January 5, 1942.

For: The President.

From: Lauchlin Currie
CABLE FROM MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE

January 5, 1942.

During the past five days six divisions of Japanese troops attacked Changsha. Their casualties, both dead and wounded, now total over three-fifths of their initial strength. The remainder of this force is fleeing northward, and is being surrounded by the Chinese.

On January 3, the third squadron of the AVG raided an airdrome in Thailand. It shot down three enemy planes and destroyed four more on the ground. All of the AVG planes returned safely to their base, the only damage being some bullet holes.
Published in

*Foreign Relations of the United States*

1942  China

pages 2-3, 5.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Dr. Soong has just come in. He brought with him the attached telegram from General Chiang Kai-shek dated January 7, 1942. He asked that I get it to you personally. Also, he asked me to say to you that if you felt there was any impropriety in his passing this along direct to you, and not through the State Department, please to let him know and he will go to them. But he hoped that he might have certain things like this established through a more direct line of communication.

He also asked that after you have read the telegram, if you wish to give him any reply direct to his General, he will appreciate it.
"I deeply appreciate your telegram of December 31st in which you clearly reaffirmed the consistent democratic spirit of your policy. I consider that the actual incident involving the seizure of Chinese lend-lease cargoes in Burma by the British military authorities is of minor importance compared to the effect on the unity of our democratic cause of the spirit which made such incidents possible. I trust that you fully understand that my attitude in this matter has not been influenced by material considerations but by political considerations which I regard as being of fundamental importance.

"The spread of the Battle of the Pacific to Australasian, British and Dutch territories emphasizes certain factors, the importance of which we Chinese appreciate acutely. The spread of war in colonial areas differs from war elsewhere, nor can the war in the Pacific today be compared with the European war of 1914 - 1918 which hardly affected the Pacific area. In Europe the military factor is paramount and the conquered populations can be relied on to regard the anti-Axis forces as liberators. In South East Asia however, besides military factors, nationalism and social conditions are factors of equal importance. Such factors may not become dangerous in a short war, but with every month that passes in a long war their importance increases and they may become decisive factors.

"Having been ruled for a long time by Western nations without economic, social or political equality, the native populations may come to regard our descriptions of the ruthlessness of the Japanese invaders as mere propaganda. They may feel that there is no reason why they should undergo sacrifices to defend their present rulers against other future rulers. If they are to have the necessary morale to endure such sacrifices as prolonged
bombings and other horrors of war as we have experienced in China, it is necessary that they should feel that they have some national interest of their own at stake. Our experience has proved that without the support of the people, armies could not maintain prolonged resistance.

"I earnestly hope that you could persuade the British and Dutch authorities to emulate the spirit of declarations which have been made by yourself, the High Commissioner Sayre and by General MacArthur, and to make changes in their attitude clearly indicating future political changes in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Such would contribute greatly towards our joint war effort. Otherwise, if the enemy should succeed in stirring up the populations for their own purposes, the situation would become increasingly more dangerous as the war progresses.

"May I say that it is the profound experience of what enabled us here in China to hold out all these years, which prompts me to speak to you in this way. I assure you that my only concern is for our joint interests and for our common victory. Relying on your great statesmanship and your unrivaled prestige as the leader of the democracies throughout the world, I wish to leave it to you to decide whether you should convey the substance of my views to the British Prime Minister. Let me say that I have the highest regard for the leadership of Mr. Churchill and I am convinced that he will fully understand the spirit in which I have broached this subject.

Chiang Kai-shek"

The above telegram was addressed to me, marked for secret communication to the President.

T. V. Soong
CABLE FROM MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK
TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE

JANUARY 18, 1942.
CHUNGKING

ALTHOUGH GENERALISSIMO REPEATEDLY MADE OFFER THROUGH DENNY'S AND LATER WAVELL TO SEND TWO CHINESE ARMY CORPS REINFORCE BURMA FORCE OFFER WAS DECLINED ON GROUNDS THAT BURMA ONLY NEEDS THREE REGIMENTS. THESE REGIMENTS NOW SENT TO KENG-TUNG WHILE OFFERED ARMY CORPS DESPATCHED CHINA FRONTS.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Further Observations on the Burma Situation.

Yesterday's TIMES conveyed the impression that the forces in Burma had been greatly strengthened. Actually, the situation is still perilous.

1. British Forces in Burma. According to latest G-2 information, British forces, mostly Burmese, number only 30,000 to 35,000 with poor and inadequate equipment.

2. Chinese Forces. Reports are conflicting and I am attempting to get accurate information from China. According to G-2 it is proposed to station the Chinese Fifth Army at the Burma border around Wantung -- a good way from the danger zones.

3. Japanese Forces. G-2 estimates Japanese forces in Thailand at from three to four divisions of 15,000 men each. A recent report is to the effect that 5,000 troops are concentrated near Moshod, inside the Burmese border. This is on the middle invasion route. Also extensive supply columns have been observed moving north toward the northern invasion route.

4. Possible Reinforcements from India. Available troops in India other than frontier guards and internal security forces are placed at two armored and five infantry divisions. They have 30 field guns, 60 tanks and 130 anti-tank guns. All small arms are likewise way understrength. It is believed these divisions will be ready at varying times up to September and that not more than five additional divisions could be made available in 1942.

5. Conclusion. Army people with whom I have talked are becoming increasingly concerned with the importance of holding Burma. This is reinforced by Chinese military and political considerations. The task will become more difficult if Singapore falls and probably cannot be done with present land and air forces in Burma.

It would appear that immediate action should be taken:

(a) to rush additional American Army air reinforcements to Burma
Memorandum for the President.

January 16, 1942.

Re: Further observations on the Burma Situation.

(b) to persuade the British to accept larger Chinese forces. These forces, with the help of current lend-lease deliveries, can be relatively well armed.

Consideration might also be given to including Burma in the China, Indo-China, Thailand command area. It logically belongs there, with bases in India. The Indies are remote, look toward Australia for reserve bases, and have poor transport and communication connections with Burma.

The British might be induced to accept the placing of Burma under Chiang Kai-shek's supreme command, provided the actual command of operations rested in Lieutenant General Drum.

Lauchlin Currie
January 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Recent operations of the AVG in Burma and China.

As you observe, the AVG continues to chalk up a remarkable record. I am afraid, however, that it will take five weeks for the planes that left yesterday to reach the group even though they are being flown from West Africa.

Lauchlin Currie
Extracts from recent cables from General Chennault to Lauchlin Currie

January 7, second squadron, Rangoon, destroyed nine Japanese airplanes. Lost one pilot and one plane.

January __, nine P-40's supported by six RAF Brewsters, raided Japanese base and destroyed twenty-four airplanes, three trucks, and straffed troops.

January 17, four P-40's from Third Squadron intercepted three Japanese bombers near Mengtsz, shot down two while the third crashed at Malipo, Yunnan.

Status of group, January 16.

Airplanes totally destroyed.....23
" badly damaged........16
" slightly damaged......12
" in commission........48
MEMORANDUM FOR LAUCHLIN CURRIE:

Will you find out what Morgenthau has done about this?

F.D.R.

Cable from Owen Lattimore to Lauchlin Currie, 1/7/42, in re need for political loan for China.

In draft of reply in file 7/26/43
Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Lauchlin Currie
January 25, 1942.

Re: Chinese troops in Burma.

1. One regiment from the 93rd Division has arrived Mongyang, Burma.

2. Two more regiments, presumably from the same division, expected to arrive Mongyang January 28.

3. The 49th Division at Wanting ready to start whenever required.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Chinese Forces in Burma.

1. When I discussed this matter with you the other day, I forgot to mention that Mr. Craw, formerly Counsellor to the Burmese Government and now Adviser to H.M.G. in London on Burma, told me, in the presence of several others, that the Burmese would not object to the presence of Chinese troops for defense against invasion. They only fear Chinese immigration.

2. According to a Chinese present at the Wavell conference in Chungking, Wavell stipulated that the proposed small contingent should confine its operations to the north, and east of the Salween river.

Lauchlin Currie

Lauchlin Currie
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I had intended showing you the attached cable after the press conference. I have already conveyed the gist of it to General Marshall.

I attended the executive session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning on the Chinese loan. The atmosphere was excellent and Secretary Stimson made a particularly impressive statement.

Lauchlin Currie
CHUNGKING, FEBRUARY 2, 1942.

CABLE FROM MADAM CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE:

THERE ARE NOW IN BURMA TWO CHINESE REGIMENTS. A THIRD IS AT THE BORDER READY TO MOVE WHEN SUPPLIES ARE MADE AVAILABLE BY THE BRITISH. THE BRITISH ARE NOW REQUESTING ANOTHER DIVISION. THE GENERALISSIMO BELIEVES THAT THE PIECEMEAL AND HAPHAZARD DESPATCH OF TROOPS IS MOST UNDESIRABLE. HE IS THEREFORE INSISTING THAT SOME SECTOR OR PORTION OF THE LINE BE ASSIGNED TO THE CHINESE: OTHERWISE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. THE ATTITUDE OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN CHINA TOWARD BRITISH POLICY AND OPERATIONS IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CRITICAL AND IT IS BECOMING VERY DIFFICULT TO COUNTERACT THIS TEND.
February 6, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I am sending you herewith a suggested message for you to send to General Chiang Kai-shek.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK,
PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,
CHUNGKING, (CHINA).

It is a source of great gratification to me and to
the Government and people of the United States that
the proposal which I made to the Congress that there be
authorized for the purpose of rendering financial aid to
China in the sum of $500,000,000 was passed unanimously by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives and has now
become law.

The unusual speed and unanimity with which this
measure was acted upon by the Congress and the enthusiastic support which it received throughout the United
States testify to the wholehearted respect and admiration which the Government and people of this country
have for China. They testify also to our earnest desire
and determination to be concretely helpful to our partners in the great battle for freedom. The gallant resistance of the Chinese armies against the ruthless invaders of your country has called forth the highest
praise from the American and all other freedom-loving peoples. The tenacity of the Chinese people, both armed and unarmed, in the face of tremendous odds in carrying on for almost five years a resolute defense against an enemy far superior in equipment is an inspiration to the fighting men and all the peoples of the other United Nations. The great sacrifices of the Chinese people in destroying the fruits of their toil so that they could not be used by the predatory armies of Japan exemplify in high degree the spirit of sacrifice which is necessary on the part of all to gain the victory toward which we are confidently striving. It is my hope and belief that use which will be made of the funds now authorized by the Congress of the United States will contribute substantially toward facilitating the efforts of the Chinese Government and people to meet the economic and financial burdens which have been thrust upon them by an armed invasion and toward solution of problems of production and procurement which are essential for the success of their armed resistance to what are now our common enemies.

I send
I send you my personal greetings and best wishes. I extend to you across land and sea the hand of comradeship for the common good, the common goal, the common victory that shall be ours.

(The President's name)
SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO
CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

WE ARE RapidLY INCREASING OUR FERRY SERVICE TO CHINA VIA AFRICA AND INDIA. I CAN NOW GIVE YOU DEFINITE ASSURANCES THAT EVEN THOUGH THERE SHOULD BE A FURTHER SETBACK IN RANGOON, WHICH NOW SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, THE SUPPLY ROUTE TO CHINA VIA INDIA CAN BE MAINTAINED BY AIR.

THE WHOLE PLAN SEEMS ALTOGETHER PRACTICAL AND I AM SURE WE CAN MAKE IT A REALITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(SIGNED) ROOSEVELT
His Excellency
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,

I have this moment signed the bill appropriating five hundred million dollars to render financial aid to China and it is now law.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
State Dept. copy
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
page 468.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 17, 1942

I enclose a translation of a telegram dated February fifteenth received from General Chiang Kai-shek.
Soon after my arrival in Delhi I received your most welcome message informing me of the granting to China of the Loan of $500,000,000. I am most grateful to you for having accepted my suggestions in their entirety and without any attached conditions. On behalf of the Chinese Army and the Chinese People I wish to convey to you, and through you to the Congress of the United States as well as the American People, our deep gratitude for this timely assistance.

For four and a half years my people have suffered untold privations and distress. This loan, which you have now secured for China, will not only ameliorate the economic situation but will also raise the morale of the people in the present struggle. The loans and supplies, which we previously received from you, have enabled China to continue our war of resistance up till now. Your new gesture in granting us this timely assistance gives inspiration and encouragement to all who are fighting for freedom during the unprecedented crisis with which the world is faced.

Besides the meeting of military needs, the proceeds of the loan will be used mainly for strengthening China's economic structure, redemption of legal tender notes, control of currency, stabilization of prices and the promotion of war production.

