On the morning of September 7th, 1937, General Chiang Kai-shek said to me:

"If you have a chance to see the President of the United States, kindly tell him two things:

"First, we trust the American people's sense of justice and their love of freedom. We have confidence in the American people. Therefore, if the American Government has any proposal to make regarding the situation in the East, we shall always be ready to respond to it or at least to give it serious consideration.

"Second, as to our own part, I have said to our people that we shall continue to work for peace; but if we are forced to fight a war, if war is once started, we have to be prepared to suffer the worst kind of miseries and we cannot stop in the midst of it.'

I have said that and cannot do otherwise now that the war has been forced on us. We are prepared to fight a long-drawn-out war".
13 September 1937

REPORT OF AMERICANS IN CHINA EVACUATED AND REMAINING
RECEIVED FROM ADMIRAL YARNELL ON 13 SEPTEMBER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Evacuated</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHANGHAI</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>2,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEIPING - TIENTSIN</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>1,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEFOO - TSINGTAO</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YANGTZE RIVER &amp; INTERIOR</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOCHOW, AMOY, SWATOW</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWANGTUNG, KWAUGSI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWEICHOW PROVINCES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAINAN ISLAND</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,348</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,789</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September 14, 1937

List of AMERICAN SHIPS ON ASIATIC STATION

SEE--Navy folder--drawer 1--1937
September 14, 1937.

List of UNITED STATES--BRITISH--FRENCH--ITALIAN and DUTCH SHIPS ON ASIATIC STATION.

SEE--Navy folder--Drawer 1--1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1937

My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed a copy of a note under date of September 9, 1937, from the Chinese Ambassador, in which he asks me to forward to you a copy of a telegram in Chinese, with English translation thereof, addressed to you by five Chinese business organizations in Shanghai. Copies of the telegram and the translation are also enclosed.

In acknowledging the Ambassador's letter I have indicated to him that I have complied with his request.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

Copy of letter from Chinese Ambassador, September 9, 1937, with enclosures.

The President,
The White House.
September 9, 1937

My dear Mr. Secretary:

At the request of five Chinese business organizations in Shanghai, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram in Chinese, together with an English translation thereof addressed to the President of the United States.

I should be much obliged if you would be so kind as to forward the telegram with the accompanying translation to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.
上海电
六年九月三日

王大使请转陈罗斯福总统暨海员公会鉴

集团要求美国商轮照常停靠中国

下列各海口否则亦不驶往日本并对中国人民抵抗侵略表示同情

政府宣布对日经济封锁之议实由爱好和平著称深信此事必将引起一般民众广泛之同情

为正义为政府所接受敌会等谨以至诚向美国政府表示深切谢忱并盼美国人民继续为正义而努力

同业公会轮船业同业公会等叩肃

同业公会钱业同业公会等
TRANSLATION

TEXT OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED AT THE CHINESE EMBASSY,
DATED, SHANGHAI, SEPTEMBER 3, 1937.

"Please forward the following telegram to President Roosevelt.

"With deep appreciation we learn that a resolution has been adopted by the National Seamen's Conference to the effect that American merchantmen call at Chinese ports as usual and if this is not possible not call at Japanese ports also with the view of showing the Union's sympathy for the Chinese people in their defence against aggressions; and that the American Government be requested to adopt an economic blockade against Japan.

"This resolution stands for righteousness and punishment for international aggressors. We firmly believe that the American people, who are imbued with the ideas of liberty and peace, will show deep interest in the Resolution; and that the American Government will accept the suggestion in the Resolution. In expressing our appreciation, it is hoped that the American people will continue their efforts in advancing the cause of righteousness.

Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
Shanghai Civic Association
Shanghai Bankers Association
Shanghai Native Bankers' Association
Shanghai Shipping Association."
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

22 September 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY M. H. McINTYRE

Admiral Leahy has requested that I forward to you the enclosed despatch as being of interest to the President.

L.E.Denfeld,
Commander, U.S.Navy,
Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations.
THE POLICY OF CINCAF DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY IS TO EMPLOY US NAVAL FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND SO AS TO OFFER ALL POSSIBLE PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO OUR NATIONALS IN CASES WHERE NEEDED PERIOD NAVAL VESSELS WILL BE STATIONED IN PORTS WHERE AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE CONCENTRATED AND WILL REMAIN THERE UNTIL IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE OR NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEM OR UNTIL THEY HAVE BEEN EVACUATED. THIS POLICY BASED ON OUR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS WILL BE CONTINUED AS LONG AS THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN EXISTS AND WILL CONTINUE IN FULL FORCE EVEN AFTER OUR NATIONALS HAVE BEEN Warned TO LEAVE CHINA AND AFTER AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE HAS BEEN GIVEN. MOST AMERICAN CITIZENS NOW IN CHINA ARE ENGAGED IN BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONS WHICH ARE THEIR ONLY MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD THESE PERSONS ARE UNWILLING TO LEAVE UNTIL THEIR BUSINESSES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR THEY ARE FORCED TO LEAVE DUE TO ACTUAL PHYSICAL DANGER. UNTIL SUCH TIME COMES OUR NAVAL FORCES CAN NOT BE WITHDRAWN WITHOUT FAILURE IN OUR DUTY AND WITHOUT BRINGING GREAT DISCREDIT ON THE UNITED STATES NAVY. IN GIVING ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION OUR NAVAL FORCES MAY AT TIMES BE EXPOSED TO DANGERS WHICH WILL IN MOST CASES BE SLIGHT BUT IN ANY CASE THESE RISKS MUST BE ACCEPTED 1830

The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, transmitted this message in plain language to-day to the addressees.
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Treasury Attaché
Shanghai, China

Date: October 14, 1937

The military situation around Shanghai is much the same as last week as far as lines are concerned, except that Chinese troops are showing signs of disaffection. According to local police reports situation causing grave concern to Chinese authorities has arisen in Soochow, Wusih, Kunshan and other cities back of front lines where large hospitals for convalescent soldiers operated. The men released from the hospitals are unwilling to return to the front, and are defying civil authorities and becoming menace to civil population. In spite of ten days heavy bombing and shelling, fourth big Japanese push failed to move Chinese lines. In Chapei and vicinity, more than 100 Japanese bombs per day have been dropped, while shells from Japanese heavy artillery have been rained on same section from dusk to dawn for past ten days. The Chinese continue to fight tanks, heavy artillery, bombers, ship's guns, and heavy machine guns with little else than rifles, hand grenades, and light machine guns. As no attempt is made to resist bombing, China's air equipment must be completely destroyed or disabled. Rumor persists, however, that many planes arrived Sian from Russia, France, and England during past few days, and that Chinese are preparing for big air raids.

In Whangpoo, Japanese warships engaged in heavy shelling of Pootung day and night for past three days, indicating another big Japanese push is on. The Chinese, judging from observation, have at last some heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns in Pootung and are answering Japanese ship guns. It is inconceivable how Chinese can hold out much longer around Shanghai unless something is done very soon by Nanking to offset terrible strafing of Chinese lines from air, land and river.

Some cargo is now moving in and out of Yangtze valley by using junks between steamers on either sides of Nantungchow-Kiangyin boom, by navigating smaller channels between Nantungchow and Chinkiang, thus circumventing Yangtze blockade effect two months as protection against Japanese naval invasion of Yangtze ports, particularly Nanking. Because of high cost of junk hire and transshipment, freight rates Shanghai to Hankow set at $42 a ton, or about five times normal rate.

Although far from normal, Shanghai showing some business activity. Many evacuees have returned from Manila and Hongkong, and some 370 Japanese businessmen have returned from Japan.
From Commander Yangtze Patrol
To Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.
Passed to Naval Operations via Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.

Message received by telephone from Nanking. Panay bombed and sunk at mileage 221 above Woosung, 54 survivors, many badly wounded now ashore at Hoshen Anwahei. H.M.S. Bee will proceed this point to assist and bring survivors to Wuhu. The USS Oahu fueling Kiukiang preparatory to departing to Wuhu. Names of personnel lost not known. Atcheson safe. Captain has broken leg. Further information will be forwarded when received.

mc--1020PM.
December 4, 1937.

Memo for Pres.
From Sec. Morgenthau

In re-Current United States trade with Japan and China-
Report os preliminary for first four weeks of November.

See Henry Morgenthau-Drawer 1--1937
Mr. Fender

This is confirmation of yesterday's in full
FOLLOWING REPORT IN FULL FROM COMMANDING OFFICER PANAY, FORWARDED APPROVED
BY CINCAF:-

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PANAY
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
VIA THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF US ASIATIC FLEET
SUBJECT: USS PANAY, THE LOSS OF BY SINKING AS A RESULT OF BOMBING BY
JAPANESE PLANES, 12 DECEMBER, 1937.

REFERENCE: (A) ART. 849 - US NAVY REGS, 1928
(B) ART. 841 - US NAVY REGS, 1928

1. ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1937, THE "USS PANAY" WAS OPERATING UNDER
THE ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL, AND AT THAT TIME, WAS ANCHORED
ABOUT FIFTEEN MILES ABOVE NANKING, ACTING AS A REFUGE FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS
AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE SHIP WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE STANDARD
OIL TANKERS MEILING, WEISHA, WEIAN, AND MISCELLANEOUS STANDARD OIL
LAUNCHES AND JUNKS. THE LATEST ORDERS FROM THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL TO
THE COMMANDING OFFICER WERE RECEIVED THE DAY BEFORE BY DESPATCH, AND SAID
THE COMMANDING OFFICER WAS TO HAVE COMPLETE DISCRETION IN MOVING THE SHIP
UP, OR DOWN THE RIVER.

2. THE SHIP WAS IDENTIFIED AS AN AMERICAN VESSEL BY TWO LARGE HORIZON
AL FLAGS, ONE SPREAD OVER THE FORWARD TOP DECK, AND ONE OVER THE AFTER
TOP DECK - BOTH CLEARLY VISIBLE FROM THE AIR AT ANY ANGLE. EACH OF THESE
FLAGS MEASURED ABOUT EIGHTEEN FEET IN LENGTH, AND ABOUT FOURTEEN FEET IN
WIDTH, AND HAD BEEN FRESHLY REPAINTED. IN ADDITION TO THESE TWO FLAGS, AND
ON ACCOUNT OF THE EMERGENCY CONDITION EXISTING, THE PANAY HAD BEEN FLYING
HER LARGEST ENSIGN AT THE GAFF BOTH NIGHT AND DAY, WHETHER UNDERWAY OR AT
ANCHOR; ALL ENSIGNS, BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL, WERE BRIGHTLY ILLUMINATED
ALL NIGHT.

3. AT 8:14 I OBSERVED ARTILLERY SHELLS FALLING IN THE RIVER ABOUT
FOUR HUNDRED YARDS OFF OUR STARBOARD BEAM, PRESUMABLY FROM JAPANESE ARTI
LLERY ALTHOUGH THE BATTERIES WERE NOT VISIBLE. AT 8:25 I GOT THE PANAY
UNDERWAY FOR UP RIVER TO GET CLEAR OF THIS FIRING, AND SIGNALLING THE CONVOY
TO FOLLOW. AT 8:43 THE PANAY WENT ALONGSIDE HMS CRICKETT TO TRANSFER AN
INJURED CHINESE EMPLOYEE OF THE ASIATIC PETROLEUM COMPANY. AT THE SAME TIME
I ADVISED LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JIM ASHBY, ROYAL NAVY, COMMANDING HMS CRICK
ET, OF MY REASONS FOR MOVING UP RIVER.
4. At 945, having resumed our journey, the Panay at the head of the column, followed in the order named by the Meiping, Meihsia and Meian. Two groups of Japanese soldiers were sighted on the left bank (north); they waved hand flags at the Panay and seemed to want to communicate with us. Accordingly, the Panay move to, and a Japanese armed tender came along-side carrying Lieutenants Shegeryo Murakami and about ninety men, most of whom were armed with machine guns. Lieutenant Anders, my executive officer, met this officer at the gangway as he stepped on board, accompanied by his sword bearer and two privates with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Anders informed me that the officer desired to speak to me, so I turned the conn over to Lieutenant Anders and went to the gangway. I was aware of the fact that it was improper for the armed orderlies of this officer to accompany him on board but considered that he probably did not know the correct procedure, and that it was proper for me to overlook the matter in this connection. I had special verbal orders from the commander Yangtze patrol not to be too sensitive about points of naval etiquette when dealing with the Japanese military, and above all, to use my judgement in avoiding such complications as might arise. Lieutenant Murakami asked me where the Panay was going, and I said to a point upriver twenty eight miles from Nanking. He then asked why we were going there, to which I replied, "to keep clear of artillery fire." He asked me about the three standard oil ships, and I informed him that they were American ships under my protection. His next question was about the Chinese troops holding solidly, to which I said that the United States was friendly to both Japan and China, and therefore I could not give him any information about the Chinese army. This conversation was witnessed by Second Secretary Mr. George Attachēson, Junior of the American Embassy, Nanking, China. Lieutenant Murakami then invited me to repay his call ashore, which invitation I respectfully declined. At 953 the Japanese tender cleared the side.

5. At 954 the Panay again resumed her way up the river. At 1150 I anchored the Panay at a point twenty miles upriver from Nanking, and about two hundred and twenty one miles above Woosung, in a broad, open space in the river. My reasons for anchoring there was simply to keep out of the way of the contending armies; this location seemed highly desirable. We were easily visible especially accompanied as we were by three standard oil tankers; for miles around, on every side, it seemed unlikely that any troops would try to cross the river in our vicinity. In selecting this spot, I
HAD IN MIND NOT ONLY THE SAFETY OF THE PANAY AND THE EVACUEES WHOM SHE WAS CARRYING, BUT ALSO THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THE AMERICAN SHIPS IN THE CONVOY, AND THEIR PERSONNEL. IMMEDIATELY UPON ANCHORING, I POSTED SENTRY LOOKOUTS FOR AIRPLANES AND TROOP MOVEMENTS. AT 13:15 I ALLOWED A PARTY OF ABOUT EIGHT MEN TO VISIT THE DECKING NEARBY FOR A GLASS OF BEER. THESE MEN WERE STILL ON BOARD THE DECKING WHEN THE ATTACK STARTED, AND WERE, THEREFORE, UNABLE TO RETURN TO THE SHIP.

6. AT ABOUT 1327 THE LOOKOUT CALLED DOWN THAT TWO PLANES WERE IN SIGHT ABOUT FIFTEEN THOUSAND FEET. THE WEATHER WAS CLEAR WITH GOOD VISIBILITY AND NO WIND. THE PLANES WERE CLEARLY VISIBLE DESPITE THEIR ALTITUDE WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AS REPORTED TO ME; AT THAT TIME I HAD NO IDEA WHATSOEVER THAT THE PLANES INTENDED TO ATTACK US. ABOUT THIS TIME I WENT UP TO THE BRIDGE WITH CQM JOHN LANG IN ORDER TO KEEP A BETTER LOOKOUT FOR FURTHER PLANE APPROACHES. ABOUT 1329 I LOOKED OUT THE DOOR OF THE BRIDGE TO PICK UP AGAIN THE TWO PLANES I HAD ORIGINALLY SEEN, AND WAS ASTONISHED TO DISCOVER THAT BOTH WERE RAPIDLY LOSING ALTITUDE IN A DIRECTION TOWARD US. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THEY APPEARED TO GO INTO POWER DIVES. LANG AND I BOTH STEPPED INSIDE THE BRIDGE, AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, A BOMB SEEMED TO STRIKE DIRECTLY OVER OUR HEADS, RIPPING A BIG HOLE IN THE ROOF OF THE BRIDGE. I LOST CONSCIOUSNESS FOR WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN ONLY A MINUTE OR TWO; WHEN I CAME TO, I DISCOVERED MYSELF ON THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE, BADLY STUNNED WITH MY HEAD COVERED WITH BLOOD, AND MY RIGHT LEG PAINFULLY INJURED AT THE HIP MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO RISE TO MY FEET. A HOLE HAD ALSO BEEN BROKEN IN THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE NEAR WHERE LANG AND I HAD BEEN STANDING. I ASKED LANG IF HE WAS INJURED, TO WHICH HE REPLIED, "NO, SIR." NOT BEING ABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE FROM THE INSIDE OF THE BRIDGE, WHICH WAS COMPLETELY WRECKED, I ASKED HIM TO PUT A LIFE JACKET ON ME AND HELP ME DOWN TO THE SHIP'S GALLEY WHICH IS ON THE MAIN DECK, AND A GOOD CENTRAL POINT FROM WHICH TO DIRECT OPERATIONS. BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO REACH THE GALLEY, WHICH WAS NECESSARILY A SLOW PROCESS ON ACCOUNT OF MY DISABLING WOUND, I HEARD THE PANAY'S MACHINE GUNS FIRING, AND REALIZED THAT THE CREW WAS CARRYING ON, PROBABLY UNDER THE IMMEDIATE DIRECTION OF LIEUTENANT ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER. AT THE GALLEY I SENT LANG, CQM, TO NOTIFY ALL OFFICERS THAT I WAS IN THE GALLEY, INCAPACITATED, AND TO TELL THE ENGINEER OFFICER, LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST TO LET ME KNOW IF WE WERE TAKING WATER, AND ALSO IF
WE COULD GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY. ABOUT THIS TIME I NOTICED MR. J. HALL PAXTON, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CHINA, ONE OF THE PASSENGERS, STANDING ON DECK JUST OUTSIDE OF THE GALLEY. I ASKED HIM TO PLEASE COME IN AND HOLD ME UP WHICH HE VERY KINDLY DID, REMAINING WITH ME THEREAFTER.

7. FROM THEN ON PLANES BOMBED US CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL ABOUT 1425. THEY APPEARED TO BE ATTACKING US IN RELAYS OF TWO OR THREE EACH, THE FIRST GROUP THAT CAME OVER, DIVE-BOMBED FROM A CONSIDERABLE ALTITUDE WHICH KEPT THEM BEYOND RANGE OF OUR LEWIS MACHINE GUNS. LATER WHEN THE PANAY WAS VISIBLY SMASHED-UP, THEY CAME MUCH CLOSER, AND NOT ONLY LET GO THEIR BOMBS FROM LOW ALTITUDES OF PERHAPS ONE OR TWO HUNDRED FEET, BUT ALSO MACHINE-GUNNED OUR DECKS, FIRING AS THEY CAME DOWN DIVING. I DISTINCTLY HEARD THEIR GUNS WHICH HAD A DIFFERENT SOUND FROM THE PANAY'S. I WAS INFORMED AT THE TIME THAT THE PLANES WERE JAPANESE NAVY PLANES, IDENTIFIED BY THEIR CHARACTERISTIC RED CIRCLE. ACCORDING TO MY RECKONING, THE PANAY MUST HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT TWENTY FOUR DIRECT HITS; I COULD NOT BELIEVE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SMALL SHIP TO RECEIVE SUCH DAMAGE AND STILL FLOAT. I WAS INFORMED LATER THAT THE FIRST BOMB WHICH DISABLED ME, ALSO PUT THE FORWARD THREE INCH GUN AND THE RADIO ROOM OUT OF ACTION, AND BROUGHT DOWN THE FOREMAST.

8. AT 1358 THE SHIP APPEARED TO BE SETTLING QUITE FAST. MEANWHILE, BEFORE THE ENGINEER OFFICER COULD REACH ME TO GIVE ME A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF OUR PROPULSING MACHINERY, I THOUGHT I HEARD A SHARP RUSH OF STEAM ESCAPING FROM OUR STEAMING BOILER. A MINUTE OR TWO AFTER THAT, ENSIGN DIWERSE, THE COMMUNICATION OFFICER, CAME INTO THE GALLEY AND STATED THAT THE SHIP WAS PLAINLY SINKING, AND ASKED IF HE SHOULD THROW OVERBOARD THE CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS. I TOLD HIM TO GET THEM ALL OVERBOARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE DID HIS BEST TO THROW THE CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET PAPERS OVERBOARD, BUT DID NOT COMPLETE THE WORK BECAUSE OF THE REPEATED BOMBING WHICH SEEMED TO BE FOCUSED IN THE VICINITY OF THE RADIO ROOM. I ALSO TOLD HIM TO SEND A SECOND MESSENGER FOR LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST, THE ENGINEER OFFICER. LIEUTENANT GEIST REPORTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND SAID WE COULD NOT GET UNDERWAY BECAUSE THE STEAMING BOILER HAD BEEN RUPTURED. I THEREUPON TOLD HIM TO PUT THE HOMOLITE PUMPS ON THOSE COMPARTMENTS WHICH SEEMED TO BE FILLING FASTEST. ENSIGN DIWERSE RETURNED A FEW MINUTES LATER TO STATE THAT ALL THE HOMOLITE PUMPS HAD BEEN WRECKED BY BOMBS.

9. ABOUT THIS TIME SOMEONE INFORMED ME THAT WE APPEARED TO BE IN DAN-
ger of being run down by one of the Socony vessels. I got Mr. Paxton to carry me to the door of the galley, and from what I could see, I supposed that the vessel was attempting to come alongside the Panay, probably to take off our personnel. About that instant another storm of bombs fell both on the Panay and the Socony ship; the latter then abandoned her attempt to help the Panay. It should be remembered that attacking planes concentrated almost all their efforts on the Panay during at least the first half hour.

13. Then, by 14½, it seemed unlikely to me that I should be able to save the ship. About 14½ Ensign Biverse returned and said he thought we should abandon ship, especially as he thought the job would take some time with only two small boats. Accordingly, I gave the order to abandon ship, and to start by sending the worst wounded ashore first. Boats contained only wounded except for the boats crews, Cbm Mahlmann, and several of the crew that had not been injured. Then came to the galley to put me in the first boat. I protested against leaving the ship at this time, and was most unwilling to do so; but, it appeared that they did not heed my protest because of my condition. With Mr. Paxton's assistance they carried me down the deck, and laid me flat on my face across the bow of the motor sampan.

11. Just before leaving the ship, I told Ensign Biverse to remain on board, telling Lieutenant Anders and the other officers that I was being taken ashore, and that if the attack should cease, I wanted Ensign Biverse to remain on board with a small detail of about six uninjured men to do what they could to keep the ship from going down. And that in any case, Ensign Biverse and his detail were to be the last to leave. I knew at that time that Ensign Biverse was the only uninjured officer, although suffering from shock, and having most of his clothes blown off, and believed that Lieutenant Anders and Lieutenant (jd) Geist were sufficiently injured to justify their leaving the ship before the last boatload. Ensign Biverse later reported to me ashore that everybody was off the ship, including all the passengers, and that he had not remained behind with his detail because he was convinced the ship might sink at any minute, and furthermore, that the bombing planes might return. I approved his action in leaving the ship as it was obviously impossible to save her. After arriving on shore, I was informed both the motor sampan and pull-
The Sanfan had been machine gunned by the attacking planes. Sometimes thereafter I heard the sound of a motor launch in the river close to where we were hidden in the reeds; the launch stayed in our vicinity a few minutes and then left. I cannot say whether or not they attempted to search for us because I was keeping my head out of sight and had deliberately left no debris on the beach by which we could be trampled. Shortly afterwards a second launch passed; meanwhile when I discovered that the ship was still afloat, I sent for English service and told him to take the motor Sanfan and cross the river to where the standard oil vessels had been beached in order to try to get standard oil launches to take the Fanny on tow and beach her. At this time I explained to English service that I wanted him to consider himself an enemy in command of the hull and the operation to move her, because of the presence of the Japanese launches mentioned this operation was not carried out as we all felt that an effort was being made to exterminate us.

