MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

I attach a memorandum of conversation with Dr. Liu, Minister Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, on the subject of the visit of Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Washington.

Should there be anything which the President wishes me to do in connection with this visit, please let me know.

I also attach a list of the members of Madame Chiang's party who accompanied her to the United States.

George T. Summerlin
Dr. Liu Chieh, Minister Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, called this afternoon at his request. Dr. Liu stated that he had returned today from New York and that he wished to call and inform us that Madame Chiang Kai-shek would be coming to Washington shortly. In further comment, Dr. Liu said that he thought Madame Chiang would arrive here sometime after the middle of the month, probably about the 20th. Dr. Liu stated further that Madame Chiang would be in Washington for about a week; that arrangements for her visit had, he understood, been made with Madame Chiang directly by the White House; and that these arrangements included the question of arranging for Madame Chiang's trip to Washington.

Dr. Liu said that he had called on Mr. Summerlin and Mr. Woodward to discuss various matters of protocol connected with Madame Chiang's visit.

Dr. Liu referred to the fact that Madame Chiang had received a great many requests to make addresses at various places in this country; that arrangements relating to Madame Chiang's time in New York after she left the hospital had been placed in the hands of an American committee there; and that Madame Chiang was to make a public
public address in Madison Square Garden on March 2.

With regard to the invitations which Madame Chiang had received to make addresses in Washington, Dr. Liu said that Madame Chiang had it in mind to make only one address while here.

Dr. Liu stated further that Madame Chiang would make a visit to Chicago and then to the West Coast and contemplated making one public address in each of a few of the larger cities. Dr. Liu said that Madame Chiang planned not to make a great number of public speeches but to keep such speeches to a small number.

I told Dr. Liu that we wished him and the Embassy to feel free to come to us at any time with any question relating to Madame Chiang's visit; and that we all desired to be of the utmost helpfulness.

Dr. Liu expressed appreciation and said that if there came to our knowledge particulars as to the arrangements made by the White House with regard to Madame Chiang's visit in Washington, he would appreciate it if we would pass this information on to the Embassy as it would be helpful to the Embassy in making its plans. I said that we would be very glad to keep this in mind.
MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S PARTY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:

Dr. Hollington Tong
Mr. Platt
Pearl Chen
Miss King
3 servants
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Madame Chiang's Madison Square Garden meeting.

I attended this meeting and the preceding dinner at the invitation of Henry Luce. The following are some of my impressions:

1. I had the feeling that Madame Chiang's speech fell a bit flat. The crowd was anxious to be carried off its feet but the speech gave no occasion for this as it was literary in tone, pointless (except for possibly the religious angle), and, it must be confessed, rather dull. The many Chinese in the audience appeared activated mainly by curiosity.

2. Dewey made an excellent impression when presiding. He introduced the speakers easily and gracefully, and his voice came over the amplifiers very well.

3. T. V. Soong was present but was very glum all evening. Madame Chiang ignored him completely and his name was not mentioned by any of the twenty-odd speakers. At dinner, in reply to a query as to whether he was accompanying Madame Chiang on her trip, he replied rather brusquely that he could not as he was tired.

4. Although the seats were expensive and there were an estimated 17,000 people there, it was announced that the receipts would all go to defray the expenses of the meeting.

Lauchlin Currie
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 China

page 175.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1943.

This letter is in the handwriting of the Generalissimo and was brought to me by his wife. The translation is by her.

F.D.R.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO
CHINA

Chungking, Szechuen
16 November, 1942.

My dear Mr. President,

I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation of Your Excellency's having extended facilities enabling my wife to go to America for medical treatment and to have the opportunity of meeting you and Mrs. Roosevelt. I feel that through her, I am having the pleasure and honor of visiting you myself.

Madame Chiang is not only my wife, but she has been for the past fifteen years a comrade and partner who has shared dangers and braved death with me. She knows my mind and heart as thoroughly as it is humanly possible for one person to understand those of another. I hope, therefore, that you will talk as freely and fully with her as you would with me. I have every confidence that through her visit the personal friendship between us will be further deepened and that the relationship between our two great countries will be further strengthened.

With warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Roosevelt,

Yours sincerely,

Chiang Kai-shek

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.
羅斯福大總統閣下
此次內子
三病承蒙樂助欣以
提前赴美早日就醫私表
至為感謝並允乘此訪問
閣下

訊用會員委事軍府政民國
戮用会员军队府民众
民国政军府事委委员用

同志彼对中意志瞭解

非他人所能及故语

下坦率畅说必对中

面者余深信

子
行更酌增進余兩人之私
及擴展我兩大民國
謂此卽此佈達
康健並問
羅夫人安好
蔣中正敬
中華民國三十三年十月十五日
任用會員委事軍政府民國
Mr. P.
This was sent to me for you by Commander Gene Markley. S.
March 8, 1943.

Dear Madame Chiang:—

I entirely forgot to give this to you before you left the White House. It is the verbatim copy of what was said at the Press Conference, and I think the Generalissimo will be amused.

I am very apologetic and very cross at having been laid up your last four or five days.

I think the New York trip has been grand but I do hope you will not overdo on any of the rest of it.

I am greatly looking forward to seeing you as soon as you come back East.

Always sincerely,

Madame Chiang Kai-shek,
The Waldorf-Astoria,
New York, N. Y.

(Enclosure)
STRICKLY CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMBASSADOR

March 9, 1943

THE STILWELL MISSION

General Stilwell came to China in February 1942 with a directive from the President to keep China in the war and to do everything possible to increase China's military contribution to the joint struggle against the Axis.

A fundamental difficulty which faces General Stilwell is that China's policy in the prosecution of this war is not always parallel to ours.

All informed Chinese are keenly aware that of the four principal members of the United Nations, China has suffered the longest and the greatest in this conflict. Furthermore, like the Russians and the British, the Chinese have a more highly developed political sense than we. Political considerations loom larger in their evaluation of situations (including the military situation) than they do for even the Russians and the British.

