THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is for your eyes only.
Will you please read and return?

F. D. R.

[Handwritten words: PSF: China, Confidential, Thanks]
Dear Miss LeHand:

I clipped here yesterday from Hongkong and plan to remain over one Clipper, fly to Honolulu, and take ship from there probably the Matesonia. It seemed wise to remain here long enough to get the factors in the local situation fixed in my mind.

The week in Hongkong was productive of considerable information, a good deal of which dove-tailed with much that I had gathered elsewhere. I had long and quite satisfactory talks with Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Madame H. H. Kung. The former is living with the latter. Madame Chiang appeared to me to be more mellow and less prejudiced than in Hankow days. I spoke quite frankly of the weaknesses and inefficiency I had observed in the course of my travels and suggested ways and means by which they might be corrected. She was receptive and asked for the names of men I had met who were honest, intelligent and possessed executive ability. One remark of hers was most encouraging. Speaking of getting things done she said: "I don't care whether a man is a Communist or not. If he can do a job I say turn it over to him and let him do it." That was quite a concession, I thought, in view of the marked anti-communist sentiment in the government at present.

I also had a good talk with Madame Sun Yat-sen. In many respects she is saner than either of her more celebrated sisters. I find I can talk to her without having to guard against offending her. She likes facts straight from the shoulder. However, she is more retiring than either Ai-ling or Mei-ling, and is not as effective on the platform.

K. P. Chen was another to whom I spoke frankly. I told him about the wolfram situation. He is honest and has no strong political bias.

However, my most interesting informant was a man who is high in government counsels, and whose name I am reluctant to put on paper. Doubtless he had an axe to grind - they all do - but he is for continued resistance, and he has split with his colleagues on this point.

The gist of his story is this: Wang Shih-chien, the Minister of Publicity, who is the chief adviser to the Generalissimo at present, is the head of a peace group. Outwardly Wang heads the pro-American and British group. It was he who told me at Chungking, when I was trying to determine whether the Kuomintang had any specific plan for moving from the period of Political Tutelage to the period of Representative Government, that conditions had changed since Dr. Sun Yat-sen enunciated the Three Principles of the People, and that it might be necessary to modify them.

Manila, P. I.,
13 January 1941.
Wang, it appears, has set about to prepare the ground work for mediation by President Roosevelt. Efforts to secure mediation by Germany and Italy, in 1937-38, failed, as did an effort to secure British mediation in 1939-40. His method is this: the Ambassadors at Washington and London are his men. They create the atmosphere in those respective countries as directed by Wang, and they make reports to the Generalissimo as suggested by him. At Chungking his men form a ring around the Generalissimo which makes it extremely difficult for the latter to receive information which is not approved by Wang. The channels of information are further guarded by assigning trusted subordinates to "cover" the American and British Ambassadors in Chungking. Han Li-wu, secretary of the Sino-British Boxer Indemnity Fund, does the job for the British Ambassador, while Doctor Pan Shu-pai, Vice-Minister of Communication, leads those who try to keep Mr. Johnson covered. The object of promoting mediation is to keep the present clique in power. Wang fears a popular movement, and he feels that one is more imminent the longer the war lasts. In this respect the "peace" group and the extreme right group, which is fanning the anti-Communist agitation, are acting by the same motive.

The same informant told me that the Chinese Ambassador to Berlin is returning with peace terms from Hitler. They are about the same as the last Japanese terms: a) Withdrawal of Japanese troops by stages; b) Removal of the Wang Ching-wei government; and c) Solution of other problems by political means. Germany undertakes to guarantee the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

I have informed both the American and British Ambassadors of the above described situation in order that they may be on their guard. The objective for which we should strive in this respect is to get information direct to Chiang Kai-shek.

Now to summarize: Our interest in the present situation, it seems to me, is to keep China actively resisting Japanese aggression. Unity within the nation is essential. Any device we can use in this direction will be effective, for China looks to us for support and guidance. We can also assist in straightening out the motor transport mess, and to promote industrial development on the cooperative basis in order to stymie Japan's economic penetration. We should guard against hoarding money unless we know how it will be spent, for the loafers are hanging around like vultures, waiting to get their hands on whatever is lying around unguarded.

It is good to get away from the environment of spying and censorship. The atmosphere of the Philippines is clean and free in comparison with any part of China - including Hongkong - today.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely,

F. S. I will go directly to Plymouth, Connecticut on my return. When convenient for him I would like to talk to the President.
NOTE:

Copy this letter filed with other related correspondence in China folder

China - 1941
Dear President Roosevelt,

Your kind letter of January twenty-third sent through Dr. Currie has been received. I appreciate deeply the assistance extended by your Government to China and your personal regards for my welfare.

During Dr. Currie's visit we have had several talks, and have exchanged views on different subjects. These discussions, I feel certain, will contribute in the improvement of China's economic situation. I have long desired to bring to your attention various problems now facing us. I am glad, therefore, that through Dr. Currie I have this long-wished-for opportunity. I firmly believe that henceforth the friendship between our two countries, and the ties binding us in the attainment of a common object will be further strengthened.

May I assure you that I shall do my part in helping to further just and lasting peace, and to bring about a better world order—two aspirations which you hold so dear and for which you have worked unceasingly.

For the rest, I have requested Dr. Currie to convey to you my hopes and suggestions.

With personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Chiang Kai-shek

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Washington, D. C.
United States of America
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a suggested draft of a letter to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, prepared by the State Department and by me. I hope, by the way, that I am correct in believing that the stamps comprise the issues since the foundation of the Republic.

The State Department suggests that after being signed it be returned to it for transmission through our embassy at Chungking.

Lauchlin Currie
April 9, 1941

Dear Generalissimo Chiang:

I received with great pleasure your kind letter of February 26 and the beautiful presents which you and Madame Chiang asked Dr. Currie to bring to Mrs. Roosevelt and myself. Please also convey my thanks to Dr. H. H. Kung for his kind gifts.

The album of a set of stamps issued since the foundation of the Republic of China is a valuable contribution to my collection and the scheelite seals arouse in me a personal feeling of appreciation of the fine cultural and artistic achievements of your great nation.

I am glad to know that you found it possible to have extensive, frank and thorough discussions with Dr. Currie. He brought back to me much good news about China. The unity of China in resisting foreign aggression has been an inspiration to the whole world and I was especially glad to learn from Dr. Currie that this marvelous spirit of the Chinese people has been maintained. It was also heartening to hear of your program of administrative and economic reforms, especially the reforms in county (hsien) government and other steps you are contemplating taking in the furtherance of a democratic development in China.

As you are aware, we are exerting ourselves to be helpful in positive, concrete ways to nations which are resisting armed attack, including your country. We believe wholeheartedly that the cause to which we are committed will win. We attempt — as I know you do — to view the entire
picture with a sense of realism and objectivity, and we are not unmindful of the magnitude of the task before us and of the need by all of continuing and even greater effort. In this light I appreciate especially the expression of your support of the principles which this Government is convinced form the only sound basis for healthful and durable relations among nations.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
President, Executive Yuan,
Chungking, China.

(FDR)

LC: em
NOTE: Original of this letter filed "Famous People" file.
Headquarters of the Generalissimo

Chungking, Szechuan
China
26 February, 1941

Dear President Roosevelt,

Your kind letter of January twenty-third sent through Dr. Currie has been received. I appreciate deeply the assistance extended by your Government to China and your personal regards for my welfare.

