Dear Mr President:—

I am inclosing copy of a memorandum of a remarkable conversation with my covering despatch with comments.

It is now clear it seems that an agreement has been reached between Rios and the Radicals on one side, and Schnake and the Socialists on the other. Both will be candidates. With three in the field no one can get the absolute majority necessary, and this will throw the election into Congress where the Leftists have a large majority. The two highest candidates only go to Congress. Supposing that Ibanez is one of the two, the other will be Rios or Schnake and if the former all the Socialists in Congress will support him, and should it be Schnake, the Radicals in Congress will support him.

My impression is that Schnake will be the man to go to Congress, and it is certain, I think, if he has any fund at all. A proposition has been made to Siebert of the Branden Cooper Company. A man will ask to buy 5000 tons of copper at the Chilean price. If the sale is made it will be sold in Argentine to people who are pro-ally, certainly not to the enemy or to any one on the Black List, and this will realize 9,000,000 pesos. This would be all that Schnake will need. Siebert has told this man who approached him that it would be all right with him but that he would have to be instructed from the home office. You will know whether it would be wise to have some one say to the
home office that the 5000 ton should be sold. The Embassy here has nothing to do with it, and does not even know about it—if you know what I mean.

I am informed that Alessandri is thinking of announcing within a few days. That, if true, and it seems too absurd, would, in my opinion, divide the Rightest minority and defeat Ibanez. It is barely possible that this is the primary object of Alessandri who is very vain and

jealous and resents Ibanez picturing himself daily in full page advertisements as the great past President. Alessandri started out with Ibanez, and I suspect with the thought that the latter would abandon the field and turn to him. But it is now quite clear that Ibanez has no such thought and two weeks ago Alessandri broke away.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude H. Bowes

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
No. 2359
Santiago, January 5, 1942

Subject: A Pro-Ibañez Interview with Members of the Staff

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of a conversation at a luncheon to which Mr. Carlos Griffin, an extreme Rightist, who represents the New York Times here none too efficiently, invited Mr. Brooks and Mr. Lyon of my staff, and at which Señor Jaime Larrain, who is known as the "royalist of Chile", was present.

I personally have no confidence in Carlos Griffin politically.

Señor Jaime Larrain was formerly head of the important Agricultural Society and a bitter enemy of the late President Aguirre Cerda and all he stood for here. His organization, the Society, is the most reactionary organization in Chile, composed of and dominated by the old feudal landowners. I have attended dinners of this Society for distinguished visitors...
visitors and at the last one Señor Olavarria, former
Minister of the Interior, and responsible for the suppression
of the anti-Nazi films, and looked upon as pro-German if not
pro-Nazi, was given a prolonged ovation that was staged.

I do not believe Larrain's story about Ibañez's relations
with the German Embassy for reasons formerly set forth. That
Larrain is a Spanish Falangist, if not actually pro-Nazi, I am
sure.

The statement that Ibañez is not being financially backed
by the German Embassy and the Spanish Falangists, composed
of rich Chileans, is contrary to everything I hear from other
quarters.

The assertion that he is being financed by the brother-in-
law of Gustavo Ross, Señor Arturo Lopez Pérez, is probably
true since I have heard this from many quarters.

The assertion that Ibañez is "absolutely pro-American"
is interesting in view of the fact that for weeks he made
speeches and inserted full page advertisements without once
intimating that he stood for continental solidarity or defense
and certainly not for solidarity with the United States.
This unquestionably hurt his candidacy since Chileans feel
it would not do to elect a President who might be abnoxious
to us under existing economic conditions. Finally, as
reported, he gave an interview to the Chilean correspondent
of the Detroit News saying what the other candidates had
said from the beginning. In view of the attitude of the
Totalitarians toward the truth, this does not greatly impress
me. However, I am sure that should Ibañez be elected he
would feel it necessary to go with us, but I am sure that
anything we asked of him would find its way to the German
Embassy.

Larrain's story that Ibañez had "fought with Von Marees"
is news in Santiago, especially since it is generally under-
stood that Von Marees' young Nazis are working in Ibañez
headquarters. And Von Marees is the most pronounced Nazi
and the most bitter enemy of the United States in the country.
We know absolutely that about two weeks ago Ibañez and Von
Marees had a secret conference at a private house.

I cannot believe for a moment that Señor Schmoke, whom
I know well and whose views as to Ibañez I have been told
by him, has entered into any such agreement as is indicated.

As to Larrain himself, as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
I have never seen or heard anything that would encourage me
to believe that he is a friend of the United States.

You will observe that Ibañez proposes to scrap the
present Constitution, which is democratic, and to create a
new form of government based on the theories of Hitler,
Mussolini and France.

Larrain's observations on Rossetti do not impress me.
I know where he stands as to Japan and what he has done in
reference to Japan. I have also informed the Department of
his
his reasons for not declaring war on Japan at this juncture and that he has no doubt but that while will be at war with Japan before very long. But he wants the aggressive act to come from Japan, not Chile.

I note, too, with interest Mr. Larrain's dislike for Gonzalez Videla and Hector Arancibia Lasso. This is significant since these two men have gone to the full extent to solidarity with the United States and the latter is almost extravagant in praise of the United States.

The comment of Carlos Griffin about the Embassy can only be based on the Embassy's silence and the rumors in the streets, growing out of the generally conceived popular idea of Ibañez associating with the Naxis and the Fifth Columnists. I do not think it is in the least proper for me to have a conference with Ibañez or any other candidate for the Presidency, since it would be open to misinterpretation and would certainly not long be a secret - in Chile my conviction is that we should not conceal the fact that we are following the campaign but that we are taking no part and saying absolutely nothing.

Respectfully yours,

CLAUDE G. BOWERS

COB:LRL
MEMORANDUM

January 2, 1942.

Constitution between

Carlos Griffin, New York Times representative
Jaime Larraín García Moreno
Clarence Brooks, First Secretary
Cecil Lyon, Second Secretary

Today Carlos Griffin invited Clarence Brooks and myself to lunch with him and Jaime Larraín García Moreno. All indications were that the luncheon had been arranged in order that Jaime Larraín could get his views about the presidential elections over to us. He is managing Ibáñez’s campaign, and one of the first things he told us was that he is spending 50,000 pesos a day on newspaper and radio propaganda. While he did not say so directly, he intimated that most of the money was being supplied by Mr. Arturo LOPEZ Perez, who said is the richest man in South America (formerly he owned the Galici Lafayette, in Paris, and is said to have gotten most of his fortune, consisting of 1,800,000,000 pesos, out of Europe before the war and has recently transferred most of it to the United States. He is a brother-in-law of Gustavo Ross.) Señor Larraín said it was fantastic to think, as he had heard, that considerable sums for General Ibáñez’s campaign were being contributed by the German Embassy. Larraín himself said he had had a terrific fight with Baron von Schoen at the beginning of the war, for at that time Larraín was President of the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura and very pro-French, as he has always been. In speaking over the radio he referred to the atrocities of the Germans, and was immediately brought to task by Baron von Schoen in a threatening letter in which Baron von Schoen intimated that he would bring pressure on the Chilean Government forces to silence Larraín, thus taking advantage of Larraín’s unfavorable position vis-à-vis the present government. Since then Baron von Schoen has tried to make up, but Larraín will have nothing to do with him.

Señor Larraín insists that General Ibáñez is absolutely pro-American, wishes to cooperate with the United States entirely and is all in favor of Western Hemisphere defense. He says that the story that he is pro-Axis has been started by his political enemies. I inquired as to whether it did not possibly come from Ibáñez’s close association with Jorge González von Narros. Señor Larraín answered this by saying that Ibáñez had fought with González von Narros and that whether or not González von Narros’s party was supporting him now was uncertain. He said, however, that Ibáñez would receive the support of most of the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Agrarians, and, in the end, the support of the Socialists, for he and Schnake had entered into an agreement that Schnake would be one of his cabinet ministers, other of his cabinet ministers would be: Interior, General Burgos; Finance, Julio Basconian, with Counselor Arturo López Pérez. Schnake will probably continue in the Ministry of Fomento; Foreign Affairs, Jaime Larraín, and probably some portfolio would be given to Rossetti, who is also supporting Ibáñez. (Señor Larraín said that most of the people in the Foreign Office at present who had merely come in since the present government and were not career, would be changed. I recall that the name of Fernando Orrego was mentioned as among those to be eliminated.)

We asked if Carlos Dávila had replied to the telegram sent by General Ibáñez asking him to be Ambassador in Washington. Señor Larraín said that he thought he had replied but had requested that his reply be kept confidential.

Señor Griffin put a number of questions to Señor Larraín, and
Brooks and I felt as though they were being arranged for our benefit. Among other things, Señor Larraín said that, were Ibáñez elected, and he felt that he had a better than good chance to be, he would form a unicameral system of government, with representatives of agriculture, industry, bankers, ecclesiastics, educators, etc., which would act as Congress. This, he admitted, would require a constitutional amendment. Moreover, Ibáñez would insist upon a strong government and would do everything possible to help the United States win the war.

We asked Señor Larraín what he thought would be the results of the Río Conference (he himself having been President of the Chilean delegation to the Buenos Aires Conference). He said that he thought it would result in a further solidifying of inter-American cooperation.

He said that, while he respected Rossetti, he did not think he was a good Foreign Minister, and said that if, for example, Rossetti wanted to create a more pro-American atmosphere in South America, he could do so by harping on the Japanese threat, for while Chilenos merely laugh at an Italian threat and are not over-impressed by a German threat, the Japanese threat is very real to them. They realize that if the American fleet were defeated Japan would come here and seize the copper mines. For that reason General Ibáñez and his advisers consider it supremely important to support the position of the United States. When I suggested that if the Foreign Minister attempted to over-emphasize the Japanese threat it might result in a policy of hold-off on any measures against the Japanese, Señor Larraín said that this wouldn't be the Spanish reaction; "We couldn't conceive of ourselves being dominated by a 'yellow' race, and we would want to fight them before they attacked us," he exclaimed. Señor Larraín is for all the Americas declaring war on Japan immediately, and if he had his way he would ship all the Japanese in Chile back to Japan immediately.

Señor Larraín was constantly referring to the danger of Communism in Chile, and intimated that the Leftists would be forced to select a candidate who had the support of the Communists. He said that today or tomorrow, or at least very shortly, the Radicals would be forced to withdraw their support from Ríos, and said that he thought that the Communist influence in their party would require them to choose González Videla or Héctor Aranibar Lasso, or possibly Señor Mendoza.

I said to Señor Larraín that I had heard the Army was not in favor of General Ibáñez because when he had last been President he had interested himself too much in their affairs, to which Señor Larraín replied, "That's Alessandri's propaganda." He also said that Señor Alessandri was not supporting Ibáñez because he would give his support to no one but Señor Alessandri.

After Señor Larraín had left, Señor Griffin indicated that he considered the luncheon had been a good idea "to end the war between the American Embassy and the Conservative elements in the country." Mr. Brooks said that he didn't think any war existed, but Señor Griffin was of the opinion that at least there had been some misunderstanding, and indicated that he thought it would be advantageous if the Ambassador had an opportunity to talk with Señor Larraín, or even with General Ibáñez, at an intimate luncheon such as today. He felt that much good would come of such a meeting.
Valparaiso, January 16, 1942

Dear Mr President:

After one solid hectic year at my desk I am taking a much needed vacation while the Foreign Office is at Rio. I had written Welles in detail about Rossetti, his tendencies, his character, his weaknesses and his stout declarations to me that he would stand with the United States and Brazil.

The campaign here is interesting and bitter. Heavily financed, Ibanez threatens to be a dangerous contender, especially when the Lefts were quarreling among themselves and not uniting on a single candidate. At length they have awakened to the danger and have united on Rio. This was made possible by the patriotic sacrifice of Schnack who withdrew in the interests of a united front. He was by long odds our best bet and this was the strong opinion also of the British and Mexican Embassies.

But he is out.

It is difficult to figure how Ibanez can possibly be elected. There are 450,000 voters and the chosen man must have a clear majority, or more than 250,000. The parties are registered and their strength known.

The Left parties are as follows:

Radicals 95,000
Sociolists 80,000
Democrats 30,000
Falangists (nothing to do with the Spaniards, 20,000
Agrarians 20,000
Independents 15,000

To this the Lefts add 20,000 Conservative and Liberal members who are in revolt against their party's nomination of Ibanez.
In addition, the Communists have now decided to support Rio in preference to Ibanez, though Rio is not their friend. They have 50,000. Where can Ibanez get 251,000 votes. The other night at a dinner Cruchaga figured it all out and confessed he could not see how Ibanez could be elected.

There is a feeling here that Ibanez will not do, since Chile is dependent on supplies from the States and that the States does not trust Ibanez. I have instructed the Embassy staff to say nothing and merely report, and I have read to the American business interests here Hull's telegram to the effect that we frown on Americans mixing in elections away from home. But Ibanez has been sending people to the Embassy asking for an appointment with me. That is one reason I am on vacation. Were I to see him it would be known by everyone in Chile and the Ibanez people would cite that meeting by word of mouth as proof that we are for their candidate. I have instructed the staff not to mix and not to go to functions for one candidate or the other. In my absence the wife of the President of the Conservative party who has attacked us in the Senate invited Cecil Lyon of my staff to a dinner in honor of Ibanez. It seems that some one advised him to go. He had tried to get out of it but the hostess called him up and insisted. He went. Now he is stricken because all the papers told of the dinner in honor of Ibanez and gave Lyons of the American Embassy as one of the guests. The purpose was served. I have just sent Lyons a reprimand.
My personal opinion that Ibanez is the candidate of our enemies is based on these undisputed facts.

1. He has the active support of every Nazi in Chile.
2. Of every Italian fascist in Chile.
3. Of every Spanish Falangist in Chile.
4. Of the party of von Mares the most fanatic Nazi in Chile who attacks us regularly in Congress.
5. Of The Aleman, the Nazi organ in Chile.
6. Of the Chilena, an organ financed by the German Embassy.

That is enough for me. A dog is known by the company it keeps.

My impression is that should Ibanez fail of election the cry of "fraud" will be raised and he will attempt the coup d'etat he has been figuring on all along. He has made two attempts by nazi methods to overthrow the regime of Aguerre Cerda. If elected of course we could force him to do as we say since Chile would collapse economically without supplies from us. But if the fortunes of war should at any time turn against us he would go over to the enemy at once.

And in the meanwhile I would feel that any confidential conversations we might have with him would be passed on to the enemy. At best he would be like the acting President in Argentine.

He has the support of "the best people" meaning the old feudal land owners and Big Business, as Mussolini had in Italy, Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain. I am afraid that some of our own people would like to help finance him. Big Business never learns.

I wrote you recently as I did because the British Embassy wanted it and the Mexican. Both were willing to do something. That is over now.

Rios is of the extreme right wing of the Radicals, very reactionary, but democratic. He has a good following among business men. No one of them is afraid
of him. The communists will support him under protest because he would
give them their constitutional rights and they think Ibanez would start in
shooting.

I shall try to evade an interview with Ibanez. If unable to do so I shall
make it as public as possible and shall then have an interview with Rios.
But even so that would be interpreted by the Ibanez people as meaning that
both are satisfactory. I shall not return to Santiago until the 28th and
I hope it will then be too late. My instinct is to refuse to have a
conference or discussion with either candidate on the ground that we have
instructions to stand absolutely aloof from the campaign.

Carlos Davila apparently has been bought with the promise of the
Ambassadorship in Washington. He has replied to Ibanez offer with the
stout assurance that Ibanez is all right with us and the Ibanez papers
are saying publicly that this means he has the assurance from the Government
of the United States. I recall that Welles does not have much confidence
in Davilla.

With warmest regards,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Tge White House.

Sincerely,

Claude M. Bowers.
January 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

On February 1 there will be elections in Chile to select the new President to take the place of President Aguirre Cerda, who died. In the last few days General Carlos Ibañez del Campo has emerged as the leading candidate. All our reports indicate that Ibañez is sympathetic to the Axis. He is a frequent attendant at the German Club and moves in Axis circles in Chile.

The opponents of Ibañez, through friends in the United States, are endeavoring to raise funds in this country. In view of the possibility that this matter may be brought to your attention, may I present the following considerations:

(1) This Government signed and the Senate ratified treaties at the Montevideo and Buenos Aires conferences by which this country specifically pledged itself not to intervene in the internal or external affairs, directly or indirectly, of any American country. The donation of funds by this Government or by United States citizens would be a definite violation of these treaty commitments.

(2) The confidence in the United States which the other
other American republics now have arisen precisely because the United States has scrupulously refrained from intermeddlin in the internal concerns of these countries. This confidence is the most precious asset that the United States now possesses in the other American republics. Interference in the internal Chilean political scene might lose this confidence overnight.

(3) The Chilean political situation is still in flux. There are two candidates in opposition to Ibañez. Negotiations are now going on in an endeavor to agree upon a single opposition candidate. If these negotiations are successful and a single candidate selected, acceptable to all groups, the possibility of the election of Ibañez would appear to be very doubtful. He would have arrayed against him not only all the democratic forces in Chile but also a large part of the voting strength of the two important Chilean parties technically supporting him, since this part has publicly announced its opposition to Ibañez's candidacy and its willingness to support any satisfactory candidate opposed to Ibañez.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In further regard to the Chilean situation, the negotiations for the designation of a single candidate in opposition to Ibañez have been successful. As a result all of the principal parties in opposition to Ibañez are agreed in support of the candidacy of one Antonio Rios who favors support of the democracies as an external policy and is sympathetic to moderate reform as an internal policy.

All signs would point to the strong probability that Rios will receive a majority of votes in the forthcoming elections on February 1.
Santiago January 23, 1942

Dear Mr President:

I have just come from the foreign office and learn that instructions are being sent by telephone to Rossetti to support the last Brazilian resolution. I cannot subscribe to the theory that Chile's attitude denotes the slightest disposition to do anything other than to go with us, and I know that she has been fearful of a surprise attack on her coast, 2500 miles long. Since this is a very slender country most of its vital industries, power plants etc are on the coast, not in the interior, and she has been ready all along to go with us with a positive assurance that we will actually provide our own ships and planes for observation and defence purposes. I know no American here where we know the facts who thinks this is unreasonable.

The election, judged by statistics of former elections, should go by a large majority to Rios and I think it will but I would not care to make a wager. Ibanez has a campaign fund without precedent in Chile and it is estimated that he is spending close to a million pesos a day. Then he has a compact, thoroughly organized Nazi organization and a Falangist organization (Francoists) which are dedicating themselves feverishly to his cause. In addition to all this I have evidence all around that because of the high cost of living, in contrast to conditions when he was President but for which he was not responsible, and because of his Nazi-like assurance that he will bring down the cost of living, he has a remarkably strong support among the lower middle classes regardless of party. Yesterday at La Union he was given a banquet at the German Club.

The danger, I think, is that should he not be defeated by a most decisive vote he will attempt for the third time his coup d'etat immediately after the
election. There has been no fear of his attempts along this line in governmental circles so long as they were merely a close corporation conspiracy among a few army officers and without popular support. But his candidacy arrays behind and with him thousands who may be lead into a coup who had no patience with his other attempts. The Army apparently would resist anything of the sort, but I hear disturbing stories about the Caribaneros who were organized by him.

By all the rules of logic Rios should be elected, but the fact remains that no one can say with any certainty what may happen. This because of the attitude of the German and Italian and Spanish totalitarians. I am shocked by the almost hysterical support being given him by the Catholic paper, La Ilustrada. It gives almost the whole paper over to Ibanez. Of course such outstanding Catholic laymen as Cruchaga and Senator Errazuriz, both of whom pretend to like the United States are for Ibanez. One however is honorary President of the Friends of Germany and the other of Friends of Japan. Both are said to have resigned since we entered the war but they have spared the feelings of the Germans and Japs by keeping any mention of it out of the papers.

Of course Ibanez pretends to be our great admirer, and if elected can be kept in line by threats of economic reprisals, but his friends and associates are entirely among the Nazi and totalitarian groups. It is a pity that Rios while a reasonably able man and a good looking man is without color or dramatic appeal.

Warmest regards,
Sincerely,

[Signature]

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
January 24, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

You will recall several recent telegrams from Ambassador Bowers urging that certain military and naval matériel immediately be made available to Chile in order to put it in a position to repel the aggression from Japan it appears so much to fear. The War and Navy Departments reviewed their supply situation and authorized me to send a telegram setting forth a list of matériel which could be made available either immediately or in the near future. Mr. Bowers has now sent a message indicating his opinion that the list is entirely inadequate and urging further reconsideration of the situation. It does not seem to me that Mr. Bowers appreciates the exceedingly heavy demands which are now being made on our war production or that the War and Navy Departments, at your direction, made a real effort to furnish to Chile whatever they could spare.

The President,
The White House.
There is submitted for your consideration a suggested telegram to Mr. Bowers. If it meets with your approval I will see that it is dispatched at once.

There are attached hereto copies of the messages between Ambassador Bowers and the Department pertinent to your consideration of this matter.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Draft telegram to Ambassador Bowers.
2. Copies of messages between Ambassador Bowers and the Department of State.
January 24, 1942.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

SANTIAGO (CHILE).

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

I have given the most careful personal consideration to the Chilean military and naval situation as described in your various communications to the Secretary of State. I fully appreciate the necessity for doing everything possible to enable Chile to resist attack from any of the Axis countries. Considerations both of hemisphere defense and of the importance to our own war effort of Chilean strategic materials make this obvious.

The materials listed in the telegram transmitted to you on January 21 by the Department of State were made available at my orders after consultation with General Marshall. You appreciate, I am confident, that the demand for war matériel is very great, not only by our own Army and Navy but by the nations now fighting with us day and night. Production is increasing rapidly, however,
and more materials will be forwarded to Chile just as soon as they become available.

It would be inexcusable to disregard the possibility of a Japanese hit-and-run attack on Chile. On the other hand, it would be equally inexcusable to suppose that any Japanese plan for such an attack would be in any way affected by the particular state of Chile's diplomatic or other relations with Japan at the time. Therefore, I hope that the "full Chilean cooperation" mentioned in your telegram 136 will be immediately forthcoming, since it will be a most valuable contribution to the placing of both our countries in the best possible position to meet all eventualities.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

RA: PWB
PA/|D: DMZ

(Repeat to AMDELGAT, RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)).
Santiago February 2, 1942

Dear Mr President:

Chile has just demonstrated in perfect form that she has a real democracy, and that the people are essentially and basically democratic. All the Axis Powers, including Spain, exerted themselves to the utmost for Ibanez the totalitarian candidate who had the most colossal slush fund in Chilean history. His people paid $7 a vote. Despite this and the fact that the democratic coalition did not have enough money to pay transportation costs in getting their men to the polls from one town where they worked to their voting town Rios has won by more than 50,000 majority, which is a big majority. The passionate democratic feeling here is illustrated by the fact that Alessandri, who hates the groups that won, emerged from his retirement to speak to more than a hundred thousand people in support of Rios in a great oration in which he said, what I have written you before, that the issue was clear cut between democracy and totalitarianism. The issue was clear; the result so decisive that there is no danger of an Ibanez coup d'état. Had the majority been slight that would have been inevitable. As it is Ibanez had issued a statement accepting the verdict of "the urns".

They have a democracy here; and that brings me to this hope -- that we will not be too impatient with democratic processes. The people here, ardent friends of ours included, have been afraid to challenge reprisals from the Axis by breaking off diplomatic relations. So when Rossetti went to Rio it was with instructions from the Government and from Congress to go along on everything but that. He was not a free agent. He is not a dictator. But I have been positive all along that
that he wishes ardently to stand well with us, and within a day or so after reaching Rio he sent a telegram to his Government, which was shown me before he returned, asking fresh instructions to permit him to vote for breaking off relations. It was a strong telegram. As a result the Government acquiesced but asked that the agreement be subject to ratification by Congress.