Acutely aware of their relative military exhaustion, of the fact that they can be no stronger politically than they are militarily, of the importance of appearing as powerful as possible at the peace table, and of the likelihood of civil war with the Chinese communists after the peace, the Chinese Government, not surprisingly, pursues a policy of conservation of military strength. The Japanese approach the truth when they accuse the Chinese of seeking to make the far (the United States) fight the near (Japan).

We recognized before December 7, 1941 that China was endeavoring to get us to fight its battle against Japan. There has been no reason for a change in this Chinese attitude and there has in fact been no change, despite the disillusioning shock of Pearl Harbor which struck the Chinese with as great force as it did us.

China's policy, now that we are fighting the Japanese, is to remain technically in the war so as to be able to sit at the peace table as a "fighting" ally, to expend as little as possible of its strength and to rely upon the other members of the United Nations--primarily the United States--to defeat Japan.

We have not bled enough for the liking of the Russians, the British or the Chinese. With political considerations looming so large in their calculations they are each fighting not only the common enemies but also, in a negative fashion, their allies.

A second fundamental difficulty confronting General Stilwell is that, in addition to his professional military task, he is involved, whether he likes it or not, in Chinese domestic politics. He is a major force in Chinese politics. By instinct, temperament and convictions, he seeks to avoid involvement in Chinese domestic politics. But the fact that he commands a military force in China, is empowered to issue orders in the Generalissimo's name and has under his control lend-lease material for distribution to China makes him, despite all of his wishes to the contrary, a Chinese political factor. While he endeavors to avoid playing domestic politics, he cannot prevent politics from being played on him.

In his efforts to short-circuit domestic politics, General Stilwell has as much as possible dealt directly with the Generalissimo. But the Generalissimo maintains his paramount position as he attained it--through political manipulation. He is not a dictator. He has no absolute over-all command. He manipulates a delicate and shifting balance of power. So there is no one with sure and final authority with whom General Stilwell can deal.

General
General Stilwell has, of course, had long-standing contact with the Chinese Army. What he discovered upon his arrival at Chungking was therefore no surprise to him. The Chinese Army is not an army in the sense that we use the word army. Rather it is an agglomerate of feudalistic military forces held more or less together by personal loyalties, endowments, grants in aid, threats of superior weight and indifferent toleration. The Generalissimo’s relation to this armed mass is variable. A few divisions he can count upon to obey his orders fairly faithfully, within the limits of their ability. Others, no. He wisely does not attempt to issue to some of the more independent commanders orders which he has reason to believe they would not be willing to obey. Many orders are issued only after negotiation with the commander or his Chungking representative.

The following comment by an exceptionally intelligent Chinese Army officer reveals a good deal with regard to the Chinese scale of military values. We were discussing possible candidates for the command of the Chinese Army at Ramgarh. I mentioned General Sun, Commander of the 38th Division, an unusually capable officer (I knew he would not be acceptable, but was interested in what reply would be given). It was this - “General Sun is too young, he belongs to no strong faction and has no political history.”

The Chinese Army is not only badly organized and, as everyone knows, poorly equipped but it is also meagerly trained. This has shown up glaringly at Ramgarh. From privates on up, with exceptions like General Sun.

Excepting for the Communist divisions and the small body of troops at Ramgarh, the morale of the Chinese Army is low. It is characterized by (1) apathy and (2) venality.

The Chinese Army officers have no great interest in fighting the Japanese. Even at Ramgarh there is some evidence of this. A Chinese-speaking American officer there who has constant contact with Chinese officers expressed surprise that not one of his Chinese colleagues (many of whom had homes occupied by the Japanese) had expressed a desire to get into the field and fight the Japanese. In China, the situation is worse.

Vanity in the Chinese Army goes along naturally with the apathy. Chinese troops have traditionally had to shift for themselves. Most units have lived off the localities in which they have been stationed. This situation has further deteriorated in most regions bordering Japanese-occupied territory. Chinese commanders in these areas have settled down with their wives and families and gone into trade. They control and profit enormously from the contraband traffic across the “fighting” lines.

For example, a British sabotage unit in Huma sought to destroy a bridge between the lines and over which the Chinese and Japanese were trading. When the Chinese commander heard of the project, he ordered the British out, suggesting that they go and fight their own war—everything was peaceful and harmonious there and the British wanted to start trouble. At Hukow on the Yunnan-Indochina border there is lively traffic between Chinese and Japanese-held territory, a certain number of ferries moving across the dividing river between certain hours. The Chinese garrisons draw their rice rations from Japanese territory. One morning late in January the rice ration failed to arrive during the scheduled trips. The Chinese commander became incensed and entered a strongly worded protest. The Japanese, not wishing to disrupt relations, obligingly dispatched the rations by a special ferry after hours.

These are samples chosen at random of the state of affairs at the front. The Japanese are as corrupt as the Chinese. The difference, however, is that the Japanese can be depended upon to fight when the orders come from the top. Corruption has not yet anervated them.

Summing up, in seeking to carry out the directive given him, General

Stilwell
Stilwell is confronted with: (1) a basic reluctance on the part of the Chinese Government to assume the offensive against Japan, (2) a Chinese inclination to rely upon the United States to defeat Japan, (3) a Chinese desire to conserve material rather than expend it, (4) attempts by Chinese political factions to use him, (5) the absence of central Chinese authority, whether individual or collective, with whom he can deal, (6) lack of organization, political factionalism, incompetence, apathy and corruption in the Chinese army.

It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that all he has to do to make China an aggressive factor in the war against Japan is to place lend-lease arms in Chinese hands and in consultation with the Generalissimo issue orders for the attack.

All he can do, in fact, is argue, plead and bargain, with lend-lease material and the Ramgarh project as the inducements to follow his lead. The Chinese want the material, for that is the stuff of power. And the Chinese generals who have seen Ramgarh want the troops trained there for their personal armies. General Ho Ying-chin who was initially chilly to the Ramgarh project has since his visit there displayed signs of covetousness. General Stilwell can and is using these ambitions to compel the Chinese to prepare to assume the offensive against the Japanese. But the Chinese can be expected to take the offensive only when they are assured that such a venture will be profitable, that what they expend in the way of material will be replaced, and with interest. That is one of the costs of an ally. The arrangement is a bargain. And we must continue, through control of the flow of lend-lease equipment, to be in a position to cut off the flow when the Chinese fall down on the fulfillment of their side of the bargain.