During Dr. Currie's visit we have had several talks and have exchanged views on different subjects. These discussions, I feel certain, will contribute in the improvement of China's economic situation. I have long desired to bring to your attention various problems now facing us. I am glad, therefore, that through Dr. Currie I have this long-wished-for opportunity. I firmly believe that henceforth the friendship between our two countries, and the ties binding us in the attainment of a common object will be further strengthened.

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For the rest, I have requested Dr. Currie to convey to you my hopes and suggestions.

With personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Chiang Kai-shek

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Washington, D. C.
United States of America.
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羅斯福大總統閣下：一月二十三日

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深信
羅斯福大總統閣下
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. LAUCHLIN CURRIE

Will you and the State Department prepare replies to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek for Mrs. Roosevelt and me?

F. D. R.

Memorandum for the President, from Lauchlin Currie, 3/12/41 advising that he has some gifts from the Generalissimo, and that he will receive another gift from Madame Chiang Kai-shek for Mrs. Roosevelt and other gifts being forwarded to Pres. and Mrs. Roosevelt from Dr. Kung. Enclosed letter of personal greeting from the Generalissimo, translation of the Chinese inscriptions on the seals present to the President and Mrs. Roosevelt by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 3/12/41 from Lauchlin Currie, memorandum from Mr. Currie, 3/16/41 to Miss LeHand, in re report on general situation in China, etc.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. LAUCHLIN CURRIE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO MISS LE HAND:

Noted.

Lauchlin Currie
In reply refer to
FE 033.1193, Currie, Lauchlin/23

April 12, 1941

My dear General Watson:

It is believed that the President may be interested in information contained in a despatch of March 3, 1941 received by mail from the American Ambassador at Chungking with regard to Mr. Lauchlin Currie's recent visit to China.

In the despatch in question Ambassador Johnson states that Mr. Currie's visit undoubtedly accomplished a good purpose and that all members of the Chinese Government feel more confident of the future, as they look upon Mr. Currie's visit as definite evidence that the United States is seriously interested in China's future and will continue to give additional assistance to China; that Mr. Currie's investigations may be compared in a way to an audit as they brought more clearly to the attention of the Chinese Government many weaknesses and problems;

that

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
that an excellent opportunity was afforded by the visit for a thorough check-up of the country's present state of affairs and for discussion of major problems with an economic expert; that the visit gave the Chinese Government considerable encouragement; and that Chinese officials unquestionably appreciate the valuable advice which they received from Mr. Currie.

Mr. Johnson reported also that the press at Chungking had commented at some length on Mr. Currie's visit and that the comment was without exception of a favorable nature.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
AID FOR CHINA UNDER THE LEASE-LEND PROGRAM

Aid for China is an integral part of the lease-lend program. The administrative machinery for effectuating this aid has already been put in motion. The Chinese Government has submitted a list of its requirements and these requirements are being analyzed and processed. Items in which we expect to extend aid to China as soon as possible include combat planes, artillery, raw material for Chinese arsenals, tanks, signalling equipment, transport equipment and quartermaster supplies. It is anticipated that requirements may amount to something like half a billion dollars.
Nothing has happened in recent days to alter in the slightest the American Government's announced policy of aiding the victims of aggression. China is definitely one of the victims of aggression and aid is being extended to China under the lease-lend program just as it is being extended to other victims of aggression, including Great Britain, Yugoslavia and Greece. In each case aid is being rushed to the full limits permitted by statute and by the requirements of our own defense.
May 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Publicity in Connection with Air Mission to China.

Did you have in mind something along the lines of the attached?

[Signature]

Beuchlin Currie
May 1, 1941.

DRAFT OF DIRECTIVE TO BRIGADIER GENERAL CLAGETT

UPON YOUR ARRIVAL AT CHUNGKING YOU ARE AUTHORIZED AND INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE PRESS CONCERNING YOUR MISSION:

COMMANDER MACDONALD, LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE AND I, CONSTITUTING AN AIR MISSION, HAVE COME TO CHINA UNDER INSTRUCTIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN RESPONSE TO AN INVITATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. THE PURPOSE OF OUR VISIT IS TO STUDY THE CHINESE AIR FORCE, ITS FACILITIES, AND ITS OPERATIONS. WE SHALL REMAIN AS LONG AS IS NECESSARY TO INFORM OURSELVES THOROUGHLY ON THESE MATTERS.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Chinese Aircraft Program

In connection with your consideration of the tentative aircraft program for China which I submitted yesterday, you may find the attached documents of some interest. The one without a title was prepared by the Chinese Mission here and the other was written by Dr. Hornbeck.

Lauchlin Currie

Lauchlin Currie
Singapore is the key to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Its position determines the control of eastern Asia regardless of the fate of the Philippines. All steps taken so far by Japan indicate their intention to prepare for a move against Singapore.

One may assume that although Singapore is well fortified, small British land, sea, and air forces there are likely to find it difficult to sustain for long the full impact of the Japanese fleet, air, and land forces unless outside assistance be given.

The recent Soviet-Japanese pact has enabled Japan to release at least ten crack divisions and some five hundred first line planes now in Manchuria for operation in other theaters of war.

Singapore could be saved by active intervention of the entire United States fleet with its attendant dangers and complications.

There is, however, a powerful means to check Japanese attack on Singapore and the South Seas or to assist in the effective defence of the beleaguered key fortress, without the intervention of the United States fleet, and that is the creation of a small but efficient air force in China.

This force would constitute a threat to the flank of a Japanese advance southward. Every Japanese move, concentrations on Formosa or Hainan, convoys of transports into China, Siam, or further west, transport of troops across Indo-China, and above all, Japanese air concentrations in Tonkin and Cochin China would be watched systematically, but more important, exposed to constant attack and diversion.

The configuration of southeastern Asia exposes Japan to such action on the part of an efficient hostile air force. Such a force located between the Burma frontier and the province of Kweichow, mostly on high plateaus, has only to cover some 350 miles to reach the Japanese air concentrations at Hanoi, where hundreds of planes are crowding the few airports which the topography of the country permits to utilize. Further, it would interfere with Japanese military transports and troop concentration on Formosa, Hainan, Paracels Island, which are all within easy range. The force could as easily attack concentrations of Japanese planes, troops, and shipping in southern Indo-China and Siam.

The Japanese are sprawled all over China and the existence of this air force would enable the main body of the Chinese regular armies to undertake counter-offensive operations with good assurance of success, which they cannot do at present until so provided with the requisite air arm. The Japanese armies in central China depend exclusively for their supplies on the long and winding Yangtze, which provides an ideal target for an air force operating on interior lines. With the initial strength of the new air force the Chinese troops could launch counter-attacks, the main purpose of which would be not only to hold existing Japanese forces in China but to compel the continuous dispatch of strong reinforcements.

Finally, the main industrial areas within Japan, the triangle Kobe, Kyoto, Osaka, as well as Yokohama and Tokyo, could be attacked by bombers operating from existing air fields in China.
All the above objectives can be achieved efficiently and successfully by a force of 500 planes composed of 350 pursuit and 150 bombers. The existing lines of communication from ports of entry from the west permit to supply and maintain in the field such a force, and would be doubly assured if urgently supplemented by some 35 transport planes of the DC-3 type. The American operated China National Airways Corporation estimate that this would give an additional capacity of 4000 tons monthly from the rail head in Burma and over the most difficult section of the Burma highway.

The full strength of 500 planes could be reached by three stages.

The first stage when the 100 P-40’s now on the water reach China and the pilots and ground crews now volunteering for service are already in the field. In July the force of pursuits could begin protecting the ways of access to China and particularly the Burma highway.

