August 18th, 1940.

FOR THE PRESS --
HOLD FOR RELEASE --

The following joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister of Canada, Mackenzie King, is released for papers appearing on the streets not earlier than 9 o'clock P.M., Eastern Standard Time, today, August 18th, 1940. The same limitation applies to use by radio broadcasters or radio news commentators.

PLEASE SAFEGUARD AGAINST PREMATURE RELEASE.

William D. Hassett

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The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and matériel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.

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CONFIDENTIAL
HOLD FOR RELEASE

CAUTION: The following is released for publication in newspapers appearing on the streets NOT EARLIER THAN 9:00 P.M., E.S.T., today.
This release also applies to radio news announcers -- 9:00 P.M., E.S.T.

STEVE T. EARLY
Secretary to the President

President Roosevelt and Premier King today appointed the following to serve as members of the Joint Permanent Board of Defense -- United States and Canada:

FOR THE UNITED STATES:

Hon. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, President, U.S. Conference of Mayors


Capt. Harry E. Hill, United States Navy War Plans Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations

Commander Forrest P. Sherman, United States Navy

Lt. Col. Jos. T. McMurray, Army Air Corps

Mr. John D. Hickerson, Asst. Chief, Division of European Affairs, State Dept., to be Secretary of the American section of the Joint Board.

FOR CANADA:

Mr. G. W. Biggar, K.C.

Brigadier E. Stuart, D.S.O., R.C., Deputy Chief, General Staff

Captain W. M. Murray, R.C.M., Deputy Chief, Naval Staff

Air Commander A. A. L. Cuffe, Air member, Air Staff, Royal Canadian Air Force

Mr. Hugh L. Kennedy, Counselor, Dept. of External Affairs, to be Secretary of the Canadian section of the Joint Board

The first meeting of the Joint Board will be held in Ottawa on Monday, August twenty-sixth.
My dear Mr. President:

The Joint Board on Defense of Canada and the United States has included in its recommendations to the two Governments, the following:

(a) The preparation in Newfoundland, by Canada, of bases permitting the operation of three squadrons of United States patrol planes.

(b) The preparation in the Maritime Provinces, by Canada, of bases permitting the operation of four squadrons of United States patrol planes.

(c) Canada to establish, not later than the spring of 1941, a force of aircraft of suitable types adequate for patrolling the seaward approaches to Newfoundland and Canada.

The accomplishment of these three projects is dependent on delivering some modern patrol planes to Canada this winter. While the construction by Canada of patrol planes facilities is in no sense a trade for patrol planes it is obvious

The President,

The White House.
obvious that, until Canada has some patrol planes, the
development of facilities for their use will lag. A very
ergetic program of flying field construction is in progress.
Very little work is being done on seaplane facilities as yet.

Canada has on order 50 PBY5s and 55 more disassembled,
total 105. Their first delivery follows our complete order
of 220. They do not desire deliveries until the British have
some but do desire deliveries as soon as the British are well
under way.

The Canadian Government is understood to be submitting
a request for early delivery of one squadron of patrol
planes. When such a request is received, it is recommended
that the delivery schedule of PBY seaplanes from the Consoli-
dated Aircraft Corporation be rearranged to provide deliveries
to Canada of two planes per month in January, February and
March 1941, and of six more at a rate of one or two per
month during the following summer.

Faithfully yours,

Chairman
United States Section
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached is the report about which
I have just telephoned you.

RUDOLPH FORSTER
Executive Clerk

Attached to the report about which
Mayor LaGuardia had informed me that the President wished
the War and Navy Deps and
Canada notified of his approval and arrangements made with Canada for
joint publication.

R.F.
11/19/40
PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
CANADA - UNITED STATES

FIRST REPORT

1. The Board has met on three occasions, namely (a) at Ottawa on August 26th, and 27th; (b) at Washington on September 9th, 10th, and 11th; and (c) at Boston and Halifax on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of October, 1940.

2. At the first of these meetings the Board made recommendations as to:
   (a) The exchange of information.
   (b) The strengthening of the forces in Newfoundland.
   (c) Certain steps to be taken in respect to the direct defense of the Maritime Provinces.
   (d) The allotment of material.
   (e) Communications.
   (f) The collection of information as to facilities for production.
   (g) The preparation of a detailed plan for the defense of North America.

Such of the foregoing recommendations as relate to dispositions for defense still to be made are incorporated in the appropriate place in this report.