I met Rossetti along with all the American and some European heads of missions on his arrival at the airport where he got a great ovation. I noticed that not only the German, Italian and Japanese were conspicuous by their absence, but that Luca de la Tena, the Spanish Ambassador, was not there. Whatever we may think, they all think that Rossetti was with us and against them.

I have just seen Rossetti. I saw him Friday evening when with him and Mendez mon. The President, I sat at a widow of the Moneda for forty minutes with watching the assembling for the monster democratic mass meeting when Alessandri made his great speech. They both told me they had no doubt of ratification. This morning Rossetti told me that he is going to the sea shore until the latter part of the week for a much needed sleep, and that he will return and resume his functions on Friday. He said the President proposes to give Congress a recess for twenty days since he does not think it wise to throw the ratification question into Congress when its member have just emerged from a very bitter campaign. He wants the waters to subside before venturing forth. And Rossetti wants some days for personally canvassing the members of Congress. He says he had not any doubt but that Congress will ratify. I asked him about individual members of the Opposition—Cruchaga for one. He says that Cruchaga will vote for ratification.

Colonel Baker has just come in with a telegram from the War Department about doubling the number of Chilean officers with our army and saying that until Chile ratifies this cannot be done for Chile. I have told him with all the emphasis I can command that nothing should be done before the vote in Congress since the doubling for other countries with Chile left out would create bitter resentments that inevitably might have a very grave effect on the result of that
vote. In other words, that nothing be done until after that vote. I am sure you will agree that I am right.

Welles did a magnificent job in Rio. Rossetti is in rhapsodies about him and vain as a peacock over an autographed photograph of Welles who had written some complimentary lines.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House

Claude H. Bowers
Santiago Feb 4, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose a copy of a letter to Weller that may interest you. I have a telegram saying we are about to make a proposition to Chile about sending some guns with American soldiers here for the protection of the mines and power plants. I got the impression they are to be submitted through the Chilean ambassador. If done and made before the notification of the Reu agreement reaches Congress after or about the 20th the one thing that the opposition can use will be swept away.

If we intend to do this, for heaven's sake let's do it before the smaller notification comes up.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,
Claude H. Rovere
Santiago, February 4, 1942

Dear Mr. Welles:

Rossetti gave a full exposition of the Rio Conference to the Council of Ministers yesterday and was warmly congratulated by his colleagues and by Mendez, who said that he had acted precisely in conformity with the instructions of the Government. I have heard much talk against Rossetti at Rio, and since it is evident that much of this is based on a lack of understanding both of his position and his power, I want to go on record on it.

1) Nine tenths of the public men of all parties in Chile including bitter enemies of Germany and warm friends of the United States, like Barros Jarpa, were absolutely opposed to breaking off diplomatic relations because of their coast line and vulnerability and their realization that they lacked the facilities to defend themselves against a surprise attack. Rossetti was miles ahead of nine-tenths in favor of complete cooperation with the United States.

2) He went to Rio under iron clad instructions of the Government and Congress backed by the press without exception. He could not violate his instructions.

3) Two days after the meeting began he telegraphed by Pedregal that he was reported weakening on his instructions and that he should take an advanced stand upon them.

4) He telegraphed the Government asking release from the instructions, strongly urging that he be instructed to go along with sentiment in favor of breaking relations, which was overwhelming in the Conference.

5) As a result of his very strong representations, the Government then agreed to permit him to vote for breaking off relations provided it were stipulated that there should be ratification by Congress. In other words there would have been no agreement on this phase but for the fight Rossetti made.

6)
6) The ratification's hope is in the fight Rossetti will undoubtedly make before Congress. Remember that neither Ortega, Saenz, Mora, Bianchi or Alamas had the courage or enterprise to get a ratification for the agreements of Peru, Panama and Habana, and that Rossetti went to Congress, made the fight, spoke and fought for four hours and got them all ratified. He is a powerful man in debate and very effective and I hope he succeeds in getting the Rio ratification promptly. He thinks he will. As a result of Rio sentiment is changing here; fears are dissipating because of the feeling now that we will help protect the Coast; and there is a general conviction that Chile cannot afford to stand aloof.

Juan Antonio Rios, the new President, attended the cocktail of the Chile-American Society for the visiting American journalists. I talked with him briefly. He is a tall, slender, fine looking man with iron grey hair and a fine eye, looking the President. However, he is not a genius or brilliant but he had good sound sense and is conservative in the better sense. He has not been favorable to breaking relations in the past, but since the Rio Conference he has taken no real position. Were he to intervene in Congress he could do much harm but I have a feeling that since action will be taken before he takes power he will stand aloof. I hope so.

Chile certainly has shown any one but an American "journalist" that she is democratic, following democratic processes perfectly and in a dignified way in elections; and civilized, as few South American nations are, after an election. Ibañez even called to congratulate Rios. At the cocktail, Larrain, who managed Ibañez's campaign, was present and most cordial to him. Cruz Coke, Senator Maza, etc., were there and cordial. I have tried to convince the American journalists here that this is "news". I do not know with what success.

Someone has just sent me a clipping from the Washington Star by Allen Haden which shocks me. The purport is that we are more disliked in Chile than in any country in South America, though Haden knows Argentina. As a matter of fact we are exceedingly popular with the overwhelming majority of the Chileans. It is our cars of the Embassy that are often cheered in the streets. Haden spent much of his time while here with Warner, of the Coordinator's Office who was recalled on my suggestion because he hated Chile and the Chileans, made his hate manifest, wanted to blacklist the Catholic organ, EL DIARIO ILUSTRADO, etc., which I stopped, and he was cordially disliked by all Chileans and all American here. Evidently Haden accepted this man's stuff as gospel. I had a higher opinion of Haden's profession intelligence.
The two were together often and made a trip South together. Happily Haden's article has not been reproduced here. It was McClintock of the Coordinator's Office who sized Warner up and demanded his recall.

The American journalists, making the return visit, have made a very fine impression here and have been writing articles for the Chilean papers that are very useful. They have been given a splendid reception.

I have learned now that Cruchaga and Senator Max Errazuriz retain the honorary presidencies of the "Friends of Germany" and of the "Friends of Japan". I do not see how I can invite to dinners at the Embassy the heads of the organizations. We are at war with the nations of whose organizations they are official heads. I like Cruchaga very much and am sorry. I suppose I have had him to dinner fifteen times. Of course I shall treat him with cordiality as before but I am sure you will agree that he has no place at an official American dinner so long as he retains his post.

Alessandri and I have become great pals, exchanging letters and compliments constantly. I admire his great ability but have been deterred from cultivating him until recently because of his attitude toward the Government. This is changed. He rose magnificently above party and prejudice and his really magnificent speech for Rios in my opinion swept Santiago into the Rios column when the Rios people had reconciled themselves to losing the City.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude G. Bowers
Santiago, February 20, 1942

Dear Mr President:

I inclose copy of a letter from President-elect Rios in which you will note that the special preoccupation of his administration will be collaboration with all the American republics "and most particularly with the great Democracy of the United States of America". I am to see him for a long talk next week and shall go into everything and particularly into the breaking of relations.

There is a strange misconception at home regarding Rossetti at Rio. We must bear in mind that Chile is a democracy, not a dictatorship; that no one man can do as he pleases but must follow democratic processes; that the mission headed by Rossetti was under absolute instructions against breaking relations at this juncture; and that he could not do other than he was instructed. These instructions were in line with general public opinion here. I know personally know, that within two days he began hammering the Government with requests for a change in the instructions to permit him to go along. And I am convinced that the formula reached would have been impossible but for the fight he was making all the time with his Government.

The agreements of Rio will go to Congress probably next week. It is Rossetti's plan first to ask for a vote of approval on his course at Rio. That will be forthcoming. He will then immediately at the same meeting ask that all the agreements reached at Rio be ratified. He now has a card in his hand he has not had before—he is in position
to inform Congress in secret session of the war material we are sending for the protection of the coast; since the one strong objection to breaking relations has been that it would be unwise to issue a challenge without having anything with which to protect the coast. He is clever and powerful in debate and has come through on more than one occasion because of the fight he has made in Congress in debates in secret sessions. I hope, can only hope, he will succeed here.

No one opposing breaking relations doubts that this is inevitable and may come at any moment, and most agree that Chile will be in the war soon. But many take the position that Chile's friendship and support of the United States should follow the line our Government did in the case of England until attacked. These, of course, overlook the fact that Chile has agreed that an attack on one of the American Republics is an attack on each and all. That I shall try to impress on Rios. But I have no indications that Rios is opposing ratification.

We have the opinion of Buenos Aires, through Armour, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs there had a conversation with Rios on the border. This when mentioned by the press here was stoutly denied by the Government which only said however that it had arranged no such meeting; and it was announced too that Rios would not go to Argentine soil. That would not have prevented Rios from seeing the Argentine on Chilean soil. I shall be in better position to guess after I have had my talk with Rios who has been in the South.

It looks as though the next Minister of Foreign Affairs here will be either Jorge Matta several times Minister under Alessandri, or Barros Jarpa. The former is old and ill and may not accept and I do not know precisely his attitude. But Barros Jarpa is militantly, openly, a champion of the United States and a close friend of mine. He, too,
was Minister under Alessandri.

I heard Welles recent speech on the radio perfectly. It made a good impression here and should have a good effect in the ratification matter.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude M. Bowen

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House.
Excellency:

I have received with particular pleasure your kind note of the second of this month in which you congratulate me on my election as President of the Republic of Chile.

I appreciate in all their value the concepts to which you refer in the electoral act. My Government will have as its special preoccupation collaboration with all the countries of American and more particularly with the United States of North America.

I assure Your Excellency that during my Administration the ties of friendship between Chile and the great Democracy of the North which you so worthily represent will be strengthened.

With assurances of my highest esteem and consideration,

(signed) JUAN ANTONIO RIOS
Santiago, February 25, 1942

Dear Mr President:

Since writing the letter to Welles, a copy inclosed, I have learned definitely that Barros Jarpa is to be the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and will give his acceptance tonight. He is a militant pro-American and has been for years, so much so that when a president for the Chile-American Cultural Institute was selected four years ago he was naturally chosen. He was Minister under Alessandri. He is a leading lawyer, a very able man, a lecturer on international law at the University. Recently he has written articles for the press attacking the Axis and Japan and in a notable speech at the University he did the same and at the same time made a spirited defence of our policies. I do not know a single Chilean whom I would rather trust as far as we are concerned.

But like practically all the leaders of Chile, like practically all the press, and most of the people who are pro-American, he does not think Chile should break off relations until something in the nature of an attack on Chile or an interference with her shipping of war material to the States occurs. He takes the position that the breaking of relations ineritably would be followed with the sinking or attacks on ships, and that so long as Chile can continue sending this material without molesta­tion the gain is not only Chile's but ours. He thinks that sooner or later and probably soon the attack will be made and then all public opinion outside Nazi and Fifth Column circles would back the Government in breaking relations. We may think otherwise but on my responsibility I state this as a fact—that Chile does not favor an unprovoked breaking of relations and I mean by that Chileans who are mili­tantly pro-American.
Because of his attitude on this one thing he is clearly disturbed about accepting the post offered. I personally think we cannot do as well anywhere else.

If he accepts, Rios, the president-elect, wishes him to go at once before the inauguration to the States to discuss with the Department every phase of Chilean relations and since he is a very reasonable, able man with a capacity to give and take I have a feeling that grounds would be laid for the elimination of all misunderstandings that may exist. It occurs to me that he might be converted to our view on the breaking of relations.

I am a bit concerned for fear that a delay in breaking relations may lead to press denunciations of Chile and reprisals which would certainly make us no friends in Chile and unquestionably would lose us many of our best friends. I have cabled Welles this view and the hope that we will exercise patience for the moment at least.

The Chileans are a peculiar people and a very proud people, and they are very much against yielding to pressure from the outside. They showed that when Franco broke relations and gave out an insulting statement. To my amazement every paper, including the most rabid anti-Government papers, went aggressively to the support of the Government. I am hoping therefore that there will be no precipitate reprisals and that Barros Jarpa can be convinced in Washington.

I dislike to bother you but this impresses me as so important that it is my duty to get this exposition of the situation to Washington.

With warmest regards,
Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Dear Mr. Welles:

During the last two days I have had long conversations with the President-elect, Rios, with Acting President Mendez and with Rossetti. I cabled the substance of my conversation with Rossetti (My telegram No. 323 February 25, 8 am). I got the distinct impression, taking into consideration the character of Rossetti, that he actually believes that Congress will ratify the agreements of Rio and that the actual breaking of relations thus made possible without any further reference to Congress will be left to the new Administration. In this connection he said that while he had personally not discussed the matter with Rios, three others had told him that from their conversations with Rios they were convinced that Rios is ready to break.

There is no longer any thought in Rossetti's mind of remaining on as Minister, and I am persuaded that he had fixed his hope on the ambassadorship in Rio which he will scarcely get unless he acts decisively and courageously on the breaking of relations.

My conversation with Mendez was very cordial. He is in no sense a great man but by no means the utterly colorless and characterless figure he was pictured in some of the wise-cracking American journals. He is a fine physician, a real humanitarian, kindly, honest, very moderate, and the fact that he does have character is manifest in the fact that he has maintained order and tranquility under difficult conditions during a critical period. He said that his Government's feeling toward the United States is one of complete coordination and cooperation, of a realization that his is best for the Chilean people, and that we can count on Chile's help in every way in connection with the war. That he hates the Axis and its allies is very clear. He said something rather indefinite to the effect that Chile has some problems peculiar to itself which makes it wise to move with some caution and deliberation but he clearly wished to make it clear that this should not be interpreted as being under the pressure of the Axis. He clearly feels that sooner or later Chile will be attacked.

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Rossetti said very emphatically that any one who thinks that by refusing to break relations with the Axis powers Chile can escape attack is stupid; that from the view point of realism it is inevitable that the Axis and Japan will sink or attack Chilean ships and industries to prevent the sending to the States of our war needs; that for the moment Japan probably feels that nothing can be gained by an attack but that this merely means that she is not ready. Thus he answers very realistically and wisely the arguments against breaking relations. He is a queer combination. I am persuaded that his bad impression in Rio was due to his vanity. He should have been very frank about the obstacles and difficulties he faced because of his lack of power beyond his instructions. But to have admitted that he is not a powerful figure dictating the policies of Chile would have hurt his vanity. Thus he posed evidently as a man having the power and authority to do what he pleased.

My conversation of an hour with Juan Antonio Rios was most pleasant. He began in a very complimentary strain of personal compliments apropos of my work here, and went on to say that he wishes to go along with the United States in complete cooperation. He said his personal and professional relations with American business here had given him a better understanding of the psychology of North Americans than most Chileans had. He said that he had received many clippings from the North American press on his election which he deeply appreciated.

He then made it clear that he will change the Minister of Foreign Affairs and that the new man will be a sincere friend of the United States and one known to the American. I said that while I have no right to ask, it would be appreciated if he were in position to inform me for Washington the name of the man he has in mind. I told him laughingly that at Viña the other day I had seen Barros Jarpa and had begun my conversation with him by asking him when he was going to take office; that he began talking of something else and that I had repeated the question as impudently as I could, and that he had passed it off with a joke. Rios asked me when I had seen Barros Jarpa. I told him last Friday. He laughed and said that I was "warm". I told him I had heard three men mentioned as possibilities, Barros Jarpa, Jorge Matte and Benjamin Claw. He seemed surprised when I mentioned Claro and I have since heard that Ben is to be Minister of Education or is to succeed to the well-paid job now held by Rios. He then said that there is no objection to telling me confidentially who is to be his Foreign Minister but that he cannot answer since the man he has in mind is to give him his answer at eight o'clock tonight. The moment the thing is settled he will give me the information in confidence for transmission to Washington.

I got the impression that it is to be Barros Jappa. This gentleman side-stepped at Viña in my conversation with him and
implied that his practice is such that he could not afford it but I suspect that since he had not been made a definite offer he protected himself by side-stepping the question. He certainly is an outstanding and most able opponent of the Axis Powers and in a speech at the University of Chile he made a powerful speech against them. He is also very partial to the United States, militantly so, and for three years has been the President of the Chile-American Cultural Institute. He was twice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Alessandri, of whom he is a close personal friend. He meets our desires on everything but one, he does not think it wise to break diplomatic relations without a specific offense aimed at Chile. This is not due to any friendly feeling for Germany, Italy or Japan, all of whose policies and purposes he has attacked formally in public. But there it is. He is moderate, reasonable, most friendly and partial to us, and on the whole he would be a good selection from our point of view. I doubt if it would be possible to get anyone else so acceptable. His relations with the whole American business colony are close and intimate. He is a great admirer of Roosevelt, Hull and yourself.

Since writing the above Barros Jarpa sent for a member of my staff with a message to me to the effect that he is the man who is to give his answer by eight o'clock tonight. He apparently was worried because while actually militantly pro-American on everything in general he, like most of the other Chileans, thinks it would be unwise to break off relations until a specific reason is furnished. He says that Rios wishes him to go immediately to the United States for the purpose of a general survey conversation with the Department covering the whole field. At nine o'clock he informed us that he had accepted.

Whatever may happen or not happen during the next month, before the new administration comes in, I think it would be unwise to indulge in any reprisals against Chile and especially before Barros Jarpa has an opportunity to reach Washington, since it seems possible to me that he may be won over from this one point and on every other point of our policies I think he is completely with us.

Congress is to be called for next Monday and Rossetti thinks the discussion may drag along for ten days or so, but he acts as though he has counted noses and knows that ratification will follow with a large majority in the Chamber and a small majority in the Senate, where the old reactionary hold-overs have a third of the votes. There is little we can do about it beyond working on Rossetti to make a fight. I talked very bluntly and strongly to him, along the line of your suggestion but his only reaction was that I need "not worry", that the agreement would be ratified, and that within a short time diplomatic relations will be broken. It would be a great blunder, considering Chilean character, to attempt to work on
members of the Deputies or Senate, since anything in the way of outside pressure would be resented and do more harm than good.

I have just heard that before the Rio Conference the Embassy in Buenos Aires had the exact formula we favored regarding the breaking of relations. I assume from this that some clerk in the Department by oversight failed to send that formula to us. It would have been very helpful to have had it since it would have permitted a lot of spade work. We were taken by surprise in the Embassy here when it developed at Rio that the breaking of relations was considered by us the crux of the whole conference. I had sent you my conversation with Rossetti in which he made clear the reluctance of the Government here to break relations at this time and this may have persuaded the Department that nothing could be accomplished at this end.

I have just had some side lights on Rossetti at Rio which throws an entirely different light upon his conduct there. I understand that he tried to do a lot of heavy bargaining amounting almost to an attempt at blackmailing Brazil and the United States. I know that is the opinion of Barros Jarpa. All I had heard before was in connection with his failure to get authority to go along with the plan for breaking relations. He certainly was not wholly responsible for that as he had his instructions and there was no possible way for him to evade his instructions.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,
Dear Mr President:

Barros Jarpa, the forthcoming Minister of Foreign Affairs just left my house after an hour conversation. As I wrote you it would be impossible to find any one in public life in Chile so notoriously sincerely and militantly pro-American. He was and still is President of the Chile-American Cultural Institute appointed by us five years ago. The British Ambassador called me yesterday to say we must be pleased at his appointment.

He told us a few days ago that President-elect Rios had told him he wished him to go at once to Washington for frank and broad discussions with you, Hull and Welles about Chilean collaboration. Today he tells me that Rios has changed him mind about the time and now thinks it best for him to go immediately or very soon after taking office. His reason is that should he go now he is afraid of resentment on the part of Rossetti, and possibly the present Government, and that the former might, in resentment, take some step that would greatly embarrass his Administration. Barros Jarpa said he thought he would suggest to Rios that Ben Cohen, whom you probably know and who certainly is well known to Welles, and who is now Ambassador to Bolivia, be sent now, under the pretext of business or pleasure, to make a preliminary survey of the whole scene with our Government. This, he thinks might simplify his own work when he goes.
Barros Jarpa is a very able man, an erudite international lawyer, a former Foreign Minister, a leader of the Bar, dignified, high-minded, honest, frank and personally charming. He has been one of my best friends ever since I came. We all at the Embassy are pleased with his appointment despite his feeling that the time is not ripe for breaking relations. Unfortunately this view is shared here by all Chileans including the most ardent of our friends. They all admit that Chile will be attacked and will instantly not only break relations but probably declare war. They cite our attitude toward England during the first two years and insist theirs is precisely the same toward us and that they will act as we did when the condition which confronted us in December arises. We all combat this as much as possible but with the sentiment so unanimous, or almost so, it is very difficult to make progress.

Last night Miles Sherover was at the house. He is very eager to join in the war work, regardless of pay. I know our people at the Department do not care for him much but since he speaks Russian, knows Russian psychology, and knows Russian leaders since floating the Russian bonds, he might be used to advantage in some connection in the embassy at Moscow.

The press here carries a story from Madrid of a government function there in honor of the thirty aviators in the Spanish army who are leaving to fight with Hitler against the Russians.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago March 16, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

The inclosed copy of a letter to Welles may throw some light on the present Chilean outlook.

With warmest regard,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Santiago, March 16, 1942

Dear Mr. Welles:

I am rather concerned over two things, - one, recent complications which are clearly creating irritation both in Washington and Santiago, and second the evident misconception in the United States of the attitude of Chile on the war. It is possible that a review of the situation as seen here at the present time and an analysis of the figures in the forthcoming Government with whom we shall have to deal may be of some service.

The overwhelming mass of the Chilean people are wholly with the United Nations and against the Axis. The decisive victory of Rios over Ibañez who frankly stood for the Totalitarian point of view does not measure the extent of this partiality for the United States. Many thousand of partisans, eager to get rid of the Popular Front, but in no sense Totalitarians or pro-Nazi, voted for Ibañez. These men were shortsighted, small-bore politicians and partisans who did not realize that they were playing into the hands of Hitler.

In our various negotiations with the Chileans we have encountered in some quarters a bargaining spirit indicative less of a desire to stand with us because of the principle involved than of getting all possible out of us in the way of credits, etc. You found that Rossetti in Rio was such a bargainer, but I am afraid we must not single him out for condemnation. It is the Chilean spirit. Pedregal is infinitely worse I think. He was once overheard saying at a dinner: "I will stay with the Yankees as long as the money holds out" But this represents the viewpoint of the business men and the politicians and not of the major part of the people. Unfortunately the press reflects the views of the politicians and business element, not of the major part of the people.

It is difficult to find many public men who frankly are sympathetic toward the Axis. Some who I am sure are sympathetic will stoutly maintain that they are not. The two outstanding friends of the Axis who puzzle me not a little are Cruchaga and

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
and Senator Max Errazuriz. The first of whom holds on to the honorary presidency of the German organization, and entirely Nazi organization and the second maintains his position as the head of the Japanese organization. Cruchaga I have tried to excuse but when he presided over a farewell dinner given by Friends of Germany to Leisewitz, and at his age toured the country with Ibañez, I abandoned the effort. Politically, however, Cruchaga is passé. His association with the Friends of Germany is unfortunate however because of his past prestige, and his intimate identification with the Church. He makes a fine banner.

While his age and his not unnatural indisposition to break old social ties at his time of life offers something in extenuation, I find absolutely nothing in the case of Errazuriz. He has no close social friends among the Japanese of whom there are few in Chile. When old friends of his have expressed their astonishment that he does not resign he asks "Why should I? It would only irritate them?" He too is an outstanding layman of the Church. I cannot accept as a friend of the United States at this time anyone who heads a Japanese organization.