It follows that the intemperate eulogies of the Chinese Army which appear in the American press and over the American air (largely inspired by the Chinese pressure groups in the United States and uninformed American sinophiles) only play into the hands of the Chinese factions wishing to obtain lend-lease equipment without restrictions as to its use (or non-use). It is scarcely necessary to note that anyone whom the Chinese might suggest as a replacement of General Stilwell would be likely to be a man whom the group in power in Chungking believed they could use to their own advantage. In feeling this way the Chinese are neither contemptible nor vicious—merely political.

Chinese and Americans have criticized General Stilwell for getting on badly with the Chinese. General Stilwell is not a man who willingly compromises. He has not concealed from the Chinese what he thinks of their incompetence and corruption. Naturally many of them have thereby been offended.

My reaction to this criticism is this. The Chinese Army and Government is ridden by politics and abuses. Any American military man who attempted to compromise and play Chinese politics would promptly find himself ensnared and rendered useless for the purpose he was sent out. General Stilwell once said to me that "My safest course is straight down the road". I am inclined to agree. The Chinese Army is not going to be made to fight the Japanese by wheeling and open-handed grants of material.

China is badly in need of the Puritan spirit. The Chinese have not produced it themselves excepting, in a modified form, in the Generalissimo. If the Chinese Army is to be regenerated, it must be through General Stilwell. What he says sometimes stings the Chinese. But it has not gone wholly unappreciated. More than a score of high-ranking Chinese officers have come to him privately telling him that he was doing China a great service by his forthrightness, that he is needed, and to keep on going straight down the road. And as has been said, even his political enemies have been impressed by what he has in six months produced at Ramgarh. He may yet perform what has seemed impossible—cause the launching of a Chinese offensive against the Japanese. If it happens it will have been a one-man achievement.

John Davies, Jr.

JD/gws
My dear Mr. President:

I have received this morning a letter from the Chinese Ambassador under date of March 6 with which he transmits a letter addressed to you by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the Ambassador's letter, together with the original of the letter from the Generalissimo.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enos.

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I beg to inform you that at the inauguration of the radiophoto service between China and the United States, there was transmitted from Chungking a personal letter, addressed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the President of the United States. I am now in receipt of the original letter together with the English translation.

I shall be greatly obliged if you will be good enough to transmit it together with the translation to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

WEI TAO-MING

Honorable Sumner Welles,

Acting Secretary of State
March 10, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have received this morning a letter from the Chinese Ambassador under date of March 6 with which he transmits a letter addressed to you by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the Ambassador's letter, together with the original of the letter from the Generalissimo.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Encs.

The President,
The White House.
願台灣憂任欣幸科學之進步
通訊之神速已使華人日益接近
此乃象徵吾同盟國家共同努力
之長足進展與作戰目的之早日達
到庶幾自由平等實現於和平
秩序上康樂於世界願下尊奉人及
貴國民眾對內外熟忱款待至深銘
感激此奉覆敬祝}

健康蔣中正謹啟

五月吉日
My dear President,

Your hand-written letter transmitted by radiophoto is an immense source of joy to me. By this newest means of communication the march of science has brought us closer and closer together. May this be a symbol of the rapid progress of the United Nations' war efforts and of the early realization of our common war aims in advancing the cause of freedom and equality in a world of peace, order and happiness. I am deeply appreciative of the warm welcome accorded Madame Chiang by you and Mrs. Roosevelt and by the American people.

With cordial greetings,

Very sincerely, yours,

(signed) Chiang Kai-shek
Mr. Ickes, Mr. President:

I am very much impressed with the press conference report which I shall take back to China with me. When I saw Mr.
Reminded yesterday, she told me that I'm in far better condition. Am glad but hope that you too were brave in mind the excellent advice of your own wise bear in mind. The Osiris that goes like this To Ta Ta Ta Ta - do you remember her?

Ian looking forward
to seeing you again when I return to the East. How much I enjoyed the visit with you and Mrs. Roosevelt?

With all good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

May 4th, 1943

Chiang
The President

Personal

Chine - 1943
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MCNARNEY

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Letter from T. V. Soong, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, Washington, D. C., 5/22/43, to the President, advising that he transmitted to the Generalissimo the President's memorandum of 5/21, with the recommendation that he concur that every available pound of air freight must be devoted to Chennault's effort, etc.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF:

To read and return. I have verbally answered the questions submitted on the second page.

F.D.R.

Translation of telegram to the President, May 29, 1943, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Chungking, in reply to the President's telegram, 5-25-43 and thanking for measures taken to strengthen the U.S. Air Force in China and to increase the capacity of air transport to China. Also speaks of ANAKIM. Attached is translation of telegram from the Generalissimo, 5-29, to Dr. Soong, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to submit orally to the President 5 points re ANAKIM.
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL McNARNEY:

For the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Please return for my files.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 6-2-43, from Dr. T.V. Soong, in answer to the President's memo, 5-21-43, cabled the Generalissimo asking that all possible cargo space on the 20 or so CNAC planes on the India-China run be allocated to supplies for the air offensive. Dr. Soong says the Generalissimo cabled that for the CNAC capacity for the next 2 months, 55% will be reserved for immediate aviation supplies (40% for American Air Force; 15% for Chinese Air Force).
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: India-China Air Transport.

I have read Dr. Soong's letter of May 22 reference air transport priorities.

While we are planning increases for the 14th Air Force which will require 7,000 tons monthly, I feel it would be unwise at this time to make a firm commitment to provide the additional 2300 ton priority as soon as Stilwell gets 10,000 tons total. The situation with respect to the revised "Anakim" may make this inadvisable. I therefore purposely avoided making a long-range commitment in my conversations with Dr. Soong.

[Signature]

Acting Chief of Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL McNARNEY

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Washington, D.C.  
May 22, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Your memorandum of May 21st has been transmitted to the Generalissimo with my urgent recommendation that he concur; for I entirely agree that every available pound of air freight must be devoted to Chennault's effort, even if it means cutting China off, for the time being, from such things as medical supplies. To omit, however, certain items now carried by China National Aviation Corporation would be poor economy. For example, the Chinese arsenals need raw materials to manufacture bombs for the 14th Air Force, and if some small gadgets cease to be imported I believe a far heavier tonnage of finished bombs will have to be brought in.

