MEMORANDUM FROM CHINA, DATED 1 JANUARY

There is now at Kunming an organization under British control with British-Dutch, French membership known as the South East Asia Confederacy. Neither our Diplomatic nor Military establishments in China are accurately informed as to its activities or its purpose.

In Kunming also there are in addition a large number of British officers engaged in intelligence and propaganda work.

Two months ago Admiral Mountbatten asked Wedemeyer to accept some British psychological officers on his, Wedemeyer's, staff.

It has now been proposed that two British squadrons of Liberators be based on China for propaganda and intelligence purposes, and that an amphibious air force be established south of Kunming on the lake.

These proposed airplanes with their impediments, cars, trucks, etc., all supplies by lend-lease would divert hump tonnage, would add logistical difficulties to those already existing in the provision of supplies for use in China against the Japanese; and they could serve no useful purpose in the war against Japan.

A "British Army Aid Group", which at one time provided aid for British prisoners escaping from the Japanese, is also supplies by the diversion of hump tonnage. It does not appear that at this late date the remaining number of British escaped prisoners in China justifies the support of the British Army Aid Group at the expense of the war effort. It is not needed by the American forces in China.

Both the Chinese and the American Commanders in China have received
a suggestion that one Indian division with broadcasting equipment
be sent to China.

Both the Chinese and American authorities replied that in their
opinion surplus British - Indian forces would be more effective
in the war against Japan by relieving Chinese and Americans now in
Burma for transfer to the China Theatre.

Chiang Kai-shek has definitely stated that he has not authorized
the organization, equipment, or operation in China of any military
forces by any other nations than the Chinese and American.

All of the agencies in China of the "Southeast Asia Confederacy"
appear to be definitely opposed to the American policy to assist
China to emerge from this war as a free united democratic nation.

A Colonel Ride, leader of the British Army Aid Group, has
submitted reports to the effect that the Chinese resent as interference
in local Chinese government American efforts to unify Chinese forces
in a common war effort against the Japanese.

The British Ambassador in China has stated that America's policy
in China is detrimental, if not destructive, to the White man's
position in Asia.

To summarize, the "imperial nations" propaganda at the present
time is designed:

(1) To keep China divided against herself.
(2) To condemn America's effort to unite Chinese Military
    Forces as interference in Chinese Government.
(3) To use Chinese and American forces and American lend-lease
    equipment for reconquest of their colonial empires, and,
(4) To use propaganda to justify Imperialism as opposed to democracy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Rumors of Sino-Japanese Understanding

I believe you may be interested in the enclosed report from Hurley in which he scouts rumors current in Chungking to the effect that the Chinese Government has reached a secret understanding with the Japanese. Ambassador Hurley sets forth the principal reasons why he is convinced that the Chinese will not find it to their interest to make any such arrangement with Japan.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 1458 from Chungking, undated, received on December 30, 1944.
Referring to your number 120 dated November 16th requesting me to keep you informed of British French Dutch activities in Southeast Asia and my report to you number 261458 dated November 26. In addition to the organizations of the three imperial governments at Mountbatten’s headquarters there has now been set up an organization at Kunming China known as the Southeast Asia confederacy which is headed by the British. There are no reports in this embassy on this organization. None of our diplomatic agencies know its purpose. There are twelve separate American so called intelligence organizations in China. Some of them are elaborately housed and staffed. None of our own organizations have been able to give me any of the basic facts pertaining to the British Dutch French operations in China or Southeast Asia.

Operating out of Kunming is a large number of British officers and
CIVILIANS COMPOSING VARIOUS IMPERIAL PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN CHINA. MOUNTBATTEN ASKED WEDEMeyer TWO MONTHS AGO TO PLACE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OFFICERS ON WEDEMeyer'S STAFF. WEDEMeyer DID NOT CONSENT. FOR BRITISH PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN CHINA THE BRITISH NOW PROPOSE TO BASE TWO SQUADRONS OF AMERICAN LIBERATORS, BRITISH OPERATED, IN CHINA. THEY ALSO SUGGEST THE NECESSITY OF ESTABLISHING AN AMPHIBIAN AIR FORCE ON A LAKE JUST SOUTH OF KUNMING. THESE AEROPLANES TOGETHER WITH JEEPS, TRUCKS, CARS AND OTHER LEND LEASE SUPPLIES ARE TO BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE BRITISH-FRENCH-DUTCH CONFEDERACY UNDERGROUND AND PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE PLANES, TRUCKS, JEEPS, CARS AND OTHER LEND LEASE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST JAPAN. ALL OF THEM WOULD BE USED FOR PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN CHINA FOR THE BRITISH AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA CONFEDERACY AND WOULD BE A LOGISTICAL DEAD WEIGHT ON ALL FORMS OF AMERICAN SUPPLIES IN CHINA AND WOULD DIVERT HUMP TONNAGE FROM THE WAR EFFORT.
There is a rather extensive British organization known as the British Army Aid Group in China whose original purpose was to aid British prisoners escaping from Hong Kong and other parts of China. They claim that they have been rescuing American pilots shot down or forced to land in Japanese occupied areas of China. Chennault denies this service. See Wedemeyer's message to Marshall dated 29 December.

The BAAG has become a formidable organization. Its leader Colonel Ride of the British Army has submitted reports to the effect that the Chinese resent America's attempts to unify Chinese forces to fight the Japanese as interference in local Chinese government. These diatribes against the American policy in China have been circulated not only in British-Dutch-French-Chinese quarters but have actually been submitted to the State Department through our own Embassy here constituting a very fine job of inside propaganda to influence the thinking of our own State Department against the American policy in China.

The British approached the Chinese and American military establishments recently with the suggestion that Britain would supply...
AN INDIAN DIVISION FOR CHINA TOGETHER WITH BROADCASTING EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY THE DIVISION. BOTH THE CHINESE AND THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THIS TOKEN INDIAN-BRITISH FORCE UNDESIRABLE. CHINESE AND AMERICANS HAVE BOTH SUGGESTED THAT SURPLUS INDIAN-BRITISH FORCES COULD BE USED IN BURMA TO RELIEVE CHINESE AND AMERICAN FORCES NOW FIGHTING THERE SO THEY COULD BE USED IN CHINA. THE BRITISH HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED THEIR DESIRE TO EQUIP BRITISH-CHINESE AND CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS AND OTHER GUERILLA FORCES THROUGHOUT CHINA TO BE LED BY THE BRITISH BUT TO BE EQUIPPED BY AMERICA MAKING ANOTHER LOAD ON HUMP TONNAGE. CHIANG KAI SHEK TOLD WEDEMeyer AND ME TOGETHER THAT HE HAD NOT AUTHORIZED THE ORGANIZATION OR EQUIPMENT OR OPERATION IN CHINA OF ANY MILITARY FORCES BY THE BRITISH FRENCH DUTCH RUSSIANS OR ANY OTHER NATION EXCEPT THE CHINESE AND AMERICANS. ALL OF THE BRITISH DUTCH FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA ARE DEFINITELY OPPOSING THE AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS SAID TO GENERAL WEDEMeyer AND ALSO TO ME THAT THE AMERICAN POLICY TO UNIFY CHINA IS DETERIMENTAL IF NOT DESTRUCTIVE TO THE POSITION OF THE WHITE MAN IN ASIA. THE
British-Dutch-French policy is to keep China divided against herself and prevent China from emerging from this war as a free united democratic nation. None of the imperial nations have taken any interest whatever in the war against Japan in China.

To summarize the propaganda of the imperial nations in China at this time is:

1. To condemn America's effort to unite Chinese military forces as interference in Chinese government.

2. To keep China divided against herself.

3. To use Chinese and American forces and American lend lease equipment for reconquest of their colonial empires and,

4. To use propaganda to justify imperialism as opposed to democracy.

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NAVAIDE (1, #2)....... Action (for delivery to the President)

FILE.

No. 1 Admiral. No. 2 File. No. 3F-1 or Chartroom. No. 4 Special.
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am presenting herewith for your consideration a report of my findings and recommendations as a result of my mission to China at your request. You will recall that your desire was for me to make an over-all survey of conditions as they existed in that country and on my return to the United States to present to you my findings.

I departed from Great Falls, Montana on the first leg of my journey on November 10, 1944 and I left Washington on November 14, 1944 going by way of New York, Bermuda, the Azores, Casablanca, Tripoli, Cairo, Abadan, Karachi, and arrived in New Delhi on November the 19th. At that place I called on Major General Frank Merrill at the headquarters of the India-Burma theater and had a long discussion with him concerning his views about the situation in China.

General Merrill was not too impressed with Chiang Kai-shek personally, but he did say that the Chinese soldier was very good, if he was given enough to eat, the proper training, adequate materiel, and competent leadership. In his opinion, much of the difficulties of the Chinese armies could be laid to the incompetency of the field commands. When asked about the Chinese Communists, he stated that in his opinion they were not allied to Moscow but were primarily a Chinese agrarian group interested in land and tax reforms.

I found out at this time also that, in the India-Burma theater, most of the troops were in the Air Forces, SOS, Engineers and Transportation Units, and that there were only two American combat regiments, both located in Burma and operating out of Myitkyina, and attached to these was another regiment, a Chinese special service outfit. At this particular time, only two battalions of the 475th regiment were in the field, but the others were getting ready to jump off.
General Merrill was well pleased with the fact that the British and Indians were now, after two and one-half years of relative inactivity, going into the Burmese jungles after the Japanese and were doing a very good job. I noticed, also, on the daily statistics tonnage data, that something like 35,000 tons of supplies was anticipated being shipped over the Hump for the month of November. Coming back from China in December, I checked this particular figure and found that actually 34,929 tons had been shipped, which was a remarkable achievement in itself.

In General Merrill's opinion, a seaport will have to be acquired on the China coast to be of real help to China and that, while the Burma Road with its pipe line will be of considerable assistance, it will not be enough to figure decisively in the China theater.

General Merrill invited me to make the trip over the Burma Road from Ledo to Myitkyina, which I accepted with alacrity because I felt that it would give me a good insight in the procedure and policy adopted by the United States in that particular part of the world.

On Monday, November the 20th, I left for Ledo by plane and stopped at Halmi Nar Hat, and from there went on to my destination where I met with General Pick, the engineer in charge of the building of the Ledo-Burma Road; Colonel Davis, his executive officer; Brigadier-General Vernon Evans, Lieutenant-General Stilwell's Chief of Staff, and other officers stationed in this vicinity.

General Pick stated that the Ledo-Burma Road would be capable of transporting a minimum of 60,000 tons a month when completed, although I must say that when I saw the General three weeks later, he had modified that particular estimate. He stated though, that if we were to get the full transportation benefit out of the Road being built, that it would be necessary for him to have 100 truck companies with trucks and shipping facilities for them, as well as ordnance, maintenance units and quartermaster depot units. He said that 86 truck companies had been promised to him previously but were side-tracked, due to the low priority of this area and their need for the invasion of the European continent. He stated further that the road to Bhamo, some 30 odd miles south of Myitkyina, would be finished by February 1945 and that the entire Burma-China Road would be opened by March 1, 1945.