I wish to reciprocate most heartily your greetings and good wishes.

February 15, 1942
Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Lauchlin Currie, dated March 2, received March 3, 1942.

Chinese forces in Burma now aggregate three divisions, one from the Fifth Army, two from the Sixth. These divisions probably comprise a total force of slightly over 20,000 troops. - L.C.J. The British are now asking for the remainder of these armies but owing to the lateness of the request and the very bad means of transportation it is difficult to accede. The Generalissimo left Kunming today (March 2) for Lashio because he insists that the British stick to the original proposition that Chinese be solely responsible for ______ section.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

March 10, 1942

Dear General Watson:

I enclose letter for the President, which I shall be obliged if you will kindly deliver to him.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

Enclosure

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson

The White House

Washington, D. C.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942  China
page 29.
March 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL WATSON:

Attached hereto is the message sent to the Generalissimo yesterday. I thought you would like to have it for your files.

Eisenhower.

1 Incl.
Message to AMMSTCA,
Chungking (3-11-42)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary of War directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to AMMISCA, Chungking: WDMFD:

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR DELIVERY TO THE GENERALISSIMO

QUOTE I HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF MARCH TEN AND APPRECIATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE PROMPTED YOUR PROPOSAL STOP SINCE GENERAL STILWELL IS AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE MATTER IS ONE OF EXTREME DELICACY COMMA PARTICULARLY BECAUSE COMMA FROM THIS DISTANCE COMMA IT IS MOST DIFFICULT FOR THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES TO VISUALIZE THE DETAILS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION STOP HOWEVER COMMA ONE OF THE REASONS THAT I DIRECTED GENERAL STILWELL COMMA A SENIOR AND EXTREMELY ABLE OFFICER COMMA TO REPORT TO YOU WAS BECAUSE I ANTICIPATED THE OCCURRENCE IN THE BURMA AREA OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION INVOLVING UNITED STATES MUNITIONS COMMA BRITISH UNITS AND THE CHINESE ARMY STOP SINCE THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH AND APPROVED GENERAL STILWELL'S

-1-

SECRET
DIRECTIVE AND PURPOSES COIIMA IT WAS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE COMMA ON THE GROUND COMMA TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS COMMA PARTICULARLY WHENEVER BRITISH FORCES AND COMMANDERS WERE INVOLVED STOP I SHOULD LIKE TO REQUEST COMMA THEREFORE COMMA THAT IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT GENERAL STILWELL POSSESSES MY CONFIDENCE COMMA YOU WILL ACCORD TO HIM FULL OPPORTUNITY TO WORK OUT THIS MOST DELICATE MATTER WITHOUT INVOLVING A NECESSITY OF PLACING THE QUESTION BEFORE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PARA IN THE MEANTIME COMMA I KNOW THAT YOU WILL DEVOTE YOUR MAXIMUM EFFORT TO THE TASK OF MEETING THE ENEMY AND OPPOSING HIS ADVANCE WITH EVERY AVAILABLE UNIT AT YOUR DISPOSAL STOP I ASSURE YOU THAT THIS GOVERNMENT IS PROCEEDING VIGOROUSLY TO FIND PRACTICABLE WAYS AND MEANS OF CONTINUING ITS SUPPORT TO YOU COMMA AND HAS NO INTENTION OF RELAXING ITS EFFORTS MERELY BECAUSE THE ROUTE FROM RANGOON HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED STOP I FEEL SURE THAT GENERAL STILWELL WILL BE ABLE TO ARRANGE A COMMAND SET UP SATISFACTORY TO YOU AND THAT COMMA MOREOVER COMMA HE WILL FIND METHODS FOR ASSURING THE CONTINUITY OF U.S. SUPPLY TO YOU AND YOUR ARMY STOP I REALIZE THAT THIS MAY SOUND A LITTLE LIKE TEMPORIZING ON MY PART BUT I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND MY PROBLEM OF BEING SO FAR AWAY FROM THE FIELD OF ACTION STOP CONFIDENTIALLY I WISH YOU WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE COMMAND UNDER
SECRET

YOU AND GENERAL STILWELL IN NORTH BURMA AND BRITISH DEFENSE
FURTHER SOUTH STOP THIS WILL GIVE THE BRITISH THE CHANCE
TO COVER THE APPROACHES TO INDIA END UNQUOTE

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

rhg
Another copy from F.D.R.L. Files
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
page 29.
MEMORANDUM TO DR. T. V. SOONG:

Subject: Message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

I request that you transmit the following message to the Generalissimo in reply to his radiogram of March 10:

"I have given careful study to your message of March 10 and appreciate the circumstances that have prompted your proposal. Since General Stilwell is an officer of the United States Army you will understand that the matter is one of extreme delicacy, particularly because, from this distance, it is most difficult for the British and ourselves to visualize the details of the tactical situation. However, one of the reasons that I directed General Stilwell, a senior and extremely able officer, to report to you was because I anticipated the occurrence in the Burma area of difficult problems in cooperation and coordination involving United States munitions, British units and the Chinese Army. Since the British Chiefs of Staff were fully acquainted with and approved General Stilwell's directive and purposes, it was my earnest hope that he would be able, on the ground, to find an acceptable solution to these problems, particularly whenever British forces and commanders were involved. I should like to request, therefore, that in the knowledge that
General Stilwell possesses my confidence, you will accord
to him full opportunity to work out this most delicate
matter without involving a necessity of placing the question
before the British Government.

"In the meantime, I know that you will devote your
maximum effort to the task of meeting the enemy and opposing
his advance with every available unit at your disposal. I
assure you that this government is proceeding vigorously to
find practicable ways and means of continuing its support
to you, and has no intention of relaxing its efforts merely
because the route from Rangoon has been interrupted. I
feel sure that General Stilwell will be able to arrange a
command set up satisfactory to you and that, moreover, he
will find methods for assuring the continuity of U.S. supply
to you and your Army."

I realize that this may sound a little light,
Tempering in my part but I know you understand
my problem of being so far away from the field of
action. Confidentially I wish you would explore
the possibility of Chinese command under you
and General Stilwell in North Burma and
British defence further West. This will
give the British the chance to cover the
approaches to India.
March 12, 1942.

Dear Grace:

The President has replied to this message, so that this copy is for your files.

Lauch

Lauchlin Currie
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

March 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I have received an urgent telegram from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which I beg to send you for your high consideration.

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

The President
White House
Japanese broadcasts state that Rangoon was taken yesterday noon. To this minute we have received no information from the British army command, but we believe the news to be true, which makes it necessary that the plan of campaign in Burma should be recast. Especially is it important that there should be effective supreme command of British and Chinese troops.

British troops in Burma, remaining after their defeat, probably have the strength of two divisions, while Chinese armies in Burma, who are all under the command of General Stilwell, have more than four times the strength of the British. It is only logical that the British troops there should also be under the command of General Stilwell.

Please convey this to the President and request if he will not ask Prime Minister Churchill to give orders immediately to place the British troops in Burma under General Stilwell. Urgently await reply.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

For your information and return for my files.

F.D.R.

Memo for the Pres. from Lauchlin Currie 3/16/42 re: the coordination of shipments to India and China.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

March 16, 1942.

Re: The coordination of shipments to India and China.

In accordance with your instructions I explored the possibilities of coordinating shipments and then called a meeting of the representatives of China Defense Supplies, Indian Purchasing Commission, British Shipping Control, and the various government agencies concerned. It was the general consensus that valuable shipping space could be conserved without loss to the Chinese program if Chinese and Indian shipping space were pooled. The main concern of the Chinese was that there should be a prompt inflow of heavy supplies into China when, as and if the land routes were opened.

I thereupon cabled General Stilwell, who suggested that shipments of material for the Yunnan-Burma railroad, for arsenals, and of trucks in excess of the amount needed for construction work, might temporarily be suspended.

Since items now going forward to India for China, exclusive of aircraft and trucks, amount to some 25,000 tons, and since this is all that the contemplated land and air routes can handle for some time, our proper course would appear to be to give priority, for the time being, to Chinese shipments of aircraft, ordnance, ammunition, road-making equipment and medical supplies.

This has met general agreement and space will be available in the same ships for Indian and Chinese cargoes. The Chinese will get the benefit of high priority and frequent sailings. The Indian Government will get the indirect benefit of this materiel and the direct benefit of additional space for the necessary heavy portion of the cargoes, such as steel for their fabricating plants.

I am attaching a summary of the cargoes now en route to India for China. Two more ships will sail this week and thereafter the proposed arrangement will come into effect.

Lauchlin Currie
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Value of Shipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 23, 1942</td>
<td>S.S. Kaimoku</td>
<td>11,981,008 lbs</td>
<td>$2,046,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 1942</td>
<td>M.S. Dona Aniceta</td>
<td>9,640,633 lbs</td>
<td>7,474,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6, 1942</td>
<td>S.S. Bering</td>
<td>12,890,059 lbs</td>
<td>2,452,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 1942</td>
<td>S.S. Exanthia</td>
<td>115,460 lbs</td>
<td>1,201,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5, 1942</td>
<td>S.S. Exiria</td>
<td>14,196,396 lbs</td>
<td>4,848,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>48,823,556</strong></td>
<td><strong>$18,023,740</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aircraft .................................. 1,081,234 lbs.
Arsenal materials ....................... 16,380,458 lbs
Motor transport .......................... 10,448,662 lbs
Ordnance ................................ 3,730,223 lbs
Service and Medical supplies ............ 996,881 lbs
Oils ..................................... 3,181,265 lbs
Telephone equipment ...................... 661,030 lbs
Yunnan-Burma Railway ..................... 11,694,258 lbs
Material for highway const. & mainten. 629,545 lbs

|                  |                          | **48,823,556**|
**SHIPMENTS**

**Planes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plane</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Total Weight</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87,960</td>
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<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>269,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-22-T</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115,993</td>
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**Trucks**

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<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Total Weight</th>
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<td>6x6 tactical type</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2,151,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x6 2½-ton cargo, Prime Mover</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,247,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x4 cargo</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>294,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4x2 tank truck, tanks for above</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>280,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x6 2½-ton cargo, Prime Mover</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,287,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x6 4-ton wrecker</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>763,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x6 2½-ton cargo, Prime Mover</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>823,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4x4 ½-ton weapons carrier</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64,680</td>
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**Motorcycles**

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<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Total Weight</th>
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<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>107,918</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

8,342,458 lbs

**Total shipments**

48,823,556 lbs

**Less self-moving**

8,342,458 lbs

40,481,098
### SHIPMENTS OF AIRCRAFT

**Jan. 31, 1942**

| Description                      | Quantity | Weight  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-43 planes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>404,830 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; parts</td>
<td></td>
<td>69,980 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-22T planes &amp; parts</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115,993 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts for P-40s</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,405 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio sets, Lockheed Hudson</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,140 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; P-48</td>
<td></td>
<td>910 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; P-43</td>
<td></td>
<td>712 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Feb. 10, 1942**

| Description                      | Quantity | Weight  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-43 planes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87,960 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; parts &amp; spares</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,500 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**March 5, 1942**

| Description                      | Quantity | Weight  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-43 planes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>269,900 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; parts &amp; spares</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,210 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; engines, P &amp; W</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30,472 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires &amp; tubes for P-40s</td>
<td>60 each</td>
<td>3,145 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Lockheed Hudson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propeller assembly blades</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11,050 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright engines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29,120 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; parts</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,619 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxygen masks</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>252 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,036 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

1,081,234 "
**SHIPEMENTS OF ARSENAL MATERIALS**

**January 23, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold rolled strip steel</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,364,641 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw &amp; saw blades</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,329 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 cal. smokeless gun powder</td>
<td>300,534 lbs.</td>
<td>394,722 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**January 31, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empty shot gun cartridge shells</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>48,563 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brass rods</td>
<td></td>
<td>835,414 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel bullet jacket cups</td>
<td></td>
<td>430,375 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper ingots</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000,033 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold rolled strip steel</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,130,035 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**February 6, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misc. chemicals</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,092 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel bars &amp; bullet jacket cups</td>
<td></td>
<td>268,515 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty shot gun cartridge shells</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>53,288 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stainless steel wire</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,570 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinding wheels, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>64,889 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferro molybdenum</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,608 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other material, tools, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>57,631 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**March 5, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zinc slabs</td>
<td>1,000,067</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanized sheet steel</td>
<td>1,666,340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanized babbed wire</td>
<td>2,223,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel billets</td>
<td>1,130,470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper ingots</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. items</td>
<td></td>
<td>212,876 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16,380,458 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 23, 1942</strong></td>
<td>6x6 tactical type trucks with parts</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spare parts for trucks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil filters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 31, 1942</strong></td>
<td>6x6 23/4-ton cargo trucks, Prime mover</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spare parts for trucks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanics tools</td>
<td>38 sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 6, 1942</strong></td>
<td>6x4 cargo trucks</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4x2 tank trucks</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6x6 23/4-ton cargo trucks, Prime mover</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6x6 4-ton wrecker trucks</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tires &amp; tubes</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spare parts for trucks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>March 5, 1942</strong></td>
<td>4x2 tanks for trucks</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6x6 23/4-ton cargo trucks, Prime mover</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4x4 1/2-ton weapons carrier</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truck tires</td>
<td>7,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truck tubes</td>
<td>12,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wrenches</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