These two, Cruchaga and Errazuriz, are principal owners of the Carrera Radio, and so anxious have I been to bring them into the fold that when Jim Farley's Coca-Cola people gave a very large advertising contract to radios and did not include the Carrera, I wrote Farley explaining the situation and asking him to remember it in the future. These men tell us that they refused an enormous contract from the Axis and hoped to make up the loss by support of American and British businessmen and I have asked our people to remember them. This, however, was before Japan launched her attack on us. By all the rules a radio station owned by the head of a Nazi organization and by the head of a Japanese organization would be put on the blacklist. But so long as it does not spread Axis propaganda I would be opposed to this because of its relation to the Church through the ownership of two outstanding laymen.

These two men are members of the Senate where they have influence, especially with the opposition, and they may be put down as opposed to breaking relations.

(2) ACTIVITIES OF ALLIED MISSIONS.

Our cause is handicapped here by the intense activity of the Axis Powers, including Spain, through their embassies and legation. Having no trade matters to look after all four concentrate on propaganda. Very few of the Allied missions do more than mark time.

The British Embassy is an exception of course and is doing
a great deal in the way of propaganda. Its propaganda section is especially worthy of commendation. Sir Charles Orde, the Ambassador is not well, and his methods lack the brute force of the Axis diplomats.

The Yugoslav Minister, Dr. Kolombatovic, is intensely and effectively active. After the Germans, the Yugoslavs have the largest and most prosperous colony here. They are ardently devoted to their country and are intensively organized. They follow Kolombatovic blindly, contributing money whenever asked. They have the brute force that matches that of the Germans and the Germans cannot pound the table any louder than Kolombatovic. He is an educated man, speaking English, French, Spanish, Yugoslav, Russian and German and he saw service in the Army and understands espionage. He talks bluntly to the Foreign Office.

The Dutch Minister, or Chargé, von Oven, is an ardent patriot but wholly ineffective. His wife is more aggressive. There is a fair sized Dutch colony that could be used to greater advantage.

The Polish Minister, Mazurkiewicz, does little beyond giving masses for the Polish martyrs, etc.

The Danish Minister, stationed at Buenos Aires, impresses me greatly, but he is seldom here, and Theodor Wessel, the Chargé, is a pleasant man, married to an American woman, but he seldom visits the Foreign Office and does nothing that I can discover.

The Chinese Minister is active but young and inexperienced and of course has no colony to back him, none worth while. He does go to the Foreign Office however and he wants to act closely in conjunction with us.

The Belgian Minister, Gerard, seemed for a time completely crushed by the fate of his country, but he has recovered and is more active, though he seldom goes to the Foreign Office.

Whenever anything comes up of any importance, the German, Italian, Spanish, Ambassadors and the Japanese Minister move in quick succession to the Foreign Office, but only the British, Yugoslav and ourselves among the Allies combat their efforts.

(3) THE SOUTH AMERICANS.

Gracie, the Brazilian Ambassador, has become very active and forceful in dealing with the Foreign Office. He was so indifferent at first that I had no confidence in his position but since Arañas visit here he has changed and is now the most energetic and effective diplomat in furthering our aims.
Señor Nieto Caballero, the Columbian Ambassador, and
Garcia Salazar, the Peruvian, are certainly with us but they
seem to hold back— are not very forceful. Of course, Nieto
has but recently arrived.

Guiralde, the Argentine, is as active against our cause
as the German, Italian or Spanish Ambassadors, with whom he
mostly associates. Ostría Gutierrez, the Bolivian, is a
strong, forceful man and gives us excellent support.

Spindola, the Mexican, since the change in Administration
in Mexico, has been very active and forceful in dealing with
the Foreign Office.

The Ministers of Panamá and Venezuela are with us but
not very effective or active.

(4) JUAN ANTONIO RIOS

Juan Antonio Rios is a handsome man who "looks like a
President" and is friendly to the United States. He is not
a great man and he has neither the humanitarian traits nor
the idealism of Aguirre Cerdá, nor the brilliance and color
of Alessandri. He is a lawyer whose practice has largely been
in the corporation field and he has been connected profession-
ally with the American businesses here and for a time was on
the board of the Telephone Company. I am sure we shall have
nothing to fear from him in the matter of protecting American
interests here. The danger is that he will think this all
we should ask him in the way of pro-Americanism. He is apt
to confuse Big Business with the United States and I suspect
that he is certain that "Dollar Diplomacy" and not the "Good
Neighbor Policy" reflects the United States. He wants
American money invested in Chile but on a fifty-fifty basis.
In the campaign he took a square position for democracy and
against totalitarianism indirectly but he refrained from any
comments that totalitarians would resent. Reared in the
South among the Germans, with whom his political career began,
he got a surprisingly large vote in the German centers of
Valdivia and Osorno, but this was probably personal. His
wife is a German and I hear that she is very pro-German and
that there have been family quarrels on the war. It is said
a divorce was pending, because of a mistress, when he was
nominated for President, then his wife concluded she could
tolerate the mistress for residence in the Moneda.

He has said that Congress will not pass on the Rio
agreements until after his inauguration, and he certainly
has never indicated any disposition to break diplomatic
relations. I am informed by Barros Jarpa, who is to be his
Foreign Minister, that in his inaugural address he will skirt
around the Rio agreements and merely say that if the breaking of relations becomes necessary he will consult Congress. In brief, I think we can count wholly on his economic collaboration but at this time I am not so sure of his political collaboration to the extent desired by us. He is very cagey about that.

I do not gather from anything I have heard that he is more than superficially interested in a program of social amelioration but that his attitude toward labor is very much that of our own Chamber of Commerce. He is a bitter enemy of the communists and Barros Jarpa tells me that he will stand no nonsense from them. He will try to curtail their activities. I am a bit afraid he may go so far as to precipitate social disorders since he will be very apt to interpret any demand of labor on wages or working conditions as "communistic".

I am giving you the dark side, hoping that I may be wrong.

Barros Jarpa is certainly sincerely pro-American. He bases his opposition to breaking diplomatic relations on the belief that it would be but an idle gesture calculated to invite attack when Chile is not prepared for the defense of its coast. He finds Chile's position in its relation to the United States precisely that of our position in relation to England during the first two years of the war. He said to me that Pan-Americanism does not contemplate the determination of the foreign policy of any one nation by a majority vote of the whole. This interested me, since I have heard from Aguirre Cerda, Foreign Ministers and other public men bitter resentment of the action of some nations in South America in publicly proposing and publicly urging the adoption of some action on all American nations without previous diplomatic consultations.

But not withstanding all this, he insists that Chile will go along with the United States in the war.

This may furnish the Department with some background material and be helpful.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,
Santiago, April 2, 1942

Dear Mr President:-

I inclose herewith a copy of a letter to Mr Welles which may contain information you would like to have.

I am firmly of the opinion that if the Government here, shy of anything that may annoy the Axis, continues to hold back from the public the various contributions we are making to the economic life and national defence of Chile, this information should be given to the United and Associated Press in Washington and sent here for the local press. We have popular sentiment with us, but with the Axis propaganda lying about us and with Government here withholding from the public, as it so often has done, our contributions, I feel we must give our friends the facts. I took up with El Mercurio the failure of the press to give us credit for the coast defence material and the owner followed with a strong fine editorial.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago, April 2, 1942

Dear Mr. Welles:

The clear intent of Ruiz Guiñazú’s visit was to exert pressure on Chile to go along with Argentina on her war policy, and all the Axis missions here, including, of course, the Spanish, also part of the Axis, prepared to make a Roman holiday. The Government here was embarrassed as I wrote you or rather wired you. That Rossetti was in earnest about it I learned later in a strange way from Barros Jarpa who told me that Rossetti showed him a telegram to Michels instructing him to inform our Government in the sense of his talk with me. I was a bit surprised to hear Barros Jarpa say that he had disapproved. Rossetti gave a luncheon for Guiñazú but invited no diplomats, just the members of the Guíñazú mission and members of the Foreign Office staff. Members of my staff who have seen him in the street report that no one was paying any attention to him. My daughter happened to pass the Moneda when he made his much advertised appearance there to call on the Acting President and was amazed to find not more than a dozen people standing about, though on such occasions usually there is a large crowd.

The climax came when Guiñazú delivered his address at the University of Chile to which the entire Diplomatic Corps was invited. Not one solitary member of the diplomatic missions of South and Central America attended. I did not. None of the European Allies attended except the poor Pole, who is a nice well meaning fellow but a bit dull and who was frightened to note the absence of all diplomats except those of the Axis – the German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese, all with all their military members in uniform. This has been the topic of much conversation in the Corps.

The next morning the superb article of the U. P. to the effect that we are not furnishing war material to Argentina now because of her failure to cooperate on a policy of continental defense appeared, conspicuously displayed, in all the leading

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
leading papers and created something of a sensation. It helped to increase the governmental timidity here regarding Guinazu. That night Guinazu spoke by invitation before the House of Deputies. It was a bromidic speech but he managed to get something about the desire of Argentina and Chile to remain neutral in the war. On the whole the Guinazu visit has been a dismal flop.

Yesterday in response to the expression of a desire of Gonzalez Videla to meet me, I invited him with a senatorial friend of his and four others to a quiet luncheon at my house. He stayed until four o'clock, from one, and talked very freely. He is a handsome man and really brilliant and altogether charming. He was enthusiastic about the U. P. story of that morning. He thought that we are not using enough of that sledge hammer kind of propaganda. The Axis is using the most unscrupulous methods, lying, etc., and taking advantage of the traditional feeling in Chile in favor of neutrality in ordinary wars to get in their work against breaking relations. He actually did not know about the coast defense material we have already set up here. He thought that few do know. As you know I told Rossetti he could give out the story of the arrival of the guns, in accordance with instructions, but some days went by before anything was said in the press and then it came in the form of a brief statement from the Minister of Defense which was not what it should have been. I did not feel at liberty without instructions from Washington to give it out from the Embassy. You may recall that I suggested that it be given out in Washington to the U. P. with the request that it be given a full play here.

Gonzalez commented on the fact that our A. P. and U. P. do not appear to be doing any pro-American war work on their own and he said that the French agency, the German agency, the Italian agency, the Spanish agency, all are engaged in constantly propaganda mostly predicated on lies, while our agencies can in such stories as appeared yesterday serve our cause enormously by printing the truth. He said that the United States has a very great popular following in Chile but that we must give them something to talk about.

Cecil Lyon thought that Gonzalez was implying that he would be glad to look after Chilean propaganda for us, but the idea did not occur to me, nor to others present, thought it may be true. My impression that he is slated for a diplomatic post blinded me at least to such an impression. Whether we could make use of Gonzalez, if such was in his mind, depends in my opinion entirely on his relations to Rios. As far as I know they are good. Because of Gonzalez' fight with Marcial Mora for refusing to extend the day for the primary three days to give Gonzalez a chance to get to the people, an attempt was made to expel Gonzalez from the Radical party. It resulted
in failure and Morahas resigned the Presidency of the Party.

Just have your letter of the 26th. It is queer that even after the date of your letter Barros Jarpa spoke to me about Arturo Alessandri being offered the post if feelers indicate a willingness. However, as I informed you, he said at the same time that if Alessandri will not take it no change would probably be made. I wonder if Rios is acting on such things without keeping Barros Jarpa informed.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Dear Claude:

April 28, 1942

I have received your letter of April 16, 1942 with which you enclosed a copy of your letter of April 15, addressed to Sumner Welles.

There has, to my knowledge, been no intimation by any responsible officer of the Government of the United States that this Government is contemplating any deliberately unfavorable action against any friendly country such as Chile which has not as yet seen fit to take drastic action against our enemies to the extent at least of breaking relations. From a purely realistic point of view, there would seem to be nothing to gain from such action on our part. As I believe Sumner Welles has mentioned to you, however, there will naturally be some matters with respect to which the nations who have broken relations with the Axis will inevitably receive treatment different from the treatment received by those countries which continue to maintain a semblance of neutrality. But this difference will be due to the necessity for giving preferential assistance to those countries which are cooperating most closely with us.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of April 23, 1942 enclosing a letter of April 16, 1942 which you have received from Ambassador Bowers at Santiago.

There is enclosed for your consideration a draft of a reply to Ambassador Bowers.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Draft of reply.

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. SUMNER WELLES

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Letter from Claude Bowers, April 16, Santiago, Chile to the Pres.
Dear Mr. President:

I am rather sorry that we have decided against the acceptance of an invitation to Wallace or Welles to be the guest of the Chilean Nation since it had seemed to me that if offered the opportunity which means so much in a soundly democratic country like this to reach and marshall public opinion which determines governmental action in accordance with the principles of democracy. It is true that Chile has moved slowly and has not broken relations yet but it is moving slowly in the right direction and the foreign policy here is in the hands of a Minister who is ardently and sincerely our friend, a real champion of democracy and well known as an uncompromising enemy of Totalitarianism or dictatorships. A dictator can fix a policy today which may be all we ask for, and if the fortunes of war away against us tomorrow and the prospects of our enemies brighten, he can change the policy over night; but the real democratic convictions of the Chilean people would make that change here impossible.

Yesterday at a banquet given at the Air Field in honor of the American aviators who brought the fifteen planes I made a speech presenting the American flag sent by you and General Marshall. In the speech I got in the fact that we have thus served Chile at a sacrifice; and General Castro in his reply said Chile would never forget the sacrifice we had made. I sat beside Barros Jarpa and had a long talk with him on Chilean policy. He is clearly unhappy over the situation.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
situation. He said that his hesitancy about going to Washington is due to the fact that until Chile breaks relations his position there among a people highly worked up naturally on the war would be difficult in that until relations are broken he could not say to interviewers the things he would like to say and that we would have him say; that this would make Chile's position with the American public more unfortunate than now. He then said that there are certain things he wants to do and thinks he can do speedily. He wants to remove the pro-Nazi Ambassador in Argentina and send Luis Subercaseaux; he wants to suppress the Nazi paper here, the ALEMAN; and he wants to go after all the pro-Axis activities here, the agents, spies, propagandists, and all organizations enemies of the United States and wipe them out. He made this astonish statement: "The only possible justification for our present policy of legal neutrality would be to proceed drastically against all these enemies of the United States."

I told him I thought it is a great mistake to postpone indefinitely his trip to Washington, that the misunderstandings could be wiped out in intimate conferences, that postwar matters would be considered and that I am afraid that if Chile holds off from such a conference while other nations are holding them Chile may find in the end that she has missed the boat. I shall continue to press him on this.

I confess that I cannot understand clearly the psychology here about the breaking of relations. Barros Jarpa said something vaguely which suggested to me the possibility that there are party considerations involved which do not meet with his approval.

Our situation is much better I think than ever before. Gracie, the Brazilian Ambassador, agrees with this. The press is very friendly. My relations with the leaders here both of the Government and the Opposition are most cordial, on terms of personal friendship. With patience I feel we shall get in the end all we want. Today I am having an intimate luncheon at the house with Arturo Alessandri, the former President, Senator Alessandri, his son, Barros Jarpa and wife, Cruchaga, Marcial Mora, the Radical, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance, and the Agustín Edwards.
With both Barros Jarpa and President Rios worried, with the desire of both of them to have close relations with us, with public opinion and the press becoming more and more on our side, I am persuaded that with patience we shall get what we want.

I am writing similarly to Welles.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude H. Bowers.
Dear Claude:

I hope that the vigorous campaign which you are initiating, according to your letter of April 29, 1942, will bear fruit in a changed Chilean attitude, and I understand from Mr. Welles that the measures you have suggested to him are undergoing study.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable

Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of May 11, 1942 enclosing for preparation of reply a letter dated April 29, 1942 from Ambassador Bowers. There is enclosed a suggested reply for your consideration, and signature if you approve.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

2. Suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

BUREAU RA
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 5/14/42

ADDRESSSED TO
The President, The White House.
Dear Mr President:

I inclose a copy of a letter to Welles that may interest you. It gives some indication of the conditions with which we have to deal here. I am firmly convinced that the time has come to talk rather bluntly to our friends. Our great trouble is that our real friends are apparently afraid to stand up for us publicly while the Axis crowd hammers away at us. I am now arranging with a number of Chileans who will sign letters to the papers answering the attacks --letters I shall write or inspire. They are easily and effectively answered. I sometimes think that the trouble here as in some parts of our own country is that the cheaper politicians are afraid of the "German vote". Day before yesterday the Illustrado, organ of the Church had a two and a half column review of a book on the Rio Conference which would have the Pan-American Union mean merely a union of the South American states and which creates the impression that we are not real friends of these States. The author had the audacity to attack insultingly the 18 nations that have gone with us by breaking relations. I arranged with a Chilean to write an answer of equal length which was quite as downright and this appeared today in the Illustrado. Strange thing about this paper. I am convinced that at heart it is totalitarian and it certainly is reactionary but it publishes everything we ask and publishes more in our favor than any other paper here.
We are all deeply interested in what really is happening in Italy. Of course she is practically out of the war and is as much a conquered country as Belgium. Possibly she wants peace. But peace with Mussolini would be absurd. A peace with him in power at the conclusion would scarcely be a victory for democracy. I feel the same way about Franco and Suner. Here the Italians are under cover, ashamed in public, inactive or at least so ineffective that they may be ignored. The Japs are the most insolent. The Francoist the most sneaking and in propaganda in certain quarters the most valuable to Hitler.

I have hopes that under Morales, the new Prime Minister, something will actually be done to wipe out the Axis agents and Fifth Column conspirators. He talked very frankly to me, initiating the conversation along this line, and the next day he sent the new head of the bureau of investigations, Colonel Frias to see me. I was much impressed by him, and plans were made for close collaboration. We shall soon see what we shall see.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
My dear Mr. Welles:

Late in the day I last write you, I saw Barros Jarpa and had a rather straight and downright conversation with him, taking advantage of my personal relations with him before he entered the Ministry. I began by observing lightly that the Brazilian Ambassador had protested against the insult to his country by the Nazi propaganda sheet called EL ALEMAN. He said he had. I then said that, of course, I felt 100 per cent sympathy with the Brazilian. But, I added, "the United States and President Roosevelt have been atrociously lied about and outrageously attacked for many months in both this paper and EL CHILINGO". I said that I have sympathy with the laws guaranteeing the liberty of the press, but that he, Barros Jarpa, knew perfectly well that these two papers, financed, subsidized by the Axis, are not legitimate newspapers but mere propaganda sheets, concentrating on attacks on the United States. I then said in substance:

"The fact is that I have been greatly embarrassed by the tone and color of the press. For example: For many months the Chilean Government begged me to impress on Washington the vital need of batteries for coast defense, for planes, etc., and, agreeing with that need, I made many personal appeals not only to Mr. Welles but even to the President. I actually fought Chile's battle on that issue. You, know, of course, it was a bad time to get arms from us. Our own Army was insisting that we could use everything we could produce. Our Allies, fighting with us, Britain, China, and Russia were in dire need of these guns and planes. But in the end we made the sacrifice for Chile, and the batteries arrived. They arrived with men sent to give the necessary instructions to the Chilean Army on the use of the guns.

Now, you know, I have been utterly amazed by the fact that I have yet to hear one word of appreciation".

"Do you mean from the Government?", asked the Minister.

"Well, yes. The fact is that I have not had one word of

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
of appreciation from the Government, outside personal words from the Army and Navy, but I was not thinking so much of that. I was thinking of the press. (Lying a bit) I said that I had been instructed to send to Washington the reactions of the press."

"And", I went on, "we searched the Santiago papers microscopically and I was unable to find one single syllable of appreciation. On the contrary" -- and here I took up several copies of ALEMAN and EL CHILENO having each double page, sensationally headlined attacks on us for sending this material -- "on the contrary I found these. Here, time and again, in these Axis propaganda sheets, we are accused of having actually bullied a reluctant and embarrassed Chile into taking these guns against her wishes. We are accused with having actually sent "an army of occupation". The Chileans were invited to hang their heads in shame as long as 'the foot of the invader is on Chilean soil'. The public was told, falsely, that the Americans went as a great courtesy to instruct the Chilean Army in the use of these guns, were insulting to Chilean officers.

"Now you can understand my embarrassment. I had urged that this material so earnestly and persistently asked to be sent and I had to send to Washington -- all there was to send nothing but these foul attacks on use for having dared send it.

"This attitude of the press concerns me greatly because human nature is human nature everywhere, and Chile needs other things that we can furnish only at a sacrifice, and when I urge the sending of these I am afraid that our experience in the case of what we have sent will not be a strong inducement."

Here Barros Jarpa told me that the press had said nothing about the arrival of the batteries on instructions of the Government then in power.

"But", I said, "after the Axis subsidized propaganda sheets had flooded the streets with the story of their arrival along with denunciations of us for forcing them on Chile, it was no longer a secret. A statement of the facts would then have seemed to be in order -- but not a word".

He then said that a meeting of certain Ministers had been called by Morales, Minister of the Interior, to consider what can be done about these papers. I said I hoped something could be done to protect the friends of Chile from insults.

II
II

There is one way to reach these Axis propaganda sheets. They could not publish without paper. They get this paper from a paper manufacturing company here which furnishes all the Santiago press, and this company could not make the paper without wood pulp from Canada and possibly, I do not know, from the United States. The British here, acting through Arthur Pack, Commercial Attache, in charge of the Black List and by odds the best man in the Embassy, tells me that he is going to recommend that no more wood pulp be sent this manufacturer if he is to continue to furnish the finished product to the two papers. He says he has talked with the manufacturer who is quite ready to refuse them paper but he says there is a Government commission which orders the distribution of the paper to the press, and these two papers are included. In other words the Chilean Government orders this manufacturer to furnish these Axis sheets paper.

If the Allied nations furnishing the wood pulp informs the Government that all wood pulp from them will be cut off unless these papers are cut out, it will find itself in the position of either cutting them off or saying, in effect, that better it is that no paper be published at all in Santiago if these two Axis organs, subsidized by the German Embassy we are sure, are refused paper. The effect on EL MERCURIO, and all the other papers would then be magical. The Government would not dare sacrifice them for the two Nazi sheets.

This is something you may care to think over.

III

The Radical Party is again on the war path against its own Government. At a meeting of the Radical Junta, one Mario Bunster Carmona, a rich playboy, not in Congress, but a member of the Junta, actually brought up a resolution attacking Morales for having appointed Colonel Frías head of the Bureau of Investigations. I strongly suspect the reason. I believe, thus far, that Morales is in earnest about cooperating with us in the matter of running down the Axis agents, etc., and Colonel Frías, who came to me from Morales, impressed me as a strong and sincere man who may mean business. In other words, he will not be a tool of the Axis in the Investigations. We know that throughout the war Nazi tools have been members of the Investigations; that damning evidence has been pigeonholed; that when raids have been made the Nazis have been tipped off in advance.

It
It looks very much as though the pro-Axis element, including the cheaper of the politicians interested in the "German vote", is concerned lest something actually be done. I do not think Morales will pay any attention and I cannot believe that President Rios will not sustain him. But here we have an issue and on the solution we may reach intelligent conclusions.

IV

On the anniversary of the birth of the Japanese Emperor some of the papers carried full page articles in glorification. EL MERCURIO did. Of course the Japanese paid for it but EL MERCURIO failed to note publicly that it was an advertisement. However, EL MERCURIO in the same issue carried a hot editorial the very reverse of complimentary to the Japanese. The Japs are very cocky here. They have almost taken possession of the Chilean Golf Club. Last Sunday some Americans told me that about fourteen were there. Also, of course, the Germans, Italians and Spaniards.