I visited the 20th General Hospital at Ledo, which has had as many as 2,600 cases at one time and is manned by a staff of 156 American nurses, 80 doctors, and several hundred medical corpsmen. They have done a remarkably good job in this General Hospital, as they have in all the hospitals along the Road under the most difficult conditions and the most trying circumstances. The wards, generally speaking, have dirt floors, and the sides are made of bamboo and hessian cloth, while the roofs are thatched affairs. The buildings last from nine months to a year and a half and then new ones have to be rebuilt in their place.
In this particular hospital they have done a lot of work in connection with a type of disease known as Scrub or Mite typhus, for which our typhus shots are of no avail. The cure that the General Hospital found most successful in combating this disease was the use of air-conditioning. By keeping the wards at a steady temperature, they have reduced the fatalities from 27 per cent to less than one per cent.

In visiting the eight hospitals along the Road, I found that the work being done in all of them was outstanding. There was one hospital which had no women nurses and one hospital at Tagap in the process of being activated which would have a complete colored staff of doctors and nurses. From the experiences of 400 American nurses along the Road, I found that a great many of them had been out there one and a half to two years and more and the remarkable thing to me was how they had been able to sustain their morale and do the fine work they had been doing under the difficulties which were, and are, their daily lot.

I also found at Ledo, that 100 silver rupees were being paid to natives for each bailed out American flyer brought in. Many of our flyers are forced down in the jungles and have to live there for days and weeks, and many of them have never been found. The natives have been responsible for rescuing a great many and bringing them back to American headquarters.

On November the 21st I left Ledo by jeep for my trip over the Road, but before starting out I visited the plane-loading warehouses and saw how the Quartermaster Corps had developed a system of loading material in a very efficient manner and also a system of dropping stuff into the jungle with remarkably little loss. This particular area has had to use this type of transportation because there was no other way of getting the stuff to our men, and they have dropped such things as galvanized barrels of water, motors and field guns, rations, medical supplies, ammunition, etc. Approximately 600 tons are shipped out daily by air from the Ledo fields, and a plane can be loaded on an average of 17 minutes.

After leaving Ledo, I stopped and visited the 14th Evacuation Hospital, the 335th Hospital at Tagap, and the 73rd Evacuation Hospital at Shingbwiyang at the end of the Naga country and the beginning of the Hukawng Valley. The Road so far, from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, 102 miles, was a rough one, but all things considered a good road, wide, rocked and proven in the last monsoon.

On November the 22nd I left Shingbwiyang and on the road visited the medical battalion station outside of Tingkawk, went through a lot of dense jungle, crossed a number of rivers on pontoon bridges, and observed the extremely good work being done by the engineer battalions, both white and colored, all along the Road. I also visited the aviation liaison field at
Shadazup and from there went on to Warazup, where there are fighter and transport fields. The route from Warazup was through Kamaing to Moegaung and this was the roughest ride I have ever undertaken. We averaged between five and ten miles an hour for about fifty miles. I left Moegaung on November 23rd, and took the jeep train from there to Myitkyina. However, before I left Moegaung, I had a chance to visit General Liao Yao-hsiang of the Chinese 6th Army and his American liaison officer, Colonel Philipp. General Liao Yao-hsiang, with his 6th, and Lieutenant General Sun Li-jen of the 1st, were both doing a grand job to the south of the Road and the reason that these two armies had the respect and confidence of the American military was because they were well-fed, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led. I arrived in Myitkyina that same afternoon and had dinner with Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan that night. It might be well to point out here that one of the chief complaints which I found along the Road was the lack of a definite rotation policy. General Sultan had the same idea of the Chinese soldier as General Merrill. As the situation in China was getting critical at that time he feared a Japanese drive into Kunning and stated that if that operation succeeded, all our efforts in Burma would go for naught. His objectives were (1) to open a road to China by means of Burma and (2) to get supplies to China.

It is not our policy to fight in Burma except where necessary to protect the Road. The British, according to General Sultan, do not care for a road to China or a road in Burma. They want a weak China where the United States wants a strong China. General Sultan disliked putting the Chinese with the British because of their distrust of one another, but there were times when he has to do so in order to protect his movements. General Sultan claimed that there were 250,000 Japanese in Burma against six or seven divisions of Chinese, British and American troops. He did not tell me, though, that the Japanese divisions that he was facing were greatly decimated as to personnel and materiel nor that the British alone, as I found out later, had at least 13 divisions in Burma.

The busiest airfield in the world is at Myitkyina. It is a marvel of efficiency. Indian pioneer troops do the unloading. The British pay them and we feed them. The British also clothe the troops of the 1st and 6th Chinese armies but we furnish them with arms. When food is dropped, American liaison personnel attached to the Chinese armies are there to see that the food is evenly distributed to all concerned. This is very important because otherwise some of the soldiers would have to do without and the result would be impaired efficiency as is the case so often in China itself.

At the Myitkyina airfield, there have been as high as 284 transports loaded and unloaded in a day, in addition to fighter and liaison planes coming on and off the field. In one 13 hour stretch there were 556 landings and take-offs, and during October 1944, 195 transports landed per day.
On November the 24th, I visited Major General Howard Davidson, commander of the 10th Air Force at his headquarters and sat in on his daily conference. Later that afternoon, I took off in a Billy Mitchell bomber with Colonel Rosy Grubb and Lieutenant Colonel Pinkney for Kunming. After leaving Myitkyina we went south to Shamo and circled the town while American P-51 Thunderbolts came in low and dropped their bomb loads and made some good hits. Then we went over the Hump at 14,000 feet to Kunming, where I stayed with General Claire Chennault. He expressed great confidence in the Chinese and said they should have their own leadership but that lend-lease should be given direct to Chiang Kai-shek under the supervision of General Wedemeyer. He stated that the tactical situation looked bad due to the loss of our advanced airfields, but that the over-all picture was good as he had engaged 350,000 Japanese with his 14th Air Force and he hoped to draw in 150,000 more. He notified me that he was still maintaining a number of American-operated airfields behind the Japanese lines and that while it was a difficult proposition he was continuing to supply them all. In his opinion Japan is moving a great deal of her heavy industry on to the Chinese mainland and he further stated that a China landing is necessary if the war is to be brought to a successful conclusion in that country. He rates the Communists highly, and declares there is no connection between them and Russia, a conclusion which was borne out in my conversations during the rest of my stay in China. He is, however, sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek in his dealings with the Communists and thinks he is the one man who symbolizes an aggressive China. He has nowhere near enough planes and neither does Chiang Kai-shek have enough supplies even though they have been promised them time and time again.

There was a three-ball alert in Kunming while I was there but the Japanese dropped their bombs at Chenking, 25 miles away. The next day I visited Major General G. X. Cheves, the SOS officer of the Chinese theater and he informed me that all the stuff coming into China is shipped to Calcutta and from there to Assam where it is loaded in planes for flights over the Hump, and that in excess of 90 per cent of the food and all building supplies are furnished by the Chinese.

I have been able to arrive at some conclusions on the basis of my few contacts to date. Under the present system, being conscripted into the Chinese army is like receiving a death sentence because the soldier receives no training, no food and little equipment. They are starved and poorly equipped because of graft up above. The commanders hang on to much of the stuff they receive and then flood the black markets and enrich themselves. The administration of food supply on an equitable basis is necessary or the Chinese army will not be able to fight.

On November the 26th, I left Kunming for Chungking. When I started on this trip I thought that the Chinese problem was supply, but now I am beginning to think it is cooperation among the Chinese themselves and that this has always been the case. Conditions in China are really bad. Some people, for example, working for the Chinese Maritime Commission can work
only one-half day because they cannot get enough to eat and many soldiers
die of malnutrition. Many Chinese, whom I met in Chungking, feel pretty
despondent over the war situation. The American military are not too
optimistic but are trying to hide their feelings.

I met Major General Albert Wedemeyer, Commander-in-Chief of American
forces in China, and was very favorably impressed by him. It is a tough
situation for any one to be put into "cold", but I feel that if any man
can salvage anything out of this that Wedemeyer will be the one. He
recognizes the gravity of the situation. He is not fooling himself. He
isn't underestimating the abilities of the Japanese nor is he over-estimating
the fighting qualities of the Chinese. He wanted to get General Chen Cheng
as his field commander against the Japanese, but the Generalissimo appointed
Chen Cheng his Minister of War instead and gave Wedemeyer General Hoh
Ying-chin as his field commander. While this did not look so good at the
time, it very likely was a shrewd move, because Hoh Ying-chin is the
Kweichow war lord and consequently will fight harder to save his province.
Ho Ying-chin, now Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army and Commander of the
forces in Kweichow and Kwansi is a political general. He is anti-communist
and has fought a Communist-Kuomintang rapprochement. While he is no longer
Minister of War he is still in a powerful position and is still a key figure
in future Chinese policies and politics.

Many rumors are prevalent in Chungking that people are selling out and
converting into portable goods and cash, so that they can start moving.

General Wedemeyer has had to ask for the recall of some of Stilwell's
staff members, because they do not know their job and he is trying to draw
together a staff of his own which he can have confidence in.

I was not too impressed with the Intelligence System of the American
Army in Chungking, as I felt that they did not know their business and their
information was not up to date. For example, they reported a three-ball
alert at Kunming and the raid on Chenking three days after it actually
happened. General Wedemeyer could find no American officer who could tell
him what the American plans in China were. None of the officers knew what
they were supposed to do and consequently a bad situation existed on his
arrival.

I saw Major General Pat Hurley and we had a very long talk. He talked
for two hours and forty-seven minutes and I talked for thirteen minutes, which
was about right. General Hurley informed me that the United States objectives
were (1) to keep China from collapsing and (2) to unify, replenish and regroup
Chinese military forces for the purpose of carrying on the struggle and thereby
saving American lives. There was some talk at that time that General Hurley
would be appointed Ambassador and later when that news became definite there
was a feeling of relief on the part of all hands. No better choice could be
made for this very important position. General Hurley tried, without too much success, to get the Communist and Central Government together so that a unified China would result and a greater degree of cooperation brought about.

The Communists are a force to be reckoned with in China. They have approximately 90 million people in the territories under their control and they seem to have evolved a system of government which is quite democratic, and they also are strong enough to have their authority recognized in the areas they rule. The Central government has something in excess of 300,000 troops in the Communist area and the result is that the Communist and Central Government troops that could be used in fighting the Japanese are being used to blockade one another and consequently the rift in China remains quite wide. The biggest single problem in the country today is this disunity within China itself. At the present time we have a military mission in Yenan. Our military and diplomatic representatives are doing all that they can to close this breach and to bring about greater cooperation among the Chinese. This is the crux of the whole Chinese picture and much will depend on this gulf between these two elements being closed.

The Communists are well-disciplined. They teach their young boys and girls how to use hand-grenades. They have developed small cannons out of bored elms which they set off by a fuse or a match lock. For armament they use captured Japanese guns and when they haven't guns they use spears. Japanese steel helmets, telephones and wires are other things which they have captured and used.

