Santiago, January 6, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter to Hull on a subject on which I feel very strongly, along with the whole of my staff. It may be you have not seen my telegram of yesterday. At any rate, I think you may be interested.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:
Letter, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

P.S. Since writing the above have just seen telegram from Dawson saying some resentment in Uruguay because of our specially good treatment of Argentine resulting in prosperity there. Today at noon had Father Weigel and Father Charles, the famous Belgian priest both of whom are doing great work for us here and both volunteered the opinion that it is a grave mistake to "appease Argentine". Incidentally both said our worst enemy in South America is the present Spanish regime which is doing damage. No one I know can understand how it is so important to us to maintain the paper surplus in Argentina, our open enemy, at the expense of Chile, our friend, which asks but 500 more tons out of the thousands we give Argentina. If we shift the 300 Chile will still have less than a thousand and Argentina still have between four and five thousand.
Santiago, January 6, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I hope you have seen the telegram I sent yesterday regarding the mass publicity from the United States given to stories published here that we are about to make reductions in our purchases of strategic war material and to reduce the price of what we do purchase. The effect here has been most distressing and, as I think, along with all members of my staff, and all American business men here with whom I have talked, most dangerous. In this connection I hope you will read the telegram no. 12, January 3, 1944, 10 p.m., prepared by the Economic Counselor, who is not a sentimentalist. The general effect of all this publicity has been to re-awaken the fear so much insisted upon by our enemies that the Good Neighbor Policy is entirely a matter of momentary convenience and that we really are not in the least concerned with the welfare of Chile or South American countries; that the moment the immediate necessities are satisfied we will drop them all like hot potatoes. These stories of not only great reductions in the amount purchased, but of the price also, have been seized upon by our enemies and used by the pro-Argentina in connection with the Bolivian situation. But most alarming to me, is the fact that not a few among the strongest and most loyal supporters we have had during the last two years are alarmed and inclined to question the sincerity of our pretensions.

Coming so suddenly, the two things together, and played up so conspicuously, almost flamboyantly in articles from the United States, this would be bad at any time. But of all times imaginable, I can think of no time so bad as now and for the following reasons:

(1) I, personally, am absolutely certain that the Argentine set-up and the part the Argentine has played in the Bolivian Nazi coup, is the first step in a well thought out and financed plan to break up continental solidarity, and to create a bloc in South America hostile to us and under the leadership of Argentina.

(2) The two countries that Argentina has tried the hardest to align with her are Chile and Brazil; and in the case of Chile, this attempt is dangerous, since she has a long

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
long, common boundary with Argentina, with some boundary disputes; she has important commercial connections with Argentina that cannot be lightly disregarded; and the large German element here, directed from Argentina, is most active in trying to stir up trouble against the present democratic regime here.

(3) Despite all this, Chile has stood like a stone wall, not only stood herself, but Fernández has worked day and night on the Ambassadors of all American nations and through his Ambassadors in all these nations, to hold them together against the conspiracy. And in this he has had the absolute support, thus far, of President Ríos. Chile took her stand long before the Montevideo Committee made its recommendation and in absolute accord with that recommendation. In fact he acted, as you may remember, precisely as we wished before our wish was conveyed to him. I know this to be true since I have seen his instructions to his diplomatic missions. And in all this he has taken his stand four-square with the United States. He asked me to say to you and President Roosevelt long ago that he would act in absolute conformity with us. He has beyond the shadow of a doubt.

And because of that, our enemies have attacked him. Just now he and the President and Chile are entitled to every consideration from us. It seems most unfortunate to me that in the very midst of this crisis involving, as I think, the future influence of the United States, we should throw into the lap of our enemies, and theirs, the most damaging material for anti-American propaganda. This certainly is not the time.

I called in all our economic people of the Embassy and we discussed the situation and we are all agreed, to a man, and very strongly agreed, that this is not the moment to begin a pinching of this country. We feel there should be a six months continuance of present prices for one thing. By reducing prices, we save but $200,000, and that, in these days, and with so much involved, seems inconsequential. I have no doubt that the Axis, active through Argentina, will spend far more in an effort to get Chile.

The press here is becoming bitter over its inability to get an increase of as little as three hundred tons of newsprint a month in view of the enormously greater amount sent to Argentina. I must confess my inability to understand, in view of Chile's attitude toward us, and Argentina's, why
why 300 tons cannot be taken from the thousands of tons sent to the Argentine. Yesterday this was discussed in the Senate, emphasis put on the fact that pro-Axis Argentina, maintaining relations with the Axis, fares far better. But I have previously made my feeling about this clear. Everyone here knows about the enormous difference in amounts sent to the two countries. It is not easy to explain away here.

But, to put it all in a nut-shell, Chile is the soundest, most instinctive democracy in South America; we are fighting a war for the preservation of democracy; and I feel that Chile has proven her fidelity to us. This, I think, is paramount.

Sincerely yours,

CLAUDE G. BOWERS

CGB/es
January 12, 1944

Dear Claude:

I appreciate your sending me a copy of your letter to Secretary Hull about the Bolivian situation. I have read it with the greatest interest. Please tell Fernández that I—that all of us here in Washington—admire the courage with which he has faced the present crisis. Also tell him that Chile can count upon our support in its stand against outside intrigue.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, December 28, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter to Hull. I think the Bolivian affair is a first step in a determined attempt, well thought out and organized in Argentina under the direction of Nazi agents there, to smash the policy of continental solidarity and to create a pro-Nazi bloc against democracy in general and against the United States in particular. I hope that the hoary Nazi policy of promising everything to get in and cynically jeering at the promise when in, will not make any impression in Washington. To wipe out Fascism in Europe and have it established at our back door, is hardly what we want.

Incidentally, you may be interested, as I am, in the fact that during the week the British Ambassador has manifested no interest and has not seen me. I do not care for that spirit. Of course the British Ambassador here is a weakling and afraid to express an opinion about the weather without specific instructions from London.

Which reminds me of an observation of Jefferson on his colleagues when he was in Paris. He said they all had "padlocks" on them" when the trunk is opened it is usually found to be empty".

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Enclosure: Letter, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

That the inspiration and direction of the Bolivian Nazi coup came from Argentina is now too clearly demonstrated in the investigations of our various missions in South America. That the coup in La Paz was tried to test the spirit of the United States, and the other South American nations, is quite as clear to me. I have no doubt whatever that the crowning of the Nazi coup in La Paz with success, following that in Argentina, would be an invitation and an incitement to the pro-Nazi, anti-American elements in the armies of various South American countries, and that the ultimate result would be the creation of an anti-American bloc under the direction of Argentina. In brief I think, and have no doubt, that this is crucial.

Nothing has delighted me more than the attitude of the Government and press and people in Chile. As you know from the telegrams, Chile has determined to go with us. I see Fernández daily. He came to my house with all his telegrams for an hour and a half on Christmas and I was at his for that length of time on Sunday, the next day and yesterday I saw him twice. He sent for me at 8 in the evening after I had been with him an hour at noon to show me the telegram from his Ambassador in Argentina concerning the approach to him of the Argentine Government on the matter of the recognition of the Bolivian regime. The reply of his Ambassador was in accord with instructions from Fernández. I note that the Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, also approached, telegraphed Rio for instructions. The Chilean Ambassador had his instructions before.

I have sometimes thought it unfortunate that Chile's relations with Argentina are not better understood by Washington or by some in Washington. Chile has a real problem there. A long common frontier with some boundary questions; a big and powerful neighbor with a disposition to bully; and real need for a degree of economic collaboration—all making it necessary when at all possible to at least pretend to a cordial feeling

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
of friendship. This has been too generally interpreted as an indication that Chile shares the views of Argentina. Fernández and some of his predecessors have often spoken to me in confidence of the embarrassing nature of Chile's position and of their realization that the little gestures are open to misinterpretation. I have passed all this on to the Department.

But in this Bolivian crisis, Chile has taken a strong stand with us and against Argentina and if that does not count with us, nothing can.

I wish I could make it clear that Chile is the soundest, most instinctive democracy in South America, with institutions strikingly similar to our own, and with the mass of the people as passionately devoted to the democratic ideology as our own. For that reason, she is a sore thumb to all the dictatorial regimes, and particularly to Argentina with its Nazi, Fascist and Phalangist views. It is a constant rebuke to certain other nations that would like to see a dictatorship here as a justification of their own. That puts Chile in the most dangerous position of all — even Uruguay, which is in danger because right up against Argentina.

I have just read Butler's observations about Chile — the most fantastic thing I have ever read. He refers to Chile as a dictatorship! Good God! He has the democratic center in the South, about Valdivia, which is the German and pro-Nazi section. He speaks of a "revolutionary spirit", due to the "dictatorship" in Santiago, and the resentment of the democratic Nazi element in the South, and says we are hated because we support the "dictatorship". Really, Mr. Secretary, some Senator who can talk ought to be furnished with the facts here so he can tear the shirt off Butler and make him ridiculous. If you think Connally or McKellar should have the facts, I am willing to write them, but not without authorization from you. After all, you have the facts in Washington.

Butler's campaign is most dangerous. His interview on Bolivia sounds like something of the 1880's. Just another South American revolution! Nothing wrong about that! It is their own business! My God, that sort of stuff sent by our press associations to South America makes Butler scarcely less than a Nazi propagandist.

You may be interested to know that Fernández has a real affection, aside from admiration, for you and the President and he speaks of you both to Chileans in terms of the highest praise and almost with emotion of the kind things you said to him. I am convinced that his instructions to his Ambassadors in America
are stronger than those of any other Foreign Minister. All his Ambassadors had instructions from the first to inform the Governments to which they were accredited that Chile would go with us. Thus, when yesterday the emissary of Gilbert saw the Chilean Ambassador in Buenos Aires about recognition, the Ambassador did not have to await instructions. He had them before and acted upon them instantly.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

CLAUDE G. BOWERS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request, there is submitted herewith a draft of letter in response to that of December 28, 1943 written you by Ambassador Bowers.

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers, December 28, 1943, with enclosure.
2. To Ambassador Bowers.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

January 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter addressed to the President from Ambassador Bowers, dated Jan. 7, 1944, enclosing copy of a telegram which the latter sent to the Secretary of State, etc., re termination of copper agreement with Chile, and asking for authorization to inform the Foreign Minister about the woodpulp quotas.
January 27, 1944

Dear Claude:

I have received your letter of January 7, 1944, enclosing a copy of a telegram to the Secretary of State concerning the proposed termination of the copper control agreement. The situation is, as you say, delicate, particularly in view of the present Argentine and Bolivian political situations. It is, however, important that the copper agreement be terminated if possible or at least be rendered inoperative insofar as are concerned those other American republics which have either broken relations with or declared war on the Axis. You refer to the possibility of Argentine pressure on Chile to furnish copper. Were each country to yield when there is a risk of specific difference with Argentina, unity of purpose or action would be rendered most difficult. I am sure that an acceptable formula to adjust this matter can be found and am relying on you in this.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
Santiago, January 7, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a telegram sent the Department today. It is terribly disheartening at a time when we have aligned Chile with us to the full in the vital matter of the Bolivian Junta, to have these new plans to reduce everything, purchases and prices, to the serious immediate disadvantage of Chile thrown in our laps. On the matter of wood pulp, we all feel very strongly. I, personally, cannot yet understand why it is impossible to give Chile 300 more tons of newsprint greatly needed, by taking that meager amount from Argentina, our enemy, openly now our enemy, organizing or trying to organize an anti-United States bloc in South America. It would still leave Argentina with five or six thousand tons a month against 580 tons a month for this outstanding democratic country. The press is now attacking on that score and this week it was the subject of discussion in the House of Deputies. It is dangerous, and very hard to understand. This view is warmly shared by every single member of my staff.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Copy of telegram, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
SecState,
Washington, D. C.
US URGENT.
Confidential for Hull,

I have given considerable thought to your 11 January 4, 6 p.m. and am convinced in my own mind that it is not opportune for me to bring up in a direct manner with the Minister of Foreign Affairs the matter of the termination of the copper agreement, especially on top of the bombshell which we exploded in preliminary mention of price reductions under the overall agreement for the purchase of certain minerals from the small mining industry. See my 21 January 4, 6 p.m. and 39, January 7, 4 p.m. in this connection.

This telegram strictly confidential.

I prefer to bring up this matter with the Foreign Minister at a time when I can convey some good news to him and I most earnestly recommend that I be authorized to inform him that we have fixed the woodpulp quotas for the second and remaining quarters of this year at 4000 tons per quarter. The technical details of the Chilean woodpulp requirements have been exhaustively reported by the Embassy. The Department is aware of the vast saving to the newsprint production industry of the United States which will result from sending chemical woodpulp to Chile where it can be mixed with Chilean mechanical woodpulp in the ratio of about
about one part US woodpulp to seven parts Chilean woodpulp for the production of newsprint. Moreover, it will aid in maintaining existing Chilean industries and therefore be consistent with our policy of developing in Chile copper and other industries which depend largely for their raw material on Chilean resources. The matter of the failure of the United States to supply Chile with sufficient wood pulp while Argentina is able to obtain supplies from Europe as well as the United States because she did not break relations with the Axis has caused comment here which has even reached the floor of the House of Deputies. I must ask therefore that the Department and the other concerned agencies of the Government augment without delay the woodpulp quotas for Chile.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has inquired about the Department's resolution in regard to the exchange of Chilean copper for Argentine mares. He states that he would not admit of pressure from Argentina, that the mares are desired for agricultural purposes especially because of the limited gasoline supplies made available to Chile, and that this is purely a Chilean request. He was apprised that the Argentine army customarily has its military needs for copper manufactures handled by a Proclaimed List firm (Sema) and that it is thought the Argentine army pays the firm in copper. It is believed that he would like a favorable reply even though it placed the exchange on a restricted monthly basis, but in any case he wishes an early
early reply. I am convinced of the good faith of Fernandez and do not think he would make this request unless it really meant something to him and the administration. If at all possible, I would suggest that I be authorized to inform him of some concessions in this matter, but I do not insist. I do, however, feel that I must insist in the increased woodpulp quotas.

The Department will realize that the Chilean picture is spotted and that a real danger exists here of a military coup because of constant conspiratorial activity of Axis through Argentina. The Government is doing everything in its power to prevent it and has so far succeeded but I consider the situation is still delicate and we must not repeat not do anything which can be used by our enemies to aggravate it. Economic curtailments strike everyone down the line from the Government and the capitalist to the laborers and we must make them with the greatest perspicacity to avoid injuring our own best interests and postwar trade. For example, it has been rumored here recently that the State Railways, unable to obtain loans in the United States to cover purchases of needed equipment, have turned to Great Britain and are now negotiating a barter agreement involving an exchange of nitrate for railway equipment. In this connection, the Nitrate Sales Corporation here feels that it obtained from the State Department what amounted to a veritable promise that nitrate above the 700,000 tons would be purchased by the United States. Consideration might be given to the purchase of additional nitrate if the Chilean
Chilean State Railways will purchase in the United States a substantially corresponding value of railway equipment. I am aware that we do not like arrangements which smack of barter although there is a certain similarity to barter in lend-lease and reverse lend-lease. The Chileans are essentially traders and we must keep that point in mind in our dealings with them and it is well to have in hand a quid pro quo even if it is not presented as such in effecting a transaction.

In conclusion, I entreat that my views be given the utmost possible consideration consistent with the prosecution of the war. I ask prompt upward revision of woodpulp quotas, authority to revise the overall agreement for minerals along the lines of my 21 and my 39, and in general consideration of the Chilean scene as a whole and not piecemeal. I am doing my best to further the advancement of the good neighbor policy on a firm foundation of mutual trust and mutual advantage. Great strides were made during the past year but it would be easy to lose ground through ill-timed action or action which the Chileans could feel inconsiderate. We must not give our enemies the opportunity to refer to us as "Fair weather friends".

BOWERS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request, there is submitted herewith a draft of letter in response to that of January 7, 1944, written you by Ambassador Bowers.

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers, January 7, 1944, with enclosure.

2. To Ambassador Bowers.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Embassy of the USA, Santiago, Chile, 2/1/44, to the President, enclosing paraphrase of a telegram he is sending to Secretary Bull in re demands being made on Franco, and asking that the demands include one to the effect that Franco cease using Spanish diplomatic missions in Latin America in such a manner as to serve the Axis and create prejudices against the U.S.
Dear Claude:

I appreciate your kindness in sending me a copy of your telegram no. 293 of February 1, 1944 to Mr. Hull concerning the current policy toward Spain. As always, I find your views of interest.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, February 1, 1944

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a telegram I am sending Secretary Hull. It strikes me that the exclusion of this particular demand is not to our advantage. I was right in my reports from 1937 on regarding the plan to use the Spanish fascists against us in South America, as has been shown full measure, running over.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Paraphrase of a telegram sent to the Department:

208, February 1, 2 p.m.

for the Secretary.