12. About this time the planes started bombing the standard oil vessels. At 1425 they ceased bombing the Fanny altogether which at that time appeared likely to sink at any moment; it should be remembered that the bombing planes first concentrated their attack on the Fanny. It was while they were bombing the Fanny that two of the standard oil vessels were able to get underway and beach themselves.

13. With only two small boats available it took many return trips to take all the personnel off the ship; starting at 1445 we completed the operations at a little after 1530. Sometime before the ship sank I heard the battle of machine guns and was informed that an armed Japanese boat was firing on the Fanny. I was subsequently informed that this boat had put several men on board who remained only a few minutes and then left. I was shortly informed that the ship sank with her colors still flying at 1536 turning over to starboard.

14. While on board the roar of the bomb explosions and the pieces of debris flying around made it impossible to keep any written record of the various hits, the damage sustained, or the injuries to personnel. However, there was absolutely no panic. The orders I gave were carried out exactly. The ship had the normal Yankee cribboat general quarters station still; he had special details for air defense which involved using only our machine guns in order to avoid opening
THE HATCHES LEADING TO THE THREE INCH MAGAZINES. I WANTED TO PREVENT HAVING THE SHIP BLOWN UP BY HER OWN THREE INCH POMDER. THE PANAY ALSO HAD AN ABANDON SHIP BELL; MY REASON FOR GIVING THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP WAS THAT I OBSERVED THAT SHE WAS SETTLING DOWN BY THE HEAD TO STARBOARD, AND IT WAS REPORTED TO ME AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED THAT SHE MIGHT SINK AT ANY MINUTED. I FELT MY NEXT DUTY, IF I COULD NOT SAVE THE SHIP, WAS TO SAVE THE LIVES OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE CREW AND PASSENGERS. THE HULL HAD MANY HOLES WHEN ABANDONED AND WAS SHIPING WATER RATHER RAPIDLY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY TO BEACH HER BECAUSE HER STEAMING BOILER HAD BEEN RUPTURED. ALTHOUGH I WAS TAKEN AshORE IN ONE OF THE FIRST BOATS WITH THE BADLY WOUNDED I CONSIDERED MYSELF IN COMMAND OF THE SHIP AND CREW THROUGHOUT; AND WHEN I TURNED THE SHIP OVER TO ENSIGN BIVERSE JUST BEFORE BEING PUT INTO THE BOAT, I DID SO WITH THE IDEA THAT HE WAS THE ONLY ABLE BODIED OFFICER LEFT WHO COULD REMAIN BEHIND AND INSURE THAT EVERY PERSON HAD BEEN REMOVED. I NEVER RELINQUISHED COMMAND ALTHOUGH I WAS UNABLE TO BE IN MORE THAN ONE PART OF THE SHIP ON ACCOUNT OF MY PHYSICAL CONDITION. LIEUTENANT ANGERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WITH GREAT COURAGE AND PERSEVERANCE MAINTAINED THE FIRE OF ALL OUR MACHINE GUNS; ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN BADLY WOUNDED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IN THE THROAT, AND LATER IN THE ARM AND BOTH HANDS. HE WAS ABLE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP HIS FEET AND MAINTAINED ACTIVE CHARGE.

15. AS ALREADY MENTIONED I HAD MY MEN ABANDON SHIP IN THE ORDER OF THE WORST WOUNDED. FIRST I SENT THE BOATS TO THE NEAREST LAND WHICH WAS COVERED BY HIGH REEDS. I TOLD THE MEN THAT AFTER THEY REACHED THE BEACH THEY WERE TO GET IN SHORE AND HIDE IN THE REEDS WITHOUT HOWEVER GETTING TOO FAR SEPARATED. AFTER GETTING ALL THE MEN OFF THE SHIP AND ON THE BEACH WE FOUND TWO JAPANESE PLANES FLYING FAIRLY LOW OVERHEAD APPARENTLY LOOKING FOR THE PANAY SURVIVORS. THE REEDS HOWEVER APPARENTLY AFFORDED US SUFFICIENT COVER TO REMAIN UNSEEN. THESE PLANES SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED, BUT SHORTLY LATER COMING ATTACKS WERE MADE ON THE TWO STANDARD OIL VESSELS, WHICH WERE BY NOW BEACHED ON THE BANK OPPOSITE US. THE THIRD STANDARD OIL VESSEL HAD ALREADY BEEN SUNK BY BOMBS.
16. MY PLAN FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHIPS COMPANY TO THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE US NAVY WAS TO HAVE EVERYONE REMAIN UNDER COVER NEAR WHERE
WE HAD LANDED UNTIL AFTER DARK; THEN HAVE THE WORST WOUNDED LOADED ON
BOARD A STANDARD OIL LAUNCH, WHICH WAS NEAR AND HAD BEEN ABANDONED BY
HER NATIVE CREW, AND TOWED AROUND TO THE MAINLAND. A SMALL SCOUTING
PARTY WHICH HAD BEEN SENT OUT TO CHECK UP ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL SPOT ON
WHICH WE HAD LANDED REPORTED TO ME THAT WE WERE ON AN ISLAND.

17. LIEUTENANT ARTHUR E. ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WAS
BY THIS TIME BADLY WEAKENED FROM LOSS OF BLOOD, AND LIEUTENANT (JC)
GEIST WAS ALSO BADLY WOUNDED IN THE LEG. ENsign BIERSE HAD ESCAPED
ACTUAL INJURY BUT WAS SUFFERING SOMEWHAT FROM SHOCK. I FELT THAT UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR URGENT CONDITION AND POSITION THAT I SHOULD
UTILIZE THE EXPERIENCE AND MATURE JUDGEMENT OF CAPTAIN FRANK N. ROBERTS,
US ARMY, THE ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CHINA,
WHO HAD COME ON BOARD AT HANKING. HE HAD ESCAPED INJURY AND WAS MOST
ANXIOUS AS AN OFFICER TO ASSIST ME IN ANY WAY. HIS ABILITY TO SPEAK
CHINESE WAS ALSO A VALUABLE FACTOR. I THEREFORE APPOINTED HIM AS MY
IMMEDIATE REPRESENTATIVE TO TAKE ACTIVE PHYSICAL CHARGE UNDER MY DIRECTION,
AND SUCH ORDERS AS HE GAVE WERE AFTER CONSULTATION WITH ME AND BY
MY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION. I ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE GRATEFULLY THE KIND AND
EFFICIENT ASSISTANCE OF MR. ATCHESON. IN THE SAME WAY IT IS MY GRATEFUL
DUTY TO ADD THAT CAPTAIN ROBERTS SERVICES WERE ABSOLUTELY INVALUABLE AND
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO EXPRESS MY FULL APPRECIATION OF THEM. I AM
SURE THAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE PARTY WOULD AGREE THAT HIS EFFICIENCY,
KINDNESS, AND TACT AND HIS EXPERIENCE IN HANDLING AN OPERATION OF THIS
NATURE ON SHORE GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO OUR FINAL ESCAPE. MR. ATCHESON,
WHO ALSO SPEAKS CHINESE, AGREED AT MY REQUEST TO REMAIN WITH THE PARTY
TO FACILITATE DEALINGS WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS.

18. AT ABOUT 1715 THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY, MR. J.
HALL PAXTON WHO ALSO SPEAKS CHINESE, LEFT OUR PARTY AT MY REQUEST TO TRY
TO GET A MESSAGE THROUGH EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH TO THE AMERI-
CAN AMBASSADOR AT HANKOW INFORMING HIM OF OUR PLIGHT.
19. As already mentioned, after dark all able-bodied men tracked the launch carrying the wounded around the little island on which we had found ourselves close to the mainland. In the meantime Mr. Paxton who had gone on ahead sent back coolie carriers from the first village and they carried our wounded there. At this village we engaged more coolies and set out for the next village inland Hoshien, which was 5 miles away and 3 miles inland from the river bank. My plan was to travel by night and hide by day. When we arrived at Hoshien about midnight we were received and treated with the greatest kindness by the magistrate and all the Chinese there, and were quartered in the hospital where we remained throughout the daylight period. On Monday, 13 December, ensign storekeeper first class, and Mr. Sandro Sandri, Italian journalist, died from their injuries while we were there.

20. At dark that evening 13 December, we set out for the next town inland Han Shan by junks which Captain Roberts had engaged. It was while we were at Han Shan approximately 12 miles inland from the left north bank that I received word of the American and British gunboats which had been sent to assist us, and of the presence of a Japanese gunboat to guarantee us safety from further attacks. The magistrate and the Chinese residents of the second village were just as helpful as those of the first finding the party, and rendering medical aid they were willing to have us in spite of the fact that they thought as we did, that our presence among them would draw down bombing attacks from the Japanese planes.

21. We left Han Shan about 1200 on 14 December in the same junks in which we had arrived and reached the Yangtze River about 2145 that night. The entire party was on board the USS CAHU and HMS LADYBIRD by 2130 15 December.

22. All the passengers who were on board the Panay were there at their own request. I do not know what losses of personnel property they may have sustained other than their cameras and what was contained in their travelling bags except in the case of Mr. Paxton, who had previously turned over to me a locked brief case which I had hidden beneath my bunk; the nature of the contents of which I was not informed. Mr. Paxton had also given me for safe keeping a valuable Chinese vase.
MESSRS. ATCHESON, PAXTON, AND CASSIE AND CAPTAIN ROBERTS HAD, I BELIEVE, ONE OR MORE TRUNKS APiece.

23. I HAVE NO COMPLAINT TO MAKE REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF ANY OFFICER OR ENLISTED MAN OR ANY PASSENGER. IN MY OPINION EVERYONE ACTED WITH FINE COURAGE AND INITIATIVE. I CONSIDER THAT THE ACTION OF MY OFFICERS AND CREW IN ATTEMPTING TO RETURN THE FIRE, RENDERING FIRST AID, SAFELY EVACUATING ALL PERSONNEL, TRANSPORTATING THE WOUNDED, KEEPING TOGETHER, AND RETURNING AS ONE PARTY WITH THE DEAD AND WOUNDED IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THEIR COURAGE, DISCIPLINE, AND FORTITUDE. I KEENLY REGRET THAT MY OWN INJURY PREVENTED ME FROM OBSERVING INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF COURAGEOUS CONDUCT OF WHICH I FEEL CERTAIN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVERY OFFICER AND MAN PERFORMED BOTH WHILE ON BOARD SHIP AND DURING THE SUBSEQUENT TRAVELLING ASHORE. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY, AND GRATEFUL FOR, THE HIGH MORALE AND CHEERFUL AND FAITHFUL MANNER IN WHICH MY OFFICERS AND MEN ASSISTED ONE ANOTHER. I DEEM IT MY DUTY HOWEVER TO COMMENT PARTICULARLY UPON THE COOL AND COURAGEOUS CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT ARTHUR F. ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WHO THOUGH WOUNDED IN SEVERAL PLACES, UNABLE TO SPEAK, AND SUFFERING SEVERE LOSS OF BLOOD; KEPT HIS FEET, DIRECTED THE FIRE, AND SUPERVISED THE ABANDON SHIP. HIS CONDUCT WAS AN INSPIRATION TO ALL HANDS. I ALSO CONSIDER THAT LIEUTENANT CLARK G. GRAZIER, MEDICAL CORPS, US NAVY, THE ONLY DOCTOR WHO WAS FORTUNATELY NOT WOUNDED DISPLAYED COOLNESS, ABILITY, AND RESOURCEFULNESS WITH HIS TREATMENT OF THE MANY WOUNDED; BOTH WHILE UNDER FIRE ABOARD SHIP AND UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS ASHORE. HIS UNTIRING EFFORTS AND PROFESSIONAL SKILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO REDUCE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INJURIES.

24. THE CASUALTIES TO PERSONNEL SUSTAINED ON BOARD THE PANAY OR IN OPEN SAMPANS AFTER ABANDONING SHIP WERE AS FOLLOWS: DEAD: CHARLES L. ENGVIUGER STOREKEEPER FIRST CLASS, EDGAR G. HULBERG COXSWAIN, MR. SANDRO SANRI ITALIAN JOURNALIST; SERIOUSLY INJURED: JAMES J. HUGHES LIEUT. COMMANDER, ARTHUR F. ANDERS, LIEUT., JOHN W. GEIST LIEUT. (US), JOHN H. LANG CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, CARL H BIRK ELECTRICIANS MATE FIRST CLASS, ALEX KOZAK MACHINISTS MATE SECOND CLASS, PERES D. ZIGLER SHIPS COOK THIRD CLASS, NEWTON L. DAVIS FIREMAN FIRST CLASS; MINOR INJURIES:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>TRANSMITTER</th>
<th>FRACTION</th>
<th>TRANSMITTER</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td></td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.L.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.L.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.B.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.J.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.J.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;P&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;P&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;U&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;U&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;U&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;U&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;X&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;X&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FREQUENCY MULTS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>INITI</th>
<th>SHIFT TO</th>
<th>NO. ENG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PAGE ELEVEN

CHARLES S. ADAMS RADIOMAN SECOND CLASS, TONY BARBA SHIPS COOK THIRD CLASS,
JOHN A. BONKOSKI GUNNERS MATE THIRD CLASS, ERNEST C. BRANCH FIREMAN FIRST
CLASS, RAYMOND L. BROWNING ELECTRICIANS MATE THIRD CLASS, WALTER CHEATHAM
COXSWAIN, THOMAS A COLEMAN CHIEF PHARMACISTS MATE, JOHN A. DIRNHOFER
SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, YUAN T. ERH MESS ATTENDANT FIRST CLASS, FRED C.
FICHTENMAYER CARPENTERS MATE FIRST CLASS, EVERY F. FISHER CHIEF WATERTENDER,
MICHAEL GERENT MACHINISTS MATE SECOND CLASS, CECIL B. GREEN
SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, JOHN L. HODGE FIREMAN FIRST CLASS, DON B. HUFFMAN
WATERTENDER SECOND CLASS, H. JOHNSON MACHINISTS MATE SECOND CLASS, H.
KERSKE COXSWAIN, PETER H. KLUMPERS CHIEF MACHINISTS MATE, WILLIAM P.
LANDER SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, ERNEST R. MAHLMANN CHIEF BOATSWAIN MATE,
WILLIAM A. McCABE FIREMAN FIRST CLASS, STANLEY W. MCEWEN SEAMAN FIRST
CLASS, JAMES H. PECK QUARTERMASTER SECOND CLASS, REGINALD P. PETERSON
RADIOMAN SECOND CLASS, VERNON F. PICKETT CHIEF MACHINISTS MATE, KING
F. SONG MESS ATTENDANT FIRST CLASS, HARRY B. TUCK SEAMAN FIRST CLASS,
CLEO E. WAXLER BOATSWAIN MATE SECOND CLASS, JOHN T. WEBER YEOMAN FIRST
CLASS, ROBERT R. HEGARD FIREMAN FIRST CLASS, KENNETH J. RICE ELECTRICIANS
MATE THIRD CLASS, CHARLES S. SCHROYER SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, FAR Z. WONG MESS
ATTENDANT FIRST CLASS, CLARK G. Grazier Lieut (JC), DENNIS H. BIVERBE
ENSIGN. THE FOLLOWING CIVILIANS PASSENGERS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED: EMILE
GASTIE EMBASSY CLERK, JAMES MARSHALL COLLIERS CORRESPONDENT; MINOR INJURIES:
J. HALL PAXTON SECOND SECRETARY, ROY SQUIRES CHINA IMPORTING AND EXPORTING.
FOLLOWING CIVILIANS ON BOARD MEIPING MINOR INJURIES, F.H. VINES BRITISH
AMERICAN TOBACCO; FOLLOWING CIVILIANS ON BOARD MEINSHA DEAD, C.H. CARLSON
MASTER.

SIGNED JAMES J. HUGHES.

COURT OF INQUIRY HAS FINISHED TAKING TESTIMONY. AS SOON AS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IS RECEIVED FINDINGS WILL BE FORWARD BY RADIO
IN PLAIN LANGUAGE.
FOLLOWING REPORT IN FULL FROM COMMANDING OFFICER PANAY, FORWARDEDApproved
BY CINCAF:-

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PANAY
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
VIA THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF US ASIATIC FLEET

SUBJECT: USS PANAY, THE LOSS OF BY SINKING AS A RESULT OF BOMBSING BY
JAPANESE PLANES, 12 DECEMBER, 1937.

REFERENCE: (A) ART. 640 - US NAVY REGS, 1929
(B) ART. 641 - US NAVY REGS, 1929

1. ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1937, THE USS PANAY WAS OPERATING UNDER
THE ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL, AND AT THAT TIME, WAS ANCHORED
ABOUT FIFTEEN MILES ABOVE NANKING, ACTING AS A REFUGE FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS
AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE SHIP WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE STANDARD
OIL TANKERS MEIPING, MEISHIA, MEIAN, AND MISCELLANEOUS STANDARD OIL
LAUNCHES AND JUNKS. THE LATEST ORDERS FROM THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL TO
THE COMMANDING OFFICER WERE RECEIVED THE DAY BEFORE DESPATCH, AND SAID
THE COMMANDING OFFICER WAS TO HAVE COMPLETE DISCRETION IN MOVING THE SHIP
UP, OR DOWN THE RIVER.

2. THE SHIP WAS IDENTIFIED AS AN AMERICAN VESSEL BY TWO LARGE HORIZONTAL
FLAGS, ONE SPREAD OVER THE FORWARD TOP DECK, AND ONE OVER THE AFTER
TOP DECK- BOTH CLEARLY VISIBLE FROM THE AIR AT ANY ANGLE. EACH OF THESE
FLAGS MEASURED ABOUT EIGHTEEN FEET IN LENGTH, AND ABOUT FOURTEEN FEET IN
WIDTH, AND HAD BEEN FRESHLY REPAINTED. IN ADDITION, TO THESE TWO FLAGS, AND
ON ACCOUNT OF THE EMERGENCY CONDITION EXISTING, THE PANAY HAD BEEN FLYING
HER LARGEST ENSIGN AT THE GAFF BOTH NIGHT AND DAY, WHETHER UNDERWAY OR AT
ANCHOR; ALL ENSIGNS, BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL, WERE BRIGHTLY ILLUMINATED
ALL NIGHT.

3. AT 0814 I OBSERVED ARTILLERY SHELLS FALLING IN THE RIVER ABOUT
FOUR HUNDRED YARDS OFF OUR STARBOARD BEAM, PRESUMABLY FROM JAPANESE ART-
ILLERY ALTHOUGH THE BATTERIES WERE NOT VISIBLE. AT 0825 I GOT THE PANAY
UNDERWAY FOR UPSTREAM TO CLEAR OF THIS FIRING, AND SIGNALLED THE CONVOY
TO FOLLOW. AT 0843 THE PANAY WENT ALONGSIDE HMS CRICKETT TO TRANSFER AN
INJURED CHINESE EMPLOYEE OF THE ASIATIC PETROLEUM COMPANY. AT THE SAME TIME
I ADVISED LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JIM ARDDY, ROYAL NAVY, COMMANDING HMS CRICK-
ETT; OF MY REASONS FOR MOVING UPSTREAM.
4. At 9940, having resumed our journey, the Panay at the head of the column, followed in the order named by the Weiping, Meihsia and Meian. Two groups of Japanese soldiers were sighted on the left bank (north); they waved hand flags at the Panay and seemed to want to communicate with us. Accordingly, the Panay move to, and a Japanese armed tender came along-side carrying Lieutenant Shigeyo Murakami and about ninety men, most of whom were armed with machine guns. Lieutenant Anders, my executive officer, met this officer at the gangway as he stepped on board, accompanied by his sword bearer and two privates with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Anders informed me that the officer desired to speak to me, so I turned the conn over to Lieutenant Anders and went to the gangway. I was aware of the fact that it was improper for the armed orderlies of this officer to accompany him on board but considered that he probably did not know the correct procedure, and that it was proper for me to overlook the matter in this connection. I had special verbal orders from the commander Yangtze patrol not to be too sensitive about points of naval etiquette when dealing with the Japanese military, and above all, to use my judgement in avoiding such complications as might arise. Lieutenant Murakami asked me where the Panay was going, and I said to a point upriver twenty-eight miles from Nanking. He then asked why we were going there, to which I replied, "To keep clear of artillery fire." He asked me about the three standard oil ships, and I informed him that they were American ships under my protection. His next question was about the Chinese troops holding solidly, to which I said that the United States was friendly to both Japan and China, and therefore I could not give him any information about the Chinese army. This conversation was witnessed by Second Secretary Mr. George Atcheson, Junior of the American Embassy, Nanking, China. Lieutenant Murakami then invited me to repay his call ashore, which invitation I respectfully declined. At 9953 the Japanese tender cleared the side.

5. At 9954 the Panay again resumed her way up the river. At 1100 I anchored the Panay at a point twenty miles upriver from Nanking, and about two hundred and twenty-one miles above Woosung, in a broad, open space in the river. My reasons for anchoring there was simply to keep out of the way of the contending armies; this location seemed highly desirable. We were easily visible especially accompanied as we were by three standard oil tankers for miles around, on every side, it seemed unlikely that any troops would try to cross the river in our vicinity. In selecting this spot, I
had in mind not only the safety of the Panay and the evacuees whom she was carrying, but also the safety and well being of the American ships in the convoy, and their personnel. Immediately upon anchoring, I posted sentry lookouts for airplanes and troop movements. At 13:15 I allowed a party of about eight men to visit the Meiping nearby for a glass of beer. These men were still on board the Meiping when the attack started, and were, therefore, unable to return to the ship.