The Communists have gone into villages which they captured, told the people they were spreading democracy, asked how many were in favor of reducing land taxes, interest rates, etc., and then allowed them to vote. Young girls go in and propagandize the women, getting them to make rugs, blankets, etc., which the Communist army buys and thus they are given a better economic standing. Then they form ladies societies of various kinds and in this way help to lift themselves out of the rut they have always been in. The Communists at this time look upon the United States as their great ally because they know that we are really fighting their enemy, the Japanese, and every time a B-29 flies over their territory, they know it is an assurance that we are their friends.

The Communist Party is the chief opposition group in China. They are not Communists in the sense that Russians are as their interests seem to focus on primarily agrarian reforms. Whereas they used to execute landlords and expropriate their estates to divide up among the peasants, today they try to cooperate with landlords or anyone else who will help them in their fight against Japan. They are more reformers than revolutionaries and they have attacked the problems most deep-seated in agricultural China, namely, high rents, taxes, and interest rates, and they have developed cooperatives and a system of local democracy.
They are organized effectively in the region under their control to carry on the war and to maintain their own standing. There is a theoretical agreement between them and Chiang Kai-shek wherein their armies—the Fourth and Eighth Route—are under Chungking but such is not the case and the result is that they maintain their separate status militarily, economically, and politically. The Soviets send in no aid to them. Consequently they are dependent on their own resources and what they can capture from the Japanese. The Generalissimo fears the Communists because he feels that they are too strong, that they will extend their influence wherever and whenever possible and, if allowed to continue unchecked, they will eventually supersede the Kuomintang. While there have been incidents between the Kuomintang and the Communists there has probably been no civil war. We do not know all that has gone on between them because of the rigid censorship which exists but we do know that negotiations have been carried on looking to a settlement of their differences; that Chou En-lai has made many trips to Chungking to discuss matters with the Central Government; that at the present time a small amount of medical supplies—3% of a 20-ton American shipment—has been sent to Yenan; and that an American Military Mission is in the Communist area to study what strategic moves can be made from there.

American influence has been to try to get the divergent elements in China together. This is important and necessary to prevent a possible civil war; to bring about as great a degree of unification as possible to carry on the war; and to help the Chinese to help themselves in settling their own internal problems. There is a bare possibility that the present crisis which confronts China may be a means of bringing these two groups together.

During my stay in China I noticed many conscripts but I did not think they were being handled very well. Many rich men's sons have bought themselves out of being conscripted into the army for as little as $50,000 CN. I have been informed that $500,000 CN will make one a regimental commander. Surely no sound type of soldiery can be created on this basis. I have also found out, and this was later confirmed on my visit to Chengtu, that there was some bad feeling at that place between the Americans and the Chinese and that the latter threw rocks and tomatoes at Americans in jeeps, probably because they had lost their land for airfields and also, perhaps, because they did not receive compensation from the Central Government though we had paid Chungking for the land. Another reason may be that they were being bombed by the Japanese at this time which they attributed, and rightly, to the creating of the American fields. On the first Japanese raid against Chengtu, flares were lit to outline some fields and this was evidently done by Japanese who infiltrated into the area, or by Chinese who were friendly to Japan.

On November 28th I visited several businessmen in downtown Chungking and tried to get their views on the present situation. It appeared to me that the Chinese businessmen had adopted a "wait and see" attitude. The crux of the situation seemed to be what would happen at Sweiwang. If it
stood, well and good; if it feel, the great retreat from Chungking would begin. It appears to me that as of this date, China's house has a leaky roof and a shaky foundation. Whether or not that house can be put in order is a question mark.

I had a conference with Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and he told me that there used to be a connection between Yenan and Russia, but since the dissolution of the Comintern it has disappeared, although it might rise again as there is an idealistic bond between the two.

The Kuomintang is controlled by a small selfish group known as the CC (Central Group) and dominated by the Chen brothers - Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu. They are now, due to recent party changes, on the outside of the Cabinet. Dr. Sun Fo said that the Generalissimo is now becoming more realistic; that previously he never liked to hear bad things, saying it was enemy propaganda and his subordinates, therefore, told him only the good things and consequently conditions went from bad to worse. Finally the Generalissimo set out to find what was wrong and sent his two sons out to investigate the conscription policy. When they came back with their story of ill-treatment, graft and corruption he made a personal trip to the conscription center in Chungking, saw what they had told him was true, and jailed and court-martialed the administrator in charge. Sun Fo told me that about 100 thousand of the 250 to 300 thousand troops under General Hu Tsung-nan in the Northwest area have been shifted to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front and that the old "sit back and let the United States do the job" attitude is changing. Sun Fo said that our best bet was to stick to the Generalissimo. On the basis of information which I have been able to gather, it appears to me that both the Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested in preserving their respective parties at the present time, and have been for the past two years, than they are in carrying on the war against Japan. Each party is more interested in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory. The Kuomintang is inefficient in matters of administration, in the conduct of the army, in education, finance and in taxation. It is also inefficient in times of great crisis, as for example, during the time of the Honanese famine when dogs ate human beings and the Honanese revolted against the Central Government's army; they were inefficient in this past summer's campaign when no authority was given frontal leaders; when there was countermanning of orders; and when there was no food for soldiers and more interest in blockading Communists than in fighting the Japanese; and they were inefficient in the handling of refugees from Kwangsi to Kweiyang.

The Kuomintang is hated more every day and this is due to fear of the army and the attitude of tax collectors; and is proved by the revolts of the peasantry, the party criticism by provincial leaders, student revolts against conscription and the fact that many Chinese will stoop to anything to get to America and, once there, to stay there. It is corrupt. It speaks democratically but acts dictatorially. The worst censorship in the world is
located in Chungking and there is one detective assigned to every ten foreigners (this statement was even published in the papers). Meetings of Liberals are invaded by Kuomintang toughs, spies are everywhere and people are afraid to talk. The Kuomintang is afraid of the will of the people, has lost much of its popular support and will not allow any of its power to be used in the way of agrarian reforms. However, the Kuomintang is still the party in China. It has its leader in the Generalissimo who has the franchise in the war against Japan. It has a powerful army. The middle class leans toward it and it still has the support of America. On the other hand, the Communists have their elements of strength and weakness. Among their weak points is their spirit of sanctimoniousness (they look upon themselves as pious crusaders and do-gooders); their knowledge of the outside world is primitive; there are social distinctions among them, and they are totalitarian and dictatorial in their own way. Their points of strength are they have a good military force, estimated at around 600,000 and there is more democracy in their territory than in the rest of China.

I saw the Generalissimo on Thursday, November the 30th and told him that the United States had sent over three of its very best men in Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer and Donald Nelson. He answered that if they had been here a year ago the situation would be different now. I said that we must forget the past and look to the future, that the United States had a great admiration for China and wanted to see her a strong power so that she could make herself a bulwark for peace in the Orient.

I had a conference with Mr. C. Y. Wu, who informed me that he would be watched because he came to the Embassy, as the secret police (Special Service) do not want the Chinese to speak to foreigners. He also informed me that the secret police are everywhere, even in Colonel DePass' office, and that the Colonel knows this. The Colonel, by the way, is the American military attache. He informed me that the May issue of LIFE was suppressed in China and that in the April issue of TIME articles were deleted but that mimeographed copies were made and distributed. The same thing has happened to READERS DIGEST articles.

The Kuomintang is weak and feared. The Generalissimo is personally honest, but he cannot stand criticism. The feeling among the Chinese is one of depression.

I had a very interesting conversation with John Davies, 2nd Secretary of the American Embassy at Chungking, but now attached to Wedemeyer's headquarters, and his attitude was one of realism. He stated that even though we have a military mission in Yanan at the present time, the Generalissimo would like to have it withdrawn, but due to the difficult situation China finds itself in his hands are tied and he can do nothing about it. It is up to us to use every conceivable type of aid we can in China because the main thing is the saving of American lives. The Communists, he informed me, have a good underground movement in most parts of Occupied China and it will come in handy, when and if, the eventual landings on the China coast occur.
I went to the Generalissimo's house again where Chiang expressed his belief that China would hold at Kweiyang. When the Generalissimo asked Nelson what differences he noted between his first trip and this one, Nelson told him that he found less talk of post war development and a greater concentration on the present needs of China. He told the Generalissimo that if the Chinese held the Japanese, and did a good job of helping themselves through their own WFB he would be glad to come back again next Spring, bringing a mission of businessmen and then talk post-war development. Nelson got his point over very nicely and I am sure the Generalissimo got the idea.

On Saturday, December 2nd, I went to Chengtu and saw the fields at which the B-29's were refueled and serviced, going to and coming from Japan; found out that flares had been used at various of these fields during periods of Japanese bombardments and that these flares were evidently lit by Chinese collaborators. Found out also that wires had been cut leading from the field on a number of occasions. The different fields at Chengtu are fine pieces of work, created entirely by hand and an excess of 100,000 Chinese were employed in building them.

The morale at Chengtu is not too good, and the reason is the faulty rotation program. Among the bomber crews, morale is fairly good; among the fighters, it is fair; but in the supply units, it is poor. Furthermore, the rotation policy seems to work better for the officers than the enlisted men and it creates a bad situation. The feeling among the men at Chengtu is that the usefulness of the fields there is not worth the price in maintaining, now that the 21st bomber command has been activated on Saipan. The supply problem, the vulnerability of the fields, and the distances involved, make it a difficult situation.

In this area, $40,000 CN are paid to the Chinese bringing in grounded American flyers. This goes to pay for porters, etc. The guerrillas pick many of the grounded Americans up inside the Japanese lines and carry them out, and sometimes the process takes a matter of weeks. Then they notify a magistrate or some other official who in turn notifies American headquarters, which in turn sends out a plane to pick them up.

The B-29's are tough ships to handle as they need lots of room, still have some "bugs", and have a hard time making altitude with a full load.

I went from Chengtu to Kunming and saw General Chennault again. I asked him his attitude on the present situation. He said that he was still not worried but only "bothered". The cooperation between Chennault and Wedemeyer is grand, and a fine spirit is evident in Kunming.
Speaking of cooperation brings up the subject of Stilwell, who was thought very highly of in India and Burma, but not so well in China. The opinion in China seems to be that he had a phobia about being driven out of Burma and wanted to go back, hence the building of the Burma Road which people in China considered took supplies that should have come there (how, I was unable to find out) and men who could have been used in China. This is a highly debatable question. Another criticism is that Stilwell rarely appeared in Chungking and that he and Chennault were always fighting one another.

Among the impressions which I should like to record, is one concerning the lack of land activity being carried on by the British until recently. After almost two and a half years, it is not enough that they should have the small number of units that they now have in the field in Burma, while we have the 10th and 14th Air Forces, as well as other air forces working out of India under SEAC. Our B-29's have carried on missions in Thailand, Burma and Singapore. Under whose control have these areas been and to whom will they revert? We are spreading too far and too thin and we are carrying too much of the load in an area where British interests are predominant. Sending a part of the British fleet to participate in the Pacific War is not enough. There must be land operations on a large scale as well.

While in Kunming, I was informed by Generals Chennault and Glenn that there are 28 squadrons of transport planes in India to only two in China. I will have more to say about this later in the report.