I note, in the press despatches treating of the demands being made on Franco, the absence of that one which most affects us, namely, that he cease using Spanish diplomatic missions in Latin America in such a manner as to serve the Axis and create prejudices against the United States. I am sure that Hitler and Mussolini were motivated in their support of Franco in the Spanish war by the theory that Spain has great influence in South America and could thereby be used in spreading totalitarian ideas and in striking at us. The organization of a Fascist group of South Americans in Spain having as its purpose the spreading of Fascist doctrines on this continent was reported by me as early as 1937, as were the articles and commen-
datory editorials of the Franco press. Since the war began this has abundantly been borne out. It may be the demand on Franco to end this sort of thing will be included in the demands being made, but if it is not, I suggest its inclusion as being of the greatest concern to us.

BOWERS

OG: 1da
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of February 9, 1944 enclosing a letter from Ambassador Bowers relative to the Spanish situation, there is attached a suggested reply, for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:
1. Letter from Ambassador Bowers, dated February 1, 1944.
2. Suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, 3/3/44, to the President, enclosing copy of his telegram to the State Dept., in re Mr. Fernandez, the Chilean Foreign Minister, etc.
March 24, 1944

My dear Claude:

I have received your letter of March 8, 1944 and have noted your feelings in regard to Fernandez. I must say he made a favorable impression on me when he was here last autumn. You will admit, however, that his recent decision in regard to Argentina, whether or not he was acting as a free agent, has let us down badly in so far as continental solidarity is concerned. I gather from your letter and cabled reports that no one realizes this at present more than he and that he is anxious to make amends. Of course it is never too late to do that. I am inclined to agree with you that little would be gained by his being forced out. That, however, would appear to be a question that only the Chileans themselves can decide.

I appreciate your suggestion about the Good Neighbor policy and shall bear it in mind. While it may be desirable to limit the phrase to this hemisphere, there seems no question of the advisability of extending the principle to the other.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, March 8, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing copy of a telegram sent to the Department. I have seen five or six Foreign Ministers since I came to Chile. Not one has had the ability, the international comprehension, the training, or the spirit of friendly cooperation with us that Fernández has shown since he engineered the rupture. He has made a mistake, but one mistake, in view of the record before his time, is not vital. It should be sheer tragedy were he forced out by the very belated ardor of the Radical Party to make way for one of their politicians. Almost every crisis since I have been here has been forced by the Radical Party, though the President has been a Radical, and in not one instance has there been anything to explain the crisis but patronage. The Radical Party is the Tammany Hall of Chile. In the fight for rupture, our greatest obstacle for a long time and until the very end, was the Radical Party. Should Fernández be forced out on the ground that we do not want him, the President would be called on to name a Radical. I cannot think of one qualified by experience, knowledge, or friendship for us.

May I be permitted the temerity to suggest that the extension of the Good Neighbor Policy to the whole world will not set well in South America? The Good Neighbor Policy implied a special interest of ours in the Americas. With the extension, it ceases to have any special significance for this continent. Cannot some other phrase be coined for the extension, leaving the Good Neighbor Policy what it has been all along? I think this is an especially bad time to indicate any lessening of our special interest in South America. The British are working incessantly and with plenty of money to build up British post war trade on this continent. With an intensification of their activities and the lessening of ours, I am afraid of the effect.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
SECSTATE - WASHINGTON URGENT

CONFIDENTIAL FOR UNDER SECRETARY, DUGGAN, BONSAL AND LYON

Yesterday afternoon Pablo Ramirez came to me from Fernández asking if I would see the latter at his house in the evening. The Minister looked very tired and discouraged but impressed me, as always, as frank and sincere in what he said. He said he had considered the provisional recognition of Argentine Junta as routine and that the provision that Argentina carry out all its obligations as promised under the Rio agreement as constituting a warning to Farrell, as furnishing a club through which Chile can be of service in forcing him to keep his word, and also a way out should he fail. Mistaken though I think he was, I am positive of his sincerity. When I suggested that he may have feared the possible drawing together of Bolivia and Argentina constituting a grave threat to Chile, he said that while there was that danger this did not motivate his act. I have the distinct impression that he was the victim of bad advice from Conrado Rios and Felix Nieto.

He protested almost pathetically his complete sympathy with the United States and his ambition to work with us; his admiration for Roosevelt and his affection for Hull; and urged that we use Chile as a club on Argentina. He said and proposed certain things.

(1) He said he had already told the Argentine Ambassador that it is imperative that a civilian known to be strongly democratic and wholly satisfactory to the United States and United Nations be named Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that steps must be taken immediately to discharge the obligations of continental defense under the Rio agreements.
(2) He suggested that Armour come here ostensibly for a rest to tell him personally and secretly how Chile could most effectively cooperate with him. This implied distrust of his Ambassador. Pablo Ramirez, who was present, here interjected the remark that the Ambassador does not have the confidence of the United Nations and should be recalled.

(3) He asked our opinion on the wisdom of calling a meeting of American Foreign Ministers with some advance notice, to check up on what the country of each has done toward carrying out the Rio agreements; commenting that this would put each country on its mettle and result in more being done than has been, and implied it would be helpful to him.

(4) He said he has not sent any instructions to his American missions to carry on a campaign to persuade any to accord recognition to Farrell.

After this conversation I am convinced that he was not motivated by resentment and certainly not by any conscious opposition to us. He made a blunder, his first, very similar but not quite so pointed as that of Aranha in ordering his Ambassador to ignore the agreement and "go immediately and recognize Ramirez", which was the first break in continental solidarity.

The incident has its advantages. It is intensifying the disposition to force into operation the Rio agreements, economically and politically. The Government is now acting vigorously on the spy cases. Yesterday, President Ríos summoned the Chief Justice and asked him to put some iron into the judge acting in the cases, and warned him that any spy released by the court will be immediately rearrested on his personal order and responsibility.

The situation developing from the incident, resulting in
-3-

opposition, calls for this observation: I am not impressed but rather depressed by the sudden ardor of the Radical party which for two years has been our constant stumbling block. It is interested primarily in the jobs. It would like to have Fernández out, that one of its politicians may be put in. It has no one whose friendship for us, whose disposition to cooperation, whose comprehension of the world situation, remotely approaches that of Fernández who engineered the rupture and for more than a year has cooperated vigorously with us. If there have been delays, it has not been due to him since he has persistently pressed for action that we want. I am convinced that the recall of Conrado Rios would greatly simplify our problems in Argentina, and with attacks being made upon him here, I am wondering if it could be intimated to Michels that we have no confidence in his friendship for us. Certainly it will not be to our advantage to have Fernández sacrificed.

Repeated to Buenos Aires.

BOWERS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

CHILEAN RECOGNITION OF THE FARRELL REGIME IN ARGENTINA

There is attached for signature a reply to Ambassador Bowers at Santiago, answering his letter of March 8 to the President.

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers, March 8, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram from Santiago.
3. From The White House, March 17, 1944.
4. To Ambassador Bowers.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What are we going to do next
to call Henry Luce to account? We
seem to have to do it about once a
month!

F.D.R.

Telegram to the Secretary of State, No.
550, from Bowers, Santiago, 3-24-44, re
spontaneous action by all Americans in
Chile re attack in Time in revenge for
Bowers denunciation of its slander of the
dying Aguirrecedra.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, 3/24/44, to the President, in re vicious attack made on Mr. Bowers in "Time" magazine. Encloses copies of telegrams sent to Time Magazine protesting the attack by American Chamber Commerce in Chile, Chile-American Association, John W. White and by H.R. Graham, and others.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

PRIVATE AND  
CONFIDENTIAL  

April 1, 1944.  

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  

Please prepare reply and also speak to me about this letter from Claude Bowers.  

F. D. R.  

Letter addressed to the President dated March 20, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

TIME ARTICLE CONCERNING AMBASSADOR BOWERS

There is attached for signature a reply to Ambassador Bowers at Santiago, answering his letter of March 24 to the President.

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers, March 24, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram to Time, Inc. from American Chamber Commerce in Chile.
3. Copy of telegram to Time Magazine from Chile-American Association.
4. Copy of telegram to Time Magazine from John W. White.
5. Copy of telegram to Time Magazine from American businessmen in Chile.
6. From The White House, March 30, 1944
7. To Ambassador Bowers.
Dear Claude:

I have received your letter of March 24 concerning the *Time* article of March 20. The method adopted by *Time* in this case is not new and the State Department has made it very clear to the Washington representative of that magazine how we feel about it, but as you know as well as anybody else, it is not easy to prevent these things and at the same time enjoy a free press.

I have noted with interest the telegrams enclosed with your letter. This indication of real friendship and respect by so many of your friends and countrymen should give you real satisfaction.

With good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

March 30, 1944.
Embassy of the
United States of America
Santiago, March 24, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

In view of the lying and vicious attack on me in Time, and the silence of the State Department, imposed by dignity, I am proud to enclose herewith copies of telegrams of protest spontaneously sent that scurrilous, Loose magazine by the American Chamber of Commerce in Chile, the Chile-American Society, and twenty-two of the leading Americans here, executives of American interests. I have notes from colleagues expressing their "disgust", and I am sorry to say the Canadian phrased it "my disgust with the peculiar methods of some of your periodicals". John White also telegraphed a denunciation to the New York Herald-Tribune, Baltimore Sun and Philadelphia Record.

Sincerely,

CLAUDE G. BOWERS

Enclosures:
Copies of telegrams,
as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Your untimely reference Ambassador Bowers' issue March 20th represents underhand misinformation considered by us harmful to our country's best interests during a period when all of us are endeavoring further hemisphere solidarity under capable leadership our well placed Ambassador.

American Chamber Commerce in Chile
The Chile-American Association of Santiago Chile energetically protests the publication in the issue of Time of March 20th, 1944, attacking the Ambassador of the United States, the Honorable Claude G. Bowers. The article is not only inaccurate, unjust and unpatriotic but lessens the confidence a magazine such as Time should merit.

Chile-American Association
TO: HERALD TRIBUNE - NEW YORK
SUN - BALTIMORE
RECORD - PHILADELPHIA

(TRUE COPY - es)

FYI TIME MAGAZINE ATTACK BOWERS AUGUST TWENTIETH ISSUE COMPLETELY FALSE UNWARRANTED HE WAS CONSTANT DIRECT TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION WASHINGTON FROM LOCALITY HIS FIRST REST MOREN YEAR ADDITION EMBASSYS DAILY COMMUNICATION WASHINGTON STOP CHILES REASONS BREAK SO WEIGHTY WOULDN'T BEEN ALTERED IF BOWERS HAD CAMPED FORMINISTERS DOORSTEP STOP BOWERS UNDOUBTEDLY DONE MORE ANY OTHER MEMBER OUR FOREIGN SERVICE DEFEND DEMOCRACY SOUTH AMERICA HE ALMOST SOLELY RESPONSIBLE NONRECOGNITION BOLIVIA WHICH DISCOURAGED THREATENED SPREAD MILITARY GOVERNMENTS SIMILAR ARGENTINAS STOP ATTACK PROBABLY REVENGE BOWERS FORCEFUL DENUNCIATION TIMES FALSE CHARGE PRESIDENT AGUIRRE CERDA WAS DYING DRUNKENNESS

JOHN W WHITE

J W WHITE, Club de la Unión
The undersigned American business men in Chile deeply resent the uncalled for and completely unfounded article in the issue of Time of March 20th, 1944, attacking the Ambassador of the United States the Honorable Claude G. Bowers. The Ambassador was taking a well earned and long postponed vacation of short duration within two and a half hours automobile ride of Santiago and at all times was in telephonic communication with the Embassy. Scurrilous attacks of this nature are particularly unjust in the case of the person representing the United States in Chile during these difficult times when the fact is that his able representation has secured the complete confidence of the American colony as well as that of the Government to which he is accredited. Furthermore in our opinion Time is being unfair to itself and its subscribers by resorting to such low type journalism which in time of war is certainly an unpatriotic effort to destroy the very work which the Ambassador must do.

H. R. Graham
J. H. Cussen
P. A. Seibert
J. R. Cotter
R. P. Miller
J. L. Willett
James Carr
Richard Reinoehl
Roy Cohn
Fred Moore
Hugh McFadden

W. R. Judson
Richard Brenner
Frank May
William Slack
James O'Gara
Lawrence Baldwin
C. G. Bush
W. E. Morrison
O. H. Mitchell
M. S. McGoldrick
W. J. Turner
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of April 1, 1944, enclosing a letter from Ambassador Bowers relative to the Spanish and Argentine situations, there is attached a suggested reply for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:


2. Suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers.
April 25, 1944

Dear Claude:

Thank you for your letter of March 20, 1944 commenting on the present position of Argentina and Spain. As always, I find your views both interesting and thoughtful.

I now am going to write you with complete frankness, knowing that you will realize the absolutely confidential character of what I say and will divulge this to no one.

Our radius of action in dealing with Argentina has been limited by the dependence of the British particularly on certain prime Argentine exports. We have not simply accepted the British statement of their need; our own food and supply people confirm what the British have told us. The invasion of Europe may have some effect upon this situation, but the estimate of food needs for Europe indicates a continuing dependence upon Argentine supplies for some time to come.

Armour believes that his British colleague in Buenos Aires has given him adequate, although possibly not dynamic, support. British Government action has been frequently handicapped by the attitude of some leaders of the large colony of hard-shelled British. These persons are influenced as much by postwar trade considerations as by the imperative necessity of first winning the war. The British Government is not alone in having difficulties in getting its own people to
see the war in the proper light. We have our own problems. You, for instance, know better than anyone of the difficulties that the *Time-Life* articles have created from time to time in our relations with Chile, and our newspapermen keep insisting upon sending despatches about our need for Argentine produce.

Your first-hand information concerning Gil Robles and other figures in a possible monarchist restoration in Spain is very interesting. The question of the restoration of the monarchy seems, however, to have again receded into the background.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, March 20, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I have some ideas touching but indirectly on Chile which I nevertheless consider of so much significance that it should be called to your attention for whatever it may be worth. We unquestionably are losing prestige in South America because of the Argentine situation, due to the fact that Argentina defies us with impunity and yet escapes economic sanctions. While defying us openly and pluming themselves among the other American nations on their success, they are prospering beyond any other American nation, and were before the rupture of relations which, thus far, means less than nothing. The other American nations that have stood by us and are suffering from economic causes and are sure to suffer more in the post-war period, while it seems Argentine will increase her prosperity, are laughed at by the Argentinians and told it would have been better for them to have followed Argentina rather than the United States. If the war ends with these conditions, I feel positive that Argentina will emerge as the dominate nation of the continent; and its influence will be against us.

I know, of course, that we have been unable to do anything because of the attitude of England. This seems intolerable to me since we are spending billions and risking millions of lives perhaps for the protection of England's position in Europe while she is unwilling to stand by us in a problem of the Americas. Now I am going to say something I would not whisper outside. I am firmly convinced that England finds the idea of continental solidarity under our guidance obnoxious, since she fears the effect of this solidarity on her post-war trade. I know that she did nothing to help us in the fights for rupture - certainly nothing in Chile. On the contrary, her business men here usually sympathized with Chileans on their theory that nothing would be gained by a rupture. I am convinced that

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
she rejoices in the anti-American attitude of Argentina.

She is exerting herself assiduously to curry favor here. Recently her Chamber of Commerce gave a great banquet for the Minister of Finance, and I just learn that another is planned for the President. I was shocked when the Lord Willingden mission was here to note that little, if anything, was said about the war. It was purely a "buy British" excursion, composed of big industrialists, a man from the Bank of London, all of the Chamberlain appeasement crowd. Last week when the Valparaiso papers carried elaborate stories about the Filipino army officer, Commander Lopez Manzano, a delegation of English business men in Valparaiso called on El Mercurio there to protest with some vigor. This I get from El Mercurio, and it seems incredible.

But the best evidence that a long term campaign to diminish our influence on this continent is found in the field of the press. The Reuter agency is partly financed by the British Government; English business men here, and presumably in other countries, contribute to the Reuter fund; and the Reuter news is an English interpretation. The United Press for years has served most of the papers of South America, all the important ones in Argentina and most here, and the Argentine Government has closed down the United Press there and all its clients have had to go over to Reuters. Whether this is part of the trade on the British attitude toward sanctions against Argentina, or merely a fine Argentine gesture to encourage the British in right doing, I do not know, but I have strong suspicions. Should the result be permanently the shifting of the South American press from the United Press to Reuters, I know the effect on us and on our prestige here will be decidedly unfortunate.

I noticed, copied here, an editorial from the London Mail saying Argentina's attitude is not pro-totalitarian, or pro-Nazi but "anti-American imperialism." Our press takes it quietly without a word.

Another thing that may be of interest to you in reference to the Spanish situation. I yield to no one regarding Spain, as to the personnel of its public life, and the meaning behind its diverse movements. Since we hear that an agent of the movement to force the King back on the people is in Washington, and since the press here reports the full Ministry already chosen by the late King's son, an analysis of its meaning may be of some slight interest. The movement is clearly one of a part of the Army, the big industrialists, the big bankers, the feudalistic land owning aristocracy. This means the economic reactionaries.
Nothing is said about release of the thousands of democrats in jail, the return of the gallant men who for two and a half years held back the Nazi flood from Europe, or elections and a return to a parliamentary government.