I enclose an interesting report prepared by Garrison on the Havastele Agency.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Claude F. Brown
My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of May 11, 1942 enclosing for preparation of reply a letter dated April 29, 1942 from Ambassador Bowers. There is enclosed a suggested reply for your consideration, and signature if you approve.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosures:

2. Suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers.

The President,

The White House.
Santiago, May 23, 1942

Dear Mr President:-

The other day I arranged a secret meeting with President Rios and Barros Jarpa at the former's private residence at 10 P.M. to talk off the record and very frankly of the various things which I am afraid are creating serious misunderstandings among the men in the street in the United States and Chile. I sent a full report of the hour and a half conversation to Welles and suggested to him that you might care to see it. The atmosphere was most cordial. One thing came out which throws a new and I think true light on the fact that the agreements of Rio have not been ratified by Congress. I was told frankly that the President himself had prevented the submission of the agreements to Congress when Rossetti was trying to submit them. He said that under Chilean tradition and the Chilean Constitution the management of foreign affairs is the exclusive prerogative of the President. He submits only treaties for ratification. To have submitted the agreements of Rio would have compromised his presidential rights and have raised a question as to his power. He says that the agreements are in operation; that he has recognized them in sending Chilean representatives to two conferences called by the Rio conference. He says that if and when he decides to break diplomatic relations with the Axis he will not ask Congress anything about it since he has the power to do so on his own.

My plain talk about Nazi activities here being unmolested
thus converting, as I told them, Chile into a Nazi base for operations against the United States and the Canal had, I think, an immediate effect.

Thirty six hours later came the President opening address to Congress. He reached a paragraph which I am sure was added as a result of my conversation. When he reached it, he paused, looked over the Congress deliberately, and then read very slowly and with marked emphasis the declaration that Chile will not tolerate any activities aimed against any of the American republics.

The day before I think I got another result of the conversation. I had told the President and Minister that speeches were made in Congress and articles had appeared in the press, honestly made and written I thought probable, and because of misinformation. We had been charged with discriminating against the Chileans when, I said, "the Chilean Government knows this is not true and yet no representative of the Government has made the correction. Within twenty four hours Barros Jarpa addressed Congress on foreign policy and said with great emphasis that these stories are without foundation and that there has been no discrimination against Chile and that whatever embarrassments may come here as a result of rationing have come to all the American countries and most of all to the United States.

Our agent here is now satisfied of complete cooperation of the Government in the uncovering of Nazi activities. The new Chief came to see me at once on taking office. The President said the other night he had come on his instructions. He made a fine impression on me and better still on our agent with whom plans are being worked out. I have a feeling that
something worth while will come of this, that action will be taken that will create an impossible situation for the Axis and lead to the breaking of relations under circumstances that will not appear to have anything to do with pressure from us.

At the opening of Congress as the diplomats were leaving, getting in their cars in front of the Capitol, where a great crowd was gathered, the Japanese were roundly hissed. I left before the Germans. But when my car—I had three of our naval and military men in plenty of gold braid with me—strolled there was vigorous cheering for a full block. We are all agreed that the situation is much better.

At the same time I have information which bears out my impressions of Rossetti and his attitude. As I have insisted all along, Rossetti went to Rio intensely eager to please us; as I have reported two days after the conference at Rio convened I saw a telegram from Rossetti asking the Government to alter his instructions so he could go along 100 per cent with us; and the other night Bill Arnold, head of the Tel. and Tel. here was with Ruis, the Sub-Minister who was at Rio as a delegate and who has always impressed me as pro-Nazi, talked freely while in an inebriated state and said that he had had a "hell of a time with Rossetti at Rio" because despite his instructions he was wanting all the time to disregard instructions and go in for breaking relations; and that, Ruis, business had been to watch him and see that this was not done. I have always felt that we got the wrong slant on him at Rio. Unhappily Ruis is Minister without portfolio, Secretary General of the President, and I have no doubt his influence is thrown against us. But I do not think
him a strong character.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude H. Bower

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago, May 27, 1942

Dear Mr President:

The decisive action of Congress in voting an investigation of Nazi activities would have been impossible four months ago. I think there is no doubt that we are making big progress toward the realization of our ends. The personnel of the Committee is anti-Nazi -- that is the big majority are pronouncedly anti-Nazi.

I have explained the statement issued by the Foreign Minister with the approval of the Peruvian, Bolivian Ambassadors and myself. The Nazis through their numerous paid agents who carry on the whispering campaign against us were circulating the fantastic story that we were arming Peru and Bolivia and encouraging them to attack Chile to recover the lost provinces. Fantastic as it seems, it was causing great uneasiness even among our friends. I think the correction necessary.

Today I gave a luncheon for Bishop Walsh of Maryland and a New York priest with him en route to Bolivia on some church mission, and had all the hierarchy from the Archbishop down, two prominent Church laymen Senator Cruze Coke and Senator Horatia Walker, two members of the Deputies belonging to the Falangist party here who are militant against facism and the nazis and friends of ours, the Bolivian Ambassador, and Dawson of the City National who was one of the founders of The Commonweal.

Twenty in all and all Catholics. It created a very fine impression. We
are closer to the Church as an Embassy I think than any other Embassy here, including the Spanish.

I am to see Barros Jarpa in half an hour. Luis Subbencassuax told me at luncheon that Barros Jarpa is going to the States by H June 15th. I shall find out if this is true.

We all feel that Chile is moving rather rapidly toward a change in policy. The President's wife is arriving in Los Angeles on June 4th to put her boy in an American school. I have suggested to Welles that while she is going incog I think we should by all means have a representative of the Government meet her on landing and offer any service. This action of the President is gall and worm wood to the Germans.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely, 

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago, June 2, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You may be interested in some observations on a very noticeable change in sentiment here toward the breaking of relations during the last two weeks. The cordial reception of Prado of Peru has contributed some to the feeling that Chile is not in a comfortable position; and Mexico's declaration of war has had a powerful effect. The mass of the people here are not enamored of Vargas' ideas of government; they are of Mexico's and this means a stronger sentiment among the masses for the breaking of relations.

Barros Jarpa is singing another tune, and instead of saying that of course Chile will not break relations unless directly attacked is now speaking of when Chile breaks relations. I think that my straight off-the-record warning addressed to the President and him at the night meeting at the President's house has had some effect. He now assures me he is going to Washington.

Then, too, he has been talking very aggressively to Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador. The other day

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

The White House,

Washington.
he told him that any one found engaged in activities
against another American nation will be jailed or expelled;
and this week he told him that any attack on Chilean
mines or on the Panama Canal will mean a declaration of war.

More noticeable still, is the radical change in the
tone of the press. It, aside from the Axis sheets, has been
fair, but much too neutral for my system. Now all the
legitimate papers are changing. EL IMPARCIAL, the most
reactionary paper, which has been pro-Axis at heart and
in tone within reasonable bounds, is now printing our propa-
ganda. It is owned by two brothers. Recently one, not
connected with the management, wrote an article against
the Rio Conference. A Spanish refugee, former editor of
EL LIBERAL in Madrid, wrote a beautiful and brilliant reply,
very courteous and almost courtly in tone, which EL IMPARCIAL
published. Infuriated by the effectiveness of the reply,
the brother wrote a bitter article against us and our cause
which his brother point-blank refused to publish, saying
he would not publish anything against the United States.
The paper was dependent on German advertising and now that
we have guaranteed 15,000 pesos worth of American advertising
a month it promises to come over entirely. You can imagine
the effect here.

In Valparaiso, La UNION, conservative paper, has from
time to time been scarcely friendly, and recently it used
some Transocean matter. We challenged its action and
the editor, a Conservative member of the Deputies, came
here to see me and gave a satisfactory explanation and a pledge not to repeat. We have straightened him out with the American advertisers and he has put me on his free list for his daily paper.

I am sending Welles today a proposition sent me by four Ministers which he may repeat to you. The majority of the Government today is for breaking relations. I have a feeling that we may get results within a few weeks.

I have heard an explanation of the failure to recall the Ambassador from Buenos Aires immediately after his action in the May Day demonstration. He has a group of friends among the Radicals in Congress and the President does not want to affront them while his emergency legislation is pending. Then, again, he is notoriously a crack shot with the pistol and prone to challenge critics. But I think his days are numbered. Armour writes me that he is much subdued.

I wish you could have seen the ceremony at Chile's West Point on the occasion of the presentation of the American flag sent by you and General Marshall. It was an impressive ceremony. I spoke, General Escudero spoke, and then the color bearers, three men, were ordered forward, the flag placed in their possession, and the band struck
up, and these men with the American flag flying gaily passed down the line of the cadets — doing the goose step. No use to quarrel with the goose step here. In the salon where cocktails were served afterwards I noticed portraits of a number of the former Directors with mustaches twirled up cockily at the end, a la Wilhelm. I thought it significant of a certain period here and on the way back mentioned it to Colonel Johnson and Major Kane. "Have you ever seen the pictures of the mess hall at West Point?", they asked in a chorus. I confessed ignorance. "Well you ought to see how many of them wear the Prussian mustache", they said.

But I started out merely to say that I feel more encouraged over the outlook here than ever before. I am sure we are following the right course here, considering Chilean psychology, in appearing more hurt than angry at Chile's tardiness.

With warmest regards,

Faithfully and sincerely yours,

Claude H. Bower
Santiago, June 13, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a pastoral instruction sent out by Archbishop Caro, head of the Church in Chile, citing instructions from the present Pope while Papal Secretary of State, instructing Catholics not to align themselves with any one political party, thus making it a Church party. It has been sent the Department, but you may be interested. Had the Hierarchy taken this stand in Spain instead of ordering Catholics, as Cardinal Gama did, to vote against the Republican parties in the election of March 1936 on pain of hell fire and damnation otherwise there would have been no incidents involving the Church there.

I would particularly call your attention to the significance of this letter. The Conservative Party here, the Tory party, representing the old feudalistic element poses as the "Church party", and is against breaking relations and I think is Totalitarian in spirit. It has been using its pretense as a Church party to line up Catholics against breaking relations and liberalism in general, and the old Archbishop, a lovely old man, is a liberal and was made the head of the Church because of his work among the poor. This letter is a notice to Catholics that they are under no compulsion to follow the policies of the Conservative Party and is therefore a lusty blow in our behalf.

I incorporate as part of this letter the following from a letter I have written Mr. Welles today:

More and more the matter of breaking relations with the Axis revolves around the inexplicable position of Barros Jarpa. We know positively that he personally is exerting himself

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
himself in every way to stem the rising tide in favor of a break. I know that he is inspiring, indeed almost ordering, and in at least one instance has written editorial articles in favor of his present policy. He dictates to LA NACION and EL MERCURIO. The first directly; the second through a subordinate in the Foreign Office who writes on foreign affairs for it.

Garrison has this morning brought me an amazing story. EL IMPARCIAL, as you know, is probably the most reactionary of the Rightist papers, and until recently pro-totalitarian, but we have an understanding with the publisher who is pledged to publish nothing against us and who is taking and publishing matter in our favor and in favor of breaking relations. The former editor of EL LIBERAL, Madrid, a refugee here now, a friend of the publisher of EL IMPARCIAL, and a man of great cleverness with his pen, has been writing subtle but powerful articles for EL IMPARCIAL signed "Ghost of the Pacific". These have evidently been getting under the skin of Barros Jarpa. Yesterday the publisher of EL IMPARCIAL told Garrison that Barros Jarpa had asked who wrote these articles. The publisher says he refused to tell. He says Barros Jarpa said that if the growing division among the Rightists on breaking relations continues he may have to resign.

That to me means two things: First, that unless something outrageous is done by the Axis Barros Jarpa will continue to oppose breaking relations. Second, that I am right in my suspicion that domestic politics, involving a plan to convert the Government into a Rightist Government through some understanding with the Conservatives and Liberals, who, as parties, are opposed to breaking relations, is at the bottom of the whole thing. And yet the other night Barros Jarpa talked seriously to me about recognizing Russia as proof that Chile is with the democracies. Another of those contradictory things about the Minister.

The publisher of EL IMPARCIAL told Garrison he understood that President Rios is wavering, which I think true. That probably is making Barros Jarpa uneasy.

I am invited to lunch at Barros Jarpa's tomorrow and his wife told my wife's secretary that it is not "official" and
the guests are to be my "friends". It has possibilities and I may hear something there.

The most shocking thing I have heard, and this comes second hand but reliably I think from Matte, Minister of Finance, favoring the break in relations, is that Barros Jarpa in giving the President a summary of our telegram which in substance I read to the President and which Barros Jarpa translated in my presence, and properly, to him, he said that we had taken a position against "bargaining" but - and this is the point - that we had said we would continue to give assistance to Chile despite her present policy. This, if true, is downright dishonesty and trickery. There is a fight within the Government now on breaking and Barros Jarpa might be capable of such scoundrelly and again Matte may have been misinformed by the President. Barros Jarpa has told several people that the majority of the Ministers are in favor of breaking relations.

Mr. Hull told the press conference that Barros Jarpa was expected to visit us and this was printed in the papers here. I cannot understand why Barros Jarpa should have thought it necessary to tell the local press that the story that he had been "invited" to the United States is "inexact". A formal invitation has not been sent but your own letter and the fact that I have personally told Barros Jarpa that you and the President both have written me that they are looking forward to his visit makes this denial seem far-fetched. It is the kind of petty quibbling that annoys me most in the Minister. And makes his position inexplicable.

Gustavo Ross is back. Luis Subercaseaux, a Conservative aristocrat wholly with us, has seen me twice since the return and both times has asked me eagerly if I had seen Ross. Both times he told me Ross is ardently pro-Ally. Yesterday it was whispered around that Ross with President Rios had conferred with me at my house. Formerly, according to the gossip, I was having secret conferences with Contreras Labarca, the Communist leader. I am reliably informed that at a dinner at the home of a pro-Nazi ex-Deputy, Ross calmly summed up the situation pro and con and ended
by showing that the advantages were on the side of complete cooperation with us. From another source I am informed that Ross told the President, "You have two problems: one social; the other international; you think you have an economic problem but that is not true". Figure that out yourself.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Claude H. Bowes
TRANSLATION

EL IMPARCIAL - June 11, 1942.

THE CHURCH AND PARTISAN POLITICS

Declaration of the Archbishop of Santiago

"On various occasions we have fulfilled the duty of insisting on the observance of the norms announced by the Holy Apostolic See, regarding the attitude which priests, members of the Social Action and the faithful in general should assume in regard to partisan politics.

"We are pleased to observe that, in general, those instructions have been complied with, and thus to verify that, thanks to God, there reigns in our nation an atmosphere of respect for the Church, its ministers and for the faithful in general, the good results of which for the Church and the Nation it is impossible to deny.

"We deem it convenient, nevertheless, to recall once more the pontifical norms referred to, with the desire that they may be observed fully and perfectly.

"In the letter of the then Excmo. Cardinal Pacelli and now happily reigning Pope S. S. Pio XII, addressed especially to the Chilean Episcopate, under date of June 1st, 1934, very wise instructions were given, some of which we wish to quote:

"Without doubt the Church cannot be without interest in the true 'great politics,' which looks toward the general welfare and forms part of General Ethics; that is, which promotes and defends the sanctity of the family and of education, the rights of God and of conscience. The Church must see to it that its sons are at the same time the best citizens and that they cooperate to the public welfare, both in the administration and in the Government of the State. In this sense participation in politics is a duty of justice and of Christian charity.

"It is another thing if it is a question of 'partisan politics,' that is, of the activity of groups of citizens who desire to solve economic, political and social problems in accordance with their own schools and ideologies, which, although they may not be contrary to Catholic doctrine, may arrive at different conclusions.

"In other words, a political party, although it may desire to take its inspiration from the doctrine of the Church and defend its rights, cannot arrogate to itself the representation of all the faithful, since its concrete program cannot have an absolute value for everybody, and its practical actions are subject to error.

"It is evident that the Church could not link itself to the activity of a political party without compromising its supernatural character and the universality of its mission.'

"To these inspired words the Excmo. Cardinal believed it useful to add the norms given by the Plenary Council of Latin America, in every respect in agreement with his, as dictated by the same spirit:"
"Let the clergy refrain prudently from questions which refer to purely political or civil things, and with regard to which, within the limits of the Christian law and doctrine, there can be different opinions, and let them not involve themselves in political factions, to the end that the Holy Religion, which should be above all human things and unite the spirits of all citizens with the cord of mutual charity and benevolence, may not appear to fail in its office and that its salutary ministry may not make itself suspect.

"May these words be received by all with the respect and adherence they deserve; rather than human words, they are the voice of Our Lord God, who speaks through the intermediary of the successors of the Apostles, whom the Holy Spirit en-lightens. They are supernatural words which seek solely the welfare of the Church and of souls.

"May they have the power to raise our thoughts above human passions, which divide men for temporal and fleeting motives, and prevent them from contemplating the truth; may they bring them, on the contrary, that lofty serenity, in which reigns the peace which unites hearts with the cords of charity and illumines minds with the splendors of the immutable truth and of God."

JOSE MARIA CARO R., Archbishop of Santiago
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter to the Pres. from Claude Bowers from Chile June 13th re situation in Santiago.
Dear Claude:

In reply to your letter of June 13, I wish to state most emphatically that Señor Carlos Dávila has not received from any authorized person in the Government of the United States any indication of the policy of the United States toward Chile. Specifically, he has not seen me on this or any other matter and he has seen neither the Secretary of State nor Mr. Welles for many months past. You are, of course, fully familiar with the details of his interview with Henry Wallace.

It is most important that you lose no opportunity to express to President Ríos my view that the maintenance of diplomatic and other relations between Chile and the Axis powers represents a grave danger to Chile and to the cause of the Americas.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of June 23, 1942 enclosing a letter of June 13 you have received from Ambassador Bowers in Santiago, Chile.

In response to your request, I am enclosing a draft of a suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers for your consideration and signature if you approve.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. Draft.
2. Letter returned.

The President,

The White House.
Santiago, June 13, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You will recall that just before the inauguration of President Rios I wrote you the suggestion that you write him a letter of congratulation and in it make it clear enough that you hope he will break relations with the Axis. That suggestion was made by me because two men close to the President had reported to me that he had said that should you make the request he would conform.

Since then there is no doubt in my mind that Rios has been given very wrong impressions as to our feeling regarding Chilean policy and the breaking of relations. He has said to several people, and I think in all sincerity, that the United States is entirely satisfied with Chile's policy and is entirely indifferent as to the breaking of relations. I have been informed that Carlos Dávila recently wrote him personally that he should not permit himself to be "stampeded by pressure from the Embassy" here since he had it directly from Welles or you - I have heard it both ways - that everything is satisfactory as it is.

Yesterday without being forced to be assertive I had the opportunity to make it absolutely clear to him that we have no other thought than that he should break relations in conformity with the continental solidarity agreed upon. This was at a meeting arranged by him, and Barros Jarpa was present. It also gave an opportunity to say to Barros Jarpa in the President's presence what I have often said to the Minister himself that it seems very necessary to me that the Minister should go to Washington as soon as possible.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
My purpose in writing now is this: last night before a dinner at the British Embassy the Ambassador gave me a memorandum to the effect that Senator Anselmo Hevia and a group of Senators are working for the breaking of relations, and through a friend of the Senator's, who is a close friend of the President, Osvaldo Hirriart. The latter was won over and saw President Rios. He then reported that President Rios was firmly convinced that "the United States was quite happy with the way in which Chile was behaving" since she was getting Chilean supplies without danger and that there were no internal disturbances making for sabotage. He said, or is so reported, by his friend, to the Senator that if the United States wants Chile to break relations it was desirable that some action be taken by an important American statesman to dissolve the aforementioned impression of our satisfaction; that if you or Mr. Welles "could state openly and publicly that the United States wishes Chile to break off relations with the Axis", which he said could be done without an appearance of pressure - the argument most effective with public opinion favoring the present policy would fall to the ground.

This is in keeping with my suggestion referred to in the first paragraph. This could be arranged at a press conference of yours or Welles, but with the situation as gratifying and promising as it is just now, I doubt the wisdom or necessity at this juncture.

The situation here is clearing remarkably recently and President Rios in the presence of Barros Jarpa told me yesterday that the present policies of his Government leads logically and inevitably to a breaking of relations.

With warmest regards,

Faithfully and sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Santiago, July 14, 1942

Dear Mr President:-

On the receipt of your undated letter asking me to avail myself of the first opportunity to tell President Rios that in your opinion Chile's action in maintaining diplomatic and other relations with the Axis is dangerous not only to Chile but to all the American Republics, I made an appointment and saw him yesterday afternoon. I found him extremely cordial and in good spirits. In some preliminary conversation before I reached your message Chile's policy in the war came up, and largely on the President's initiative. He talked with emphasis and seeming sincerity. He said that he is absolutely with the Allies and "particularly with the United States". That is proposes that Chile shall go along with us in every way and to cooperate in any way we suggest "for the winning of the war, the defence of the United States, and of the Americas". That he has instructed Michels on his return to Washington to say as much to you. That he is sending Barros Jarpa to Washington under instructions to comply with any request we may make in respect to the war.

On reading your message he said: "I am glad I said what I did before reading this because I hope it shows that these are my own views".

He then said, apropos of breaking relations, that there may be some little trouble, and he wants just enough time to strengthen his position. He appears to fear that the Nazis might precipitate
troubles in the mines of the North and he then said that he hoped in such contingency that he could count on the support of the United States.

He then said that he had heard that Carlos Davila had not seen you or the State Department in months. This he undoubtedly heard from Michels who came here with blood in his eye. I verified what he had heard. Whether this information disturbed him as to Barros Jarpa I do not know. It should. There is no doubt in my mind that Barros Jarpa is tricky, given to brazen misrepresentations and suppressions, and is dishonest. This is shocking to me and the American colony has been shocked by his attitude in view of his reputation for years as a strong pro-American. I suspect that he is trying to make his policy conform to the selfish interests of the Chilean shipping company and other Chileans who are now making money hand over fist. Very confidentially I am told by the Electric Company that after he became Minister he was offered a retainer of 30,000 pesos with no thought of his accepting and that he took it without a blink. I have thought that a reversal of his policy on orders of Rios would precipitate his resignation but I am now convinced that he will hold on and I am afraid try to defeat Rios purpose by trickery. However if he goes to Washington as he must now plain talk may get results and if not from him, from Rios.

Warmest regards,
Sincerely

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago, July 23, 1942

Dear Mr President:

When Michels reaches Washington he will ask to be received by you since he is under instructions, according to his word to me, and according to President Rios statement to me, to say to you that Chile is ready to do whatever you think necessary to the winning of the war, to the defence of the United States and of the Continent. This is what Rios said to me as I reported before. Just before leaving Michels had a final talk with Rios and he told me afterwards that the President had reiterated what he had said to him and to me.

Under these circumstances I think you should be very firm on what we think necessary so Michels can so report to Rios.

I have written Welles in the same vein.

Lund, the Danish Minister, on his arrival here came to consult me regarding his audience with Barros Jarpa. I told him I had the positive pledge of Barros Jarpa and of Rossetti before him, that no Quisling designation would be considered. Today Lund reported back to me on his talks with the President and the Minister and he said that both conversations were most satisfactory. For this both Lund and Wessell here say they are indebted to my intercession.

Unahppily our British friends here did nothing.
Senator Cruz Coke, the most popular man in the Conservative party has just resigned the Vice Presidency of the party on the ground that he cannot accept responsibility in the party's present opposition to the breaking of relations. He had told me that he would make his reasons public but nothing has yet appeared. It may follow.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
San Francisco
July 31, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

you may be interested in just two sections of letter to welles.

with warmest regards
sincerely
Edward G. Wolle

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Santiago, August 1, 1942.