Second stage. A force ready to operate in September and composed of 200 pursuits and 100 bombers could be constituted if immediate decision were taken and intense preparations were made to supply an additional 100 pursuits and 100 bombers to be shipped during the month of May.

Third stage. By the first of November a full force of 500 craft would be ready to operate by shipment in June and July of 150 pursuits and 50 bombers. In addition, replacements at the rate of 15% would have to be provided.

The gradual development of the operations would by then permit the full force to attack all the objectives at the end of the rainy season. From the first of November there is six months of clear weather over Burma and Yunnan, permitting extensive operations. Thus preparatory work would be accomplished under the cover of bad weather and the force would be ready to operate at the best season, provided immediate decision and requisite practical steps are taken, which would imply certain diversions of planes, equipment, and personnel, and concentrated preparation (including the question of shipping).

Permission has already been obtained to recruit pilots and ground crews for the P-40’s already on the way. If permission is given to recruit an additional 150 pilots and 300 technical men for ground crews, the personnel of the force could be in the field by the end of July. There are 1200 Chinese pilots and a large number of ground crews available in China; one-third experienced, one-third with fighting experience, and the remainder requiring more training, and the existence of this renders it possible to limit the number of the foreign members of the force.

With this personnel and air craft in operation this autumn, not only the determined Japanese move toward the south could be prevented or rendered difficult, but should this move materialize, vitally effective assistance would be afforded to the defenders of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by constant attacks in the rear of the enemy forces.

To sum up:

Effective air operations in China should follow a carefully planned program which includes the procurement, shipment, assembly, and operation of specified types of airplanes in order to attain prescribed tactical and strategical objectives.
The general outline of such a program follows.

First Phase

Airplanes Required:
1. 100 bombardment, modified Lockheed Hudson type.
2. 100 pursuit, P-40 type.
3. 100 pursuit, P-43 type.
   Note: Of the above listed airplanes, 100 P-40's have been procured and are en route to China.

Volunteer Personnel:
1. 100 pilots.
2. 160 technical and clerical.
   Note: These men are now being employed.

Tactical Objectives:
1. Defence of air bases, Burma highway, supplies in transit and in storage in Yunnan province and industrial establishments in vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan, by:
   a. Local operation of pursuit airplanes.
   b. Counter-offensive operations of bombardment airplanes.

Strategic Objective:
To force the Japanese to divert a portion of the air force now available for expeditionary use to the defence of his bases in Indo-China and counter offensive operations in Yunnan province.

Time Schedule:
1. The 100 pursuit airplanes, P-40 type, may begin initial operations early in July, 1941.
2. The 100 bombardment airplanes, Lockheed Hudson type, and 100 pursuit airplanes, P-43 type, may begin operations early in September if the airplanes of both classes are made available without delay.

Second Phase

Airplanes Required:
1. Maintenance of initial strength of:
   a. 100 pursuit, P-40 type;
   b. 100 pursuit, P-43 type;
   c. 100 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson type, by regular monthly replacement of losses.

2. Provision of additional airplanes of following classes, types, and numbers:
   a. 100 pursuit, P-43 or P-47.
   b. 50 pursuit, P-39.
   c. 50 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson, B-26 or B-23.
Volunteer Personnel:

1. Increase volunteer personnel as follows:
   a. Pilots, 150 additional.
   b. Technical, clerical, 250 additional.

Tactical Objectives:

1. Defence of all establishments in Yunnan province.
3. Attack Japanese supply dumps in Indo-China and Hainan Island.
4. Attack Japanese supply vessels, transports, tankers, and small naval vessels in harbors of Indo-China and Hainan Island and at sea between those places.
5. Occasional raids on Japanese industrial establishments in Japan.
7. Support of offensive operations of Chinese armies.

Strategical Objectives:

1. Force diversion of considerable portion of available Japanese air force to defence of Japanese establishments on south China coast and in Japan and to counter-offensive operations in interior of China.
2. Enable Chinese armies to assume offensive operations which will make necessary heavy reinforcement of Japanese troops in China.
3. Destruction of Japanese supplies and supply ships in order to handicap operations of an expeditionary force to the south of Indo-China.
4. Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple production of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan.

Time Schedule

1. The increase of the air force from 300 to 500 airplanes (350 pursuit and 150 bombardment) should be completed by October 31, 1941.

When the railway between the Burma Road and Siang Yun is completed, and this could be effected by June, 1942, sufficient carrying capacity would be amply provided for the maintenance in the field of 1,000 combat planes, or indeed any strength it is desired to build up to.
### Table of Approximate Distances in Statute Miles

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December 4, 1940
Revised April 23, 1941

The importance of Singapore to the defense of the British Isles and the British Empire and to the interests of the United States.

1. The importance of Singapore to the immediate defense of the British Isles lies in the fact that any major naval power based in Singapore could command the Indian Ocean and the maritime routes of access to the raw materials and manpower of India, Malaya, and most of the Dutch East Indies. While the British Isles could perhaps carry on without access to these materials and to this manpower, the effect of such a loss upon the economic and financial resources of the British Empire—a vital factor in the defense of the British Isles—would be considerable. Such a loss by seriously weakening our own economy (rubber, tin, jute, quinine, vegetable oils, tungsten, antimony, mica are among the supplies that might be lost to us) would adversely affect the extent of our economic aid to the British Isles.

2. More important, the British Isles cannot carry on in a defensive position for an indefinitely prolonged period. However strong defensively, they must in time succumb unless a sustained offensive can successfully be launched against Germany. It is from this point of view that
that Singapore assumes its greatest importance in the
defense--as directed to ultimate survival--of the British
Isles; i.e., the long-term defense of the Isles.

From point of view of ultimate offensive action
against Germany, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near
East are areas of major and of obvious importance afford-
ing as they do (1) the key to an invasion of Europe through
the disaffected occupied countries of the Balkans or
through a weakened and perhaps collapseing Italy and (2) a
possible means of once more bringing into action against
the Axis the French forces in Syria and in North Africa.
The significance of Singapore to the defense of the British
position in the Near East lies in its domination of the
only remaining effective lines of communication for the
supply of materials and troops to that area. If the
Japanese gained possession of Singapore it would seem that
they could not only control Malaya and the Netherlands East
Indies but most or all of the Indian Ocean as well. (See
attached summary of distances from Singapore to various
points.)

Troop reinforcements for the British forces in the
Near East come from Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma,
South Africa and/or the British Isles. Supplies for these
forces come from some or all of the foregoing areas and/or
from among the following: Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Western Hemisphere. As British naval power cannot ensure uninterrupted passage of the Mediterranean by British transports or by British merchant vessels (even though the increasingly doubtful assumption be made that the Axis powers will at no time during the war be able to close the Straits of Gibraltar), the only sure (for the present) route of access to the Near East from the areas named above is via the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

3. It must also be remembered that one of Britain's major weapons against Germany is the blockade. The rôle of Suez and of the Eastern Mediterranean in the enforcement of the blockade is readily apparent. Singapore's rôle is hardly of less significance. The regions of the Indian Ocean and of the Pacific eastward and southward and northward from Singapore are vast reservoirs of supplies. While Great Britain controls the routes to those reservoirs, Germany can be kept in large measure from drawing on them. Should Great Britain lose that control, not only would the British Isles be deprived of those supplies but those supplies would in substantial measure be made available to Germany--via the Persian Gulf and the Caspian and via Vladivostok. In the event of loss by the British both of Singapore
Sin gapore and of their position in the Near East, the Axis Powers would have direct and full access to each other and these supplies could, therefore, be made directly available to Germany with the result that all effectiveness of the strategy of the blockade would be lost.