3. In the interval between the first and second meeting of the Board, announcement was made of the arrangement between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States for the establishment by the United States of bases in Newfoundland, the Bermudas, the Caribbean Area. In the interval between the second and third, the tripartite arrangement between Germany, Italy, and Japan was announced.
4. The present report is directed to indicating the allocation of responsibility as between Canada and the United States for the direct defense of North America so far as that defense may require joint or concerted operations by the two countries and also the steps which should be taken by the two Governments in advance of such joint or concerted operations.

5. In order that joint or concerted operations may be promptly and effectively proceeded with when they become necessary and are ordered to be taken, the Board recommends that each Government should independently, and as soon as possible, take the following steps.

EAST COAST

CANADA

(a) Provide facilities in Newfoundland for the operation of United States aircraft in numbers as follows:

(i) A minimum of three squadrons of patrol planes (36 planes).

(ii) A minimum of 73 land planes.

(b) Provide radiotelegraph and other facilities at Sydney and Newfoundland Airports, for land plane staging.

(c) If physically possible, provide a fighter aerodrome near St. John's.

(d) Complete defenses for the port of St. John's and for Botwood.

(e) Complete the harbor defenses (including underwater defenses) at Halifax, Sydney, Gaspe and Shelburne.

(f) Expand the aircraft operating facilities in the Maritime Provinces, so as to provide for the operation of United States aircraft in numbers as follows:

(i) Four squadrons of patrol planes (48 planes).

(ii) One composite wing of approximately 200 planes.
(g) Select and complete a base or bases in Newfoundland sufficient to permit the operation of at least one squadron of patrol planes (12 planes).

(h) Provide staging facilities in Newfoundland for short range aircraft between Sydney and the Newfoundland Airport, these to include radio facilities.

(i) Develop airways and other transportation facilities in New England so as to permit the rapid reinforcement of the Canadian Forces in the Maritime Provinces.

(j) Provide ground, anti-aircraft and harbor defenses of United States bases in Newfoundland.

**WEST COAST**

**CANADA**

(k) Develop air staging facilities for aircraft on route between Alaska and the Continental United States.

(l) Complete the highway from Terrace to Prince Rupert.

(m) Complete the harbor defenses at Prince Rupert, Vancouver and Esquimalt-Victoria, including underwater defenses at Esquimalt and Prince Rupert.

(n) If a suitable area can be found, provide an aerodrome at the north end of Vancouver Island so as to permit the operation of defending aircraft therefrom.

**UNITED STATES**

(o) Complete army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks, Alaska.

(p) Complete land plane bases at Ketchikan, Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage, Bethel, Nome and Fairbanks.

(q) Complete the naval stations (including fixed defenses) at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor.

(r) Complete airways between Ketchikan and Dutch Harbor and between Nome and Bethel.

(s) Provide coast defenses in the Juan de Fuca Straits so as to tie in with the Canadian fixed defenses at Esquimalt.

(t) Complete aircraft operating facilities at Seattle, Aberdeen, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia, Spokane County, Fort Angeles and Tongue Point.
6. In addition to the foregoing, the Board recommends that

(a) The appropriate civil and military authorities in the two countries make and put into immediate effect reciprocal arrangements for the prompt and continuous exchange of all necessary meteorological information collected by any of them.

(b) The aircraft detection organizations of the two countries on the east coast and on the west coast, respectively, make and put into immediate effect reciprocal arrangements for co-operation between them in their respective areas.

(c) The Governments of Canada and the United States bring about an arrangement to simplify the procedure in connection with the travel of public vessels and service aircraft of the two countries, to include provision for the following:

1. Passage, upon local notification, of United States public vessels through Canadian waters and United States service aircraft over Canadian territory while en route between United States ports and Alaska or United States bases in Newfoundland.

2. Visits of public vessels and service aircraft of either of the two countries to ports of the other country, upon local notification, when engaged on matters connected with the joint defense of Canada and the United States.

3. Upon local notification, flights of Canadian service aircraft over that part of the State of Maine which lies along the route between Quebec and the Maritime Provinces when such flights are on matters pertaining to the joint defense of Canada and the United States.