Dear Mr. Welles:

Your memorandum on your conversation with Michels will probably arrive later today but your telegram assures me that the Ambassador did say to you what Rios told me he would be instructed to say. There is a noticeable weakening in Conservative and Liberal circles on the breaking of relations. When I read the press report of Rios visit to Valparaiso and his speech I thought instantly of what he had said about "a little time to strengthen his position", and since he lost Valparaiso in the elections it flashed on me that this tour was part of the process. It resembled the visit of a candidate in the heat of a presidential campaign for he did not miss a spot in the town. The speech emphasized two points - his determination to act alone on foreign policy and his declaration that he will not permit Chile to be separated from the sister republics on the issue of democracy. This struck me as a cautious and gradual approach to something definite. On going to the office I found I alone had the impression that some step forward had been taken. But the next day I was convinced that my interpretation had been correct when Horsey of the United Press told me Rios had called him that morning and asked what the reaction to his speech had been in the States. Horsey was compelled to tell him there had been none and to suggest that perhaps it was because there was nothing new in the speech. This clearly disappointed Rios who said: "Your report should have interpreted the speech". It looks favorable at last. But from Barros Jarpa not a word.

II.

Lund the Danish Minister has finally come and gone. I alone have fought his battle here against the Quisling designation, as reported to the Department at various times. When Lund arrived he called on me before seeing the President and Minister to get my suggestions as to his line with them. I told him I had positive assurances and that he should, in my opinion, say absolutely nothing that would indicate the slightest doubt as to Chile's

The Honorable
Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
attitude. He saw the two officials and reported to me afterwards that he had followed this course, that he had been most cordially received, that there was nothing in anything they said or in their action to indicate that he was in the slightest danger. And since then the Diplomatic List has been printed by the Government and Lund is down as the Danish Minister. He came to thank me before leaving and he said he had notified the Danish Minister in Washington that we had been responsible for saving him from an embarrassing situation here.

III

I have received nothing in reply to my two telegrams regarding LA CRITICA, the Socialist organ here. Unless we are able, indirectly, to help there, it seems certain the paper will pass out, and since it is one of the two only papers here that has been demanding the breaking of relations, and since it has gone beyond all others in defense of our position, and since the Socialist party is the one pro-American party, as a party, it seemed to me that we cannot possibly stand by and let this happen at this time. I understand that $50,000,000 was made available to the Coordination Committee to meet war needs and emergencies and this impresses me as an emergency. And we have been appealed to.

I certainly realize the delicacy of such proceedings. LA CRITICA is a party paper. If we are known to help it, it can be interpreted as an interference in internal politics, though of course we are thinking of the paper as a supporter of our policy only. For that reason we have discussed the matter with Dawson of the Bank and the proposal made to the Department is the only one he could figure out.

If we cannot do this, it is unfortunate, since the German Embassy would give this paper or any other $25,000, greatly more than we are considering, for its support in the twinkling of an eye. Of course LA CRITICA could not be bought by the German Embassy for $100,000 — which is all the more reason why we cannot be indifferent to its passing.

We have spent many thousands of the Coordination Committee funds for things that do not remotely approach the importance of this. I am giving you this, not as a new appeal, but as an explanation of the position of this Embassy, and I shall not press the matter more. But unless something is done speedily it will be too late.
I know our policy of standing entirely aloof from interferences of other countries' internal affairs and wholly agree in normal times. Even now it is "magnificent", but "it is not war", - not this war - I am afraid we cannot fight in a bar room with drawing room manners, or meet the Nazis with meat cleavers with ping pong mallets.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely yours,
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of yesterday, I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter dated August 1 which I have received from the Acting Secretary of War and which has to do with the policy of our Government towards Chile.

The War Department was advised of the policy which we intended to pursue towards the other American Republics, as approved by you, prior to the Rio de Janeiro Conference of January 15 last. I have, therefore, received this letter with very great surprise.

In any event there appear to be expressed therein a considerable number of misapprehensions and an equal number of incorrect statements.

No suggestions have ever been made by this Government that we should take any action "which can be made to appear as a bribe of munitions of war offered to Chile for breaking with the Axis Powers", as

The President,

The White House.
expressed in the War Department's letter. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the Chilean Government expressed its desire to negotiate a Lend-Lease Agreement with us, but we have replied that we would not be in a position to conclude such an agreement until and unless Chile indicated her intention of actively participating in measures for the defense of the Hemisphere. (This, of course, is exactly the same position which we have taken with regard to Argentina, except that in the case of Chile we sent the Chilean Government last winter four batteries and a few airplanes so that Chile could defend her strategic ports in the event of a surprise attack by the Japanese.)

The President of Chile has now sent you word that Chile will break relations with the Axis Powers if this Government believes it necessary, but has at the same time urged that when this step is taken Chile be permitted to obtain from this country munitions of war and armament which we can spare, and which will put Chile in a better position to resist attack, should attack occur. I have informed the Chilean Government that we will consequently be willing to reach an agreement with Chile as to the nature of a Lend-Lease Agreement so that such an agreement can be signed when and
if Chile takes the action which she has said she will take.

The most astonishing feature in this letter, however, is the two paragraphs which read:

"Granted that such action would stop undesirable trade with Japan and eliminate Axis influence in Chile, and granted that such action would have a good effect on Latin America as a whole, it must also be borne in mind that Chilean shipping, now immune from Axis attack, would be subject to hostile submarine action.

"The main concern of the War Department with respect to Chile from a military point of view is the supply of copper. However, it is believed that under present conditions, Chile will continue to export this metal to the United States, as her failure to do so would result in an economic crisis. In the case of a rupture between Chile and the Axis Powers, this supply might well be jeopardized."

As you know, there has been no trade between Japan and Chile since Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, only a very small percentage of strategic materials, such as copper, exported from Chile to the United States is carried in Chilean flag ships. The great bulk of these materials is carried in United Nations flag ships. Under present conditions, therefore, if Japan were able to do so, she would be sinking these United Nations flag ships on their way between Chile and the United States, but the truth of the matter is, of course, that if Japan were
in a position to prevent Chile from sending us strategic materials even in Chilean flag ships, she would undoubtedly do so were she in a position to take effective action in that regard, whether Chile broke diplomatic relations or not.

It seems to me of vital importance that Chile break relations with the Axis Powers as promptly as possible. A break in relations is of the highest degree of importance in our national defense interests because of the fact that the Axis embassies and consulates in Chile are not only today directing subversive activities in the other American Republics which have broken with the Axis but, as you know, these missions are likewise sending a flood of intelligence to the Axis Governments, reporting on conditions in the United States, and what is probably more dangerous, reporting not only on the movements of our ships touching Chilean ports, but also on the movements of United Nations ships throughout South America. Finally, if Chile breaks relations, I am fairly confident that Argentina could not then stand out for long as the one country in the New World which had not broken with the Axis Powers.

I have been concerned for some months past with repeated reports which have come to me that the Chilean and Argentine military and naval officers in Washington
have been reporting to their respective governments that officers of this Government are telling them that we do not in reality wish those two countries to break with the Axis Powers. Similar reports have reached me that the British military and naval officers in Washington and in the capitals of the two countries in question have been telling high officials of the Army and Navy of Argentina and Chile exactly the same thing. This confusion as to policy has not unnaturally created very considerable doubt on the part of the Chilean Government, particularly on the part of the Chilean President, as to what our real desires might be.

As you remember, the Chilean Ambassador is calling to see you this coming Wednesday morning, August 5. He will immediately report to his President the statements you will make to him. I believe that if he understands clearly that you hope that the Government of Chile will break relations with the Axis Powers because of the great assistance which that will render in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, favorable action will be taken in the not too distant future.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

[signature]
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington

August 1, 1942

The Honorables,
The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am informed that the Government of Chile, through its Ambassador in Washington, has informed our Government that it will, if we should consider it desirable, break relations with the Axis Powers, but that it could not maintain itself in power after such action unless the United States could transfer to Chile sufficient munitions of war for the defense of Chile.

I also understand that you desire an estimate from the War Department as to the minimum amount of munitions which it would be necessary to transfer to Chile to insure her defense under the present circumstances, and in addition, a statement of what munitions the War Department could recommend for transfer to Chile in order that she might break with the Axis Powers as above indicated.

I think it proper to point out that, from the point of view of the War Department, the advantages to be derived by the United States from the breaking off of relations between Chile and the Axis Powers are questionable.

Granted that such action would stop undesirable trade with Japan and eliminate Axis influence in Chile, and granted that such action would have a good effect on Latin America as a whole, it must also be borne in mind that Chilean shipping, now immune from Axis attack, would be subject to hostile submarine action.

The main concern of the War Department with respect to Chile from a military point of view is the supply of copper. However, it is believed that under present conditions, Chile will continue to export this metal to the United States, as her failure to do so would
result in an economic crisis. In the case of a rupture between Chile and the Axis Powers, this supply might well be jeopardized.

Moreover, should we take action which can be made to appear as a bribe of munitions of war offered to Chile for breaking with the Axis Powers, this action will become known to the other Latin American nations and cannot fail to cause resentment among those who have already declared war, or who are at present affording us material assistance in the use of their territory, and for whom we have been able to do very little in the way of Lend-Lease aid.

Returning to the immediate subject of transferring munitions to Chile, I understand that you feel that it is not advisable at this time to obtain from the Chilean Government an estimate of what they consider necessary for their national defense.

In consequence, I have listed in Annex "A" of this letter, the more important items for which the Chilean Government has to date made official requests. Practically every item listed is critical.

Lacking time to make a complete study of the defense needs of Chile, it is still possible to analyze some of the main considerations.

It seems logical to assume that the most probable hostile action would be the shelling, by submarine, of the more important Chilean ports or the installations located near them. These ports are Tocopilla, Antofagasta, Barquito, San Antonio and Valparaiso. The best defense against such action is the fire of properly placed light and medium artillery, of which the Chilean Army now has an adequate supply. In this connection it may be noted that the War Department has already supplied Chile with the materiel of four (4) batteries of 155mm guns expressly for the purpose of defending all of the above-mentioned ports, except Valparaiso, to safeguard the copper supply.

Less likely, but still possible, is a hostile aircraft carrier raid directed at one of the above-mentioned objectives.
Effective defense against such a threat would necessitate combined air and ground forces, including especially anti-aircraft artillery.

As will be noted from Annex "B" of this letter, the Chilean Army is reasonably well equipped to supply the necessary ground forces except in the matter of tanks and anti-aircraft artillery, and consequently their request for field artillery and like items cannot seriously be considered.

The Chilean Army is deficient in combat aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery and tanks, and a request for these items is logical, and the amounts requested are not excessive for the defense of the five localities listed above.

Unfortunately these items are highly critical.

It is unthinkable to take such equipment from the hands of our troops, and in consequence, it could only come from future production. The allocation of means from future production is a function of the Munitions Assignments Board and the War Department could not, in the present circumstances or the foreseeable future, recommend the transfer of such equipment to Chile, in the amounts requested. Combat aircraft is at present out of the question.

However, appreciating the urgency of this situation and despite the critical nature of the items involved, the War Department will recommend transfer of the following:

a. 20 - 37mm antiaircraft guns with 1500 rounds of ammunition per gun to be available by September 1, 1942.

b. 30 - Mormon-Harrington light tanks to be available by August 10, 1942. This type of tank is operated by three (3) men, armed with one (1) 37mm gun and three (3) caliber .30 machine guns.

It is possible that at a later date, thirty (30) of a slightly different type Mormon-Harrington tank may become available. This latter type employs a crew of four (4) men and is armed with two (2) 37mm guns.
and six (6) caliber .30 machine guns. Production difficulties with respect to engines make it impracticable to set a delivery date for this type at present.

In addition, I attach an Annex "C" of this letter certain other smaller items of equipment which could be recommended for transfer in moderate amounts.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Acting Secretary of War

3 Incls.

Annex "A"
Annex "B"
Annex "C"
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Sumner Welles wanted the following message given to the President before he sees the Chilean Ambassador today:

"I have just received a personal message from the Foreign Minister of Brazil, which tells me that the President of Chile yesterday told the Brazilian Government that the Chilean Government is only awaiting the result of the President's interview today with the Chilean Ambassador, in making its decision to break diplomatic relations with the Axis."
Santiago, August 8, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

Because of rapidly developing changes here, the copy of the letter to Welles, enclosed, may interest you. It is now realized, as a result of your "firm stand" with Michels on the breaking of relations with the Axis, and since this is the one thing that Rios has been saying he was waiting for, and since he has said repeatedly that he would break in the event you said so, I cannot assume that he is going to break. And Barros Jarpa's right-about-face is significant of the attitude of Rios. Nothing could be more significant than Barros Jarpa's insistence that my friend Cruze Coke shall go along with the President to Washington since he is a leader in the demand for the break. And he is the most popular man in the Conservative party, which, as a party, has been opposed. His personal popularity, extending beyond party lines, is such that the party did not dare accept his resignation as Vice President, based on his inability to subscribe to its policy, and he was given absolute freedom to fight for the break.

With warmest regards,

[Signature]

Claude W. Bowles

The White House.
Santiago, August 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Welles:

As I telegraphed, Cruz Coke came to me directly from his
hour's conference with Barros Jarpa and I have sent you the
substance of the conversation. The Senator evidently was very
vehement for at one juncture he tells me the Minister smilingly
touched him on the knee with the admonition "not so loud". He
told the Minister that but for his long personal friendship
with him he would attack him personally because his policy of
"equivocal". It appears that Barros Jarpa was most conciliatory
and that he gave unmistakable indications of a radical shift
on his part. When the Senator told him it was "outrageous"
and "almost treason" to have given permission to the author
of the book on the Rio Conference to speak to the War College
and subtly to attempt to incite to rebellion by the Army if
diplomatic relations with the Axis were broken, and demanded
the right to reply before the same body, Barros Jarpa said:
"You are absolutely right and you shall have permission".

The Minister told him of the Michels conversation with
Roosevelt and said that our President was very firm on the
necessity of breaking relations, and the Minister did not seem
to resent this but to be reconciled to it.

More significant, in my opinion, is the fact that he said
also President Roosevelt is prepared to invite Rios to Wash-
ington if assured of his acceptance and that he, the Minister,
is going to urge the President to accept. He said "it is most
important". And in the event of his going he said he thought
he should be accompanied by about two parliamentarians and that
Cruz Coke should be one of them. In view of the Senator's
position this certainly is significant. The Senator told him
that he would not go unless assured that his own views were
accepted and would be acted upon. I told the Senator I
thought it well for him to go; that in view of what Rios
positively knows about our position it would be incredible for
him to go without the intention of breaking.

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
This morning the new Consul to Los Angeles, Señor Cardenas Muñoz, came in to say good-bye. He is intensely pro-American and has a son at Yale. He said he had just come from President Ríos who seemed much pleased because, as he told him, he had been or would be invited to Washington. The Consul has the impression that the break is inevitable.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

CURT
Santiago August 12 42

Dear Mr. President:

We have sent you a memorandum on what we have said on his return and I have sent him the enclosed comments. On matters that he mentioned apropos an ally has been commented on by us before but without information so much stronger.

Yours sincerely

Claude Hopkins

Hon. W. H. Roosevelt
The White House
Dear Mr. Welles:

The memorandum of the conversation of Michels with you and the Ambassador's observations call for some comments from this end. I am impressed especially with the Ambassador's discovery that the President "was greatly misinformed, not only in regard to public opinion and the views of the Government of the United States, etc." This would seem to be a most serious reflection upon me, whose business it is to properly inform this Government along that line. This I have done time and time again, without number, in discussions with the Foreign Minister, but as you have seen, when reports continued to reach me that the President here had said he was reliably informed that we were entirely satisfied and that he had a misconception of the feeling in the United States, I asked permission to talk frankly, and off the record, and did talk with him at his house with the Foreign Minister present, for almost two hours. You yourself can judge from the long report I sent you on that conversation whether there could have been any possible justification for the implication that I had not given him the real information.

Let me add here since the Chilean Ambassador in Washington presumably was reporting to his Government, it seems all the more remarkable that the President should have been misinformed.

Apparently the misinformation reached the President from Barros Jarpa; and the misinformation reached him from Carlos Dávila who it seemed did send information opposed to that I had given and presumably to what Michels had sent.

Nor can there be any possible excuse for any misunderstanding with the members of the Cabinet. I personally have talked often with the leading members of the Ministry who not only did understand the situation but have been insisting on the breaking of relations.

I agree with Michel's explanation of Barros Jarpa's attitude in part. As I have made clear to you, I have thought

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Washington, D.C.
thought that having taken such a pronounced stand immediately after taking office, his personal pride had become involved, making it difficult for him to shift without some specific reason. But I do not ascribe his former stubbornness to that as the primary reason. I am convinced that he has been thinking of the selfish interest of a little group of Chilean money makers who have been making money hand over fist under existing conditions, notably the shipping company, and who want no disturbance of the status quo. That is also the view of Cruz Coke.

II

We now come to the Ambassador's statement that the policy of the British Embassy and the British colony is diametrically opposed to our policy; that the commercial interests of the British here are insisting day by day that Chile should not break relations; and that the reason for the attitude of Embassy and Colony is that they believe the commercial preponderance in Chile of the British will be best served if relations are not broken.

I have not heard from any of our people of members of the British Colony engaging in that open propaganda. I shall take pains to investigate discreetly. But it seems to me not improbable. When the Willingdon Commission was here I was much impressed by the fact that --

(1) The members of this Commission in their speeches, and talks among people generally, had little to say about the war and that they seemed entirely concerned with post-war trade with Chile after the war.

(2) That the Commission was composed almost exclusively of bankers and industrialists, of the Tory element that was with Chamberlain and his policies, and that all with whom I talked very noticeably moderated their praise of Churchill. At heart this group seemed to me to be of the old appeaser element and not friendly to Churchill.

Later when Lord Davidson was here I talked alone with him for more than an hour and I was a bit shocked to notice in him the same trend of thought.

But that which has disturbed me most has been the fact that the Embassy here has given very scant support to us at the Foreign Office. Orde, the Ambassador, in several cases has said that he had not put in a lick in that quarter because he "had no instructions from London". He talks to me personally as though he would like to see relations with the Axis broke, but he appears a bit academic about it, and he talks to me like an outsider spectator observing a fight that interests him mostly as a spectator. He certainly
certainly has made no effort to help at the Foreign Office in this regard. His position seems to be that since the breaking of relations with the Axis concerns only the American nations that formulated the agreements of Rio, it would do harm to us and our fight for a European Power to intervene. I get the distinct impression that he tries to convey the idea to me that the British Embassy is playing our game by staying out.

III

I know of no earthly reason why "The Socialist and Radicals do not feel that they have any real contact with the American Embassy". I have had repeated and close contacts regularly with Schnake, the real leader of the Socialists, and with Marmaduke Grove the head of the party. I have had Schnake at the house at lunch with two or three men alone several times. Grove seems me often. Among the Radical leaders I have close contact with Marcial Mora, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Finance and head of the Party; with Saenz, former Foreign Minister and the first man to be elected by the Popular Front, and with Labarca, former Minister of the Interior several times and an outstanding leader of the party, and with numerous others.

The only criticism of myself I have heard, before this, has been that I did not cultivate the Rights - which is also untrue.

I suspect that the Ambassador gets his information from some members of his party with whom we do not have intimate contacts. We cannot attempt to have such relations with all the members of the Party. It would be bad policy. There is a great deal of jealousy in the Radical party. So much so that it has been in the habit of throwing out the President of the Party at intervals of two or three months ever since I came to Chile. However, if he will indicate specific persons we should cultivate we shall be glad to do so.

But the Ambassador's statement that members of my staff maintain social contact "solely with elements of the Right" is distinctly not true, and absolutely false. Heath has Rightists at his house but he does have Socialists and Radicals; Lyon has invaluable contacts with the Rights, but he has at his house many leaders of the Left and goes to their parties, and, as officer in charge of cultural relations, his intimate contacts with the intellectuals brings him into close touch with Leftists almost entirely. Brooks social contacts are almost entirely with the parties of the Left because they are in power. Faust, who reported politics, had scarcely any contacts with the Rights and almost too intimate contacts with the Left including the Communists.
This, I think, covers the ground as far as any disagreement as to facts are concerned. There is no possible reason why any Secretary need be sent here that the Leftists can see frequently; since they can see the people now hear frequently if they wish; since members of the staff do see them frequently; and since it is notorious here that I am always glad to see any man in public life on a human basis and without regard to protocol, a matter often commented on by the press here in a complimentary way. There is no need for sending another Secretary here for that purpose.

Michels acted precisely as he should while here, but it is well to bear in mind that he is a very active politician, with his own group of friends in his Party whom he wishes to see predominant in the Party and he probably wishes to see them on intimate terms with the Embassy since instead of being detrimental to a politician now days it is very advantageous.

IV

Cruz Coke is to make a speech on international affairs in the Senate today, according to the press. He had told me of his intention. Whether this is good or bad at this juncture is conjectural. It would seem to me to have been better if he had made the speech outside the Senate, since in the Senate his speech may give an opportunity for our enemies to speak also, and I doubt if Riós is anxious to have a furious fight on as he approaches action on the breaking of relations.

Returning to the Michels report about the British opposition to the breaking of relations: Senator Horacio Walker, very pro-English, of English extraction, certainly pro-democratic, and hostile to the Axis openly, is nevertheless opposed to the breaking of relations. He has close contacts with the British Embassy. That may be significant.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of August 12, 1942 transmitting a letter of August 4, 1942 from Ambassador Bowers at Santiago, Chile.

A draft of a suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers is enclosed for your signature if you approve.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers, August 4, 1942.
2. Reply to Ambassador Bowers.

The President,

The White House.
Santiago, August 4, 1942

Dear Mr President:

From several reliable quarters I have it that President Rios has said precisely what he said to me,—that is, that if we say that the breaking of relations with the Axis is helpful or necessary in the winning of the war he will break; but that he is a bit concerned lest there be some trouble and he told me, as he apparently has said to others, that in that event he would like to feel that he could count on the support of the United States.

As I wrote before, after having said this once, he followed me to the door to reiterate it. And because of that I have suggested that it would be helpful if I were authorized to say to him that in the event of trouble from the Nazis he could count on our support. I have had no reply to that suggestion.

Rios seems primarily concerned lest this trouble take the form of strikes in the nitrate and copper fields, and he has specifically mentioned the communists in those fields. This seems stupid to me, but it conforms with his character, since he is a Rightest at heart, and unfriendly to the communists whose 80,000 votes elected him. It seems incredible to me that at this juncture the communists would be interested in stopping the accumulation of war material to be used against Hitler. I suspect there may be some Nazi agents in these fields posing as communists; and there
no doubt are Nazis, Facists and Spanish fascists in these mines
, unknown to the managers. Contreras Labarca, communist leader here,
has been told indirectly from us that in the event of any change
he must see to it that his people go right and he has given the
assurance.

I understand that Michels will tomorrow give you a personal letter
from Rios and assume that your reply will come in the pouch to
me for personal delivery to the President. I have not yet heard
what Michels reported to Hull and Welles, and I cannot well act
with intelligence here unless I am kept completely informed of
the proceedings there. I assume the report is on its way by courtier

But in view of the fact that I think Rios ready to break and
Barros Jarpa is not, it is most important that I have reasons for
seeing Rios without interference from Barros Jarpa. Your letter
in reply to Rios will give me the reason.

The situation is delicate since I must continue to deal with Barros
Jarpa and pretend to believe in his sincerity, and without an
excuse I cannot well ask to see the President without arousing his
suspicions and incurring his displeasure.

With warmest regards,
Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.

I have no doubt there is a good
explanation but you should know that
among the masses here, our friends
and our communists. The failure
of Russia and the U.S. to attack Russia
is creating suspicions and a very bad
impression.
Dear Mr. President:

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With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

CLAUDE G. BOWERS

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.

(Written in Pen) - I have no doubt there is a good explanation but you should know that among the masses here, our friends and not communists the failure of Britain and the U.S. to assist Russia is creating suspicions and a very bad impression.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Claude:

Your letter of August 4, was of particular interest. It confirms my impression that developments in Chile are proceeding along the right lines. I have discussed with Sumner Welles the points raised by President Rios and I understand that he has already informed you of our point of view.