But I am intrigued by the announcement that Gil Robles is to be Prime Minister. I know him well and followed him and his views closely for six years. He is the son of a very reactionary professor at Salamanca. When a student there, Gil Robles and a few young men ran a paper bitterly denouncing Unamuno, the ornament of the University, because he was a liberal and a democrat. He never has known the generous liberal impulses of youth. He was reactionary from his cradle. He attended one of the Nazi conventions at Nurnberg. His paper was an ardent friend of Mussolini. In the campaign of 1936 in a public speech he said that "the curse of Spain is too much education." In another he said that the ideal political set up is that of "the philosophers of the 16th Century." During the two years he was actually in power his people wrecked the public school program, making splendid progress under Azana; they reduced the very reasonable laws enacted for lifting the status of labor to nullities; they wrecked the plans for agrarian reforms. While Minister of War he had Franco as head of the staff, and Republican officers were sent to unimportant posts and enemies of the Republic sent instead. It was common knowledge that these two manipulated the army in preparation for a coup d'etat. When the election was lost in 1936 he went the next day to Portello, the Prime Minister, and asked him to make himself dictator. Portello himself let that out.

But when the election was lost, many, including the monarchists, turned bitterly against him because they said he had the game in his hands and he did not have the guts to act when his people were in power. He ran away from Spain the night before the war began and the present regime has never permitted him in Spain. He remains in voluntary exile in Portugal.

Thus hated by the Republican element, which is pre-dominant, but in exile, or in prison, hated by the Falangists, his selection for Prime Minister merely means that he has made terms with Alba and the Monarchists.

I also know Ventosa, the Minister of Finance. He is a pleasant man, of the big money group headed by Cambo, of Barcelona. It is as though the first John Pierpont Morgan had been made Secretary of the Treasury.

It is also edifying to hear in this press report that Juan March is financing the restoration. He is literally the Al Capone of Spain, notoriously crooked, and
his fortune was largely made during the first war when he was a contrabandist on a large scale and did work for Germany. He was in jail for notorious crookedness when I went to Madrid and he bribed his way out. He financed largely the Fascist uprising in the beginning in 1936. He certainly is a sweet smelling rascal to finance any respectable movement.

You may want some of these facts in the back of your head.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
SECRET

Secretary of State

Washington

981, June 7, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR STETTINIUS DUGGAN AND LYON

Yesterday evening formal homage was paid the United Nations, apropos the invasion, in the Congress, leading members of all parties participating, including Cruz Coke, Grove, Amunategui and Contreras Labarca, and Fernandez spoke in warm commendation of our cause and particularly mentioned the United States, and spoke for President Rios. Senator Guzman in his speech paid an elaborate tribute to our contribution to Chilean independence and proposed that streets be named after Poinsett and Admiral Wooster. In addition there was a demonstration in the streets. Numerous telegrams of congratulations from all parts of Chile have been received. I think it is within the facts to say that there is every proof of a real general enthusiasm in Chile over the successful invasion.

President Rios also made an official statement in which he characterized the forces of the United Nations as defending
2: #981, June 7, 1 p.m. from Santiago

defending the culture and civilization of the (*) inst
and pledged Chile and its Government to a definite policy
of cooperation with the United Nations and their associates
in the defense of the democratic regime and the unity of
the Continent.

The press continues to give unusual space to the news
from France, and all the newspapers carry very favorable
leading editorials. President Roosevelt's prayer also
carried in full and favorably commented on by Catholic
Conservative EL DIARIO ILUSTRADO.

Ben Meyer of the AP who sent a report of the homage
paid by Congress to the United Nations, to Roosevelt,
Churchill and Stalin, informs me that the Argentine censor
has forbidden its publication in Argentine papers.

Repeated to Buenos Aires.

BOWERS

EJH LMS

(*) Apparent omission.
June 10, 1944

My dear Claude:

I have received your letter of April 6, 1944 enclosing a copy of your letter of the same date to the Secretary of State, which I understand he answered at some length on May 5, 1944.

The Chilean record of compliance with the resolutions adopted at the Rio de Janeiro Conference in January 1942 as compared with that of the other American Republics was very fully discussed in a mimeographed circular instruction from the Department of State dated March 4, 1944, file no. 710 Consultation 3/355A. The material covered in this instruction is currently being brought up to date by the Department of State and you will be provided with a copy of the revision shortly.

I think the variation in appreciation of Chile's cooperation and effort as between the Department of State on the one hand and the Embassy at Santiago on the other, is largely a matter of perspective and when viewed in the light of the complete information which is available here on the measures taken by all the other American Republics to implement the Rio resolutions, Chile's performance appears less impressive than it may to those on the spot. I must admit that I am somewhat at a loss to understand the statement attributed to Mr. Spaeth to the effect that Chile is doing better than Peru since he has participated in studies just completed by the Committee.
Committee for Political Defense covering all the republics, which suggest that Peru has been more effective than Chile in implementing Rio Resolution XVII, the area with which Mr. Spaeth deals.

I find your remarks and prognostications in regard to the political situation in this country, as always, very interesting.

Very truly yours,

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, April 6, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a personal letter to Hull, which may interest you. The insistence from Washington that Chile is cooperating less than the other American Republics causes some skepticism on the staff since our information does not bear it out. Indeed Spaeth, when here, told a member of the staff that Chile is doing better than Peru. Certainly she has closed—closed—the German Bank, while Brazil has merely put in an interventor; and the German Insurance Company is also being closed or taken over. Certainly the espionage crusade here goes beyond that in any other American nation. I am asking a report on what has been done to carry out our wishes in Brazil, Peru, Columbia, Uruguay and Bolivia. If, as claimed, Chile's record is below that of others, it can be used effectively, perhaps, at the Foreign Office.

Meanwhile, Chile, by energetic action has rendered us great service in Buenos Aires, as Armour so generously has reported to Washington. Fernández has kept me intimately informed, sending for me twice yesterday. This has been done in stopping the censoring of American news reels, in the reopening of the United Press, and in forcing the suspension of the paper that attacked Armour. She is also bringing strong pressure to get the army men out of the Foreign Office, the Interior and Finance, to bring about the freedom of the press, elections, the resumption of constitutional government, and putting Stettinius' five points in operation. At this moment I know of no American nation rendering greater service to us.

I sometimes wonder if Washington realizes how Chile is hated because of its democracy by the nations ruled by dictators and oligarchies of economic Tories. I know that Peru and Brazil are pouring poison into Washington.

The defeat of Willkie and his withdrawal probably means Dewey, and that means reaction. I think Willkie would have polled more votes in the general election, and that the liberal element supporting him will not support Dewey at the polls.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:
Copy of letter, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Washington, D.C.
Santiago, April 6, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of the 21st and its reference to Michels' explanation of the recognition of the Farrell regime. I think there is no doubt that it was precipitate action and that Fernández, much to his distress, acted on the orders of Ríos, who is clearly too cautious about Argentina.

Of course I had no such stupid thought as that we could in any way prevent Fernández going, but in accordance with the custom of keeping you informed as to the realities of the situation here, I wrote my own opinion of the effect. There is not a scintilla of doubt that I was, and am, one hundred per cent right on that. Ríos makes some mistakes, but he would make many more but for Fernández; and Ríos has done some fine things, the rupture, the putting of the agreements of Río into operation, the campaign against the spies, and these have all come about through the insistence of Fernández.

Fernández never told me that he had been let down, but he so expressed himself to a friend who confidentially told me. I then asked him for his recollection of the understandings he thought he had and these have been sent the Department and no doubt you have seen them. I attended no meeting but in your office and there I myself clearly understood that the steel plant project had been gone into by our people who thought favorably of it; that we were not then, because of the war, in position to send the machinery, but that if the request were repeated in six months, we would see what we could do. Of course conditions remain such that we cannot do anything now.

But I was puzzled and a little distressed the other day when the Bethlehem Steel man from the States came to see me and told me that Pearson had asked him to report on the feasibility of the plan. That seemed to me almost ironical. It would hardly have been necessary for him to have come here to have given the opinion he had. Of course Bethlehem does not want any competitor here even in a small way.

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
I also understood that we, as a Government, would do nothing to prevent Chilean nitrate reaching our market. I was shocked the other day to see a government pamphlet put out by the Agricultural Department on synthetic nitrate, referring to an artificial plant in Canada, and saying in black type that it would probably be possible to displace natural nitrate with the synthetic article for agricultural purposes in the States. This amazed me since we are committed by the agreements of Rio against this very thing.

I am also puzzled by the insistent note that Chile has done less for the war effort than any other American nation, has cooperated less. She moved slowly in the rupture but that is due to her democratic processes and the fact that she is a government of law, under a Constitution that operates, and not of a Dictator. In the matter of carrying out agreements, I am told by our own people that she has done more than numerous other American nations. Now that the President has issued his decree, which had to wait on congressional action, he has closed the German bank - closed it as we wished; but Brazil has put in an interventor - which is not what we wanted. I am informed this morning by Fernández that the German Insurance Company also is being closed. And in the matter of the Black List, the Government here has never uttered one, single word of complaint or objection and we have the longest list in South America; but I am told that we have trouble in Brazil, and I know that when here Aranha got me into a corner at the Brazilian Embassy and denounced the Black List with bitterness.

It would be very helpful here if the Department will send me a list of the things we feel should be done, together with what each other American Republic has done about it. If it is as bad as we are told, without specifications, it can probably be used effectively on the Government here. But our people in the economic section are pleased with what is being done and is being planned.

The sweeping campaign against espionage here and the arrests are unquestionably the most important that have been made in any other American Republic. I am afraid our press has little to say about this.

It is very clear to me, Mr. Secretary, and I have said it before, that there are nations in South America gunning for Chile and spreading all sorts of fantastic tales about her to create a prejudice against her in Washington; and I know the reason - they feel that with Chile out, there will be more for them. I know, and I write this with deliberation, that not one South American nation really wanted Chile to break relations with the Axis for this reason. I did not have
one American colleague lifting a finger about it when I
and my staff were working day and night and Sundays,
until three weeks before the rupture when the Brazilian
Ambassador got instructions from Rio. I talked frequently
with the Peruvian, the Brazilian, the Bolivian, and other
Ambassadors during that time and they were all plainly
pleased that the prospects were bad.

And that brings me to the latest falsehood put in
circulation—that Chile was trying to form a southern
bloc with Argentina and Bolivia against the United States.
This seems to have its origin in Lima, with Dr. Correa.
When I heard this amazing tale, I spoke to Fernández about
it and he said it was utterly false. Since then Correa re-
peats it to Patterson. Today I talked again with Fernández,
who was naturally indignant, and said it was a lie out of
the cloth and he told me the whole background. Tamaya wanted
something of the sort and had his unofficial agent here sug-
gest it. But this agent was not received and when he had a
friend mention it to Fernández, the latter denounced it. It
was because of this report that Ríos arranged his interview
with the AP in which he said that Chile wanted and would
tolerate no bloc but the Pan-American bloc. This appears of
a piece with the other fantastic tale out of Lima about
Fernández trying to persuade Argentina to break relations
with the United States. It is too silly to discuss.

Meanwhile Chile has done some things for us which
deserve all praise and appreciation. She is insisting in
Buenos Aires on civilians for the portfolios of State,
Interior and Finance; for the restoration of the freedom
of the press; for the restoration of the professors thrown
out; and on early elections and the restoration of constitu-
tional government. She has insisted that the Argentine
Junta prohibit press or radio attacks on the United States.

That she is making some progress is of knowledge to
us. Thus when American news reels were censored she pro-
tested strongly and got the pledge that it would not be
done again. Armour has given due credit to Chile for this.
Voluntarily, she went to battle over the suppression of the
United Press, and the ban has been lifted, and again Armour
telegraphs the Department that Chile's action had much to
do with it. And I know Fernández ordered his Ambassador to
cooperate and place himself at the disposal of Armour, and
Armour tells me this has been done. In other words, Chile
is cooperating with us, where no other American nation can.

I note that you "wonder whether I have gone to suf-
icient pains to emphasize the gravity of our position".
Be assured I have hundreds of times from the beginnin of the

war.
war. I suppose that comes up four times in five that I have seen him in two years. The Government here realizes it. There are business elements here who know it, but pretend to ignorance. But the Coordination Committee, through its publicity, has made it plain as can be in the press.

I have written at length, for which I apologize, because I feel that from some source, for some reason, prejudicial information is pouring into the Department from motives not in the least disinterested.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,
May 3, 1944

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your letter of April 6, 1944 commenting on our present relationships with Chile.

With regard to the projected steel mill, I think if you will review the memorandum of the conversation which I had with Sr. Fernandez, you will find that your recollection is at slight variance with the facts as the only commitment which I made was to assure Sr. Fernandez orally that it would be given serious consideration. In line with this policy, other officials of the Department and the Export-Import Bank have urged the officials of the Corporacion de Fomento to make a most careful survey and present a complete and detailed project for consideration. This will be presented within the next few days and it is anticipated that some forty-five to sixty days will be necessary for study and consideration of the financial and supply problems involved by the interested agencies of the United States Government before a decision can be reached. Your statement that according to your understanding the steel mill project had already been given favorable consideration is premature since the necessary data have not so far been made available. It was known that the preparation of the detailed plans for the project and the consideration of these would require considerable time. Now that the plans have been prepared, we can only hope that the necessary consideration will result in a favorable decision.

I doubt that Mr. Pierson would have given a Bethlehem Steel representative any official commission to investigate the steel mill project on behalf of the

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schmule Date FEB 4 1972
Export-Import Bank. It is now becoming widely known that plans for a Chilean steel plant are in process. Bethlehem Steel and possibly United States Steel will presumably show increasing interest in ascertaining the specific plans for the project and will undoubtedly tap all possible sources of information to learn details, which for obvious reasons are closely held by the Corporación de Fomento at the present time. I am not certain that your belief that Bethlehem Steel does not want any competitor in Chile is correct. They may very well be interested in this project for quite different reasons.

It is a common Chilean misapprehension that the United States was committed by the Rio Protocol on the question of nitrate. For your information, I quote Resolution IX on which the Chileans base their interpretation, which indicates clearly that there was no commitment as regards synthetic nitrate plants:

"The Third Meeting Of The Ministers Of Foreign Affairs Of The American Republics

"Resolves:
That the nations of the Americas stimulate the development of the basic production of each of them, avoiding insofar as possible the establishment or expansion of production of substitute or synthetic commodities which is economically artificial and might displace the consumption of natural products available in other American nations, there being excepted only those industries which are indispensable for national defense provided that such defense needs cannot be effectively met with natural products."

As far as anti-espionage activities are concerned, you have already been informed (telegram no. 482, April 19) that the Department is pleased at the progress being made in the PQZ case. However, I think it desirable to point out that if the net result of the action now being taken is merely to bring the individuals to trial and subsequently release them, this could hardly be considered satisfactory. What seems desirable here is a strict enforcement of security measures.
measures and a vigorous prosecution of known agents resulting in the conviction of those found guilty. In the case of persons not found guilty by the courts it would seem wise, if they are found to be undesirable enemy aliens, for them to be interned in Chile or deported to the United States for repatriation or internment. I must say that I do not feel too happy at the prospect of a long delay in setting up an internment camp and that relegation of undesirable enemy aliens to specified localities following the previous practice of the Chilean Government appears quite inadequate to handle this danger. In this connection you may wish to again consider the Department's telegram no. 249 of February 28, 4 p.m., and urge upon the Government a reconsideration of their decision not to deport for internment in the United States dangerous enemy aliens, or at least the establishment of adequate internment camps. Continued enforcement of restrictions on the use of communications, banking facilities and travel facilities by enemy aliens, is, of course, also necessary and desirable.

As you already know, I was much pleased by the Chilean assistance in connection with the UP and other matters of current interest in Argentina.

It is not correct that prejudicial information about Chile has been pouring into the Department. It is my desire and that of the other interested officers in the Department to cooperate with the Chileans on economic and other matters in so far as the limitations imposed by the war will permit. I think that you should avail yourself of every opportunity to make it clear to the Chileans that when it does not prove possible to grant a specific Chilean request, that does not indicate any lack of good will, but merely that careful and prolonged consideration of all the factors involved will make it impossible in many instances to grant everything that the Chileans desire.

My attention has recently been called to a lecture by Dr. Antonio J. Quevedo of Ecuador in which he said that the South American states sometimes ask too much of the friendship of the United
United States towards the other countries of the continent, believing that the United States should look after their interests even before our own. I think our inter-American relations would be on a firmer basis if more leaders in the other American Republics shared this point of view.

In conclusion, I suggest that you may desire to discuss these matters further with Mr. Philip Bonsal when he visits Santiago.

Thank you for writing me in detail in regard to these matters, and with warm personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 26, 1944

There is attached for signature a letter which has been drafted to Ambassador Bowers at Santiago, answering his letter of April 6 to the President.

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers, April 6, 1944.
2. Copy of letter to the Secretary of State, April 6, 1944.
4. To Ambassador Bowers, drafted May 23, 1944.
The White House
Washington

May 13, 1944.

Memorandum for
The Secretary of State:

For preparation of reply
For my signature.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, April 6, 1944, from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, enclosing a copy of a personal letter to Secretary Hull, same date.
ROBERT E. HANNEGAN

Memorandum

June 21, 1944

TO: Miss Grace Tully

My thanks to the Chief for letting me see the attached.
Santiago, June 9, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I am sure that in no one of the American nations was the news of the invasion received with more general and sincere enthusiasm than in Chile. President Ríos issued a stirring statement, in denunciation of the "barbarian" attempt of the Nazis on the liberties of mankind. The Senate and the House of Deputies immediately dedicated a full session to paying homage to the United Nations when speeches were made by the spokesmen of every party, including, of course, both the Communist and the Conservative. In these speeches special reference was made in most cases to the United States and to you and especially in the speech of Senator Guzmán. There was also a demonstration in the streets, and the press is publishing pages of news and is paying tribute editorially.