536 trucks 10,448,662 "

600 motorcycles
### Shipments of Ordnance

**January 23, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-pounder anti-tank guns, parts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>90,075 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition for 2-pounder, A.P. shot, Primer 12 MK.II</td>
<td>27,009 rds.</td>
<td>180,305 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting machine for engineering troops</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,000 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamite for engineering troops</td>
<td>56,000 lbs.</td>
<td>64,400 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty bombs, fragmentation, 17 lb. MK.II</td>
<td>8,969</td>
<td>105,418 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs, frag, 17 lb. MK.II</td>
<td>11,898</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonator, MK.III</td>
<td>11,993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire arming assembly, frag. Prac. 17 lb. MK.II</td>
<td>11,532</td>
<td>263,791 lbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**January 31, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field howitzers, parts, access.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>158,753 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren guns</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>79,950 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounting tripods</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball cart. for Bren guns</td>
<td>7,500,768 rds</td>
<td>505,008 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank guns, 37 mm. &amp; parts</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46,267 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson sub-machine guns, .45 cal.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra magazines for</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts &amp; accessories</td>
<td>55,993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control equipment sets, spare parts for Browning .50 cal. A.A. guns</td>
<td>123,567</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout cars M3A1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69,220 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallic links, .30 cal.</td>
<td>1,460,000</td>
<td>17,739 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrotechnic pistols, N-2, &amp; parts</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>624 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms parts, 7.92 mm., .30 &amp; .50</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SHIPMENTS OF ORDNANCE - page 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 6, 1942</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank guns, 37 mm. parts &amp; access.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot, fixed, A.P. M51 w. tracers</td>
<td>60,000 rds</td>
<td>340,626 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge, Ball, Cal. .45</td>
<td>... 3,000,000</td>
<td>165,000 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition, .30 cal. ball, for P-43s</td>
<td>2,460,000</td>
<td>203,390 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallic belt links, .30 cal.</td>
<td>1,000,000 links</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge, Ball, .30 cal. for tanks &amp; scout cars</td>
<td>3,540,000 rds</td>
<td>273,840 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts of or for howitzers</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,798 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteries, dry cell, signal equip. for howitzers</td>
<td>20,128</td>
<td>5,014 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs, 17# frag. MK.II</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>3,720 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting caps, tetryl</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1,440 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>March 5, 1942</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare parts for P-40 machine guns</td>
<td></td>
<td>813 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 mm. pack howitzers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19,500 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 mm. field howitzer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33,240 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren guns</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,997 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripods</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,550 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition, Ball, .30 cal.</td>
<td>2,149,056 rds</td>
<td>144,648 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-pounder anti-tank guns, parts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-pounder A.P. shot, Q.F.</td>
<td>19,996 rds</td>
<td>133,764 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shells, Fixed,H.E. for 3&quot; A.A.gun</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>459,037 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout cars, M3A1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,560 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers double head wrenches</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75 lbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 3,730,223 lbs |
SHIPMENTS OF SERVICE AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 23, 1942</td>
<td>Cotton sheeting</td>
<td>2,469,221 yds</td>
<td>839,608 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 1942</td>
<td>Medical supplies including 500,000 c.c. of typhoid vaccine</td>
<td></td>
<td>99,306 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6, 1942</td>
<td>Fire extinguishers for hospitals</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>440 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disinfestors, steam pressure sterilizers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47,775 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steel safes for hospitals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,550 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dyes, coal tar, for uniforms</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,202 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Weight:** 996,881 "
March 12, 1942.

SHIPMENTS OF OILS

January 23, 1942.
Lubricating oil .................. 390,600 lbs.

January 31, 1942
Lubricating oil .................. 143 "

February 6, 1942
Lubricating oil .................. 1,669,043 "
Penetrating oil .................. 9,180 "
Hydraulic fluid .................. 4,152 "
Lubricating grease ................. 222 "

March 5, 1942
Lubricating oil .................. 1,107,925 "

Total: 3,181,265 "

SHIPMENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

January 23, 1942
Telephone equipment ............... 511,030 "

March 5, 1942
Telephone equipment ............... 170,000 "

Total: 681,030 "
SHIPMENTS FOR YUNNAN-Burma RAILWAY

January 23, 1942
Steel rails, bars, cross ties, track bolts
nuts, etc. ............................ 4,172,207 lbs.

January 31, 1942
Rock-drills, air compressors, etc. ........ 512,515 "

February 6, 1942
Rock-drills, tools, oil, steel rails, cross-ties
pumps, pipe, etc. ...................... 5,877,697 "

March 5, 1942
Steel rails, welding rods, instruments, etc. 1,131,839 "

11,694,258

SHIPMENTS OF MATERIAL FOR HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January 23, 1942</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>250 tons</td>
<td>575,000 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety fuses</td>
<td>40,000 ft.</td>
<td>698 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting caps</td>
<td>15,000 caps</td>
<td>117 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March 5, 1942</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shovels</td>
<td>625 dozen</td>
<td>31,250 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable concrete mixers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18,080 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid lighting paint</td>
<td>200 kits</td>
<td>4,400 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

629,545 "
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


I received a cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek today stating that it has finally been decided to induct the A.V.G., the formal induction to take place July 4. In the meantime every effort will be made to maintain the efficiency of the unit.

Lauchlin Currie
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

April 4, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

Three days ago I telegraphed the Generalissimo asking if he had received any messages from the Indian leaders in connection with Cripps' mission. He has replied today that he is in constant touch with his Indian friends and that, after the Cripps' proposal was published, in his opinion chances of a satisfactory settlement have greatly diminished. He characterized the British attitude as lacking in sagacity and deplored the probable result, namely, disaster for both Britain and India.

I feel that you may like to know his reactions.

With kind regards,

[Signature]

[Signature]
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

April 4, 1942

Dear General Watson:

I shall be grateful if you will kindly give
the enclosed letter to the President.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 China

page 32.
AprU 18, 1942

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is a radiogram sent to the Generalissimo in accordance with instructions which you transmitted to me through Miss Tully.

JOSEPH F. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incl.
April 17, 1942

Message sent from General Marshall to the Generalissimo, Chungking.

"This message is to be delivered immediately and personally to the Generalissimo. I have recently learned from General Stilwell that a special aircraft project which we have had under way for some time and which will involve a landing at one of your fields had not been completely coordinated with your desires. I want personally to express to you my deep regret that this matter was not brought to your attention in detail, at its inception. The necessity for secrecy has made me reluctant to discuss the subject by radio but I assumed that you had been completely informed by one of our Air officers formerly serving in China. The President is fully appreciative of your difficult situation and is particularly anxious that all our operations in your region be under your complete control and in conformity with your desires. Since he has learned that you consider the execution of this mission undesirable at this time he would be very glad to cancel it if this were possible and he regrets that he cannot now do so because of the imminence of execution. He is therefore especially grateful to you for the very effective measures you have directed to be taken to make the venture a success. I take this opportunity to assure you that in the future no U.S. Army effort will be undertaken in your theatre until I have received definite evidence that you approve in every respect. I hope that a considerable proportion
of the airplanes involved will successfully complete the mission and thereafter be available, under General Stilwell's direction, to participate in U.S. air operations in India and China so as to support the magnificent effort you are making. By every means possible we are attempting to rush air support to that important region. MARSHALL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is a radiogram received from General Stilwell this morning. It is not very encouraging and about the only action we can take is to send him a radiogram expressing confidence. This is being done.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Radiogram from Gen. Stilwell.
Para 1. British apparently close to exhaustion and collapse. (Attention Secwar and Chief Staff). Had hoped their front could be held until we could counter attack at Pyinmana, but they have lost Magwe and we have had to divert 2 regiments to protect our flank. Will have to increase this help to 1 Division and perhaps more. However, we are attempting an attack South from Bawlake with 1 Division, hoping to threaten Toungoo via Mawchi. In addition we hope to counter attack from Pyinmana if British Front can be stabilized for few days more. We have 3 Divisions ready for this action, total strength about 16,000.

1 is now fighting delaying action back to the position. The other 2, less 1 regiment, are in position. We will have 8 pieces of Artillery and perhaps 6 Planes from the A V G. Comparative riches. Am dickering for temporary use of some British Tanks, without much hope of getting them. Supply and medical services working as well as could be expected, with our meager facilities.

Para 2. The situation is critical. British Command is discouraged. No help of any kind from India. I British Plane now working in Burma. 40 Jap Transports reported in Rangoon. Continuous Jap bombing of all towns within reach. Bpt all towns within reach. All villages South of Mandalay have been burned. Mandalay a complete wreck. I more Chinese Division to arrive Mandalay April 20, about 7,000 men. Remaining Division of 80-8th Army 10 days behind. Japs can reinforce faster than we can. At present it seems probable that we will be back in the Hills by May 10th and highly problematical if we can keep any communication open with India. I believe British have for some time written Burma off. Troops could have been marched in long ago, had they meant business. British High Command here not inspiring. Enormous staff at Maymyo includes 15 Generals. Wavell remains in India and says he is sorry he cant send
Para 3. Have been unable to report recently due to constant running around in attempt to egg the boys on to positive action. In general, action since Toungoo has been concentration and readjustment in hope of striking a blow at Pyinmama. Up to yesterday we had a fair chance, and there is still a glimmer of hope. The next 48 hours should clear the situation considerably.
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR for AMMISCA

No. 540 AMMISCA, April 18th, 1942

Plans and efforts for assisting and supporting China outlined Wurad 459 were personally explained to Generalissimo. He understood the situation fully. He requested that War Dept advise: 1-date AVG will be brought to full strength in aircraft and personnel, 2-specifically how many and what type airplanes would be diverted to 10th Air Force and on what date, 3- what action the President will take on Generalissimo urgent request for 300 airplanes for Burma defense? After conversation with Madame Generalissimo expressed strong anti-British feeling, became quite angry and excited and stated he does not consent to diversion of Chinese Aircraft for defense of India. He desired to protest the diversion, he stated it was a Breach of Faith, that it would have a demoralizing effect on moral of Chinese Army Officers and men, that it would adversely affect the good will and mutual understanding between China and the United States to divert Aircraft promised and delivered to China, and that he opposes the diversion with all his strength. It was made clear that unless India was defended and lines of communication to China kept open little or no US aid could reach China. The Generalissimo stated his decision was final, request that Washington be informed and politely withdrew. Russell end.

Footnote: Radio 459 (4-13-42) (CM-OUT-2308) Concerns Airplane Detectors. The reference 459 comes through without error. Attention is invited Radio 449 (4-12-42) (CM-OUT-2193)

ACTION: OPD
INFO. COPIES: TAG G-2
               LOG JIC
               FILE MAJ HAMMOND
               A-2
               SGS
               CG AAF

CM-IN-4903 (4-18-42) 3:24 Pm

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
April 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMiral KING:

Herewith is a draft of a message from the President to the Generalissimo. While it is quite long, it is deemed best to explain the situation fully so as to answer the many questions the Generalissimo has asked.

Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incl. Seen - no comment - EqhK

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 4/24/69
Signature - 3/42
MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Staff directs that a message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to AMISCA, Chungking, China: WDWPD:

THIS MESSAGE IS TO BE DELIVERED PERSONALLY TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK STOP I HAVE CAREFULLY EXAMINED ALL OUR PLANS FOR PROVIDING YOU AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE AIR SUPPORT THAT YOU REQUIRE IN THE GREAT BATTLE YOU ARE WAGING IN BURMA STOP NO REPEAT NO AIRPLANES CONSIGNED TO THE AVG WILL BE DIVERTED TO THE TENTH AIR FORCE COMMA AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRPLANES SCHEDULED FOR THE AVG REMAINS UNCHANGED STOP I GIVE YOU THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULES OF SHIPMENTS COMMA SIXTY ONE PURSUIT AND SIX CARGO AIRPLANES HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED AT KARACHI STOP THIS NUMBER INCLUDES THOSE ACTUALLY DELIVERED TO THE AVG STOP ONE HUNDRED TWENTY PURSUIT PLANES ARE NOW AT SEA IN VARIOUS SHIPS COMMA SOME OF WHICH WILL ARRIVE AT KARACHI IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE STOP THERE ARE NOW FLYING TO CHINA FROM THE UNITED STATES SIX CARGO PLANES STOP SOON TO LEAVE THE UNITED STATES ARE THIRTY TWO LIGHT BOMBERS AND TWENTY TWO CARGO PLANES STOP FUTURE DEPARTURES INCLUDE TWO HUNDRED NINE PURSUIT PLANES COMMA NINETY ONE OF WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THIS COUNTRY IN APRIL STOP PARA FINE.
SECRET

TENTATIVE PLAN WHICH WE WERE CONSIDERING FOR DIVERTING SOME OF THESE PLANES FOR EARLY OPERATION IN INDIA HAS BEEN ABANDONED.

AND I REPEAT THAT ALL THE AIRPLANES ABOVE LISTED ARE BEING DELIVERED TO YOU FOR OPERATIONS UNDER YOUR DIRECTION STOP

THE AIRPLANES NOW BEINGSENT TO THE TENTH AIR FORCE FOR OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND TO PRESERVE AIR COMMUNICATIONS TO CHINA ARE FROM BRITISH AND AMERICAN ALLOCATIONS AND HAVE NO REPEAT NO RELATIONSHIP TO PLANES PREVIOUSLY CONSIGNED OR PROMISED TO CHINA STOP PARA I GIVE YOU THIS INFORMATION IN DETAIL SO THAT YOU MAY HAVE A DEFINITE BASIS FOR PLANNING AND SO THAT YOU MAY BE REASSURED WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTIONS YOU HAVE RAISED STOP

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIR PLANES ALLOCATED FOR OPERATIONS IN CHINA IS FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY SIX AND OF THESE THE PORTION THAT HAS NOT YET LEFT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE DISPATCHED AS SOON AS WE ARE ABLE TO DO SO STOP PARA I AGAIN CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE MAGNIFICENT EFFORT YOUR TROOPS ARE MAKING AND I AM EARNESTLY HOPEFUL THAT WITH THE AIR ASSISTANCE REPRESENTED IN THE ABOVE SCHEDULE OF ARRIVALS AND SHIPMENTS YOUR SITUATION WILL RAPIDLY IMPROVE

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PERSONAL TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM THE PRESIDENT

ALL OUR PLANS FOR PROVIDING YOU WITH THE AIR SUPPORT YOU NEED IN THE GREAT BATTLE YOU ARE FIGHTING IN BURMA AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED BY ME. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRPLANES SCHEDULED FOR THE AVG REMAINS UNCHANGED AND NO AIRPLANES CONSIGNED TO THE AVG WILL BE DIVERTED TO THE TENTH AIR FORCE.

FOLLOWING ARE SHIPMENT SCHEDULES:

THERE ARE NOW FLYING TO CHINA FROM THE UNITED STATES SIX CARGO SHIPS. ONE HUNDRED TWENTY PURSUIT PLANES ARE NOW AT SEA, AND SOME OF THESE WILL ARRIVE AT KARACHI IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. SIXTY ONE PURSUIT AND SIX CARGO PLANES HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED AT KARACHI. INCLUDED IN THIS NUMBER ARE THOSE ACTUALLY DELIVERED TO THE AVG. THIRTY TWO LIGHT BOMBERS AND TWENTY TWO CARGO PLANES ARE TO LEAVE THE UNITED STATES SOON. TWO HUNDRED NINE PURSUIT PLANES ARE SCHEDULED FOR FUTURE DEPARTURES, NINETY ONE OF WHICH ARE TO LEAVE IN APRIL.

THE AIRCRAFT LISTED ABOVE ARE BEING DELIVERED TO YOU FOR OPERATIONS UNDER YOUR DIRECTION. PLANES PROMISED OR PREVIOUSLY CONSIGNED TO CHINA HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO PLANES NOW BEING SENT TO THE TENTH AIR FORCE FOR OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND TO PRESERVE AIR COMMUNICATIONS TO CHINA. THESE LATTER PLANES ARE FROM AMERICAN AND BRITISH ALLOCATIONS.
IT WILL BE NOTED THAT A TOTAL OF FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY SIX AIRPLANES HAVE BEEN ALLOTTED FOR OPERATIONS IN CHINA AND THAT THOSE WHICH HAVE NOT ALREADY LEFT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE DISPATCHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS INFORMATION IS GIVEN YOU IN DETAIL SO THAT YOU MAY HAVE A DEFINITE BASIS FOR PLANNING.

I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT YOUR SITUATION WILL IMPROVE WITH THE AIR ASSISTANCE OUTLINED ABOVE. I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE MAGNIFICENT FIGHT YOUR TROOPS ARE MAKING.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Airplanes for China.

The information on which Mr. Currie has acted, as represented in his attached memorandum, is no longer applicable. The War Department has already informed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that no airplanes are to be diverted from Lease-Lend commitments to China. We have also provided him with a schedule of expected arrivals of airplanes at Karachi, against the China commitment.

I am attaching copies of recent radio dispatches on this subject.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.
April 19, 1942

AMMISCA
Chungking, China

War Dept. No. 509

No AVG planes will be diverted to the 10th Air Force. REUR 540. Total number of airplanes scheduled for AVG remains unchanged. Present status is as follows:

Arrived at Karachi 61 pursuit and 6 cargo.

Enroute by boat 120 pursuit.

Enroute now flying eastward from the United States 6 cargo.

Enroute flying about to leave the United States 32 light bombers and 22 cargo.

Remaining to go 209 pursuit, 91 of which are expected to leave United States in April.

This message to Stilwell for Bissell from Arnold.

Above gives a grand total of 456 airplanes allocated to you for operations in China.

Arnold

AAF PC 630

Originator: CGAAF

Info. Copies: TAG, File, OPD, G-2

CM-OUT-3634 (4/19/42)
TO: AQUILA
NEW DELHI INDIA

W. D. No. 192

There will be no diversion to 10th Air Force of planes consigned to Chinese. You will do everything possible to expedite the delivery of these planes to China.

Following message sent to Stilwell repeated for your information. Breretons Air Force will be used in conformity with the British in Bay of Bengal Indian Ocean Area from Ceylon northward. Acknowledge receipt.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: TAG
File
G-2
CG AAF
SOS (Int. Div.)

April 20, 1942

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DECLASSIFIED
FDR DIR. 5200.9 (2/27/58)

Date: 6-22-66

Signature: Carl L. Spaar

SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

What can I tell Currie to pass on to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Attached Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek

I have replied to this cable stating that while General Arnold hopes Stilwell will divert a number of pursuits to Brereton, who is under his command, which diversion will later be made good, it is appreciated here that this can only be done with the Generalissimo's consent. There is no question of diverting them from this end. (I checked this with both Generals Arnold and Eisenhower.)

The Joint Staff has decided that the U.S. shall furnish one pursuit group in India. This is standing in the way of our allocating more pursuits to China in May. I should think the British might be persuaded to take over this commitment. Stilwell could then move Brereton's fifty-odd pursuit pilots and some ground personnel to the North Burma area and we could set up 50 more pursuits for this area for May shipment with the idea of establishing and maintaining two pursuit groups to cover the whole China - Burma area.

209 pursuits have arrived or are enroute and 43 more will be shipped in the next ten days. 33 medium bombers should leave by air around May 10th. This pretty well completes the Chinese program. Forward commitments have been made for the British and Russian programs, but not the Chinese. The assurance that, for the time being, we would ship 50 pursuits and 10 medium bombers monthly would go a long way to meet Chinese political and military requirements.

Leuchlin Currie
Few days ago in reply to Generalissimo's inquiry War Department through Bissell stated that no lease-lend planes needed for China can or will be given to third party regardless pressure without Generalissimo's consent. But today Bissell presented War Department memorandum purporting that aside from maintaining personnel and equipment AVG full strength consisting eighty planes it intends divert remaining pursuits originally meant for China through lease-lend to U. S. Tenth air force for protection invasion northeast India and avoid risk of destruction of British eastern navy. Believe you should know Generalissimo shocked at suggestion since in his message to President he urged immediate dispatch three hundred additional planes support Chinese expeditionary force. Generalissimo most forcefully opposes War Department move and expressed himself to Bissell as follows:

First, Chinese nation has waited patiently anxiously for arrival planes for over year while Chinese army already disgruntled because since formation AVG all planes sent to protect Rangoon and Burma instead reinforcing China fronts.

If therefore lease-lend planes diverted to Tenth Group people and Army will feel themselves robbed of widows' mite and will certainly resent not being treated as worthy ally who has unstintedly given all to common cause.

Second, if planes necessary to defend India etcetera why not take from lots assigned to Russia or Great Britain who are receiving thousands from America instead from paltry few designated for China.

Third, Chinese army and people are asking with all aid from America what has Great Britain contributed to allied cause.

Please inform President of Generalissimo's attitude.

Today British Army in Burma again retreated even from Magwe and all oil fields lost.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND FILES.

H.L.H.
10, Downing Street.
Whitehall.

17th April, 1942

Dear Mr. Hopkins,

I enclose as arranged a copy of the message received today through the Chinese Ambassador from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) F.D.L. BROWN
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL NO. T 585/2

Chinese Embassy,
49, Portland Place,
W. 1.

April 17, 1942

My dear Prime Minister,

I hasten to transmit to you the following message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which has just reached me, in accordance with his direction:

"While on my recent inspection at the Burma front I became acutely aware of numerous weaknesses on the Allied side and the pressing need for remedying these deficiencies. The most signal failing was the lack of organization in the rear and the distressingly poor morale of the people. In all my life of long military experience I have seen nothing to compare with the deplorable unprepared state, confusion and degradation in the war area of Burma.

"To mention one aspect of the situation. On April 7th I arrived at Mandalay, a city bombed by the Japanese on the 4th, more than half of the city being destroyed. Though I arrived on the third day following the raid, yet I found fire still blazing, since there was no fire extinguishing apparatus or personnel. There was intolerable stench from the corpses of those killed in the raid and the carcasses of animals which had not been removed. The same was the case with the corpses in houses, for the whole population had completely disappeared. The personnel responsible for the maintenance of communications had also gone off. Complete absence of the fighting spirit was to be observed among the civilian defence personnel. The public services and the masses were alike. They seemed to think of nothing but their own safety. The whole scene was therefore one of desolation and disorder. Rolling-stock damaged in the raid was left on the rails with the result that railway traffic had come to a standstill. Nothing had been done to repair the means of telegraphic communication. From the military point of view, the Burmese forces showed themselves incapable of winning the people's confidence and enlisting their co-operation, while they were themselves so lacking in fighting spirit that they presented a spectacle I can..."
scarcely attempt to describe in the present telegram. Owing to
the lack of organization and leadership, the majority of the
people were being utilized by the enemy, and the anti-British
sentiment was especially marked among the Lamas. Fifth columnist
activities were so extensive that it was almost impossible to
deal with them. The situation was depressing and alarming to a
degree.

"Another point I wish to emphasize is that the greatest
handicap experienced by the Chinese forces lies in the superiority
of the enemy in the air. They have been fighting in Burma nearly
one month, yet not a single machine of the Allied air force has
been used for their protection and assistance. As a consequence,
the enemy has been able to co-ordinate his movement on land and in
the air with the utmost ease, while the Chinese forces have found
themselves fighting under the worst possible conditions and forced
to make excessive sacrifice. The present state of public morale
in this war zone, the inadequacy of the different services in the
rear and the utter disparity of air power make it impossible for
the Allied forces to remain in the field, not to speak of operating
with any hope of success. Nevertheless, the Chinese forces are
continuing to hold a salient more than 60 miles in depth from
Yedasa to Pyimiana, and by sustained hand to hand combat with the
enemy, are thus covering the exposed flanks of the British and
Burmese forces.

"The Chinese expeditionary force is, it is true, concerned,
on the one hand, with the protection of China's means of communi-
cation and contact with the Allies, knowing that this is necessary
for the preservation of the only available base on the continent
of East Asia for a counter-attack on Japan. At the same time,
however, the aim that above all inspires tremendous effort is that
of defending the sub-continent of India. The Chinese forces are
perfectly well aware of the difficulties attendant upon the main-
tenance of public health, transport, telegraphic and telephone
communication in the war zone of Burma, and they are fully prepared
to make all sacrifices demanded of them. They went to Burma,
however, in the belief that they would be afforded Allied air
protection.