I was delighted to learn that the directive establishing the 14th Air Force's air transport priority has already been issued. I am informed it grants Chennault, in accordance with your desires, the priority of 4700 tons monthly until the ground forces in China have also received a total of 10,000 tons of supplies. But it stops there, making no provision for any but the initial period, and seemingly throwing the question open again thereafter.

Am I not right in believing that it was your decision to put in effect Chennault's entire plan of operations? You will recall that in his plan's second phase, which should start three to four months from the beginning of the offensive, Chennault will go forward from the attack on the Japanese supply lines and installations in China and sea lanes along our coasts, to the attack on the Japanese islands proper with his long range bombers. The priority of 4700 tons monthly satisfies the needs of the first phase; as he pointed out, to support the second phase a priority of 2300 tons additional, or 7,000 monthly will be required. If this priority comes into effect after the ground forces' 10,000 tons have been carried, it will be, I believe, carrying out your decision, since the air transport line is scheduled to expand by that time to carry 10,000 tons monthly, thus giving General Stilwell 3,000 tons each month. I am informed that in order to permit the necessary scheduling of air operations and equipment this clarification is indispensable.

Yours sincerely,

The President  
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I received this this morning from T.V. Soong.

H.L.H.

encl. copy of Dr. T.V. Soong's letter of June 15th re ANAKIM
Washington, D.C.
June 15, 1943

Dear Harry:

I am in receipt of the following message from our Ambassador in London, which I am passing on to you, as I am sure you wish to be kept informed of such developments:

"I SAW EDEN WHO SAID THAT PREPARATIONS TO IMPLEMENT ANAKIM ARE BEING STARTED, ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE QUESTION OF COMMAND IS BEING THRASHED OUT. HE IS DISCUSSING WITH LEATHERS TODAY SHIPPING FOR SUPPLIES BOTH TO THE FAR EAST AND TO RUSSIA."

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

(s) T.V.

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins,
The White House
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Subject: Loan to China

Regarding the loan the Generalissimo has requested, the following points reflect the War Department's interest in the matter:

1. General Hearn, Stilwell's Chief of Staff, has informed General Marshall that in his opinion the economic situation is not as critical as pictured by the Generalissimo. It is believed by the War Department that there is no immediate danger of an economic collapse in China. Information received from the Treasury Department is that a balance of $260,000,000 of the February 1942 loan to China of $500,000,000 still remains in the U.S., thus indicating the economic problems of China are of the type that cannot be solved by cash loans. It would appear that what is needed is commodities rather than cash or credit.

2. General Hearn has further informed the War Department of the serious delay on the part of the Chinese in allocating funds for the construction of airfields for the 14th Air Force. He cites a current example in which funds necessary to initiate construction of five airfields were not made available until after a delay of approximately three months. General Hearn is of the opinion that we can anticipate slowness in the allocation of further funds for projects of this type, and considers that a way must be found to expedite the use of available labor and materials in China.

3. Another important point is the rate of exchange. Chinese currency is furnished to the U.S. at the official rate of approximately CHF $20 to U.S. $1. The actual outside rate (Black Market) is nearer CHF $100 to U.S. $1. Were it not for this exorbitant artificial rate, the U.S. would not have to pay as much as five times the local cost of items purchased. For many months attempts have been made by the State, Treasury, and War Departments, working together, to obtain a better rate, but there has been persistent delay on the part of the Chinese in reaching an agreement. U.S. military expenditures in China are now in excess of U.S. $15,000,000 a month, and will increase
greatly. In this connection, Stilwell has just informed us that the Chengtu fields for the VIR bombing project will cost CN $2,000,000,000, and that it is the Generalissimo's interpretation of the President's agreement that the entire cost will be borne by the U.S. The War Department believes that strong measures should be taken to correct a situation which is so unfair and costly to the U.S., and which so delays prosecution of the war.

JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Incl -
Message from
President to
Generalissimo
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1943.

Dear Grace:

The Air Priorities Division of the Army Transport Command has asked me for a note requesting priority for T. V. Soong and party to go to England by air and return.

Would you find out from the President whether he wishes to sanction the request for White House priority #1 for T. V. Soong and a party of seven additional people, together with 500 pounds of excess baggage, to England on July 21, and return on August 30? If not, the State Department would handle the request.

Do you think you could get some word back to me before three, as I hope to leave town this afternoon?

Sincerely,

Lauchlin Currie

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a note which has been received from the Chinese Ambassador, transmitting for the President two telegrams dated July 4th, which have been received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

George T. Summerlin
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honor to inform you that I have just received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the two following telegraphic messages, dated July 4, 1943, for transmission to the President:

(1) "I have read with pleasure your radiogram of June 29 upon my return to Chungking from the fronts. May I express to you my sincere thanks for the warm and hearty welcome which you and Mrs. Roosevelt have accorded to Madame Chiang and for the kind concern for her health which both of you have shown during her stay in America.

On this 167th anniversary of America's Independence Day, I offer to you my cordial felicitations and best wishes for your health and for the prosperity of your great nation.

Chiang Kai-shek"

(2) "Madame Chiang arrived in Chungking this afternoon. In spite of the strenuous trip, I am delighted that she seems stronger than when she left. We both wish to thank you and Mrs. Roosevelt for the many courtesies and warm hospitality you have shown her during her visit in America.

Chiang Kai-shek"

I shall be greatly obliged if you will be good enough to forward them to their high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

WEI TAO-MING
WB2 VIA RCA

F CHUNGKING 91 JUL 7 0845 1943

URGENT MRS ROOSEVELT
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

I ARRIVED CHUNKING ON THE FOURTH AFTER EXCEEDINGLY RAPID TRIP STOP
THE FIRST DAY OUT I CAUGHT A SEVERE AND PAINFUL CHILL IN MY NECK
AND AM JUST NOW REGAINING SOME FREEDOM OF MOTION STOP I HASTEN TO
THANK YOU AND THE PRESIDENT MOST HEARTILY FOR ALL YOUR KINDNESSES
TO ME AND MOST OF ALL FOR YOUR FRIENDSHIP WHICH I CHERISH STOP
LOOKING FORWARD WITH EAGERNESS TO OUR NEXT MEETING STOP PLEASE
INFORM PRESIDENT I SHALL WRITE HIM SOON WITH AFFECTION
MAY LING SOONG CHIANG.
July 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Attached telegram from Chunksing.