Nothing has done us more good here than the taking of Rome by General Clark without destroying any of the religious or historical buildings. The Hierarchy here had written me before about the protection of Rome and I replied by quoting your observation. This was published in the press. I now have a long and almost fulsome letter of appreciation on the care taken to prevent destruction from Acción Católica de Chile, the most militant Catholic organization of the country.

Without being asked, I am taking the liberty of giving you my impressions on the Vice Presidency. We have the impression that certain elements are bitterly against Wallace. These elements are bitterly against him because he stands militantly for the things your Administration stands for. I am convinced from years of close observation that this element will support the opposition candidate for the Presidency regardless of who is named for the Vice Presidency; and that the nomination of someone who at heart has not really favored the progressive measures of the last eleven years will not secure the vote of a single one of the reactionaries, but may easily be misinterpreted and resented by the great liberal army

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
army which constitutes the backbone of your supporters. This reactionary element may be able to manipulate a convention, as in Texas, but I am sure that the mass of the voters there will not be swayed by its intrigues. The alleged plan of the Texas reactionaries to defeat the desires of the people through the manipulation of the electoral college, ought to be made the most of by our people, for it can be used as an open confession of their hope to take from the people the choice. I imagine the plan will amount to nothing, but the purpose can be made infamous in the popular mind.

Recently I had a letter from New York saying that Dewey gets his ideas of foreign policy from a lawyer in the office of Sullivan & Cromwell.

In the midst of the war I am positive that the indecent attacks on you by small-bore politicians and reactionaries will be resented by all decent Americans, and that our strategy is to concentrate on the war and on administrative achievements along the line of social security.

Your "prayer" was published in full on the front page of all papers here and there were editorials, one particularly strong from the second paper of Santiago, which is the organ of the Catholic Hierarchy.

Your ancient friend, Colonel Behn, was here, and I gave a dinner for him and was glad to have his volunteered admission that I had been right and he wrong in the Spanish matter. He tells me that he has no doubt of the result of the election.

We are all puzzled a bit by Welles' articles apropos of Argentina. I hope they are not the result of mere resentment for his record is too fine to have it marred. I have never understood just what happened in his case: I am as puzzled as the American who told a compatriot in a hotel lobby that a man standing nearby was the Archbishop of Canterbury. "Impossible", said the compatriot. "But I have seen him and I know it is the Archbishop of Canterbury". "Ridiculous", grunted his friend. "Why don't you ask him". "I will", said the one who insisted. He was seen speaking to the alleged Archbishop, who appeared very angry. Finally he returned to his friend. "What did he say?" he was asked. "Very funny thing", said the clearly mystified messenger. "I asked him and he turned on me and said, "Why damn you, what do you mean by your God damned impudence. Now get the hell away from me". 
"Is that all he said?"

"That's all he said."

"Then", said the other sadly, "I suppose that now we never will know if it was the Archbishop of Canterbury."

I hope you will not think it impertinent that I should send you my impressions about the Vice Presidency. Sometimes one can get a clearer view from a distance.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL
June 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. ROBERT E. HANNEGAN

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from Ambassador Bowers, dated June 9, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 26, 1944

When the Chilean Ambassador Don Rodolfo Michels makes his farewell call on Tuesday you may wish to give him a message to carry to President Rios regarding our present views on Argentina, our strong feelings of regret and disappointment that Argentina remains the only country in this hemisphere which lends aid and comfort to our common enemy, and our concern with the militaristic totalitarian program of the Farrell Government. For these reasons we have asked Ambassador Armour to return to the United States.

You might wish to refer to the fact that when Chile recognized Argentina, the Foreign Minister of Chile stated that the recognition was conditional on Argentine implementation of the break in relations with the Axis. It might then be advisable to express the hope that Chile as a leader among the nations truly dedicated to the principles of democracy may now be receptive to a re-examination of its position toward the Farrell government.

(c) in Argentine folder, 1-44)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
SECRETARY HULL

To reply to as I have not
the time before leaving.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let. 7/6/44 to the President from
Amb. Claude Bowers re conditions in
Chile
July 13, 1944

Dear Claude:

Just as I am leaving, I want belatedly to answer yours of June twelfth with that very interesting confidential memo from Freda Kirzoway. It has been very useful and I have proceeded to have a follow-up via Sam Rosenman.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Claude G. Bowers
The American Embassy,
Santiago,
Chile.

(Dictated but not signed)
Santiago, June 12, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I do not want to bore you with too many notes but Freda Kirzcoway has just sent me a VERY CONFIDENTIAL memorandum on her talk with Wilkie and his plans and ideas which I think you should by all means have. It is very interesting, and I hope it means he will act properly during the next four months. I entirely share Wilkie's reaction on Churchill's last speech. Particularly his tribute to that great "neutral" Franco. The great mass of the people in no country will be taken in by that stuff. He is primarily a monarchist which is all right if the people want a monarchy, but his whole Spanish outlook has been colored by his anxiety to restore the son of an English princess to the throne to continue the binding of the moribund nobility in Spain with the Tory sector of the nobility in England. He was for Franco until a year before the Spanish phase of the present war was reached when the great guns of the Germans commanding Gibraltar were placed. I do not think the last speech was a happy one, in striking contrast to others he has made. I rather like the set up in Italy.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Claude H. Bowen

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure:
Memorandum, as stated.
W. intends to become the leader of a new liberal party in the country. He expects the re-election of Roosevelt by a big majority. He hopes the President will have enough control over the Democratic Party to carry through the measures necessary for the winning of the war and the conclusion of treaties and other international agreements after the war. But he foresees an internal breakdown, a general disintegration of the Democratic Party. F.D.R.'s personal power will obviously be on the wane; he cannot expect to lead the party in another election and therefore such strong reactionary forces as those represented by, say, Byrd, George, and one or two of the other more or less responsible Southern conservatives will gradually assume power. Such men might even give the President the support he needs on the war and international measures while building up their own control of the party machine. The element loosely lumped together under the New Deal will lose all influence, he believes. Having lost control they will be politically homeless and ready to join a new progressive coalition of groups. It is this process which he sees as giving some assurance that a new Liberal Party would be more than an organization of left labor people and independent progressives.

In connection with the election he told me that his own expectation of a big Roosevelt majority had been somewhat modified by several talks he had had with political writers like Hagerty of the Times. Hagerty thinks New York State is extremely doubtful; that Roosevelt has a small edge but no more. He thinks that many accidental
influences might shift the balance the other way. Both seem to agree that it would depend a good deal on how the Catholic vote is affected by Roosevelt's policies, particularly in regard to Russia.

He made one interesting comment on the Middle West. He said Roosevelt had lost support through the very process of yielding to the farm bloc. He said that/he had held prices firm and prevented the enormous increase of farm prosperity there might have been some grumbling but the individual farmers would still have been accessible to Democratic pleas. He said that the extreme prosperity of many of the farm districts had turned innumerable farmers into solid, high-tariff Republicans. In illustration of this he told me about a man who is part owner of one of his farms in Indiana. He said in 1936 this man was a left New Dealer while now he was not only a Republican and bitterly opposed to the President, but he was worried because W. was showing so many dangerously radical tendencies. (This whole argument seemed to me rather tenuous but he expounded it at great length.)

He says he is not allowing himself yet to decide how he will act in the present campaign. He is not going to Chicago. The anti-isolationist leaders in the Republican Party are trying to get him to write the foreign policy plank for the platform. He doubts the wisdom of doing this. The party, he thinks, would accept his plank and might easily choose Stassen as Vice-Presidential candidate. Such a move would put him in the position, if he decided not to support the ticket, of being merely, as he put it, a sourpuss-resentful because he was not himself chosen to lead the ticket. He feels that
his hands will be freer if he keeps clear altogether, taking no part in the convention or pre-convention maneuvers. He thinks the chance that Dewey will not be nominated is insignificant, although he says that within the past ten days he has talked to at least twenty-one important Republican leaders — either State chairmen or governors — and not one of them really wants Dewey. On the other hand, not one of them will oppose him. The possibility of organizing a genuine opposition is negligible, he believes especially since there is no potential candidate who can command the support of the people who are most strongly against Dewey. He said if he were betting, he would put 8 to 2 on Dewey's nomination.

He is very bitter about Stassen. He told me about two or three specific instances of Stassen's perfidy, rather minor instances but illuminating as well. He said that a letter had been dispatched to Stassen asking if he would allow his name to be put up for the Vice-Presidency and he believes Stassen is likely to say yes.

What W. is going to do between now and the convention is to publish a series of pieces, probably through the Associated or United Press, on the issues of the campaign. He has devised an effective and imaginative form in which to do this. In ten installments he plans to write a comment upon the planks of a platform which he thinks the party should adopt, — each day a plank, covering all important domestic and foreign issues. He hasn't any idea that this will influence the writing of the actual party platform. He intends it as a challenge and obviously he will use it to show up the party leadership now actually in control.
The real leader of the party is, of course, Herbert Hoover. Dewey is entirely his man and so is Spangler. Both take explicit instructions from Hoover as to speeches and political strategy. He thinks Hoover's influence in the party is large beyond all reason. It stems less from political shrewdness—such as Jim Farley has—than from his prestige as President and his knowledge of the country or at least of the Republican organization throughout the country. He says that there is hardly a small town anywhere in the United States that doesn't have one or more key Republicans who look up to or owe a debt of gratitude to Hoover.

W. doesn't know how the liberal forces will emerge and coalesce to form a new party which he hopes to see created. We talked about the Liberal Party here in New York. He has doubts, however, about the party's value as the nucleus of a national movement. He recognizes the disabilities involved in its narrow trade-union base and its factional origin. He agreed with me that on the national scale the C.I.O. Political Action Committee was accomplishing results that put it far in the lead. He thinks on the whole Hillman has been handling his limited forces and resources very shrewdly. I think he will try to play along with both groups on the theory that it does him no harm to have friends in all progressive camps and that even these extremely hostile elements might fuse and merge in the larger political structure he envisages. He has no illusions, however, about the state of mind of both groups now. He knows there can be no cooperation in the near future.

He also said he thought La Guardia was wrong in believing that the anti-Communist propaganda and position of the Liberal Party
would get much attention in the coming campaign. He looks upon the new party as a means of rounding up some Roosevelt votes that might otherwise go by default. He obviously does not consider the role of the Communists in American politics of sufficient importance as to be worth worrying about, at least on a national scale.

We talked a lot about foreign policy. He spoke with extreme bitterness about Churchill's speech. He was also critical of Stalin's unilateral moves both in regard to Poland and in Italy. But he takes the view in general that Stalin's entire purpose is concentrated on the rebuilding of Russia and the creation of a vast industrialized society there. He thinks his foreign policy is defensive, not imperialistic, and that the United States and Britain are themselves largely responsible for Stalin's recent policies. He said that when he came back from his trip around the world he begged Roosevelt to fly to Moscow. At that time Russia's fortunes were at low ebb; its losses were staggering; and the Stalingrad struggle was still going on. He believes that if Roosevelt had gone over then with the honest purpose of offering full help to Russia during the war and our participation in a real security system after the war, all of the recent difficulties would have been avoided. He said "at that time the thing was a set-up." I asked him why Roosevelt hadn't gone. He said "I believe personally that he was afraid of the Catholics and he may also have been committed to a foreign policy which would have made any such promises to Russia impossible."

W. now talks exactly like an early vintage New Dealer. He made great fun of the Republicans for adopting a pro-states rights
position. He is devoting one of his coming series of articles to this subject, pointing out the historical inconsistency of their present stand. He said flatly that he believed stronger federal control was inevitable. He is, of course, bitterly opposed to the poll tax. And quite clearly he is ready to ally himself not only with generally progressive groups but with organized labor in the coming Liberal Party.

Whether or not he is sincere I don't know, but he certainly makes an impression of sincerity. Also, a man who is looking out primarily for himself is not likely to take such a long chance as is involved in the launching of a new party.
August 19, 1944

My dear Claude:

I was pleased to find awaiting me on my return to Washington your letter of July 20, 1944 with its enclosure, copy of a letter of the same date to the Secretary of State.

While the simile which you draw between Chile and the Spanish Loyalists is interesting, we of course all trust that war of the character which you envisage will not come to pass on this continent. I know we shall all direct our every effort to prevent it. Since you wrote me I understand that the question of giving assurances to Chile that we would protect her in case of attack by Argentina has been discussed with you and that you have been informed of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this respect.

Thank you for your remarks about my nomination.

With warm personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
Santiago, July 20, 1944.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose copy of a personal letter to Hull which seems to me to be of paramount importance as to our policy in South America. I cannot get out of my mind the great mistake of the Democracies in concentrating their effort on preventing defense material from reaching the Loyalists of Spain while the Axis Powers unrestrainedly poured tanks, planes, artillery and soldiers into Spain for the support of the Fascist cause. I do not want to see anything remotely similar in South America. The evidence is very strong that Argentina is feverishly preparing for war and there is no doubt, because the admission has been made in conversations, that the Perón element, or rather the people in power in Argentina, are entirely Nazi-minded and look to the domination of the continent by that country. Their first plans contemplate Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia. For geographical reasons Chile is in the most danger and under threat. She has no fighting planes to defend herself and Santiago can be easily bombed from Mendoza, since Argentina has a large number of bombers of the vintage of 1938. If we cannot furnish Chile the war material selected and approved and promised for her own defense I think it necessary for us to give assurance that should Argentina attack Chile under existing conditions we will support her militarily. As Sherlock says, this seems elemental to me.

I suppose your nomination will come today. All South America -- except Argentina -- is for you.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Claude R. Bowers
Santiago, July 20, 1944.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The John White interview was based on what Cruz Coke told him, and the morning after, the Senator called to "assume full responsibility." The fear of an appeasement policy as to Perón, he told me, was not based on any fear of your position or of the United States but was due to Churchill's speech in rather ridiculous praise of Franco and his assertion that ideology no longer is involved in the war. The understanding that discussions between Britain and the United States of the policy toward Argentina are pending lead to the fear that Churchill's point of view, together with Britain's attitude on Argentina, and the relations between Fascist Spain and Fascist Argentina, might lead to some such compromise.

From time to time I have explained certain hesitations and unsatisfactory actions of Chile on the ground that Chileans have serious fears of an attack in the region of Magellan and further north. The fact that there are abundant reasons for the fear has been demonstrated in the conversation between Perón and Von der Beck and the Chilean Military Attaché and other conversations, reported fully to the Department. I must ask that the Department realize that there is at present serious tension here as to Argentina; that the danger is admitted not only by politicians and statesmen but is very real in the Chilean army, which is alarmed by warlike preparations across the mountains, and that it has reached the Senate, which this week has discussed it in secret session.

In addition to these interviews, Chile is alarmed as to Argentina because she understands --

(1) that she is building tanks, some very large ones, and boasts that she has eighty factories making war material. The material comes in part from Spain and the work is said here to be under the supervision of German technicians and mechanics.

(2) that Argentina has, or claims to have, one hundred fighting planes and claims to be making more. I understand that
these planes are of the date of 1938, but Chile has none at all.

(3) That the Argentine army about Mendoza has been tripled in recent months and I understand from Armour that there is much military activity in that quarter.

(4) That Argentina has a much larger army on the frontier of the far south than Chile has in Magellan, and Argentina can move her troops by land while Chile, with few boats, must send hers by water - a slow process.

(5) That Argentina has announced the acquisition of a great amount of skiing material for the army, which can have only Chile in view.

(6) That they made much of their review of their Italian trained Alpine troops on their national holiday and these can only be meant for the mountains between Argentina and Chile.

The evidence seems complete to me that the men in power in Argentina are thinking Nazi-wise of that country as destined to dominate this continent by force if necessary, as in fact they have said that just as Germany was destined to dominate the continent of Europe, Argentina is destined to dominate the South American continent. Perón told a Chilean that the day of small nations is over because of modern war methods.

I feel very strongly that it should be our policy to cultivate Chile to the utmost for the following reasons:

(1) Argentina is, has been and will continue for a long time to be our stubborn enemy in South America. With Brazil, our traditional friend, with us on one side, it is important that Chile on the other should be tied to us, and Brazil and Chile should be encouraged to draw together closer.

(2) She is the one strong, firmly rooted democracy in South America because the democratic instinct is strong in all her people from highest to lowest.

(3) Her people with their great mixture of northern European blood, are more like our people, politically, psychologically and physically than are any other people on the continent.

(4) Her governmental system and ideology are models for the liberal, democratic, and progressive element in all American nations and this explains the critical attitude toward Chile of nations with systems and ideologies diametrically opposed to ours. For this reason criticisms of Chile emanating from nations ruled by dictators or feudalistic oligarchies, as in Perú, must be viewed with suspicion and never accepted on their face.
Because of all this I hope that we can reconsider our policy of withholding necessary military defense material promised long ago, selected and I understand approved. The purpose of lend-lease was the "defense of the continent." With a Power, frankly Fascist or Nazi, making war preparations aimed at the Democracies and small nations and looking to the domination of the continent by a pro-Nazi Power, I certainly feel that the protection of a democratic nation against a Nazi-minded, anti-American Power is in line with continental defense.