I had a conference with T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister, on Friday, December 8th, who informed me that he and the Generalissimo were now in full accord and also that the conditions of the Chinese soldiers, who were ill-fed and ill-cared-for is being attended to. T. V. Soong is probably the best known of China's leaders abroad. He does not have a large following in China but he has great personal prestige there and among Americans. He is modern in his outlook, understands China's needs, and now that he is Acting President of the Executive Yuan he can, I believe, be depended upon to do his utmost to see that the necessary reforms are administered. Politically Dr. Soong informed me that the government was making "at long last" overtures toward the Communists. He was quite hopeful some solution could be worked out. He said China would have to unify internally to win the war and to have a strong position at the peace table. Economically he admitted the situation in China was bad but one of his policies is going to be to keep inflation from spreading. He blamed H. H. Kung for the present financial situation. He said that the Generalissimo had too much to look after personally, that there were too many "yes" men around him, that bad news worried him, but that now the Generalissimo was going to take a more active interest in military affairs and that he, T. V. Soong, would help him in administrative affairs.
On Saturday, December 9th, I visited with Dr. Dan Nelson of the Lutheran Mission in China and Father Mark E. Tennian of the Mary-knollers. The opinion of the missionaries was that the Japanese could take the rest of China whenever they wanted to. Father Tennian stated, and this was agreed to by other missionaries with him, that the Communists in China have now adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the church and they admit that the Communists are doing good work for the people, but they questioned the sincerity of their attitude toward religion. They feel China should solve its own problems.

I again saw General Wedemeyer, who was having his troubles with the Chinese and he realizes that he must be a politician in his job as well as a military man. I found out also, that Mountbatten had sent two squadrons of cargo combat planes to work under Wedemeyer in taking the 14th and 22nd Chinese divisions out of Burma to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front. However, these cargo ships were really out of air commando units and numbered only 26 instead of the 50 expected. Mountbatten has finally promised to send 50 more out of the 200 he has on hand. This is a sorry state of affairs, because under GCS 308/6 issued on January 7th, 1944, it was stipulated that all American planes in India could be used by Americans for emergency in defense of China. Furthermore, 100 combat cargo planes (the 4th group) are due in India next month. Most of the planes under Mountbatten are American made and American manned, but it is a difficult job to get them away from him. Only the expostulations of Generals Sultan or Stratemeyer (maybe both) got the additional 50 at this time.

I would say that the American Military in the Far East are fed up with the dilatory tactics of the British out there. All the British are interested in is Singapore, Hongkong, a restoration of prestige, and a weak China.

On Sunday, November 10th, the Chinese situation took a turn for the better with the recapture of Tushan, although it must be admitted that this "victory" was due not to actual fighting, but to the withdrawal of the Japanese some time before. This was brought about because the Japs had evidently over-extended themselves and had pushed ahead too rapidly. Furthermore, it has been confirmed that the Japanese are pulling up the rails of the railroads in western Kwangsi and transporting them to complete the link between Nanning and Dong Dang in French Indo-China and which when completed will create an all-rail transportation link between Indo-China in the south and Manchukuo and Korea in the north.

I had a conference with Chiang Meng-lin, one of the Generalissimo's closest advisors, and he informed me that the removal of General Hoh, Chen Li-fu, and H. H. Kung was demanded by groups in China long before it took place. The Generalissimo refused to accede to these demands until he was ready to make the move and then he wanted to make it appear that it was his own doing. This, of course, was a matter of face, and is a factor of great importance in comprehending the Chinese situation. Chiang Men-lin realized
the great need for food, training and leadership in the Chinese army and he has made it a point to stress these lacks to Chiang Kai-shek from time to time. He made a report on the bad conditions in the army in Hunan and Kwangsi, sent a memorandum to the Generalissimo who visited these areas and confirmed what he had found out. He stated that his report and the Generalissimo's visit was in part responsible for the removal of Hoh. He said, further, that the Generalissimo could not consent to General Wedemeyer's placing Chen Cheng in command before Kweiwang, because Chen as War Minister was in a better position to push needed army reforms, whereas Hoh was in a spot where he had to make good - or else. I was further informed by Chiang Meng-lin that the Generalissimo fears the Communists, war lords and intellectuals, and makes his decisions with these factors in mind. Later in the day I spent an enjoyable hour with Madame Sun Yat-sen, who said that the only solution to China's problem is a Coalition government. She is friendly toward the Communists but thinks that the Generalissimo will not have anything to do with them. She further stated that China, to be a great power, must form such a government, and she thought that such a move would in reality strengthen the Kuomintang rather than weaken it. She made the statement that all factions of Chinese are "very much pleased with America's disinterested attitude" and that they realize that we have no ulterior motive in their country. Before leaving Madame Sun Yat-sen, I was told by her that many people were very much worried and wanted to get out of Chungking because they felt that the situation could not be saved.

On Monday, December 11th, I saw General Chen Cheng, Minister of War, and referred to him a Reuter's dispatch quoting Senators Brewster and Chandler to the effect that we would lose all our air fields in China unless a miracle occurred. He termed the senators' statements politics and said it was only helping the enemy. He was very confident of China's ability to hold and he stated that he could be of much more use as War Minister than in the field in the way of executing reforms as he puts it "at the rear where it has to be done for those at the front who need it". In other words, he has the authority now which he had lacked as a commander in the field. We discussed the reforms needed in the Chinese army, the Burma Road, and the present situation. He impressed me as a man who will do his job and do it well, or know the reason why. Chen Cheng, according to all American military men, is China's best soldier. His appointment as War Minister was the best possible move that the Generalissimo could make to bolster China's armies and lagging war morale. His loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek is unquestioned and he is personally incorruptible. Among the many leading generals in China he stands out because of his devotion to his country, his word which is his bond, and his honesty.

Later in the afternoon, I talked to Ambassador Hurley and he told me that the Generalissimo had offered the Communists the following proposals:

1. Recognition as a legal party
2. Equipment of their armies on the basis of equality
3. Participation in the government
The Communists would not accept these proposals because they feared their participation in the government would be very limited and their armies would be wiped out. They, therefore, turned down the Generalissimo's three point program, but I understand that Colonel Dave Barrett who heads the American military mission in Yenan is going back with a counter-proposal.

Ambassador Hurley is not too optimistic, but he is sticking to President Roosevelt's desire for a unified China so that it can participate fully in the war.

That evening I saw the Generalissimo for the third time and spent an hour and a half with him, and at his request, gave him a frank recital of my findings. I pointed out the full extent of our lend-lease support to him and emphasized that in an effort to assist China we have done everything humanly possible and some things which were thought impossible. To evaluate fully our assistance we should keep in mind the following points:

(1) We have performed superhuman feats in getting material over the Hump to aid in China's defense.

(2) We are doing a tremendous job in building the Ledo-Burma Road and its auxiliary pipe line.

(3) We have carried on operations in the Pacific which were all aimed at weakening China's - and our - enemy, Japan, and which must be included in any reckoning of assistance to our Asiatic ally.

(4) We have given China much in the way of financial aid through loans, credits, etc.

(5) We have tried to assist in a reorganization of the Chinese Army through developing training schools in this country and China; through detailing liaison personnel to the different armies; through better feeding methods; and through the activation of the Chinese-American Composite Wing of the 14th Air Force.

We have done all within our means to assist China because we want to see her use everything she has to bring the war in the Far East to a successful conclusion. We have, I repeat, no ulterior motives in our policy toward China. We want to see China a great power because we feel that as such she will be a decided factor in maintaining the peace in the Orient. We want to get out of China as soon as victory is won.

Last but most important, every move we have made and will make in China is dictated by one primary consideration and that is to save as many American lives as possible. Everything else - everything - is predicated on this primary factor.
I told the Generalissimo that he had had and would continue to have, our full support, but that we expected him to take the necessary steps to bring about the needed internal reforms in his civil, military and economic administration, and I also mentioned several times our lack of any designs on China. I further stated that my opinion of the Chinese situation had changed from one wherein supplies to China was most important to one which stressed the need of cooperation among the Chinese people themselves. I backed up as vigorously as I could, opinions expressed to me by Wedemeyer, Hurley, and Donald Nelson, and with which I agreed. He replied by saying America did not understand a country in revolution and he compared China today with its dissident elements and the Kuomintang to the dissident elements and the revolutionary soldiers of George Washington's time. He stated that he would continue to try for a settlement with the Communists in a political way. I pointed out different possibilities to him and he answered that he had considered them all, Americans, he continued, expect his government to make all the concessions. Why don't we try to get the Yenan group to make some? This sounds like a good suggestion.

I brought Brewster's and Chandler's statement in the Senate to his attention and said it indicated the attitude of some elements in the United States toward the present situation. Like War Minister Chen Cheng, he said that those statements played into the hands of the enemy. I also said that the American attitude toward China had changed with the Stilwell incident and that now we expected results and that China must assume its full share of responsibility. I pointed out that China to be a great power must earn that recognition.

I held nothing back in my conversation with the Generalissimo and I told him, after he requested me to, the honest results of my observations. I do not know what his real reaction was, but he seemed impressed and stated that reforms were under way. In conclusion he made the statement that this was not the worst crisis China had faced and that he was confident of victory.

Chiang Kai-shek is a dictator in name only. It is true that he is President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Army but his power is limited because he has to recognize all factions within the Kuomintang - and some outside - with the result that he serves as a balance wheel and has to resort to compromise to keep a semblance of unity. No one would acknowledge this more quickly than Chiang himself. Though constantly subject to pressures he has shown great skill in maintaining the stability of his government over the years he has been its head. He has been a remarkable leader and today he is the one man in China with sufficient prestige to carry her through the war. He has had to be a politician primarily, a military leader secondarily. To maintain himself in power he has had to manipulate these groups as the occasions demanded. The results have been a hodge-podge of policies which the western mind finds hard to comprehend. The disastrous results of this maneuvering have been manifested in many ways;
1. He has used something like 16 divisions to blockade the Communists and has thus lost the use of large numbers of troops to fight Japan.

2. He has allowed Chinese military strength to deteriorate in other ways through his inability to mobilize China's resources; to conscript the college students and the rich men's sons; to see that his troops received food and medical supplies.

3. He has allowed hoarding to go on unchecked; has done nothing to stop inflation; and has allowed merchants and landlords to profit greatly.

4. He has failed to improve the condition of the peasantry in regard to high rents and high rates of interest.

On the other hand, he is the one leader in China. It has been under him that China has attained political freedom and the status of a great power. He is the one man who can make Chinese independence and unity a reality. His faults can be understood when the complexity of the Chinese puzzle are studied in detail and they are no more uncommon than the faults of the other leaders of the United Nations.

The seriousness of the situation in China has brought home to him the need for some reforms and he has applied himself to bringing order out of chaos. He has withdrawn some of his Communist blockading divisions from the northwest to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front; he has continued to carry on negotiations with Chou En-lai, the No.3 Communist, with the hope, as he expressed it to me, "that a political settlement can be made"; he has given his full support to the Chinese W.P.B. set-up by Donald Nelson and administered by Wong Wen-hao; he has called for 100,000 volunteers from among the college students though he has not conscripted them; and he is seeing to it, under American help and supervision, that the Chinese soldier is now being fed and that the Chinese conscripts are now being treated better.