In connection with the difficulty in following military developments in China as illustrated by the attached telegram, you might care to suggest to T. V. Soong sometime that we would appreciate it if permission were granted our observers to be stationed in active areas in China. I am sure we would be happy to grant reciprocal rights!

Lauchlin Currie
A strictly confidential telegram of June 29, 1943, from the Charge d'Affaires at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

After a two weeks' trip to the Yangtze front a number of foreign press correspondents have just returned to Chungking. The trip was arranged by the Chinese authorities at the request of the correspondents. The correspondents saw no fighting and were not able at such a late date to obtain important or comprehensive information at first hand concerning the operations which took place during the latter part of May and the early part of June. However, there appeared to have come to light a number of interesting aspects of the picture in general.

The Chinese military informed the correspondents that in round numbers Chinese casualties were 10,000 and Japanese casualties were 30,000. However, the general understanding is that there were never more than 24,000 Japanese soldiers in action as against some 110,000 Chinese soldiers on the Yangtze sector and that about 7,000 was the number of Japanese casualties. The American Military Attache also believes these are the correct figures. Coordinated Sino-American action — and with much credit to the American air force — was partly responsible for the success of the Chinese troops and the American air force which resulted in a return to virtually the same status quo as existed in May. The success was due also partly to the fact which appears now that an appreciable admixture of puppet Chinese was comprised in the Japanese Divisions. One Japanese to two Koreans and six Manchurians is the estimate of the Military Attache of the ratio in some of the units. Apparently this is the first time in which puppet troops participated to any great extent in Sino-Japanese fighting outside of Manchuria. (It does not appear to be known whether troops of the Wang Ching-wei Regime actually took part in combat.)
CHUNGKING 184 11 1600 CHG ETAT

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

AS THE WHOLE NATION STANDS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SEVENTH YEAR OF WAR IT IS WITH DEEP APPRECIATION THAT I RECEIVE YOUR CORDIAL MESSAGE PARA IN SPITE OF SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP SUSTAINED DURING SIX YEARS OF UNREMITTING WARFARE AGAINST AGGRESSION THE RESOLUTE
WILL OF THE ARMY AND PEOPLE OF CHINA TO DEFEND LIBERTY REMAINS UNSHAKEABLE AS EVER STOP WE REALIZE AS YOU DO THAT THE ROAD TO FINAL VICTORY IS BESET WITH MANY DIFFICULTIES BUT THE VISTA THAT OPENS BEFORE US IS THE ONE THAT INSPIRES CONFIDENCE STOP THE TRIUMPH OF OUR
The following Message was received "VIA MACKAY RADIO,"

MK11/3/50

COMMON CAUSE IS NOW A CERTAINTY STOP THE MOUNTING STRENGTH OF ALL FIGHTING ALLIES MUST PREVAIL STOP AND WHEN OUR COMMON ENEMY IS UTLERLY DESTROYED FREE MEN EVERYWHERE MAY THEN PROCEED TO ESTABLISH AN ENDURING PEACE ON THOSE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FREEDOM FOR WHICH WE ARE FIGHTING PARA IN

WRITE YOUR MESSAGE ON THE GREEN-TOP BLANK, FILE THROUGH POSTAL TELEGRAPH BY MESSENGER, TELEPHONE OR POSTAL TELEGRAPH PRINTER. BE SURE TO SPECIFY "VIA MACKAY RADIO." IF DESIRED, MESSAGES MAY BE TELEPHONED DIRECT TO MACKAY RADIO BY CALLING NATIONAL 1246.
The following Message was received “VIA MACKAY RADIO,”

MK11/4/34

RESPONSE TO YOUR KIND ENCOURAGEMENT THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES ARE RESOLVED TO CARRY ON THE WAR TO THE END STOP IN THEIR NAME I EXTEND TO YOU MY HEARTFELT THANKS

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

On July 14, 1945, we sent a message to Dr. H. H. Kung, the Chinese Minister of Finance, informing him that the Treasury is prepared in principle to agree to the Chinese request to purchase $200 million of gold out of the $500 million financial aid as a means of helping to check inflation in China. Dr. Kung was also informed that a formal request was, of course, necessary before any definitive decision and action could be taken.

The Chinese Government has already drawn on the Treasury to the extent of $240 million out of the $500 million financial aid: — $200 million has been set aside as backing for Chinese Government savings certificates and bond issues; $20 million was used to purchase gold, and $20 million is being used for the printing of banknotes and the purchase of relative materials. The purchase of gold with an additional $200 million will mean that in total the Chinese will have used $440 million out of the $500 million financial aid.

In the message to Dr. Kung, as well as in discussions with the representatives of the Chinese Government in Washington, it has been made clear that the Treasury is acquiescing to the Chinese proposal because the Government of China deems that the sale of gold to the public will aid its war effort by helping to fight inflation and hoarding and that, therefore, the decision to purchase the gold is primarily the responsibility of the Chinese Government. Furthermore, the Chinese have been urged to give careful consideration to the best ways of using the gold, particularly because of the great costs, difficulties and dangers inherent in the use of gold as a means of checking inflation under conditions existing in China at present. We especially stressed the fact that the Chinese Government will by this step be sacrificing large amounts of foreign exchange, which could be used in the post-war period to pay for imports needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The use of gold coins as against bullion for the purpose was carefully considered. It was felt both by us and by the Chinese Government that this technique for selling the gold to the public would not be feasible in the present instance, primarily because it would be necessary to give the gold coins a fixed monetary value, while it is contemplated that the price of gold in terms of yuan will change frequently and substantially as time goes on.

