that seems amusing."

Those lines constitute what probably is the most candid admission of intent ever set down on paper by a political playboy.

In another revealing passage in his book, Bullitt speaks of the socially sacred precincts of his Rittenhouse Square birthplace, and tells how the original pattern of Philadelphia comprised five such squares. He wrote:
"The central square had perished. City Hall stood above it as a tombstone. One Square had become the center of the red light district. One had been adorned with a brownstone Roman Catholic Cathedral, and was inhabited by priests, Irish politicians and street cleaning contractors."

(Page 32, paragraph 2.)

Presumably Mr. Bullitt's present political cohorts will appreciate his pungent gift for satiric description.

The gilded beneficiary of a spendthrift trust emerged from his twelve years of obscurity and oblivion in 1932. Bullitt made a $25,000 contribution to the Democratic campaign fund and worked for the success of the Democratic candidates.

Between the election and the inauguration of the President, Bullitt committed another major international faux pas. After the election in November, Bullitt boarded ship for Europe. Shortly after his arrival, stories appeared in American newspapers of his visits to various embassies and his conduct of secret negotiations regarding scaling down of war debts. He was said to have assured statesmen of debtor countries that if they would await the inauguration they would find the incoming chief executive most liberal regarding non-payment of an unknown number of billions of dollars owed to the United States.

**Senator Wanted**

**Bullitt JAILED**

Naturally, Bullitt was welcomed as an international Santa Claus in the European capitals to which he bore such welcome and pleasant news.

But at the same time, less prodigal and more practical citizens back home in America were alarmed at the prospect of an unofficial private citizen acting in such good-time-Charlie manner with money that actually belonged to the taxpayers. The matter was brought up on the floor of the Senate. Senator Robinson, of Arkansas, demanded Bullitt's immediate arrest on charges of violating the Logan Act, which makes it a
criminal offense punishable with a fine and 10 years' imprisonment for any private citizen of the United States to conduct secret negotiations with any foreign power.

However, before the matter could be brought to a head, the inauguration was held, and Bullitt had returned to the United States. To this day, however, his status during his pre-inaugural European travels never has been clarified either by Bullitt himself or by anyone else. Bullitt did attempt to laugh off the charges by explaining coyly that he was merely “visiting old friends,” but inasmuch as virtually every American newspaper correspondent in every capital whose chancellery Bullitt visited made the same report of his strange war debt activities, the matter would appear to require more than mere laughing off.

**Embarrassed State Department**

Either Bullitt violated the law on his own responsibility by presuming to negotiate with foreign powers concerning their debts to the United States, or he was secretly commissioned and aided and abetted in doing so by the then President-elect. The net result was grave embarrassment to the State Department, which had been conducting debt negotiations at the time with several European nations. Bullitt’s interference completely disrupted these negotiations, and discredited the constituted and legal officials of the State Department who were in utter ignorance of his mission as well as his standing.

In 1933 Bullitt was appointed by President Roosevelt to be first United States Ambassador to Soviet Russia, for whose recognition he had agitated since the 1916 revolution.

The young diplomat undertook his important mission under three naive misconceptions. They were:

1. That Soviet Russia in consideration of recognition was to cease forthwith its program of revolutionary propaganda in the United States;
At this foreign ceremony Bullitt was made Sir William C. Bullitt, Knight of the Wine Bowl.

(2) That a satisfactory settlement was to be made of the $400,000,000 Russian debt to the United States incurred by the Kerensky government; and

(3) That Russian trade with the United States was to reach the sum of $500,000,000 annually—or about 45 times what it previously had been.

No one of the three objectives ever was realized. The new Ambassador failed to bring about any of the three, although not from any lack of trying, according to his own peculiar lights.

Has Trained Seal Armed with authorization from Congress for the construction of a $1,200,000 Embassy in the Soviet capital, and further
armed with a check book and 30 suits of clothes tailored in London, Bullitt set forth for Moscow in high hopes.

When he first reached Russia, Bullitt became a Soviet idol. He taught Russian army officers to play polo. His parties eclipsed in bizarre splendor even those given by the rich Red officials. In Moscow, they still talk of the party he threw at which he obtained the loan from the Zoo of birds and animals. Bears and mountain goats were in cages in the ballroom, and a trained seal served champagne from a glass balanced on its nose. As a party giver, the first Ambassador was an unqualified success, no matter what his shortcomings as a diplomatic representative.