"They have been astonished to find nothing of the sort, and
the general conditions under which they have to fight are even
inferior to those on the front in China. The difficulties in
some respects are far worse than those encountered in China. If
nothing is done to effect improvement, a very bad impression of
their Allies will be formed in the minds of Chinese officers and
men, which it will be difficult to remove.

"Fierce fighting is now proceeding in Central Burma. Should
Central Burma be lost and Northern Burma become a battlefield,
India will be exposed to the immediate threat of invasion by land.

"I am by no means ignorant of the fact that Great Britain and
the U.S.A. are doing everything possible to increase production
and are meeting with many difficulties in their conduct of war. I
have therefore been most reluctant to express impatience or make
complaint and so to add to your cause of anxiety. What I have my-
self witnessed has, however, so impressed me with the gravity of
the crisis that I feel bound to inform you of the fact. If no
vigorous action is taken in Burma to change the attitude of the
masses and the non-combatant public both at the front and in the
rear, if nothing is done to raise their morale, and if strength in
the air cannot be increased, then defeat in Burma will be inevitable.

"The most urgent need is air power. A small number of machines
will be of little use. At least 300 aircraft ought to be brought
rapidly to the scene in order that air superiority may be obtained
and a new complexion put upon the present perilous situation. The
left flank of the threatened sub-continent of India may thus be
protected. I am of opinion that the Burma war area cannot be re-
garded as merely a subsidiary field of operation. It is, on the
contrary, an area of basic importance for the conduct of the war in
the Far East. We must lean on it as an essential support in our
resistance to Japan. If Burma is lost, nothing will stand in the
path of Japan's push to India; the line of communications and trans-
port between China and her Allies will be cut; the base for land
operations against Japan will be lost and the difficulty of the
Allies will be greatly multiplied. The enemy will be able to
develop his offensive to the East or the West at will.

"I make this report of my observations on the spot in the
hope that your country will immediately make use of the greatest
possible number of aircraft in Burma in accordance with the
request stated above, so that the urgent need of land forces may
be met, encouragement given to the Chinese expeditionary force,
and the base for counter-offensive against Japan kept firmly in
our hands."
"I shall await your reply with the greatest eagerness to know what may be your views on the points I have made in this communication."

I beg to add that should you need me for any purpose in regard to the above communication, I am entirely at your disposal.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister.
April 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPT. McCREA:

Will you dig out the correct statistics on this and speak to me about it?

F.D.R.

Memo from Lauchlin Currie, April 21 to the Pres. Re: Progress of China's air transport program.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 29, 1942.

As reported in Ambassador Gauss' telegram of April 18, General Chiang Kai-shek feels that it is desirable to recognize without delay the "Korean Provisional Government" now at Chungking.

The Chinese Government has requested an expression of our views. There is attached for your consideration the draft of our proposed reply.

The Soviet Union is also specially interested in the question of Korea. An approach to the Soviet Government in the matter might, however, be embarrassing to
to that Government in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is not at war with Japan. There remains the possibility, in case the "Korean Provisional Government" at Chungking is recognized by the Chinese Government, that the Soviet Union may support some other Korean group associated ideologically with the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government may be motivated in its desire to accord recognition to the "Korean Provisional Government" by a wish to nip in the bud the development of any Soviet-supported Korean group.

This whole question of Korean independence and the recognition of a Korean government has many complicated and delicate aspects. In view of China's geographical position and historic association with its neighbors, it is doubted whether this Government should interpose strong objection to any course which the Chinese Government may decide upon. It would seem appropriate, however, for this Government to lay before the Chinese Government a complete exposition of its views.

Enclosure:
Draft telegram. 

"CH"
May 4, 1942.

General Watson states that the President wishes this paper shown to the Chief of Staff and General Arnold only, then returned to the White House.

m.d.t.

M.D.T.
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

April 29, 1942

Dear General Watson:

Will you kindly present the enclosed copy of a telegram from the Generalissimo to the President.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Major
Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

April 29, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

I have received the enclosed telegram from the Generalissimo in reply to your message of April 21st, and hasten to forward it to you.

With kind regards,

[Signature]

The President

The White House
SECRET

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERALISSIMO FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.
DATED CHUNGKING, APRIL 26, 1942.

"I thank you for your telegram of April 21. I am most grateful to you for the detailed information you sent me regarding the allocation and shipment of planes for China. Such information will enable me to have a definite basis for the formulation of my plans for future war operations. I am further grateful to you for your assurance that every effort will be made to expedite the shipment of those planes which have not already left the United States.

"The military situation in Burma is critical. Our army is resisting with determination. The enemy can be stopped if the forces of our allies in Burma resist with determination and if adequate supplies of arms are forthcoming immediately.

"I therefore fervently hope that you will expedite the delivery of such planes and munitions to China without delay."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

April 29, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Raphael Later:

The attached papers are returned
for the President's Confidential
file as directed.

5/13/42

John Q. Dean
Colnel ESC
Dec 3, 1942
May 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

For your information and return for my confidential files.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Attached Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

I have conveyed the substance of this message to General W. B. Smith for transmittal to General Marshall.

Lauchlin Currie
Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Lauchlin Currie, May 6, 1942.

Please inform General Marshall that the Generalissimo has entire confidence in Stilwell, who is also well liked by our officers. The Burma situation cannot be otherwise since the command rests in the British instead of Stilwell, although the British forces number ten thousand. In a long cable to the President after the Burma inspection the Generalissimo predicted what has now happened. British Staff inefficiency or negligence, plus local conditions, continue to nullify Stilwell's efforts. On the Burma trip a high-ranking American officer told me the British think the war can be conducted by passing documents from department to department. It is impossible ever to depend on British promises or statements. When British retreated at Lashio they destroyed among other supplies 300,000 gallons of gasoline, although several weeks previously they officially notified us that no more gasoline was available for the Chinese army. The American Volunteer Group have all been practically sacrificed because no intelligence system was set up in Burma despite pressure on the British to remedy this defect.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

May 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
GENERAL MARSHALL:

For your information and return  
for my confidential files.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from Hon. Lauchlin Currie, 5/7/42, with attached copy of cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Lauchlin Currie, 5/6/42, asking that Mr. Currie advise General Marshall that the Generalissimo has entire confidence in Stilwell, in re Burma, etc.
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: Chongking
TO: Agar for America

No. 682 Amica 13th

Following is paraphrase of message just received from Madame Chiang Kai Shek with request it be conveyed to the President and with the statement that the delay in acknowledging his message (urad 622) was due to her indisposition. I am deeply appreciative of your sympathetic assurance that my visit to America will be welcomed by yourself and Mrs. Roosevelt. The visit will afford me the long wished for opportunity to meet you both.

The date of my departure is indefinite at this time owing to a number of matters requiring my personal attention. But when the date can be set, I shall be very happy to avail myself of your kind offer to arrange transportation facilities for me.

The Generalissimo joins with me in sending our warmest personal greeting to you and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Kavling Soong Chiang " Magruder

Stillwell


ACTION: SGS

INFO COPIES: TAG FILE

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DECLASSIFIED
DOO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/56)

DATE: 2-13-70

Signature:  

CM-IN-3678 (5/14/42) AM 2:53

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

May 9, 1942

ANNISCA-
Chungking, China

War Dept. No. 622

For Madame Chiang Kai Shek. I have just learned that you are considering coming to the United States in the near future for medical treatment. I am distressed to hear of the purpose of your proposed visit but I assure you of the warmest welcome. The United States Government will be pleased and honored to arrange transportation via the U.S. Air Ferry Route which offers the maximum of speed, though at some sacrifice of comfort. I will be glad to make arrangements for you at the Mayo clinic or such other hospital as you may choose. Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in very warm regards to you and the Generalissimo. Signed Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Marshall

Originator: SGS
Info. Copies: FILE
CM-OUT-1800 (5/9/42)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's acceptance of your invitation to her to come to this country for medical treatment. A copy of your invitation is also attached.

Instructions will be issued at once to the Military Attache at Chungking and to the Air Force Ferry Command to make the necessary arrangements when the date has been set by Madame Chiang Kai-Shek.

encls.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
pages 60, 61.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Attached cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

I think the reason behind this request is not so much for consultation as for morale boosting, and as such would be very desirable.

If Mr. Hopkins goes I do not think my presence would add a lot. On the other hand, if Mr. Hopkins is unable to go I believe I still have a lot of prestige in China as your representative.

You will note that an immediate reply is requested.

Lauchlin Currie
CABLE FROM MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK
TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE

May 31, 1942.

Owing critical situation in China Theater Generalissimo wiring President request Hopkins come China for consultation. Would it be feasible for you to come together. Reply immediately.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. H.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Noted by Mr. Hopkins
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transports for China.

In connection with the cablegram from Brereton relative to transports now in use between India and China being sufficient, it is to be noted that Brereton states, "Stilwell reports".

Regardless of the above, I am continuing to send transports to India for service in China until a total of 75 has been reached. This is in accordance with the agreement made with the Chinese that a total of 75 planes be available for this run by the end of June. If they cannot be used between India and China, they can be used in the trans-India service where transports are urgently needed.

In this connection, I am sending a cablegram to Stilwell for confirmation of his statement, and also intimating that we cannot understand why this small number is sufficient when there is so much strategical material to be carried in.

I am not satisfied that we can continue to run the 2 engine airplanes from India into China indefinitely. I am still of the opinion that while we will either replace the 2 engine planes by 4 engine planes or fly into China by another route from partial service already made, the best route ultimately should be from Eastern Siberia into Northern China.
June 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Apropos of General Brereton's cable that no more transports are needed into China, do you know whether this message was seen by General Stilwell and whether or not it has Stilwell's approval?

I can't quite understand Brereton's message in the light of the small tonnage which has been taken in each month.

Are you satisfied that we can continue to run the 2-engine planes from India into China?

F.D.R.
Am on an inspection trip with the Generalissimo, returning within ten days. Following is the gist of a message from Nehru, received just before our departure from Chungking.

Mahatma Gandhi, whose views are supported throughout the nation, has no desire to precipitate matters or impede the war effort. He indignantly denies he has ever encouraged Japan, and is still determined to resist aggression. Grieved over adverse effect on China of Burma developments but feels that unless British imperialistic policy is changed radically no effective help can be expected from India. The military effort is being impeded by the British soldiery, who are antagonizing both the Indian officers and men.

Gandhi considers that immediate recognition of Indian independence is essential. He is prepared to accept the British as an ally, not involving Indian subordination. He is perturbed at the Indian Government's growing policy of internments without trial, unfair treatment of Indian refugees from Burma, shifting of large-scale population without providing transportation or compensation. If such treatment is continued it may necessitate disobedience.

While Gandhi does not intend to start a big movement unless the British Government compels him, he cannot remain passive when his
people are spiritually degraded. Gandhi and Congress have no wish to impede the British but cannot associate themselves with the British war effort. Treatment of India as a vassal proves Great Britain opposes Indian and Asiatic freedom. Only through independence can India utilize her great resources in the cause of world freedom. Gandhi and the Congress, while differing on some points, are fully agreed that no solution of India and the world problem is possible except on the basis of Indian independence.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

1. According to the information received from Stilwell and Brereton, our two-motored transport planes are not satisfying the requirements for the India-China route. Of course, the weather conditions during the monsoon season are contributing materially to this deficiency. However, no C-54 airplanes would be available for use in China before the end of the monsoon season since the first several of these aircraft must be flown for a month or two in an area where there are adequate landing fields and maintenance facilities in the event that trouble should develop, as is quite possible, with a new type of equipment.

2. There will be a total of only 18 C-54 airplanes produced up until the end of October and these will be most urgently needed on operations across the North Atlantic to support our forces in the U. K.

H. H. Arnold
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL ARNOLD:

Do you think I should send a reply
to the enclosed?

F.D.R.
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

June 2, 1942

Dear General Watson:

I shall be grateful if you will kindly give
the enclosed letter to the President.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
Washington, D. C.
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

June 2, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I have received the enclosed telegram from the Generalissimo which I hasten to forward to you.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President

The White House
"Please transmit the following message to the President:

"During this time when the Chinese theatre is in such urgent need of combat and transport planes, I am deeply grateful to you for the despatch to us of the Tenth Air Group, originally stationed in India, and also of other planes formerly stationed in Australia, to assist in war operations. This timely addition of new fighting power will not only strengthen the morale of the army and improve the war situation, but will encourage the Chinese army to redouble its efforts.