He has reorganized his cabinet and given the more democratic elements a chance to be represented and he has pledged his full support to the American team of Wedemeyer and Hurley. His intentions are good and he has shed some of his administrative burdens on the shoulders of T. V. Soong, now acting President of the Executive Yuan, so that he can devote more of his time to strictly military affairs.

All these moves are in the right direction but the question is; has he gone far enough or does he intend to, and, is there still time? China used to be able to trade space for time but now she has very little space and not much time. As I tried to impress on Chiang, the responsibility is now his as we have done everything we possibly could do to assist him. If he
holds we'll get the stuff through to him; if he fails, all our efforts in Burma, over the Hump, and the magnificent work of the 10th and 14th Air Forces and the 20th Bomber Command will have been for naught.

We are committed to Chiang Kai-shek and we will help him to the best of our ability. The decision, though, rests not on our shoulders but on the Generalissimo's. He and he alone, can untangle the present situation, because on the basis of what he has done and in spite of some of the things he has done, he is China.

The American government through General Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley, and Donald Nelson has been doing all its its power to bring the different groups in China together. This policy has been pursued not because we want to dictate in China's internal affairs but because we want the Chinese to cooperate with one another so that the full forces of their resources and manpower can be brought to bear against Japan. They realize that Chiang Kai-shek's position is a difficult one and that he fears giving in to the Communists because of the effect it might have on him and his party. They think, though, that if the Chinese themselves can get together it would be to the best interests of China. If they do not get together the seeds of dissension will only continue to grow and the eventual harvest will be of such a nature as to make the Taiping Rebellion of the last century a minor revolution in comparison. It might even mean the intervention of a great power in the Chinese internal situation.

I should like to state, at this point, that the policy of the United States in China is one in which no ulterior motives are involved. In that country - and in that country only so far as I know - our foreign policy is clear, clean, and definite. We are in China to help China and ourselves against a common enemy; we intend to get out of China just as soon as victory is won; and we, alone among the great nations, want China to be a world power because we feel she will become the bastion of peace in Asia. The Chinese know all this and because of it they trust us implicitly.

On Tuesday, December 12th, I was able to acquire some information concerning a revolution in the Chinese province of Sinkiang. This had been going on since December 1943 but because of its remoteness, it was hard to get up-to-the-minute information. At first the White Russians, very numerous in the province, were blamed for the outbreak. Then the Kazaks, then the Kirghiz, and finally the Soviets and now the Kazaks are being blamed again. Evidently Kuomintang control of Sinkiang is not very strong and a great deal of cruelty has been practiced by the Kuomintang government officials because of the supposedly Communist sympathizers in the various groups up there.
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The Kazaks have blocked the Northwest Caravan Road leading into Dihwa and because of this a 500-truck shipment from Russia has been held up. Incidentally, it had been my intention to go to Dihwa but because of weather conditions it was impossible to do so.

It appears that, fundamentally, the revolt started when the Chinese attempted to move the Kazaks, a nomadic people, from their good grazing lands in the northern part of the province, to the barren southern area. In the trouble that started there was shooting and some Kazaks were forced to flee into Outer Mongolia where the villages they found havens in were invaded by Chinese troops and they were fired on by Chinese planes. The Soviets protested this action as Russia in reality looks upon Outer Mongolia as a part of its territory and Outer Mongolian forces drove the Chinese "invaders" out.

These incidents seem to be due to economic causes and a bad conscription policy, and mark a change from the old policy of the previous governor, Sheng Shih-tsai, who for ten years maintained peace among the divergent groups in Sinkiang.

I understand that the American Consul in Tihwa cannot talk to people on the street because to do so would make them liable to suspicion. He has White Russian servants, and one of his maids was arrested for carrying a pistol (which was wholly untrue) captured and jailed by the Chinese, was beaten, hung by her heels and finally released.

In the afternoon of December the 12th, the day before I left, I had a final conference with General Wedemeyer, who was more optimistic about the situation. He suggested that there be closer cooperation between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, on the military level, because he realizes how effective the State Department personnel can be in the many countries in the world in which our armies are stationed. He said he had the full cooperation of George Atcheson, the Charge at Chungking, and the whole embassy staff, and he values highly the services of the members of the embassy staff who have been loaned to the army.

I left Chungking on December 13th and I must say that my conclusions are in close accord with the thoughts of the majority of the American civil, diplomatic, and military officials there. They want the Chinese to get together so that we can win the war in Asia; and they want to get the boys out of China just as soon as victory is won. The main concern of all of them is the saving of American lives. They do not care whether a Chinese is a Communist or not, just so he fights Japan and takes that much of the burden off our soldiers.
The weaknesses of the Generalissimo's government are apparent as I have tried to point out in this report, its durability a question which only Chiang Kai-shek himself can answer. It is my belief that he will do all that he can, according to his views, to bring about the necessary reforms and to achieve a degree of unity. It is his purpose, he informed me, to try and get democracy to the people as soon as possible and he intends to call a Constitutional Convention sometime during 1945.

He has had, and will continue to have, a difficult problem on his hands. I feel we should give him every possible support because he alone can bring China together. There is no other person in that country who has his prestige or his ability and I say this in spite of the many weaknesses in his government which I have called to your attention. In retrospect, he has been a great leader for China. No other country has ever fought so long with so little against such great odds. Furthermore, China is doubly important now because of the fact that Japanese heavy industry has been moving to the Chinese mainland since the Doolittle bombing of Tokyo and this adds up to the war ending in China where it began in 1931 - a grim picture to look forward to.

After I left Chungking I visited General Gilbert X. Cheves, in charge of our S.O.S. in China. He is a go-getter and had already done a grand job on the transportation and supply end in Calcutta. He informed me that the Generalissimo had just put him in charge of all internal transportation in China; that he was going to run trucks - not transportation - from Ledo to Kunming over the Burma Road on January 22, 1945; and that the road would be opened for transporting supplies into China from Burma and India by April 1, 1945 at the latest. It is my understanding that General Cheves will be appointed Chief of S.O.S. for the Chinese armies soon and if such is the case, the problem of feeding and supplying the Chinese armies will be well handled.

After leaving Kunming I went over the Hump to Chabua in Assam and inspected the loading facilities at some of the fields. General Cranston and his men are doing a grand job there in getting needed stuff into China.

In Calcutta I visited the docks and saw the fine work being done by the men in the Transportation Corps. We have fine installations there for unloading and warehousing. We have increased the efficiency of the railroads from Calcutta to Assam and speeded up the river traffic to that area as well. Direct telephone communications have now been established by the U.S. Army from Calcutta to Chabua and Myitkyina.

I had a conference with General George Stratemeyer at Hastings Mill in Calcutta. He informed me that General Wedemeyer would get 150 cargo combat planes from Mountbatten; that Mountbatten had a case in being reluctant to release these planes because he had been given certain assignments by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to carry them out he needed the planes himself. General Stratemeyer stated that if the theater (I.B.) could get another 100 cargo combat planes (a 5th group) that their needs would be satisfied.

The Indians in Calcutta did not seem too friendly. They dislike the British and do not like us too much probably because they think we are helping the British.

At a conference in Stratemeyer's headquarters I was shocked to find out that in the attack on Rangoon yesterday - December 15th - four of our B-29's were lost due to our own bombs exploding too soon after being released. This is not the first time this had happened and something has to be done to correct this - and soon. They are tough enough to fly without this happening to the boys.

On December 17th I again met with General Frank Merrill at New Delhi and we discussed the results of my trip. In general, we are in complete agreement on the Chinese situation. About India and Burma, we should get out as soon as possible because our presence there lays us open to too many politically explosive problems. We should leave enough personnel to handle transportation and engineering problems allied to it to maintain supply runs from Calcutta to Chabua and Ledo and over the Road. From a combat point of view we have no interests in Burma, Malaya, Thailand, or French Indo-China nor should we be interested in keeping American air forces, O.S.S. men, or other of our units under British command. This is highly important to us if we are going to keep out of trouble so that the United States will not become involved in political squabbles in that part of the world. We have no direct interests in that area and we will have enough to do to concentrate our energies on the main job of defeating Japan through aid to China. The wrong use of our air forces, such as dropping propaganda leaflets over French Indo-China, or through sending our O.S.S. men into that country, could create situations politically embarrassing to us and likely to involve us in a way that we would not desire. As long as American units are under Mountbatten's command in Southeast Asia this is a possibility we cannot overlook and must always be on our guard against. These comments are not made slightingly against our British allies but only because our own interests and objectives must come first.

In India the Royal Air Force does not do the work that the American Air Forces do in the matter of flying supplies. The British say it will fatigue their men too much when they are asked to do something extra. The Americans are always willing to fly extra hours and to get as much supplies into Burma, India, and China as is possible. The British - not us - are the ones who are going to reap the benefits of our work in India and Burma. They will have up to date telephone systems already in operation and stretching for hundreds of miles, improved wharf facilities, and better roads and railroads.
I had a further conference with General Merrill in which he informed me — and this bears out statements by Generals Pick and Cheves — that the pipeline from Calcutta to China will carry 13,000 tons a month but — and this is in contrast to statements earlier made by Pick and Cheves, that the Road will carry only from 8 to 12 thousand tons a month. This latter figure can be increased but it will take more men. The net result then, of the Road and pipeline, will be an increase of 25 to 30,000 tons a month. General Merrill also informed me that he has diverted enough food supplies from India to last the Chinese armies on the Kweichow-Kwangsi front for six months and that he has in supply in India enough small arms and ammunition to take care of 35 Chinese divisions.

In conclusion, I feel that all our supplies to China should be handled through General Wedemeyer. This will give him a lever which he can use to make the Chinese armies more responsible to him. This supervision is necessary in the interests of the greatest possible efficiency and I feel that with the present fine cooperation between the American military and Chiang Kai-shek that it can be worked out.

In addition to this I recommend that every possible means for increasing supplies to China be explored; that we keep the Road open and use it to its maximum capacity; that we withdraw all our air and ground combat troops at the earliest feasible opportunity from Burma and India; and that we send them either into China or other areas where needed.

Finally, the boys in Burma and China are very much upset about the lack of a definite rotation policy and feel they are the forgotten men at the end of the road. They resent the secondary status of their area in matters such as priorities and they are fearful of the let-down which will result at home when Germany is defeated. They do not want to be forgotten and they wish their folks could really be made to understand the viciousness of the enemy they face in the Far East and the amount of time it is going to take to defeat Japan. These boys are realists and they know what they're up against because they've learned — the hard way. Our men fight bravely and well but not with any crusading spirit. They are interested in getting a dirty job done and coming home. That is their war aim — to come home to "Shangri-la" or the "Old Country" as the refer to the U.S. and to get out of the places they are in just as quickly as they can after the job is finished.

Before my departure from China and Burma, the Chinese had captured Bhamo in Burma and on January 3, 1945 were reported to have taken Wanting on the Burma-China frontier but reports two days ago stated that the Japanese had captured the latter town. When Wanting falls, and it should at any moment, it would mean that combat operations along the Road itself
are now over and that the 5,000 trucks ordered for China by you will not have to be flown in over the Hump but will this month start rolling into Kunming from India under their own power. It means, further, that supplies over the Road and oil through the Pipe line will be flowing into China before spring.