4. Upon local notification, flights of U.S. service aircraft between points in the United States over the Ontario peninsula, including the prohibited area

7. The Board recommends that, when joint or concerted operation are directed by the two governments to be undertaken, the responsibilities to be allocated to each country and to be discharged by each through its appropriate land, sea and air forces, should be as follows:

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

CANADA

(a) To exercise initial control of Canadian, British and friendly shipping on the Atlantic and to inform the United States immediately of the location and routes of all important units.
(b) To undertake the initial ground, anti-aircraft, coast and air defense of Newfoundland and its harbors, except insofar as the United States may be in a position to participate in such initial defense.

(c) To provide for the surface and air patrol of Belle Isle Strait and the initial security of the sea communications between the mainland and Newfoundland.

(d) To provide initial air patrol over other sea approaches to Newfoundland.

(e) To provide for the ground, anti-aircraft and coast defenses of the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula and the initial air defense of these areas.

(f) To provide for the naval and air defense of:
   1) Gaspé and Maritime Province harbors;
   2) The Gulf of St. Lawrence to the line Sydney—Port aux Basques;
   3) The Bay of Fundy to the line United States—Canadian Border to Yarmouth; and
   4) The sea area within a thirty-mile radius from the entrance to Sydney, Halifax, Shelburne, St. John's, Botwood, and any other naval bases operated by Canada.

(g) Provide facilities in aid of the movement, by water, of United States forces from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.

**UNITED STATES**

(h) To augment its forces in Newfoundland to one reinforced division and a composite air group (73 planes).

(i) To establish off-shore surface and air patrols to seaward of waters to be patrolled by Canada, also inshore patrols of Placentia Bay.

(j) To control shipping in areas patrolled by the United States.

(k) To augment the mobile ground and air defense of the Maritime Provinces in the event of a major attack.
WEST COAST OPERATIONS

CANADA

(1) To provide for the initial ground, anti-aircraft, coast and air defense of British Columbia.

(2) To provide for the naval defense of Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver and Prince Rupert.

(3) To provide naval and air defense for British Columbia coastal waters and naval patrols for such parts of these waters as are enclosed by a line drawn from the Canada-Alaska boundary to Cape Fuzon - thence to 3 miles west of Langara - thence 3 miles off the west coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands to Cape St. James - thence to Cape Scott - thence 3 miles off the west coast of Vancouver Island to the meridian of Race Rocks - thence to a position 48° 20' north 123° west - and thence north along the meridian of 123° west to the shore line in Boundary Bay.

(4) To control shipping in the area in which Canada provides surface patrols.

(5) To concentrate land forces in British Columbia for the initial support of United States garrisons in Alaska, including air support for these, if required.

(6) To provide facilities in aid of the movement by water and air of United States forces to Alaska, including the provision of staging facilities for seaplanes.

UNITED STATES

(r) To provide forces necessary for the defense of Alaska.

(s) To provide for off-shore surface and air patrols to cover the sea approaches to south-eastern Alaska, British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, and for protection of shipping in the Gulf of Alaska.

(t) To control shipping in the area patrolled by United States forces.

(u) To provide a mobile reserve of at least one division, with necessary aircraft, for co-operation with Canadian and United States coast defense forces in the British Columbia-Puget Sound region.
May 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
AND THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

What do you think I should say to Chairman LaGuardia in reply to this? I agree with his recommendations and I would suggest that the matter of responsibility be outlined somewhat as follows:

(a) The United States not being an active belligerent is, nevertheless, virtually ready to undertake the defense of the Canadian eastern coast, including the land and waters of Newfoundland and Labrador.

(b) Canada has not either the men or the material to undertake this except as a participant on a much smaller scale than the United States.

(c) Canada is really devoting its war effort to sending as much in the way of men and materials across the ocean as possible.

(d) In the active carrying out of war plans the strategic responsibility ought to rest with the United States, in view of the fact that in actual defense nine-tenths of the total effort will fall on the United States.

(e) In regard to command, I suggest that the principle be laid down that the Canadian and American forces operate as a unit, and that the senior officer in any given locality or sector be in command, whether such senior officer be an American or a Canadian.

F. D. R.

Original memorandum for the President from Hon. F. H. LaGuardia, undated, in re principle adopted at recent staff conferences with the British that one Power would be charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the Associated Powers normally operating in the same area, sent to the Secretary of War; copy of President's memo and copy of Memorandum from Mayor LaGuardia sent to the Secy. Navy; copy in our files.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

During the recent staff conferences with the British, the principle was adopted that one Power would be charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the Associated Powers normally operating in the same area. In accordance with this principle, the United States was assigned responsibility in the Western Atlantic Area for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces, except the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces, as may be defined in the United States - Canada Joint Agreements. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense is preparing plans to supplement the United States - British agreement. In these plans, the proposal made by the United States Military and Naval members was that strategic direction of forces operating in the coastal areas should be vested in the United States in order to insure effective integration of the Joint Defense effort. At the same time they expressed a willingness that the Tactical Command in practically all of the Canadian territories and coastal waters be vested initially in Canada.