In brief, were Singapore to be taken by Japan, Great Britain's tasks, both of (1) defending the British Isles and of (2) winning the war, would be rendered vastly more difficult and her chances of survival be greatly diminished.

4. Singapore is, furthermore, important from point of view of more obviously direct interests of the United States. Were Singapore to fall, the blockade of China (except for the inadequate and unreliable northwest route from Russia) could be made complete and the defeat of China by Japan would be facilitated. The control over the natural resources of the South Seas area which Japan would acquire if it took Singapore has already been indicated. Our own position in the Philippines—a far more valuable possession both economically and strategically than is usually recognized—would, of course, be strategically prejudiced.

It is in its effect upon China's resistance, however, that the fall of Singapore to Japan would most conclusively
conclusively affect (adversely) the direct interests of the United States (other than and in addition to our interest in survival of the British Empire). Were China to succumb, we would be less able than now to protect our interests in the Far East. Our historic Far Eastern policy and our whole position in the Far East would be seriously compromised. Not the least of the disastrous results of China's defeat would be a serious drop, as a result of such a blow to our prestige, in popular morale in this country and in the morale of the peoples of South America. The only remaining counter weights to the power and influence in the Far East of Japan would be those of Russia. With the collapse of China, Japan would be master in East Asia and in the South Seas, and Japan would be able to draw freely upon China's natural resources and man power. The security of Australia and New Zealand—to both of which we are bound by increasingly strong ties—would be endangered. In addition, Japan's access to the great economic resources of India would be definitely facilitated and Japanese political influence in India would increase.

The increase in Japan's strength vis-à-vis the United States which would result from these various developments would be notable, and Japan's ability to challenge our economic
economic (and before long our political) position in Central and South America would be vastly increased. At the same time, our general commercial and strategic position would be considerably weakened—by our loss of the Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets for our exports (and by our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self-sufficient) as well as by inevitable restrictions upon our access to the rubber, tin, quinine, jute, tungsten, tung oil and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions.

5. It has been suggested that Japan would be only too glad to sell to the British and to us the products of the region, and that in fact, therefore, our (and the British) economic situation would not be adversely affected. The fate of British and American trade in Manchuria and in North China is persuasive evidence that our (and British) export trade would certainly suffer. Whether Japan's ability to dictate the terms upon which we could acquire rubber, tin and other products would also prove harmful to us in times of peace need not concern us. The present and the immediate futures are times of war, and in the war that is raging not only is Japan an open if nonbelligerent partner of Germany and Italy but the United States is openly aiding Great Britain and China.
Japan must--while and so long as she is an ally of Germany--aid Germany in the latter's attempt to destroy the British Empire, and toward that end Japan must give support to Germany's attempts to hamstring the British in their operations--both general and particular--of resistance. Consequently, were Japan to acquire control of Singapore (i.e. control of the key ways to the vast natural resources of Asia and the South Seas) it could not with any warrant be expected that she would freely sell to the British or to us--we being Britain's greatest armorer and supplier--what we severally and jointly need (with our expanding requirements) of the strategic materials of the Orient.

6. There is little if any warrant for the view, rather lightly advanced in various quarters (and made without consideration of the above-enumerated reasons why successful Japanese aggression southward would make Germany's defeat far less likely), that, if and when Germany shall have been defeated, it would be an easy matter for Great Britain and/or the United States to put Japan out of any advanced positions which Japan may or might have taken while British and American attention and efforts were concentrated upon problems in the Atlantic and in Europe. Were the Japanese during the present war to occupy Singapore without having had to pay a huge price,
price, the Japanese Empire would be at the end of the war a very different entity from that which it is today, an entity much more powerful in a military sense than it is now. Is there any warrant for an assumption that at that point the British would be so powerful that they would and could move with success against such a Japan as would then exist? It may well be doubted, also, whether the people of the United States would at that point be willing to embark upon far-flung overseas operations for the mere purpose of driving the Japanese out of points in which they had established themselves on the western side of the Pacific.
Distances from Singapore to various points, in statute miles by Great Circle measurements--

West coast of Ceylon - 1700 miles.

(Note: If Singapore could not be defended, certainly Ceylon could not be--from Colombo to the mouth of the Gulf of Aden it is 2000 miles and from Colombo to the northwestern tip of Sumatra it is 1100 miles. Furthermore, Italian East Africa would be available for minor bases, thus permitting the distances from Colombo to the coast of Italian East Africa--2000 miles at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; 2700 miles at the frontier between Kenya and Italian East Africa--to be halved. Bases at Singapore, Sumatra, Colombo and Italian East Africa would give Japan control of the Indian Ocean with consequent ability to blockade India and to cut all communications to the Gulf of Aden.)

Mouth of Gulf of Aden - 3700 miles.

Northwestern point of Australia - 1800 miles.

(From Java, which is controlled by Singapore, the distance is 1200 miles.)

West coast of Borneo - 400 miles.

Southern tip of French Indochina - 450 miles (thus controlling Gulf of Siam.)

Jolu in Sulu archipelago of Philippines - 1250 miles.
May 15, 1941

Dear Lauch:

It is quite all right to go ahead and negotiate regarding the air program or any other thing that the Chinese request but I don't want to imply that I am at this time in favor of any of the proposals. Obviously that can only be finally worked out in relationship to our whole military problem and the needs of ourselves and the British. This should be taken up with General Burns and General Arnold.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Lauchlin Currie

HLH/1mb
5-14-41

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

For preparation of reply to Currie.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Aircraft Program for China.

After spending a lot of time trying to inform myself on the general aircraft program and the various factors that have to be borne in mind, I have worked out a tentative program for the balance of this year. I don't think it will disrupt in any significant degree the Army or British programs and I believe that, though modest, it is probably as large as the Chinese can handle this year. I need not emphasize the actual importance of establishing a decent air force in China, nor the psychological importance of an early determination of a program that the Chinese can count on.

May I proceed to negotiate with the Army and the British on this tentative program with the understanding that while you are prepared to accept modifications in the plan, nevertheless you approve of the general magnitudes involved? This would give me a basis for negotiation.

Lauchlin Currie
A TENTATIVE AIRCRAFT PROGRAM FOR CHINA

The following program is designed to supply China in 1941 with 244 pursuit ships, 112 bombers, 340 trainers and 22 transport planes.

1. Pursuit Ships.

a. The British are prepared to release 144 air-cooled engine Vultee 48 C's. This force could be replaced and augmented by the release by our Army in the first six months of 1942 of their 147 air-cooled Republic P 43's as the more advanced P 47's become available.

b. In order to replace and augment the initial Chinese pursuit force of 100 liquid-cooled Curtiss P 40 now en route, the Army could release 100 P40B, as the more advanced P 40 D's and E's come into production. This release could be continued in the first half of 1942.

2. Bombers.

It is suggested that the Army release 40 of its older B 18 bombers, of which it has 258, and which, though slow, are suitable for night bombing. It is further suggested that the Army and the British release from current production 72 bombers up to the end of 1941 according to the following schedule:

3 each monthly from the Army and the British in May, June and July.
4 each monthly in August and September.
5 each monthly in October and November.
6 each in December.

A gradually increasing monthly schedule could then be provided for throughout 1942 to provide for replacements and additions.