In conclusion, I can make no better statement than you did in your message on the State of the Union this past week, to wit: "The men and women who have served with so much devotion in these far distant jungles and mountains deserve high honor from their countrymen".

Very respectfully yours,

Mike Mansfield

P. S. I am also enclosing for your consideration and up-to-date report on the Ledo-Burma Road and the Pipe Line being constructed from Calcutta long the Road and into Kunming.
A. Background.

By mid-year of 1942 the area occupied by the Japanese had been extended to include all Burma. As the Japanese swept up from the south, English, Burmese, Kachins, Anglo-Indians, and a defeated army of British, Chinese, and a few Americans escaped as best they could into neighboring India. The Burma Road was closed, and with it the last supply route to the beleagured Chinese.

The situation was critical. In Egypt the Germans were pounding at the gates of Alexandria, apparently preparing to strike to the east. Toward Burma, the formidable barrier of the uncivilized frontier beginning with the Patkai mountains proved itself a sturdy bulwark, for at that moment it was all that stood between the Japanese and India.

In 1943, all eyes turned to the Orient. The Chinese were barely able to carry on, and only the trickle of supplies which crossed the Hump by plane kept their heads above water. It was evident that the dominant mission in the Far East at that point was the reopening of a supply line to the Chinese.

The map of India took on new importance. An inadequate railroad wandered lazily up the Brahmaputra Valley to the furthest outpost of civilization in the northeast corner of Assam. Designed to service only the normal peace-time needs of the tea plantations in this part of India, the railroad terminated at Ledo, an insignificant native village surrounded by jungle-covered hills. This same village had been the end of the trail for those refugees from northern Burma who fled ahead of the Japs in 1942. From Ledo, so named by the Italians who first opened the coal mines in the adjacent hills, began to unwind the road which was to make famous the name of the obscure Indian village.

Beyond the railroad lay the unbroken barrier of the Patkai mountain range stretching out like a giant finger from the Himalayas. It forms both natural barrier to communication between Assam and Burma, and at the same time a boundary between these two countries which nevertheless has remained too wild to be clearly defined or explored. Running East and West across northern Burma, these mountains blanketed by a 200 foot deep impenetrable jungle served as home only to the uncivilised tribes of Naga head-hunters who are native to this portion of the world. From May through September, the warm monsoon winds which sweep north over the plains of Burma, deposit the terrifically heavy rainfall over the entire area through which a road was to be built by the United States Army Engineers.

The whole region in which operations were planned had the unsavory reputation of being the unhealthiest portion of the world. Veterans of the Philippines, Central America, and the South Pacific deemed this country from Assam to the Hakawng as the worst jungle of them all. The Bengal Tiger, King Cobra, and blood-sucking leeches which infested it were far less dangerous than the unseen germs from which no part of this land was free and no man immune.
Staid Britons dismissed the plan of a road as an impossibility. Professional soldiers had shaken their heads and said "no military vehicle will cross those mountains on its own power", and scoffed at the thought of trucks and tanks ever moving beyond the Ledo railhead. But during the final weeks of 1942 and the early part of 1943, plans for the project went on and the initial effort was begun.

The undertaking has no parallel in military history. It is a combination of building a major modern highway through virgin jungle-covered mountains and valleys, and at the same time having to fight a first rate, well-equipped enemy for the ground over which the road is to run. It departs from the usual strategic concepts in that the CONSTRUCTION phase (Services of Supply) is the primary objective; the FIGHTING (Combat) is secondary, to brush the enemy aside from the road route. Although by comparison with other theaters the number of men involved is not large, the whole enterprise, in manpower, materials, and objective, is on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the defending Jap was capable of being the superior force. The situation has not been simplified by the fact that, in the scheme of global warfare, this theater is both at the end of the longest line of communication in the world and not the highest on priorities.

The road is an ever lengthening dragon with an insatiable appetite. Its mouth is at Ledo and its extending tail pushes through the hills and down into Burma. A triad of effort sustains it: (1) ENGINEER: to develop the base from which the dragon feeds and to see that the tail grows steadily in the right direction; (2) SUPPLY SERVICE: to feed the hungry animal rations and material; (3) MEDICAL: to conserve the effective manpower doing the job. On this same organization for CONSTRUCTION is superimposed the heavy burden of supplying and hospitalizing combat troops.

Inevitably, no one of these three essential services is able to secure all the personnel, equipment, supplies, or housing it considers necessary for the accomplishment of its mission. It has been a kaleidoscopic scene of mud, insufficient and over-taxed equipment, rain, malaria, disappointments, heat, language difficulties, jungle fighting, landslides, and homesickness. The work has gone forward by dint of a prodigious expenditure of sustained physical and emotional energy on the part of all concerned.

The mission is best viewed in its four main phases, during each of which the activities of the three essential services had to be readjusted to meet the changing needs. First, came the 100 mile drive through the Patkai mountains into the Hukawng Valley, climaxcd by the break-through to Shingbwiyang of the lead column on the 27th of December, 1943; second, the Valley Campaign which ended with the dry season; third, Myitkyina; and finally, "mopping up" and the junction of the Ledo and the Burma Roads.
B. First Phase: "The Road to Shingbwiyang"

During the exodus from Burma in the face of Jap aggression, 30,000 refugees started up this narrow trail into India. Thousands died - of fever, hunger, exposure, exhaustion. Bit by bit, personal belongings were abandoned. Reliable observers estimated 20,000 persons perished on this 110 mile trail. Months later, as engineers pushed the road through the jungle, their skeletons seemed almost to pave the trail in places.

In its first 100 miles the Road covers seven summits of the Patkai Range. From the peak at Fangsan Pass, four countries can be seen: China, Tibet, Burma, and India. From Hell's Gate to Fangsan Pass, a distance of seven miles, the climb is straight up, with 220 hairpin curves in this stretch.

In contrast with the Ledo Road, the Burma Road is a narrow trace with a high crown of hand-layed rock. No rock of any structural value is available anywhere along the route of the Ledo Road. As a result the road is graveled, the material being secured from rivers along the way. Minimum shoulder width of the road in the mountains is 33 feet, while in the valleys it is a minimum of 49 feet. Although the Ledo Road was built with temporary bridges for combat expediency, its standards are those of a freight highway designed to carry more than 60,000 tons per month (an average of 8500 vehicles pass one Military Police post in a 24-hour period). It is a safe two-way road with a maximum of 10% grade. All temporary bridges have been replaced with modern steel structures, the latest design in military stream-crossing equipment being installed. Because of the tremendous rainfall along the route, prodigious culvert installations are required. For every mile of road, 10,000 feet of culvert have been installed.

The Ledo Road was first covered by advance survey parties that determined the best routes. Next the lead bulldozer blazed a path through the jungle. This was followed by clearing crews, who blasted the trees with tons of dynamite and pushed the debris aside. Next, leveling and grading was performed, culverts, drains, and ditches dug. Finally the road was metalled with gravel, hauled from gravel points at rivers, sometimes many miles from the spot being covered. Lastly, the gravel was spread over the highway surface. Through the mountainous sections the road was built almost entirely with bulldozers. In the valleys, these same tractors were used to pull scrapers.

Work was begun in December of 1942 and continued through the winter in the hands of three battalions of colored American Engineers, together with a small number of other troops, but initial progress was slow. During the following March heavy rains began and work on the road was seriously impeded. Little advance was made because work crews were forced to concentrate on maintaining that portion of road already cut and to keep it open to traffic.

During the remainder of the 1943 monsoon season, all forward progress on the road was halted and the men battled against nature to hold the narrow ribbon of roadway. They widened the trace, installed culvert, graveled the road
bed. The incessant rains continued. Dozers were lost over banks. Men were soaking wet all the time; not even their beds were dry. Equipment was buried by slides. By September, the toughest road job in the world had come to a standstill only 42 miles from the starting point, and all concerned were thoroughly discouraged. It was evident that new leadership was needed if the road was to go through.

In October 1943 Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick took over the job of building the Ledo Road and supplying General Stilwell’s combat forces. He analyzed the situation, re-organized his forces, and promised Stilwell that the road to Shingbijyang would be open for traffic on New Years Day. On December 27, the primary objective of the Ledo Road was completed; the building of a road into Burma over which General Joseph W. Stilwell could bring men and equipment and supplies in his return march against the Japs. The road reached the village of Shingbijyang four days ahead of the scheduled deadline. This cut through the matted, malarious, jungle-covered mountains was outstanding in all the brilliant achievements by the Corps of Engineers.

The Patkai mountains are one of the foot-hill chains of the Himalayas. Peaks in the immediate vicinity of the road reach an elevation of about 6000 feet; the highest point on the road itself is about 4500 feet. The soil is clay with an insecure shale foundation; vegetation is a dense tangle of tropical hardwood, bamboo, and ferns. The valleys are steep and narrow, and the streams become torments when rain falls in their water sheds. Population is thin, and the small villages cling to the tops of the hills. All native trails climb the slopes at steep grades and follow high saddles across the ridges. After two weeks on foot in this territory, an engineer Colonel, who had spent much of the last twenty years in Alaska, termed this the roughest country he had ever seen.

The First Phase comprised the extending of the road through the mountains until it entered the Hukawng Valley of Northern Burma at Shingbijyang (mile 102). It was entirely construction. Combat was limited to minor patrol activity. During this phase, construction, supply, and evacuation were complicated by the fact that everything had to move over a single gravel road building through the mountains. By-passes were precluded. Mud, broken bridges, and landslides were chronic. The use of native porters, utilization of short cut trains for foot traffic, and air-dropping were purely supplementary.

Late in December 1943, Americans and Chinese were pouring into Shingbijyang over the break-through trail, an air strip was in operation, and a hospital unit was receiving Chinese casualties. The lead bulldozer had plunged down Xabkya Hill and reached the valley on the 27th of December. The first leg of the race to China had been covered.
C. Second Phase: "The Valley Campaign"

On December 31, two bulldozers started cutting a new road south of Shingbwiyang through the Hukawng Valley to the Tanai River (Upper Chindwin). Because this was definitely a combat zone, guards from both the Chinese and American armies were out in front and on both flanks of the engineers. At Taihpa Ga, a company of American engineers constructed an airfield while being subjected to Jap artillery and sniper fire. The men worked on armor-plated equipment, took to slit trenches during a barrage, then went back to work. A number of men were wounded, but the field was completed in record time.

By February 1944 the lead bulldozer had advanced to Mile 134.5. At the end of May, the lead bulldozer was at Mile 190.5 (Warasup) where progress was halted by enemy action. Air fields at Shingbwiyang, Tingkawk Sakan, and Warasup were completed or under construction when the rains started.

The end of May brought the monsoon in full strength. The rains, though later, were heavier than in 1943. In one two-day period at Tagap a rainfall of over 15 inches was recorded. At Shingbwiyang total rainfall for the season was over the 150-inch mark.

Slides, washouts, cave-ins, and waist-deep mud in many places were encountered. All new road construction was halted and once more the engineer troops turned to maintenance work to hold the road against encroachments of the monsoon. There were black days, one after another. Six major bridges were swept away by flash floods during one 24-hour period. But never was the road blocked more than 96 hours, and great convoys of trucks rolled over the road into Burma all during the five-month-long rainy season.