Yours very sincerely,
U. S. Urgent

Military Attaché reports temper of conversations at a dinner by highest Chilean Army officers indicating grave fears of Argentina's intentions toward Chile under the Peron regime. (Very secret for the Secretary) These officers are firmly persuaded that Argentina under the present set-up is making "undoubted war preparations" aimed at Chile. They believe that the plan is a gradual concentration of Argentine military forces in the vicinity of Río Gallegos in readiness for an assault across the level pampa plains of Chilean Patagonia toward Punta Arenas and Natales, and a blockade by land-based artillery of the Strait of Magellan south of Punta Arenas in the vicinity of Cape Forward. They fear, if they do not believe, that a thrust is planned across the south-central part of Chile north of Tampico aimed at the coal mines and the naval base of Talcahuano. There is not a scintilla of doubt that the Army here and the political leaders are greatly concerned.
(2) From one who attended a meeting of some military, political and intellectual men last night in secret conference I learn that this fear is acute, along with the fear that we and Britain may, through minor concessions, grant recognition to the Peron group which would be disastrous to democratic Chile. They discussed a manifesto circulated they understand in Buenos Aires to effect that Argentina must take over Chile as far north as Concepción. They unquestionably fear that we may thus relegate Chile to a secondary consideration. This appears to be the general course of the discussions now going on here.

(3) All this ties up with our failure to release to Chile the war material they thought promised and which has been selected as approved. I am of the opinion that we must make it clear that should Chile be attacked by Argentina we will support Chile militarily. Without such assurance there is danger that Chileans may conclude that their first obligation is to security of Chile through some agreement with Argentina.

(4) The Naval Attaché and others in the Embassy suggest that if two of the small airplane carriers could make periodical visits, at intervals, to Valparaiso, the effect on Argentina would be salutary. It is pointed out that Santiago could be easily bombed from Mendoza and Chile has no fighting planes for defense. You may wish
wish to give this serious consideration.

Bowers

CGB: lda
encoded: bb
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers' letter of July 20, 1944, for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:

1. To Ambassador Bowers, drafted August 15, 1944.
2. From Ambassador Bowers, July 20, 1944, with enclosures, copy of letter to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1944, and copy of secret telegram for the Secretary of State, July 20, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY OF STATE.

For preparation of a reply.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, 7/20/44, to the President, enclosing copy of his personal letter to Secretary Hull, in re policy in South America.
Santiago, August 24, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith copy of a note to Hull, that may be of interest. The enthusiasm here for our action in the liberation of Paris has been extraordinary. A great demonstration was organized on the spur of the moment and it was proposed to march to the French Legation and then to my Embassy and thence to the Moneda where President Ríos, Fernández and the French representative took the salute. Since the English were to be ignored, I thought it best, in view of the fact that our English friends seem a bit humiliated, to advise that the demonstrators confine themselves to the French and the Moneda. Everyone understood what we had done and we did not need any demonstration. But they carried American flags and shouted for us.

I have an idea about Patton: Put him in an iron cage between military operations, feed him on raw meat, and turn him loose just when the fight begins. What a man!

Your speech from the coast to the Convention was a masterpiece in every way. The fact that it was delivered "from the front", made a great impression here. I note that the reaction against the reactionaries of certain southern States over their brazen proposal that the electors set aside the pronounces will of the voters has been overwhelming, as I thought would be the case. I was sorry about Wallace, but his magnificent sportsmanship has saved the day with the liberals.

It is maddening to think of the possibility that Laval, Petain and other skunks of France may be given refuge in Switzerland. If Laval, why not Hitler, Goebbels

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Goebbels, Mussolini and all the rest? I hope the United Nations take a damn stern stand with Switzerland to prevent such an outrage.

I notice that it is generally thought that the late Vatican Minister of Foreign Affairs may be succeeded by Cardinal Tedechina. I know him well and you may be interested. He is a magnificent looking man, tall, slender, with the face of a saint, though he always seemed to me to be most worldly wise and a diplomat of finesse. He was Nuncio in Madrid during my time there. When I made my initial call upon him he amazed me by talking at length about my book "The Irish Orators", which had been out of print for ten years. He knew everything about me - my having made the speech in New York on the 100th anniversary of Catholic Emancipation in Ireland. None of my other colleagues knew anything about me.

He was considered rather liberal than otherwise. When the King went upon his travels, Tedechina promptly advised the Vatican to recognize the Republic, and among the medieval members of the Spanish hierarchy, he was unpopular in consequence. When he was one of the three Cardinals discussed for Pope, I read in the Manchester Guardian that his weakness was in the fact that he was thought too liberal because he had advised the Pope not to commit himself too much to Franco. I saw him frequently, "assisted" in making him Cardinal when the President put the red cap on his head, and liked him.

He had one embarrassing experience. It was his custom to report to the Vatican usually by long distance. He would arrange with the Telephone company to clear the wires for a stated hour. When Pita Romero, the Foreign Minister, was appointed to negotiate a Concordat with Rome, and before Romero left Madrid or the Foreign Office, the Cardinal called Rome. He told Rome that Romero was a nice young man, a good Catholic, et cetera, but that it would be best to string him along and do nothing since it was possible that in three months the elections would sweep in the EDEA and better terms might be possible. He had asked for a man of a certain name at the Vatican. There was another man of the same name who was Military Attaché of the Spanish Embassy. The telephone people in Rome got them confused and put the Cardinal on to the Military Attaché. When the latter heard the dulcet voice of the Cardinal pouring forth secrets, his first impulse
was to tell him there had been a mistake. But he decided not to. He turned the interview over to the Spanish Ambassador, who sent it on to Romero, the Foreign Minister. A few days later Romero met the Cardinal and said, "I understand you had a conversation with Rome the other day." "Yes", said the Cardinal, in his sweetest tone which was like honey, "I wished to prepare the way for your reception and thought it could be best done by word of mouth rather than in a stilted despatch". Romero smiled pleasantly on the Cardinal and thanked him, and the Cardinal beamed benevolently on the Minister. Of course, both knew of the blunder.

But Tedechina is a very wise man, a brilliant man, a diplomat of the old school of long ago, but wide awake to the present and able to apply the old finesse in a modern way.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am particularly grateful for your thoughtfulness in sending Fernández a telegram of appreciation of the very militant pro-United States speech he made before the American Chamber of Commerce here. He was enormously pleased. He had told me before that he was seeking the opportunity. His speech, and the manner of its delivery, made a very strong impression on all the Americans, and he spoke extemporaneously. He asked that the stenographic report be sent him for possible correction for the press and I was a bit afraid he might want to moderate the tone. Instead, he strengthened the phrasing. It was thus published here and in Buenos Aires, though I am told it was a little emasculated in La Prensa and La Nacion there. This, no doubt, due to the censorship since it was sent hence as delivered.

He has just replied to my note on the President's statement on post-war organization on which the views of the American nations were solicited. I rather think this is about the first reply you have received. You will note that he accepts for Chile the whole spirit and intent. He proposes, of course, that the smaller nations have representation on the Council, with which we all agree. I interpret his reply as one of complete cooperation with us.

Our great trouble here, as I have indicated before, as to Argentina is this: The Farrell crowd, hear Chile, and much concerned about her, are constantly having prepared articles rather cleverly free from outer malice, written more in sorrow than in anger, showing that Argentina is merely misunderstood and that all these misunderstandings can be wiped out by a spirit of mutual conciliation. They are singularly free from attacks on us. These are turned over to the AP and the UP and sent over South America, I presume. Certainly they are sent here and published with all the other news despatches of the two Associations. I have no doubt the press associations have to send these out.

Now we cannot prepare answers and counter-propaganda here at the Embassy and take it to the press and ask for

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
publication because under all the circumstances this would seem like pressure. The only way I know to counteract this Argentine stuff would be through the preparation of our own material in Washington and to have this turned over to the AP and UP with the request made strong that it be sent to South America. I hope this can be done.

We managed the taking of Paris magnificently. The effect here magical. Everyone is loud in praise of our action in arranging for the French to "take" Paris. That day I attended a dinner for Fernández given by the Czechoslovakian Minister and from all quarters, from the French particularly, and the Chileans, I was overwhelmed with congratulations for our action, everyone making it clear, including the Foreign Minister, that they understood that we had, with Patton's army, actually made the fall of Paris inevitable and purposely arranged for the French to have the credit. "It was a stroke of genius", Fernández said, "that after the German invader had trampled on Paris so long, the American, liberating her, did not march into the city but arranged for the French to give the final blow".

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,
Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing copy of a letter to Secretary Hull giving my impressions of Marcial Mora, the new Chilean Ambassador, on the theory that it may be advantageous to you in your first conversation with him.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:
Copy of letter, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Santiago, August 30, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Since Marcial Mora leaves here September 11 to assume his duties as Ambassador in Washington, it occurs to me that it may be advantageous to you to have my impression of the man. He is a gentleman of considerable polish, always courteous and instinctively friendly. He is an able and successful lawyer, and at one time was President of the Central Bank of Chile. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs during my time here and this was in the first stages of the war and before we were directly involved. He did not at that time impress me as understanding the significance of the struggle or the danger that Chile and South America might easily be drawn in. I found him invariably friendly, but I did not have an exalted impression of him at that time.

Later, after Pearl Harbor, he was president of the Radical Party, the first and most important party of the Government coalition. He was very popular with his party and was looked upon as headed toward higher honors, possibly the Presidency of the Republic. About this time, a great change came over him. He became an ardent supporter of the Allied cause and very insistent on a rupture with the Axis during the period when Barros Jarpa, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was stubbornly, and through devious and dishonest misrepresentations to President Ríos, fighting for the continuation of relations with our enemies. Marcial Mora challenged the position of the Minister and attacked his policy openly and with vigor. When the directors of the Radical Party passed a resolution approving the policy of Barros Jarpa, Mora instantly resigned on that issue. He was importuned by his party to retain the presidency, but he refused.

It was then that he conceived the idea of organizing the overwhelming but inarticulate majority favoring democracy, and using them as a battering ram against the enemies of rupture. This organization, which reached into every nook and corner of the country, was the only organized and directed movement for the breaking of relations. It became a power. It organized numerous great mass meetings demanding rupture. He always spoke and struck from the shoulder. Many of his erstwhile friends of the aristocracy and business became his enemies.

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
enemies. He infuriated Barros Jarpa, and annoyed the President by his militancy and outspokenness. But he never wavered, but intensified his activities. When Barros Jarpa went, and the President came to realize the nature of the struggle across the sea, he was restored to the favor of the President and his appointment to Washington comes as a result.

You will find him anxious, I am sure, to follow our line. His speeches at various functions given in his honor since his appointment have been fighting, democratic speeches. He has a profound admiration for Roosevelt and Hull, and this I know to be sincere.

We have just had another illustration of the fact that Chile is the strongest functioning democracy in South America. A senatorial vacancy having occurred, former President Alessandri, aged 74, but vigorous, was nominated by the Rightists, and Ríos, taking this as a challenge, had del Pedregal, known to you, and a forceful speaker and strong character, run against him. The fight was sensational and attracted more interest than the last presidential election. It was bitterly contested but decently fought. The polls closed at 4. At 8, the election of Alessandri was known. And immediately del Pedregal went to Alessandri's headquarters in Talca to congratulate him warmly, and they embraced. Alessandri telegraphed President Ríos thanking him for protecting the dignity of the polls and for the perfect management by the authorities resulting in the voting in the most serene atmosphere, and saying that this was in keeping with the democratic traditions of the country. President Ríos replied, thanking him, and saying that the election was proof of the inherent democracy of the Chilean people, and congratulating Alessandri on his election.

While Alessandri was elected, the American press conclusion that this is an indication of the dwindling popularity of Ríos, is untrue. This district is naturally Rightest and Alessandri's majority was much smaller than that of the last election. In fact, the fight of del Pedregal has raised him to a commanding height as a probable presidential candidate.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stettinius and the President, since they may want to have some sidelight on Mora before he arrives.

Sincerely,
Santiago, September 21, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose as of possible interest, a letter to Mr. Hull concerning the visit to Chile of General George Brett. He made a profound impression, and seemed to me meticulously correct in everything he did. He was received with genuine enthusiasm. He did so well I think you should know it for the record.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Copy of letter, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

General George Brett, accompanied by General Luther Smith, who came with about 30 others to represent the United States in the celebration of Chilean independence, left this morning after five days of hectic activity. They were received with unusual enthusiasm and made a profound impression, particularly on the military forces here. A full report on the activities of the mission will be sent to the Department.

The General, who is very popular here with the armed forces, and thoroughly appreciated, handled himself magnificently in all his conversations with military and political leaders. After luncheon I gave for the mission, when I had as guests the President, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior and of National Defense, and the ranking officers of the Army and Navy, General Brett had an hour's conversation in my library with Fernández and the Minister of Defense. The thing that rankles here, as was developed in the conversation, is that we have apparently furnished more army equipment to Peru, than to Chile. Fernández went into the unquestionable difference as to real democracy between Chile and Peru, talked very frankly and confidentially of the agitation by demagogues in Peru against Chile, thus creating a war spirit, and he could not understand the advantage given. He did not ask for more equipment than is given to Peru, but in view of the agitation in both Peru and Bolivia against Chile, threatening a possible concerted attack, he did feel that the one Democracy among the three should have as much as either of the others that cannot be described as real democracies. The General told him that the military mission of the Peruvians in Washington was very insistent and aggressive and that the mission from Chile was less so, but implied that General Smith, as head of the Commission for a study of the various missions, could make possible an equalization. I was rather astonished to hear of the aggressive demands of Peru since I had been given the impression that Chile was a bit resented because she was so demanding. The General was very cautious and made it clear that some of the matters brought up were not within his authority and that they should be handled through diplomatic channels. I thought he showed perfect judgment, tact, and handled himself splendidly.

Santiago, September 21, 1944.

Never,

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Never, I think, has any similar mission been received with such enthusiasm. General Brett was an honor guest at two dinners given by the President, and another by the armed forces. The acclaim with which he was received caused us all some slight embarrassment because a smaller Mexican mission, headed by General Henríquez, was here to represent Mexico, and it was rather overshadowed. However, we were assiduous in our attentions to the Mexican. I had him and the Mexican Ambassador at my luncheon, and invited the Mexican to stand in the receiving line at my reception. I do not think there was the slightest feeling, and, at any rate, we could not help it if the Chileans were more effusive to our people.

I was very much impressed, too, by the popular reaction to Brett's visit. On the morning he laid a wreath at the monument of O'Higgins, the plaza was packed with a surging throng shouting "Long live the United States", "Long live democracy", making the V sign. I have attended many similar wreath layings and usually less than a hundred curious loungers appear. And the press of Santiago spread itself on the publicity of the visit. I think we can be proud of Brett.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,
Dear Mr. President:

Your ringing denunciation of the Nazi regime in Argentina has delighted our friends, but I think you should know something about the means that have been taken to weaken its effect in the other American nations. The very morning your statement was conspicuously published on the front page of all papers here, there appeared a long, laboriously wrought article from London sent out by Reuters to the effect that your statement had been received in London with "surprise and sorrow", since Argentina had just given such abundant proof of its utter devotion to the cause of the United Nations.

In today's (Sunday) El Mercurio, appear, through Reuters, numerous extracts from editorials of English papers along the same line, one strangely enough from the Manchester Guardian, another from the Yorkshire organ of Eden. Along with this, articles sent by the AP from Buenos Aires quoting with gusto the two most notorious Nazi papers there, with nothing to indicate their character.

In conversation with the British Ambassador, he did not so much as mention your statement, until I did, and he was so reserved that he practically said nothing. Meanwhile, the English colony here is decidedly pro-Argentinian on the issue.

I found the Canadian Ambassador, who is really our friend, very much confused. He agrees with our feeling but has fallen for the propaganda that these attacks on Argentina's Nazi government may tend to draw all Argentinians around it; and when I asked if that explained why, on the liberation of Paris two hundred thousand people defied the Government and marched through the streets shouting for the United States, the United Nations, for democracy and against Fascism and Farrell, he did not know what to say.

The

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
The three most damaging features of the Argentine propaganda are:

(1) That this is merely a controversy between the United States and Argentina and the other American nations are mere spectators.

(2) That there is a cleavage between the United States and England; and our denials, such as your statement, are overshadowed by the invariable food of editorials and articles from London strongly defending the Argentinians and treating the issue as one merely between us and Argentina, in which we are wrong. These are sent by Reuters instantly to South America. I wonder if they are sent to the States?

(3) That the attacks on Argentina tend to rally all the democrats of that country around the Nazi Government as a matter of national pride.

As to the first, I have urged on the Department that at Hull's press conference a correspondent be inspired to comment on this conception and ask for the Secretary's comment; and that he then give out a statement based on the agreements among the American nations and pin it down emphatically that the controversy is between the Argentine Nazi Government and the American Republics and the United Nations, and that the AP and UP be asked to send it in full to South America. Mr. Hull touched on this afterwards, but in only a sentence which came in the middle of other things, so it was scarcely noticed in the press. I still think this very important.