By 1934, the Russians' friendliness to Bullitt had cooled because of his naive efforts to have them live up to their agreements. They distrusted him, and his usefulness in Moscow ended — what measure of usefulness he had ever had. He was recalled to the United States, and given an office in Room 201 in the State, War & Navy Building, where he sulked his days idly away. Officials of the State Department referred to the office as "Hull's Death Cell," because its previous occupants during the New Deal regime had been eager and juvenile statesmen on the way out.

During his Ambassadorship to Russia, Bullitt had flitted much about the European capitals on mysterious missions. He came into frequent contact with Ambassador William Dodd, in Berlin. In his subsequent book, "Ambassador Dodd's Diary," that seasoned diplomat voices puzzled concern over his young colleague's mental gyrations. Following are excerpts from Mr. Dodd's comments:

**Dodd's Views On Bullitt Mentality**

"He was sent to Russia early in 1934 as Ambassador, on the assumption that the Communists had agreed to pay certain post-war debts and that they would then leave off their propaganda in
A gay political trio at a French Racetrack—
You know the Gentlemen!

the United States. Bullitt took a large staff and many consuls, in spite of the fact that little real work could be done in Russia until commercial treaties were negotiated. He also spent huge sums building an Embassy palace and offices, said to be about $1,000,000 (not too much if carefully applied). Not having succeeded very well at the end of his first year, he became angry.

“November 25, Monday. Ambassador Bullitt from Moscow came in this morning. He showed a real recovery from the disease which troubled him when he was here last September. His remarks about Russia were directly contradictory to the attitudes he held when he passed this way
last year. Then he was to all intents and purposes enthusiastic. But Bullitt is the heir to a great fortune and was known as a liberal contributor to the Roosevelt campaign in 1932. My gift was $25.

"I was amazed at this kind of talk from a responsible diplomat who had done much to get Russia recognized in 1933. The President must know the man's mentality, but if so, how could he have appointed him Ambassador to Soviet Russia? (Ambassador Dodd's Diary, page 277.)"

Bullitt's diplomatic career, seeming headed once more toward eclipse after his second dismal failure in Russia, was saved by the President, who in 1936 appointed him Ambassador to France, to succeed Ambassador Straus, retiring because of ill health.

**Threw Historic Champagne Party**

The rejuvenated plenipotentiary startled Paris as he had startled Moscow. He threw a party that electrified the Parisian diplomatic set. The 600 guests, including the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, downed 490 bottles of choice champagne together with a list of other wines and liquors too lengthy even to chronicle, and topped it off at 5 A.M. with an elaborate breakfast.

Having maintained a hideaway apartment on the Rue Ponthieu in Paris since 1926, Bullitt was even more at home there than he possibly could have been in Philadelphia, where he had not resided since boyhood.

He was pleased at receiving the Paris assignment, although diplomatic experts were surprised that he had been selected. Indeed, Drew Pearson, writing in his daily column in the Philadelphia Record in 1936, had predicted Bullitt would be sent to Germany to replace Ambassador Dodd because of
Bullitt's sympathy with and liking for the Germans and the Nazi governmental philosophy.

However, in Paris Bullitt achieved a notable social success as Ambassador. He entertained the Duke of Windsor, Senator Guffey, his Pennsylvania political sponsor, and innumerable cafe society notables at the Chantilly race track, and at a cost of over many times his $17,500 salary he managed to make the American Embassy the social capital of Europe.

"Tactless Phrases," said Churchill

While the clouds of war darkened over Europe, Bullitt gave elaborate parties. He had his own answer to any possible involvement of America. In 1938, when war had become almost inevitable, he commented upon President Roosevelt's increasing concern in European affairs. "The President," Bullitt said, "wanted to distract the attention of the American public from difficult and complicated domestic problems, especially between capital and labor."

Whatever can be said of Mr. Bullitt's ability as an international diplomatic figure, he cannot be accused of any lack of candor in matters where candor might conceivably be somewhat misplaced.

In 1939 Bullitt helped write the cables Washington sent to Hitler and Mussolini, in what was purported to be an effort to avert war. Winston Churchill, who had not then been elevated to Prime Minister of Britain, nor so warmly cemented his friendly personal ties with Washington, condemned the cables as "tactless phrases."

Sneaked Planes from U. S. Army

In 1939, when the rising tide of world events made it clear that the only hope of the United States to avert participation in the new World War was to become formidably and heavily armed, an airplane crash in California revealed that Bullitt
Bullitt, the intimate of Fascists and Petain, the Fascist collaborator.
had made it possible for the French to purchase American-
made fighting planes over the objection of both Army and
Navy officials. Bullitt had first approached these officials with
his boyishly enthusiastic suggestion, and met with instant and
firm refusal. Thereupon, he went over the heads of the chiefs
of the American Army and Navy directly to the President, and
obtained authority from the President for the French to make
the purchases secretly. Had it not been for the crash of one
of the planes during a test flight, it is likely that the American
people might never have known of the arrangement. They
certainly were neither consulted nor told beforehand, nor was
Congress. Even after the exposé, Washington scurried madly
to hush up the whole affair and much of it was suppressed.