The Canadian Military members opposed this plan and insisted that the strategic direction of Canadian forces must remain in the hands of Canadian authorities. Attempts to reach a satisfactory agreement are as yet unsuccessful.

It is understood that this question has been discussed by the Canadian War Council and that the position of the Canadian Service members of the Defense Board results from the instructions given them by their Ministers. The Chairman of the Canadian Section has forwarded a revised plan based upon the principle of mutual consultation and cooperation. I have been advised by the United States Service representatives on the Board that this plan is unacceptable to the War and Navy Departments, who consider that the responsibility for strategic direction of the joint defense effort of Canada and the United States must, under existing conditions, be vested in the United States as a prerequisite to effective defense of the United States and Canada.
I am in full concurrence with this view. Wars in these days against as efficient and ruthless an enemy as Germany cannot be won by consultation. If efficient and successful results are to be hoped for, it is essential that control be centralized.

This question is of vital importance and should be settled without delay. The Service members are continuing their efforts to find a workable solution, but it is my personal conviction that the situation has been created for political reasons. It is therefore recommended that you inform Mr. Mackenzie King that strategic direction of all military operations that may become necessary in United States-Canadian Joint Defense must be vested in the United States. Tactical command in specific areas should be worked out by the Military members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and referred to respective Governments for final decision.

(Signed) F. H. LaGUARDIA
Chairman.
May 16, 1941

Honorable F. H. LaGuardia
Chairman, Permanent Joint Board on Defense
City Hall
New York City

Dear Mr. LaGuardia:

I have read your memorandum regarding the command of United States-Canadian forces and agree with your recommendations. I would suggest that the matter of responsibility be outlined somewhat as follows:

The United States not being an active belligerent is, nevertheless, virtually ready to undertake the defense of the Canadian eastern coast, including the land and waters of Newfoundland and Labrador.

Canada has not either the men or the material to undertake this except as a participant on a much smaller scale than the United States.

Canada is really devoting its war effort to sending as much in the way of men and materials across the ocean as possible.

In the active carrying out of war plans the strategic responsibility ought to rest with the United States, in view of the fact that in actual defense nine-tenths of the total effort will fall on the United States.

The War and Navy Departments have informed me that the question of tactical command is being dealt with satisfactorily, and that no serious problems have arisen in connection therewith.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

During the recent staff conferences with the British, the principle was adopted that one Power would be charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the Associated Powers normally operating in the same area. In accordance with this principle, the United States was assigned responsibility in the Western Atlantic Area for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces, except the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of the military forces, as may be defined in the United States - Canada Joint Agreements. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense is preparing plans to supplement the United States - British agreement. In these plans, the proposal made by the United States Military and Naval members was that strategic direction of forces operating in the coastal areas should be vested in the United States in order to insure effective integration of the Joint Defense effort. At the same time they expressed a willingness that the Tactical Command in practically all of the Canadian territories and coastal waters be vested initially in Canada.

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I am in full concurrence with this view. Wars in these days against an efficient and ruthless enemy as Germany cannot be won by consultation. If efficient and successful results are to be hoped for, it is essential that control be centralized.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By HfP, NLR, Date
APR 11 1974
This question is of vital importance and should be settled without delay. The Service members are continuing their efforts to find a workable solution, but it is my personal conviction that the situation has been created for political reasons. It is therefore recommended that you inform Mr. Mackenzie King that strategic direction of all military operations that may become necessary in United States-Canadian Joint Defense must be vested in the United States. Tactical command in specific areas should be worked out by the Military members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and referred to respective Governments for final decision.

F. H. LaGUARDIA,
Chairman.

DECLASSIFIED

\ JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 17 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The War and Navy Departments recommend that the attached letter be dispatched to Chairman LaGuardia of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in response to his memorandum to you on the question of command of United States-Canadian forces.

Henry L. Stimson  James Forrestal
Secretary of War  Acting Secretary of the Navy

Incl.
Ltr. to Chairman LaGuardia from The President