6. At about 1327 the lookout called down that two planes were in sight about fifteen thousand feet. The weather was clear with good visibility and no wind. The planes were clearly visible despite their altitude which may not have been as reported to me; at that time I had no idea whatsoever that the planes intended to attack us. About this time I went up to the bridge with CQM John Lang in order to keep a better lookout for further plane approaches. About 1329 I looked out the door of the bridge to pick up again the two planes I had originally seen, and was astonished to discover that both were rapidly losing altitude in a direction toward us. Almost immediately they appeared to go into power dives. Lang and I both stepped inside the bridge, and almost immediately, a bomb seemed to strike directly over our heads, ripping a big hole in the roof of the bridge. I lost consciousness for what must have been only a minute or two; when I came to, I discovered myself on the deck of the bridge, badly stunned with my head covered with blood, and my right leg painfully injured at the hip making it impossible for me to rise to my feet. A hole had also been broken in the deck of the bridge near where Lang and I had been standing. I asked Lang if he were injured, to which he replied, "No, sir." Not being able to determine the extent of the damage from the inside of the bridge, which was completely wrecked, I asked him to put a life jacket on me and help me down to the ship's galley which is on the main deck, and a good central point from which to direct operations. Before I was able to reach the galley, which involved a slow process on account of my disabling wound, I heard the Panay's machine guns firing, and realized that the crew was carrying on, probably under the immediate direction of Lieutenant Anders, my executive officer. At the galley I sent Lang, CQM, to notify all officers that I was in the galley, incapacitated, and to tell the engineer officer, Lieutenant (JG) Geist to let me know if we were taking water, and also if
WE COULD GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY. ABOUT THIS TIME I NOTICED MR. J. HALL PAXTON, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CHINA, ONE OF THE PASSENGERS, STANDING ON DECK JUST OUTSIDE OF THE GALLEY. I ASKED HIM TO PLEASE COME IN AND HOLD ME UP WHICH HE VERY KINDLY DID, REMAINING WITH ME THEREAFTER.

7. FROM THEN ON PLANES BOMBED US CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL ABOUT 1425. THEY APPEARED TO BE ATTACKING US IN RELAYS OF TWO OR THREE EACH, THE FIRST GROUP THAT CAME OVER, GIVE-BOMBER FROM A CONSIDERABLE ALTITUDE WHICH KEPT THEM BEYOND RANGE OF OUR LEWIS MACHINE GUNS. LATER WHEN THE PANAY WAS VISIBLY SMASHED-UP, THEY CAME MUCH CLOSER, AND NOT ONLY LET GO THEIR BOMBS FROM LOW ALTITUDES OF PERHAPS ONE OR TWO HUNDRED FEET, BUT ALSO MACHINE-GUNNED OUR DECKS, FIRING AS THEY CAME DOWN DIVING. I DISTINCTLY HEARD THEIR GUNS WHICH HAD A DIFFERENT SOUND FROM THE PANAY'S. I WAS INFORMED AT THE TIME THAT THE PLANES WERE JAPANESE NAVY PLANES, IDENTIFIED BY THEIR CHARACTERISTIC RED CIRCLE. ACCORDING TO MY RECKONING, THE PANAY MUST HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT TWENTY FOUR DIRECT HITS; I COULD NOT BELIEVE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SMALL SHIP TO RECEIVE SUCH DAMAGE AND STILL FLOAT. I WAS INFORMED LATER THAT THE FIRST BOMB WHICH DISABLED ME, ALSO PUT THE FORWARD THREE INCH GUN AND THE RADIO ROOM OUT OF ACTION, AND BROUGHT DOWN THE FOREMAST.

8. AT 1358 THE SHIP APPEARED TO BE SETTLING QUITE FAST. MEANWHILE, BEFORE THE ENGINEER OFFICER COULD REACH ME TO GIVE ME A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF OUR PROPELLING MACHINERY, I THOUGHT I HEARD A SHARP RUSH OF STEAM ESCAPING FROM OUR STEAMING BOILER. A MINUTE OR TWO AFTER THAT, ENSIGN DIWVERSE, THE COMMUNICATION OFFICER, CAME INTO THE GALLEY AND STATED THAT THE SHIP WAS PLAINLY SINKING, AND ASKED IF HE SHOULD THROW OVERBOARD THE CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS. I TOLD HIM TO GET THEM ALL OVERBOARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE DID HIS UTMOST TO THROW THE CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET PAPERS OVERBOARD, BUT DID NOT COMPLETE THE WORK BECAUSE OF THE REPEATED BOMBING WHICH SEEMED TO BE FOCUSED IN THE VICINITY OF THE RADIOROOM. I ALSO TOLD HIM TO SEND A SECOND MESSENGER FOR LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST, THE ENGINEER OFFICER. LIEUTENANT GEIST REPORTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND SAID WE COULD NOT GET UNDERWAY BECAUSE THE STEAMING BOILER HAD BEEN RUPTURED. I THEREUPON TOLD HIM TO PUT THE HOMELITE PUMPS ON THOSE COMPARTMENTS WHICH SEEMED TO BE FILLING FASTEST. ENSIGN DIWVERSE RETURNED A FEW MINUTES LATER TO STATE THAT ALL THE HOMELITE PUMPS HAD BEEN WRECKED BY BOMBS.

9. ABOUT THIS TIME SOMEONE INFORMED ME THAT WE APPEARED TO BE IN DAN-
GER OF BEING RUN DOWN BY ONE OF THE SOCONY VESSELS. I GOT MR. PAXTON TO CARRY ME TO THE DOOR OF THE GALLEY, AND FROM WHAT I COULD SEE, I SUPPOSED THAT THE VESSEL WAS ATTEMPTING TO COME ALONGSIDE THE PANAY, PROBABLY TO TAKE OFF OUR PERSONNEL. ABOUT THAT INSTANT ANOTHER STORM OF BOMBS FELL BOTH ON THE PANAY AND THE SOCONY SHIP; THE LATTER THEN ABANDONED HER ATTEMPT TO HELP THE PANAY. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT ATTACKING PLANES CONCENTRATED ALMOST ALL THEIR EFFORTS ON THE PANAY DURING AT LEAST THE FIRST HALF HOUR.

10. THEN, BY 1440, IT SEEMED UNLIKELY TO ME THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO SAVE THE SHIP. ABOUT 1442 ENSIGN BIWERSE RETURNED AND SAID HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD ABANDON SHIP, ESPECIALLY AS HE THOUGHT THE JOB WOULD TAKE SOME TIME WITH ONLY TWO SMALL BOATS. ACCORDINGLY, I GAVE THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP, AND TO START BY SENDING THE WORST WOUNDED ASHORE FIRST. BOATS CONTAINED ONLY WOUNDED EXCEPT FOR THE BOATS CREWS, CBM MAHLMANN, AND SEVERAL OF THE CREW THAT HAD NOT BEEN INJURED. THEN CAME TO THE GALLEY TO PUT ME IN THE FIRST BOAT. I PROTESTED AGAINST LEAVING THE SHIP AT THIS TIME, AND WAS MOST UNWILLING TO DO SO; BUT, IT APPEARED THAT THEY DID NOT HEED MY PROTEST BECAUSE OF MY CONDITION. WITH MR. PAXTON'S ASSISTANCE THEY CARRIED ME DOWN THE DECK, AND LAID ME FLAT ON MY FACE ACROSS THE BOW OF THE MOTOR SAMPan.

11. JUST BEFORE LEAVING THE SHIP, I TOLD ENSIGN BIWERSE TO REMAIN ON BOARD, TELLING LIEUTENANT ANDERS AND THE OTHER OFFICERS THAT I WAS BEING TAKEN ASHORE, AND THAT IF THE ATTACK SHOULD CEASE, I WANTED ENSIGN BIWERSE TO REMAIN ON BOARD WITH A SMALL DETAIL OF ABOUT SIX UNINJURED MEN TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO KEEP THE SHIP FROM GOING DOWN. AND THAT IN ANY CASE, ENSIGN BIWERSE AND HIS DETAIL WERE TO BE THE LAST TO LEAVE. I KNEW AT THAT TIME THAT ENSIGN BIWERSE WAS THE ONLY UNINJURED OFFICER, ALTHOUGH SUFFERING FROM SHOCK, AND HAVING MOST OF HIS CLOTHES BLOWN OFF, AND BELIEVED THAT LIEUTENANT ANDERS AND LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST WERE SUFFICIENTLY INJURED TO JUSTIFY THEIR LEAVING THE SHIP BEFORE THE LAST BOATLOAD. ENSIGN BIWERSE LATER REPORTED TO ME ASHORE THAT EVERYBODY WAS OFF THE SHIP, INCLUDING ALL THE PASSENGERS, AND THAT HE HAD NOT REMAINED BEHIND WITH HIS DETAIL BECAUSE HE WAS CONVINCED THE SHIP MIGHT SINK AT ANY MINUTE, AND FURTHERMORE, THAT THE BOMBING PLANES MIGHT RETURN. I APPROVED HIS ACTION IN LEAVING THE SHIP AS IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SAVE HER. AFTER ARRIVING ON SHORE, I WAS INFORMED BOTH THE MOTOR SAMPan AND PULL-
INC SANFAN HAD BEEN MACHINE GUNNED BY THE ATTACKING PLANES. SOMETIME THEREAFTER I HEARD THE SOUND OF A MOTOR LAUNCH IN THE RIVER CLOSE TO WHERE WE WERE HIDDEN IN THE REEDS; THE LAUNCH STAYED IN OUR VICINITY A FEW MINUTES AND THE LEFT. I CANNOT SAY WHETHER OR NOT THEY ATTEMPTED TO SEARCH FOR US BECAUSE I WAS KEEPING MY MEN OUT OF SIGHT AND HAD DELIBERATELY LEFT NO DEBRIS ON THE BEACH BY WHICH WE COULD BE TRAANCED. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS A SECOND LAUNCH PASSED; MEANWHILE WHEN I DISCOVERED THAT THE SHIP WAS STILL AFLOAT, I SENT FOR ENsign DIVERSE AND TOLD HIM TO TAKE THE MOTOR SANFAN AND CROSS THE RIVER TO WHERE THE STANDARD OIL VESSELS HAD BEEN REACHED IN ORDER TO TRY TO GET STANDARD OIL LAUNCHES TO TAKE THE PANAY IN TOW AND BEACH HER. AT THIS TIME I EXPLAINED TO ENsign DIVERSE THAT I WANTED HIM TO CONSIDER HIMSELF AS BEING IN COMMAND OF THE HULK AND THE OPERATIONS TO MOVE HER, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JAPANESE LAUNCHES MENTIONED THIS OPERATION WAS NOT CARRIED OUT AS WE ALL FELT THAT AN EFFORT WAS BEING MADE TO EXTERMINATE US.

12. ABOUT THIS TIME THE PLANES STARTED BOMBING THE STANDARD OIL VESSELS. AT 1425 THEY CEASED BOMBING THE PANAY ALTOGETHER WHICH AT THAT TIME APPEARED LIKELY TO SINK AT ANY MOMENT; IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THE BOMBING PLANES FIRST CONCENTRATED THEIR ATTACK ON THE PANAY. IT WAS WHILE THEY WERE BOMBING THE PANAY THAT TWO OF THE STANDARD OIL VESSELS WERE ABLE TO GET UNDERWAY AND BEACH THEMSELVES.

13. WITH ONLY TWO SMALL BOATS AVAILABLE IT TOOK MANY RETURN TRIPS TO TAKE ALL THE PERSONNEL OFF THE SHIP; STARTING AT 1445 WE COMPLETED THE OPERATIONS AT A LITTLE AFTER 1530. SOMETIME BEFORE THE SHIP SANK I HEARD THE RATTLE OF MACHINE GUNS AND WAS INFORMED THAT AN ARMED JAPANESE BOAT WAS FIRING ON THE PANAY. I WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAT THIS BOAT HAD PUT SEVERAL MEN ON BOARD WHO REMAINED ONLY A FEW MINUTES AND THEN LEFT. I WAS SHORTLY INFORMED THAT THE SHIP SANK WITH HER COLORS STILL FLYING AT 1534 TURNING OVER TO STARBOARD.

14. WHILE ON BOARD THE ROAR OF THE BOMB EXPLOSIONS AND THE PIECES OF DEBRIS FLYING AROUND MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP ANY WRITTEN RECORD OF THE VARIOUS HITS, THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED, OR THE INJURIES TO PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO PANIC. THE ORDERS I GAVE WERE CARRIED OUT EXACTLY. THE SHIP HAD THE NORMAL YANGTZE GUNBOAT GENERAL QUARTERS STATION BILL; WE HAD SPECIAL DETAILS FOR AIR DEFENSE WHICH INVOLVED USING ONLY OUR MACHINE GUNS IN ORDER TO AVOID OPENING
THE HATCHES LEADING TO THE THREE INCH MAGAZINES. I WANTED TO PREVENT HAVING THE SHIP BLOWN UP BY HER OWN THREE INCH POWDER. THE PANAY ALSO HAD AN ABANDON SHIP BILL; MY REASON FOR GIVING THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP WAS THAT I OBSERVED THAT SHE WAS SETTLING DOWN BY THE HEAD TO STARBOARD, AND IT WAS REPORTED TO ME AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED THAT SHE MIGHT SINK AT ANY MINUTED. I FELT MY NEXT DUTY, IF I COULD NOT SAVE THE SHIP, WAS TO SAVE THE LIVES OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE CREW AND PASSENGERS. THE HULL HAD MANY HOLES WHEN ABANDONED AND WAS SHIPPING WATER RATHER RAPIDLY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY TO BEACH HER BECAUSE HER STEAMING BOILER HAD BEEN RUPTURED. ALTHOUGH I WAS TAKEN ASHORE IN ONE OF THE FIRST BOATS WITH THE BADLY WOUNDED I CONSIDERED MYSELF IN COMMAND OF THE SHIP AND CREW THROUOUT; AND WHEN I TURNED THE SHIP OVER TO ENSIGN SIVERSE JUST BEFORE BEING PUT INTO THE BOAT, I DID SO WITH THE IDEA THAT HE WAS THE ONLY ABLE BODIED OFFICER LEFT WHO COULD REMAIN BEHIND AND INSURE THAT EVERY PERSON HAD BEEN REMOVED. I NEVER RELINQUISHED COMMAND ALTHOUGH I WAS UNABLE TO BE IN MORE THAN ONE PART OF THE SHIP ON ACCOUNT OF MY PHYSICAL CONDITION. LIEUTENANT ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WITH GREAT COURAGE AND PERSEVERANCE MAINTAINED THE FIRE OF ALL OUR MACHINE GUNS; ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN BADLY WOUNDED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IN THE THROAT, AND LATER IN THE ARM AND BOTH HANDS. HE WAS ABLE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP HIS FEET AND MAINTAINED ACTIVE CHARGE.

15. AS ALREADY MENTIONED I HAD MY MEN ABANDON SHIP IN THE ORDER OF THE WORST WOUNDED. FIRST I SENT THE BOATS TO THE NEAREST LAND WHICH WAS COVERED BY HIGH REEDS. I TOLD THE MEN THAT AFTER THEY REACHED THE BEACH THEY WERE TO GET IN SHORE AND HIDE IN THE REEDS WITHOUT HOWEVER GETTING TOO FAR SEPARATED. AFTER GETTING ALL THE MEN OFF THE SHIP AND ON THE BEACH WE FOUND TWO JAPANESE PLANES FLYING FAIRLY LOW OVERHEAD APPARENTLY LOOKING FOR THE PANAY SURVIVORS. THE REEDS HOWEVER APPARENTLY AFFORDED US SUFFICIENT COVER TO REMAIN UNSEEN. THESE PLANES SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED, BUT SHORTLY LATER BOMBING ATTACKS WERE MADE ON THE TWO STANDARD OIL VESSELS, WHICH WERE BY NOW BEACHED ON THE BANK OPPOSITE US. THE THIRD STANDARD OIL VESSEL HAD ALREADY BEEN SUNK BY BOMBS.
16. My plan for the return of the ships company to the jurisdiction of the US Navy was to have everyone remain under cover near where we had landed until after dark; then have the worst wounded loaded on board a standard oil launch, which was near and had been abandoned by her native crew, and towed around to the mainland. A small scouting party which had been sent out to check up on the geographical spot on which we had landed reported to me that we were on an island.

17. Lieutenant Arthur E. Anders, my executive officer, was by this time badly weakened from loss of blood, and Lieutenant (JG) Geist was also badly wounded in the leg. Ensign Biwerse had escaped actual injury but was suffering somewhat from shock. I felt that under the circumstances of our urgent condition and position that I should utilize the experience and mature judgment of Captain Frank N. Roberts, US Army, the assistant military attaché to the American Embassy in China, who had come on board at Nanking. He had escaped injury and was most anxious as an officer to assist me in any way. His ability to speak Chinese was also a valuable factor. I therefore appointed him as my immediate representative to take active physical charge under my direction, and such orders as he gave were after consultation with me and by my authority and direction. I also acknowledge gratefully the kind and efficient assistance of Mr. Atcheson. In the same way it is my grateful duty to add that Captain Roberts services were absolutely invaluable and it is impossible for me to express my full appreciation of them. I am sure that every member of the party would agree that his efficiency, kind-ness, and tact and his experience in handling an operation of this nature on shore greatly contributed to our final escape. Mr. Atcheson, who also speaks Chinese, agreed at my request to remain with the party to facilitate dealings with Chinese officials.

18. At about 1715 the second secretary of the Embassy, Mr. J. Hall Paxton who also speaks Chinese, left our party at my request to try to get a message through either by telephone or telegraph to the American Ambassador at Hankow informing him of our flight.
19. As already mentioned after dark all able-bodied men tracked the launch carrying the wounded around the little island on which we had found ourselves close to the mainland. In the meantime Mr. Paxton who had gone on ahead sent back coolie carriers from the first village and they carried our wounded there. At this village we engaged more coolies and set out for the next village inland Hoshien, which was 5 miles away and 3 miles inland from the river bank. My plan was to travel by night and hide by day. When we arrived at Hoshien about midnight we were received and treated with the greatest kindness by the magistrate and all the Chinese there, and were quartered in the hospital where we remained throughout the daylight period. On Monday, 13 December, Ensinger Storekeeper first class, and Mr. Sandro Sandri, Italian journalist, died from their injuries while we were there.

20. At dark that evening 13 December, we set out for the next town inland Hanshan by junks which Captain Roberts had engaged. It was while we were at Hanshan approximately 12 miles inland from the left north bank that I received word of the American and British gunboats which had been sent to assist us, and of the presence of a Japanese gunboat to guarantee us safety from further attacks. The magistrate and the Chinese residents of the second village were just as helpful as those of the first finding the party, and rendering medical aid they were willing to have us in spite of the fact that they thought as we did, that our presence among them would draw down bombing attacks from the Japanese planes.

21. We left Hanshan about 1230 on 14 December in the same junks in which we had arrived and reached the Yangtze River about 2145 that night. The entire party was on board the USS Oahu and HMS Ladybird by 0100 15 December.

22. All the passengers who were on board the Panay were there at their own request. I do not know what losses of personnel property they may have sustained other than their cameras and what was contained in their travelling bags except in the case of Mr. Paxton, who had previously turned over to me a locked brief case which I had hidden beneath my bunk; the nature of the contents of which I was not informed. Mr. Paxton had also given me for safe keeping a valuable Chinese vase.
ESSRS. ATCHESON, PAXTON, AND CASSÉ AND CAPTAIN ROBERTS HAD, I BELIEVE, ONE OR MORE TRunks APiece.

23. I HAVE NO COMPLAINT TO MAKE REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF ANY OFFICER OR ENLISTED MAN OR ANY PASSENGER. IN MY OPINION EVERYONE ACTED WITH FINE COURAGE AND INITIATIVE. I CONSIDER THAT THE ACTION OF MY OFFICERS AND CREW IN ATTEMPTING TO RETURN THE FIRE, RENDERING FIRST AID, SAFELY EVACUATING ALL PERSONNEL, TRANSPORTATm THE WOUNDED, KEEPING TOGETHER, AND RETURNING AS ONE PARTY WITH THE DEAD AND WOUNDED IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THEIR COURAGE, DISCIPLINE, AND FORTITUDE. I KEENLY REGRET THAT MY OWN INJURY PREVENTED ME FROM OBSERVING INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF COURAGEOUS CONDUCT OF WHICH I FEEL CERTAIN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVERY OFFICER AND MAN PERFORMED BOTH WHILE ON BOARD SHIP AND DURING THE SUBSEQUENT TRAVELING ASHORE. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY, AND GRATEFUL FOR, THE HIGH MORALE AND CHEERFUL AND FAITHFUL MANNER IN WHICH MY OFFICERS AND MEN ASSISTED ONE ANOTHER. I DEEM IT MY DUTY HOWEVER TO COMMENT PARTICULARLY UPON THE COOL AND COURAGEOUS CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT ARTHUR F. ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WHO THOUGH WOUNDED IN SEVERAL PLACES, UNABLE TO SPEAK, AND SUFFERING SEVERE LOSS OF BLOOD; KEPT HIS FEET, DIRECTED THE FIRE, AND SUPERVISED THE ABANDON SHIP. HIS CONDUCT WAS AN INSPIRATION TO ALL HANDS. I ALSO CONSIDER THAT LIEUTENANT CLARK G. Grazier, Medical Corps, US Navy, the only doctor who was fortunately not wounded displayed coolness, ability, and resourcefulness with his treatment of the many wounded; both while under fire aboard ship and under very difficult conditions ashore. His untiring efforts and professional skill undeniably contributed greatly to reduce the seriousness of the injuries.

24. THE CASUALTIES TO PERSONNEL SUSTAINED ON BOARD THE PANAY OR IN OPEN SAMPANs AFTER ABANDONING SHIP WERE AS FOLLOWS: DEAD: CHARLES L. ENSMINGER STOREKEEPER FIRST CLASS, EDGAR G. HULSERUS COXSWAIN, MR. SANDRO SAKRI ITALIAN JOURNALIST; SERIOUSLY INJURED: JAMES J. HUGHES LIEUT. COMMANDER, ARTHUR F. ANDERS, LIEUT., JOHN W. GEIST LIEUT. (JC), JOHN H. LANG CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, CARL H. RICK ELECTRICIANS MATE FIRST CLASS, ALEX KOZAK MACHINISTS MATE SECOND CLASS, PERES D. ZIGLER SHIPS COOK THIRD CLASS, NEWTON L. DAVIS FIREMAN FIRST CLASS; MINOR INJURIES:

Signed James J. Hughes.