I am confident that the position we have taken will be completely satisfactory to our Chilean friends.

With best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,


The Honorable

Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, August 25, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter to Welles which I think contains important suggestions. You will note that I was not mistaken in my original estimate of Alessandri when he was in Washington. I am convinced that he dictates the policy of Barros Jarpa. But that the latter needs no prodding from him. The Foreign Minister's cousin, a complete Nazi tool, is Chilean Ambassador in Berlin and is reporting, even by telephone to Barros Jarpa all the propaganda handed him by Goebbels; and this is hurried to Rios. The attitude of the Foreign Minister is utterly inexplicable. The Chinese Minister, a very able, plain-speaking gentleman, talked with him for an hour and then reported to me. He found Barros Jarpa holding strange views. His talk certainly indicated a feeling that Germany will win – for he no doubt has frequent assurances of this sort from the Nazi Ambassador.

The Foreign Minister said the world is changing to a new order and Chile must have men in Tokyo and Berlin so she can watch the development; which certainly sounds as though he is convinced that the Axis will determine the new order.

Three cheers for your statement about the trying and execution of the gangsters and assassins among German commanders responsible for the mass assassinations in the conquered countries. I had said many times that since this is a gangster war, in which all the laws of war and humanity are scrapped, the gangsters after the victory cannot be treated as honorable defeated soldiers and must be dealt with as common assassins. Of course, that dates back with me for six years.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Franklin Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Santiago, August 25, 1942

Dear Mr. Welles:

If you are interested, I have sent a despatch on Waldo Frank's visit. He placed himself absolutely under my guidance and did not move a finger without consultation.

I have been disappointed by the editorial tone of most of the press on the Brazilian situation. All the papers express a complete solidarity with Brazil and disgust over the action of Germany and Italy. But I have no doubt the press, aside from the Communist and Socialist papers, took their cue from the Foreign Office. It seemed significant to me that President Rio's paper, LA HORA, refrained from comment for forty-eight hours.

I find little to enthuse me in the reply of Barros Jarpa to Aranha and but little in the President's telegram to Vargas. Gracie, the Brazilian Ambassador, with whom I am in very close contact, seemed fairly satisfied. But when I called his attention to the fact that the reference to Brazil's change in policy being justified by new concrete facts, may be interpreted as meaning that Chile will act likewise when she has "new concrete facts"—that is an attack on Chile or her ships—he thought there might be something to it, and was less satisfied.

As a matter of fact the President could have promptly broken relations on the Brazilian attack and I am told he would have had general support. I think he has missed a boat.

That which alarms me is this: Rios is not a strong man. He has no imagination. No flair. No initiative. Little moral courage. And he is easily swayed.

Our situation is this: Barros Jarpa, who is resorting to everything in an effort to prevent the breaking of relations is in position to see Rios daily and tell him whatever he wishes in secret. No one else has that privilege. That puts us at a disadvantage. In a few days I shall see him under the pretext of putting myself at his disposal regarding any phase of his visit to the States and he may give me an opening.

The Honorable
Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
opening to say that since he has said he is prepared to break relations I think it best for him to act before going, since in that event he would get a popular ovation. His pride is conspicuous, or rather his vanity, and that may have effect.

But this seems worth considering: Would it be possible for you in talks with Michels to comment on the fact that Barros Jarpa is at the President's elbow, probably not incapable of misrepresenting things, and that it would be well for Michels to write frequently directly to Rios and not depend on his despatches to Barros Jarpa reaching him. Michels is in position to make it clear to him that -

1) We understand that he has said without qualification that he will do whatever Roosevelt thinks necessary or helpful in the winning of the war, in the defense of the United States and the American nations. That he has instructed Michels to say as much to President Roosevelt and the Department.
2) That President Roosevelt has replied that he thinks the breaking of relations absolutely necessary.
3) And that we naturally assume that he will break relations before leaving for the States.

He can say that to Rios where I cannot, without appearing to bring "pressure".

In this connection here is something that bears out my often repeated statement that Arturo Alessandri is running Barros Jarpa and is primarily responsible for the latter's position. Sorriano, former Spanish Republican Ambassador, a very clever man, came to me the other day to report on a remarkable conversation with Arturo Alessandri whom he knows very well. He found Alessandri in a very excited state, holding forth with great bitterness against the United States as a powerful country trying to impose its will on little Chile. He attacked us all along the line and became so excited that Sorriano asked him, "why are you so excited".

This can be interpreted as a good omen. If Barros Jarpa has told him that a break seems scheduled it would account for his excitement and fury. There is no doubt that Barros Jarpa is working very intimately with Alessandri. In my personal contacts with Alessandri he is most cordial and even flattering, but I have not seen him recently. I can see now why Barros Jarpa was so anxious to send him to Washington.

The primary purpose of this letter is to make the suggestion about Michels maintaining direct and intimate contact with President Rios.
Despite all this, the general feeling is that Chile is about to break. González Videla, Chilean Ambassador to Brazil, who barely missed the Presidency and whom I reported as clearly our man in the Presidential primary, told my daughter in Rio that Chile will break by the last of October. But he is a militant democrat and has been with us from the beginning.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Claudia H. Bowes]
Santiago Aug. 30-42

Dear Mr. President:—

This analysis of the persons in the National Revolutionary party may possibly be of interest to you.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude H. Bowser

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles:

You may be interested in an analysis of the personnel that is to accompany President Rios to Washington, sent by cable August 26th.

Alvarez, Minister of Commerce, is one of the members of the Ministry that has stood out frankly as favoring a breaking of relations with the Axis. He is an engineer, a Radical, and having had two years training in a lead mine in Missouri he speaks English like a native, and is an easy man to get along with at all times. It is fortunate that he is to go.

Ben Cohen, Ambassador in Bolivia, you know. You know his relationships in America and he always poses with me as a great friend of ours. I think he is. His great ambition has been to be Ambassador at Washington, but he has been a bit tricky and shifty in politics and he has no chance. He ought to be with us on the main issue and probably is, but he is a worse bargainer than Rossetti, I am afraid. You know his type. Barros Jarpe says he is going because of his familiarity with the American scene.

Ben Claro is the son of a man who had many American connections and who represented American corporations as a lawyer. When his father died in New York we sent Ben in our bomber to meet the ship. Ben is very bright, but with that brightness which likes to display itself in disputations. He was in Washington about two years ago and I think he saw you. He saw President Roosevelt and came back very much set up about it. But at my house as my guest at cocktails and dinners he has been overheard in conversations criticizing us because of our big investments here. I have heard that he is against breaking relations, but to me he goes no further than to say that while relations must be broken sooner or later no pressure must be brought. He speaks English like a native. He is well placed in the Radical party and was secretary of Rios's campaign committee. I think he was bitterly disappointed when offered no place in the Ministry, and I suspect this designation is meant as soothing syrup. But if treated with great consideration I have no doubt he would favor our policy completely.

Castelblando, President of the House of Deputies, former president of the Radical party, is thoroughly democratic and a very decent man generally. I am told that he would be more aggressively for breaking relations but for
the fact that there are many Germans among his constituents. He is a friend, however, of González Videla, Ambassador now in Río, and most militantly our friend, and I met him last at a small dinner given by González when here. I would put him down as with us.

Barrenechea, Socialist, is described to me by Barros Jarpa as "a Socialist but very decent," which is praise indeed. Of course he is militantly for breaking relations. Though I have never heard him, he is said to be a fine speaker.

Senator Hernán Videla, who has been added since Barros Jarpa gave me the list, is a Radical, a man of great ability, and essentially friendly to us and our cause. He knows the United States and speaks English perfectly. He is an expert on minerals and I suspect he is added with the view to a bit of bargaining on the price of minerals.

In addition there are others with no political significance, such as Valenzuela, of the Protocol office, a military aide, a private secretary.

It is not definitely determined that Marcelo Ruiz, former Sub-Minister of Foreign Affairs whom you met at Río, and now Secretary General of the President, will go. Barros Jarpa says he may go, since the President feels he "must have a confidential adviser on the delegation." This is rather disconcerting. I have known Ruiz for three years and am convinced that he is altogether wrong on the war, that his sympathies are wrong. When Rossetti was Minister he was our friend here, just as Ruiz was against us under cover. I hope he is left at home. You may have formed a different opinion at Río but all my instincts, which are generally reliable, warn me that he is not our friend. However, he is not a strong man and he will fall in with whatever Ríos wants. Even so you will observe that the delegation is overwhelmingly with us.

I think this Embassy should be promptly furnished with the program which Barros Jarpa tells me has been made out for Ríos's visit.

When Rockefeller comes I am arranging a dinner to which all who accompany Ríos and Barros Jarpa will be invited, along with others like Cruz Coke who are with us, and Cruchaga, who I am sure is most friendly to us.

II.

I am curious about your conversation with Michels about Cruchaga and Max Arráuz. Did Michels try to defend the latter? I was delighted with your reply. Max is our open enemy, and since he is a miserly sort of person I suspect that he is profiting financially by his devotion to the Pagan enemy, though his stock in trade is that he is a most pious Catholic, a professional.

III.

Real Catholics here are more and more coming over. As in Spain, our
enemies among them are of the old feudalistic aristocracy who use religion as a cloak for their selfish political ends. On my visit to Concepción I called on the Archbishop, who seemed most appreciative, and to my amazement he and the Bishop appeared at the station to see me off in a rain storm.

On visiting the 360 year old church of San Francisco here I found that because of a tax on the cloisters which the church cannot stand it was thought necessary to tear down part of the building and sell the ground. It seemed such vandalism to me that I asked the priest for the data and told him I would see if, as an individual, I could do anything about it. I saw Barros Jarpa, told him it was none of my business, that I was speaking to him as an individual, with a historian's reverence for historic things and as a lover of Santiago, and asked if a way could not be found to prevent this destruction. He was avowedly amazed and equally pleased, and he said he would see what could be done. The problem has been solved. San Francisco has been saved. And Barros Jarpa has given the fact, together with the correspondence, to the press.

Saturday the corner stone of a new building of the Catholic University, to replace one burned, was laid. I was invited. We had made a good contribution. The Catholic Ambassadors of Perú and Bolivia were present and the Catholic Minister of Poland. To my surprise I was put between the Nuncio and the Archbishop, and when the parchment scroll was signed, first by the Nuncio, then the Archbishop, I was again surprised when I was asked to sign on the first line with them.

I think we have completely wiped out the old notion that we are a pagan and an anti-Catholic nation.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,
Santiago, September 10, 1942

Dear Mr President:

I am writing Welles about some important developments but assume he will convey the information to you if he thinks it necessary are advisable. This is a personal letter. Some time ago I visited the colonial church of San Francisco, church and monastery, built 350 years ago and one of the most precious possession of Santiago. The priest told me that while the buildings were exempt from taxation there was a tax of 2000 pesos a month on the cloisters which are the most charming. It would be necessary he said, sadly, to tear down part of the church and monastery and sell the cloisters. I told him I would see if anything could be done. I went to Barros Jarpa as an individual, not as an Ambassador, as a historian with a reverence for historic things, and told him I thought it would be a tragedy. He was amazed but manifestly pleased and he said he would interest himself. As a result, the tax has been reduced to 400 pesos a month and the ancient church is saved. Barros Jarpa then gave the press my letter to him and his reply, and the press has been filled with fulsome praise of me. Today I received from the Father of the Franciscans the following:

"The Father of thr Providencial P of the Franciscans greets you attentively and thanks you in the name of the Franciscan monks for the enormous favor which you have done them in using your good offices before
the Chilean Government so that the internal taxes on the real estate of
our Monastery of San Francisco is lowered and the church and monastery
saved from destruction. God bless the Ambassador”.

I did this because I actually was intensely interested, but it has
created something of a sensation among the Catholics who deluge me with
letters. I am giving Luca de la Tena the Spanish Ambassador sent here to
mobilize the Catholics against a run for his money and am doing more
for the Catholics and getting more credit from them than he.

I also intervened, as you may know, to prevent Chile from deposing Lund
the Danish Minister from his post to make way for a Quisling appointee,
as was done in Argentina. I was successful through several devices and
it may interest you to know that Lund knows I did it and has just written
me as follows:

“Want to thank you again most sincerely for your brilliant guidance and
help in the matter which we may call my continued recognition in Chile. It
was a beautiful piece of diplomatic skill”.

I understand that Lund has so informed the Danish Minister in Washington
and the Government in London.

With warmest regards,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.

Sincerely

Claude H. Bowell
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  (SC)

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1467, September 11, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

Had two hour talk with Schnake who resigns from Ministry to concentrate on seeking better cooperation of parties with the approval of Rios. His relations with President close. He thinks it stupid not to break before going to Washington. Says Rios had thought attitude toward break did not include Roosevelt but his letter to me, which I showed Rios, altered his opinion and now convinced break must come. His idea is to talk over things in Washington and then agree. I spoke of personal and political advantages in break preceding visit and Schnake agreed. He ascribes Barros Jarpa's attitude to pride of opinion aggravated by criticism of fellow ministers. He doubts, however, if he is entirely frank with President. I urged immediate break, but suggested that if it is postponed until after visit government might soften disappointment of American public if

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble  Date  FEB 4  1972
it prepared the way by (one) cutting telecommunications with Axis countries, (two) by arresting and deporting leading Nazis and other agents, (three) and by immediately expelling the former German Consul (*) General in New York, and (four) by declaring Lippe persona non grata. He agreed this should be done.

His impression is that the visit will mean a break and complete cooperation; that the three days in Washington will not permit complete plans; that then someone, and he made it clear it would probably be himself, will be sent to help work out the lines of effective cooperation.

He said that in all the countries Rios visits efforts should be made, as I have suggested previously to have each country speak plainly to Rios on the necessity of a break and complete cooperation. This he said would make it possible for Rios to stress the fact that "pressure" had come from all the American nations and not just the United States. He also said he is convinced that Gustavo Rios is favoring a break and that he has said that "Chile is a fool for not going in completely with the United States."

BOWERS

NPL

Delay on above message caused by 124 group omission in original text.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 14, 1942

With reference to the attached letter from Ambassador Bowers I do not believe that anything more can be done at the present time. Mr. Welles had two rather extensive conversations with the Chilean Ambassador at the beginning of September, when he expressed his serious concern at the reports being received from Chile and stressing the desirability of a break in relations prior to Rio's visit to the United States. The Ambassador agreed and at the second of the two interviews showed Mr. Welles a very emphatic letter which he proposed to send Rio.

On September tenth I had an extensive conversation with the Chilean Ambassador and this morning I again saw the Ambassador. Copies of my memoranda of these conversations are attached.

P.S.
I call your special attention to telegram No. 1467 from Santiago which has just been received.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 10, 1942

SUBJECT: BREAKING OF RELATIONS WITH AXIS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHILEAN AMBASSADOR, SENOR DON RODOLFO MICHELS

The Ambassador of Chile called at his request.

He said he came first to pay his respects and secondly to explain why the President of Chile planned to stop in certain other countries en route to the United States. He said that President Rios would be obliged to stop one day in Lima, one day in Quito and one day in Bogota. He added that the President had recently accepted an urgent invitation to stop in Mexico, and from there would come to the United States direct, returning by way of Caracas and Rio de Janeiro. I promptly replied that no explanation was necessary, but that I appreciated the courtesy and consideration implied.

I inquired of the Ambassador how the situation in Chile looked from his personal viewpoint. He promptly replied that he still believed that President Rios had no other intention than to carry out his proposal, recently made to and accepted by this Government, that Chile dissolve diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. He added that he had heard nothing to the contrary since he returned from Chile. He then proceeded, however, to argue on his own initiative in favor of the possible course of the President of Chile in not taking this action on the part of his Government until his return to Santiago following his visit to the United States. He discussed for some minutes the wisdom of this course so far as the President might be concerned. He concluded by saying that the President himself would have to decide on the timing of the announcement dissolving diplomatic relations.
I then said that, of course, I was aware of the Ambassador's personal views as expressed to the Under Secretary a short time ago and also conveyed in his letter to the President of Chile according to his statement to Mr. Welles. I added that I was pleased and not at all surprised at the Ambassador's personal views with respect to this matter, and that the Under Secretary and I have been in complete accord with this view from the time it was first discussed between the Ambassador and Mr. Welles. I proceeded to say that our two countries are in the same situation; that we are going up or down together depending on the outcome of the present war with the Axis powers, and that what is to the best interests of Chile in this matter should be to the best interests of the cause as a whole. I continued by saying that I was for the moment speaking personally to the Ambassador in an effort to work out as accurately as possible what should be the official views of our respective Governments.

I then inquired of him whether, in the event the President should withhold an announcement of the action of his Government on this matter until his return, the enemy propaganda and malcontents in Chile might not with effectiveness charge that the President of Chile had been subjected to pressure by the United States, and even Mexico. The Ambassador answered that he did not think so. I remarked that in the light of my fifty years of experience in dealing with public psychology, I could not help but take the opposite view. The Ambassador finally said that he had written to President Rios some ten days ago in an endeavor to keep the matter alive and that he expected shortly to have the President's further word on this subject.

I thanked him and again indicated the interest of this Government.

C.H.
The Ambassador of Chile called at his request.

He referred to the fact that he had conferred with Mr. Bonsal on Saturday and had given him more or less the contents of a telegram just received from his Government. He proceeded to repeat some portions of the telegram, which he had before him in Spanish. Having read the complete translation over the week-end, as given to me by Mr. Bonsal, I made clear to him that Mr. Bonsal had acquainted me fully with their conversation on Saturday. The Ambassador made an earnest plea in support of the idea that President Rios should not break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers until after his visit to this and other countries in October, adding that it was his own personal view that the domestic political situation in Chile warranted the advisability of this course. The Ambassador said that this was definitely the view of his Government, and that, in addition, President Rios had requested him to say that he preferred that this question should not be further discussed. He said that this was all in a friendly spirit and based on the assumption that such discussion would tend to stir up controversial elements in Chile, and thus complicate the whole situation.
I thanked the Ambassador for coming in and speaking with me as he did, and then proceeded to state that, of course, everything we say on this or any other subject relating to the war in connection with the matter of Chile's severing diplomatic relations with the Axis governments would be said in the warmest spirit of friendship and thoroughly amicable relations, just as members of a family discuss questions among themselves. I said that, of course, the Ambassador and President Rios have the most perfect right to express their views fully and freely about all phases of this question of breaking diplomatic relations, and whatever those views are, I and other officials of this Government will not take umbrage, since this is the only spirit in which matters between our two Governments can be suitably considered and disposed of. I then said that as this matter developed, it was my understanding that President Rios, speaking through the Ambassador himself on his recent return from Chile, said that he was willing to do anything considered necessary for the defense of the hemisphere, and that President Roosevelt then informed Ambassador Michels that the maintenance of diplomatic relations between Chile and the Axis powers was a serious threat to the security of the continent. Thereafter, the invitation was extended to President Rios. The Ambassador agreed that the invitation was thus extended after the commitment had been made by the President of Chile without reference to the question of his visit to this country. I then added with some emphasis that since the President and the Ambassador have the right freely to offer any comment in their minds at this time with respect to this matter, I and my Government feel equally free to offer our comment, which is to adhere to the original views expressed by President Roosevelt, Mr. Welles and myself to the effect that it would be more advisable for a break in relations to take place before the President's visit to this and other countries in October. The Ambassador bowed and seemed to acquiesce in the unqualified adherence of the President and others of us to our original views but proceeded again to rehearse some of his personal ideas in support of the opposite view. We separated with the matter remaining in this way.

It was manifest that the Ambassador and President Rios plan to adhere to their position that the President of Chile would not break off relations until his return to Chile, despite the adherence of this Government to the opposite view.

G.H.

S:CH:MA:ARK
Dear Mr President:-

I understand from reports that Michels said to you what President Rios told me he would instruct him to say, that anything you think necessary or useful in the winning of the war, for the defence of the United States, or of the American continent, Chile would do. Unhappily Barros Jarpa who resorts to all manner of misrepresentations and suppressions to prevent a break in relations, which you told Michels you thought necessary and useful, is still Minister of Foreign Affairs and constantly at the elbow of the President. Yesterday I had an hour with Rios on the cutting off of telecommunication with the Axis countries and I was shocked to find that the proof submitted to his Minister that the Axis missions are constantly and intensively reporting the movements of American ships and engaging in activities not only dangerous to us but to Chile, had not been called to his attention as his Minister had promised. I was even more shocked to find that he actually seemed to think that the decree issued recently forbade the use of code to the Axis missions in communicating with their Governments.

It is now very plain to me that Rios has no thought of breaking relations before going to Washington, though something may be done to force it. Five leading Senators, representing all the parties, are going to submit at a secret session of the Senate next Wednesday when international affairs are to be discussed, a resolution, signed by them all, demanding the
breaking of relations but whether this passes is problematical, since Barros Jarpa will probably have some excuse or other and hand it down as coming from the President.

The Peruvian Ambassador at last has talked with Barros Jarpa about breaking and he found, as we all do, that he is absolutely against it, and he gives as one of the reasons that the world order is changing and that it is important that Chile should have representation in Berlin and Tokio to keep informed; the implication being that Germany will dictate the new order. His cousin, a Nazi, is Ambassador in Berlin and no doubt sends him whatever Goebbels gives out, and also "very confidential information" about the state of the war, indicating that the Axis is about to win.

At last we are getting a little cooperation from the British Embassy which does absolutely nothing without specific instructions from London.

I have suggested to Welles the wisdom of a very frank talk with Michels who conveyed the pledge of Rios. It can be safely said that our information is that there is no serious thought of breaking relations before he goes to Washington and that we hear from many sources that he gives the impression to some who see him that he has no really serious thought of breaking at all unless Chile is directly attacked. Having said that, we can properly ask Michels for his interpretation of the pledge he was instructed to convey.

There is a powerful and numerous pro-Nazi group here, posing as friends of ours who can see no advantage to us in breaking relations and these are acquaintances of the President who go in relays to him with their story.
These are backed up by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Under these circumstances I think it of the utmost importance that
Michels communicate directly to the President just how we feel in Washington.
Most of these people here are afraid of the United States, of the economic
damage we can do Chile if forced to it, but as the Peruvian Ambassador says
they feel they are on velvet now and that if they can get away with it it is
all to the good. For that reason I think plain speaking in Washington to
Michels is most important.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Should we do something about
this?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Embassy of the U.S.A., Santiago, Chile, 9/4/42, to the President. Mr. Bowers refers to Barros Jarpa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, who is absolutely against breaking relations with the Axis. Mr. Michels, who conveyed to the President the message from President Rios, that anything the President of the United States thought necessary or useful in the winning of the war, for the defense of the U.S. or of the American continent, Chile would do. Mr. Bowers feels that some plain speaking in Washington to Michels is most important. He feels sure there is no serious thought of breaking relations before President Rios goes to Washington.
Santiago, Chile, September 21, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Rockefeller has come and gone and has acted in conformity with my suggestions. I gave him leave to reply frankly to all questions as to how we feel at home about Chile's policy, and since those who talked with him and cultivated him were the business crowd and politicians interested primarily in that crowd, and these are for not breaking relations, what he said I think was effective. They have the notion--the name explains--that he is the man who decides what they can get here in the way of money and material. They thought he would speak their language. Instead he spoke a very robust American language. However, I have reported all this in detail to the Department.

It occurs to me that it might be helpful for you to have a rather intimate portrait of President Ríos before you talk with him. He is a man of fair education but very provincial. He is a lawyer of fair ability and has represented corporations mostly. Among our business men here he was represented to me in the days of Aguirre Cerda as a "strong man". I have found him incredibly weak, not remotely comparable with Aguirre Cerda. He is reactionary as to domestic politics, and his reputation for "strength" comes from his attitude toward labor and strikers. He believes in the club for them.