"Air transportation is now a matter of great urgency. Based on the experience of the last few months, two-motor transportation planes, with their limited carrying capacity and performance, have been found entirely inadequate for the India-China route. I understand that, commencing June of this year, the United States will be in a position to produce fifteen DC-4 four-motor transport planes. Will you be so good as to allocate these planes and other planes of this type for use along the India-China air route? Because the war situation is presently more acute in our theatre of war than elsewhere, I am hopeful that you will give favorable consideration to my request.

Chiang Kai-shek"
Published in

*Foreign Relations of the United States*

1942  China

pages 88-89.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: Lauchlin Currie

Re: Trip to China.

I find myself in a somewhat embarrassing position. I wired Madame Chiang that you did not feel able to spare Harry Hopkins and suggested my going. She replied, "Eagerly await your arrival for many problems can only be discussed through personal conference. Please wire date of departure".

When, however, I called Dr. Soong today he said that nothing could be served by my going, that the situation was hopeless and beyond mere talking, and that he would see you next week. I was a bit taken aback as only a week ago he voluntarily suggested my going to China, to which I gave a non-committal answer.

I am sorry that I seem to have got things tangled up a bit. I am afraid, however, that that is typical of all our relations with the Chinese!
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942  China
pages 95-96.
July 4, 1942.

My dear Generalissimo:

Mr. Currie's visit affords me an opportunity to return the greetings you sent me on Mr. Latimore's return. I was glad to learn that you find his work helpful to you. I have always regarded him as both a good American and a good friend of China and I share your confidence in his complete integrity. His intimate knowledge of the Chinese scene has been of great assistance to us.

I gave serious study to your request that Mr. Hopkins visit you for a personal talk. Mr. Hopkins was eager to go and I should have liked to have been able to send him. Various compelling considerations, however, finally and reluctantly forced me to withhold my assent. His health is not robust and the trip is a long and arduous one at this time of year. Moreover, he is playing a most vital role in the war effort here, and I did not feel that I could spare him for an extended period.

I have, therefore, asked Mr. Currie to resume his earlier and most profitable talks with you. Mr. Currie has my complete confidence, has access to me at all times, and has quietly and in the background been active on all phases of Sino-American relations—military, political and economic—since his last visit to China. He will, I am confident, faithfully and accurately convey my specific views and general attitudes to you, and yours to me. It will be the next best thing to our having personal talks, which I hope will not be too long deferred.
There is one apparent misunderstanding which I am most anxious to have cleared up. Since we are fundamentally of the same mind and our countries have common objectives both in the war and in the post-war period, I feel that I can speak frankly and freely to you. I was greatly disturbed and upset by a recent cable from you which intimated that the China theater was no longer regarded here as meriting attention. The simple truth of the matter is that we are doing absolutely all in our power to help China win this war just as we are helping Britain and all the other United Nations to win this war. For you to entertain any thoughts to the contrary leads me to feel that you may not appreciate the strategic picture as it appears to me.

In the past six months it was impossible to prevent Japanese advances and the capture of the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Burma. This impossibility arose simply from the element of geography. During this period the first thing to do was to limit the extent of the Japanese advances in order to hold the South Pacific, to prevent us from being bottled up in the United States and to prevent control by Japan of all seaborne commerce in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

This seemed to have been successfully accomplished until ten days ago and then a most unfortunate and unexpected development occurred. As I write this letter Egypt, the Suez Canal, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and even Ethiopia are all threatened with capture by the Germans and Italians. A simple glance at a map will show that if this happens American aid to China will be practically eliminated because of German and Japanese domination of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Bay of Bengal.

I am sure that in the light of the current situation you would not want the United States at this critical juncture to give no aid to Britain and Egypt.
since this would jeopardize the whole of the Far East. If you had been in my place, attempting to look at the war in its global aspects, I am sure that you would have done everything possible to bolster our position in the Near East. Your interest in China alone, I feel confident, would have led you to divert a few planes from the Indian theater.

You have yourself suggested the desirability of a single unified command for the whole war. For various and cogent reasons this is not possible to establish in any formal sense. By virtue of the American position, however, I am to a large extent filling that role. It is in this role that I have, as a matter of emergency, sanctioned the diversion of a few available planes from the Indian-China theater, even though earlier, before the emergency arose, I had felt that no diversion would be necessary.

Mr. Currie comes to you at a most critical and anxious time for all of us, and for you in particular. I have no doubt whatever of the ultimate victory of our cause. I am only grieved that our allies should have to bear the major brunt of the fighting in the next few months.

Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in extending our warmest personal regards to you and Madame Chiang.

Very sincerely yours,

(FDR)

LC: cm

His Excellency,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
Chungking, China.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,

U. S. A.
The Executive Yuan

Chungking, August 3, 1942.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President,

It was a pleasure to receive your kind letter of July 4 through Dr. Currie. It is indeed gratifying to find that the United States and China are so close in their views not only on how to traverse the steep and thorny way to victory but also on what you so felicitously call the "Open Door to a future of democratic collaboration and constructive progress."

We profoundly regret the untimely death of Mr. A.M. Fox, who, in the brief year of his stay in China, not only contributed to the cause of Sino-American financial relations but also endeared himself to all those who had the pleasure of associating with him.

We are very happy to have Dr. Currie with us again and we deeply appreciate your sending him at a time when there must be so many pressing demands on him at home. I feel confident that his second visit, no less than his first, will make a very real contribution to cementing the friendly
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

bonds between our two countries. Since his arrival, besides having had occasion to confer with him and acquaint him with recent developments here, I have had prepared for Dr. Currie a confidential report reviewing various phases of our financial and economic conditions. It is my hope that he will find this report of some use in giving you an over-all picture of China's wartime finances.

With kindest personal wishes for your health,

Yours sincerely,

H. H. Kung
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I received a telegram on June 25th from the Generalissimo transmitting text of a letter from Gandhi, copy of which please find attached. The Generalissimo asked that the telegram be personally conveyed by me to the President and the Prime Minister, but the President had already left for Hyde Park.

2. In the meantime the British Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour, upon the instructions of his Government, called on the Generalissimo June 27th, and stated that it is feared that Gandhi plans to take adverse action which the Indian Government is preparing to suppress, and that if it is found necessary to arrest Gandhi it is hoped that the Generalissimo would understand.

The Generalissimo told Sir Horace the contents of Gandhi's letter which openly stated that he intends to take action. He (the Generalissimo) was aware that the matter was an internal question of the British Empire but because of consequences affecting not only the British Empire but all of the United Nations, as a friend he hoped that the British Government would act cautiously.

3. As Lord Halifax was leaving for London, on July 1st I gave him a copy of Gandhi's letter for the Prime Minister, and acquainted him also of Sir Horace Seymour's visit. Lord Halifax stated that although the Prime Minister takes the view that as a perfectly good offer was made and rejected nothing more could be done, he himself does not believe that the question should remain deadlocked. He mentioned in confidence of a new formula which he intends suggesting to the Prime Minister. The British could do nothing now to induce Gandhi to listen to reason, but he hoped that the Generalissimo will persuade Gandhi not to take precipitate action that will wreck all chances of a settlement. I immediately telegraphed his suggestion to the Generalissimo.

4. I received today three urgent messages from the Generalissimo stating that the Indian National Congress will hold a meeting from July 6th to July 8th at which it is bound to come to a decision as to what action to take. (The President will be aware that matters have come to a head with the British Government appointing two days ago an Indian Defence Minister and two Indian members to the War Cabinet, and arresting an important member of the Indian National Congress.)

As the Indian problem vitally affects the security of the United Nations, he hopes that the President will initiate definite measures leading to a just and reasonable settlement. Failing a settlement he is apprehensive that the recent Malayan and Burmese disasters will be repeated in India on an infinitely wider scale.

He solicits a clear indication of the President's attitude and opinion on the Indian problem so that he may determine his own attitude. Because of the meeting of the Indian National Congress, he hopes that he may receive the reply before July 7th, which corresponds to July 6th Washington time.

Respectfully submitted,

July 5th 1942.

T.V. Soong.
GANDHI'S LETTER TO GENERALISSIMO JUNE 25TH 1942

I can never forget the five hours close contact I had with you and your noble wife in Calcutta. I had always felt drawn towards you in your fight for freedom and that contact and our conversation brought China and her problems still nearer to me. Long ago between 1905 and 1913 when I was in South Africa I was in constant touch with the small Chinese colony in Johannesburg and I knew them first as clients and then as comrades in the Indian passive resistance struggle in South Africa. I came in touch with them in Mauritius also. I learnt then to admire their thrift, industry, resourcefulness and internal unity. Later in India I had a very fine Chinese friend living with me for a few years and we all learnt to like him.

I have thus felt greatly attracted towards your great country and in common with my countrymen our sympathy has gone out to you in your terrible struggle. Our mutual friend Nehru whose love of China is only excelled if at all by his love of his own country has kept us in intimate touch with the development of the Chinese struggle.

Because of this feeling I have towards China and my earnest desire that our two great countries shall come closer to one another and cooperate to their mutual advantage I am anxious to explain to you that our appeal to British power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defence against the Japanese or to embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom. That problem does not arise before me as I am clear that India cannot gain her freedom in this way and a Japanese domination of either India or China would be equally injurious to the other country and to world peace. That domination must therefore be prevented and I would like India to play her natural and rightful part in this.

I feel India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India has been a helpless witness of the withdrawal from Malaya, Singapore and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a repetition of what befell these unfortunate countries. But unless we are free I can do nothing to prevent it and the same process might well occur again crippling India and China disastrously. I do not want a repetition of this tragic tale of woe.

Our proffered help has repeatedly been rejected by British Government and the recent failure of Cripps Mission has left a deep wound which is still running. Out of that anguish has come the cry for immediate withdrawal of British power so that India can look after herself and help China to the best of her ability.

I have told you of my faith in non-violence and of my belief in the effectiveness of this method if the whole nation could turn to it.

That faith in it is as firm as ever. But I realise that India today as a whole has not that faith and belief and the government in Free India would be formed from the various elements composing the nation.

Today the whole of India is impotent and feels frustrated. The Indian Army consists largely of people who have joined up because of economic pressure. They have no feeling of a cause to fight for and in no sense are they a national army. Those of us who would fight for a cause for India and China with armed force or with non-violence cannot under foreign heel function as they want us. And yet our people know for certain that India free can play even a decisive part not only on her own behalf but also on behalf of China and world peace. Many like me feel that it is not proper or manly to remain in a helpless state and allow the enemy to overwhelm us when a way to effective action can be opened to us. They feel therefore that every possible effort should be made to ensure independence and that freedom of action which is so urgently needed. This is the origin of my appeal to British power to end immediately unnatural connection between Britain and India.
Unless we make that effort there is grave danger of public feeling in India going into wrong and harmful channels. There is every likelihood of public feeling for Japan growing simply in order to weaken and undermine British authority in India. This feeling may take the place of robust confidence in our ability never to look to outsiders for help in winning our freedom. We have to learn self-reliance and develop strength to work out our own salvation. This is only possible if we make a determined effort to free ourselves from bondage. That freedom has become a present necessity to enable us to take our due place among the free nations of the world.

To make it perfectly clear that we want to prevent in every way Japanese aggression I would personally agree and I am sure the Government of Free India would agree that the Allied powers might under treaty with us keep their armed forces in India and use the country as a base for operations against threatened Japanese attack. I need hardly give you my assurance that as the author of the new move in India I shall take no hasty action. And what action I may recommend will be governed by consideration that it should not injure China or encourage Japanese aggression in India or China. I am trying to enlist world opinion in favor of a proposition which to me appears self proven and which must lead to the strengthening of India and China defence. I am also educating public opinion in India and conferring with my colleagues. Needless to say any movement against the British Government with which I may be connected will be essentially non-violent. I am straining every nerve to avoid conflict with British authorities. But if in the vindication of the freedom which has become the immediate desideratum this becomes inevitable I shall not hesitate to run any risk however great.

Very soon you will have completed five years of war against Japanese aggression and invasion and all the sorrow and misery that this have brought to China. My heart goes out to the people of China in deep sympathy and in admiration for their heroic struggle and endless sacrifice in the cause of their country's freedom and integrity against tremendous odds. I am convinced this heroism and sacrifice cannot be in vain, they must bear fruit. To you to Madame Chiang and to the great people of China I send my earnest and sincere wishes for your success. I look forward to the day when Free India and Free China will cooperate together in friendship and brotherhood for their own good and for the good of Asia and the world.

In anticipation of your permission I am taking the liberty of publishing this letter in Harijan.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Mr. Currie took with him letters to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. H. H. Kung, signed by the President Saturday afternoon, and carbon copies were left in the President's basket. The attached papers will complete your files.