The suggestion was therefore made to the Chinese representatives in Washington that the gold might be sold to the public in China in small bars of one or two ounces in order to reach the widest possible section of the Chinese public and such bars might have some engraving which might suggest the United States origin of the financial aid, if the Government of China so wished.

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Secretary of the Treasury
July 16, 1943.

My dear Generalissimo:

When Madame Chiang was here my wife gave her an engagement pad similar to the enclosed but in green. She told my wife that you would probably take it away from her because it was something that you had always wanted and did not have. Mrs. Roosevelt, who is now away on a trip, ordered this other one.

So if you did appropriate the first one, you can make amends by returning it to your good wife and accepting this one!

With my warm regards to you both,

Always sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,
President of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China,
Chungking,
China.

In President's handwriting:
"This is a copy of my previous letter which with the pad was "sunk" by our common enemy -- Best of luck to you both! F.D.R."
January 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. BRADY:

You will recall the package from the President for Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek which you asked me to take care of. We have just received a message from General Stilwell's headquarters stating that this package was delivered to Madame Chiang Kai Shek's secretary on January 24.

B. W. Davenport
B. W. DAVENPORT,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS THOMPSON:

Mrs. Roosevelt gave Madame Chiang an engagement pad and she liked it so well she said that the Generalissimo would probably take it from her, so Mrs. Roosevelt bought one for the President to send on to the Generalissimo.

I understand from the State Department it was lost at sea. The President asks if Mrs. Roosevelt will be good enough to get another one for him to forward.

G.G.T.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington  

July 23, 1943

AIR MAIL  
No. 346

George Atcheson, Jr., Esquire,  
American Charge d'Affaires ad interim,  
Chungking.

Sir:

There is enclosed herewith a letter from the President addressed to "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, Chungking, China", transmitting as a gift for him an engagement pad. An office copy of the letter in question is also enclosed for the Embassy's files.

You are requested to see that the President's communication and its enclosure reach their high destination in such manner as may be deemed most appropriate.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Enclosures:

1. Letter with enclosure.
2. Office copy of letter.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1943.

My dear Generalissimo:

When Madame Chiang was here my wife gave her an engagement pad similar to the enclosed but in green. She told my wife that you would probably take it away from her because it was something that you had always wanted and did not have. Mrs. Roosevelt, who is now away on a trip, ordered this other one.

So if you did appropriate the first one, you can make amends by returning it to your good wife and accepting this one!

With my warm regards to you both,

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
President of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China,
Chungking,
China.
July 16, 1943.

My dear Generalissimo:-

When Madame Chiang was here my wife gave her an engagement pad similar to the enclosed but in green. She told my wife that you would probably take it away from her because it was something that you had always wanted and did not have. Mrs. Roosevelt, who is now away on a trip, ordered this other one.

So if you did appropriate the first one, you can make amends by returning it to your good wife and accepting this one!

With my warm regards to you both,

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, #
President of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, Chungking, China.
MEMO FOR MISS TULLY:

Dear Grace:

When Madame Chiang was at Hyde Park, Mrs. Roosevelt gave her an engagement pad similar to this but in green. She, Madame Chiang, said that the Generalissimo would probably take it away from her because it was something he had always wanted and did not have.

Mrs. Roosevelt ordered this one, but unfortunately it did not come until after Madame Chiang left. Do you want to send it with a message from the President? I imagine you have better channels for sending it than I have.

Malvina
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. SUMMERLIN

Will you please be good enough to have the enclosed letter and package forwarded to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek?

M. H. MCINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Ltr of 7/16/43 to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, Chungking, China, from the President, and enclosing an engagement pad similar to the one Mrs. Roosevelt gave to Madame Chiang.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

Do you think I should send this long, detailed telegram to Madame Chiang? It was prepared by General Giles.

F. D. R.
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

7 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Madame Chiang Kai-shek

In the temporary absence of General Arnold, attached draft is suggested as an appropriate reply to Madame Chiang Kai-shek's letter of 30 July 1943, which you forwarded to General Arnold on 30 August. Original of Madame Chiang's letter is returned herewith.

2 Encls
1-Ltr fr Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 30 July.
2-Draft of reply from The President.

BARNEY H. GILES
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of the Air Staff
PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK:

I appreciate your letter of June 30, and especially your kind personal reference to Mrs. Roosevelt and myself. We enjoyed very much having you visit us. Since distance and official duties have made it difficult to arrange a meeting between the Generalissimo and me, I feel that we are fortunate indeed in being able to exchange views through you.

I am glad you sent me the detailed report of air conditions in China, based on Chennault's interview with the Generalissimo. In consultation with General Arnold, I have carefully considered each of the points you raised and I shall give you all the facts that are known to us.

Many of the problems you mention are well on the way to solution. We have, however, met with delays and disappointments caused by circumstances beyond anyone's control, such as the sinking of one of the ships carrying airplanes and equipment for the 80th Fighter Group, and the flood conditions in India and Yunnan.

With reference to paragraph two of your summary of the interview, in which you set out the agreed program and its current status, I have the following comments:

a. As you know, June deliveries of 1,626 tons of aviation supplies fell short of the planned 3,000 tons for which priority was given. July and August deliveries also fell short of the planned 4,700 tons. Total deliveries by the Air Transport Command for June were 2,382 tons and for July 3,451 tons. Estimated total deliveries for August were 4,200 tons. Our objectives have not been met because of difficulties in modification of transport aircraft, scarcity of operational spare parts, failure to complete airfields in Assam as rapidly as had been planned and floods in India and Yunnan. All C-46 aircraft were grounded for a period of time for adjustment of mechanical defects usually found in new airplanes. Action has already been taken to correct these defects, and it is expected that the serviceability of C-46s in the future will be greatly improved. Airdromes and transport aircraft are now nearing program levels. The Air Transport Command objective for September is 10,000 tons, priority being given to 7,000 tons of aviation supplies. Every effort is being made to meet this program and it appears now to be within our capabilities.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date ________