The Japanese had to be pushed back to make way for the road. Practically this required clearing the valley by a series of frontal pressures and flanking movements. There were several difficult river crossings. The Combat Command was comprised of two American-trained Chinese divisions. In later weeks Merrill's famous "Marauders" moved down the line. The Japs refused to withdraw and had to be pushed back by the sheer viciousness of repeated battles - Yupbang, Taihpa Ga, Maingkwan, Balaum, Shadusup.

Once in the flat lands, the road construction problems changed in character in three respects: (1) The old refugee trail ran across the valley through the principal villages. This was developed into a two-track combat road. Along it occurred the main action. It was the main supply line. (2) The Ledo Road followed a different route along higher ground in an arc to the east and rejoined the old trail at the lower end of the valley. This eliminated the necessity of this section carrying freight until it was ready for traffic. It also permitted the use of by-passes, and basic work proceeded at several points simultaneously. The dense jungle growth resembled that of the hills, but the construction problem changed from sidehill cutting to raising the roadbed over marshy areas. (3) Flat land facilitated the building of air fields at vital locations. These were extensively utilized for movement of supplies and personnel, and as bases for fighters and bombers so that our air superiority could be maintained.
In April and May, the Chinese were fighting their way down out of
the Hukawng and into the Mogaung Valleys, meeting increasingly stiff opposition.
At the same time, a combat team of Americans and Chinese crossed eastward into
the Irrawaddy Valley, and secretly moved toward the air field at Myitkyina.

The dry season was virtually over; the road was graveled to about
mile 151; a final fifteen mile link to the advance sub-depot at Tingkawk was
incomplete. Access by ground to the latter town was over the old Combat Road,
which joins the new road trace at this point, and which was becoming increasingly
difficult to navigate due to rain. Construction of a pipeline had kept pace
with the road and by now it was supplying fuel to Tingkawk. An improved
gavel road ran twenty miles south to Warasup (mile 185), where a new air strip
was under construction. Fighting on the Kamaing front was only a few miles
below, and the supply road was built right into the artillery emplacements.

D. Third Phase: "Myitkyina"

The Beginning of the monsoon could reasonably be supposed to preface
a general let-down in the intensity of the Allied advance; a period of quiet
waiting and relaxation could be expected. Academically, it was impossible to
supply the 50,000 troops so far forward of the railhead under such conditions.
So reasoned the Japanese.

But Uncle Joe Stilwell turned to Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick,
white-haired boss of Pick's Pike, whose problem also it was to keep the combat
troops supplied. Can continued operations in the valley be supported PLUS a
surprise attack in force on Myitkyina - during the monsoon? It was a bold
stroke and on General Pick's answer hinged the decision. He leaned Uncle Joe
two of his Combat Engineer Battalions to assist in the attack and committed
himself to support the operation.

The air field at Myitkyina was seized at the end of May. Surrounded
by Jap territory, the Americans and Chinese clung desperately to their position;
they depended entirely on air supply and air evacuation. June brought with it
everywhere rainfall well above the average. The fighting continued vicious and
without quarter, but by the third of August the town had fallen and the area
was "mopped up". The advance was months ahead of schedule.

Meantime another force of Chinese, British, and some Americans pushed
down the valley from Warasup through Kamaing and Mogaung to Sahaw. This push
was supported in part along a badly flooded road and by barge down the Mogaung
River, but mainly by air. Eventually this force established contact with the
Myitkyina troops, and the situation at the end of summer was well in hand.

Throughout the monsoon, the engineers were fighting to hold their own.
The finished road stood up. Supply depots and medical installations were
developed near the air fields at Shingbiyang, Tingkawk, Warasup, and
Myitkyina. In spite of all the hardships, in spite of the rains, the campaign
had been pushed and won.
E. Fourth Phase: "Road Junction"

With the coming of dry weather in October 1944, the ground forces again came into their own. The old road running through Kamaing and Yoeaung to Myitkyina was rehabilitated and was carrying convoys in November. The new road trace is being pushed forward with incredible speed. Myitkyina is a great forward base with airfields, warehouses, and hospitals. With this support, combat has pushed down toward Katha, evade, and beyond. Japanese forces have been almost completely routed.

With the capture of Yame on December 16, 1944 and of Wanting, in China, by the C.E.F. on January 3, 1945, the last two combat obstacles to completing the road were overcome. The Chinese First and Sixth Armies -- American trained - under Generals Sun and Liang had done their job well and now the road can be pushed through to completion. Trucks, which we have had to ferry over the Hump will, before January is out, be traveling over the Ledo-Burma Road clear to Kunming and, before Spring, we will be shipping in thousands of tons of needed material over the Road to China and our pipeline from Calcutta -- the longest in the world -- will be feeding the hungry tanks of the planes of the 14th Air Force. The completion of the Road and the Pipeline will mark an achievement that America can be proud of because the boys who built them and the girls -- the nurses who looked after them -- did their jobs under the most trying and difficult conditions anywhere in the world.

Very respectfully,

Mike Mansfield

P.S. Since writing this report Wanting has been recaptured by the Japanese but it will be recaptured by the Chinese at any time now. The reference made to it in the last paragraph will stand.
THE PIPELINE

Integral in the project to supply China is the Pipeline. It was designed as a continuous system starting with a tanker unloading terminal at Calcutta; following the Brahmaputra Valley through Bengal and Assam; across the Fakkei Range into northern Burma; on into China with the eastern terminus at Kunming in Yunnan Province. The line parallels the Ledo Road from Assam to its junction with the Burma Road, then it will follow the latter into Kunming.

As the line progressed, completed portions furnished gasoline and high speed diesel fuel to the fighting and construction forces driving south. Later it was a vital factor in supplying aviation gasoline to the numerous newly constructed airfields along its route.

The line was divided into two sections: one section was a 6" line from Calcutta to Tinsukia, in northern Assam, approximately 750 miles, where it emptied into a large storage terminal. The other section consisted of two 4" lines starting at Tinsukia and ending at Kunming, China, approximately 1000 miles.

In the early Fall of 1943 materials for the 4" lines began to arrive in the Ledo area, and in October General Pick gave the signal to begin construction. There were no trained pipeline personnel available, so Engineer General Service troops were pressed into service. Work started at Digboi, Assam, where motor gasoline and high speed diesel fuel could be obtained from the Assam Oil Company.

At first many difficulties were encountered and the untrained personnel made slow progress, but after a few weeks of practice these men were constructing pipeline like veterans and had completed 50 miles of the first 4" line before trained Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies arrived to relieve them. On the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor the pipeline had delivered its first gasoline to Ledo, and the storage tanks at Mile 0, official starting line of the Ledo Road, were filled. The first section of the Tinsukia-Kunming line was in operation, greatly easing the burden of moving motor gasoline by truck or rail.

Many difficulties confronted the crews as they progressed. Although the line paralleled the Ledo Road as closely as possible, many times the right-of-way had to deviate from the road due to the terrain. In some cases bulldozer traces had to be cut down and around a mountain side in order to get pump equipment and pipe on the proposed site. In one instance, a whole pump station was dismantled and portered piece by piece four miles through the jungle and then reassembled on location.

Numerous cable suspensions were constructed over the many chasms that had to be spanned. For one 20-mile section reaching up to Fangsau Pass, one-tenth of the line had to be supported by cables.
All this tended to slow down construction but by February 1944 the completed pipeline was supplying gasoline needs for the first 50 miles; by the end of March as far as Shingbwiyang (mile point 102).

Construction of the line moved on south towards Tingkawk Sakan. The monsoon season began with full force, and mud and water seriously hindered transportation of materials. Progress was slow and on some days only a few hundred feet of line were completed. However, by mid-summer high speed diesel, motor, and aviation gasoline were pouring through the line to Tingkawk.

Past Tingkawk the line was pushed on towards Warazup. Simultaneously work began at Warazup on a line to Myitkyina, and from there another crew began a "meeting" line. Part of this would remain in place as a section of the permanent installation; the remainder isolated by a shorter route would be removed and re-used elsewhere when its job here had been completed.

On the section south of Warazup the old native roads had become impassable. Water was 4 or 5 feet deep along some of the proposed right-of-way. Material was hauled by truck as far as the roads would permit or dragged through by tractors. Then pipe rafts and pontoons with outboard motors were called into play to float the pipe where needed. Many times men had to wade waist deep in water to get the pipe strung; they then had to work all day in the same water to get it coupled together. Progress was difficult but four days before the October first target date the line was completed to Myitkyina. The arrival of gasoline and diesel through the pipeline released many cargo planes for other critically needed supplies.

The maximum output of the two 4" lines is nearly equal to the carrying capacity of 400 cargo trucks. In a 24-hour period they will deliver approximately 8000 barrels of fuel or 336,000 U. S. gallons.

At the present time motor gasoline, high speed diesel, and aviation gasoline are being dispensed at all required points between Ledo and Myitkyina. One-third of the thousand-mile line was in operation by early December supplying the fuel for tanks, road graders, bulldozers, cargo trucks, jeeps, and cargo and combat planes.

Early in November an advance party for the China section of the line was flown over the Hump to Yunnanyi to set up a Headquarters, and three Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies followed soon afterwards. On December 1st, construction began in the China Theater. At the same time the line was moving south from Myitkyina, on towards China, keeping pace with the road. The Calcutta to Kunming pipeline will become a reality early in 1945.
Behind this feat, one of the epics of this war, lies an engineering achievement unsurpassed anywhere. While not an inch of the pipe-line built has been damaged by enemy fire, work on more than one occasion proceeded under Japanese assault.

The vital urgency of the job was felt by all ranks who worked day and night under protection of sentries, throughout the monsoon when floods exceeded the protection of gum boots, and with malaria causing havoc among personnel. The work progressed amidst wild animals and snakes, many of which were killed, while leeches, unwelcome but tenacious companions, not to mention other "crawlers" of the jungle, were a pest. The Tenth USAAF rendered valuable aid, dropping rations, medical necessities and mail to inaccessible parties.

Three quarters of a million section pipes, each of 20 feet length, were brought from America. American labor employed received special training for three months in the States. This labor was supplemented in the first stage by over 7,000 coolies, supplied from tea garden labor and latterly by the Indian Pioneer Corps, 2,000 of whom were employed at one stage.

It is impossible to describe the day-to-day difficulties which had to be contended with, mainly in the matter of transport, in building the line. The pipe has been laid at an altitude of over 4,000 feet and will cross ranges of 8,500 feet in China. It has been suspended over rivers and laid under rivers. At some stages of the construction obstacles appeared insuperable but were overcome, one by one. Every problem faced sharpened resources of solution.

When the full story is told and the stage-to-stage time table given, this construction will rank as one of the speediest engineering tasks known. Some idea can be obtained from the fact that it took from March to August 1944 to build the line to Assam. The line has fed successful operations in North Burma. Today it is serving oil requirements in Assam and Burma, filling thirsty planes, trucks, bulldozers and jeeps, not to mention thousands of cigarette lighters of GI's.