Court of Inquiry has finished taking testimony. As soon as record of proceedings is received findings will be forwarded by radio in plain language.
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: CINCAF
INFO: USS OAHU

PRIORITY /S

PAUSED BY CINCAF TO OPNAV FOR INFORMATION

Ø13 FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ATCHESON BY TELEPHONE FROM DR TAYLOR ANKING EMBASSY STAFF SAFE ONE SAILOR DIED CAPT AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER WOUNDED SURVIVORS UNABLE TO GO TO RIVER AS JAPANESE ARE NOW MACHINE GUNNING THE TOWN DR TAYLOR ADVISED EVERYONE REMAIN HOHSIEN REQUEST JAPANESE BE ASKED NOT TO ATTACK HOHSIEN PERIOD JAPANESE PATROLS NOW ON NORTH BANK OF RIVER AND APPEAR TO BE ABOUT TO ATTACK THE TOWN 1132

2351 CRMX 12 DEC

(OFFICERS PHONED, SEE CNO CHECK OFF LIST )
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

NPG NR 3237 Z WIFE V NEGB Q MUSK NEDE NPJ NITE GR 16

FROM: USS LUZON
ACTION: ALUSNA PEIPING
INFO: OPMAN USS PANAY RDO SHANGHAI

1111 OFFICER WHOSE SIGNAL NUMBER IS 11485 ARRIVED HANKOW ELEVENTH
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI
RADIO SHANGHAI INFORM ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI 2335

13 ACTION (4)
05 10A 11 16 (6) 19 20 38 PX C B

MARCORPS
1943
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: CINCAF
INFO: USS DAHU

PRIORITY /S

PASSED BY CINCAF TO OPNAV FOR INFORMATION.

0013 HAVE URGED HASHIMOTO THROUGH BRITISH AT WUHU NOT ATTACK HOHSTEN UNTIL AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN REFUGEES HAVE BEEN EMBARKED AND PERIOD EXPECT DAHU ARRIVE WUHU EARLY TOMORROW MORNING /HAVE REQUESTED BRITISH CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO LOCAL JAP AUTHORITIES 1247

0150 CRMX13DEC /0203

13 ACTION(4)
05 10A 11 16(6) 19 20 38/PX
CWO MARCORPS(2) STATE VIA MSGR.

PHONED STATE,
HOLD FOR MSGR.
0210/13 /S
FROM: ALUSNA TOKYO
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO CINCAF.

PRIORITY /S

1612 SENIOR AIDE TO NAVY MINISTER CALLED TODAY TO INFORM NAVAL ATTACHÉ OF SINKING OF USS PANAY BY JAPANESE BOMBING PLANES AND STATED QUOTE
NAVY MINISTER WISHES TO EXPRESS TO SECRETARY OF NAVY AND US NAVY HIS
SINCEREST REGRET TO THIS UNHAPPY ACCIDENT 1616

33 ACTION(4)

BUNAV 05 10A 11 16(6) 19 20 38 PX
CWO MARCORPS(2) STATE VIA MSGR.

PHOTOED SEE CWO
CHECK OFF LIST

WHITEHOUSE (2)
FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: CINCAF
INFO: USS OAHU

PRIORITY AZ

PASSED BY CINCAF TO OPNAV FOR INFORMATION

0013 FOLLOWING FROM HMS BEE QUOTE HAVE BEEN OFF HIONS FOR ONE HALF HOUR AND CAN SEE NO SIGNS OF LIFE ON NORTH BANK SOCONY MEIAN BEACHED AND DESERTED APPARENTLY HIT BY BOMB ON BRIDGE PANAY OUTBOARD SAMPan RECOVERED FROM HALF MILE BELOW MEIAN SOCONY MEIHSTIA BURNING FIRECELY AT KAIYUAN WHARF ON RIGHT BANK WERE

AM PROCEEDING TO INVESTIGATE UNQUOTE 1525

13 ACTION(4)

Q439CRMX13DEC ØØA Ø5 15A 11 16(6) 19 2Ø 3Ø PX CWO
MARCORP [2] BUNAV

STATE VIA MSGR.
0013 FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM HMS BEE QUOTE ONE FIVE NAUGHT NUGHT HAVE PICKED UP PICKERING OF SOCONY CPO. PUCKETT STOKER HOYLE AND CHINESE CANTEEN MANAGER OF PANAY FROM RIGHT BANK WHO INFORMED ME THAT THERE ARE SOME TWELVE EUROPEANS ABOUT ONE AND A HALF MILES FROM KALYUAN WHARF WHERE (50) I HAVE BERTHEO ALONGSIDE STOP MEILING AND MEINS A ARE BURNING ALONGSIDE WHARF AHEAD OF ME STOP JAPANESE AIRPLANE HAS CIRCULATED SHIP AT LOW ALTITUDE JUST AFTER BERTHING STOP PICKERING INFORMS ME THAT OFFICERS AND REMAINDER OF SHIPS COMPANY AND PASSENGERS OF PANAY ARE ON LEFT BANK BUT HAVE NOT LOCATED (100)

THEN STOP THEY MAY NOT TRYING TO REACH OUR CONCENTRATION ALONG LEFT BANK BUT I CAN NOT OBSERVE BANK Owing TO INTERVENING ISLANDS STOP HAVE SENT PARTY TO COLLECT EUROPEANS ALREADY MENTIONED AND INTEND IF NECESSARY TO REMAIN HERE FOR THE NIGHT 1625 0740

13 ACTION (4)

STATE VIA MSGER MARCORP(2) BUNAV
FROM: CONYANGPAT
ACTION: CINCAF INFO: USS OAHU
PRIORITY

PASSSED BY CINCAF TO: OPNAV FOR INFORMATION

§§13 FURTHER MEAGER TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS EM FROM ATCHESON THROUGH OR TAYLOR AT ANKING REPORTS OUR PERSONNEL IN GRAVE DANGER IN HOHSIEN PRESUMABLY FROM MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT AREA PERIOD HOHSIEN IS THREE MILES INLAND FROM RIVER PERIOD IF JAPAN NAVAL VESSELS HAVE REACHED NANKING AS REPORTED PRESS NEWS HERE SUGGEST ADVISABILITY URGING (5§) THEIR ASSISTANCE IN HELPING US WITH SAFE CONDUCT FROM HOHSIEN TO RIVER PERIOD WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO INFORM HOHSIEN OUR PERSONNEL IN HOHSIEN BY TELEGRAPH THAT H.M.S BEE IS IN VICINITY PERIOD OAHU NOW ENROUTE WUHU SHOULD ARRIVE TOMMORROW MORNING UNLESS DELAYED BY INSECURE NAVIGATION PERIOD WILL DESPATCH HER TO HOHSIEN (1§§) SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL AND AFTER NOTIFICATION OF HER MISSION IS GIVEN TO LOCAL JAP AUTHORITIES IN WUHU 19§§

13 ACTION(4)

§5 1§A 11 16(6)

19 2§ 38 PX CWO STATE MARCORPS (2)

THIS HAS BEEN RELAYED STATE DEPT
FROM; CINCAF
ACTION; OPNAV
INFO; AMCON SHANGHAI CHINA
AMCONSAM AMBASSADOR CHINA

COMYANGPAT

0015 JAPANESE TRANSPORT COMMANDING OFFICER LADYBIRD
MARSHALL COLLIERS MAGAZINE VINES BAT HODGES F FIRST PANAY
WHO WERE IN HOSPITAL WUHU TO SHANGHAI # BY PLANE 2047

13-ACTION(4)
05 10-A 11 16(6) 19 20 38 PX
CWO STATE MARCORPS(2)
BUNAV

WHITEHOUSE

RELAYED STATE DEPT VIA WR

1131 AE 15 DEC MX
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

Please note enclosed - "Ship abandoned at 1405. Before vessel sank was machine gunned by two Japanese army motor boats whose crews boarded about 1534 and left before vessel sank." Please have check-up made on these statements. Also, I should like to know whether any guns were fired from the PANAY.

F. D. R.

State Department No. 0015 - Cincafe.
Dear Mr. President:

Replying to your memorandum of yesterday this Department received on 16 December radio reports from the USS OAHU containing the following information:

At the time of the first airplane attack all ships were at anchor. The Standard Oil ships succeeded in getting under way after the first attack but the PANAY was hit forward took a list to port and down by the head sinking in about one hour. The planes made a number of attacks with bombs and machine guns. Colors were displayed by all four ships with a flag at the gaff and two large flags displayed horizontally on the upper awnings.

The attacking force consisted of three heavy bombers and six light bombers. The heavy bombers dropped three bombs from an undetermined altitude and then proceeded down river. The light bombers dive bombed and machine gunned the ships. The first heavy bomb fell fifteen feet off the port bow of the PANAY, making a hole in the bow, wrecking the bridge and wounding the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Hughes. The second heavy bomb hit the PANAY demolishing the radio room and surrounding spaces. During these attacks the crew manned their machine guns returning the fire but their projectiles passed through non vital parts of the planes. After these attacks on the PANAY bombs were dropped on the Standard Oil Company's vessels, apparently with the general plan of concentrating on the armed vessel before undertaking to destroy the others.

Survivors from the PANAY landed in boats during which time diving planes from low altitude attacked the boats with machine guns wounding two men in the boats.

Before the PANAY sank and after it was abandoned by its crew two Japanese Army motor boats sprayed the ship with machine gun fire, boarded it and remained on board about five minutes, the United States flag at that time still flying and easily distinguished.
After the crew reached shore planes repeatedly flew over the area with the apparent purpose of exterminating the survivors who hid their wounded and scattered to such shelter as could be found.

At dusk the survivors assembled, proceeded to a farm house where stretchers were improvised for the wounded, and then walked about five miles to the town of Hohsien.

I noted at once that the PANAY remained afloat about an hour after the crew left, and must assume that the bomb damage and the list resulting there from were so serious as to make further defensive effort ineffective.

We have directed Admiral Yarnell to make a full report by despatch, which report may be expected very soon after Admiral Yarnell makes contact with the survivors, including the wounded Captain and Executive, now enroute to Shanghai on board the USS OAHU and HMS LADYBIRD.

Most respectfully,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
December 18, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I note your telegram to Johnson asking him for his recommendation in regard to withdrawing from Hankow to Canton. My personal slant is that he ought not to withdraw. If it is advisable for him to leave Hankow because it may be attacked or isolated, he should then move even further inland, keeping contact with whatever is left of the Chinese government.

F. D. R.
COPY CH

NPG 5846

FROM COMSOPAT
ACTION OPNAV
INFO 2ND BRIGADE, COMSUBRON5, COMDESRON5, CONCAF, COMYANGPAT,
AMBASSADOR CHINA, USS MARBLEHEAD, ALUSNA PEIPING

12 Philippines SOUTH CHINA PORTS QUIET 2000

13 ACT (4)

258 DMX

5 10 11 12 16 (6) 19 20 38
PX CWO STATE RELAYED MARCORPS (2)
FROM: 2ND BRIGADE (USMV)
ACTION: CPNAV CINCAF
INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI CHIMACOMSUBRON FIVE, CONDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT, COMSOPAT, AMAMBASSADOR CHINA, ALUSNA
PEIPING, C

8629 JAPANESE ADVANCE REPORTED 20 MILES NORTH PUK-OW 22 MILES NORTH
WUHU PERIOD MAIN DRIVE,
NORTH CHINKIANG 12 MILES WEST /DRIVE ON HANGCHOW MOVING SLOWLY ALONG
GRAND CANAL NOW AT CHANGAN PERIOD TWELVE TRANSPORTS LOADED
MUNITIONS FON YANGTZEPOO WHARVES AND DEPARTED FOR SEA PERIOD GENERAL
HARADA. JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE TODAY CALLED EXPRESS APOLIGIES
REGRETS PANAY INCIDENT TO COMSECBRIG 1908

1737 DEMK / 1423 13-ACTION 9XX (4)
05 TOA 00-A 11 16/9
19 20 38 PX CWO STATE MARCORPS (2) WHITEHOUSE

RELAYED STATE DEPT VIA WR
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

NP5775 FROM CIBCAF

NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

NP5775 FROM CIBCAF

120 AT PRESS CONFERENCE BY GENERAL HARADA JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE
HE SAID THAT JAPANESE BOAT WHICH BOMBED PANAY AT 1100 12 DECEMBER
GAVE WARNING THAT THE VESSEL WAS IN DANGEROUS ZONE THAT PANAY FIRED
AT JAPANESE TROOPS ON SHORE WITH MAIN BATTERY AND THAT THE ARMY BOAT
WHICH BOARDED THE (50) PANAY BEFORE SHE SANK DID NOT MACHINE GUN THE
VESSEL BEFORE BOARDING THESE STATEMENTS ARE ENTIRELY CONTRARY TO ALL
EVIDENCE GIVEN BY SURVIVORS TO COURT OF INQUIRY 2256

13 ACTION

05 10A 11 19 20 38 PX CWO STATE MAR CORPS (2) 16 (6) WHITE HOUSE
2025 CRMX 20 DEC
RELAYED TO STATE VIA WIRE
NAVY MESSAGE

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: CINCAF
PASSED TO OPNAV BY CINCAF FOR INFORMATION

SEVENTEEN BOMBERS ACCOMPANIED BY NINE DROPPED APPROXIMATELY EIGHT FIVE BOMBS AND TWO PACKAGES LITERATURE VICINITY RAILWAY STATION KIUKIANG 1300 TODAY 1525

13-ACTION(4)
03 10-A 11 19 20 15(6)
38 PX CWO STATE MARCORPS(2)

RELAYED STATE DEPT VIA WR

1322 AH WJ/
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

F6C
XXX

NP6578
FROM COMYANGPAT
ACTION OPNAV

20TH ARDRIG-YANGPAT-COMDESRON 5-DOUSIBRON 5-CINCAF-
COMSOPAT-AMAMBASSADOR CHINA-USS MARBLEHEAD-ALUSNA PEIPING
NITE AG

20 20 SEVENTEEN JAP BOMBERS PLUS NINE PURSUIT PLANES BOMBED KIUKIANG
VICINITY RAILWAY STATION 1300 TODAY PERIOD APPROXIMATELY EIGHTY FIVE
BOMBS DROPPED ALSO TWO PACKETS LITERATURE PERIOD OTHER RIVER PORTS
QUIET 20 30

13 ACTION (4)

20 10 A 11 16(6) 19 20 38 PX CWO MARCORPS(2) STATE
20 29 CMIX 20 DEC

RELAYED TO STATE VIA WIRE
NPG 5556

FROM: SACRAMENTO

TO: CINCAF

INFO: OPNAV MARBLEHEAD

1937

ROUTINE

RESTRICTED

AIR RAID ALARM SOUNDED. NINE HUNDRED SINGLE SEAPLANE DROPPED
BOMBS IN VICINITY RAILWAY STATION. TEN FIFTEEN HUNDREDS CHINESE
EVACUATING TO NORTHWARD 11-45

TOR CODE ROOM 1435 26 DECEMBER

DISTRIBUTION:

13(4) ACTION

5 16A 11 16(6) 19 26 38 CWO MARCORPS(2) STATE FILE

SENT TO STATE VIA MESSENGER
FROM: SACRAMENTO
TO: CINCAF
INFO: NAVY DEPT MARBLEHEAD ALUSNA PEIPING

ØØ2Ø PLANE DID NOT DROP BOMBS AT TEN FIFTEEN EXPLOSION ASHORE
AS PLANE PASSED OVER CURFEW EIGHTEEN HUNDRED TONIGHT THREATS
AND RUMORS OF FURTHER DESTRUCTION CONTINUE WITH UNEASINESS
OF INHABITANTS 185Ø

TOR CODE ROOM 14ØØ 2Ø DECEMBER

DISTRIBUTION:
13(4) ACTION
Ø5 1ØA 11 16(6) 19 2Ø 3Ø CW0 MARCORPS(2) STATE FILE
SENT TO STATE VIA MESSENGER
FROM: THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF ASIATIC FLEET.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

THE FOLLOWING ARE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY ORDERED TO INVESTIGATE THE BOMBING AND SINKING OF THE USS PANAY.

THE COURT WAS COMPOSED OF CAPTAIN M. V. MCKITTRICK, COMMANDER M. L. DEVO, LIEUTENANT COMMANDER A. C. J. SABALOT, MEMBERS, AND LIEUTENANT C. J. WITTING, JUDGE ADVOCATE. THE FINDINGS ARE APPROVED.

THE RECORD OF THE COURT WILL BE FORWARD TO THE DEPARTMENT BY AIRMAIL LEAVING MANILA ABOUT TWENTY-NINE DECEMBER.

THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) THAT ON DECEMBER 12, 1937 THE USS PANAY A UNIT OF THE YANGTZE PATROL OF THE "S ASIATIC FLEET WAS OPERATING UNDER LAWFUL ORDERS ON THE YANGTZE RIVER.

(2) THAT THE IMMEDIATE MISSION OF THE USS PANAY WAS TO PROTECT NATIONALS MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE USS EMBASSY NANKING AND OFFICE THE AMBASSADOR AT HANKOW PROVIDE A TEMPORARY OFFICE FOR THE "S EMBASSY STAFF DURING THE TIME WHEN NANKING WAS GREATLY ENDANGERED BY MILITARY OPERATIONS AND TO AFFORD A REFUGE FOR AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS.

(3) THAT DUE TO INTENSIVE SHELL FIRE AROUND NANKING THE USS PANAY HAD CHANGED BERTH SEVERAL TIMES TO AVOID BEING HIT AND ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 12, 1937 FORMED A CONVOY OF SOCONY OIL COMPANY VESSELS PRINCIPALLY THE SS MEIPING, MEISHIA AND METAN AND PROCEEDED UP RIVER.

(4) THAT ADEQUATE STEPS WERE TAKEN AT ALL TIMES TO ASSURE THAT THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES WERE INFORMED OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE USS PANAY.

(5) THAT IN ADDITION HER REGULAR COMPLEMENT THE USS PANAY HAD ON BOARD AT THIS TIME FOUR MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY STAFF FOUR AMERICAN NATIONALS AND FIVE FOREIGN NATIONALS.

(6) THAT AT 0940 WHILE STANDING UP RIVER THE USS PANAY STOPPED IN RESPONSE TO A SIGNAL FROM A JAPANESE LANDING BOAT "A JAPANESE ARMY BOARDING OFFICER WITH GUARD WENT ON BOARD AND WAS INFORMED THAT THE USS PANAY AND CONVOY WERE PROCEEDING TO ANCHORAGE TWENTY EIGHT MILES ABOVE NANKING NO WARNING WAS GIVEN OF ANY DANGER LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED.

(7) THAT AT ABOUT ELEVEN HUNDRED DECEMBER 12, 1937 THE USS PANAY AND CONVOY ANCHORED IN THE YANGTZE RIVER IN A COMPACT GROUP AT ABOUT MILEAGE TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE ABOVE WOOSING TWENTY EIGHT MILES ABOVE NANKING.
(6) That the USS Panay was painted white with buff upper works and stacks and displayed two large horizontal flags on her upper deck awnings plus large colors at her guns.

(9) That the Socony Vacuum ships Heining Methia and Meitan each displayed numerous horizontal and vertical American flags of all large size.

(10) That at thirteen thirty the crew of the USS Panay were engaged in normal Sunday routine and were all on board except a visiting party of eight men on board the SS Heining.

(11) That at about thirteen thirty eight three large Japanese twin motored planes in a Vee formation were observed at a considerable height passing overhead downstream at this time no other craft were in the near vicinity of the Panay and convoy and there was no reason to believe the ships were in a dangerous area.

(12) That without warning these three Japanese planes released several bombs one or two of which struck on or very close to the bow of the USS Panay and another which struck on or very close to the SS Heining.

(13) That the bombs of the first attack did considerable damage to the USS Panay disabling the forward three inch gun seriously injuring the captain and others wrecking the pilot house and sick bay disabling the radio equipment the steaming fire room so that all power was lost and causing leaks in the hull which resulted in the ship settling down by the head and listing to starboard thereby contributing fundamentally to the sinking of the ship.

(14) That immediately thereafter a group of six single engined planes attacked from ahead diving singly and appearing to concentrate on the USS Panay a total of about twenty bombs were dropped many striking close aboard and creating by fragments and concussions great damage to ship and personnel these attacks lasted about twenty minutes during which time at least two of the planes attacked also with machine guns one machine gun attack was directed against a ship's boat bearing wounded ashore causing several further wounds and piercing the boat with bullets.

(15) That during the entire attack the weather was clear with high visibility and little if any wind.

(16) That the planes participating in the attacks on the USS Panay and its convoy were unmistakably identified by their markings as being Japanese.
(17) That immediately after the first bomb struck air defense stations were manned the thirty caliber machine gun battery opened fire and engaged the attacking planes throughout the remainder of the attack. The three inch battery was not manned nor were any three inch shells fired at any time; this was in accordance with the ships air defense bill.

(18) That during the bombing many were injured by flying fragments and concussion and all suffered shock on the first bomb. The captain suffered a broken hip and severe shock; soon thereafter lieutenant anders executive officer was wounded by fragments in throat and hands losing power of speech; lieutenant jg giest engineer officer received fragments in the leg; ensign biverse had clothing blown off and was severely shocked. This included all the line officers of the ship the captain being disabled, the executive officer carried on his duties giving orders in writing and issued instructions to secure confidential publications to get underway and to reach the ship extensive damages prevented getting underway.

(19) That about fourteen hundred believing it impossible to save the ship and considering the number of wounded and the length of time necessary to transfer them ashore in two small boats the captain ordered the ship to be abandoned this was completed by about fifteen hundred by this time the main deck was awash and the Panay appeared to be sinking.

(20) All severely wounded were transferred ashore in the first trips the captain protested in his own case; the executive officer when no longer able to carry on due to wounds, left the ship on the next to the last trip; and ensign biverse remained until the last trip.

(21) That after the Panay had been abandoned mailman cdm and weimers jr first returned to the Panay in one of the ships boats to obtain stores and medical supplies while they were returning to the beach a Japanese power boat filled with armed Japanese soldiers approached close to the Panay opened fire with a machine gun went along side boarded and left within five minutes.

(22) That at fifteen fifty four the uss Panay shortly after the Japanese boarding party had left rolled over to starboard and sank in from seven to ten fathoms of water approximate latitude 37° 44' 37° north longitude 117° 27 east, practically no valuable government property was salvaged.

(24) THAT MESSRS. ATCHESON AND PAXTON OF THE US EMBASSY STAFF RENDERED HIGHLY VALUABLE SERVICES ON SHORE WHERE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUNTRY AND LANGUAGE COUPLED WITH THEIR RESOURCEFULNESS AND SOUND ADVICE CONTRIBUTED LARGELY TO THE SAFETY OF THE PARTY.

(25) THAT AFTER SOME FIFTY HOURS ASHORE DURING WHICH TIME THE ENTIRE PARTY SUFFERED MUCH HARDSHIP AND EXPOSURE, SOMEWHAT MITIGATED BY THE KINDLY ASSISTANCE OF THE CHINESE, THEY RETURNED AND BOARDED THE 'SS OAH' AND HMS LADYBIRD.

(26) THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF AN UNPRECEDENTED AND UNLOOKED FOR ATTACK OF GREAT VIOLENCE UNTIL THEIR FINAL RETURN; THE SHIPS COMPANY AND PASSENGERS OF THE 'SS PANAY' WERE Subjected TO GRAVE DANGER AND CONTINUED HARDSHIP. THEIR ACTION UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE BEST TRADITIONS OF THE NAVAL SERVICE.