[Signature]

Francis McConnell
2 copies for White House

Laughlin Currie is on his way to OPM, carrying the attached with him. EOB.
July 4, 1942.

Dear Dr. Kung:

Dr. Currie's second visit to China gives me an opportunity to reply to your letter of January 14.

I fully reciprocate the feeling you so clearly state, that no single member of the comity of nations is safe when aggressor nations are allowed to choose their victims one by one. That is why, in aiding each other and coordinating our efforts against the common enemy, we all realize that we must make sacrifices not for ourselves alone but also for those who are making sacrifices on our behalf. The long and heroic struggle of China, and the unparalleled sacrifices you have made, have drawn closer than ever the ties between our two peoples and between all the United Nations.

There can be only one outcome of the prodigious effort we are called on to make. Victory will mean not only a triumph over aggression, but an Open Door to a future of democratic collaboration and constructive progress.

Since the lamented death at his post in China of Mr. Fox, who so loyally served our common cause and principles, I attach an added importance to Dr. Currie's visit and the opportunity he will have to confer with you. His great competence in financial and economic matters will enable him to bring back a picture of the important economic side of the collaboration between our two Governments and the Governments associated with us.

With cordial wishes for your personal health,

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency,
Dr. H. H. Kung,
Ministry of Finance,
Chungking, China.

(FDR)
2 copies for White House
July 4, 1942.

My dear Generalissimo:

Mr. Currie's visit affords me an opportunity to return the greetings you sent me on Mr. Lattimore's return. I was glad to learn that you find his work helpful to you. I have always regarded him as both a good American and a good friend of China and I share your confidence in his complete integrity. His intimate knowledge of the Chinese scene has been of great assistance to us.

I gave serious study to your request that Mr. Hopkins visit you for a personal talk. Mr. Hopkins was eager to go and I should have liked to have been able to send him. Various compelling considerations, however, finally and reluctantly forced me to withhold my assent. His health is not robust and the trip is a long and arduous one at this time of year. Moreover, he is playing a most vital role in the war effort here, and I did not feel that I could spare him for an extended period.

I have, therefore, asked Mr. Currie to resume his earlier and most profitable talks with you. Mr. Currie has my complete confidence, has access to me at all times, and has quietly and in the background been active on all phases of Sino-American relations—military, political and economic—since his last visit to China. He will, I am confident, faithfully and accurately convey my specific views and general attitudes to you, and yours to me. It will be the next best thing to our having personal talks, which I hope will not be too long deferred.

Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
pages 95-96.

(carbon copy placed in "open" China folder)
There is one apparent misunderstanding which I am most anxious to have cleared up. Since we are fundamentally of the same mind and our countries have common objectives both in the war and in the post-war period, I feel that I can speak frankly and freely to you. I was greatly disturbed and upset by a recent cable from you which intimated that the China theater was no longer regarded here as meriting attention. The simple truth of the matter is that we are doing absolutely all in our power to help China win this war just as we are helping Britain and all the other United Nations to win this war. For you to entertain any thoughts to the contrary leads me to feel that you may not appreciate the strategic picture as it appears to me.

In the past six months it was impossible to prevent Japanese advances and the capture of the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Burma. This impossibility arose simply from the element of geography. During this period the first thing to do was to limit the extent of the Japanese advances in order to hold the South Pacific, to prevent us from being bottled up in the United States and to prevent control by Japan of all sea-borne commerce in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

This seemed to have been successfully accomplished until ten days ago and then a most unfortunate and unexpected development occurred. As I write this letter Egypt, the Suez Canal, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and even Ethiopia are all threatened with capture by the Germans and Italians. A simple glance at a map will show that if this happens American aid to China will be practically eliminated because of German and Japanese domination of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Bay of Bengal.

I am sure that in the light of the current situation you would not want the United States at this critical juncture to give no aid to Britain and Egypt.
since this would jeopardize the whole of the Far East.
If you had been in my place, attempting to look at the war
in its global aspects, I am sure that you would have done
everything possible to bolster our position in the Near
East. Your interest in China alone, I feel confident, would
have led you to divert a few planes from the Indian theater.

You have yourself suggested the desirability of a
single unified command for the whole war. For various
and cogent reasons this is not possible to establish in
any formal sense. By virtue of the American position, how-
ever, I am to a large extent filling that role. It is in
this role that I have, as a matter of emergency, sanctioned
the diversion of a few available planes from the Indian-China
theater, even though earlier, before the emergency arose,
I had felt that no diversion would be necessary.

Mr. Currie comes to you at a most critical and anxious
time for all of us, and for you in particular. I have no
doubt whatever of the ultimate victory of our cause. I am
only grieved that our allies should have to bear the major
brunt of the fighting in the next few months.

Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in extending our warmest
personal regards to you and Madame Chiang.

Very sincerely yours,

(FDR)
DEAR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT:

The Chinese Army and people are deeply moved by the inspiring message which you were good enough to send us on this Fifth Anniversary of our war of resistance. Love of peace, justice and freedom is the traditional trait of our two peoples. We in concert with twenty-six allied nations have dedicated ourselves to the heroic fight in defence of civilization and humanity as you have truly said in your telegram. Our two armies and peoples are united in spirit as nations and peoples have never before been so united. At the same time no greater responsibilities have devolved upon our two great democracies since the beginning of their history. Upon receipt of this message of greetings from one hundred and thirty million friends across the Pacific, our army and people fully realize the prime necessity of annihilating the forces of evil in the Pacific so as to hasten the day of victory in this global war against aggression. Will you please accept my personal warm thanks and those of the entire Chinese army and people.

Chiang Kai-shek.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AUG. 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Hull called to say that he earlier this morning, before your message from Currie was received by him, dictated a memorandum of reply to the Generalissimo which he thought you could use as a basis. He is also preparing a reply to your message from Currie.

GGT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have just been notified by the War Department that the Generalissimo has agreed to the immediate dispatch of an additional 23,000 troops by air to India for equipping and training there, with a possible 15,000 later. This was something I had raised with the Generalissimo during my visit, assuming we could dispense with two months' export of strategic materials. Upon my return I found that we could.

This move both increases the security of India and makes the recapture of Burma more feasible.

Lauchlin Currie
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

LAUCH CURRIE

I think you had better take up this matter of Sino-British relations with the State Department. I am inclined to the belief that a tripartite war agreement -- China, Britain and the United States -- may be a good thing but that it is a matter of timing. It would be my thought that this should not be discussed with Britain until about December first, if it is to be discussed at all.

In regard to the Generalissimo's message to me in the form of the Aide Memoire, I think you might show this to General Marshall and General Arnold and tell them that the most effective thing we can do just now is to get from five to ten transport planes operating into China as fast as possible via the Indian route. I am assuming, of course, that the combat planes now in China will be kept up to full numerical operating strength.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Sino-British Relations

During one of my conversations with the Generalissimo I mentioned as something that was possibly desirable a mutual assistance and consultative pact with Great Britain. The Generalissimo at first dismissed the suggestion with the curt remark that he would enter into no pacts to which the United States was not a signatory. He then went on to state with some warmth various grievances against the British.

I was therefore somewhat surprised when he himself brought the subject up in one of my last meetings and questioned me closely as to whether the idea of the pact had the approval of the President or Churchill. I replied that I had had no expression of opinion from either, that it was entirely my own idea and that all I had hoped or expected in raising the matter with him was to get some intimation that if such an idea were broached it would receive sympathetic consideration by China and would not be summarily rejected. The Generalissimo said that he would be happy to give me an intimation along these lines, that he was agreeable to my discussing the matter with the President, and that he was fully aware of the highly tentative nature of the suggestion.

The Indian situation broke the day I left China. I assumed that it postponed any immediate possibility of improving Sino-British relations. Upon my return to Washington, however, I was surprised to find that Dr. Kung, not the Generalissimo, had told T.V. Soong that I had raised the possibility of arriving at a better understanding with the British and apparently suggested that he pursue the matter. Subsequently I have learned that Dr. Soong has talked about going to London.

Would you like me to

a) Drop the matter?

b) Run across to England and give Churchill the background and explore other aspects of Sino-British relations such as recapture of Burma?

c) Turn the whole matter over to the State Department?

Lauchlin Currie
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Re: Attached Aide Memoire handed to Lauchlin Currie by Chiang Kai-shek

I am not sure that the President had an opportunity to glance over this most interesting document. If he did not, you might like to slip it into his bag.

Lauchlin Currie
SECRET

Aide Memoire

Although I have conveyed to you orally my views on the general strategy of the war, it may be helpful to you to have a written summary.

I have been greatly heartened by what you have told me of the President's general approach to the problem. I will confess to you freely that prior to your visit and in default of any first hand information, I had feared that the President's plan was merely to mark time in the East while throwing all of America's resources into a campaign to defeat Germany first. Such a plan naturally alarmed me greatly because it meant a long drawn out war in the East. My people are weary and exhausted and a long continuance of the war here would place a serious strain on them. Moreover, Japan would have been given time to utilize and exploit her newly acquired resources and the task of defeating her would become more difficult and costly with each passing day. I was, therefore, enormously relieved to learn from you that offensive action against Japan would not be delayed until Germany is defeated but will take place simultaneously with or even possibly prior to offensive action against Germany.

Please assure the President that I fully appreciate that Germany is our strongest and most dangerous enemy and that first to resist Germany and later defeat her will require far more resources than will Japan's defeat. I likewise appreciate the importance of

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
establishing a second front as soon as it is practicable in order to relieve the pressure on Russia and on the Near East.

In short, I believe that the President's general strategic plan, as you have explained it to me, is well conceived. The suggestions and comments I have to offer are, I believe in conformity with this general plan and are designed to improve it's details as applied to the Far East.

1. Prior to the opening of an offensive, it is essential (a) to strengthen the defensive position of areas that may be the object of enemy attack and (b) to continue the process of attrition of the enemy's strength and seek to prevent him from exploiting newly acquired resources and of creating bases for offensive and defensive action.

In regard to the first point my impression is that adequate action is being taken to safeguard the position of Australia, Hawaii and Alaska. I cannot help feeling, however, that the defense of India and particularly China requires immediate strengthening. At the present moment American air forces in China consist of about 45 pursuit planes and 7 available bombers. Although this tiny force is being operated brilliantly, it naturally is suffering operational losses and is, in both my opinion and that of American air officers here, in a highly vulnerable position to sustained and concentrated enemy action.

In regard to (b) the air arm in China and India is so weak as to seriously impair its effectiveness in wearing down enemy strength and
can offer little impediment to enemy operations in Burma, India, China and in occupied China. A few additional bombers operating from England, in relation to the number already there, can have little effect on the outcome of the war. They are, however, of crucial importance in this area.

Will you please, therefore, convey to the President my feeling of the urgent need for immediate and substantial air reinforcements. I am here confining my remarks to the strictly military necessities. You will recall my oral remarks on the political and morale aspects of the matter, which are equally important.

2. To support continued effective defense in China, it is absolutely essential that an immediate and large increase in the capacity of the air ferry line be secured. The present capacity is pitifully small and we are forced to draw on our meagre reserve stocks of gasoline, bombs and ammunition. This cannot continue. I am convinced that operations 24 hours a day and every day in the week are possible with proper equipment and personnel. I am assured that it is perfectly possible to transport 5,000 tons monthly, which is the very minimum for sustained operations of a reinforced air force and of our arsenals.

Please do everything you can to impress upon the President the supreme necessity of building up air transport to 5,000 tons as quickly as possible.

3. Plans should immediately be instituted for coordinating offensive action on Burma, Thailand and Indo-China with offensive
action from Australia. China is fully prepared to contribute all she can to this effort provided her forces receive adequate air support. I must say in all frankness, however, that I cannot undertake offensive action without such support. American support is also required in two other phases of the plan we have discussed. Despite Mr. Churchill's message which you conveyed to me I feel that American support is necessary for activating the British military authorities in India. I have seen little evidence of any serious intentions or preparations in India for offensive action against Burma.

I feel, therefore, that some American troops in India are indispensable to the successful planning and prosecution of an offensive. I appreciate General Marshall's concern over the problem of shipping to India as contrasted to Europe. Please point out to him, however, that if through dispatch of say one division to India he can thereby activate some 15 or 20 other divisions in the Far East, this changes the comparison completely.

4. I should like again to impress upon you the necessity for speed in all the points I have mentioned. The necessity of immediate action is dictated both by the growing exhaustion of my resources, army and people and by the danger of permitting the enemy to consolidate and exploit the gains he has made.