As to the second, Churchill should give out a stronger declaration than has yet been given, and at this time.

Washington is so preoccupied with the war across the sea that I doubt if it realizes just what is taking place in South America, if the continent is to be judged by Chile. After the rupture, the Germans, the Fascists and the Spanish Falangists took to cover and for a time there was little anti-American propaganda. Now all these forces have rallied with an intensified hate and renewed their bitter attacks against us by waving the Argentine flag. Nothing could be clearer than that the Nazis and Fascists have taken up where they left off at the time of the rupture. There is money behind the crusade; there is organization; there is inspiration and brazen direction from Argentina; and we face today, in Chile, precisely the
same forces that fell with the rupture. It may be even more vicious, for many who did not dare openly to support Germany, are now supporting Argentina, the dear and cherished neighbor. Pins with the Chilean and Argentine flags crossed are distributed for wearing; chain letters to "patriots" glorifying Argentina and calling on "patriots" to rally to the Nazi regime to prevent the Yankees from reducing them to "slavery", are being sent out with ten stamps to cover the postage on the copied screech; and Argentine agents and propagandists are appearing here and in Peru and presumably elsewhere.

Now that Fascism is about beaten in Europe, the big drive is on in South America to plant it here, and I thought you might want to know how it is working.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

x429
x87
Dear Mr. President:

Apropos of the observations sometimes heard that there was no intimation of an attack by Japan before she struck, I find in the files the two enclosed telegrams I sent to Washington on December 2 and December 5, which are not without interest.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:
Paraphrase of telegrams, as stated.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
I have been told by Rossetti that the Minister of Japan has requested the privilege for the Japanese in Panamá to come to Chile because war is almost inevitable. Immediate rejection was made of the request and the Chilean Consul and the Chilean Minister in Panamá were sent telegraphic instructions not to issue visas. Rossetti says all Japanese in Chile have been placed under constant and close observation. He also states that all precautions have been taken against possible sabotage by our enemies of the mines and the railroads connecting them with the coast.

I suggest a telegram from yourself or the Secretary, expressing appreciation to Rossetti for the despatch with which matters concerning the two Governments have been attended to would have a most salutary effect.

CONFIDENTIAL - UNDER SECRETARY. (No.671)

BOWERS
December 5 1941

I am informed by Rossetti that yesterday, the German Ambassador reinforced the request made by the Japanese Minister that the Japanese in Panamá be given permission to come here and that an instant refusal was given. The Minister warned that other nations will be approached, notably Peru, and requests that he be informed of any such developments in the neighboring nations.

For the Under Secretary - Confidential.

(No. 697)

Bowers
November 22, 1944

Dear Claude:

Your November 9 letter was most heartening. I enjoyed reading your vivid account of the election night dinner you held for ex-President Santos and at which the Foreign Minister and other of our good friends were present. You know how deeply I appreciate your warm sentiments. I have received a number of congratulatory messages from Chile and these either have been answered or replies are in the course of preparation.

I was interested in your observation concerning Chile's action in the Argentine problem. Although Ambassador Mora apparently did assure the people of the Department that Chile would maintain a common front with us, the fact is that Mora very strongly argued for a consideration of the Argentine matter as the first item on the agenda of a meeting of Ministers and went so far as to put his ideas down in a memorandum to the Department. Fortunately, your discussion with Fernández produced a different official view, and your recent telegrams have been very helpful.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Claude C. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
Santiago, November 9, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

Warmest congratulations. My greatest joy, after that of your triumph, was in the reelection of Bob Wagner and Joe Guffey's successful leadership again in Pennsylvania. I have just written Joe that he is as one of Jacksonian group composed of Amos Kendall and Frank Blair and others, who constituted the shock troops of Old Hickory and I know he will like the comparison. It is a true one too.

Dr. Santos asked me to fix my dinner for him on election night since he wished to get election returns under our flag. I had forty diplomats and senators, and the reception on the radio was perfect and the UP and AP sent bulletins at frequent intervals. It was like a jollification meeting of our own people after an election at home.

The Acting President gave out an interview which I sent the Department for transmission to you. It struck me as very strong. I am enclosing a copy of a telegram signed by numerous Senators of all parties, headed by the Conservative President of the Senate. Senator Guzmán spoke on your election the next day in the Senate. Last night, at a dinner at the Moneda given by the Acting President for Santos, both Fernández and Santos spoke of your election as a triumph for democracy and an enlightened international policy. Guzmán brought me the telegram and told me that Arturo Alessandri asked to be excused from signing; only another illustration of the fact that he is at heart anti-American. Of course he fought rupture and is fighting for Argentina. We are very good friends and he insists on his devotion to us, but always with the insinuating reservation "but we won't be vassals", which tells the tale.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Perhaps our position on the Argentine proposal will be announced before this reaches you. Fernández and Chile have acted in the most impeccable manner on this problem. He has made a suggestion to the Department, through me, which impresses me as statesmanlike. The fact is that the South American nations have been eager for a conference of Foreign Ministers on post-war and peace plans, and when Argentina made her proposal most of them jumped to its approval since this appeared to open the way. I have kept the Department informed for some time of this feeling and I am not surprised at the reaction to the Argentine proposal. Fernández proposes a plan which he thinks would cut the ground from under the Argentinians.

I have read with amazement Franco's request that Fascist Spain shall sit in on the Peace Congress. Why not Hitler? And even Mussolini might be able to drag himself to the table to give advice. Vansittart has made the only possible observation. What the diplomacy of democratic nations needs more than anything else today is more Vansittarts and fewer Hoares.

That ride in the rain was a stunning answer to the attempt to convince the people of your enfeebled condition. It was good democratic weather.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Copy of telegram, as stated.
Accept our fervent congratulations at the North American people's confirmation, in your triumph, of its faith in Democracy, in the principles upheld by yourself and the leaders of the Allied countries, in the definitive victory of liberty and in the consolidation of your desire for Pan American Good Neighborhood.
Los Senadores de la República de Chile que
reciben nuestra fervorosa congratulación porque el
pueblo norteamericano ha confirmado con vuestro triunfo
su fe en la Democracia, en los principios sustentados
por vos mismo y los jefes de los países aliados, en la
victoria definitiva de la libertad y en la consolidación
de vuestro afán de buena vecindad pan americana.

Los firmantes:

José Figueroa
Eduardo Cruz Coka
Enrique Barros
Leonardo Gyapán
Carlos Centeno Taboada
Albert Maller
Alfonso Bríguez
Gregorio Arenáldiz
Eldorado Enrique Gyapán
César Gueuí
José Marx
Arazi Albert Martín
Eldorado Dominguez
Maraduke Kelly
Alfonso Lisa
Isaac Torres
Klement Alvaro
Héctor Rodríguez
Maximino Bríguez
Ulises Gómez
Manuel iruarre González
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of November 15, 1944 enclosing a letter from Ambassador Bowers, there is attached a suggested reply for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Ambassador Bowers, dated November 9, 1944.
2. Suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

To prepare reply.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 9, 1944, expressing congratulations and giving Chile situation in re Argentina matters, etc. Enclosed copy of telegram signed by many Senators of all parties, headed by the Conservative President of the Senate, extending congratulations to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Ltr. of 12/2/44 from Hon. Claude G. Bowers,
Santiago, Chile; re liquidation of Axis
firms and enterprises in Chile.
December 16, 1944

Dear Claude:

Thank you for your letter of December 2, concerning the liquidation of Axis firms in Chile.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

"F. D. R."

The Honorable

Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to Ambassador Bowers.

With reference to your memorandum of December 8, 1944 enclosing a letter from Ambassador Bowers, there is attached a suggested reply for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Ambassador Bowers, dated December 2, 1944.

2. Suggested reply to Ambassador Bowers.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a personal letter from Claude Bowers to you in 1941.

At that time there was a question of the British attitude towards the Fascist Government of Spain. This was in May of 1941 and it all got washed up in June of 1941 when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. I presume it belongs in your files.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

December 12, 1944
Dear Mr President:

Your letter explanatory of the Import-Export Bank proposition, apropos the credit to the Bank of Chile to take care of exchange, worked magic in instantly satisfying the Government people here that no offence could possibly be taken. I gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President the substance of what you wrote and both were not only satisfied but much pleased. So that is that.

I am sending this letter very confidentially since it relates to a most delicate matter. Some time ago a Captain Wilson, an Englishman, educated at Cambridge, and a member of the Labor party in England who flew for the loyalists in Spain and then came here wrote an article for a paper here which was most critical of the Tory party and of the nobility, though complimentary enough about Churchill. He came to see me and he impressed me as a rather intense young man of intelligence who was prone in his partisanship to be unfair even to Chamberlain—if that is possible.

Later he wished to go to the United States for a few days only on what he described as a business trip, and he intimated that he would probably want to see some one in the State Department. He had no British passport and the British Embassy not only refused to give him one, but was very active and bitter in denouncing him to us. At first I ascribed this to the fact that the Embassy personnel here is very much of the Chamberlain appeasement school, and that this man's fighting in Spain when the Chamberlain Government was extending itself to help the totalitarian combination win in Spain, was most offensive.

We told him that we could not give him a visa unless he had a passport and an assurance that he could return here. This latter permission he received by act of the President.

Santiago May 20, 1941
Later still, the Mexican Ambassador told me at a cocktail party that he had seen this chap who made a good impression on him as a young enthusiast with judgement none too good. Later still he told me he was puzzled about the fellow. He said he had in his possession certain startling papers on the stationary of the British Embassy which, he, the Mexican, had been permitted to examine. He thought I should see these papers. When Wilson saw me next I told him I would like to see them and suggested that he fix a time when he could bring them. He said he would not think of taking them out of his house, but that I could see them if I went to his. I did not care much for that and consulted the Mexican who said he had been compelled to go to this man's house which is not far from the Mexican Embassy, but he had thought it over since and regretted going. He wondered if the young fellow, hard up, had been taken on as a Nazi agent, and he thought it possible that in that event a hidden photographer may have taken his picture entering the house. The Ambassador suggested that I try to get Wilson to bring me copies of the papers. If I would then show him the copies he would tell me whether these were the papers he had seen on Embassy stationary. I made an excuse for not going to the house and Wilson brought me the copies which I inclose — the very copies that were brought to me. The Ambassador says they are actual copies of the originals he had in his hands.

The thing is startling and so delicate that I have not mentioned the papers to anyone in the Embassy and I think it best not to send them to the State Department since I think it just as well to have nothing of the sort in the archives there.

You will note that it involves Halifax, Hoare and Sir Charles Orde the Ambassador now here. Also Gustavo Ross the reactionary Chilean in voluntary exile in B.A. If it is all a fixed-up fake it is cleverly done in some respects. There is no doubt whatever that the British Embassy here is not friendly to this liberal Government and that it was all for Ross in the presidential election the latter lost. I had heard too from quarters I trust that when Lord Willingdon of the Mission was in B.A. before coming here that he had conferences with Ross there. That entire mission was
composed of big industrialists and bankers of the Tory party who were supporters of the Chamberlain policy. You will note that Ross is addressed as "Mr President". This seems a bit far fetched. You will note too that for some strange reason there are no dates to these communications. It would be interesting to know whether the British Ambassador has been ill since Orde letter refers to a "quick recovery". And of course it is possible that the stationary which the Mexican Ambassador says unquestionably is that of the Embassy with the long slender envelope "In his Britannic Majesty's Service" was stolen. Wilson says these papers were picked up in B.A. but he refuses to tell how they were taken.

The Mr Jackson referred to in the alleged Orde letter is the man from the Bank of London here, now in jail, for frauds with the exchange board. It is interesting to note that the attorney for the Bank is a notorious Nazi. I expressed some amazement to Orde about this one day and he said he could not understand why the Bank had such a man as legal advisor.

If this fellow is a Nazi agent the clear intent is to destroy faith in Britain as far as its interest in liberal and democratic government is concerned. There is just enough back ground covering five years to give color to this theory.

I have thought it best to keep all this entirely to myself and to send it to you alone. You will know whether there is anything in the existing situation to give the slightest color of reality to these papers. Of course there is or was a strong totalitarian group in England before the war began, and the mysterious visit of Hess ostensibly to see a man who was close to if not of this group is a bit disturbing. You may have heard confidentially from Churchill the true story of Hess. No one doubts Churchill, Bevin, Eden, Duff Cooper or Sinclair or any one in the British Government in London.

But after considerable deliberation with myself I am convinced that you and you only should have these copies. The Mexican Ambassador is air tight on the subject, and he says he has mentioned the papers to me alone. You can look them over, consider them in the remote event that you have other information of a similarly disturbing nature, and then burn them.

General Escudero spent some time alone at my house the other day. He says that in the
South of Chile, the hot bed of the Nazis and the center of the German element, there is no longer the familiar mingling of Chileans and Germans, and that the two are in two groups now, the Chileans of course in the majority. The Foreign Minister told me Saturday that the situation in that region is being constantly watched "not only by the police but by the army". Schnake is coming alone to my house this evening and I shall get his views.

One thing is certain, the ablest and the most outspoken champion of our policy in the public life of Chile is Schnake. Yesterday a leading Conservative Senator said to me at a cocktail party at the Argentine Embassy: "We owe a great deal to the United States for what it has done with Schnake". He added that Schnake is a much abler man than any other in the Government parties. He is making a vigorous fight against the communists and is preparing to make a similar fight against the Nazis. He has forced the timid politicians of the Radical party on the communist combination and he may put some ginger into the Government in dealing with the Nazis.

Everyone here is on tip-toe for the Thursday speech you make.

The dismal succession of German victories, in the Balkans, in Crete, and with the sinking of the "Hood" is having a bad effect in South America in that even more are thinking now that Britain cannot win and that South America had best make economic arrangements with Germany. I do not hear this, but I sense it. It is not that the South Americans like the idea, but that they fear for their future.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House.
Strictly confidential.

Sir,

We have arranged dispatch United States the full report of the situation in this country.

have mentioned the necessity informing the Washington State dept and for this reason we have agreed with your resolution.

Activities are going on exceptionally well. We have received the following sum of $2000,000 from the above mentioned persons. It is being utilised intelligently according to instructions of Lord Halifax.

We are eager to have your confirmation with reference to the sum mentioned by His Excellency President Ross which will fortify our deposits here.

Awaiting your Details

Yours Obedient Servant

Press Attache

His Majesty's Military Attache in B.A.
His Majesty's Ambassador in B.A.

Sir,

His Excellency Sir Charles Orde begs to inform you of the following resolution adopted at the last meeting here.

Sir Charles takes this opportunity in wishing your Excellency a quick recovery.

RESOLUTION APPROVED OF AT THE "BRITISH FASCIST OVERSEAS UNION"

"That His Majesty's ambassador in South America utilise the Spanish Government Diplomatic Corp for all political matters and orders"

The following resolution was dispatched to Spain.

"On behalf of the British Fascist Overseas Union we convey our wholehearted support and loyalty to your Excellency Sir Samuel Hoare"

His Excellency will communicate at a later date.
My Dear President Ross,

I have received instructions from Lord Halifax for you.

In the event of your requiring assistance H.M. Embassy in B.A. will be at your disposal.

We have arranged all the necessary arrangements and we hope to stop this political work soon.

Mr. Jackson will receive fresh instructions. It is advisable you communicate with General Herrera today and notify our Military attaché immediately.

Yours Sincerely,

Charles Orde

This letter was discovered in B.A.
December 20, 1944.

Dear Claude:

I have just received your letter of November 20 and Ed Stettinius has shown me your note on your letter of resignation. As you know, of course, the circular was pro forma and it is my earnest hope that you will carry on in the important position of Ambassador to Chile. I know that Ed Stettinius and his associates in the Department feel exactly the same way. I have no doubt that Chile's cooperation with us during these difficult days has in a large measure been due to your efforts and the excellent relations thus established with President Rios and Fernandez.

I was interested in what you had to tell me regarding Fernandez' decision to go along with us on the Argentine question. I realize that the problem for Chile has, as you say, been a more difficult one because of her unfortunate recognition of the present regime in Buenos Aires, which makes it all the more satisfactory for us to know that we are to have her support on this vital question.

By this time your worries about Bonnet must already have been set at rest for the new Ambassador of the Provisional French Government is Henri Bonnet, who is a bird of quite a different feather from Georges Bonnet, the former Foreign Minister whom you recall so eloquently. Henri Bonnet was in this country at the time of our invasion of North Africa and was subsequently Commissioner for Information in Algiers.

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.
I hope you arranged to see that Batista got plenty of his favorite "Martinis" during his recent visit.

With all good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Bowers.

As requested in your memorandum of December 4 I have prepared a suggested reply for your signature to Ambassador Bowers which I enclose herewith.

I am also returning Ambassador Bowers' letter to you.

Enclosures:

1. From Ambassador Bowers to the President, November 20.
2. Suggested reply.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaalbe Date FEB 4 1972
Santiago, November 20, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

In compliance with instructions from the Department, I am sending Secretary Hull a note placing my resignation at your disposal to the end that you have the usual freedom of action in a possible reorganization of the diplomatic corps in the new administration.