(27) THAT AMONG THE PANAY PASSENGERS MR. SANDRA SANDRI DIED OF HIS INJURIES AT THIRTEEN THIRTY THIRTEEN DECEMBER. MESSRS. HALL, PAXTON, EMILE GASSIE AND ROY SQUIRES WERE WOUNDED.

(28) THAT EARLY IN THE BOMBING ATTACKS THE STANDARD OIL VESSEL GOT UNDERWAY, MEILING AND MEISHA SECURED TO A PONTOON AT THE KAIYIAN WHARF AND THE MEIAO WAS DISABLED AND REACHED FURTHER DOWN THE RIVER ON THE LEFT BANK. ALL THESE SHIPS RECEIVED INJURIES DURING THE FIRST PHASES OF THE BOMBING. SERIOUS FIRES ON THE MEILING WERE EXTINGUISHED BY THE PANAY VISITING PARTY OF EIGHT MEN WHO WERE UNABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR SHIP.
(29) That after attacks on the Panay had ceased the Heiping and Meishia were further attacked by Japanese Bombing planes set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to this bombing Japanese army units on shore near the wharf attempted to avert this bombing by waving Japanese flags; they were not successful and received several casualties. It is known that Captain Carlson of the Meian was killed and that Messrs. Marshall Vines, Pickering and Squires were wounded. Casualties among the Chinese crews of these vessels were numerous but cannot be fully determined.

(30) That the following members of the Panay crew landed on shore from the Heiping after vainly attempting to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board; V. F. Pickett CM; J. A. Coleman CM First; J. A. Dinnholfer Seaman First; T. A. Donkowskii CM Third; R. L. Boring EM Third; J. L. Hedge Fireman First and W. T. Hoyle MM Second. These men encountered Japanese soldiers on shore who were not hostile on learning they were Americans.

(31) That all of the Panay crew except J. L. Hedge Fireman First remained in one group ashore until the following day when they were rescued by Hms Dee. Hedge made his way to Woom and returned Shanghai via Japanese Naval Plane on fourteen December.

(32) That in searching for and rescuing the survivors near Admiral Holt RN and the officers and men of Hms Dee and Hms Ladybird rendered most valuable assistance under trying and difficult conditions thereby showing a fine spirit of helpfulness and cooperation.

(33) That Charles L. Esminger SC First died at thirteen thirty thirteen December at Homsien China from wounds received during the bombing of the USS Panay and that his death occurred in line of duty not the result of his own misconduct.

(34) That Edgar G. Hulse's Coxswain died at zero six thirty nineteen December at Shanghai China from wounds received during the bombing of the USS Panay and that his death occurred in line of duty not the result of his own misconduct.

(35) That Lieutenant Commander James J. Hughes, Lieutenant Arthur F. Anders, Lieutenant (JG) John W. Giest, John H. Land CM, Robert R. Hebard Fireman First, Kenneth J. Rice EM Third, Carl H. Birg EM First, Charles Schroyer Seaman First, Alex Kozak MM Second, Peres D. Ziegler SC Third, and Newton L. Davis Fireman First, were seriously injured in line of duty not the result of their own misconduct.

(36) That Lieutenant Clark G. Grazier MC, Ension Denis H. Biwerse
CHARLES S ADAMS RM SECOND, TONY BARBA SC THIRD, JOHN A BONKOWSKI GM THIRD, ERNEST C BRANCH FIREMAN FIRST, RAYMOND L BROWNING EM THIRD, WALTER CHAETHAM COXSWAIN, THOMAS A COLEMAN CPHM, JOHN A DRNHOLFER SEAMAN FIRST, YUAN T ERH MATT FIRST, FRED G FITZHENMAYER CM FIRST, EMERY F FISHER CWT, MICHAEL GEREANT MM SECOND, CECIL B GREEN SEAMAN FIRST, JOHN L HODGE FIREMAN FIRST, FDN. B HUFFMAN WT SECOND, KARL H JOHNSON MM SECOND, CARL H KRESKE COXSWAIN, PETER H KLUMPERS CMM, WILLIAM P LANDER SEAMAN FIRST, ERNEST R MAHLMAN CBM, WILLIAM A MCCABE FIREMAN FIRST STANLEY W MCEOWN SEAMAN FIRST, JAMES H PECK QM SECOND, REGINALD PETERSON RM SECOND VERNON F PICKETT CMM, KING F SUNG MATT FIRST, HARRY S TUCK SEAMAN FIRST, CLED E WAXLER EM SECOND, JOHN T WEBER YEOMAN FIRST, AND FAR Z WONG MATT FIRST, WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED IN LINE OF DUTY NOT THE RESULT OF THEIR OWN MISCONDUCT.
To: Secretary of the Navy
From: Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.

The following is the opinion of the Court of Inquiry ordered to
investigate the bombing and sinking of the USS Panay. Period the opinion
is approved. Quote: Opinion was that the USS Panay was engaged in carrying
out the well-established policy of the United States of protecting American
lives and property. Two that the Japanese aviators should have been
familiar with the characteristics and distinguishing markings of the Panay
as this ship was present at Nanking during the Japanese Aerial Attacks
on this city, three that while the first bombers might not have been able
on account of their altitude to identify the USS Panay, there was no excuse for
attacking without properly identifying the target especially as it
was well known that neutral vessels were present in the Yangtze River
that it was utterly incon-ceivable that the six light bombing planes
coming within about six hundred feet of the ships and attacking for over
a period of twenty minutes could not be aware of the identity of the ships
they were attacking. Five that the Japanese are solely and wholly respon-
sible for all losses which have occurred as the result of this attack
six that the death of CL Ensinging SK First and EKG Hulsebus Coxswain
occurred in line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct
seven that the injured and wounded members of the crew of the USS Panay
received their wounds and injuries in the line of duty and were not the
result of their own misconduct. Eight in considering the case as a whole
and attending 6 incidents that the Court is of the opinion that no
offenses have been committed nor blame incurred by any member of the
Naval Service involved.

1735

ACTION

WHITE HOUSE.
To: Secretary of the Navy
From: Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.

The following is the opinion of the Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and sinking of the USS Panay period. The opinion is approved quote opinion was that the USS Panay was engaged in carrying out the well established policy of the United States of protecting American lives and property two that the Japanese aviators should have been familiar with the characteristics and distinguishing markings of the Panay as this ship was present at Nanking during the Japanese aerial attacks on this city three that while the first bombers might not have been able on account of their altitude to identify the USS Panay there was no excuse for attacking without properly identifying the target especially as it was well known that neutral vessels were present in the Yangtze River that it was utterly inconceivable that the six light bombing planes coming within about six hundred feet of the ships and attacking for over a period of twenty minutes could not be aware of the identity of the ships they were attacking five that the Japanese are solely and wholly responsible for all losses which have occurred as the result of this attack six that the death of CL Ensign MG Sk First and EMH Hulseus Coxswain occurred in line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct seven that the injured and wounded members of the crew of the USS Panay received their wounds and injuries in the line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct eight in considering the case as a whole and attending six incidents that the court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor blame incurred by any member of the Naval Service involved.
Sheet 10 has not, and probably will not be received until tomorrow, Wednesday.

Lt. Demett
FSL 17
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: SEENAV

ΟΦ21 (SHEET FIVE) ALL OFFICERS THAT I WAS XM IN THE GALLEY INCAPACITATED AND TO TELL THE ENGINEER OFFICER LIEUTENANT JG GEIST TO LET ME KNOW IF WE WERE TAKING WATER AND IF WE COULD GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY ABOUT THIS TIME I NOTICED MR J HALL PAXTON SECOND SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CHINA ONE OF THE PASSENGERS STANDING ON DECK JUST OUTSIDE OF THE GALLEY I ASKED HIM TO PLEASE COME IN AND HOLD ME UP WHICH HE VERY KINDLY DID REMAINING WITH ME THEREAFTER PARAGRAPH SEVEN FROM THEN MK ON THE PLANES BOMBED US CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL ABOUT FOURTEEN TWENTY FIVE THEY APPEARED TO BE ATTACKING US IN RELAYS OF TWO OR THREE EACH THE FIRST GROUP THAT CAME OVER DIVE BOMBED FROM A CONSIDERABLE ALTITUDE WHICH KEPT THEM BEYOND RANGE OF OUR LEWIS MACHINE GUNS LATER WHEN THE PANAY WAS VISIBLY SMASHED UP THE CAME MUCH CLOSER AND NOT ONLY LET GO THEIR BOMBS FROM LOW ALTITUDES OF PERHAPS ONE OR TWO HUNDRED FEET BUT ALSO MACHINE GUNNED OUR DECKS FIRING AS THEY CAME DOWN DIVING I DISTINCTLY HEARD THEIR GUNS WHICH HAD A DIFFERENT XM SOUND FROM THE PANAYS I WAS INFORMED AT THE TIME THAT THE PLANES
WERE JAPANESE NAVY PLANES IDENTIFIED BY THEIR CHARACTERISTIC RED CIRCLE ACCORDING TO MY RECKONING THE PANAY MUST HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT TWENTY FOUR DIRECT HITS I COULD NOT BELIEVE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SMALL SHIP TO RECEIVE SUCH DAMAGE AND STILL FLOAT I WAS INFORMED LATER THAT THE FIRST BOMB WHICH DISABLED ME ALSO PUT THE FORWARD THREE INCH GUN AND THE RADIO ROOM OUT OF ACTION AND BROUGHT DOWN THE FOREMAST PARAGRAPH EIGHT AT THIRTEEN FIFTY EIGHT THE SHIP APPEARED TO BE SETTLING QUITE FAST MEANWHILE BEFORE THE ENGINEER OFFICER COULD REACH ME TO GIVE ME A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF OUR PROPELLING MACHINERY I THOUGHT I HEARD A SHARP RUSH OF STEAM ESCAPING FROM OUR STEAMING BOILER A MINUTE OR TWO AFTER THAT ENSIGN BIWERSER THE COMMUNICATION OFFICER CAME INTO THE GALLEY AND STATED THAT THE SHIP WAS PLAINLY SINKING AND ASKED IF HE SHOULD THROW OVERBOARD THE CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS I REPLIED TO GET THEM ALL OVERBOARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE HE DID HIS SHEET SIX FOLLOWS

1315 CX 21 DEC 13 ACTION

RELAYED STATE DEPT,
21 sheet four thousand feet the weather was clear with 
good visibility and no wind the planes were clearly visible 
in spite of their altitude which may not have been 
as high as reported to me at that time i 
had/idea whatsoever that the planes intended to attack us
about this time i went up to the bridge with 
gcm john lang in order to keep a better lookout
for further planes approaches about thirteen twenty nine i looked 
out the door of the bridge to pick up again 
the two planes i had originally seen and was

astonished to discover that both were rapidly losing altitude in 
a direction toward us almost immediately they appeared to go 
into power dives last and i both stepped inside the 
bridge and almost immediately a bomb seemed to strike directly 
over our heads ripping a big hole in the roof
of the bridge i lost consciousness for what must have 
been only a minute or two when i came to 
i discovered myself on the deck of the bridge 
badly stunned with my head covered with blood and my
right leg painfully injured at the hip making it impossible for
ME TO RISE TO MY FEET A HOLE HAD ALSO BEEN BROKEN IN THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE NEAR WHERE LANG AND I HAD BEEN STANDING I ASKED LANG IF HE WAS INJURED TO WHICH HE REPLIED NO SIR NOT BEING ABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE FROM THE INSIDE OF THE BRIDGE WHICH WAS COMPLETELY WRECKED I ASKED HIM TO PUT A LIFE JACKET ON ME AND HELP ME DOWN TO THE SHIPS GALLEY WHICH IS ON THE MAIN DECK AND A GOOD CENTRAL POINT FROM WHICH TO DIRECT OPERATIONS BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO REACH THE GALLEY WHICH WAS NECESSARY A SLOW PROCESS ON ACCOUNT OF MY DISABLED WOUND I HEARD THE PANAYS MACHINE GUNS FIRING AND REALIZED THAT THE CREW WAS CARRYING ON PROBABLY UNDER THE IMMEDIATE DIRECTION OF LIEUTENANT ANDERSON MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER AT THE GALLEY I SENT LANG COMM TO NOTIFY SHEET FIVE

1246 CX 21 DEC.

13 ACTION
05A 04 03 02 10A 11 12 16(6)

20 20 23 38 BURNAY MARGOFS

WHITE HOUSE RELATES STATE DEPT
Sheet six utmost to throw the confidential and secret papers overboard but did not complete the work because of the repeated bombing which seemed to be focused in the vicinity of the radiotelegraphy room. Also told him to send a second messenger for Lieutenant J. Geist the engineer officer. Lieutenant Geist reported shortly thereafter and said we could not get underway because the steaming boiler had been ruptured. Thereupon told him to put the homolite pumps on those compartments which seemed to be filling fastest in case someone returned a few minutes later to state that all the homolite pumps had been wrecked by bombs. Paragraph nine about this time someone informed me that we appeared to be in danger of being run down by one of the Socony vessels. Got Mr. Paxton to carry me to the door of the galley and from what I could see I supposed that the vessel was attempting to come alongside the Panay probably to take off our personnel about that instant another storm of bombs fell both on the Panay and the Socony ship. The latter then abandoned her attempt to help the Panay. It should be remembered that the
ATTACKING PLANES CONCENTRATED ALMOST ALL THEIR EFFORTS ON THE PANAY DURING AT LEAST THE FIRST HALF HOUR. PARAGRAPH THEN BY FOURTEEN HUNDRED IT SEEMED UNLIKELY TO ME THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO SAVE THE SHIP ABOUT FOURTEEN ZERO TWO ENGINES RETURNED AND SAID HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD ABANDON SHIP ESPECIALLY AS HE THOUGHT THE JOB WOULD TAKE SOME TIME WITH ONLY TWO SMALL BOATS ACCORDINGLY I GAVE THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP AND TO START BY SENDING THE WORST WOUNDED WHOSE FIRST THE FIRST BOATS CONTAINED ONLY WOUNDED EXCEPT FOR THE BOATS CREWS COULMANN AND SEVERAL OF

THE CREW HAD NOT BEEN INJURED THEN CAME TO THE GALLEY TO PUT ME IN THE FIRST BOAT I PROTESTED AGAINST LEAVING THE SHIP AT THIS TIME AND WAS MOST UNWILLING TO DO SO, BUT IT APPEARED THAT THEY DID NOT NEED MY PROTEST BECAUSE OF MY CONDITION WITH NO PARTING ASSISTANCE THEY CARRIED ME DOWN THE DECK AND LIFTED ME ON MY FACE ACROSS THE BOW OF

THE MOTOR SAUNA SHEET SEVEN FOLLOW 2250.

1355 ON 29 DEC.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY.
Just before leaving the ship I told Ensign Biwerse to tell Lieutenant Anders and the other officers that I was being taken ashore and that if the attack should cease I wanted Ensign Biwerse to remain on board with a small detail of about six uninjured men to do what they could to keep the ship from going down and that in any case Ensign Biwerse and his detail were to be the last to leave. I knew at that time that Ensign Biwerse was the only uninjured officer although suffering from shock and had had most of his clothes blown off and believed that Lieutenant Anders and Lieutenant JG Geist were sufficiently injured to justify their leaving the ship before the last boatload. Ensign Biwerse later reported to me ashore that everybody was off the ship including all the passengers and that he had not remained behind with his detail because he was convinced the ship might sink at any minute and furthermore that the bombing planes might return. I approved his action in leaving the ship as it was obviously impossible to save her after arriving on shore. I was informed both the motor sampan and pulling sampan had been machine

---

white House
Gunned by the attacking planes sometime thereafter I heard the sound of a motor launch in the river close to where we were hidden in the reeds. The launch stayed in our vicinity a few minutes and then left. I cannot say whether or not they attempted to search for us because I was keeping my men out of sight and had deliberately left no debris on the beach by which we could be traced. Shortly afterwards a second launch passed meanwhile when I discovered that the ship was still afloat I sent for Ensign Biwerse and told him to take the motor sampan and cross the river to where the standard oil vessels had been beached in order to try to get standard oil launches to take the Panay in tow and beach her at this time I explained to Ensign Biwerse that I wanted him to consider himself as being in command of the hulk and the operations to move her because of the presence of the Japanese launches just sheet eight follows 2205.

1418 CX 21 Dec
From: CINCAF
Action: SECNAV

Page eight mentioned this operation was not carried out as we all felt that an effort was being made to exterminate us. Paragraph twelve about this time the XX planes started bombing the standard oil vessels at fourteen twenty-five thirty. Ceased bombing the Panay altogether which at that time appeared likely to sink at any moment. It should be remembered that the bombing planes first concentrated their attack on the Panay. It was while they were bombing the Panay that two of the standard oil vessels were able to get underway and beach themselves. Paragraph thirteen with only two small boats available it took many return trips to take all the personnel off the ship starting at fourteen zero five. We completed the operations at a little after fifteen hundred sometime before the ship sank. I heard the rattle of machine guns and was informed that an armed Japanese boat was firing on the Panay. I was subsequently informed that this boat had put several men on board who remained only a few minutes and then left. I was shortly informed that the ship sank with her colors still flying at fifteen fifty-four turning over to starboard.
FOURTEEN WHILE ON BOARD THE ROAR OF THE BOMB EXPLOSINS AND THE PIECES OF DEBRIS FLYING AROUND MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP ANY WRITTEN RECORD OF THE VARIOUS HITS THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED OR THE INJURIES TO PERSONNEL. HOWEVER THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO PANIC THE ORDERS I GAVE WERE CARRIED OUT EXACTLY. THE SHIP HAD THE NORMAL YANGTZE GUNBOAT GENERAL QUARTERS STATION BILL WE HAD SPECIAL DETAILS FOR AIR DEFENSE WHICH INVOLVED USING ONLY OUR MACHINE GUNS IN ORDER TO AVOID OPENING THE HATCHES LEADING TO THE THREE INCH MAGAZINES I WANTED TO PREVENT HAVING THE SHIP BLOWN UP BY HER OWN THREE INCH POWDER. THE PANAY ALSO HAD AN ABANDON SHIP BILL. MY REASON FOR GIVING THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP WAS THAT I OBSERVED THAT SHE WAS SETTLING DOWN BY THE HEAD TO STARBOARD AND IT WAS REPORTED TO ME AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED THAT SHE MIGHT SINK AT ANY MINUTE. I FELT MY NEXT DUTY IF I COULD NOT SAVE THE WHIP WAS TO SAVE THE LIVES OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE CREW AND SHEET NINE Follows 2214

1439 CX 21 DEC

13 ACTION
ØA Ø1 Ø3 Ø5 1ØA 11 12 16(8) 19, 2Ø

23 38 BUNAV MARCORPS (2) WHITEHOUSE
RELAYED STATE DEPT.
FSL 26
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: SECNAV

Sheet nine passengers the hull had many holes when abandoned and was shipping water rather rapidly it would have been impossible to get the ship underway to beach her because her steaming boiler had been ruptured although I was taken ashore in one of the first boats with the badly wounded I considered myself in command of the ship and crew throughout and when I turned the ship over to Ensign Bivers just before being put into the boat I did so with the idea that he was the only able bodied officer left who could remain behind and insure that every person had been removed I never relinquished command although I was unable to be in more than one part of the ship on account of my physical condition Lieutenant Anders my executive officer with great courage and perseverance maintained the fire of all our machine guns although he had been badly wounded almost immediately in the throat and later in the arm and both hands he was able however to keep his feet and maintained active charge paragraph fifteen as already mentioned I had my men abandon ship in the order of the worst wounded first.
SENT THE BOATS TO THE NEAREST LAND WHICH WAS COVERED BY HIGH REEDS

I TOLD THE MEN THAT AFTER THEY REACHED THE BEACH THEY WERE TO GET
IN SHORE AND HIDE IN THE REEDS WITHOUT HOWEVER GETTING TOO FAR
XXX SEPARATED AFTER GETTING ALL THE MEN OFF THE SHIP AND ON XXX THE
BEACH WE FOUND TWO JAPANESE PLANES FLYING FAIRLY LOW OVERHEAD
APPARENTLY LOOKING FOR THE PANAY SURVIVORS THE REEDS HOWEVER
APPARENTLY AFFORDED US SUFFICIENT COVER TO REMAIN UNSEEN THESE
PLANES SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED BUT SHORTLY LATER BOMBING ATTACKS
WERE MADE ON THE TWO STANDARD OIL VESSELS WHICH WERE BY NOW
BEACHED ON THE BANK OPPOSITE US THE THIRD STANDARD OIL VESSEL HAD
ALREADY BEEN SUNK BY BOMBS PARAGRAPH SIXTEEN MY PLAN FOR THE
RE-TURN OF THE SHIPS COMPANY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE US NAVY
WAS TO HAVE EVERYONE REMAIN UNDER COVER NEAR WHERE WE HAD LANDED
UNTIL AFTER DARK THEN HAVE THE WORST WOUNDED LOADED ON BOARD
A STANDARD OIL LAUNCH WHICH WAS NEAR AND HAD BEEN ABANDONED BY HER
NATIVE CREW AND TOWED AROUND TO THE MAINLAND A SMALL SCOUTING
PARTY WHICH HAD BEEN SENT OUT TO CHECK UP ON THE SHEET TEN
FOLLOWS 2222

1508 CX 21 DEC

13 ACTION

01 03 05 10A 11 12 16(6) 19 26

23 38 BUNAV MARCORPS (2) WHITEHOUSE
RELAYED STATE DEPT.
Restricted

NPG 673
1937

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: NAVY DEPT

21 TOLD HASEGAWA TODAY EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ACCESS AMERICANS TO THEIR PROPERTIES HONGKONG YANGTZEPOO POSTING CAUSING MUCH ILL WILL RESENTMENT COMMA HE SAID SITUATION BEING STUDIED WITH VIEW RELAXATION PERIOD FEEL ADMIRAL SINCERELY ANXIOUS IMPROVE CONDITIONS BUT LACKS FULL AUTHORITY SEMICOLON WELL FOUNDED REPORTS INDICATE MM MUCH GRAND BRIBERY CONNECTION ENTRY PROPERTY REMOVAL PASSES HONGKONG PARAGRAPH ADVISED HIM OUR ONLY OBJECT IN NOT ACCEDING ENTRY NIHONESE MARINES THEIR MILLS OUR SECTOR HERE WAS DESIRE PREVENT INCIDENTS AND IF TROOPS BROUGHT INTO AREA QUIETLY INCONSPICUOUSLY IN SMALL NUMBERS TRUCKS ALSO REMAINED INSIDE MILLS I WOULD OFFER NO FURTHER OBJECTION HE APPROVED THIS WE SET FIRST JANUARY SUCH ENTRY WHICH AGREEMENT BELIEVED SATISFACTORY COMMA ARMY HAS EVIDENTLY PRESSED NAVY SEND FORCES MILLS AND LATTERS FACE WILL BE SAVED BY THIS ARRANGEMENT PARA INFORMED HIM THAT SEVERAL PRESS INTERVIEW STATEMENTS BY GENERAL HARADA NOT ACCORDANCE FACTS ALSO COULDN'T UNDERSTAND HOW NAVAL PLANES FLYING NANKING MONTHS WITH US GUNBOATS PRESENT UNABLE RECOGNIZE PANAY THIS OCCASION COMMA HE CRIED THERE WAS MUCH CONFUSION HIS PLANES ACTING ON ARMY INFORMATION THAT CHINESE VESSELS ESCAPING UP RIVER FROM CAPITAL PLUS MANY AVIATORS VERY RECENTLY CHANGED AND DENIED SEA AIRCRAFT UNDER ORDERS MILITARY

1500

TOR IN CODE ROOM 2130 21 DEC 1937

DISTRIBUTION:
13(4) ACTION
25 10A 11 16(5) 19 20 38 CWD MARCORPS(2) STATE(2) WHITEHOUSE
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

NPG 5705  FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV

CORRECTED COPY

1. 125 at press conference by General Harada Japanese military attache. He said that Japanese boat which boarded Panay at 1100 12 December gave warning that the vessel was in dangerous zone that Panay fired at Japanese troops on shore with main battery and that the army boat which boarded the Panay before she sank did not machine gun the vessel before boarding. These statements are entirely contrary to all evidence given by survivors to Court of Inquiry 2256.