3. Trainers.

Heavy emphasis should be placed immediately on the creation of a first-class Chinese air force. To this end it is suggested that a group of instructors under the charge of a first-class army flying school officer be sent to China. It is further suggested that 340 advanced and primary trainers be diverted from the production of 7,170 scheduled for the army this year. A tentative schedule might be as follows:

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<tr>
<td>May</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td>November</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>
3. **Transport Planes.**

It is suggested that ten additional B-18's be released by the Army for this purpose and that the twelve DC3's now detailed to Army generals be released. For personal Army transport service here the two-engined Beechcraft, seating six and faster than the DC3's, would appear to be a desirable substitution for DC3's.
The attached tentative program would call for the following schedule of deliveries:

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<tr>
<td>1. Pursuit ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vultee P 48C</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curtiss P 40B</td>
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<td>Republic P 43</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>2. Bombers</td>
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<td>B 18</td>
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<td>3. Trainers</td>
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<td>4. Transport</td>
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<td>B 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC 3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</table>
Published in Pearl Harbor Hearings

Part 19 Pages 3496-3498

Published also in Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, page 1004.
Telegram from General Chiang Kai-shek
Dated July 8th, 1941

From most reliable sources originating from Japan it is learned that a secret agreement has been concluded and signed between Germany, Italy and Japan on the 6th of July, covering on the one hand recognition of Japanese spheres of interest, and on the other Japanese undertaking to advance southward and against Siberia. Please communicate the news to the President immediately.

Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Soviets have repeatedly announced their desire to conclude definite military arrangements with us against Japan. Will you ask the President if he would be in favor of such an arrangement, and if the situation is ripening for a military pact between China, Russia and Great Britain with the friendly support of the United States.
The Government has secured definite information that the recent Japanese Imperial Conference made the decision to move southward against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies first before coping with the Siberian problem.

In accordance with this information all departments of the Government have received instructions from the Generalissimo to take immediate measures to meet this action.
Telegram from Berlin
Dated July 4, 1941

Replying to your telegram No. 19 during Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin although understanding was reached as to the respective spheres of interest and responsibilities the three Axis partners were unable to agree on the tempo of action. Germany and Italy desired immediate Japanese advance southward to which Matsuoka would not agree owing to the then prevailing situation.

I now learn that since the outbreak of the Russo-German conflict complete agreement has been reached which calls for early action against Vladivostok by Japan, simultaneous with consolidation of Japanese bases in Indo-China and Thailand preparatory to an advance southward against the British and the Dutch.

Our friends here declare that we should be by no means discouraged by developments and hope that you may still be able to visit Switzerland.

Owing to the severance of diplomatic relations I am routing my telegram through Switzerland. I am proceeding there myself and hope to maintain contact with our friends from there.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. IV The Far East
pages 1005–1006.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

July 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Reply to Chiang Kai-shek's message.

In accordance with your instructions, I discussed this matter with Mr. Welles. He suggests that you authorize me to convey the following message to T. V. Soong:

In answer to the Generalissimo's enquiry as to whether the President would be in favor of definite military arrangements between the Soviet and Chinese Governments, the President has authorized me to inform you that the United States Government, not being a party to the agreement, cannot take responsibility for it. However, the President added that he was of the opinion that such military arrangements would definitely be to China's benefit. His attitude toward the suggested pact between China, Russia and Great Britain was similar. The President would appreciate further information as to the nature of the proposed military arrangements and pact.

/s/ Lauchlin Currie

Lauchlin Currie

"L. C"

"OK"

"FDR"
Representative John M. Vorys, of Ohio, to President Roosevelt, Washington, July 11, 1941, enclosing a memorandum by Dr. E. Stanley Jones entitled "Memorandum of Conversations Regarding Possible Peace Between Japan and China (undated). Mr. Vorys sent to the President the memorandum of the conversations which Dr. Jones had with Dr. Miao, Secretary of the National Christian Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, well-known author of Japan regarding a basis of peace between China and Japan.


O.F. 150-C July 11, 1941
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I HAVE TALKED TO THE
PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS AND IT
CAN BE FILED.

H.L.H.
June 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS

Will you speak to me
about this?

F. D. R.
Telegram from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
Chungking, May 31st, 1941

The following is my message to the President, which please present through Mr. Currie:

"The Chinese people are most thankful to you for the reference to our national struggle against Japanese aggression in your fireside chat of May 27th, and also your assurance of continued and increased material assistance.

I take this opportunity to thank you most warmly for your approval of $49,000,000 worth of ordnance for China under the Lease-Lend Bill.

May I refer again to our urgent need of airplanes. Through Dr. T. V. Soong I have presented a request for the modest organization of an air unit of 500 airplanes. Knowing your great sympathy and interest in our difficult struggle, may I request you to give this scheme your early approval which will further strengthen the morale of our people and our Army."
CABLE TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE FROM OWEN LATTIMORE

CHUNGKING, July 22, 1941.

FOLLOWING IS FROM GENERALISSIMO. PLEASE NOTE RELIABLE INFORMATION RECEIVED. ON JULY (?) AT ROME JAPAN, GERMANY, ITALY SIGNED SECRET EXTENSION OF AXIS PACT PREVIOUSLY PREPARED BUT UNSIGNED. GENERALISSIMO NOW CONFIDENT JAPAN WILL ATTACK RUSSIA WITHIN FEW WEEKS. TWO REASONS FOR ATTACK. FIRST, KUANTUNG ARMY WILL TAKE INITIATIVE. SECOND, FEAR OF REVOLUTION IN JAPAN IF NO DECISIVE MOVE MADE.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: China Aid Program for New Appropriations

I have been spending a lot of time on the China Aid program for the purpose of the new lease lend appropriation. The original Chinese requests amounted to about $1.5 billion. In conjunction with the War and Treasury Departments and General Burns, I worked out a program amounting to $600 million. This program is one which I believe we can meet through 1942, and one which I believe to be within the capacity of the Burma Road to transport. Only $215 million was earmarked for China out of the original $7 billion, plus $23 million from the $1.3 billion available for diversion from stocks. Since the Chinese Aid program is popular, since it has been allotted a relatively small amount to date, and since we can use any of the goods we might not be able to send to China, I hope that you will approve the program when it is submitted to you by General Burns and the Budget Director.

Lauchlin Currie
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

I note in a number of dispatches during the past week or ten days that Japanese troop or plane withdrawals are reported from several sectors on the Chinese front.

I think we should relay these reports to Gauss and the Military Attache in Chungking for the information of the Chinese Government, with the suggestion that one or two powerful attacks on weakened Japanese positions might do real good at this time. Possibly you have done this already.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference your memorandum of July 29, 1941 in regard to reports of withdrawals of Japanese troops and planes from certain occupied places in China.

The messages to which you refer were repeated to the Embassy at Chungking via naval radio by the sending offices. We have brought these reports orally to the attention of the Chinese Ambassador here and are today conveying to Ambassador Gauss by telegraph the suggestion that he and the Naval and Military Attachés inform appropriate Chinese officials at Chungking of the reports in question.
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
CHUNCKING.

Please inform General Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese Ambassador promptly delivered to me for communication to the President General Chiang's gracious expression of appreciation of this Government's action in freezing Chinese assets in this country pursuant to General Chiang's request. State further that the communication will be promptly conveyed to the President, who is absent from Washington at this moment; and that, speaking for the President, I reaffirm that it is the desire and purpose of the people and Government of the United States to aid China in concrete ways in the struggle which the Chinese Government and the Chinese nation are most courageously making to preserve and maintain China's place and perform China's function as one of the great independent nations of the world.
Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, August 3, 1941, enclosing a cable to Laughlin Currie from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, August 2, 1941.