Lauds the Nazis
for Second Time

Bullitt remained as Ambassador
to France until the German oc-
cupation in 1940. At that time,
Secretary of State Hull cabled
him to follow the French government on its flight from Paris
to Vichy. The Ambassador ignored the order of his superior.
He remained in Paris, and helped the Nazi troops occupy the
city. He served as the go-between with the Germans—and
upon his return to the United States made another laudatory
comment upon the German armed forces which, he said, had
acted “most commendably” throughout the occupation.

That statement roused even wider criticism than his state-
ment about the Kaiser’s stand on “the side of decency and
common sense” during the first World War.

In the resultant furore, Washington columnists Alsop and
Kintner added fuel to the flames by revealing in a published
column that during the German occupation Bullitt had ac-
tually ruled Paris for two weeks in that fateful June, that he
had handed over the French declaration making Paris an
open city to the Germans, that he was worried over the danger
of a “Communist uprising” in Paris, and that he refused to
depart until Paris was “safely” in German hands.
“Does Not Serve . . . His Country”—HLS

Since the surrender of Paris, Bullitt has occupied a vague position of “special assistant” in the Navy department. Even in the obscurity of that position, he managed to draw upon himself the irate criticism of high placed policy-making officials. In his column in the Philadelphia Record of June 16, 1943, Drew Pearson related the incident of a memorandum Bullitt had circulated among department heads in the capitol. Secretary of War Stimson wrote across the face of Bullitt’s memorandum:

“The author of this memo does not serve the purpose of his country,” and initialed it “HLS.”

Having failed in the effort in 1938 to foist the trouble-making playboy contributor upon the Democratic party in

Wm. C. Bullitt photographed in his Washington home, July 29, 1943, eleven days after announcing his Mayoralty candidacy.
Pennsylvania as its candidate for Governor, the administration at Washington was more successful in saddling the party with Bullitt's candidacy for the Mayoralty of Philadelphia in 1943.

In selecting Bullitt as the Democratic candidate, the brain trusters in Washington showed characteristic arrogant disregard for the spirit if not for the letter of the laws governing such candidacies. For if William C. Bullitt is a legal resident of Philadelphia—if he complies with the legal requirements for a candidate for Mayor, he does so only technically. Morally, he is not nor has he ever been since boyhood a bona fide resident of Philadelphia. He has only voted in Philadelphia four times since attaining his majority 31 years ago.

In 1942, when Bullitt applied for a motor vehicle operator's license in Pennsylvania, he stated that he had held a Massachusetts license in the previous year, 1941. He gave as his residence Penllyn, Montgomery County.

Just Where Does Mr. Bullitt Live?

"Who's Who" gives Bullitt's residence as "Meadow Farm, Penllyn, Montgomery County, Penna." and lists 1811 Walnut St., Philadelphia, as his "office." In registering as a voter in Philadelphia, Bullitt gave 1811 Walnut St., which is the rich and exclusive Rittenhouse Club, as his residence, and swore that to be the truth. However, the Philadelphia telephone directory does not list him, nor the Philadelphia city directory, although the out-of-town telephone book currently lists him as living in Montgomery County. He is listed therein as "Bullitt, Wm. C., Penllyn pk Penllyn Amblr 1510."

Neither Bullitt's Cadillac or Buick automobiles nor his daughter Ann's station wagon are titled in Pennsylvania. The 1943 Philadelphia Social Register lists Bullitt's residence as 2447 Kalorama rd., Washington, D.C.

Bullitt's actual residence—if he can be said to have an actual residence—would appear to be "Apple Hill Farm, Hartwell road, Ashfield, Massachusetts." At any rate, he
has lived there more consistently, and is better known there than in any of the other dozen or more dilatory domiciles he has graced in the 25 years of his roving adult life.

It is not a club room he claims in Ashfield as his home, but a 250-acre estate which he purchased in 1920. He pays taxes to the county of Franklin, and the residents of Ashfield look upon him as their feudal lord of the manor. Indeed, they refer to their community as “Bullittville.”

The current edition of the Ashfield telephone book lists:

“Bullitt William C r. .......................... 90”

His Buick sedan, purchased in Washington in 1938, is registered there.