2. 25 CRM X

13...ACTION

5 10A 11 19 20 38 PX CWO

STATE WIRE MARCORPS 16(6) WHITEHOUSE
NAVAL MESSAGE
RECEIVED AT NAVY DEPARTMENT

NPG 57Ø5  FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV

CORRECTED COPY

Ø12Ø AT PRESS CONFERENCE BY GENERAL HARADA JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE
HE SAID THAT JAPANESE BOAT WHICH BOARDED PANAY AT 11ØØ 12 DECEMBER
GAVE WARNING THAT THE VESSEL WAS IN DANGEROUS ZONE THAT PANAY FIRED
AT JAPANESE TROOPS ON SHORE WITH MAIN BATTERY AND THAT THE ARMY BOAT
WHICH BOARDED THE PANAY BEFORE SHE SANK DID NOT MACHINE GUN THE
VESSEL BEFORE BOARDING THESE STATEMENTS ARE ENTIRELY CONTRARY TO ALL
EVIDENCE GIVEN BY SURVIVORS TO COURT OF INQUIRY 2256

2Ø25 CRM X

13..ACTION
Ø5 1ØA 11 19 2Ø 38 PX CWO
STATE WIRE MARCORPS 16(6) WHITEHOUSE
F5L 8
Z SNOW V F5Q GR 292
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: SECNAV

Φ 21 FOLLOWING REPORT IN FULL FROM COMMANDING OFFICER PANAY FORWARDED
APPROVED BY CINCAF QUOTE FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER USS PANAY
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY VIA THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF US ASIATIC
FLEET PARAGRAPH SUBJECT USS PANAY LOSS OF BY SINKING AS A RESULT
OF BOMBING BY JAPANESE PLANES TWELVE DECEMBER NINETEEN THIRTY SEVEN
PARAGRAPH REFERENCE AFFIRM ARTICLE EIGHT FOUR ZERO US NAVY REGULATIONS
NINETEEN TWENTY BAKER ARTICLE EIGHT FOUR ONE PARENTHESIS THREE US
NAVY REGULATIONS NINETEEN TWENTY PARAGRAPH ONE ON SUNDAY DECEMBER
TWELVE NINETEEN THIRTY SEVEN THE USS PANAY WAS OPERATING UNDER THE
ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL AND AT THAT TIME WAS ANCHORED
ABOUT FIFTEEN MILES ABOVE NANKING ACTING AS A REFUGE FOR AMERICAN
CITIZENS AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY THE SHIP WAS ACCOMPANIED

WHITE HOUSE
BY THE STANDARD OIL TANKERS MEILING MELANIA META AND MISCELLANEOUS
STANDARD OIL LAUNCHES AND JUNKS THE LATEST ORDERS FROM THE COMMANDER
YANGTZE PATROL TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER HAD BEEN RECEIVED THE DAY
BEFORE BY DESPATCH AND SAID THE COMMANDING OFFICER WAS TO HAVE COM-
plete discretion in moving the ship up or down the river paragraph.
Two. the ship was identified as a Mediterranean vessel by two large
horizontal flags one spread over the forward top deck and one over
the after top deck both clearly visible from the air at any angle.
Each of these flags measured above eighteen feet in length and about
fourteen feet in width and had been freshly repainted in addition to
these two flags and on account of the emergency condition existing
the Panay had been flying heavy largest size ensign at the gaff both
day and night whether under way or at anchor all ensigns.

Both horizontal and vertical were brightly illuminated all night sheet
two follows 2121.
1 SHEET TWO LONG PARAGRAPH THREE AT ZERO EIGHT FOURTEEN I OBSERVED
ARTILLERY SHELLS FALLING IN THE RIVER ABOUT FOUR HUNDRED YARDS OFF
OUR STARBOARD BEAM PRESUMABLY FROM JAPANESE ARTILLERY. ALTHOUGH THE
BATTERIES WERE NOT VISIBLE AT ZERO EIGHT TWENTY FIVE I GOT THE PANAY
UNDERWAY FOR UPRIVER TO GET CLEAR OF THIS FIRING AND SIGNalled THE
CONVOY TO FOLLOW AT ZERO EIGHT FORTY THREE. THE PANAY WENT ALONGSIDE
HMS CRICKETT TO TRANSFER AN INJURED CHINESE EMPLOYEE OF THE ASIATIC
PETROLEUM COMPANY. AT THE SAME TIME I ADVISED LIEUTENANT
COMMANDER JIM ASHBY ROYAL NAVY COMMANDING HMS CRICKETT OF MY REASONS FOR MOVING
UPRIVER PARAGRAPH FOUR AT ZERO NINE FORTY HAVING RESUMED OUR JOURNEY
WITH THE PANAY AT THE HEAD OF THE COLUMN FOLLOWED IN THE ORDER NAMED
BY THE MEIPING, MEIHSHA AND MEIAN TWO GROUPS OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS.
WERE SIGHTED ON THE LEFT NORTH BANK THEY WAVED HAND FLAGS AT THE
PANAY AND SEEMED TO WANT TO COMMUNICATE WITH US ACCORDINGLY THE PANAY
Hove to and a JAPANESE ARMED TENDER CAME ALONGSIDE CARRYING LIEUTENANT
SHEGEYO MURAKAMI AND ABOUT NINETY MEN MOST OF WHOM WERE ARMED WITH
MACHINE GUNS LIEUTENANT ANDERS' MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER MET THIS OFFICER
AT THE GANGWAY AS HE STEPPED ON BOARD ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SWORD BEARER
AND TWO PRIVATES WITH FIXED BAYONETS LIEUTENANT ANDERS INFORMED ME THAT
THE OFFICER DESIRED TO SPEAK TO ME SO I TURNED THE CONN OVER TO LIEUT-
ENANT ANDERS AND WENT TO THE GANGWAY I WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT
WAS IMPROPER FOR THE ARMED ORDERRIES OF THIS OFFICER TO ACCOMPANY
HIM ON BOARD BUT CONSIDERED THAT HE PROBABLY DID NOT KNOW THE CORRECT
PROCEDURE AND THAT IT WAS PROPER FOR ME TO OVERLOOK THE MATTER
IN THIS CONNECTION I HAD SPECIAL VERBAL ORDERS FROM THE COMMANDER
YANGTZE PATROL NOT TO BE TOO SENSITIVE ABOUT POINTS OF NAVAL ETIQUETTE
WHEN DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE MILITARY AND ABOVE ALL ELSE TO USE
MY JUDGEMENT IN AVOIDING SUCH COMPLICATIONS AS MIGHT ArISE LIEUTENANT
MURAKAMI SHEET THREE FOLLOWS 2129

ARRIVAL 15 Action (a)
06A 01
03 05 16A 11 12 15(e)
19 20 23 38
1147 AX

Lines
Massacre (2)

Relegated state dept  Armed forces regiment
White House

White House
Ø21 Sheet Three asked me where the Pan-ay was going and I said to a point upriver twenty-eight miles from Nanking he said why are you going there to which I replied to keep clear of artillery fire he asked me about the three Standard Oil ships and I informed him that they were American ships under my protection his next question was about the Chinese troops holding solidly to which I said that the United States was friendly to both Japan and China and therefore I could not give him any information about the Chinese army this conversation was witnessed by Second Secretary Mr. George Attcheson Junior of the American Embassy Nanking China Lieutenant Murakami then invited me to repay his call ashore which invitation I respectfully declined at zero nine fifty three the Japanese tender cleared the side paragraph five at zero nine fifty four the Panay
AGAIN RESUMED HER WAY UP THE RIVER AT ELEVEN HUNDRED
I ANCHORED THE PANAY AT A POINT TWENTY MILES UPWATER
FROM NANKING AND ABOUT TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY ONE MILES
ABOVE WOOSUNG IN A BROAD OPEN SPACE IN THE RIVER
MY REASONS FOR ANCHORING THERE WAS SIMPLY TO KEEP OUT (200)

OF THE WAY OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES THIS LOCATION SEEMED
HIGHLY DESIRABLE WE WERE EASILY VISIBLE ESPECIALLY ACCOMPANIED AS WE
WERE BY THREE STANDARD OIL TANKERS FOR MILES AROUND ON
EVERY SIDE AND IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT ANY TROOPS WOULD
TRY TO CROSS THE RIVER IN OUR VICINITY IN SELECTING (300)

250
THIS SPOT I HAD IN MIND PRIMARILY THE SAFETY OF
THE PANAY AND THE EVACUEES WHOM SHE WAS CARRYING BUT
ALSO THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THE AMERICAN SHIPS
IN THE CONVOY AND THEIR PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY UPON ANCHORING I
POSTED SENTRY LOOKOUTS FOR AIRPLANES AND TROOPS MOVEMENTS AT THIRTEEN
HUNDRED I ALLOWED A PARTY OF ABOUT EIGHT MEN TO VISIT
THE MEIPING NEARBY FOR A GLASS OF BEER THESE
MEN WERE STILL ON BOARD THE MEIPING WHEN THE ATTACK
STARTED AND WERE THEREFORE "UNABLE TO RETURN TO THE SHIP
PARAGRAPH SIX AT ABOUT THIRTEEN TWENTY SEVEN THE LOOKOUT CALLED
DOWN THAT TWO PLANES WERE IN SIGHT ALTITUDE ABOUT FIFTEEN SHEET FOUR FOLLOWS 2138

1220 CX 21 DEC.

13 ACTION(4)

00A 01 03 05 10A 11 12
16(6) 19 20 23 38 BUNAV
MARCORPS(2) WHITE HOUSE
RELAYED STATE DEPT
I was on the 21st floor, four thousand feet. The weather was clear with good visibility and no wind. The planes were clearly visible in spite of their altitude, which may not have been as high as reported to me at that time.

I had no idea whatsoever that the planes intended to attack us about this time. I went up to the bridge with C.O. John Lang in order to keep a better lookout for further planes approaches. About thirteen twenty-nine I looked out the door of the bridge to pick up again the two planes I had originally seen and was...
ASTONISHED TO DISCOVER THAT BOTH WERE RAPIDLY LOSING ALTITUDE IN A DIRECTION TOWARD US ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THEY APPEARED TO GO INTO POWER DIVES AND I BOTH STEPPED INSIDE THE BRIDGE AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY A BOMB SEEMED TO STRIKE DIRECTLY OVER OUR HEADS RIPPING A BIG HOLE IN THE ROOF OF THE BRIDGE I LOST CONSCIOUSNESS FOR WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN ONLY A MINUTE OR TWO WHEN I CAME TO I DISCOVERED MYSELF ON THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE BADLY STUNNED WITH MY HEAD COVERED WITH BLOOD AND MY RIGHT LEG PAINFULLY INJURED AT THE HIP MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR
ME TO RISE TO MY FEET A HOLE HAD ALSO BEEN BROKEN IN THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE NEAR WHERE LANG AND I HAD BEEN STANDING I ASKED LANG IF HE WERE INJURED TO WHICH HE REPLIED NO SIR NOT BEING ABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE FROM THE INSIDE OF THE BRIDGE WHICH WAS COMPLETELY WRECKED I ASKED HIM TO PUT A LIFE JACKET ON ME AND HELP ME DOWN TO THE SHIPS GALLEY WHICH IS ON THE MAIN DECK AND A GOOD CENTRAL POINT FROM WHICH TO DIRECT OPERATIONS BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO REACH THE
Galley which was necessarily a slow process on account of my disabling wound I heard the Panays machine guns firing and realized that the crew was carrying on probably under the immediate direction of Lieutenant Anders my Executive Officer at the galley I sent Lang CQM to notify Sheet Five follows 2144

13 Action

00A 01 03 05 10A 11 12 16(6)

1246 CX 21 Dec.

19 20 23 38 BuNAV MARCORPS

WHITE HOUSE RELAYED STATE DEPT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

There is forwarded herewith a copy of the report submitted by the Commanding Officer of the PANAY covering the period during which that vessel was destroyed by aerial attack. This report was received by despatch during last night.

Most respectfully,

William D. Leahy
FOLLOWING REPORT IN FULL FROM COMMANDING OFFICER PANAY, FORWARDED APPROVED
BY CINCPAC:

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PANAY
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
VIA THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF US ASIATIC FLEET
SUBJECT: USS PANAY, THE LOSS OF BY SINKING AS A RESULT OF BOMBING BY
JAPANESE PLANES, 12 DECEMBER, 1937.
REFERENCE: (A) ART. 845 - US NAVY REGS, 1929
(B) ART. 841 - US NAVY REGS, 1929

1. ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1937, THE USS PANAY WAS OPERATING UNDER
THE ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL, AND AT THAT TIME, WAS ANCHORED
ABOUT FIFTEEN MILES ABOVE NANKING, ACTING AS A REFUGE FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS
AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE SHIP WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE STAND-
ARD OIL TANKERS MEILING, MEINSIA, HEIAN, AND MISCELLANEOUS STANDARD OIL
LAUNCHES AND JUNKS. THE LATEST ORDERS FROM THE COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL TO
THE COMMANDING OFFICER WERE RECEIVED THE DAY BEFORE BY DESPATCH, AND SAID
THE COMMANDING OFFICER WAS TO HAVE COMPLETE DISCRETION IN MOVING THE SHIP
UP, OR DOWN THE RIVER.

2. THE SHIP WAS IDENTIFIED AS AN AMERICAN VESSEL BY TWO LARGE HORIZON-
TAL FLAGS, ONE SPREAD OVER THE FORWARD TOP DECK, AND ONE OVER THE AFTER
TOP DECK - BOTH CLEARLY VISIBLE FROM THE AIR AT ANY ANGLE. EACH OF THESE
FLAGS MEASURED ABOUT EIGHTEEN FEET IN LENGTH, AND ABOUT FOURTEEN FEET IN
WIDTH, AND HAD BEEN FRESHLY REPainted. IN ADDITION TO THESE TWO FLAGS, AND
ON ACCOUNT OF THE EMERGENCY CONDITION EXISTING, THE PANAY HAD BEEN FLYING
HER LARGEST ENsign AT THE GAFF BOTH NIGHT AND DAY, WHETHER UNDERWAY OR AT
ANCHOR; ALL ENsignS, BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL, WERE BRIGHTLY ILLUMINA-
TED ALL NIGHT.

3. AT 0614 I OBSERVED ARTILLERY SHELLS FALLING IN THE RIVER ABOUT
FOUR HUNDRED YARDS OFF OUR STERNBOARD BEAM, PRESUMABLY FROM JAPANESE ART-
ILLERY ALTHOUGH THE BATTERIES WERE NOT VISIBLE. AT 0625 I GOT THE PANAY
UNDERWAY FOR UP'RIVER TO GET CLEAR OF THIS FIRING, AND signalled THE CONVOY
TO FOLLOW. AT 0643 THE PANAY WENT ALONGSIDE HMS CRICKETT TO TRANSFER AN
INJURED CHINESE EMPLOYEE OF THE ASIATIC PETROLEUM COMPANY, AT THE SAME TIME
I ADVISED LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JIM ASHBY, ROYAL NAVY, COMMANDING HMS CRICK-
ETT, OF MY REASONS FOR MOVING UPRIVER.
4. At 0945, having resumed our journey, the Panay at the head of the column, followed in the order named by the Weiping, Meihsia and Meian, two groups of Japanese soldiers were sighted on the left bank (north); they waved hand flags at the Panay and seemed to want to communicate with us. Accordingly, the Panay move to, and a Japanese armed tender came alongside carrying Lieutenant Shegeyo Murakami and about ninety men, most of whom were armed with machine guns. Lieutenant Anders, my executive officer, met this officer at the gangway as he stepped on board, accompanied by his sword bearer and two privates with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Anders informed me that the officer desired to speak to me, so I turned the coin over to Lieutenant Anders and went to the gangway. I was aware of the fact that it was improper for the armed orderlies of this officer to accompany him on board but considered that he probably did not know the correct procedure, and that it was proper for me to overlook the matter in this connection. I had special verbal orders from the commander Yangtze Patrol not to be too sensitive about points of naval etiquette when dealing with the Japanese military, and above all, to use my judgement in avoiding such complications as might arise. Lieutenant Murakami asked me where the Panay was going, and I said to a point upriver twenty-eight miles from Nanking. He then asked why we were going there, to which I replied, "to keep clear of artillery fire." He asked me about the three standard oil ships, and I informed him that they were American ships under my protection. His next question was about the Chinese troops holding solidly, to which I said that the United States was friendly to both Japan and China, and therefore I could not give him any information about the Chinese army. This conversation was witnessed by Second Secretary Mr. George Atcheson, junior of the American Embassy, Nanking, China. Lieutenant Murakami then invited me to repay his call ashore, which invitation I respectfully declined. At 0953 the Japanese tender cleared the side.

5. At 0954 the Panay again resumed her way up the river. At 1100 I anchored the Panay at a point twenty miles upriver from Nanking, and about two hundred and twenty-one miles above Woosung, in a broad, open space in the river. My reasons for anchoring there was simply to keep out of the way of the contending armies; this location seemed highly desirable. We were easily visible especially accompanied as we were by three standard oil tankers, for miles around, on every side, it seemed unlikely that any troops would try to cross the river in our vicinity. In selecting this spot, I
PAGE THREE

HAD IN MIND NOT ONLY THE SAFETY OF THE PANAY AND THE EVACUEES WHOM SHE WAS CARRYING, BUT ALSO THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THE AMERICAN SHIPS IN THE CONVOY, AND THEIR PERSONNEL. IMMEDIATELY UPON ANCHORING, I POSTED SENTRY LOCKOUTS FOR AIRPLANES AND TROOP MOVEMENTS. AT 1300 I ALLOWED A PARTY OF ABOUT EIGHT MEN TO VISIT THE MEIPING NEARBY FOR A GLASS OF BEER. THESE MEN WERE STILL ON BOARD THE MEIPING WHEN THE ATTACK STARTED, AND WERE, THEREFORE, UNABLE TO RETURN TO THE SHIP.

6. AT ABOUT 1327 THE LOOKOUT CALLED DOWN THAT TWO PLANES WERE IN SIGHT ABOUT FIFTEEN THOUSAND FEET. THE WEATHER WAS CLEAR WITH GOOD VISIBILITY AND NO WIND. THE PLANES WERE CLEARLY VISIBLE DESPITE THEIR ALTITUDE WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AS REPORTED TO ME; AT THAT TIME I HAD NO IDEA WHATSOEVER THAT THE PLANES INTENDED TO ATTACK US. ABOUT THIS TIME I WENT UP TO THE BRIDGE WITH CQM JOHN LANG IN ORDER TO KEEP A BETTER LOOKOUT FOR FURTHER PLANES APPROACHES. ABOUT 1329 I LOOKED OUT THE DOOR OF THE BRIDGE TO PICK UP AGAIN THE TWO PLANES I HAD ORIGINALLY SEEN, AND WAS ASTONISHED TO DISCOVER THAT BOTH WERE RAPIDLY LOSING ALTITUDE IN A DIRECTION TOWARD US. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THEY APPEARED TO GO INTO POWER DIVES. LANG AND I BOTH STEPPED INSIDE THE BRIDGE, AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, A BOMB SEEMED TO STRIKE DIRECTLY OVER OUR HEADS, RIPPING A BIG HOLE IN THE ROOF OF THE BRIDGE. I LOST CONSCIOUSNESS FOR WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN ONLY A MINUTE OR TWO; WHEN I CAME TO, I DISCOVERED MYSELF ON THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE, BADLY STUNNED WITH MY HEAD COVERED WITH BLOOD, AND MY RIGHT LEG PAINFULLY INJURED AT THE HIP MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO RISE TO MY FEET. A HOLE HAD ALSO BEEN BROKEN IN THE DECK OF THE BRIDGE NEAR WHERE LANG AND I HAD BEEN STANDING. I ASKED LANG IF HE WAS INJURED, TO WHICH HE REPLIED, "NO, SIR." NOT BEING ADE TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE FROM THE INSIDE OF THE BRIDGE, WHICH WAS COMPLETELY WRECKED, I ASKED HIM TO PUT A LIFE JACKET ON ME AND HELP ME DOWN TO THE SHIP'S GALLEY WHICH IS ON THE MAIN DECK, AND A GOOD CENTRAL POINT FROM WHICH TO DIRECT OPERATIONS. BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO REACH THE GALLEY, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN Necessarily A SLOW PROCESS ON ACCOUNT OF MY DISABLING WOUND, I HEARD THE PANAY'S MACHINE GUNS FIRING, AND REALIZED THAT THE CREW WAS CARRYING ON, PROBABLY UNDER THE IMMEDIATE DIRECTION OF LIEUTENANT ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER. AT THE GALLEY I SENT LANG, CQM, TO NOTIFY ALL OFFICERS THAT I WAS IN THE GALLEY, INCAPACITATED, AND TO TELL THE ENGINEER OFFICER, LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST TO LET ME KNOW IF WE WERE TAKING WATER, AND ALSO IF
WE COULD GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY. ABOUT THIS TIME I NOTICED MR. J. HALL FAXTON, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CHINA, ONE OF THE PASSENGERS, STANDING ON DECK JUST OUTSIDE OF THE GALLEY. I ASKED HIM TO PLEASE COME IN AND HOLD ME UP WHICH HE VERY KINDLY DID, REMAINING WITH ME THEREAFTER.