He is a man without an ideology, without ideals, without strong convictions or principles. He is a second rate politician, an opportunist. Elected by the Leftest parties, his supreme ambition is to make such terms with the Rightest parties as to make it possible for him to rid himself of any dependence on the parties that elected him. One of the missions of Barros Jarpa, a Rightest, in the Ministry, is to help

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
bring this about. Unhappily the Rightests here, as in Spain and everywhere, are not really against dictatorships. They, here, as parties are not supporters of our policy. And since Ríos thinks in terms of local politics entirely, he is loth to adopt a policy that might interfere with his plans for a Centre or better still a Rightest regime.

When I say he is weak I do not mean that he lacks physical courage. He has very little moral courage, I am afraid. I described him to Rockefeller as "the Warren G. Harding of Chilean politics". After some talks with him, Rockefeller thought I had "hit him off uncannily".

He is not a Nazi. He realizes Chile's economic dependence on us. He wants to be considered our firm friend. He was pleased as Punch with his invitation to visit us and is greatly worried lest we get the impression he is not friendly. Like Barros Jarpa he is partial to American investments down here and thinks that we as a nation judge other nations by their attitude toward American business interests. Lacking ideals or an ideology, he finds it difficult to believe that we put the preservation of democratic institutions immeasurably above our moneyed interests.

But he is awakening slowly. He would have awakened earlier but for his Foreign Minister who is not entirely frank with him.

I am persuaded that he is also a bit afraid. I am sure he fears that an attempt may be made by the Nazis here to make trouble if he breaks relations. He dreads it.

His personal popularity does not approach that of Aguirre Cerda. His character explains that in part. He has lived apart from his wife for eight or nine years. There was a momentary reconciliation for the purposes of the campaign and they lived together a little over a month after he entered office. Then she packed up and went to California. The reason heard here is that he resumed his relations with his mistress, a big blond Nazi German woman, and his wife is said to have tossed some article at him—playfully I hope—and left the house. The other story is that his wife bought all the clothes in town and he rebelled against the bill. These are the tales of the gossips. I do know that he and his friends do not want his wife invited East when he is there, the reason given being that she "might create a scandal". When she left for the States, I inquired as to the propriety of going to the plane to see her off and Barros Jarpa

advised
advised against it. So that is that. He is very much of a ladies' man and we know some of his lady playmates. He is a rather impressive looking man, tall and with a fine head and good features, but you will see at a glance that he is a weak one.

I have a feeling that when you come into contact with him, he will shrivel and agree to almost anything you ask. Morales, his Minister of Interior, says that he will tell you the exact date when he will break with the Axis.

While I am seeing him this week again to press for an immediate cutting off of telecommunications and an immediate break, I have no confidence in my success.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude A. Russell
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1942

My dear Claude:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of September 24, 1942, outlining the effect that may be anticipated as a result of a reduction of Chile's fuel supply to forty percent of the last year's consumption figure. I understand that the Department of State recently sent you a telegram explaining the necessity for this reduction, which, in the case of Chile, did not become effective until October 1 of this year.

The increased demand for oil tankers to be used in war operations is primarily responsible for the fuel shortage in the Western Hemisphere. Many countries have already taken steps to meet the existing shortage and I am sure you appreciate that there has been no discrimination against Chile in so far as fuel allotments are concerned.

Our first consideration, naturally, is to use our existing transportation facilities to supply fuel to the actual theaters of war, and civilian needs in all countries must be considered secondary. Whenever the special circumstances make it possible, additional allotments of fuel will be made to enable reserve inventories to be built up in the various countries of the Western Hemisphere.

With cordial regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
Dear Mr. President:

This morning I was asked by President Ríos to advise you that if we persist in the announced reduction in gasoline to 40 per cent of last year the effect, economically, will be disastrous, resulting in the closing down of factories and shops and the unemployment of men. He tells me that private cars will be refused gasoline beginning October 1st, but, with this gain, the 40 per cent reduction would be, economically, very serious and even grave. He is afraid, and I have no doubt he is right, that this sort of upheaval economically will be used against his regime and his plan for breaking relations, by the Nazi element.

Some time ago Phillip Clover, Special Assistant to handle the gasoline rationing in Chile, was here and made a very thorough investigation, and he reported that to reduce Chile lower than 60 per cent compared with last year would be disastrous economically. Our own people in the Embassy, who are experts on the subject and on the ground, agree with Clover. Apparently the gasoline people in Washington, with this recommendation and advice before them, decided to reduce, not to 60, or even 50, but to 40 per cent. On the advice of those in the Embassy in charge, I telegraphed all this to the Department long ago, urging something more compatible with the positive economic needs, but no reply has been received. I sent a follow-up telegram asking for a reply some time ago, and no answer.

The President,
The White House.
Just now we are primarily interested in the breaking of relations; and in this respect we have made great progress in the last month. Politically, we all feel that it would be a great setback, resulting in bitter resentment, if factories must close, farms go uncultivated, essential transportation fail, and men be thrown out of jobs upon the streets. Clover put the figure at 60 per cent. Some of my people feel the Chileans might get along barely with a 50 per cent reduction; everyone agrees that 40 per cent is disastrous. If someone has some purpose in all this it would be highly advantageous were we to be informed. We will be blamed by many because private cars are taken from the street, but with that I am not concerned; it is a different matter when factories are closed, unemployment is forced, and absolutely essential transportation facilities are denied. I hope that something can be done about it.

With warmest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

Claude E. Bowles
My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to refer to your memorandum of October 2 requesting that a reply be prepared to a letter dated September 24 from Ambassador Bowers at Santiago.

There is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a draft of a reply to Ambassador Bowers' letter.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Ambassador Bowers, September 24, 1942.
2. Draft of reply to Ambassador Bowers.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

BUREAU
RA
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

To

Letter drafted 10/7/42

Addressed to

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter to the Pres. from Claude Bowers
Chile, Sept. 24th.
Santiago, October 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing copy of a letter to Welles that has some amusing features. Rios is now awake to the situation in which Barros Jarpa has placed him and the country and has apparently turned upon him. If drastic action against the spy ring is taken, as promised for this week, something will have been done to create a better atmosphere for the visit; and if Rios completely shuts off all telecommunications with the Axis that should help. I personally feel Rios should first break and then go, fixing a date for the visit far enough in advance; but he seems rather strongly convinced that it is of the utmost advantage for him to be able to say to the congressional leaders and others that on his trip he found all the South and Central American nations agreed that Chile should break and that he cannot, and will not, have Chile isolated. It is possible of course that if drastic action is taken against the spies, and telecommunication is completely shut off, a controversy with the Axis missions may result which will force a speedy break. It is so advantageous to the Axis, however, to have a free hand here that I doubt if the Axis countries will take the initiative in breaking.

The case of Barros Jarpa is tragic. He has been a great friend of ours for years and all the American colony were devoted to him, and most of his clients were the American corporations, and he finds himself anathema with his old friends, and about to be repudiated by the President. I am told that he is terribly depressed. His attitude is utterly inexplicable to me on any ground other than one so infamous that I would rather not mention it.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Most sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Santiago, October 19, 1942

Dear Mr. Welles:

The Nazi honeymoon resulting from the postponement is now over and Chileans whose brains would not rattle in a mustard seed are now most contrite and humble. General Escudero and high functionaries of the Army are depressed and told Colonel Johnson that they felt they had "lost a friend." President Rios is depressed and I hear from several quarters that he is through with Barros Jarpa. The best proof of his loss of confidence in his Minister is his action in consulting with the Sub-Minister instead, and in rejecting Barros Jarpa's idea that Rios should not go to the States now. He now seems in a mood to cut off telecommunications with the Axis completely. This week will tell whether Morales means business about the espionage ring. He has promised the arrests of the eighteen leaders whose names, with proof, were furnished the Foreign Office three months ago. I am told from seemingly dependable quarters that there will be a reorganization of the Government with Barros Jarpa out this week. The latter is much depressed and humble and apparently would give much to be able to retrace his steps. He has been seeking some way out without any ostensible back-down on his part, and, as you know, has expressed the hope that Brazil will smooth things over. Gracie tells me that Aranha is now willing to act on the assumption that there is nothing to mediate. EL MERCURIO will henceforth work for a rupture in relations, according to Agustin Edwards.

Emilio Edwards Bello came to thank me for the information I sent him from you, and he tells me he did go to Alessandri to inform him that he had his story all wrong. He found Alessandri in bed sick, and the old man at first flamed and tried to tell his visitor just what his visitor had actually done in Habana, but the visitor stood stoutly by his guns, told him you are a friend of Chile and of all the Americas, and finally the old man subsided and agreed.

Alessandri

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
Alessandri insisted that he is a friend of ours— which I
gravely question—and pointed to a copy of "Jefferson and
Hamilton" on his bed which I had inscribed to him, and
said he hoped we are still friends.

The truth is that domestic politics and personal political
ambitions have played a major part in the confusion here.

Rossetti is demanding that the Rio agreements be lived
up to. Barros Jarpa told Gracie that the agreements may
be submitted to Congress for ratification and Rios had said
as much to the Sub-Minister, notwithstanding the fact that,
att the instance of Barros Jarpa, the President had prevented
the ratification when Rossetti was pressing for it just
before he went out, on the ground that all this was the
prerogative of the President and that this could not be
compromised by a submission. Gracie told Barros Jarpa
that of course the submission would be a great triumph for
one man who would make the most of it. "Who," asked Barros

I have stood aside, said nothing, seen no one, and
after the cancellation of my dinner I cancelled a fair at
the Embassy to raise money for the war workers here, and had
the things donated for raffle returned, and the ticket
money as well. This has worried them quite a lot and the
merchants were very nervous, evidently fearing that they
had incurred our displeasure and might find themselves on
the Black List. They were reassured and told that if the
fair is held later they will have another opportunity to
contribute. The Chileans are now going out of their way
to appear cordial.

The atmosphere here is better for us as a result of
the upheaval. The Axis people now seem certain the rupture
will come. The ACCION CHILENA, whose editor is in jail
because of its infamous attack on Roosevelt, came out this
week with an article which implies that a rupture is coming
and attacking me as "shameless and cynical" and engineering
a rupture with "friendly nations." I am ignoring this last
issue.

That which saves the situation more than anything else
is the Chileans fine sense of humor. They are laughing at
Barros Jarpa, laughing at the sending of the spies to Zapallar,
saying that they are going to turn Nazi spies to get a summer
at Zapallar at Government expense. The aristocracy with
villas there are protesting indignantly about making a
spy nest of the place and the spies are now removed from
there. TOPAZ, the best paper of humor in South America,
always strongly with us, is full of amusing sketches. You figure in one. Roosevelt standing on the steps of the White House smiling and with a chin that almost drags the ground is sitting for Rios who is approaching up the walk when you, from behind a tree with a sling knock off Rios' plug hat. This alone might be misinterpreted, but taken with all the rest of the issue it is not misinterpreted here. Another sketch is based on the practice here of the ladies putting their hair in curl papers before a party. All the members of Rios party for the trip are shown with their hair in curl papers and an expression of utter confusion on their faces.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
TO AMBASSADOR BOWERS IF YOU DEEM
ONE NECESSARY.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President
from Ambassador Bowers, dated
October 10, 1942, re President's
visit to the U. S. and
Under Secretary of Welles' speech
in Boston.
My dear Mr. Early:

I wish you would have the enclosed letter to the President delivered at once since it is of vital and pressing importance.

Sincerely yours,

Claude R. Bowers

The Honorable
Stephen Early,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
October 22, 1942.

Dear Claude:—

Thank you much for yours of the fifteenth. We are keeping discreetly quiet. I hope you liked my cordial reply to Rios. I really meant it when I talked about sitting around a table peacefully and talking things over.

I do hope and believe things will work out all right.

My best wishes to you,

Always sincerely,

Honorable Claude G. Bowers,
American Embassy,
Santiago,
Chile.
Santiago, October 15, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

In case it may interest you I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Welles. With a secret enemy like Barros Jarpa, posing ostentatiously as a cordial friend, it was inevitable that Welles' statement of the bald facts would be seized upon to prevent the Rios visit. I have felt all along that Barros Jarpa would do anything within his power to prevent Rios from meeting you. He has seized upon the Boston speech to misrepresent what was said; has bullied the press here, with the exception of the Socialist, and the Communist organs into playing his game, and for the moment made himself into a national hero. Not however with the intelligent and the masses who have been with us all the time.

It has since occurred to me that possibly Welles' speech was intended to postpone the visit of Rios until he breaks relations. If so it was a heroic method and I am hopeful it will be successful. It has been enormously helpful because -

I have poured in on Barros Jarpa positive proof of the operations of the Nazi espionage ring here and he has kept everything from the press, not to mention the Senate, and as I found five weeks ago not even to President Rios. The Welles speech brings this out dramatically. The people themselves know now what we think.

Too much importance must not be attached to the seeming general jubilation over Barros Jarpa "defending the national honor." There is a very large and influential element here, financially and socially important, which is secretly if not openly pro-Nazi, anti-democratic and anti-American. All these have rushed into print and shouted.

Then, with the exception of the Socialist and Communist organs which are making a fight on Barros Jarpa, all the other papers here, easily intimidated, were called in and given orders by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make the most of the incident. EL MERCURIO, the highest grade paper

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
paper here, really a distinguished paper, resented the dictation I am sure and when Arturo Alessandri issued his distinctly pro-Nazi lying letter, EL MERCURIO called up the Foreign Office and protested against its publication. It was told to print it. This paper goes on the theory that regardless of who is in power, the press should support the Government, but in the present instance it is fed up.

Day before yesterday the Agricultural Society gave its big dinner and this was made the occasion for a big ovation for Barros Jarpa. But it is well to remember that this Society is composed of the old feudalistic landowning aristocracy which is bitterly anti-democratic, always pro-totalitarian, and now pro-Nazi and pro-Argentine and anti-United States. It is hated by the mass of the people.

The people now are beginning to awaken to a realization of the fact that neither the sovereignty nor dignity of Chile was insulted by the Boston speech, and that they have been lead by Barros Jarpa into an attitude offensive to the one nation on which the economic life of Chile now depends. Some bitterness is developing in consequence against him. Last night Marcial Mora, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Finance, and former President of the Bank of Chile, came to me to express his disgust. He came out militantly for breaking relations some time ago. He was frankly alarmed over the possible effect on Chile. Senator Cruz Coke came to the house last night seething with indignation. Senator Maza, head of the Liberal Party, very conservative, and until recently against breaking relations, but for some time now in favor of it, has resigned the Presidency of the Party and the directors of the Party with him.

At this moment I feel -

That you having sent a cordial letter to Rios, our position now should be one of silence while these people sweat and come to a realization that Chile must break relations and act drastically against Nazi and Axis espionage. I do not think we should make a single move. It is clearly up to Rios now. The less we say the more nervous these people will become. I am saying absolutely nothing and have issued orders to the heads of all sections in the Embassy to instruct all under them that they are to say absolutely nothing if approached beyond "it is too bad".

Many decisive things may happen here before this reaches you, - the resignation of the Government and a reorganization, with Barros Jarpa out, seems possible before Sunday.
Sunday. I am informed that Rios has in mind making Ben Claro Foreign Minister and while he is a bright young man, I could name a score of others better qualified and for us more dependable.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely yours,

[Handwritten signature]

Henry A. Stimson
Dear Mr. Welles:

You may find it convenient to have a review of the incidents here relating to the Boston speech. There certainly was not one word in the speech that does not conform to the precise facts. The reaction here is of two sorts. In the case of Barros Jarpa and his pro-Nazi Fifth Column allies it was one of pretended outrage because of a simulated "insult" to the dignity of Chile. This is pure Nazi propaganda. In the case of President Rios it was a little different. I have no doubt that the reaction of our press on the speech did create an unhappy atmosphere for his trip. I have many reasons for believing that it was with the greatest reluctance that he postponed it.

The subtle misrepresentations of Barros Jarpa of the speech, conveying the impression, popularly held in consequence, that you had said that Chile is stabbing her American neighbors in the back, instead of that the Nazi espionage rings here are stabbing them in the back; and the fact that the Government here, which in this instance means Barros Jarpa, has failed to give out the statement made to Michels by President Roosevelt in your presence, have had a bad effect on public opinion.

Having built up a case by misrepresentations and suppression, Barros Jarpa and the Nazi element have been making the most of it. The fact is that just before this Barros Jarpa was very much on the defensive and there was a general feeling that he could not last long. Now he has set to work to convert himself into a national hero, Horatio at the bridge, valiantly defending the sovereignty and dignity of his country, against the Colossus of the North. This has been done largely through the press. Before giving out his statement which contained lies, he summoned all the papers to his office and gave instructions as to what he wanted said and what he wanted unsaid. This has had no effect on LA CRITICA, the Socialist organ

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
organ, or EL SIGLO, the Communist, but all the others, with
the exception of EL MERCURO which has been reasonable
throughout, have fallen in line with zest. The result has
has been that the press for some days has been filled with
glorifications of Barros Jarpa, some in editorials, some
in special articles and letters, some in telegrams sent to
the Minister, and - this seems serious to me - some in edi-
torials of commendation from Brazilian papers.

There is no doubt in my mind, as I had reported, that
Barros Jarpa was much chagrined over Rios' prospective visit
and that he was most eager to find a pretence to sabotage
the trip. In this sense the speech played into his hands.

But, on the other hand, the suppressions by Barros Jarpa
of essential facts pertaining to Axis espionage had utterly
confused the public as to the realities, and the speech
has shocked them into a realization that something must be
wrong. At first blush I think they jumped to the conclusion
that you merely intended to insult them; but they are now
beginning to suspect that you would never have made such a
statement without ample justification. And the fact that
President Roosevelt has sustained your position convinces
them all the more. The original thought of our enemies was
to differentiate between you and President Roosevelt, and
to create the impression that the latter would not approve.
No one longer entertains that fantastic idea.

The speech and the reaction have also served a good
purpose in that it has brought various men out in their
true colors. I fancy the Department no longer thinks, if
it ever thought, that my impressions of Arturo Alessandri
were dictated by prejudice. But in an article of glori-
fication of Barros Jarpa's attitude, I find the names sub-
scribed of Juvenal Hernandez, Rector of the University,
whom I have always thought pro-German and anti-American;
Jorge Matte, who would have been Foreign Minister if Barros
Jarpa had not been and who is absolutely against offending
the Axis; Carlos Vial, President of the Compañia Sud-americana
de Vapores, and of course our old Nazi friend del Pedregal
of the Fomento Corporation.

Our supporters have been momentarily silenced and over-
whelmed because of the merry pro-Barros Jarpa crusade of
the press; they have been afraid to say much lest what
they say be put down to hostility to President Rios; but
their opinion as to breaking relations has not altered in
the least and their opposition to Barros Jarpa has intensified.

EL SIGLO
EL SIGLO and LA CRITICA have ferociously attacked Barros Jarpa, demanding his resignation, and the Socialist Party has formally demanded the immediate breaking of relations and the removal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As the conservative element interested selfishly in the economic well-being of the country begin to reflect on the wisdom of attacking or opposing the one nation on which Chile is economically dependent, I have no doubt that there will be a change in them and that they will reach the conclusion that Barros Jarpa has rendered a great disservice to the nation.

II

The arrest of the three Nazi spies, including the President of the German Bank as the leader, and of the former Consul General in New York dwindles in importance in view of the fact that they are not to be expelled, on the pretext that Argentina will not permit them to enter that country even to get a boat for Spain. They are not imprisoned. Barros Jarpa had told me that if they could not find a way out they would be confined to some obscure out-of-the-way little town under police supervision. It now develops that they are sentenced to a summer at Zapallar, the Newport of Chile, the choicest summer spot in the country, within easy reach of Valparaiso, and thick with Axis sympathizers, and they will in no sense be confined but will be free to come and go about at will and only be compelled to report once a week to the police in Zapallar. The German Ambassador, and Leisewitz of the German Embassy to my personal knowledge are in and out of Zapallar constantly. I have not the slightest doubt but that they are being sent to Zapallar to please, if not on the request of, the German Ambassador. I should think it well worth while if some American humorist would write a funny story on the mockery of the thing and have the A.P. and U.P. send it to Chile.

III

Roosevelt's reply in a friendly way to Rios' telegram is entirely satisfactory but nothing more should be done now but the Chileans should be permitted to sweat in our silence. I have instructed all the people at the Embassy that they are to refuse to discuss the controversy. I find that our silence makes them sweat and worry more than anything else.

IV

As you know Barros Jarpa has been gunning for Michels ever since he went in. Because Michels in an interview after leaving President Roosevelt expressed himself as
satisfied and said the incident seemed closed, the Minister and his cohorts are trying to work up a sentiment against him, with the hope of having him removed. EL IMPARCIAL last night had a cartoon with Michels up in the air looking dazed and saying, as he said on leaving the White House that "he could see the rainbow", while a noble citizen looking up from the ground remarks that he seems "up in the moon". Of course I do not think Rios would dare remove him and I am sure he has no thought of doing so.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,
My dear Mr. President:

Nothing but some great blunder can prevent the hoped for rupture with the Axis now, and I hear from various sources that it may come within a few days. Duhalde, the Minister of Defense, and the strongest man in the Government, told a friend of mine that "It is a matter of hours". Nothing can be expected until Fernandez the new Minister of Foreign Affairs arrives on Sunday. We have reached the point where further attacks during the next week or ten days on Chile's failure to act would be harmful.

I find among even those most strongly with us a feeling that the dignity of Chile has been offended rather seriously because as far as the public knows we have not taken the trouble to reply to Chile's protest. Of course you made the reply in person to Michels and Chile was authorized to give it out. For manifest reasons, of course, Barros Jarpa suppressed it and people generally have the impression we have treated an official statement of Chile's with the contempt of silence. I have telegraphed my opinion that our reply as submitted to me should be given the U.P. and A.P.

Rios is as eager to go to Washington as can be and is determined to go and his cordiality to me in public yesterday at the review in the O'Higgins ceremony was rather unusual.

I am becoming rather uneasy over the disposition of our Ambassador's in other South American countries to give out interviews against Chile, since I can assure you your Ambassador in Chile is infinitely better qualified to know what should and should not be said to fit in with the situation of the moment. I understood that these over-eager colleagues were given the facts as background to feed the press quietly

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
and not to issue official statements. I have an unpleasant recollection of the time when your Ambassador in Spain was reporting the exact truth when American Ambassadors here, there, and everywhere were reporting on Spain in contradiction to my reports, getting it all "out of the horse's mouth" — mostly Fifth Columnists. The record is most eloquent now as to who was right and knew what he was about.

With highest personal regards, I am

Most sincerely yours

Claud, H. Bowe
Santiago, October 29, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

As I telegraphed the Department at the time, your telegraphic reply to Rios was magnificent and took the wind out of the sails of our enemies. I took the liberty in a personal note to Rios to quote from your letter about the sincerity of your statement about sitting down like brothers, and this morning Fernandez, the new Foreign Minister, told me Rios is delighted and is writing me. At his first diplomatic reception this morning only the Germans, Italians and Japanese were absent, these being received later. Fernandez was most ostentatious in his attentions to me. After passing all along the line he immediately hurried back to me and talked a long while, and I noticed the tip off from a functionary of the Ministry to the photographer who caught us in conversation. I have the feeling that Fernandez is a pure opportunist and that his policy will be dictated by Rios absolutely. He seems more hearty and cordial since his conferences with Rios than when I first saw him before he had these conferences. He told me this morning that Rios has given orders to proceed drastically and intensively against the espionage ring.