Thus far Fernández has acted with courage, and in accord with us, regarding the Argentine proposal that a conference of Foreign Ministers be called to hear her defense of her untenable position. He feels, as do all the Foreign Ministers, that there must be a conference to consider post-war and peace problems, and believes that the favorable reaction of so many countries to the Argentine proposal, as expressed in their press, if not by their Ministers, was due entirely to the belief that this offered an opportunity for the more important conference desired by them. The fact that we have acquiesced in the idea that a conference on post-war problems and the peace he thinks has had an excellent effect.

I hope it is realized that it requires more courage for Chile to take a stand against the Argentine proposal than for any other country, because of her unfortunate recognition of the present regime at Buenos Aires. Fernández assures me that he wishes to act in complete conformity with our position. He has not, and will not, reply to the Pan American Union or Argentina, or to the Mexican note until he knows precisely what our position will be, since he plans to make his reply harmonize with ours. He agrees with me that if, in the event of a conference of Ministers on post-war matters, it is decided to admit Argentina to make her statement, this should be done, not in the beginning of the conference, but at the close, unless in the meanwhile the Argentinians comply in every respect with its commitments at Rio. This, I know,

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
is his position and since he has reiterated it to me since he has discussed the matter with President Ríos and the Acting President, I am hopeful that he will not be overruled. Meanwhile, despite an organized pro-Nazi campaign to force the return of the Chilean Ambassador to Buenos Aires, he remains in Chile and I hear he will never be sent back. However, this man is waging a subterranean campaign and former President Alessandri is said to be with him. Incidentally, he is campaigning against me as responsible for his retention here—which is only true in part, since Fernández has no confidence in him.

I have just had the shock of my life in the News Digest of the Department of November 14 which says that the insufferable pro-Hitler collaborator, Bonnet, is to be sent as French Ambassador to Washington. In view of his notoriously pro-German policy as Foreign Minister, his brazen deceptions of his colleagues in the Ministry, all set forth in some detail in numerous books from Pertinax down, his appointment seems so incredible that I wonder if another Bonnet is meant. I observed this man's actions closely when in France during the Spanish war and in my opinion he, after Laval, was the most infamous of the betrayers of France. I recall, too, Cordell Hull's statement to me in private conversation to the effect that the man is notoriously crooked. Weak and stupid as he was, even Daladier looked upon him with contempt. I hope the News Digest is entirely wrong.

Batista comes this week and we are in for another cavalcade of dinners and I am giving one. Have you heard the story about him when in the States? He left his Minister, Martinez, in Washington to grapple with the sugar agreement while he toured. In one town at a party he was plied with martinis until he realized he had had too many. He thought of dropping out of a dinner to follow. At the table a page approached to tell him there was a call from Martinez, on the 'phone. "No martinis", he said. The boy tried again. "No, no, no more martinis". The boy reported to his boss and was told the call was important and that he had to make Batista understand. He returned. "Damn it, damn it, I said, I want no more martinis".

Warmest regards.

Sincerely, 

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

December 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from
Ambassador Bowers, dated December 12,
1944, re Chile declaring war on Japan.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
January 1, 1945

Dear Claude:

I have read with interest your December 12 letter describing the conversations you and Mr. Wright had with President Rios and Foreign Minister Fernandes upon the occasion of Mr. Wright's visit to Chile. It is of course important in their own interest that Chile and the other countries concerned take the step in question. It is unfortunate that this was not done when relations were broken with the Axis when, as you indicate, the step could easily have been taken. We were very glad to suggest that Chile might wish to take the initiative in this matter and to give her a reasonable period in which to prepare for this. However, the sands of time are running and as you were told in a telegram this week, we feel that we cannot further delay approaching the other countries concerned although we still very much hope that Chile will see her way clear to take the initiative.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaufle Date FEB 4 1972
January 2, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has signed the letter to Ambassador Bowers which you submitted with your memorandum of December thirtieth. It is being returned to you herewith for transmittal.

M. C. Latta
Executive Clerk
Dear Mr. President:

I understand you personally are much interested in the matter which brought Wright here with a confidential message to me regarding a declaration of war. The instructions were that the utmost care should be taken not to create the impression that pressure was being exerted, or even that a request was being made, but to make it clear that we were merely setting forth possible contingencies as to the future which are of concern to Chile and to us. That was done with a meticulous regard for the instructions and that is thoroughly understood by both Ríos and Fernández.

It is unfortunate that war against Japan was not declared at the time of the rupture but at that time the Department did not encourage but rather discouraged such steps as being meaningless and possibly embarrassing to us. It could easily have been declared at that time.

The embarrassment now lies in the fact that nothing new has developed on which to predicate a declaration of war after a year and a half, and yet such a declaration would have to be explained to the Senate which would have to be consulted. Fernández unquestionably is right in saying that without a pretext the Government would be attacked in the Senate by its enemies and demagogues like Alessandri would make the most of it. And the time is inopportune because party feeling momentarily is high because of the congressional elections in early March.

I sat beside Ríos at a luncheon for General Dunham in Viña Thursday and he made it clear that he wishes to comply and will earnestly seek a pretext or solution. On Sunday in the garden of the Governor, at Viña, I had forty minutes with him alone on that subject and others, and that afternoon in the President's summer palace in Viña, Wright and I had an hour with him and Fernández. Both keenly appreciate the fact that we come first to Chile; both made it crystal clear that they see the advantage and will seek a solution. When it was suggested that

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
that it would be sufficient if Chile declare that she considers herself legally in a state of belligerency with Japan, both perked up, exchanged glances which indicated relief, and Ríos thought it might be done without inviting attack since he had said publicly before rupture that rupture was equivalent to a declaration of war. With this statement before them, the Senate voted for rupture. I think Ríos and Fernández will make the most of this in informal conversations with senators who will not know that the idea originates with us, but will be given the impression that it originates with Chile because of a fear that her position will not be strong enough in the post war conferences.

I feel strongly that we should be patient while they seek a way out that cannot be plausibly attacked. The Ríos régime is under political attack now because —

(1) She did break with the Axis.

(2) She is moving with more vigor than anywhere else in the liquidation of the German bank, insurance company and many German firms.

(3) She did accept our position as to Argentina, taking our three points.

(4) She has just agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Russia.

These array some powerful factors against the Administration at the beginning of a campaign. It is not timely to insist at this moment. Our enemies are with the opposition. However, I shall talk with Fernández frequently without pressing him in any way.

Every democrat approved Stettinius’ statement as to the Italian situation. It was just too bad that the morning after Eden told the Commons that Sforza would not be tolerated because he was attacking Bonomi, that Bonomi lifted an incredulous eyebrow to inquire "Who told you that? He is a very close friend and has not attacked me". After all, our boys are not in Europe fighting and dying to make the world safe for the House of Savoy, or for monarchy anywhere that the people do not want it. I am afraid that just now monarchy is more sacred with Churchill than democracy. This, I am afraid, comes more from his American mother than from his more liberal father. This, of course, to you alone.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to Ambassador Bowers

In accordance with your memorandum of December 26 there is enclosed a draft reply to Ambassador Bowers concerning Mr. Wright's visit to Chile.

Enclosure:
Copy of letter to Ambassador Bowers.
Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a letter to Rockefeller which may be of interest to you. I thought it not bad to furnish him with background on the existing situation here.

I am seeing Fernández tomorrow regarding the proposition brought here by Wright. He and the President are most eager to comply, and understand perfectly the advantages to Chile. Under normal conditions, Ríos would send the Senate a message asking the declaration of a state of belligerency at once. The fact that nothing has occurred since the rupture, makes it embarrassing to explain such action now — because of the bitter political fight being made now in view of the congressional elections in March. But they are preparing the ground. Ben Meyer, of the AP, saw Ríos the other day and was told that the President "considers Chile now in a state of belligerency" and, more significant, that "something very interesting may happen soon."

But immediately on top of this came the death of an Administration Senator whose successor cannot be elected until March and this leaves the Government just short of a majority in the Senate. Fernández fears that the injection of the issue at this moment would precipitate a rather foul and prolonged political debate in which Arturo Alessandri, an Italian demagogue without principles, who has opposed us on rupture, and on Argentina, and on the UNRRA, would resort to the dirtiest tactics.

All this is due to the fact that Chile is now engaged in a bitter general election, and you know that that means. It seems tragic that whenever anything vital comes up it finds Chile embarrassed and hamstrung by an election — as during the conference at Rio.

I am trying to persuade Fernández to take chances and call in Senators of the Opposition, who have character and

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
and some patriotism and explain the danger to Chile unless a state of war is declared and appeal to their patriotism, without intimating that the suggestion came from outside the country. I shall do my best.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature: Claude [illegible]wes]
Dear Nelson:

Now that you are in the saddle it may not be without interest to know my feeling about the present state of things in Chile. An enormous amount of water has passed over the dam since you were here, since the Government is now eager to cooperate with us in every way possible.

It seems manifest to me that our position is weakening in South America in the last few months and that there has been an intensification of the activity of our enemies which apparently is making headway in some of the nations of this continent. I think we are holding the line better here than in certain other countries, such as Columbia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and, I am wondering, if not Panama, where recent happenings are still mysterious from this distance.

After the rupture there was a long period when the Nazi, Fascist and Falangist elements became discouraged and the propaganda against us dwindled to almost nothing. But these elements were still here and ready to avail themselves of any excuse to revive this propaganda. The excuse came with the Argentine question. And this added openly another element which, while against us on the big issue, did not have the temerity openly to espouse the cause of the Nazis and Fascists. This element, composed of business men and the old landowning aristocracy seized on the Argentine question to join in the hue and cry, basing their position on the hypocritical ground that the "sovereign rights" of a sister nation were being attacked, and that the present Argentine group is, in reality, doing everything it is expected to do under the Rio agreements, and that we are interfering in the internal affairs of another nation. They are not Nazis they say - not at all - but just "Americans" and "Chileans" interested primarily in "continental solidarity".

Their position, and that of the Nazis, is constantly being buttressed by a clever stream of propaganda furnished by the Farrell crowd, and disseminated through the continent through the press associations to whom this material is furnished officially. Thus Farrell, Ferón and Peluffo are frequently giving interviews stoutly declaring their devotion to democracy, insisting that they have consistently supported
the effort of the United Nations contending that they have carried out all the commitments of Rio, and more in sorrow than in anger, lamenting that the solidarity of the American nations is being broken by a prejudice from the North.

These interviews, given to the press associations, are printed in all the capitals of the continent, and by their constant reiteration are making an impression on the man in the street, or, at any rate, confusing him.

Thus, we are up against this propaganda.

In addition, Argentina now has as guests about twenty Chilean newspaper men, who are received in state by the dignitaries in Buenos Aires, accorded every courtesy, furnished with elaborate entertainment, and given interviews which are sent back to the papers here by these visitors. This tends to strengthen the propaganda of the Argentinians.

Unhappily we cannot and must not close our eyes, even though we keep our mouths shut, to the fact that the British are making a very heavy contribution against us and for Argentina. Never a week that the papers here do not publish editorials in English papers transmitted to South America for publication by the Reuter Agency. With these I suppose you are familiar. The fulminations against us and our position in even the most obscure and unimportant English papers are sent all over through Reuters and the South American has no way of knowing the status of these cheap journals.

I have felt for some time that we should inspire more meticulously prepared editorials in leading American papers to be sent out by our Press associations. These ought to come from New York and Washington. Coming thus through the press associations they would be published. The papers here are very high grade, and it is dangerous for us through my office, or the Coordinator's office here, to take propaganda on the Argentine matter to them and ask for publication. It would be all over town by night.

Now Argentina insists, with every semblance of a hurt victim of an unreasoning prejudice, that she has done everything asked at Rio, and we say she has not; but to make our point stick, we must give reasons for our denial. This apparently has been done by the Montevideo Committee. This is sent us for publication in Chilean papers. I suggest that it was a great mistake that the report
report touching on Argentina's position was not given to the AP and the UP at Montevideo. Then it would have been printed in papers all over the continent. If not there, why could it not be put on the wires from Washington?

Then, again on propaganda, we not only have it from the Nazi Right in Argentina, but from the Left in Mexico. These two countries have a common aspiration - each wants to be the dominant and dominating country of South and Central America; and both are jealous of and rather afraid of our influence. The Mexicans are effusive to our faces in their devotion to us; but through their Embassies, here at least, they quietly work upon the workers and the unions and the Socialists to poison their minds against the "imperialistic" and "capitalistic Yankees". I know this to be true.

So we have operating against us in propaganda the Argentinian totalitarians, the Mexicans, and for some reason I have never been able to understand, the British, who were against us on rupture and are against us on Argentina.

Just now we are losing face with the Liberals here because of our expressions of complete satisfaction with Bolivia where the pro-Nazi element is notoriously in the saddle with the entrance of Paz Estenssoro and his people into the Ministry; where papers are suppressed, pro-democrats and pro-Americans are being imprisoned or shot. I assume that we recognized this regime because we did not want more than one nation off the reservation in our fight on Argentina; and that now there is little we can do about it. But I suggest that nothing should go out of Washington indicating complete satisfaction with the regime of Estenssoro and the Military Lodge.

This is merely thinking out loud so you may be able to sense the situation here. I would not have you think that Chile is not wholly with us as far as the Government is concerned, or that the majority of the people are not with us, but I am afraid we are having popular faith in our position weakened by the methods I have described.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,
Santiago, January 8, 1945.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a letter to Rockefeller in which I try to establish in the mind of the Department the actual status of Alessandri in reference to the United States. It may interest you now and be of some service later.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Santia g o, January 8, 1945.

Dear Nelson:

It may be of interest in following events in Chile to have a brief recital of the activities of the former President Arturo Alessandri with a reference to his psychological make-up and record. He is of Italian origin, his father migrating from Italy. In his earlier career he was an extreme Leftist, and something of a socialist and on his first election to the Presidency he sponsored many social measures of a high order, thus incurring such bitter hostility from powerful forces that he was forced from office. Returning after exile and reentering politics, he was again elected President but a change had come over the spirit of his dream and he made his affiliations with the Rightest parties and came to be looked upon by the masses as very reactionary. After the election of Aguirre Cerda he went to Italy and Germany, where he saw Mussolini, Ciano, Ribbentrop, Goering and Goebels, and on his return he was almost mobbed by the miners and workers at Antofagasta.

My relations with him have been unique in my experience. At first he was very hostile, saying in conversations that I was a "Communist" because of my attitude toward the Hitler-Franco-Mussolini combination for the extermination of democracy in Spain, but being challenged usually on this he finally abandoned that line. After I met him he became flatteringly friendly, delivering extravagant eulogies on me to his callers at his home and at dinners outside and so far as I know this is still his line. He even did this once in a public speech. But throughout all this he has managed to array himself invariably in opposition to the United States and the things we wanted.

This began with the fight for rupture with the Axis when he tried to assume the leadership of the Fifth Columnists opposing the break. Not only did he fight the rupture in conversations but in letters in the press. When Welles made his Boston speech he wrote a long denunciation, filled with falsehoods, for the press. He has continued his attacks on the Government for the rupture to this day. When Wallace was here, he wrote a letter to the papers lying about Cecil Lyon of my staff and saying that he did not really care to meet

The Honorable
Nelson Rockefeller,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
meet Wallace since he was opposed to the rupture; although he had resorted to every method to create a situation making it possible to create the impression that Wallace had sought a "conference" with him, which would have been the most offensive thing to the Government possible.

Though elected to the Senate, his vote fell short of that of Ibañez in the presidential election in his district. He ran in a strong Rightest community but did not get the entire Rightest vote. Cruz Coke thought his nomination a grave mistake.

He had placed himself in the forefront in the fight over Argentina, attacking us by indirection and something directly, and boasting of how he had "ticked off Culbertson" when he was Ambassador. His general line is this: "I am a great friend and admirer of the United States - but we won't be serfs". He maintains close connections with the pro-Argentinians here, and is a champion of Conrado Rios, attacking the Government for not sending him back to Buenos Aires.

Recently, in the Senate, he attacked the Government because of its contribution to the UNRRA.

During the fight for rupture he received in his house a Japanese agent.

It is commonly believed that he has secret contacts with the rather small pro-Nazi element in the Army. There is not a scintilla of a doubt that he hopes for a situation making feasible a military coup d'etat.

Cruz Coke, no doubt, senses his idea in this. He knows the Chileans will not long tolerate a military Government. One once in, Alessandri would strut forward as the champion of democracy, constitutional government, civilian rule and demand that the army retire. Then, said Cruz Coke, "the United States would be expected to loudly applaud this stout champion of democracy and lend its aid toward having him summoned to bring order out of chaos."

The reason for his activities lie in his morbid ambition to be President again, though he is now 76. He really feels it is offensive that any one should be President but himself. In his hectic haste, and partly because he is mentally feeling the effect of his age, he has made many silly blunders which have embarrassed his family and friends. In secret session of the Senate in attacking the Government for having broken relations with Japan and Germany, Cruz Coke, of his party, conspicuously left the Chamber and others, of the Right, such as Senator Walker and others, who supported rupture, were greatly outraged and told him so.
He must be put down as distinctly anti-American; pro-Nazi, pro-Japanese, pro-Argentinian, but he once told me that the reason the present Government is not overthrown is because of the feeling that another put in by force would fail to get recognition from the United States. Of course I made no comment.