7. FROM THEN ON PLANES BOMBED US CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL ABOUT 1425. THEY APPEARED TO BE ATTACKING US IN RELAYS OF TWO OR THREE EACH, THE FIRST GROUP THAT CAME OVER, DIVE-BOMBED FROM A CONSIDERABLE ALTITUDE WHICH KEPT THEM BEYOND RANGE OF OUR LEWIS MACHINE GUNS. LATER WHEN THE PANAY WAS VISIBLY SMASHED-UP, THEY CAME MUCH CLOSER, AND NOT ONLY LET GO THEIR BOMBS FROM LOW ALTITUDES OF PERHAPS ONE OR TWO HUNDRED FEET, BUT ALSO MACHINE-GUNNED OUR DECKS, FIRING AS THEY CAME DOWN DIVING. I DISTINCTLY HEARD THEIR GUNS WHICH HAD A DIFFERENT SOUND FROM THE PANAY'S. I WAS INFORMED AT THE TIME THAT THE PLANES WERE JAPANESE NAVY PLANES, IDENTIFIED BY THEIR CHARACTERISTIC RED CIRCLE. ACCORDING TO MY RECKONING, THE PANAY MUST HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT TWENTY FOUR DIRECT HITS; I COULD NOT BELIEVE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SMALL SHIP TO RECEIVE SUCH DAMAGE AND STILL FLOAT. I WAS INFORMED LATER THAT THE FIRST BOMB WHICH DISABLED ME, ALSO HIT THE FORWARD THREE INCH GUN AND THE RADIO ROOM OUT OF ACTION, AND BROUGHT DOWN THE FOREMAST.

8. AT 1358 THE SHIP APPEARED TO BE SETTLING QUITE FAST. MEANWHILE, BEFORE THE ENGINEER OFFICER COULD REACH ME TO GIVE ME A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF OUR-PROPELLING MACHINERY, I THOUGHT I HEARD A SHARP RUSH OF STEAM ESCAPING FROM OUR STEAMING BOILER. A MINUTE OR TWO AFTER THAT, ENSEIGN DIVERSE, THE COMMUNICATION OFFICER, CAME INTO THE GALLEY AND STATED THAT THE SHIP WAS PLAINLY SINKING, AND ASKED IF HE SHOULD THROWN OVERBOARD THE CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS. I TOLD HIM TO GET THEM ALL OVERBOARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE DID HIS UTMOST TO THROW THE CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET PAPER OVERBOARD, BUT DID NOT COMPLETE THE WORK BECAUSE OF THE REPEATED SOMEBING WHICH SEEMED TO BE FOCUSED IN THE VICINITY OF THE RADIO ROOM. I ALSO TOLD HIM TO SEND A SECOND MESSENGER FOR LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST, THE ENGINEER OFFICER. LIEUTENANT GEIST REPORTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND SAID WE COULD NOT GET UNDERWAY BECAUSE THE STEAMING BOILER HAD BEEN RUPTURED. I THEREUPON TOLD HIM TO PUT THE HOMOLITE PUMPS ON THOSE COMPARTMENTS WHICH SEEMED TO BE FILLING FASTEST. ENSEIGN DIVERSE RETURNED A FEW MINUTES LATER TO STATE THAT ALL THE HOMOLITE PUMPS HAD BEEN WRECKED BY BOMBS.

9. ABOUT THIS TIME SOMEONE INFORMED ME THAT WE APPEARED TO BE IN OAH-
GER OF BEING RUN DOWN BY ONE OF THE SOCONY VESSELS. I GOT MR. PAXTON TO
CARRY ME TO THE DOOR OF THE GALLEY, AND FROM WHAT I COULD SEE, I SUPPOSED
THAT THE VESSEL WAS ATTEMPTING TO COME ALONGSIDE THE PANAY, PROBABLY TO
TAKE OFF OUR PERSONNEL. ABOUT THAT INSTANT ANOTHER STORM OF BOMBS FELL BOTH
ON THE PANAY AND THE SOCONY SHIP; THE LATTER THEN ABANDONED HER ATTEMPT TO
HELP THE PANAY. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT ATTACKING FLAMES CONCENTRATED
ALMOST ALL THEIR EFFORTS ON THE PANAY DURING AT LEAST THE FIRST HALF HOUR.

10. THEN, BY 1:45, IT SEEMED UNLIKELY TO ME THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO
SAVE THE SHIP. ABOUT 1:45 ENSIGN BIVESE RETURNED AND SAID HE THOUGHT WE
SHOULD ABANDON SHIP, ESPECIALLY AS HE THOUGHT THE JOB WOULD TAKE SOME TIME
WITH ONLY TWO SMALL BOATS. ACCORDINGLY, I GAVE THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP,
AND TO START BY SENDING THE WORST WOUNDED ASHORE FIRST. BOATS CONTAINED
ONLY WOUNDED EXCEPT FOR THE BOATS CREWS, CSM MAHLBOM, AND SEVERAL OF THE
CREW THAT HAD NOT BEEN INJURED, THEN CAME TO THE GALLEY TO PUT ME IN THE FIRST
BOAT. I PROTESTED AGAINST LEAVING THE SHIP AT THIS TIME, AND WAS MOST UNWILLING
to do so; but, it appeared that they did not heed my protest because of my condi-
tion. With Mr. Paxton's assistance they carried me down the deck, and laid me
flat on my face across the bow of the motor sampan.

11. JUST BEFORE LEAVING THE SHIP, I TOLD ENSIGN BIVESE TO REMAIN
ON BOARD, TELLING LIEUTENANT ANDERS AND THE OTHER OFFICERS THAT I WAS BEING
TAKEN ASHORE, AND THAT IF THE ATTACK SHOULD CEASE, I WANTED ENSIGN BIVESE
TO REMAIN ON BOARD WITH A SMALL DETAIL OF ABOUT SIX UNINJURED MEN TO DO WHAT
THEY COULD TO KEEP THE SHIP FROM GOING DOWN. AND THAT IN ANY CASE, ENSIGN
BIVESE AND HIS DETAIL WERE TO BE THE LAST TO LEAVE. I KNEW AT THAT TIME THAT
ENSIGN BIVESE WAS THE ONLY UNINJURED OFFICER, ALTHOUGH SUFFERING FROM SHOCK,
AND HAVING MOST OF HIS CLOTHES BLOWN OFF, AND BELIEVED THAT LIEUTENANT ANDERS
AND LIEUTENANT (JC) GEIST WERE SUFFICIENTLY INJURED TO JUSTIFY THEIR LEAVING
THE SHIP BEFORE THE LAST BOATLOAD. ENSIGN BIVESE LATER REPORTED TO ME ASHORE
THAT EVERYBODY WAS OFF THE SHIP, INCLUDING ALL THE PASSENGERS, AND THAT HE HAD
NOT REMAINED BEHIND WITH HIS DETAIL BECAUSE HE WAS CONVINCED THE SHIP MIGHT
SINK AT ANY MINUTE, AND FURTHERMORE, THAT THE BOMBING FLAMES MIGHT RETURN. I
APPROVED HIS ACTION IN LEAVING THE SHIP AS IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SAVE
HER. AFTER ARRIVING ON SHORE, I WAS INFORMED BOTH THE MOTOR SAMPAN AND PULL-
The saipan had been machine gunned by the attacking planes. Sometime thereafter I heard the sound of a motor launch in the river close to where we were hidden in the reeds; the launch stayed in our vicinity a few minutes and then left. I cannot say whether or not they attempted to search for us because I was keeping my men out of sight and had deliberately left no debris on the beach by which we could be traced. Shortly afterwards a second launch passed; meanwhile when I discovered that the ship was still afloat, I sent for Ensign Elmore and told him to take the motor saipan and cross the river to where the standard oil vessels had been beached in order to try to get standard oil launches to take the panay in tow and beach her. At this time I explained to Ensign Elmore that I wanted him to consider himself as being in command of the hulk and the operations to move her, because of the presence of the Japanese launches mentioned this operation was not carried out as we all felt that an effort was being made to exterminate us.

12. About this time the planes started bombing the standard oil vessels. At 1425 they ceased bombing the Panay altogether which at that time appeared likely to sink at any moment; it should be remembered that the bombing planes first concentrated their attack on the Panay. It was while they were bombing the Panay that two of the standard oil vessels were able to get underway and beach themselves.

13. With only two small boats available it took many return trips to take all the personnel off the ship. Starting at 1430 we completed the operations at a little after 1530. Sometime before the ship sank I heard the battle of machine guns and was informed that an armed Japanese boat was firing on the Panay. I was subsequently informed that this boat had put several men on board who remained only a few minutes and then left. I was shortly informed that the ship sank with her colors still flying at 1654 turning over to starboard.

14. While on board the roar of the bomb explosions and the pieces of debris flying around made it impossible to keep any written record of the various hits, the damage sustained, or the injuries to personnel. However, there was absolutely no panic. The orders I gave were carried out exactly. The ship had the normal yankee gunboat general quarters station bill; I had special details for air defense which involved using only our machine guns in order to avoid opening
THE HATCHES LEADING TO THE THREE INCH MAGAZINES. I WANTED TO PREVENT HAVING THE SHIP BLOWN UP BY HER OWN THREE INCH POWDER. THE PANAY ALSO HAD AN ABANDON SHIP BELL; MY REASON FOR GIVING THE ORDER TO ABANDON SHIP WAS THAT I OBSERVED THAT SHE WAS SETTLING DOWN BY THE HEAD TO STARBORD, AND IT WAS REPORTED TO ME AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED THAT SHE MIGHT SINK AT ANY MINUTED. I FELT MY NEXT DUTY, IF I COULD NOT SAVE THE SHIP, WAS TO SAVE THE LIVES OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE CREW AND PASSENGERS. THE HULL HAD MANY HOLES WHEN ABANDONED AND WAS SHIPPING WATER RATHER RAPIDLY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE SHIP UNDERWAY TO BEACH HER BECAUSE HER STEAMING BOILER HAD BEEN RUPTURED. ALTHOUGH I WAS TAKEN ASHORE IN ONE OF THE FIRST BOATS WITH THE BADLY WOUNDED I CONSIDERED MYSELF IN COMMAND OF THE SHIP AND CREW THROUGHOUT; AND WHEN I TURNED THE SHIP OVER TO ENLIST BIVIERE JUST BEFORE BEING PUT INTO THE BOAT, I DID SO WITH THE IDEA THAT HE WAS THE ONLY ABLE BODIED OFFICER LEFT WHO COULD REMAIN BEHIND AND INSURE THAT EVERY PERSON HAD BEEN REMOVED. I NEVER RELINQUISHED COMMAND ALTHOUGH I WAS UNABLE TO BE IN MORE THAN ONE PART OF THE SHIP ON ACCOUNT OF MY PHYSICAL CONDITION. LIEUTENANT ANDERSON, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WITH GREAT COURAGE AND PERSEVERANCE MAINTAINED THE FIRE OF ALL OUR MACHINE GUNS; ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN BADLY WOUNDED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IN THE THROAT, AND LATER IN THE ARM AND BOTH HANDS. HE WAS ABLE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP HIS FEET AND MAINTAINED ACTIVE CHARGE.

15. AS ALREADY MENTIONED I HAD MY MEN ABANDON SHIP IN THE ORDER OF THE WORST WOUNDED. FIRST I SENT THE BOATS TO THE NEAREST LAND WHICH WAS COVERED BY HIGH REEDS. I TOLD THE MEN THAT AFTER THEY REACHED THE BEACH THEY WERE TO GET IN SHORE AND HIDE IN THE REEDS WITHOUT HOWEVER GETTING TOO FAR SEPARATED. AFTER GETTING ALL THE MEN OFF THE SHIP AND ON THE BEACH WE FOUND TWO JAPANESE PLANES FLYING FAIRLY LOW OVERHEAD APPARENTLY LOOKING FOR THE PANAY SURVIVORS. THE REEDS HOWEVER APPARENTLY AFFORDED US SUFFICIENT COVER TO REMAIN UNSEEN. THESE PLANES SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED, BUT SHORTLY LATER COMING ATTACKS WERE MADE ON THE TWO STANDARD OIL VESSELS, WHICH WERE BY NOW REACHED ON THE BANK OPPOSITE US. THE THIRD STANDARD OIL VESSEL HAD ALREADY BEEN SUNK BY BOMBS.
16. MY PLAN FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHIPS COMPANY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE US NAVY WAS TO HAVE EVERYONE REMAIN UNDER COVER NEAR WHERE WE HAD LANDED UNTIL AFTER DARK; THEN HAVE THE WOUNDED LOADED ON BOARD A STANDARD OIL LAUNCH, WHICH WAS NEAR AND HAD BEEN ABANDONED BY HER NATIVE CREW, AND TOWED AROUND TO THE MAINLAND. A SMALL SCOUTING PARTY WHICH HAD BEEN SENT OUT TO CHECK UP ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL SPOT ON WHICH WE HAD LANDED REPORTED TO ME THAT WE WERE ON AN ISLAND.

17. LIEUTENANT ARTHUR C. ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WAS BY THIS TIME BADLY WEAKENED FROM LOSS OF BLOOD, AND LIEUTENANT (JG) GEIST WAS ALSO BARELY WOUNDED IN THE LEG, MPmotion BIVENSE HAD ESCAPED ACTUAL INJURY BUT WAS SUFFERING SOMewhat FROM SHOCK. I FELT THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR URGENT CONDITION AND POSITION THAT I SHOULD UTILIZE THE EXPERIENCE AND MATURE JUDGEMENT OF CAPTAIN FRANK N. ROBERTS, US ARMY, THE ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHÉ TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CHINA, WHO HAD COME ON BOARD AT HANKING. HE HAD ESCAPED INJURY AND WAS MOST ANXIOUS AS AN OFFICER TO ASSIST ME IN ANY WAY. HIS ABILITY TO SPEAK CHINESE WAS ALSO A VALUABLE FACTOR. I THEREFORE APPOINTED HIM AS MY IMMEDIATE REPRESENTATIVE TO TAKE ACTIVE PHYSICAL CHARGE UNDER MY DIRECTION, AND SUCH ORDERS AS HE GAVE WERE AFTER CONSULTATION WITH ME AND BY MY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION. I ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE GRATTEULLY THE KIND AND EFFICIENT ASSISTANCE OF MR. ATCHESON. IN THE SAME WAY IT IS MY GRATEFUL DUTY TO ADD THAT CAPTAIN ROBERTS SERVICES WERE ABSOLUTELY INVALUABLE AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO EXPRESS MY FULL APPRECIATION OF THEM. I AM SURE THAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE PARTY WOULD AGREE THAT HIS EFFICIENCY, KINDNESS, AND TACT AND HIS EXPERIENCE IN HANDLING AN OPERATION OF THIS NATURE ON SHORE GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO OUR FINAL ESCAPE. MR. ATCHESON, WHO ALSO SPEAK CHINESE, AGREED AT MY REQUEST TO REMAIN WITH THE PARTY TO FACILITATE DEALINGS WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS.

18. AT ABOUT 1715 THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY, MR. J. HALL PAXTON WHO ALSO SPEAKS CHINESE, LEFT OUR PARTY AT MY REQUEST TO TRY TO GET A MESSAGE THROUGH EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT HANKOW INFORMING HIM OF OUR PLIGHT.
19. AS ALREADY MENTIONED AFTER DARK ALL ABLE BODIED MEN TRACKED THE LAUNCH CARRYING THE WOUNDED AROUND THE LITTLE ISLAND ON WHICH WE HAD FOUND OURSELVES CLOSE TO THE MAINLAND. IN THE MEANTIME MR. PAXTON WHO HAD GONE ON AHEAD SENT BACK COOLIE CARRIERS FROM THE FIRST VILLAGE AND THEY CARRIED OUR WOUNDED THERE. AT THIS VILLAGE WE ENGAGED MORE COOLIES AND SET OUT FOR THE NEXT VILLAGE INLAND HOSHIEEN, WHICH WAS 5 MILES AWAY AND 3 MILES INLAND FROM THE RIVER BANK. MY PLAN WAS TO TRAVEL BY NIGHT AND HIDE BY DAY. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT HOSHIEEN ABOUT MIDNIGHT WE WERE RECEIVED AND TREATED WITH THE GREATEST KINDNESS BY THE MAGISTRATE AND ALL THE CHINESE THERE, AND WERE QUARTERED IN THE HOSPITAL WHERE WE REMAINED THROUGHOUT THE DAYLIGHT PERIOD. ON MONDAY, 13 DECEMBER, ENG-MINGER STOREKEEPER FIRST CLASS, AND MR. SANDRO SANDRI, ITALIAN JOURNALIST, DIED FROM THEIR INJURIES WHILE WE WERE THERE.


21. WE LEFT HANSHAN ABOUT 1200 ON 14 DECEMBER IN THE SAME JUNKS IN WHICH WE HAD ARRIVED AND REACHED THE YANGTZE RIVER ABOUT 2145 THAT NIGHT. THE ENTIRE PARTY WAS ON BOARD THE USS OAHU AND HIS LADYBIRD BY 2100 16 DECEMBER.

22. ALL THE PASSENGERS WHO WERE ON BOARD THE PANAY WERE THERE AT THEIR OWN REQUEST. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT LOSSES OF PERSONNEL PROPERTY THEY MAY HAVE SUSTAINED OTHER THAN THEIR CAMERAS AND WHAT WAS CONTAINED IN THEIR TRAVELLING BAGS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF MR. PAXTON, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY TURNED OVER TO ME A LOCKED BRIEF CASE WHICH I HAD HIDDEN BELOW MY BUNK; THE NATURE OF THE CONTENTS OF WHICH I WAS NOT INFORMED. MR. PAXTON HAD ALSO GIVEN ME FOR SAFE KEEPING A VALUABLE CHINESE VASE.
MESSRS. ATCHESON, PAXTON, AND CASSIE AND CAPTAIN ROBERTS HAD, I BELIEVE, ONE OR MORE TRUNKS APiece.

23. I HAVE NO COMPLAINT TO MAKE REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF ANY OFFICER OR ENLISTED MAN OR ANY PASSENGER. IN MY OPINION EVERYONE ACTED WITH FINE COURAGE AND INITIATIVE. I CONSIDER THAT THE ACTION OF MY OFFICERS AND CREW IN ATTEMPTING TO RETURN THE FIRE, RENDERING FIRST AID, SAFELY EVACUATING ALL PERSONNEL, TRANSPORTATING THE WOUNDED, KEEPING TOGETHER, AND RETURNING AS ONE PARTY WITH THE DEAD AND WOUNDED IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THEIR COURAGE, DISCIPLINE, AND FORTITUDE. I KEENLY REGRET THAT MY OWN INJURY PREVENTED ME FROM OBSERVING INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF COURAGEOUS CONDUCT OF WHICH I FEEL CERTAIN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVERY OFFICER AND MAN PERFORMED BOTH WHILE ON BOARD SHIP AND DURING THE SUBSEQUENT TRAVELLING ASHORE. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY, AND GRATIFIED FOR, THE HIGH MORALE AND CHEERFUL AND FAITHFUL MANNER IN WHICH MY OFFICERS AND MEN ASSISTED ONE ANOTHER. I DEEM IT MY DUTY HOWEVER TO COMMENT PARTICULARLY UPON THE COOL AND COURAGEOUS CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT ARTHUR F. ANDERS, MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WHO THOUGH WOUNDED IN SEVERAL PLACES, UNABLE TO SPEAK, AND SUFFERING SEVERE LOSS OF BLOOD; KEPT HIS FEET, DIRECTED THE FIRE, AND SUPERVISED THE ABANDON SHIP. THIS CONDUCT WAS AN INSPIRATION TO ALL HANDS. I ALSO CONSIDER THAT LIEUTENANT CLARK C. Grazier, Medical Corps, US Navy, the only doctor who was fortunately not wounded displayed coolness, ability, and resourcefulness with his treatment of the many wounded; both while under fire aboard ship and under very difficult conditions ashore. His untiring efforts and professional skill undoubtedly contributed greatly to reduce the seriousness of the injuries.

24. The Casualties to Personnel Sustained on Board the Panay or in Open Sampans After Abandoning Ship were as follows: Dead: Charles L. Ensinger Storekeeper First Class, Edgar S. Heubus Coxswain, Mr. Sandro Sanri Italian Journalist; Seriously Injured: James J. Hughes Lieut. Commander, Arthur F. Anders, Lieut., John W. Geist Lieut. (JC), John H. Lang Chief Quartermaster, Carl H. Birk Electrician Mate First Class, Alex Kozak Machinists Mate Second Class, Ferbus D. Ziader Ships Cook Third Class, Newton L. Davis Fireman First Class; Minor Injuries:
PAGE ELEVEN

CHARLES B. ADAMS RADIOMAN SECOND CLASS, TONY BARBA SHIPS COOK THIRD CLASS,
JOHN A. BONKOSKI SUNNYS MATE THIRD CLASS, ERNEST C. BRANCH FIREMAN FIRST
CLASS, RAYMOND L. BROWNING ELECTRICIANS MATE THIRD CLASS, WALTER CHEATHAM
COXSWAIN, THOMAS A. COLEMAN CHIEF PHARMACISTS MATE, JOHN A. DIRNHOFER
SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, YUAN T. ERH MESS ATTENDANT FIRST CLASS, FRED C.
FICHTENMAYER CARPENTERS MATE FIRST CLASS, EMERY F. FISHER CHIEF WATER-
TEINDER, MICHAEL GERENT MACHINISTS MATE SECOND CLASS, CECIL B. GREEN
SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, JOHN L. HODGE FIREMAN FIRST CLASS, FON B. HUFFMAN
WATERTEINDER SECOND CLASS, H. JOHNSON MACHINISTS MATE SECOND CLASS, H.
KERSKE COXSWAIN, PETER H. KLUPIERS CHIEF MACHINISTS MATE, WILLIAM P.
LANDER SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, ERNEST R. MAHLWANN CHIEF BOATSWAIN MATE,
WILLIAM A. MCCABE FIREMAN FIRST CLASS, STANLEY W. McEwEN SEAMAN FIRST
CLASS, JAMES H. PECK QUARTERMASTER SECOND CLASS, REGINALD P. PETERSON
RADIODIAN SECOND CLASS, VERNON F. PICKERT CHIEF MACHINISTS MATE, KING
F. BUNO MESS ATTENDANT FIRST CLASS, HARRY B. TUCK SEAMAN FIRST CLASS,
CLEO E. WAXLER BOATSWAIN MATE SECOND CLASS, JOHN T. WEBER VEDMAN FIRST
CLASS, ROBERT R. HEINARD FIREMAN FIRST CLASS, KENNETH J. RICE ELECTRICIANS
MATE THIRD CLASS, CHARLES S. SCHROEDER SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, FAR Z. KONG MESS
ATTENDANT FIRST CLASS, CLARK G. GRIZER LIEUT (MC), DENNIS H. BIVERSE
ENSIGN. THE FOLLOWING CIVILIAN PASSENGERS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED: EMILE
CASSIE CURASSY CLERK, JAMES MARSHALL COLLERS CORRESPONDENT; MINOR INJURIES:
J. HALL PAXTON SECOND SECRETARY, ROY SQUIRES CHINA IMPORTING AND EXPORTING.
FOLLOWING CIVILIAN ON BOARD HELPING MINOR INJURIES: F.H. VIENCES BRITISH
AMERICAN TOBACCO; FOLLOWING CIVILIAN ON BOARD UNLOADING DEAD, C.H. CARLSON
MASTER.