The press at home may have had something about the college student "demonstrations" and may have exaggerated. The fact is one evening about 25 students appeared in front, sang the national antem, and then left a letter to me. I was at the office, not home, etc.
letter was most respectful, complimentary to the United States and to me, and declared the students in complete sympathy with the Allies and thoroughly democratic, but that they were hurt because Chile's protest had been ignored. I told the servants that if they appeared again to invite them in and summon me; but the next day a gang of young Nazis hitched on and the officers at the gate refused them entrance. I then sent a note to the young men who had come first and told them I would be glad to receive a committee of fifteen. They appeared the next day and I found them splendid young fellows, really on our side, really hurt because they thought the protest had been treated with contemptuous silence. I had three members of the staff there so there could be no misrepresentation of what was said and I heard their spokesman and discussed matters with them for almost two hours. We then posed in a group for a picture.

By inviting them in and treating them as I did it smashed the plan of the Nazis, and the leading magazine here gives the front page cover to the photograph with the comment that nothing could better illustrate the spirit of democracy and particularly of the democracy of the American nations. I assured these boys that you personally had replied on October 10th, and I told them at length about the espionage activities here.

There is no doubt that Rios is most eager to make the journey. Now that arrests are being made of the Nazi and Axis spies on a large scale, I have suggested here that it would be well were the Government to give the A.P. and U.P. full stories on these arrests for the papers.
of the United States -- useful in creating a better atmosphere for the visit.

Am disgusted with Wilkies playing of Jim Watson politics after he had had the doors thrown open to him through your letters. John Lamb, of Indiana, the wisest politician I ever knew, often said to me that "if you go to bed with your enemies you get lice". I was favorably impressed with Wilkies conduct until after and during his last trip when he began to play the demagogue with an international situation.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Santiago, November 7, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

The situation as to Chile now is this:

First there is no longer any doubt of her determination to break relations with the Axis and to proceed energetically against Axis espionage.

Second, President Rios is eager to make his trip and wants the atmosphere prepared in the United States so he can have the kind of reception a Chilean President must have.

Third, immediately on his return he proposes to break relations, basing his action on the ground that not "pressure from the United States" but the common desire of all the American countries he had visited makes it imperative and desirable.

When I saw Rios last Tuesday he talked along this line and thought it would be most helpful if some one high in authority in Washington said something in commendation of the present activities of the Government against Axis espionage and expressed confidence in Rios' intentions to cooperate fully. I telegraphed Washington proposing the plan which was adopted of having a correspondent at a press conference ask either you or Hull for comment. The effect here has been splendid. President Rios, Fernandez, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ruiz Solar, Secretary-General of the President, Morales, the Minister of the Interior, have expressed their gratitude warmly to me and the diplomats of our American allies are delighted.

I think that unless conditions here force a rupture before we must reconcile ourselves to having Chile act now and persistently against German espionage and let her have her way about breaking on Rios' return. I find that practically

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
practically all my American colleagues think it best in the long run that way. They fear that an immediate break would be ascribed to "pressure" or "dictation" from us, and they feel that Rios' idea of returning with the announcement that in all American nations but one, he found the feeling that Chile should break and for the sake of solidarity he was breaking, would be less difficult for Rios and divert attacks from us.

That Rios is eager to go I know. Intimate official associates of the President tell me that he cannot go until after the visit of the President of Ecuador but that he plans to go immediately thereafter, and Ben Cohen, Ambassador in Bolivia, who was summoned here to accompany Rios a month ago, tells me he is remaining here since it would not be worthwhile for him to return to La Paz and then come back in three weeks.

The press is now making an open campaign for rupture on the request of Rios and the Foreign Minister. The other night 60,000 people of all parties, all but the Conservatives, staged a demonstration without precedent in favor of rupture and for two hours Rios, Morales and Fernandez reviewed the parade from the balcony of the Moneda.

They saw banners with your pictures, Churchills and other United Nation leaders including Stalin's and heard shouts for you. Churchill and victory. It was orderly and it has made a deep impression.

We must be very careful now to do nothing, and say nothing, that would change the current which now is strong and growing stronger every hour.

The election seems to me a great victory for your Administration. In an off year, with you necessarily silent, with taxes burdensome, with the isolationist element resentful, and with our Party in power for ten years, it is marvelous that we emerge in control of every branch of the national government. The gubernatorial result in New York does not amaze me. Somehow, Bennett, who probably is an able and good man, has never thrilled me, and he lacks the color and the dramatic appeal that his democratic predecessors have had. His election rather smears Wilkes chances. The Lord's will be done!

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Santiago, November 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Yesterday I had an hour with President Ríos, apropos our landing in North Africa. I was impressed with his earnestness and sincerity. He greeted me effusively on entering the room, with warmest congratulations on our landing and on your speech to the French people, and his expression, usually reticent and shy, bore out the sincerity of his words. He said that because of Chile's love for France our action will have a splendid effect here; and because South Americans are largely Latin it will have a fine effect over the continent. I then told him our attitude toward Italy and our action in declaring Italians in the States not alien enemies and he said this too would be effective.

He told me that he asked all the papers here to begin a campaign for rupture and that within a few days "even the ILUSTRADO" will be supporting his policy in this sense. With a laugh he added "I even have the pledge of Arturo Alessandri that he will keep silent henceforth". He then said that the trouble with Arturo is his apparent inability to understand that in a grave international situation local politics should stay out.

He also said, apropos of the recent action of the Supreme Court in holding the German banker spy that he had asked the Court to take such action if possible as a matter of high public policy. Laughingly he then added that when the German Ambassador saw him in the interest of this banker spy he had told the Ambassador that this is a democracy with three independent branches of government, but that the Court was composed of able men who would handle the banker's case according to law.

I am

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
I am sending a confidential report of the Minister of the Interior to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which the latter sent to my house last night, to the Department today in despatch No. 4904. This report is an honest statement of facts, as I know from my own knowledge and after conferring with our Intelligence Officer, Wall. If you are interested in this phase you will find an explanation of the delay in taking action against the Axis espionage and something on the difficulties here due to lack of adequate funds. I have submitted a suggestion apropos of that.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely yours,

Claude G. Bowers
Santiago, November 16, 1942

Dear Mr President:-

I am inclosing two telegrams sent by me yesterday (Sunday) and today which I consider of such importance at this juncture that I feel you should see them and consider them, and I am afraid that in the crush of work Mr Welles may overlook calling them to your attention. There is no doubt that Chile has definitively determined to break with the Axis, and the President's statement to me that he had called in the papers and asked them to begin the campaign for rupture has been since borne out by their action. When he told me that the Ilustrada, extremely Right, and the organ of the Church had promised him to support him if he ruptures I was more than skeptical. This morning proof of his sincerity again in the editorial in that paper.

We have had so many reasons for resenting Chile's lack of action that I am afraid some of our people have become prejudiced and are prone to be indifferent to Chile's present advances under enormously changed conditions. Nothing could be worse here. I have no doubt that at this juncture we must give the President here every sympathetic consideration and such assistance as we can in making his right about face easier, more dignified and graceful.

For the first time during the last month I have been able to talk with the utmost frankness in an atmosphere of unreservedly and confidentially, and we are going places. Your telegram to Rios in
reply to Rios startlingly cordial and sympathetic cable to you on North Africa, has pleased the President enormously, delighted the Foreign Minister and given great satisfaction to the Chilean people. That is the tone we must assume and the line we must follow. The rupture seems positively assured, and I do not think we should quibble over the method or means Rios may think best. For the first time Government here has talked confidentially to me on Chile's relations with Argentine, revealing what I had long thought.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Referring to your telegram of November 14, 2 pm, #1371

1) This morning Fernandez telephoned asking if I would receive him at 12:30 today. He came to inform me that yesterday instructions had been sent to the Chilean legation in Vichy to retire them to Madrid and remain there pending clarification of the situation since with the Germans in absolute control in France there is no point in having a legation there; and also to the end that Chile may be in better position to follow us on whatever steps may be taken as to possible recognition of another Government. He told me the French Minister has informed him he had received not one word from his Government in eight days and is very much distressed as to his situation.

2) He also came to express profound appreciation for the "very moving character" of Roosevelt's telegram to Ros.

3) I then told him I had transmitted the request brought me by Cohen and explained failure to incorporate sentence asked.

4) I then told him President Roosevelt's schedule which makes impossible Rios' visit before January 5th and he appeared to understand, but half in earnest suggested it might be possible to arrange exchange of dates with Cuban President. He said he thought Rios should go as soon as possible.

5) When he said he and Rios felt it best to break relations immediately on return instead of before going, I told him I have no instructions, no authorization but asked if he would like for me to give him my own feeling personally. He said he would. I then set forth the reasons why a break before would be advantageous, covering the line in your telegram. He thanked me for speaking frankly and said he would speak frankly in return. This brought out a plan of Government here not hitherto known. I give you a rough but absolutely accurate quotation:

"We are a neighbor of Argentina, our territory touching, with always a possibility of some territorial or other complication and for that reason alone we wish to be fair with Argentina. Rios' plan is this: he makes the trip and his last stop is in Buenos Aires. There he will say to Castillo that Chile has determined absolutely on an immediate rupture with the Axis, and since Chile does not wish to leave Argentina out of a limb or isolated, he will urge that Argentina join and break simultaneously. He will make it clear that Chile will break at once even if Argentina will not, but that he wished to spare Argentina the embarrassment of being left alone." Fernandez said there is a very strong feeling for rupture among Argentinians and that there is a good prospect that when Rios makes his immediate intentions known and invites Argentina to join, she may do so. If she does not, it will not deter Chile at all.

Here is something you may want to consider. It is the first clear exposition of Chile's attitude toward Argentina I have heard.

I told him frankly that our friends had been worried because Rios' last visit would be to Buenos Aires and that the Argentines might persuade him not to break. He said that was quite true at one time but no longer.

He said he would give Rios my views and he hoped I would submit this very confidential plan of Rios to Washington for its serious consideration as a practical way of bringing not
only Chile but Argentina into the orbit. But he reiterated that having given Argentina her chance, Chile will act regardless of Argentina's reaction. I am sure he talked with complete frankness.

6) El Mercurio today editorially mentions rupture. The editorial written by Foreign Office official.

Please call the President's attention to this telegram. Repeated to Buenos Aires.

Bowers
Referring to my telegram No. 1983 of November 15, 2 pm

Now that even the DIARIO ILUSTRADO has come out editorially with pledge to support Rios in whatever policy he may adopt, I think it very necessary that Washington consider the rapidly changing prospects here. It must be kept in mind in whatever is done or said that there is no doubt that the determination has been reached by the President and his Government to break with the Axis; that Government is acting positively to prepare the way for the break soon; that the action of ILUSTRADO this morning bears out Rios' statement to me reported at the time that he has the pledge of this paper to support him in the event of a break; that Morales Saturday made a speech given to the press which leaves no doubt of Government's position in which he said, apropos of the action being taken against Axis espionage, that he is acting on the President's instructions to act energetically against all agencies operating against the democracies.

While we are and shall do what we can to break the break before Rios' statement, we should give due consideration to Fernandez' explanation of the plan as it relates to Argentina and bear in mind that there is a special Argentine-Chilean problem involving the relations of the two nations.

We have the assurance from every governmental quarter up to the President that the break will come immediately on Rios' return; and the fact that the President feels that the visit should be at an early date indicates the feeling that the break must come as soon as possible.

Now that the press campaign is launched to prepare the ground for the break I am afraid that it is unfortunate to have this continued for as much as two months since it will lose its punch in that time, and I suspect this may be in the mind of Rios.

Our resentments of Chile's attitude in the past have been richly earned, but now that the dirt in our direction is pronounced, and pledges are made, I feel that an attitude of indifference now would be very bad and that it should now be our policy to do what we can to smooth the way for the Government there to act through such confidential cooperation as we can give.

If President Roosevelt could possibly spare three days for Rios immediately after the Cuban leaves it would greatly hasten the rupture; and if the visit made before the rupture Coordination Committee and propaganda agencies in States could prepare a good atmosphere by having press assume that this is the preliminary to the break.

We shall do what we can within the proprieties to convince the Government that rupture should come before the visit.

However for the first time, we have reached a very friendly cooperative confidential state of negotiations, and the purpose of this telegram is to urge that Washington take cognizance of this changed situation and be as helpful as it is reasonable and proper in making it as easy as possible for Government to right about face with some semblance of dignity.
Santiago, November 23, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am much gratified by the report in the press here that you have intervened to prevent the assassination— for that is what it would amount to—of Largo Cabellero, Quiroga, and Giron, arrested by the Germans in France and sent to Franco. I note that special emphasis is laid on Largo Cabellero which is all right. But since Largo Cabellero is a Socialist and it appears from the press that my old friends Fernando de los Rios and Del Vayo have interceded with you, it occurs to me that they may not have said enough about Quiroga and Giron who are of the party of Azana, mere republicans and outstanding democrats. Giron's arrest is outrageous since he was not a politician, merely a strong republican and an idealist, a physician of standing, who was made Prime Minister to succeed Quiroga when the latter at the very beginning of the war was displaced. He was a personal friend and appointment of Azana.

Quiroga is a man of ability, an ardent democrat and republican, and he was very close to Azana. He was Prime Minister when the war began. Because he was Prime Minister when Calvo Sotella, the head of the Axis crowd in Spain, was assassinated by three officers of the Assault Guards, it was charged, as part of the Nazi conspiracy, that he had arranged the assassination, and because of this he is in danger. Of course he had no more to do with arranging an assassination than Azana. Calvo Sotello, who was killed none too soon in the interest of the Republic, was killed because just before, three days I think before, an officer of the Assault Guards was assassinated by the Fascists and the Assault Guards took matters into their own hands without consulting the Government at all.

I am gratified by your intercession because military reasons have necessitated the giving out of statements by us implying perfect confidence in Franco, and this has caused a painful impression among all the friends of Spanish democracy.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
democracy who do not see the military angle.

Apropos of "Mango's and Jordana's Neutrality", I might suggest that perhaps, since the proof of the pudding is the eating, that perhaps Jordana might instruct his Missions here and throughout South America that neutrality does not mean an intensification of their cooperation with the Axis in the nastiest kind of propaganda against us; and that it is difficult to associate "neutrality" with the presence of Spanish troops with the Germans operating against Russia, our Ally.

Incidentally, Jordana, whom I know, was the man who entered into the agreement with Mussolini in 1926 to turn the Balearic Islands over to the use of Italy as a base in the case Italy should be involved in a war. He was a Fascist then as he is a Fascist now. One can be a monarchist, as in Italy, and still stand for a Fascist regime, as in Italy.

I am merely giving you this as background.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Claude Bowers
Dear Mr. President:

Since Morales, Minister of the Interior, and Oscar Schnake arrive in Washington Wednesday or Thursday on a confidential mission from Ríos to you, it may be of assistance for you to have my analysis of these men and of their mission before you see them. Primarily both have been militantly anti-Nazi and both lead and persisted in the fight for a rupture with the Axis. Both are pro-American and pro-Roosevelt, particularly Schnake. The latter, whom you know, is in my opinion by odds the nearest to a statesman of vision and judgment of any man in public life here, but I understand you have a high regard for him. Morales is young, a bit excited, impulsive, very ambitious, but inexperienced; and his judgment of men and things is very often not sound. He appears to have the impression that Nelson Rockefeller is the dictator of our foreign policy, etc.

I talked with Morales before he left but found him rather too cagey on his mission to suit me and I had an hour's confidential talk with Schnake at my house Saturday. There appears to be no doubt that the purpose of the mission is to say to you that Chile is going to break with the Axis very soon; to give you Ríos's idea of what may be needed in the way of cooperation as defence against possible attacks or sabotage. Schnake said that he is not impressed by economic needs, but that certain material for defence does seem reasonable to him. I told him that when Chile breaks it is my impression that she may get some defence material, but expressed doubt about getting anything until Chile's position is entirely clarified. I suggested that you be told first that Chile will break on a specified day, that this be made a secret, official governmental declaration. I told him that with this determined absolutely, I felt sure there would be a disposition to talk over with Morales and Schnake the defence necessities sympathetically.

The President,

The White House.
I intended to say to Schnake that I thought it a grave mistake not to inform Michel of the visit, but before I got to it Schnake anticipated me by saying that he is distressed over that phase and thinks it a grave mistake. I suggested that since Michel has been for rupture and stands well with Washington, this concealment of the intended visit from him would be open to misinterpretation. He saw that at once, had seen it before. He said he would see the Foreign Minister that day and tell him what he thought, and that unless the Foreign Office informs Michel, he said, "I personally shall inform him." I think that this concealment from Michel merely reflects local political maneuvering, and I am convinced that Morales wants to be Ambassador in Washington.

As you have possibly observed, if you read the telegrams to the Department I sent you, I feel very strongly that the situation here now is such that we must change our attitude from one of justified resentment over past policies to one of sympathetic cooperation with Rios. I base this on the common understanding in all circles here that rupture is coming very speedily. There are reasons.

First: Rios three weeks ago called in the publishers of all the papers, told them he is preparing to break and asked them to launch a campaign for rupture. If he does not intend to break this would be incredibly stupid.

Second: The papers are acting in accordance with the request, and EL MERCURIO, the NEW YORK TIMES of Chile, very conservative, is strong in its editorial declarations that Chile must break.

Third: The Foreign Minister in a powerful exposition of foreign policy before the Senate told it bluntly that Chile must break and very soon, and will.

Under these circumstances I feel strongly that it would be a grave mistake to permit resentment of past policy to lead us into an attitude of indifference, and that on the contrary we should now concentrate on doing whatever is possible to make it easier for Rios.

We understand here that if Chile breaks the Argentine Government will stand pat against rupture; that she is encouraged in this attitude by the British; and in line with this is the fact that the British here, including the Embassy, have stood aside and given us no help whatever in the matter of rupture. In addition we find that the British colony is making the most of our alleged alliance with Darlan, the French Fascist, and expressing its sympathy effusively with the Free French, who will have no truck with the Darlans and Pétains, and criticizing us to them. These are things to be kept under cover, of course, and not given to the public, but I think it necessary for you to have the facts.
I was talking this morning with the Brazilian Ambassador, who thinks that when Chile breaks, if Argentina does not, we must get rough with her, and he expressed surprise over the six millions furnished Franco Spain for the purchase of goods from the Argentine.

I cannot be expected to share in anyone's enthusiasm over good General Franco in view of the vicious cooperation the Spanish Embassy here is constantly giving the Axis through propaganda of the most unscrupulous sort. I note one new result in an intercepted letter from a Falangist here to one in the Canal Zone:

"The North American politics is in its worst period of presumption and imperialism. The American Ambassador Bowers is a declared Communist, who aided the Spanish Republic, and he now lunches daily with Contreras Labrador."

Labarca is the Communist leader whom I saw once at a public gathering.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]
Dear Early,

Hope this reaches The President promptly since it relates to the prospective call upon him by Morales and Schuack who reach Washington Wednesday or Thursday.

Sincerely,

Claude W. Bowes
December 18, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith the letter addressed to you by the President of Chile which was brought to Washington by the Chilean Minister of the Interior, Señor Morales, whom you received yesterday. I am also enclosing a translation thereof.

In the event that you wish Señor Morales to take back to Chile when he leaves next week a reply to this letter, I am enclosing a suggested reply. If this draft meets with your approval, please sign it and send it back to me and I will hand it personally to Señor Morales before he leaves Washington.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosure:
Letter from President of Chile.
Suggested reply.

The President,
The White House
Urgent

Stephen Early, Esquire,
Executive Office,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
December 23, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure to receive Your Excellency's letter of December 2 from the hands of your Minister, Señor Raúl Morales.

It has been all the more gratifying to me to talk with Señor Morales since I have learned from you of your personal friendship for him and the unlimited confidence with which you honor him.

I share with you a firm belief in the value of discussions of this nature between representatives of peoples who share a great tradition of friendship, and, at the present critical hour in the world's history, face together with the other free peoples of the world the imperative necessity for common sacrifices and cooperative effort if they are to preserve their right to forge their own destinies as independent, sovereign nations.

It is my confident hope that the conversations which I and other officials of my Government have enjoyed with His Excellency

Juan Antonio Ríos Morales,
President of the Republic of Chile,
Santiago.
Señor Morales have brought very close the day when the community of American Republics, of which the United States is proud to be a member, may count upon the fullest support and practical collaboration of your great country in the vitally important task of insuring our common survival.

I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing to you, as I did to Señor Morales, my hope that when the difficulties of the immediate future in Chile are passed, you may feel that circumstances are such that you may come to the United States in pursuance of the invitation which I had the pleasure of extending to you last August.

Please accept the assurances of my highest esteem and my best wishes for your personal well-being.

Believe me

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
His Excellency
Juan Antonio Ríos Morales,
President of Chile,
Santiago.
Exmo Señor

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.

WASHINGTON
Exmo. Señor
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidente de los Estados Unidos
de Norte América
WASHINGTON.-

GRANDE Y BUEN AMIGO:

Circunstancias que son conocidas de Vuestra Excelencia y que nadie lamenta más que yo, me han impedido hasta ahora corresponder a la gentil invitación de Vuestra Excelencia e ir a Washington para tratar personalmente y en un ambiente de sinceridad y confianza las cuestiones que interesan vitalmente a nuestros dos países y a la América, y para llevar al Gobierno de Vuestra Excelencia y a su gran pueblo el testimonio de la sincera amistad y del propósito de franca colaboración que animan a Chile en estos momentos decisivos para los destinos de América y del mundo.

No deseando postergar por más tiempo la expresión de esos anhelos, he pedido a mi Primer Ministro, Señor Raúl Morales, para que como enviado especial y personal mío se dirija a Washington y lleve a Vuestra Excelencia y a su ilustrado Gobierno el pensamiento exacto y los verdaderos sentimientos que animan e informan la acción del Presidente de Chile.

La amistad personal e ilimitada confianza que dispenso al Señor Raúl Morales, la posición que ocupa en mi
Gobierno y las dotes de talento que lo distinguen, me dan la seguridad que habrá de encontrar favorable acogida en Vuestra Excelencia y que sabrá interpretar fielmente los propósitos que me animan de hacer cada día más estrechas las muy cordiales relaciones que felizmente unen a nuestros dos pueblos.

Ruego a Vuestra Excelencia quiera aceptar las seguridades de mi particular aprecio y los votos que formulo por su ventura personal y el éxito de su Gobierno.

[Signature]
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
CHILE

Santiago, December 2, 1942.

His Excellency
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United
States of America,
Washington.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND:

Circumstances which are known to Your Excellency and which no one regrets more than I have prevented me hitherto from responding to Your Excellency's kind invitation to go to Washington to discuss personally and in an atmosphere of sincerity and confidence the questions which vitally concern our two countries and America, and to take to Your Excellency's Government and your great people the assurances of the sincere friendship and the purpose of frank collaboration which animate Chile in these moments decisive for the destinies of America and of the world.

Not desiring to postpone longer the expression of these desires, I have asked my First Minister, Mr. Raúl Morales, to go to Washington as my special and personal envoy.
envoy and take to Your Excellency and your enlightened Government the exact thought and the true sentiments which inspire and shape the action of the President of Chile.

The personal friendship and unlimited confidence which I have for Mr. Raúl Morales, the position which he occupies in my Government and the talented gifts which distinguish him afford me the assurance that he will meet with a favorable reception from Your Excellency and that he will be able faithfully to interpret the purposes which move me daily to draw closer the very cordial relations which happily unite our two peoples.

I beg Your Excellency to be good enough to accept the assurances of my particular esteem and my good wishes for your personal happiness and the success of your Government.

(S) J. Ant. Ríos
Department of State

BUREAU

DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADRESSED TO

THE PRESIDENT
December 18, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

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Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Letter from President of Chile.
Suggested reply.

The President,

The White House
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