August 6, 1942
Chungking, China

SECRET

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

What is the situation in regard to Stilwell in China? Apparently the matter is so involved between him and the Generalissimo that I suppose Stilwell would be more effective in some other field.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: General Stilwell.

In your absence I communicated to General Marshall your suggestion that I cable to the Generalissimo our intention of recalling General Stilwell and of leaving General Wheeler as acting chief. General Marshall demurred, saying that he had not been able to think of a suitable successor to Stilwell. One of the qualifications that appeared important to General Marshall was the willingness of the British to accept the command of the individual concerned. He had at the moment instituted discreet inquiries as to how General Alexander felt about General Stilwell.

I don't exactly know what the next move is. I judge, however, that the situation has not improved very much, as various things I started which depended on mutual goodwill for their continuance apparently have ceased shortly after my departure from China.

Lauchlin Currie
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942  China

page 159.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Situation relative to General Stilwell.

Support of General Stilwell

The Secretary of War and I have personally had lengthy discussions regarding General Stilwell. We feel that at least for the time being we should continue to support him in the accomplishment of what is an extraordinarily difficult mission. Our great objective is to reoccupy Burma sufficiently to open up a supply route into China. The British cannot do this alone; the Chinese certainly can't manage it; neither side would admit of leadership by the other. So our only hope as I see it is to secure guidance by an American. He must be a troop leader rather than a negotiator or supply man who would only serve to promote harmony at Chungking. We have searched our resources and at the moment we do not see any officer with a sufficient knowledge of the Chinese and with sufficient standing as a troop leader to hope to secure either British or Chinese acquiescence for control of a campaign.

Stilwell has spent almost ten years in China. I believe an officer without some such experience would be utterly helpless in dealing with Chinese methods, particularly in resistance to Occidental methods.

I know that Mr. Currie feels that Stilwell should be relieved but I do not believe Mr. Currie realizes what this is going to mean towards the accomplishment of our military objective in Burma.

Clarification of the situation

It is hoped that your reply to the Generalissimo's three demands, a draft of which I recently submitted for your approval, will go a long way towards clarifying the situation.

Officer en route to China

Colonel Timberman of the General Staff is departing by air today for China to survey the entire situation. He has had years of experience in China. I should not like to take any final action prior to his return.

It is therefore recommended that no action relative to General Stilwell should be taken at this time.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Chungking, Szechuan, 10/6/42, to the President, in reply to the President's letter of 9/22 which was handed to the Generalissimo by Mr. Willkie. Refers to Mr. Willkie's visit, and to invitation to Madame Chiang to visit the U.S.
My dear General Chiang: October 26, 1942

I was very pleased to receive your letter of October 6, 1942, in which you were so good as to give me the benefit of your observations in connection with the recent visit to China of Mr. Willkie.

It was very gratifying to learn from you that you found your talks with Mr. Willkie profitable, especially in the matter of acquainting you with the problems which we in this country face in connection with the war.

Mr. Willkie has told me of the cordial welcome which you and your countrymen extended to him and of the full opportunities he was accorded for making observations of conditions and for exchanging views with you and other Chinese leaders, and I wish to express my deep appreciation for all that you did for him.

I am happy to inform you that Mr. Willkie has spoken in the warmest terms of the fine spirit he found prevailing among the Chinese people. I am sure that his visit will prove of great benefit by enabling us in the United States to visualize more clearly many important aspects of questions involved in integrating our common war effort.

State Dept. Copy
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
pages 171-172.
Mrs. Roosevelt desires me to thank you for the message which you conveyed from Madame Chiang. We shall look forward with pleasure to the day when we can welcome her to this country and, I hope, you also.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

General Chiang Kai-shek,
Chairman of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of the Republic of China, Chungking, China.
State Dept. copy
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
page 160.
My dear Mr. President,

Mr. Willkie has kindly handed me your letter of August 22nd. He has been a most welcome guest, not only to my wife and myself, but to the entire Chinese nation. I am sure you will be glad to hear of the enthusiastic reception extended to him by the populace in different parts of China. It was a spontaneous expression of the Chinese people's profound attachment to the United States.

I have had long and profitable talks with him, during which, among other things, I realized more fully the consummate wisdom which you have exhibited in grappling with the almost overwhelming problems that you have successfully faced and which fills me with profound admiration of you as a world statesman and a protagonist of human freedom. It was this unflagging leadership which has rendered possible the magnificent war effort which is now being put forth by the American nation. I shall not fail to call upon my fellow countrymen to strive to emulate the exertions of their comrades-in-arms across the Pacific.

It is a matter for regret that Mr. Willkie cannot remain in China long enough to permit of his observing conditions in our central provinces. He has, however, visited several places of importance in the Northwest, which is one of the bases of our armed resistance. When you have heard his report, I would be greatly obliged if you will let me have a full statement of your views.

Madame Chiang wishes me to request you to convey her kindest regards to Mrs. Roosevelt. She appreciates greatly your kind invitation, and it is her earnest desire to pay a visit to your great country as soon as circumstances permit.

Always sincerely,

Chiang Kai-shek

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Washington, D.C.
United States of America
My dear Dr. Kung:

It was very gratifying to me to learn from your letter of October 7, 1942, of the cordial welcome which was extended by the people of China to Mr. Willkie on the occasion of his recent visit there. Mr. Willkie has personally reported to me how profoundly he was impressed not only by the friendliness of his welcome but also by the helpful attitude which was manifested everywhere in affording him the fullest opportunity to observe conditions and to exchange views with Chinese leaders. I wish to express my appreciation of the courtesies which you extended to Mr. Willkie.

We in this country cannot but feel encouraged by the spontaneity and warmth of the welcome accorded in China to Mr. Willkie as a manifestation of the spirit of unity with the United States and with the other United Nations prevailing among the Chinese people.

Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in thanking you and Madame Kung for your thoughtful gift of Chinese tea and in heartily reciprocating your kind expression of good wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency
Dr. H. H. Kung,
Chinese Minister of Finance,
Chungking.
THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CHINA.

October 7, 1942.

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
The White House, Washington, D. C.
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. President,

Taking advantage of Mr. Wendell Willkie's return to Washington, I am sending you this message to say how much our Government and people appreciate your sending him to our country. Never have I seen such spontaneous and heartfelt welcome accorded to a foreign visitor by our people of all walks of life as that shown to your personal representative. Despite his short stay, Mr. Willkie has done much by his infectious enthusiasm to invigorate China's war efforts. I am sure that having seen the facts in China with his own eyes he will be able to give you a correct picture of China's war efforts as well as of her problems and needs.

Knowing that you and your family are fond of Chinese tea, I take this opportunity to send you and Mrs. Roosevelt some fresh tea from this year's crop, one jar of red tea and another of green tea, which please accept with the warmest regards and best wishes from Madame Kung and myself.

Sincerely yours,

H. H. Kung.
The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
The White House, Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

Kindness of Mr. Wendell Willkie.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Attached drafts of letters to the Generalissimo and Dr. Kung.

I think these letters are all right as far as they go. I am afraid, however, that they don't meet the Generalissimo's request that when you had heard Willkie's report, you would let him have a full statement of your views. But then again, this request is a very difficult one to meet.

Lauchlin Currie
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. LAUGHLIN CURRIE

Are these proposed letters all right to send to the Generalissimo and Dr. Kung?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 10/20/42, to the President, returning letter which the President received from Dr. H.H. Kung dated 10/7/42, draft of reply for the President's signature to Dr. Kung, letter from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 10/6/42, and draft of reply for the President's signature to the Generalissimo.
My dear Mr. President:

I enclose for your consideration, in pursuance of your two memoranda, both dated October 15, 1942, drafts of letters addressed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to Dr. H. H. Kung in reply to their letters to you of October 6 and October 7, respectively.

The originals of the two incoming letters are returned herewith, copies having been made for the Department's files.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. From Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, dated October 6, 1942.
2. From Dr. H. H. Kung, dated October 7, 1942.
3. To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
4. To Dr. H. H. Kung.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you be good enough to personally prepare a reply for my signature?

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from Dr. Kung, dated October 7, 1942, brought back by Mr. Willkie, re appreciation of the President sending Mr. Willkie to China.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

WILL YOU SHOW THIS TO THE PRESIDENT?

H.L.H.
November 16, 1942

Dear Harry:

A message from General Stilwell this morning indicates that Madame Chiang Kai-shek will probably leave Chengtu, China, today or tomorrow.

The time necessary for her trip is quite indefinite since the record is three days but, on the other hand, bad weather may delay her arrival here for an indefinite period. Further information will be sent to you as soon as it is received.

I assume that the White House or the State Department will make proper arrangements for Madame's arrival, entertainment, and the hospitalization which you indicated was the reason for her trip.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL

Mr. Harry Hopkins
The White House

* The Walter Reid could do about anything she might require.

G.C.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Harry called to ask what arrangements have been made for Madam Chiang Kai-Shek? He asks if the State Department has been notified and if everything has been taken care of for her entry into this country?

Madam Chiang Kai-Shek is leaving New Delhi tomorrow and will probably arrive in Miami on Tuesday. She is very desirous of continuing on to New York to enter a hospital. No one seems to know whether any arrangements have been made and everyone is wondering if we shouldn't get hold of General Arnold or who ever handles these matters and see that the plane goes through in accordance with her wish.

G.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL WM. D. LEAHY

For the Joint Staff to consider and prepare reply.

F. D. R.

Enclosure
Paraphrase of Chiang Kai-Shek's reply to the President 11/14/42 from Chungking, China

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date 1-42
Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt
Lunch at White House
Thanksgiving-Nov 26 42
Mr. President:

Madame Xiang has sent message asking me to meet her tonight at Mitchell Field. Your train will not make it. I am off duty. Meet her at Hyde Park.

Harry
1942 - Thanksgiving Day - The White House.

Note in person to The President from Harry Hopkins, re. arrival of H. H. Chiang Kai-shek written on his. Kermit Roosevelt's place card.

Dated by F.D.R.
Grace:

You said to give this back to you when Madam Chiang arrived.

dot
Important among the points which need to be considered in regard to General Hsiung are:

General Hsiung was sent here by Chiang Kai-shek on the understanding on the part of the Chinese that the President definitely desired and requested the presence here of a highly qualified Chinese military representative.

General Hsiung, whatever may or may not be his military qualifications and capacity to be helpful in the war effort, is a close personal friend, confidant and trusted adviser of Chiang Kai-shek.

General Hsiung, although he has been accorded what may seem to us all the courtesies and attention which the situation warrants, has not been accorded the amount or the type of courtesies and attention which from his point of view (and doubtless what would be Chiang Kai-shek's point of view) are due to a military representative of the Generalissimo and of a country which is an active and substantial fighting contributor to the United Nations war effort.

General Hsiung is capable of being, if well disposed toward the United States, a valuable asset in our relations with China, but if alienated and not well disposed, a distinct liability in connection with those relations.

General Hsiung might or might not--probably not--be capable of contributing information or ideas of value in a war council, but General Hsiung probably could be conciliated and be used to advantage as a political ally at the probably small price of his being made to feel that he is regarded as a man of importance and his being consulted in connection with matters of apparent importance.
Dec. 15

1942

My dear Generalissimo,

The once vast distances between our two countries have been successively diminished by the steamship, the radio, the cable, the airplane, and now by this marvel of science which I am utilizing today. I take this unique chance to tell you, honored friends of this country, including Mrs. Roosevelt and myself, just to have with us your charming and distinguished wife.

Always sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt
WASHINGTON, D.C.--When President Roosevelt prepared a letter written in longhand for transmission, yesterday, over the new radio photo service between the U.S. and China, he made a slip in spelling that caused the Office of War Information no end of anguish. The letter, addressed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had one too many "L's" in the word "Generalissimo." The OWI held up facsimiles of the letter, which were to be distributed, and went quietly to work with ink eradicator. But pictures taken at the White House as the President handed the letter to Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming, revealed the orthographic error -- and much of the OWI's work was wasted. Here, (photo above), is a corrected facsimile of the letter, showing a prominent white space where the correction was made.

CREDIT LINE: (ACIF) 12-16-42 (ML)
NY CHI MGS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Elizabeth Chevalier called me from Pasadena, California to say that they were very anxious to have Madame Chiang Kai-Shek as Honorary Grand Marshal at the Rose Bowl game on January first.

She said it was rumored that the Madame was expected there around that time. They do not wish to issue an official invitation through the Embassy until they know whether it is possible for her to do this. Elizabeth said that even if she could not be there in person, they would like to arrange to have a microphone brought to her and that she would have the third largest listening audience in the world.

What advice do you think I can give her?

G.

21436 Sycamore
Pasadena, Calif.