SIGNED JAMES J. HUGHES.

COURT OF INQUIRY HAS FINISHED TAKING TESTIMONY. AS SOON AS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IS RECEIVED FINDINGS WILL BE FORWARDED BY RADIO
IN PLAIN LANGUAGE.
The report which followed this memorandum was an exact duplicate of the eleven page report on the Panay incident which is to be found in this folder therefore it was not recopied.

2/14/73  DP
The following are facts of the court of inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and sinking of the USS Panay. The court was composed of Captain HV Mooltrick Commander MS Ney Lieutenant Commander ASK Sabalot members and Lieutenant CO Whiting. Judges Advocate. The findings are approved. The record of the court will be forwarded to the Department by air mail leaving Manila about thirty-nine seven. On December tenth Nineteen Thirty Seven the USS Panay a unit of the Yangtze patrol the US Asiatic fleet was operating under lawful orders on the Yangtze River. That the immediate mission of the USS Panay was to protect nationals maintain communication between the US Embassy. The officer the Ambassador at Manila provide a temporary office for the US Embassy staff during the time when Manila was greatly endangered. By military operations and to afford a refuge for American and other foreign nationals three that due to intensive shell fire around Manila the USS Panay had changed berth several times to avoid being hit and on the morning of December tenth Nineteen Thirty Seven formed a convoy of seven vacuum oil company vessels principally the SS Melinda and Neman and proceeded upriver. Four that adequate steps were taken at all times to assure that the Japanese authorities were informed of the movements of the USS Panay. Five that in addition to her regular complement the USS Panay had on board at this time four members of the American Embassy staff four American nationals and five foreign nationals. Six that around nine forty while standing upriver the USS Panay stopped in response to a signal from a Japanese landing boat a Japanese Army boarding officer with
BOARD WENT ON BOARD AND WAS INFORMED THAT THE USS PANAY AND CONVOY WERE PROCEEDING TO ANCHORAGE TWENTY EIGHT MILES ABOVE NANKING NO WARNING WAS GIVEN OF ANY DANGER LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED SEVEN THAT AT ABOUT ELEVEN HUNDRED DECEMBER TWELFTH NINETEEN THIRTY SEVEN THE USS PANAY AND IX CONVOY ANCHORED (35°) IN THE YANGTZE RIVER IN A COMPACT GROUP AT ABOUT MILEAGE TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE ABOVE WOOSUNG TWENTY EIGHT MILES ABOVE NANKING EIGHT THAT THE USS PANAY WAS PAINTED WHITE WITH BUFF UPPER WORKS AND STACKS AND DISPLAYED TWO LARGE HORIZONTAL FLAGS ON HER UPPER DECK AWNINGS PLUS LARGE COLORS (45°) AT HER CAFF NINE THAT THE SOCOTY VACUUM SHIPS HAVING THREE AMERICAN AND MEXICAN EACH DISPLAYED NUMEROUS HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL AMERICAN FLAGS OF ALL LARGE SIZE TEN THAT AT THIRTEEN THIRTY THE CREW OF THE USS PANAY WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL SUNDAY ROUTINE AND WERE ALL ON BOARD EXCEPT A VISITING PARTY OF EIGHT MEN ON BOARD THE SS HEIFING ELEVEN THAT AT ABOUT THIRTEEN THIRTY EIGHT THREE LARGE JAPANESE TWIN-ROTOR PLANES IN A VICE FORMATION WERE OBSERVED AT A CONSIDERABLE HEIGHT PASSING OVERHEAM DOWNRIVER AT THIS TIME NO OTHER CRAFT WERE IN THE NEAR VICINITY OF THE PANAY AND (55°) CONVOY AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE SHIPS WERE IN A DANGEROUS AREA SHEET TWO FOLLOW 115.

165° VP MX. 22 DEC.

23 ACTION

PA 25 CWO 11A 11 13(4) 16(6) 19 28 35 PX STATE MARCOMPS(2)

WHITE HOUSE
ØØ23 SHEET TWO TWELVE THAT WITHOUT WARNING THESE THREE JAPANESE PLANES RELEASED SEVERAL BOMBS ONE OR TWO OF WHICH STRUCK ON OR VERY CLOSE TO THE BOW OF THE USS PANAY AND ANOTHER WHICH STRUCK ON OR VERY CLOSE TO THE SS MEIPI NG THIRTEEN THAT THE BOMBS OF THE FIRST (5Ø) ATTACK DID CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE USS PANAY DISABLING THE FORWARD THREE INCH GUN SERIOUSLY INJURING THE CAPTAIN AND XXXXXX/WRECKING THE PILOT HOUSE AND SICK BAY DISABLING THE RADIO EQUIPMENT THE STEAMING FIREROOM SO THAT ALL POWER WAS LOST AND CAUSING LEAKS IN THE HULL WHICH RESULTED IN THE (1ØØ) SHIP SETTLING DOWN BY THE HEAD AND LISTING TO STARBOARD THEREBY CONTRIBUTING FUNDAMENTALLY TO THE SINKING OF THE SHIP FOURTEEN THAT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER A GROUP OF SIX SINGLE ENGINED PLANES ATTACKED FROM AHEAD DIVING SINGLY AND APPEARING TO CONCENTRATE ON THE USS PANAY A TOTAL OF ABOUT TWENTY BOMBS XXX/WERE DROPPED close aboard and creating by fragments and concussions great damage to ship and personnel these attacks lasted about twenty minutes during which time at LEAST TWO OF THE PLANES ATTACKED ALSO WITH MACHINE GUNS ONE MACHINE GUN ATTACK WAS DIRECTED AGAINST A SHIPS BOAT BEARING WOUNDED ASHORE (2ØØ) CAUSING SEVERAL FURTHER WOUNDS AND PIERCING THE BOAT WITH BULLETS K FIFTEEN THAT DURING THE ENTIRE ATTACK THE WEATHER WAS CLEAR WITH HIGH VISIBILITY AND LITTLE IF ANY WIND SIXTEEN THAT THE PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACKS ON THE USS PANAY AND ITS CONVOY WERE UNMISTAKINGLY IDENTIFIED BY THEIR MARKINGS AS (25Ø)
BEING JAPANESE SEVENTEEN THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST BOMB STRUCK
AIR DEFENSE STATIONS WERE MANNED THE THIRTY CALIBER MACHINE GUNS BATTERY
OPENED FIRE AND ENGAGED THE ATTACKING PLANES THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER
OF THE ATTACK PERIOD THE THREE INCH BATTERY WAS NOT MANNED NOR WERE
ANY THREE INCH SHELLS FIRED AT (3BB) ANY TIME THIS WAS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SHIPS AIR DEFENSE BILL EIGHTEEN THAT DURING THE BOMBING MANY
WERE INJURED BY FLYING FRAGMENTS AND CONCUSSION AND ALL SUFFERED SHOCK
ON THE FIRST BOMB THE CAPTAIN SUFFERED A BROKEN HIP AND SEVERE SHOCK.
SOON THEREAFTER LIEUTENANT AMMERS EXECUTIVE OFFICER WAS WOUNDED (35B)
BY FRAGMENTS IN THROAT AND HANDS LOSING POWER OF SPEECH LIEUTENANT XX JG
XXXI GIEST ENGINEER OFFICER RECEIVED FRAGMENTS IN THE LEG ENSIGN BIVERSE
HAD CLOTHING BLOWN OFF AND WAS SEVERLY SHOCKED THIS INCLUDED ALL THE
LINE OFFICERS OF THE SHIP THE CAPTAIN BEING DISABLED THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
CARRIED ON HIS DUTIES (4BB) GIVING ORDERS IN WRITING HE IssUED INSTRUCTIONS TO SECURE CONTINENTAL PUBLICATIONS TO GET UNDERWAY/NINETEEN THAT
AT ABOUT FOURTEEN HUNDRED BELIEVING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SAVE THE SHIP AND
CONSIDERING THE NUMBER OF WOUNDED AND THE LENGTH OF TIME NECESSARY TO
TRANSFER THEM ASHORE IN TWO SMALL BOATS THE CAPTAIN ORDERED THE SHIP TO
BE ABANDONED THIS WAS COMPLETED BY ABOUT FIFTEEN HUNDRED BY THIS TIME
THE MAIN DECK WAS AWASH AND THE PANAY APPEARED TO BE SINKING SHEET
THREE FOLLOWS (513B).

1711 VP MX. 22 DEC. 1845

53 ACTION

55A 55 CWD 15A 11 13(4) 16(6) 19 20 30 PX STATE
MARK CORPS (2) WHITE HOUSE
Fifth Sheet:

ThreeTwenty severely wounded were transferred ashore in the first trips the captain protested in his own case the executive officer when no longer able to carry on due to wounded left the ship on the next to the last trip and ensign diverse remained until the (5\(\alpha\)) last trip twenty one. That after the Panay had been abandoned Mahlman CB and Weimers KE first returned to the Panay in one of the ships boats to obtain stores and medical supplies while they were returning to the beach a Japanese power boat filled with armed Japanese soldiers approached (19\(\alpha\)) close to the Panay opened fire with a machine gun went along side boarded and left within five minutes twenty two that at fifteen fifty four the USS Panay shortly after the Japanese boarding party had left rolled over on starboard and sank in (15\(\alpha\)) from seven to ten fathoms of (15\(\alpha\)) water approximate latitude thirty degree forty four minute (15\(\alpha\)) thirty north longitude one hundred seventeen degree twenty seven east practically no valuable government property was salvage twenty three that after the Panay survivors had reached the left bank of the river the captain in view of his own injuries and the (20\(\alpha\)) injuries and shock sustained by his remaining line officers and the general feeling that attempts would be made to exterminate the survivors requested Captain FN Roberts US Army who was not injured and who was familiar with local operations and the Chinese language to act under his directions as his (25\(\alpha\))
FROM CINCPAC
ACTION BENGAY.

3123. SHEET FOUR. TWENTY EIGHT. THAT EARLY IN THE BOMBING ATTACKS THE
STANDARD OIL VESSEL SOT UNDERWAY WEIPING AND WEISHA SECURED TO A
POONTOON AT THE KAIYUAN WHARF THE MEIYAN WAS DISABLED AND BEACHED FURTHER
DOWN RIVER ON THE LEFT BANK ALL THESE SHIPS RECEIVED XXX INJURIES DURING
THE FIRST PHASES (5%) OF THE BOMBING. SERIOUS FIRES ON THE WEIPING
WERE EXTINGUISHED BY THE PANAY VISITING PARTY OF EIGHT MEN WHO WERE
UNABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR SHIP THIRTY NINE THAT AFTER ATTACKS ON THE
PANAY HAD CEASED THE WEIPING AND WEISHA WERE FURTHER ATTACKED BY JAPANESE
BOMBING PLANES SET ON FIRE (1/4%) AND DESTROYED. JUST PREVIOUS TO
THIS BOMBING JAPANESE ARMY UNITS ON SHORE NEAR THE WHARF ATTEMPTED TO
AVERT THIS BOMBING BY WAVING JAPANESE FLAGS THEY WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL AND
RECEIVED SEVERAL CASUALTIES IT IS KNOWN THAT CAPTAIN CARLSON OF THE
MEIYAN WAS KILLED AND THAT MESSRS. MARSHALL, VINES, PICKERING AND 150
COURIERS WERE WOUNDED. CASUALTIES AMONG THE CHINESE CREWS OF THESE VESSELS
WERE NUMEROUS BUT CANNOT BE FULLY DETERMINED. THIRTY THAT THE FOLLOWING
MEMBERS OF THE PANAY CASH LANDED ON SHORE FROM THE WEIPING AFTER VAINLY
ATTEMPTING TO EXTINGUISH OIL AND GASOLINE FIRES ON BOARD COLON VP PUCKETT
CMI. JA. STANES (2197/) FIRST JA. L. HOGUMPER SEAMAN FIRST TA. COLEMAN CPHM. JA.
BONCOLPWT. ON THIR. RL BOWING EM. THIR. JL. HENGE FIREMAN FIRST AMN. MT
HOYLE. MI. SECOND. THESE MEN ENCOUNTERED JAPANESE SOLDIERS ON SHORE WHO WERE
NOT HOSTILE ON LEARNING THEY WERE AMERICANS THIRTY ONE THAT ALL OF THE
PANAY CREW (250)
FROM THE MEIFENG EXCEPT JL HODGE FIREMAN FIRST REMAINED IN ONE GROUP
ASHORE UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY WHEN THEY WERE RESCUED BY HIS BEE HODGE
MADE HIS WAY TO WURI ANI RETURNED SHANGHAI VIA JAPANESE NAVAL PLANE ON
FOURTEEN DECEMBER THIRTY TWO THAT IN SEARCHING FOR AND RESCUING THEY
SURVIVORS REAR ADMIRAL HOLT RN AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF HIS BEE AND
HMS LAMYBIRD RENDERED MOST VALUABLE ASSISTANCE UNDER TRYING AND
DIFFICULT CONDITIONS THEREBY SHOWING A FINE SPIRIT OF HELPFULNESS AND COOPERATION
THIRTY THREE THAT CHARLES L ENSMINGER SC FIRST DIED AT THIRTEEN
THIRTY THIRTEEN DECEMBER AT KOSIEN CHINA (35) FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED
DURING THE BOMBING OF THE USS PANAY AND THAT HIS DEATH OCCURRED IN LINE
OF DUTY NOT THE RESULT OF HIS OWN MISCONDUCT THIRTY FOUR THAT EDGAR C
HULSEBUS COXSHAW DIED AT ZERO SIX THIRTY NINETEEN DECEMBER AT SHANGHAI
CHINA FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED DURING THE BOMBING (45) OF THE USS PANAY
AND THAT HIS DEATH OCCURRED IN LINE OF DUTY NOT THE RESULT OF HIS OWN
MISCONDUCT THIRTY FIVE THAT LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES J HUGHES LIEUTENANT
ARTHUR F AMERS LIEUTENANT JR JOHN W GEIST JOHN H LANK CQM ROBERT R
HERBARI FIREMAN FIRST KENNETH J RICE EM (46) THIRD CARL H BIRK EM
FIRST CHARLES S CHROYER SEAMAN FIRST ALEX KOZAK MW SECOND PERES & ZEGLER
SC THIRD AND NEWTON L NAD IS FIREMAN FIRST WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED IN
LINE OF DUTY NOT THE RESULT OF THEIR OWN MISCONDUCT THIRTY SIX THAT
LIEUTENANT CLARK G GRAZIER MC ENLISTED DENIS (56) H BIERSE CHARLES G
ADAMS MW SECOND TONY BARBA SC THIRD JOHN A BOMOWSKI ON THIRD ERNEST
C BRANCH FIREMAN FIRST SHEET FIVE FOLLOWS (62).

1821 VP MX. 22 DEC./1932

STATE MARCORPS(2) WHITE HOUSE
FROM GINCAF
ACTION SECHAV

S%23 SHEET FIVE RAYMOND L BROWNING EM THIRD WALTER CHEATHAM COXSWAIN
THOMAS A COLEMAN CHM JOHN A STIRLING FISHER SEAMAN FIRST YUAN T ERH MATT FIRST
FRED G FIGHTENMAYER CW FIRST EMERY F FISHER CWT MICHAEL GRENANT MM
SECOND CECIL B GREEN SEAMAN FIRST JOHN L HENRY FIREMAN FIRST FOR B HUFFMAN
AT SECOND KARL H JOHNSON MM SECOND CARL H KENSKE COXSWAIN PETER H KLEMPERS
CM WILLIAM P LANGER SEAMAN FIRST MM ERNEST P KAHLER CM WILLIAM A
MCCABE FIREMAN FIRST STANLEY W MCGRAW SEAMAN FIRST JAMES H PECK EM SECOND
REGINALD PETERSON MM SECOND VERNON F PUCKETT CM KING F SONG MATT
FIRST HARRY D TUCK SEAMAN FIRST CLEO E WAXLER CW SECOND JOHN T WEBER
SECOND YERMAN FIRST AND FAR Z WONG MATT FIRST WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED IN LINE OF
DUTY NOT THE RESULT OF THEIR OWN MISCONDUCT UNQUOTE S%23.

1735 WP LX 22 DEC.

S%3 ACTION
S%6 CW 1%A 11 13(4) 16(6) 19 2% 30 PX STATE MARCOMPS(2)

WHITE HOUSE
FROM: 2ND BRIGADE (USMV)  
ACTION: OPNAV CINCAF  
INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI CHINACOMSUBRON FIVE, COMDESRON FIVE, COMYANGPAT, COMSOPAT, AMAMBASSADOR CHINA, ALISNA  

PEIPING  

862Ø JAPANESE ADVANCE REPORTED 2Ø MILES NORTH  
PUK-OW 22 MILES  
WUHU PERIOD MAIN DRIVE  
NORTH CHINKIANG Ø 12 MILES WEST / DRIVE ON HANGCHOW MOVING SLOWLY ALONG  
GRAND CANAL NOW AT CHANGAN PERIOD TWELVE TRANSPORTS LOADED  
MUNITIONS FOOD YANGTZEPOO WHARVES AND DEPARTED FOR SEA PERIOD GENERAL  
HARADA. JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE TODAY CALLED EXPRESSED APOLOGIES  
REGRETS PANAY INCIDENT TO COMSECBRIG 19Ø8  

737 BEMX / 1423  
13-ACTION(JMX (4)  
05 10ØA 00-A 11 16)Ø  
19 20 38 PX CWO STATE  
MARCORPS(2)  
WHITEHOUSE  

RELAYED STATE DEPT VIA WR
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: 2ND BRIGADE (USM/V)
ACTION: OPNAV CINCAF
INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI CHINACOMSUBRON FIVE, COMDESRON FIVE,
COMYANGPAT, COMSOPAT, AMAMBASSADOR CHINA, ALUSNA
PEIPING C

862ø JAPANESE ADVANCE REPORTED 2Ø MILES NORTH PUK-OW 22 MILES
WUHU PERIOD MAIN DRIVE
NORTH CHINKIANG Ø 12 MILES WEST /DRIVE ON HANGCHOW MOVING SLOWLY ALONG
GRAND CANAL NOW AT CHANGAN PERIOD TWELVE TRANSPORTS LOADED
MUNITIONS FOOD YANGTZEPOO WHARVES AND DEPARTED FOR SEA PERIOD GENERAL
HARADA. JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE TODAY CALLED EXPRESSED APOLOGIES
REGRETS PANAY INCIDENT TO COMSECBRIG 19Ø8

Ø737 BEMX / 1423 13-ACTION(IMX (4)
05 100A 00-A 11 16)6
19 20 38 PX CWO STATE
MARCORPS(2) WHITEHOUSE

RELAYED STATE DEPT VIA WR
AND LOWLOON RAILWAYS AND DESTROYING AIRDROME AT WUCHOW LOCAL PRESS REPORTS
CHINESE SOURCES STATE ABOUT 15,000 JAPANESE TROOPS EARLY MORNING 26 DECEMBER
LANDED AT TA YA WAN NEAR BLAS BAY WITH INTENTION ADVANCING ON WUCHOW
AND TSANGHOUPTON TO CUT CANTON KOWLOON RAILWAY PERIOD TSINGTAO SITUATION
REPORTED TENSE BUT QUIET JAPANESE (250) PLANES 26 DECEMBER BOMBED NORTH
AIRWAYS STATION PERIOD HMS CAPETOWN CARRYING FOREIGN REFUGEES REPORTED PASS-
-ED NATUNG BOOM AND EXPECTED ARRIVE WOOSING 22 DECEMBER OTHER VESSELS ALSO
BRINGING REFUGEES REPORTED DELAYED AND BLOCKED BY BOOM DOMEI TOKYO
REPORTS JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL AT TSINGTAO NOW IN TOKYO DEMANDS
IMMEDIATE AND DRASTIC ACTION (350)

AGAINST CHINESE AT TSINGTAO STATING CONSTABLES WHO FORMERLY PROTECTED
JAPANESE PROPERTY WERE REPLACED BY SALT REVENUE GUARDS THESE MEN
LOOTED MILLS AND PREPARED LAND MINES FOR DESTRUCTION REUTER HONGKONG
OFFICIALS
REPORTS 2 JAPANESE CONSULAR OFFICERS AND 2 BRITISH OFFICERS STONED
BY GROUP XXXXXXXXXX CHINESE FARMERS IN LEASED TERRITORY 1 JAPANESE
RECEIVING DISLOCATED (350) SHOULDER DOMEI HONGKONG REPORTS Mob OF
SEVERAL HUNDRED CHINESE ATTACKED AND BEAT APRTY STRIPPING JAPANESE OF
BELONGINGS AND SERIOUSLY INJURING MAJOR SUZUKI JAPANESE RESULT OFFICER
IN HONGKONG REUTER HANKOW REPORTS UNITED STATES GREAT BRITAIN AND
FRANCE HAVE ASKED JAPAN FOR CREATION NEUTRAL ZONE AT HANKOW REUTER
HANKOW REPORTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (450)
OFFICES IN CHUNGKING ISSUED STATEMENT 23 DECEMBER REPUDIATING PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN PEIPING AND NATIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL ISSUED ORDER FOR ARREST ALL CONCERNED WITH BOGUS REGIME 957

16ACT (4)
1cA 11 12 13(4) 19 2e 2egy
MID ARMY in envelope via tuba

1119 AH MX.
radio uss luzon ck 137 govt state priority twelfth 2250 priority ch

govt state priority secstate washington aemembassy peiping amconsul

shanghai information of cinc

twenty nine december twelve ten pm

british gunboats scarab and criket with jardine hulk and merchant
ship whangpoo loaded with foreign refugees were deliberately bombed this
afternoon period no casualties reported but as there are american
refugees from nanking on hulk i hope department will urgently instruct
tokyo to press the japanese government to issue instructions which will
prevent this in future stop japanese informed british at wuhu today that
japanese military forces have orders to fire on all ships on yangtze
stop unless japanese can be made to realize that these ships are
friendly and are only refuge available to americans and other foreigners
a terrible disaster is likely to happen para sent to the department
repeated to peiping shanghai information of cinc

johnson

1311 ci mx/1321/1331 13 act (4) ø5 1øa 11 16 (6)
19 2ø 3ø px cwo relayed state

foned to 13 1345
foned to 11 1422
Additional material on the Panay incident can be found in PSF Navy 1937

Panay Folder