Currie refers to Lattimore's cable on the situation in China and recommends six courses of action to contain Japan until the Battle of the Atlantic is won.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to you by General Chiang Kai-shek under date of July 31, 1941, together with a copy of a note from the Chinese Ambassador, dated August 2, forwarding a copy of the telegram in question. As General Chiang's message, in which he conveys to you his gratitude for your having acceded to his request to place Chinese assets in this country under freezing control, refers to other requests which he has made in the interest of strengthening China, it seemed advisable that reply should be made to his telegram without awaiting your return. I accordingly sent today a reply to General Chiang by telegraph through our Embassy at Chungking and enclose a copy of my telegram herewith. I trust that my reply meets with your approval.

Enclosures:

1. From Chinese Ambassador, August 2, with enclosure.
2. To American Embassy, Chungking, August 7.
CHINESE EMBASSY
Washington
August 2, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have just received a telegraphic message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which he desires to be conveyed to the President. I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to transmit it to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

HU SHIH

Enclosure:
Telegram as above.

Honorable Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State
TELEGRAM TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
CHUNGKING, JULY 31, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am most grateful to you for having acceded to my request to place all Chinese assets under freezing control. This is additional evidence of your desire to assist China in every possible way, and is appreciated by the Chinese people in that spirit.

I am sure that the action of your Government in freezing all Japanese assets will prove an important body blow to the aggressor.

The Chinese Government is sincerely grateful to you and your Government for having brought about concerted action, on both these measures, by practically all the friendly powers who are fighting aggression.

I am confident that my other requests which I have made to you in the interest of strengthening China's
China's fighting power and meeting the emergency situation of the Far East, will receive your kind attention at the appropriate time.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
August 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Chinese Ambassador has just been in and handed me the attached copy of the statement of his Foreign Minister on yesterday announcing that the Government of China had approved the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration, and that China was the first government to do so.

The Ambassador then gently complained that his Government has been largely neglected in recent acts and utterances of this Government and Great Britain, etcetera. I assured him that this was not intentional in any sense as our record really shows, but that we are giving attention to methods of further emphasizing publicly our interest in the Chinese situation and our special desire at every stage to aid her militarily. He expressed great relief to hear this.

It is suggested (1) the President might well ask the Chinese Ambassador to call and following his call let an announcement be made that Chinese defense and needs had been discussed; (2) one or more of the American representatives to the Moscow meeting might return to the United States via Chungking and there hold some discussion.
discussion with high Chinese officials of China's defense needs; (3) public announcement might be made by the White House in regard to the sending to China of a military mission under the leadership of General John Magruder; (4) in the future our high officials might more than in the past in public addresses and statements include specific mention, when and where appropriate, of this Government's policy of aiding China.

The foregoing are merely suggestions which might be given consideration.
"The Chinese Government and people whole-heartedly welcome and endorse the joint declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the fundamental aims of the democratic Powers in resistance to aggression, and the aspirations of all peaceful and freedom-loving peoples including the peoples in the Axis countries themselves for a real new world order. China feels all the more gratified inasmuch as the Eight-Point Program is essentially in harmony with the principles of the Kuomintang and its founder's advocacy of a 'great commonwealth of nations'.

"The post-war world reconstruction will constitute a task even more difficult than that of winning the war itself. Restoration of freedom to the conquered peoples, full economic collaboration between all nations in the enjoyment of access, on equal terms, to trade and raw materials, in the advancement of living standards, and the establishment of a permanent system of general security will require the supreme efforts and resolute statesmanship of the democracies and their leaders. In this task China is prepared to make full contribution just as she has, for the past four years, made untold sacrifices of her manpower and national resources toward the democratic cause and continues to play her essential part in the world-wide conflict. China believes that the final destruction of the forces of aggression can be most swiftly achieved by first bringing about the defeat of Japan through tightening the 'encirclement' of which she herself is the sole architect."

Chinese Embassy,
Washington, August 18, 1941
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. LAUCHLIN CURRIE

What do I do about this?

F. D. R.

Letter from T. V. Soong to the President, dated August 7, 1941, saying he had been directed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to request the President and the Secretary of War to send a military mission to China in the immediate future, in order to increase the value of the Lease-Lend assistance, etc.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith, as requested, the draft of a suggested reply to the message from the British Prime Minister in regard to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal.

Enclosure:
Draft of a suggested reply to the British Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State Dept.
Letter 8/14/69
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.

November 7, 1941.

Your 525?, November 5, 5 p.m.

PERSONAL AND TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

QUOTE We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend-lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China.

We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
taking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect.

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study and effort.

I shall probably not repeat not make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official circle what I have said above. UNQUOTE.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is the corrected telegram to me from Chiang Kai-shek. After reading it, let me know if I should make any change in the message I am to hand Hu Shih on Wednesday.

F. D. R.
Telegram to President Roosevelt
from
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
Chungking, November 2, 1941

"In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr. Winston Churchill:

'Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yunnan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming and to cut China's lines of communication with Britain and the United States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of expansion either northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and my right to impress them upon you, for much the future lies in your hands.

Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan's war of aggression on China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the
Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.

You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can our army do against another that is strong in the air? A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than four years on the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand's reach. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.

For more than four years now China has kept some five million men in the field and thus immobilizes the man-power of Japan. The implications of this must be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized by yourself and all other
friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole might elsewhere. The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the whole war may hang upon it.

If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they mean to do,
one by one. I am not asking you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, to make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.

You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she is given a pretext by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for
upon this the fate of democratic cause will turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British and American willingness to cooperate in the defence of Yunnan. If the Japanese can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be gravely threatened in new ways and from a new direction.

I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the help that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression.

I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America. If the United States would draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation as I have suggested to Mr. Churchill.
I feel that success would be assured. I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now essential to avoid the errors by which statesmen of Europe allowed Nazi Germany to divide them, and to acquire a commanding position, and to prevent Japan from attacking us in succession and separately and thus attaining the stature of a second Nazi Germany in the Far East."

Chiang Kai-shek
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

What do we do about this?

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM RE: CHINA AND THE IMPENDING ATTACK ON THE BURMA ROAD.

Since I saw Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Currie, and on October 31st, the President, I have talked to Messrs. Stimson, Knox, Hopkins, Stettinius, General Burns and various officers of the War Department. They have all been most cooperative and kind.

As yet however, there has been no tangible answer to the Generalissimo's request for planes and tanks to defend the Burma Road. In fact it appears the President alone can make the decisions that will bring China the needed assistance now.

The Japanese continue to prepare a pincers attack on Kunming, one drive through the mountains, the other not through mountains but around to the east of the mountains through Kwangsi where tanks can be used.

The problem of China's air defense against this drive is peculiarly a problem of American position because China is relying on the American group headed by Colonel Chennault, an American Army Colonel now air adviser to China to protect the Burma Road. General Magruder (and I understand also Major McHugh, U. S. Naval Attache' to China,) have cabled that Colonel Chennault's force of approximately 90 American pilots and 100 P-40 airplanes in Burma is inadequately equipped to assist the Generalissimo in repelling the attack on the Burma Road. They indicate that if this air force tries to fight it may be destroyed with disastrous repercussions.

Magruder further suggests that if Chennault's force does not fight it will be considered a breach of faith by the Chinese which may have serious consequences in both the Chinese and international situations.

Magruder therefore suggests reinforcing Colonel Chennault immediately with more planes, possibly transporting them by aircraft carrier.