SECRET
b. The two additional P-40 squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group, now in Assam, will be transferred to the Fourteenth Air Force and moved to China as soon as the 80th Fighter Group is able to assume the defense of the Assam area. This is expected to be the middle or latter part of September. One P-38 squadron, the 449th Squadron of the 51st Group, was activated in China sometime ago. Provision has been made to ensure the maintenance of this squadron at the operational level of 25 airplanes. The 11th Squadron of the 371st Group of B-25s is, as you know, a part of the 14th Air Force. Two squadrons of this Group now in India will be transferred to China as soon as they can be supplied and maintained there.

c. Provision has been made for attrition and for required reserves of aircraft in all categories. Provision has also been made for necessary spare parts. Reserves of airplanes almost invariably will be greater than the fifteen percent that you mention.

d. Everything possible is being done to enable Chennault to employ types of fighters superior to the enemy's having in mind the practical consideration of the advisability of adding new type airplanes. Failure to meet production goals of P-51s and the need to correct certain mechanical defects make it impossible to deliver any aircraft of this type to China at this time.

e. Allocation of replacement B-25 aircraft to the 14th Air Force is on a basis of two with cannon to one without cannon. There appears now to be little doubt that this ratio will be maintained and that the B-25 squadron now in the 14th Air Force will be kept fully operational at this ratio.

f. Assignment for service in China of all the specially experienced personnel requested by Chennault is not practicable, as some are hospitalized, some are in other theaters, and others are indispensable in the training of new pilots for service in China.

g. Last spring 150 P-40s were allocated to the Chinese Air Force, and also 150 A-24s. When Chennault was in Washington he stated that A-24s are not suitable for operations in China, and it was accordingly agreed to allocate an additional 150 P-40s instead of the A-24s. At present, therefore, 300 P-40s are allocated to the Chinese Air Force, 89 of which have already been shipped. 48 B-25s, in addition to the 10 old B-25s from the 10th Air Force that are used for OTU training in India, have also been allocated to the Chinese Air Force.

h. Employment of available aircraft for training purposes in the theater is a theater problem, which in my opinion we may safely entrust to the good judgment of General Stratemeyer.

In paragraph 3 of your summary you mention the measures which the Generalissimo and Chennault agree must be decisively adopted, air transport expansion continuing, in order to attain full success. The above comments that I have made cover most of these measures, but for your convenience I shall summarize the entire matter:

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
a. Action has been taken to assure maintenance of 25 P-38s as a continuously operational squadron in the 14th Air Force. Two squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group will be transferred to China as soon as the 80th Fighter Group can assume the defense of the Assam area, which should be the middle or latter part of September. Movement of two additional B-25 squadrons to China is contingent upon sufficient tonnage being carried over the hump to support their operation.

b. Action has been taken to ensure necessary equipment reserves.

c. B-25s in China will be replaced on a basis of two with cannon to one without cannon. Allocations of reserves are approximately 50 percent of unit equipment. Allocations for attrition are approximately 10 percent a month. Return to the former replacement schedule would mean fewer aircraft than are being delivered under the present schedule.

d. P-51s cannot be delivered to China at this time. For the present the fighter role, both in India and in China, must be carried out by the P-40 type fighter with reinforcement by the P-38.

e. Assignment for service in China of selected personalities as requested by Chennault is not practicable. Officers with the qualifications required have however been supplied.

f. Shipping is not now the limiting factor in the flow of supplies to China. Pending the opening of land communications through Burma to China, the principal problem is the colossal task of moving supplies over the hump by air, and the one on which we are most earnestly working at this time.

Establishment of the Southeast Asia Command will, I believe, do much to ensure a vigorous united effort on a large-scale against Japan, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China. We are certain that by unifying our combined efforts in the forthcoming Burma operations, we shall hasten the liberation of China and the defeat of Japan.

As you know, I have sent General Stratemeyer to India to command all United States aviation operations in India and Burma. He is an officer of ability and wide experience, and was sent to India for the express purpose of aiding in the solution of your air problems from the India end.

With kindest personal regards to you and the Generalissimo,

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date__________
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL ARNOLD

What can I reply to
the enclosed from Madame
Chiang Kai-shek?

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Attorney General of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date
My dear Mr. President,

Upon my return home, I hastened to find out about air conditions in China as I had promised. I saw neither General Wheeler nor General Chennault in India, but last week General Chennault came from Kunming, and during his interview with the Generalissimo, I gathered the following facts. I hesitated to send you such a detailed report, but upon consideration I decided that the details, trivial as they may seem in themselves, are necessary in the formation of a comprehensive picture.

The air tonnage has not come up to expectation for two main reasons which Chennault did not mention but which I learnt from reliable independent sources. First, the work on the Assam airfields was not being sufficiently pushed, and second, there has been a distinct lack of centralization of control at the airfields where, in some cases, as many as six separate organizations were functioning. With the appointment of General Stratemeyer which you so wisely advocated, I am hopeful that these problems will be satisfactorily solved in the near future.

The Generalissimo has already appointed Chennault as Chief of his Air Staff. The following summarizes what took place at the above-mentioned interview:

1. He asked Chennault to present a detailed plan of future operations employing Chinese and American air forces cooperatively. The Generalissimo hopes to initiate the air attack on the enemy in China and along China's coasts during August and to bring the offensive to a successful climax during the autumn. The discussion, however, unfortunately revealed a number of departures from, and uncertainties concerning the program for strengthening the Fourteenth and Chinese Air Forces preparatory to such an offensive.
On his return from the United States, in describing this program to the Generalissimo, Chennault stated what had been agreed upon between him and Air Plans after the grant of air transport priority to aviation supplies; that in your final interview with him you particularly inquired whether he was fully satisfied he would receive all needed support; and that in view of the agreed program he answered affirmatively.