Admits His Legal Home is in Mass.

In the registration application, there occurs the question:

“Massachusetts residential address or place of business, (if concern, if non-resident give legal address also.)”

In answering that question, Mr. Bullitt gives “Apple Hill Farm, Ashfield, Massachusetts,” but he lists no other address as his “legal address.” That application was dated August 17, 1943. Yet just one month before—on July 17—Mr. Bullitt had announced his candidacy for the Mayoralty in Philadelphia!

On January 1, 1943, when he registered a 1929 Ford pickup, Mr. Bullitt gave his legal residence on the application as “Hartwell road, Ashfield, Mass.”

Mr. Bullitt has had a Massachusetts operator’s license since 1921 continuously except in 1923, 1924 and 1934. His first Pennsylvania operator’s license was issued on March 8, 1942, and in applying for that, he signed his application as a resident of Montgomery county.

Yet, in accepting the invitation of the Philadelphia Democratic machine to become its candidate for Mayor, this international playboy and political Tommy Manville, who has had eleven separate domiciles during the last twenty years—not
Wm. C. Bullitt, on June 18, 1941, applied for an automobile driver's license. He took oath that his "actual or bona fide" address was "Meadow Farm, Pennlyn, Montgomery County."
one of which was in Philadelphia where he now seeks office—said:

"I have agreed to be a candidate for Mayor of Philadelphia because I am convinced that unless the people who live and work in the city take their government into their own hands and run the city in their own interests the end of this war will produce a swift decay in living conditions and conditions of employment."

However, the record shows incontrovertibly that the last time William C. Bullitt—to use his own words—either lived or worked in the City of Philadelphia was as a ten dollar a week reporter on the Philadelphia Public Ledger 27 years ago.
He Doesn't Pay
Penna. Taxes

Bullitt personally has never paid a penny of personal property tax into the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. His complete ignorance of Philadelphia conditions and problems was best evidenced in a statement he made on August 27, 1943, after receiving endorsements of a number of Democratic labor men. At that time, he said:

"In my opinion the workers of Philadelphia are doing a fine job in war production, and I know that they are doing it in many cases under the handicaps imposed by bad housing, deficient recreation facilities, inadequate transportation, germ-laden air from dirty streets..."

For once, Mr. Bullitt is correct. The workers of Philadelphia are doing a fine job in war production. But when he says he knows they are doing it in many cases under the handicaps imposed by bad housing, he is making an error perhaps forgivable in a non-resident of Philadelphia. Never having made his home in the city, how could he know that Philadelphia ranks, according to a survey of the National Housing Association, 9.1 per cent above his present home city of Washington in housing? And he might, by consulting the figures, learn that Philadelphia ranks 3.8 per cent over a comparable Pennsylvania city of Pittsburgh, which enjoys a municipal administration of Mr. Bullitt's own political party.

How He Made Transit Blunder

As to the handicap to the workers imposed by what Mr. Bullitt calls "inadequate transportation," he perhaps, as a nonresident, does not read the Philadelphia papers—not even the Philadelphia Record. Had he done so, he might not have fallen into such a ludicrous error. For on June 16 last, the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin on page one carried a story headed: "Wartime Transit Here Hailed by U. S.," and on the following morning the Philadelphia Record carried a similar
dispatch headed: "U. S. Praises PTC on Its Record in Transportation." The articles, released by the United States Department of Commerce in Mr. Bullitt's home city of Washington, said: "Transportation problems in this district have not turned into the nightmares known to so many other areas of the great war activity.

"Thanks are due to truly excellent management all along the line."

Mr. Bullitt also missed a fine editorial in column one of the editorial page of the Philadelphia Inquirer on the same day, June 17, headed "Philadelphia Delivers the Goods," and commenting on the United States Department of Commerce praise of the city's wartime transportation facilities.

Disparages Philadelphia

Then again, Mr. Bullitt displayed a lamentable laxity with facts that too often has colored his public utterances when he disparaged the health conditions under which Philadelphia war workers labor. He did not trouble, for example, to consult the United States Public Health Service's latest figures on the subject. He just wanted to knock—so he went ahead and knocked. However, the Surgeon General's official compilation of death rates for cities of 100,000 and more population will tell him that Philadelphia ranks higher than Pittsburgh—which enjoys a municipal administration controlled by Mr. Bullitt's political party—and even ahead of his own home city of Washington.

Mr. Bullitt does not know the most elemental facts about Philadelphia, because he has never lived in Philadelphia since boyhood.
The man who always turned his back on Philadelphia until Senator “Joe” Guffey ordered him to run for Mayor.