While I do not think he could be elected President, if he should be I am not at all sure he would not act with us. Much of his opposition to us comes from the Governments cooperation with us. During the rupture fight I once told him in his house that we had the feeling that had he been President, Chile would have broken with the Axis long before. There was no mistaking the expression of pleasure on his face while he shook his head in negative.

He is still a vigorous speaker and because colorful, he can always get an audience and this makes him dangerous; and to make him more dangerous he has no inhibitions about misrepresenting and even lying, and he is a demagogue of the classic style.

That the Government is a little afraid of his moves, I can clearly see. But since Ibañez has said that he is out unless Alessandri tries to come back, in which event he would actively see to it that he did not, President Rios is cleverly playing one against the other. "When Alessandri gets on a rampage, I send for Ibañez, and when Ibañez becomes active, I see Alessandri", he told me recently.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Dear Mr President:

I have just sent Stettinius, with a copy to Rockefeller, a careful analysis of the Chilean delegates to the Mexican conference, with details as to their character, temperament, attitude, with observations on their weaknesses and best points of approach, in the hope that it may be useful, since neither know of all but two.

The Brett and Merrill missions have been getting along swimmingly in a perfect atmosphere of concord. One thing the Brett-Smith mission must do is to equalize the treatment of Chile and Peru in the matter of equipment. Contrary to what you—and I—was originally told we have been considerably more generous with Peru.

Last week with Brett and Merrill I lunched with President Rios at his palace in Vina where he is summering. He looked tired, having ignored doctors orders in returning to work one month after a very severe major operation. He still clings passionately to the plan of visiting Washington which means more to him than anything else. The next day I lunched with Arturo Alessandri, who was fulsome as usual, but when he embraced me on leaving I felt better when his dagger hand was removed from my back. This is unfair, since personally he is most friendly. I think Oliver in his masterful study of Walpole in "The Endless Adventure" describes and explains Alessandri perfectly in explaining that Walpole when in opposition opposed everything Government proposed even though he favored it.

I am shocked at the action of the Senate Committee on Wallace. You may be interested to know that all Chile, every segment of the press in editorials and tributes, is also astonished, shocked and disgusted. Our enemies are now strutting about telling everyone that this is a verification of their contention...
that we are still the "Yankee imperialists" still under the domination of the Plutocracy when the interests of the common man are concerned, and that we are moving as their predicted back to Dollar Diplomacy and away from the Good Neighbor policy. It is a hard nut to crack.

It seems clear to me that a readjustment of parties is necessary to the end that all progressives and Jeffersonians be in one, and all the conservatives, reactionaries and fascist-minded be in the other. We have been cursed by this confusion for generations. It began when Jeffersonians went into the Republican party on the slave issue and the Hamiltonians of the South reluctantly went into the Democratic party on the race issue. The descendants of these, still thinking in terms of their forebears, are responsible for the minorities in each party. Of course Norris was a Jeffersonian and Byrd a Hamiltonian of the deepest dye. I tried to bring this out in the first part of my Houston speech and that is what caused the hue and cry against the speech which continued in some papers throughout the campaign. They can't afford to have people thinking in terms of the fundamentals. The New Statesman of London published it in full with a prefatory explanation that it was the first American political speech it had read which gave some indication that there was really some fundamental difference in the two parties. It was not so noticeable so long as both parties played the Wall Street game, differing only in degree, but now that we are actually back to fundamental issues the contest is inevitable.

I have completed for publication in the spring the third of my Jefferson Trilogy--"Young Jefferson: The Making of a Nation" in which I show that everything he ever stood for was thought out, enunciated, proclaimed and fought for, before the adoption of the Constitution, and without doing it too conspicuously I smash the fallacy of the reactionaries that he was a conservative concerned primarily with State Rights. Wish you could find time to read it. Wallace has written a review for The Nation in which he points out the similarity between your views and Jefferson's, his methods and yours. .... Your inaugural speech was splendid in its simplicity and sentiment.

Warmest regards,

[Signature]

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
March 10, 1945

My dear Mr. President:

I have received with genuine appreciation your letter of February 14, 1945, in which you inform me of the historic decision taken by Your Excellency’s Government to declare the state of belligerency existing between Chile and Japan, and to adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations.

This notable step, by which Chile formalizes its position of solidarity with the United Nations in the common struggle against aggression, is most heartening to the entire peace-loving world, and most gratifying to me personally. Please accept my heartfelt congratulations, on behalf of the Government and people of the United States to the Government and people of Chile.

I take pleasure in again renewing to you, Mr. President, the assurance of my personal regard and highest consideration.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency

Señor Don Juan Antonio Ríos Morales,

President of the Republic of Chile.
March 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has signed the letter to the President of the Republic of Chile which you submitted with your memorandum of March third. It is here-with returned for forwarding to the President.

M. C. LATTA
Executive Clerk
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to President of Chile

In reply to a letter dated February 14, 1945 from the President of the Republic of Chile, informing you of Chile's decision to declare the state of belligerency existing between Chile and Japan, and to adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations, there is attached a suggested reply for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:

1. Letter from the President of Chile.

2. Suggested reply to the President of Chile.
LA MONEDA, Santiago de Chile, 14 de Febrero de 1945.

Excmo. Señor
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América,
Washington, D.C.

Mi distinguido señor Presidente,

con muy particular interés he leído su carta reciente, a que contesto ahora, y en la cual Vuestra Excelencia me sugiere la conveniencia de que se estudie, con carácter urgente, la resolución, de parte de Chile, de hacerse signatario de la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas, de fecha 1° de Enero de 1942.

En esa carta tiene Vuestra Excelencia a bien hacer constar el aprecio y valor que se han dado a los aportes y medidas adoptados por el Gobierno de Chile, con los cuales éste ha traducido su positiva voluntad de colaboración a la causa de las Naciones Unidas. Hace también Vuestra Excelencia resaltar los pasos trascendentales que han de darse para formular una Carta definitiva de la organización mundial de seguridad, objetivo en cuyo logro son las Naciones Unidas el símbolo de coordinación y la base jurídica del progreso y de la acción común de las Naciones pacifistas, tanto en la conducta de la guerra, como en la organización de la paz.

El Gobierno y el pueblo de Chile concuerdan ampliamente con las apreciaciones de Vuestra Excelencia, y así me es honroso y grato hacerlo constar en esta respuesta.
Vuestra Excelencia ha de tener a bien recordar que el Gobierno de Chile, a partir del 20 de Enero de 1943, o sea, desde que resolvió la ruptura de sus relaciones diplomáticas, consulares y comerciales con los países del Eje, ha mantenido una posición de leal y completa identidad de propósito y acción con las Naciones Unidas; ha adoptado todas las medidas defensivas y económicas propias de un Estado en situación de guerra, y, por ese mismo motivo, desde aquella fecha estimo que mi país se encuentra de hecho en estado de beligerancia con los países del Eje.

Aprecio, con el agradecimiento de mi Gobierno y de mi pueblo, la oportuna y eficaz sugerencia que me habéis formulado. La estimo y valorizo como proveniente de vuestra extraordinaria experiencia de la situación mundial, del afecto reiterado que os habéis dignado demostrar siempre por Chile y su Gobierno, y de vuestra adhesión ilimitada a la causa de las Democracias y al futuro de dignidad, de paz y de progreso de las Naciones que han sabido servirla.

Las excepcionales circunstancias de la hora presente me han inducido, de acuerdo con el parecer uniforme de mi Consejo de Ministros, a declarar el estado de beligerancia existente entre Chile y Japón y a recabar, para esta declaración, la sanción del Congreso Nacional, que nuestra Constitución Política exige.

Concordante con esta resolución, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile ha formulado hoy una declaración pública que la prensa nacional insertará mañana en sus columnas. De igual manera, como medida subsiguiente a tal declaración constitucional del Presidente de la República, se ha ins-
truido y autorizado a nuestro Embajador en Washington para que firme, en representación de Chile, la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas de 1° de Enero de 1942.

Renuevo a Vuestra Excelencia la expresión de mi agradecimiento por el especial y noble interés de sus consideraciones para con la Democracia chilena y los favorables conceptos de su amable carta; como asimismo reitero a Vuestra Excelencia mis fervientes votos por el pronto y definitivo éxito de las Armas de las Naciones Unidas.

Con la expresión de mis más altas consideraciones personales, soy de Vuestra Excelencia, muy sinceramente,

[Signature]
From President Dios

A SU EXCELENCIA

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.

REGISTERED
LA MONEDA, Santiago de Chile, February 14, 1945.

His Excellency,
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

Distinguished Mr. President,

I have read with particular interest your recent letter, to which I now make reply and in which Your Excellency suggests to me the suitability of consideration being given, as soon as possible, to a decision on Chile's part to become a signatory to the Declaration by the United Nations dated January 1, 1942.

In the said letter Your Excellency is good enough to mention the appreciation and value which have been given to the contributions and measures adopted by the Government of Chile, into which the latter Government has translated its positive desire for collaboration with the cause of the United Nations. Your Excellency also emphasizes the transcendental steps that are to be taken to formulate a definitive Charter of the world security organization, an objective in the attainment of which the United Nations are the symbol of coordination and the juridical basis of the progress and common action of peace-loving Nations, both in the conduct of the war and in the organization of the peace.

The Government and people of Chile are in full accord with Your Excellency's views, and I have the honor and pleasure of making this known in my reply. Your Excellency will be good enough to recall that the Government of Chile, beginning January 20, 1943 -
1943 - that is, since it decided upon the severance of its diplomatic, consular and commercial relations with the Axis countries, has maintained a position of loyal and complete identity of purpose and action with the United Nations; it has adopted all the defensive and economic measures of a State at war, and for that very reason I consider my country to have been in a state of belligerency with the Axis countries since that date.

I appreciate, with the gratitude of my Government and of my people, the timely and appropriate suggestion which you have made to me. I esteem and value it as one coming from your extraordinary experience of the world situation, from the reiterated friendship which you have at all times been good enough to show for Chile and its Government, and from your unqualified adherence to the cause of the Democracies and the future of the dignity, peace and progress of the Nations which have chosen to serve that cause.

The exceptional circumstances of the present hour have induced me, with the unanimous approval of my Council of Ministers, to declare the state of belligerency existing between Chile and Japan and to obtain for such Declaration the sanction of the National Congress as required by our Political Constitution.

In conformity with this decision, the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile has today formulated a public declaration which the national press will insert in its columns tomorrow. Likewise, as a measure subsequent to the said constitutional declaration of the President of the Republic, our Ambassador at Washington has been instructed
instructed and authorized to sign, in behalf of Chile, the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942.

I renew to Your Excellency the expression of my gratitude for the special and noble interest contained in your consideration for Chilean Democracy, and for the favorable concepts of your kind letter; I likewise reiterate to Your Excellency my fervent wishes for the early and definitive success of the Arms of the United Nations.

With the expression of my highest personal consideration, I remain, Excellency,

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) J.A. Ríos H.
Let. to the President, 3/9/45, from Hon. Claude G. Bowers, U. S. Ambassador to Chile, Santiago, Chile, congratulating President on Crimea and Mexican Conferences; report on local elections. Also writes in behalf of Rivas Cheriff who is a political prisoner in Spain and suggests that discreet inquiry might be made of Franco by our Ambassador there.
April 12, 1945

Dear Claude:

I have received your letter of March 9, 1945, and am interested in your comments on the internal political situation.

With regard to Rivas Cheriff, I am asking the State Department to approach Norman Armour to see what can be done.

Very sincerely yours,

F. D. R.

The Honorable
Claude G. Bowers,
American Ambassador,
Santiago, Chile.
April 15, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. SUMMERLIN

The President has signed the drafts of letters to the Iraqi Regent, the Syrian President, and Ambassador Bowers, submitted with the Secretary's memoranda of April tenth. They are all returned for forwarding in the usual manner.

M. C. LATTA
Executive Clerk

elb
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 10, 1945

Subject: Letter to Ambassador Bowers.

I attach a draft reply to Ambassador Bowers' letter of March 9, 1945, in which he comments on the internal political situation in Chile and inquires whether something can be done in obtaining the release of Rivas Cheriff, said to be in prison in Santander.

Ambassador Bowers' letter is returned herewith.

Enclosures:

1. Ambassador Bowers letter.
2. Draft reply.
April 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to Ambassador Bowers.

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Ambassador Bowers' letter is returned herewith.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosures:

1. Ambassador Bowers letter.
2. Draft reply.
Dear Mr. President:

Warmest congratulations on the historic meeting in the Crimea, and on your illuminating report to Congress which has made a fine impression here where it was published in full. And also on the Mexican Conference. In so far as I know, we had the most satisfactory cooperation from Chile and I thought Fernández' closing speech a statesmanlike reflection of the ideas and ideals of the Conference and of Chile's attitude toward your policies. I know it to have been sincere.

The elections here did not surprise me. They were conducted with that perfect order and decorum characteristic of elections in such a functioning democracy. The political setup changes but little. The Rights gained some seats and the Lefts lost some, and the Senate is now Rightest by one majority and the House Leftist by three. The constant wrangling among Radicals and Socialists for four years clearly disgusted the people and they paid the penalty. Since neither side has a majority in both Houses, there will be no change in the Ministry for a time at least.

The Government at the instance of Fernández and Ríos took a strong and determined stand on the bill for the purchase of the tramways and it has passed both Houses. Some slight changes were made in the House which the Government thinks will be eliminated in the Senate.

In the elections Von Marees, the Nazi leader, was defeated for reelection to the House.

I have a letter from Mrs. Azana, widow of the great Spanish President and Prime Minister, and another from Mrs. Rivas Cheriff, who was Azanza's bosom friend from their college days at the Jesuit College of the Escorial and whose sister married Azana. Señora Azana says that in passing through the States en route to Mexico she sought, through the

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
the Mexican Embassy, an opportunity to thank you personally for your intercession for her great husband but that the request was "coldly received at the White House". I suspect you knew nothing about it.

My purpose in writing comes from the letter of Mrs. Rivas Cheriff, a very charming, keenly intelligent woman who graduated at Wellesly. As you know, when the Germans swept into France, Azana and his wife were living with Rivas Cheriff and his family near Bordeaux, and Azana was given permission by the French to move into unoccupied territory. He was gravely ill after a serious operation and he left in an ambulance with a doctor and his wife, pursued by the Gestapo. Finally, exhausted, he was compelled to stop at a small French town. The Gestapo had stolen all his money and his papers, and his position was desperate. The Mexican Ambassador, now here, went to this town, gave him money, and offered him the protection of the Mexican Embassy, but his condition made this impossible.

Rivas Cheriff stayed on for a day or so to pay bills et cetera, and the Germans swept in, the Gestapo arrested him and turned him over to Franco police, operating without hindrance in France. He was hurried back and condemned to death. I wired you at the time and we may have intervened. At any rate, a number of South American countries that knew him as a great literary figure and producer of the highest in theatrical art, did intervene, and the sentence was committed to life imprisonment. After the death sentence and before the commutation, Azana heard about it and the shock killed him.

Now to the point: Rivas Cheriff, a man of the highest culture, devoted to literature and the drama, knowing nothing whatever about politics and participating not at all, but devoted to Azana personally, was sentenced to death solely because of his personal devotion to his bosom friend. He has been in prison now for four years and a half, with his wife and three children stranded in Mexico.

Several times the Gobelles of Franco's organization gives the world a statement that Franco has released, or is releasing from prison, all but those charged with crimes such as murder. Rivas Cheriff remains in prison.

His wife writes me that he has maintained his mental balance by unique activities. He is in the penitentiary at Santander. He has organized in the prison a dramatic school and puts on plays from Calderon and Lupe down to Benevente; has his own factory there for the making of scenery and costumes; has designed some unique plan to furnish light in the place of footlights. The money made is turned over to
an orphanage. The attendance of the plays is large from among the nuns as well as prisoners and the Bishop recently attended, paying 300 pesetas for his seat. Rivas Cheriff makes a little money for himself by translating from French and English for a Barcelona publisher, and he is writing a biography of Azana to be called: "An Unknown Man", by "One Who Walked Beside Him". This cannot be completed until after he can rejoin Mrs. Azana.

Recently the director of prisons said to him: "Señor----, (The Minister of Justice) and I often discuss your case and the rotten injustice of keeping you here" — making clear that even the Minister of Justice does not have freedom of action.

This seems to me a crime of the first order. I am wondering if it would be offensive to Franco for our Ambassador to make a discreet inquiry as to Rivas Cheriff, based on the fact that his wife is a graduate of Wellesley and has many friends in the United States who make inquiries. If he knew that the outside world is curious about the retention of a man who took no part in politics and suffers hell because of his personal relations with Azana, he might include him in some discharge of prisoners. Of course, since Rivas Cheriff is a brilliant writer, he may fear him out. But I would like to feel that we had made a gesture. Of course, since I assume we are not enamored of Franco's Government, with which I was not enamored from the start nine years ago, it may be we do not wish to make any minor request of Franco. But an inquiry would not be a request. If anything can be done, I would be most happy about it.

I hesitate to even mention the matter to one so burdened, but these two letters from two fine women suffering in exile, I cannot resist.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Claude E. Bowers