The President indicated to me that he would take up with the British the question of obtaining British planes and crews from Singapore. Magruder has explored this possibility in China and finds little chance of obtaining such aid unless the United States moves first.

Conferences with Lend-Lease authorities and the Army and Navy have revealed the steps that can be taken now to accelerate aid to China. They are specifically outlined in an attached memorandum. They involve planes and ordnance which can be taken from stock or through diversion only by the President's decision.

November 8, 1941
MEMORANDUM RE: MATERIALS FOR CHINA.

After exploring the situation, the following immediate action appears possible if the materials are taken from stock or by diversion rather than from future production.

**Airplanes**

80 SBD-1, 2, or 3 (or Army A-24's - same planes without arrester hooks) to be carried to the Philippines by a U. S. aircraft carrier and flown from there to China. The U. S. Army and Navy have a total of over 250 of these planes. Colonel Chennault has pilots in Burma who can fly them without further training. They are dive bombers already fully equipped which can carry 1275 lbs. of bombs 1460 miles at 210 m.p.h. The Louisiana maneuvers showed they were especially effective against ground targets such as those presented by a Japanese advance to cut the Burma Road.

**Ordnance**

80 additional 37mm Anti-Tank guns and 120 Light Tanks to go with the 60 A.T. guns and 70,000 rounds of 37mm ammunition China is getting immediately under existing schedules. Without these weapons China cannot hope to resist the Japanese panzer invasion of level Kwangsi on the way to Kunming.

48 old type 2.95 howitzers with 50,000 rounds of ammunition now in the Philippines. These could be used to repel the other pincer of the Japanese attack in the mountains of Yunnan.

24 3" A.A. guns (now superseded in U.S.A. by 90 mm A.A.) These are specifically intended to protect three vital bridges over three large rivers which the Burma Road crosses and which must be defended against air attack by batteries of 4 guns each at both ends.

750 cal. 50 A.A. machine guns. These are essential to defeat either drive because of Japanese command of the air. If not sent, the advantage of the hilly terrain in Yunnan will be nullified. Some cal. 30 A.A. might also be sent.

Part of the 800 tons of powder which is desperately needed. The Chinese arsenals will run out of powder by next January. Some must be shipped soon to be useful then.

Would it be possible to direct the Army and Navy to make these planes and ordnance available now?

November 8, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 12, 1941.

We have examined the corrected telegram of November 2 to you from Chiang Kai-shek. The corrected version simply fills in and clarifies certain minor omissions and garbles in the message as previously received. Thus, there is perceived no need to make any change in the message which you are to hand to Hu Shih.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is Winston Churchill's message to Chiang Kai-shek, transmitted to me by T. V. Soong under instructions from Chiang.

Lauchlin Currie
From Winston Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek (via T. V. Soong)

I am very much aware of the serious danger which you have pointed out in your message regarding Japan's impending new drive against China. While the Japanese may threaten South China, I am not certain that they would attack Yunnan with the present forces at their disposal at Tonking which are reported to be only half of what my military experts think they would require for such a venture. Japan may strike first in such territories where she can get the material which she lacks because of embargoes against her. However, I do realize the gravity of the situation if the Japanese should take Kunming. I am studying special means to help strengthen the International Air Force you have and give immediate support in personnel and material.

Brooke Popham informs me Colonel Chennault is ready to move into China with three squadrons in ten days' time and is asking Chennault how we can best help him.

I will keep in touch with you and I hope to send more definite statement of what we can do. Needless to say, I am keeping the President informed.
Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 14 PAGES 1161

Published also, in Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pp. 660-661. (State Dept. copy).
TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK TO DR. T. V. SOONG DATED CHUNGKING.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941

I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately. Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but none the less definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in future will record this episode.
Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Secretary of State, Washington, Nov. 25, 1941.

Relates the substance of a cable he has just received from Owen Lattimore relating how disturbed the Generalissimo (Chiang) has been regarding assistance from the United States.


[The cable, Lattimore to Currie, Nov. 25, 1941, mentioned above, is filed in PSF - China, 1941, and was published in Foreign Relations ..., page 652.]
My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I am inclosing herewith copy of a cable which we have received today from our Treasury representative in China.

I am also sending a copy of this cable to Mr. Hull.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
HONG KONG (USS MINTANAC)
NOVEMBER 22, 1941.

FROM: CAMPBELL - U. S. TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE

TO: DIVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PATROL

FOLLOWING INFORMATIVE MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY AS RESULT OF CONVERSATION TODAY WITH DR. HAN CHIAHOU FORMER VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS SINCE OCTOBER FIRST CHINESE POLITICAL OPINION HAS CRYSTALLIZED INTO THREE PRINCIPAL GROUPS AND SINCE USA JAPAN CONFERENCES THIS HAS GROWN MORE DEFINITE FIRST THE PRO AXIS AND PEACE GROUPS HAVE GROWN FURTHER TOGETHER BECAUSE OF THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE SEMICOLON THE FORMER TRYING TO ARRANGE PEACE WITH JAPAN BY INDIRECT NEGOTIATION THRU GERMANY AND LATTER TRYING BRING ABOUT PEACE BY DIRECT BARGAINING WITH JAPAN SECOND THE ANTI AXIS OR CONTINUED RESISTANCE GROUP AND THIRD THE PEOPLES OR REAL NATIONAL RESISTANCE GROUP REACTIONS BY THESE GROUPS TO PRESENT USA JAPAN CONFERENCES FOLLOWS SEMICOLON THE PRO AXIS AND PEACE GROUPS OF WHICH HOYING CHIN MINISTER OF WAR COMIA CHU CHIAHUA STRONG KUOMINTANG ORGANIZER AND CYEN PE Flu MINISTER OF EDUCATION ARE PROMINENT SEE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE OPPORTUNITIES TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR OWN POSITION FOR THEIR SPECIAL INTERESTS IN CHINA AND BELIEVE USA WILL YIELD TO JAPAN TO A LARGE EXTENT IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN SECTION TWO TO FOLLOW

Copy: hmd: 11/26/41
FROM: CAMPBELL - U. S. TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE
TO: DIVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PATROL

SECTION TWO OF MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY THE ANTI AXIS GROUP OF WHICH GENERAL TAILI HEAD OF GENERALISSIMO SECRET SERVICE COMMA WANG SHIH CHI PARTY MINISTER OF PUBLICITY AND QUO TAICHI FOREIGN MINISTER ARE PROMINENT AND ANXIOUS TO SEE USA MAKE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF JAPAN TROOPS FROM NORTH CHINA BUT ALLOWING JAPAN RETENTION OF MANCHUKUO FOR TIME BEING PLUS A LARGE AMERICAN LOAN TO STABILIZE CHINESE CURRENCY PROBLEMS THEY ALSO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS AS OPPORTUNITY TO WAIT AND BARGAIN WITH PRO AXIS AND PEACE GROUPS AS SUCH A PEACE WOULD GIVE USA STRONG HAND IN CHINA AND SOUTH PACIFIC IN CASE THIS KIND OF PEACE DOES NOT MATERIALIZE THIS GROUP WILL OPENLY BLAME USA FOR NOT TAKING DECISIVE STEP OF GOING TO WAR WITH JAPAN THEY WILL URGENT USA TO FIGHT SECTION THREE TO FOLLOW FOR SECRETARY

Copy: bj:11-26-41
FROM: CAPPELL - U.S. TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE

TO: DIVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PATROL

SECTION THREE OF MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY

THE PEOPLE FOR REAL RESISTANCE VRYUPLD

COMPRISED OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY, THE NEW FOURTH ROUTE ARMY, THE NEW FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN CHINA RECENTLY FORMED IN HONG KONG AND WHICH NOW AMALGAMATED YOUNG CHINA PARTY, CHINESE NATIONAL SOCIETY PARTY, CHINESE CONSTITUTION PARTY, NATIONAL (next eighteen code words not decipherable) NEGOTIATIONS AT JAP HINGE ON THAT A MAXIMUM POSSIBILITY OF PEACE IS LESS THAN FIFTY PERCENT DUE TO AMERICAN INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AND BECAUSE OF JAPANESE DIFFICULTIES WITH HER OWN GARRISONS IN CHINA

THIS GROUP BELIEVE PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED BY USA LOOSENING FREEZING REGULATIONS, MORE OIL FROM NETHERLANDS INDIES AND A REVISED TRADE AGREEMENT.