2. The agreed program and its current status may be described as follows:

a. Air transport priority was granted for 3,000 tons of aviation supplies in June and 4,700 tons monthly from June onwards. But in June only 1,686 tons of aviation supplies were delivered in China, and July deliveries are unlikely to pass 3,000 tons. The deficiencies largely arise from failure to expand the Air Transport operation as rapidly as was anticipated. The future operations to support the land forces in China, however, depend on delivery of needed equipment and personnel.

b. The Fourteenth Air Force was to be strengthened by two additional P-40 fighter squadrons, half a P-38 squadron, and one additional medium bombardment group by July 15. Except for five P-38's, none of these reinforcements has yet arrived, and the enemy effort to destroy the Fourteenth Air Force forces at the forward bases of Kweilin and Hengyang, which was initiated four days ago, consequently found Chennault dangerously weak in fighters. He has been promised twenty additional P-38's which are enroute, but facilities for maintaining P-38's as a constantly operational fighter squadron are doubtful. He is supposed to receive two squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group from Assam whenever the 80th Fighter Group becomes operational in India. This was originally expected to occur in mid-July, but the group will not now be ready until late August. Because of the enemy threat above mentioned, he has had to make an emergency request for one of the 51st group squadrons ahead of schedule, but as there are no positive commitments on fighter reinforcement in China and pressure is beginning for increased fighter strength in Assam, we cannot positively count on having the needed fighter strength in China by any stated date. The same rule applies to the medium bombardment group. A B-25 group is now in India, but no new group for India is scheduled, and resistance to transfer of the present group may be anticipated until a replacement is in sight.
c. Constant fifteen per cent reserves of all equipment were to be maintained on call for the Fourteenth Air Force in India. No such reserves exist, which has again increased the seriousness of the enemy threat in the forward area, by making it impossible promptly to replace damaged aircraft.

d. At least seventy five P-51's and if possible one hundred and fifty were to be sent to China in time for employment in the climax of the offensive in the autumn. Although employment of types superior to the enemy's is urgently necessary for success, this has been definitely deferred if not wholly cancelled.

e. Old Fourteenth Air Force B-25's were to be replaced at the rate of eight monthly, beginning in July, two-thirds of replacements to be cannon-armed. The replacement is occurring irregularly but at a much slower rate and although cannon-armed B-25's are of first importance for destroying Japanese water-borne communications, none have yet reached China.

f. All specially experienced personnel requested by Chennault were to be immediately sent to China. Only two pilots have been actually assigned, the others being stated to be unavailable.

g. The Chinese Air Force was to be strengthened by equipping two new fighter groups and one new bombardment group. For this purpose 150 P-40's and 48 B-25's were to be allocated and shipped by increments, the first increments to reach China in time to permit the most rapidly organized units of the new groups to participate in the autumn climax of the offensive. The shipping schedule has been so prolonged that if not expedited, few if any of these aircraft will be present in the theater when needed.

h. A Chinese Air Force operational training base was to be established in India, largely using Fourteenth and Chinese Air Force aircraft returned to India for training purposes. These planes are being used exclusively for training Tenth Air Force pilots, and thus it has been necessary to set aside twenty-five additional P-40's from the Chinese Air Force's dangerously slender resources.

3. The program presented in Washington by Chennault and apparently agreed to by Air Plans was not only modest in itself but was also the absolute minimum to assure full success of the proposed offensive. The opening of the offensive has already been gravely delayed by slow expansion of the air transport operation and departures from the program to date. Luckily the best fighting weather, from August through November,
is still ahead. After carefully reviewing the position with Chennault, the Generalissimo agrees with him that full success can still be attained if air transport expansion continues and the following measures are decisively adopted:

a. Immediate efforts to assure maintenance of the twenty-five P-38's as a continuously operational squadron, and to expedite the readiness date of the 80th Fighter Group. Transfer of the two squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group to China on the earliest possible date. Transfer to China of the B-25 Group now in India on the date desired.

b. Prompt establishment of equipment reserves in India, drawing the first echelons from nearby areas if necessary. Reserves are crucial.

c. Return to the former schedule for replacing old B-25's in China and immediate allocation and despatch of sufficient cannon armed B-25's to achieve the two-thirds proportion agreed to.

d. Immediate allocation and shipment of at least seventy-five P-51's to China.

e. Prompt assignment to service in China of all specially experienced personnel originally requested.

f. Strongest efforts to expedite the shipping schedule of Chinese Air Force equipment.

4. With extensive operations elsewhere placing such heavy pressures upon you, the Generalissimo can readily understand why there may have been departures from a single program such as the China air program. Success of the proposed China air offensive depends directly, however, on speed in meeting the revised program set forth in paragraph 3 above. Each item is of critical importance. Time above all is short. As the Generalissimo mentioned to you in May in the course of the discussion of air transport priorities, he regards launching a successful air offensive during the summer and autumn as vital to the security of the great China base thus far preserved for the United Nations against heavy odds. If the offensive is prevented from materializing, the Generalissimo feels that the outcome will be very grave. What is needed is little, and the stake great. He most earnestly hopes, therefore, that you will personally direct that the requested measures be adopted and carried out in detail forthwith, for he sees no other assurance of our obtaining what is so urgently needed for the common cause.
The weather in Washington, if it is at all like that of Chungking, must be terrible. Yesterday the house thermometer registered 112°, and even breathing was laborious. I dislike, therefore, to bother you with all these details, but the sooner we gain victory, the sooner can we acquire some measure of leisure and sense of serenity.

Thank you for all your kindnesses to me. I think longingly of the cool, icy horse’s necks! What are we having here? More likely dry camel’s humps!

The Generalissimo was enormously interested in my visits to you and Mrs. Roosevelt. He is looking forward with keen anticipation to his meeting with you. I told him about your story of the mint julep eye-openers, and he reminded me that we have a Chinese saying describing delicious drinks as being so delectable that the eyebrows fall off.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

(Madame Chiang Kai-shek)

President F. D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL ARNOLD

What can I reply to
the enclosed from Madame
Chiang Kai-shek?

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date......
In reply refer to
PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./9266

August 25, 1943

My dear General Watson:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a despatch from the American Embassy at Chungking dated August 3, 1943, forwarding a sealed communication which Madame Chiang Kai-shek has addressed to the President.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:

From Embassy, Chungking, no. 1421, August 3, 1943, with enclosure.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1421 Chungking, August 3, 1943.

Subject: Transmitting Letter from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to the President.

AIR MAIL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a sealed cover addressed to the President which Madame Chiang Kai-shek has asked us to forward by air pouch and which, she states, contains a personal letter she has written to the President.

Madame Chiang requested that this cover go forward and be delivered at the earliest possible moment.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, Jr.
American Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure;
Sealed cover from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to the President.

Single copy to the Department