THIS GROUP ALSO HOLD THAT USA WILL NOT LET CHINA GET WORST OF BARGAIN AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON BOTH SIDES ARE FOR MARKING TIME AS GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN SPRING AGAINST RUSSIA AND SOUTH EUROPE WILL BE DECIDING FACTOR IN PACIFIC OCTOBER ELEVENTH THE POWERFUL CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMAN TANG IS SCHEDULED TO MEET AT CHUNGKING DECEMBER FIFTEENTH AND FROM RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THAT MEETING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA MAY BE INTERRUPT THE POLICY OF COMMUNIST PARTY DEPENDS TO LARGE EXTENT ON RUSSIA BUT UP TO PRESENT THEY ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH OTHER STRONG RESISTANCE GROUPS

END OF MESSAGE

CAPPELL

(Service has been requested on this section of the cable due to the various words which are not decipherable.)
The White House  
Washington  

December 8, 1941.

Dear Grace:

Will you attach this to the memorandum I sent over this morning?

Lauch

Lauchlin Currie
SUPPLEMENT TO MEMORANDUM ON THE
STATUS OF CURRENT LEND-LEASE
SHIPMENTS TO CHINA

1. It is now learned that the clipper that was proceeding to Wake actually landed there, took on gas, and was last reported two hours out, proceeding east, destination unknown.

2. The clipper that arrived in Hawaii on the 7th, fueled and is returning. It is not known whether it carries passengers and spare parts.
Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, Chungking, December 9, 1941.

Transmits information from Generalissimo that he is urging simultaneous Soviet-Chinese declaration of war on Japan following American declaration.

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss),
Washington, December 9, 1941.

Transmits a message from the President to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek pledging support in the war against Japan.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, p. 759.
December 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR LAUCHLIN CURRIE:

Will you take this up with the Army before speaking to Magruder about it?

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from Hon. Lauchlin Currie, 12/9/41, in re suggestions relating to the American Volunteer Air Corps now in Burma. States this group has now about 66 P-40's ready for combat, about 90 pilots, and 130 ground personnel. It needs urgently some 20,000 pounds of spare parts to bring its strength up to about 90 planes and to give it 3 months' reserve stock of spares. In addition, for sustained combat, it will require more ammunition, its present stocks being 1 million rounds of .30 caliber and half a million rounds of .50 caliber. We have in this volunteer air group the nucleus of an American task force in Burma. Mr. Lauchlin suggests that we explore the possibility of converting this group into a regular American task force, offering the men their commissions and ratings back, and rushing supplies and personnel to bring it and maintain it at full strength. Colonel Chennault, the officer in charge, is a retired Air Corps officer who is highly regarded by General Arnold. If the President thinks the suggestion (over)
is worth exploring, Mr. Currie would be glad to take it up with the Army and to have General Magruder ascertain Chiang Kai-shek's reaction.

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR IAN CHURCHILL

Will you give Mr. Doherty the

With best wishes,

Harry H. Jr.

Washington
My dear Mr. President:

The Chinese Ambassador just called to see me and has left with me this message addressed to you by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The text of the message is attached herewith.

I am having prepared a reply to be sent in your name and I shall send you the text of the reply for your approval before it is dispatched.

 Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Telegram to the President
From Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
Chungking, December 9, 1941

In this tragic hour when you too are assailed by the treacherous aggressor the people of China renew their gratitude to the people of the United States for the understanding and help that have been given us.

To our now common battle we offer all we are and all we have to stand with you until the Pacific and the world are freed from the curse of brute force and endless perfidy.

Chiang Kai-shek

Published in Dept. of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1941, page 508.
Dr. T.V. Soong to the Under Secretary of State (Welles),
Washington, December 12, 1941.
Reports receipt of a cable from General Chiang Kai-shek expressing
the opinion that a Russian declaration of war against Japan is
only a matter of time.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, page 746.

[Copy forwarded by Welles to FDR on Dec. 12, 1941]
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang), [Moscow, December 12, 1941].

Explains that Russia is carrying the principal burden of the war against Germany and urges Chiang not to insist that Russia at once declare war against Japan.


[Translation received in the Dept. of State from Dr. T.V. Soong, o/s Dec. 16. Forwarded by Welles to FDR on Dec. 17 after Welles had first read the message to FDR on the telephone.]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from C. E. Gauss, United States Embassy at Chungking, China. 11/19/41 in which he gives President in broad outline, his estimate of the present position and possibilities in China, viewed in the perspective.
December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you check up on this?

F.D.R.

Memo from Lauchlin Currie 12/8/41 attaching brief statement on current status of shipments of material and personnel to China, both by sea and by air.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Far Eastern Situation.

I understand that you may discuss this with the Secretary of War this afternoon. I thought you would like to have the following information immediately.

General Arnold asked me if I could acquaint Chiang Kai-shek with General Brett's mission and ask for full cooperation and extreme secrecy. I did so through Lattimore and at the same time inquired about plans for the joint defense of Burma, about which I am gravely concerned and which I discussed at some length with General Gerow.

I received the following reply this morning from Lattimore:

"British have asked for one regiment Burma but have admitted us to no confidence. General Brett most welcome here especially if authorized press British for real cooperation. Would appreciate support your end."

I am further informed that the British have now requested the use of lend-lease material in Burma.

Chiang Kai-shek told General Magruder that any and all of his resources, as well as his entire force, would be and were available to act in any capacity and full cooperation offensively whenever and wherever they were required.

It seems to me that the British should be urged to take advantage of this offer and request two or three divisions instead of one regiment, and permit what lend-lease material there is there to be used by these divisions. This would permit the British to send more Indian reinforcements to Malaya rather than to Burma.

Another possibility you may wish to consider is to have General Brett remain in the Far East for some time to organize large-scale American air offensive operations; have the British send a top-flight officer to China and try to get some real cooperation.

Is there anything you would like me to reply to Lattimore's cables?

Lauchlin Currie
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Hongkong.

My Canadian friends are very sad over the fact that all of the equipment for their force of 3,000 men that arrived in Hongkong only got as far as Manila.

Lauchlin Currie
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Report from Colonel Chennault dated Dec. 27.

The single squadron of the A.V.G. stationed at Rangoon has taken part in two defensive actions.

In the first action on December 23, the squadron shot down six enemy planes, losing two planes, two pilots, and four planes damaged. In the second action, date unreported, the Japanese force was composed of sixty bombers and eighteen fighters. The A.V.G. squadron shot down thirteen fighters and four bombers. Its losses consisted of two planes and two pilots missing, and three more planes damaged.

The combined total of planes lost, missing and damaged in these two actions is eleven, which probably cuts the strength of the squadron in half.

Lauchlin Currie