The engineers feel that the worst part of their job is yet to come when the line will have to be taken over high mountains in China. But these sturdy, determined men of skill, who have overcome heart-breaking setbacks and vile weather, will see it through and enable precious fuel to be pumped to China in the common cause - to lick the Japanese as quickly and completely as possible.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 4, 1945

Subject: Communist-Kuomintang Relations

Attached is a summary of a telegram from Ambassador Hurley.

The Ambassador points out that Chiang and the Communists have similar objectives -- popular government and military unity. But Chiang's promises of popular government are distrusted and his conception of unity is summed up in his statement to the Vice President: I want to cooperate with the Communists but they must obey my orders.

The Ambassador states that "the Kuomintang still hopes to keep China under one-party rule". The Communists want a coalition government. Their optimum is 1/3 Communist, 1/3 Kuomintang, and 1/3 minority party representation. Chiang is willing to concede representation which does not endanger Kuomintang control. The gap between Chiang and the Communists is wide and fundamental. It is hoped that the Ambassador can persuade Chiang and the Communists to bridge it. If they do not, civil war, as he points out, will come sooner or later.

Chiang is in a dilemma. A coalition would mean the end of conservative Kuomintang dominance and open the way for the more virile and popular Communists to extend their influence to the point perhaps of controlling...
the government. Failure to settle with the Communists, who are daily growing stronger, would invite danger of an eventual overthrow of the Kuomintang. Chiang could, it is felt, rise above party selfishness and anti-Communist prejudice to head a coalition government which might bring new life into the war effort and assure unity after hostilities.

If a settlement is not reached, the alternative might be an American military command of all Chinese forces. It is understood that both Chiang and the Communists would agree to this. Such a command would make possible limited supply of ammunition and demolition material to the Communists which all observers agree could be effectively used. It would obviate political difficulties in the event of coastal landings adjacent to areas under Communist control. If Russia comes into the war in the Far East, it would be highly advantageous to have in China an over all American command, rather than a disunited Chinese command. And finally, an American command could serve as a stabilizing political influence in the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.

Attachment:

Summary of a telegram from Ambassador Hurley.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 7 1972
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN AMBASSADOR HURLEY'S TELEGRAM OF DECEMBER 24

The Ambassador states that, according to his understanding, our policy in China is (1) to prevent the collapse of the national government; (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek; (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander; (4) to promote production of war supplies and prevent economic collapse and (5) to unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.

The Ambassador reports (1) that military reorganization by General Wedemeyer, with the cooperation of the Generalissimo, has had a "splendid effect on the morale of the armed forces"; (2) that Chiang "has gone quite a distance for a first step" in reorganizing his Cabinet and "will go further"; and (3) that Chinese and American military and civilian officials "are cooperating and the results of the united effort are beginning to show in the military situation".

With regard to Kuomintang-Communist relations the Ambassador states (1) that Chiang "is now convinced" that the Russian Government does not recognize or support the Chinese Communists and does not want dissension in China; (2) that T. V. Soong is going to Moscow in February or March to confer with Marshal Stalin as Chiang's personal representative; (3) that the Communists submitted through him (Hurley) a plan for a coalition government and the unification of military forces; (4) that the National Government "then had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists" but "they neglected or did not choose to do so at that time"; (5) that the Government submitted a counter proposal which the Communists rejected; and (6) that Chiang has appointed a new committee which is now working out a plan which he (Chiang) believes will be feasible but which will not provide for a "coalition".

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date, FEB 7 1972
The Ambassador observes that the diplomats of "imperialistic nations" (British, Dutch, French and British dominions) believe that "their interests in Asia will be more definitely safeguarded if China is divided against herself". There are American officials in China, he continues, who feel that the Chinese Government is doomed to collapse and that therefore the American Government should be prepared to deal with the Chinese Communists. In conclusion, he indicates that he is not in sympathy with this point of view.
January 8, 1945

Dear Mr. President:

It occurs to me that my report of December 20 to you on my work in China this autumn contains information which might be useful both to the Armed Services and to the Department of State. I believe it would be worth while to send copies of the report to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Hurley, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur and General Wedemeyer. If you approve, I shall be glad to see that this is done.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Nelson

The President
The White House
January 13, 1945

To: Mr. Latta
From: Mrs. Klotz

The attached papers are being returned for the President's files.
I have carefully studied your recent message transmitted through Ambassador Gauss, and I fully recognize the extent to which China's resolute war stand has rendered her economic situation acute. I am fully mindful of the importance of taking every practical cooperative step to make possible the most active prosecution of the war as well as to make possible an orderly development of industry and trade after the war.

I think it important that you should understand our special problems over here. I cannot escape the feeling that because of the distance between us there may be danger that we may fail adequately to work out our common problems and may rush into decisions which would not be in the interests of either of our people.

I think that your suggestion transmitted to me by Madame Chiang that Dr. Kung be sent to Washington is a good one. If he were here the various financial and economic problems involved in the situation could be fully discussed to the mutual advantage of both countries.

Meanwhile I should like to make this specific suggestion: Just before receiving your message I had approved instructions to General Stilwell and to Ambassador Gauss to take up urgently with your Government the question of our military expenditures in China. I should like to suggest that an arrangement such as General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss are authorized to propose be adopted tentatively on the understanding that our army expenditures in China during the next few months can be expected to be somewhere in the neighborhood of $25,000,000 each month.

Furthermore, since you say that your Government is not in a position to continue any direct maintenance of American troops in China, this Government, in order to cover all of its military expenditures in China, including such maintenance as well as construction, is prepared to place to your account the U.S. dollar equivalent of any Chinese funds made available under general arrangements that will be suggested by General Stilwell and the Ambassador.
Chungking, April 19, 1944.

**TOTAL U.S. CURRENCY BOUGHT FROM U.S. ARMY, KUNMING, KWEILIN AND CHUNGKING AT THE OFFICIAL RATE US$5.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1943</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1943</td>
<td>5,062,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1943</td>
<td>5,986,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1943</td>
<td>13,922,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1943</td>
<td>18,618,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1943</td>
<td>23,253,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1943</td>
<td>22,695,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1944</td>
<td>19,572,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1944</td>
<td>9,982,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**US$128,340,000**

P.S. Since February 10th no more sales of U.S. Currency from the U.S. Army to the Central Bank, and after that date all Chinese National Currency needed by the U.S. Army were advanced by the Central Bank of China.
ADVANCES BEFORE JUNE 30, 1944
(unit 1,000,000)

1) Direct to Finance Department U.S.
   Army 3,900
2) All construction cost excluding
   Chengtu airfields 5,264

   9,164
3) Chengtu airfields 6,303
4) Road and Railway-siding
   construction 123

   Total up to June 30, 1944 15,587

Advances from July 1 to Sept. 30, 1944.
1) Direct to Finance Dept. U.S. Army 5,200
2) All construction cost excluding
   Chengtu airfields 2,862

   8,062
3) Chengtu airfields 445

   Total from July 1 to September 30 8,507

Advances from October 1 to Date
1) Direct advances to Finance Dept.
   U.S. Army 4,000
2) All construction cost 86

   Total from October 1 to Date 4,086

Grand total of all advances up to date
for which payment is claimed. 28,180 million
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached was written by Isaac A. Isaac, Newsweek Correspondent in Chungking, on December 22.

I don't imagine, however, it could have passed the Army censors to get to Newsweek. The analysis is on the acid side and overdrawn, but I think you will find it quite diverting in spots.

[Signature]

Lauchlin Currie
For background: Not for publication as such.

December 22, 1944.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA SINCE STILWELL'S RECALL

1. Surface Relations. Stilwell departed and the US press flared in a pyrotechnic display on the Chinese question. A few hard truths got into print. They were promptly buried in recriminations, smothered in half-truths, and editorial pap. The fireworks gave out and the show ended in a smoky fog of confusion. Behind this screen both Chungking and Washington tried swiftly to dispel the gloom and to end the untoward public display of hostility and disagreement. Both had good reasons to retreat from the stand taken on Stilwell. He in his uncomplicated way had exposed the condition of checkmate. So Washington moved Wedemeyer and Hurley into position. Chungking politely advanced Chen Cheng and TV Soong. The public air was soon made to trill faintly with notes of sweetness and light. Before long the public prints cossed with mutual goodwill. Compliments were tossed like shuttlecocks from starred and braided shoulder to starred and braided shoulder. The weak condition of the patient was of course acknowledged, but Dr. Pangless resumed charge of the case, with Dr. Coue in consultation. Latest bulletin: patient still low but doing as well as can be expected considering the nature of the illness.

("The generalissimo and I have not only become friends", said Gen. Hurley at a press conference this week, "but I may say we have achieved a degree of comradery. The recent government changes are largely responsible for the fact that the Chinese Government, the US command, and this Embassy are now working as one team....").

(Chiang to Hurley via TV Soong: (In effect) "Splendid! Splendid!"

(US HQ spokesman: "I admire him (Chen Cheng) as a friend and as a military man..." NE: spokesman, Maj. Gen. R. E. McClure, has just arrived to serve as Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff.)

Back of the compliments is a degree of substantial improvement in the machinery of military cooperation at the top level. The improvement has a largely technical and personal character. Gen. Wedemeyer enjoys frequent and direct contact with Chiang Kai-shek. There is even a telephone in his office that runs right into the generalissimo's bedroom. There are regular joint meetings of the American and Chinese top staffs. In the American military establishment there is a great process of weeding out and reorganization in progress. In the Chinese top establishment there is a great deal of talk about weeding out and reorganizing. How much the tumult signifieth may be suspected now, can be confirmed only later.

2. The Political Situation. Reorganization of the government in the interests of greater "unity" and efficiency was one of the points in the affaire Stilwell. After Stilwell left, Chiang duly re-shuffled his principal viziers. Ho Ying-ching, War Minister and Chief of Staff, and H. H. Kung, Finance Minister and Boss of the Bureaucracy, were the chief betes noires. So Ho was relieved of the War Ministry and was replaced by
Chen Cheng, and other Kuomintang militarists with a better reputation among the American military. Ho, however, remained Chief of Staff, and was promptly named Commander-in-chief of Chinese armies in the Southwest. H. H. Kung was advised to continue his long course of recuperation in the US and was replaced as Finance Minister by O. K. Yui, a faithful acolyte in the Kung hierarchy. Kung also "asked" on grounds of ill-health to be relieved of all his other posts. Action taken on his request is not clear but in any case T. V. Soong, long in impotent eclipse as Foreign Minister, was named Acting President of the Executive Yuan (Chiang himself is president) -- a position roughly equivalent to that of premier or Grand Vizier. Chen Li-fu, for years one of Chiang's trusted hatchetmen specializing in "youth control" was removed from the front bench he has long occupied as Minister of Education and sent to a back bench from where he can continue to function with less undesirable publicity. His successor is Chu Chia-hue, a Kuomintang politician with a German background.

These changes changed nothing but a few personalities in the front row. They represented, eloquently, Chiang's ability to "adapt" himself to accumulated political pressures -- the pressures of the economic and bureaucratic stagnation in which Kung had such a big hand, the screaming abuses in the army for which Ho Ying-ching was only in part responsible, and the intellectual paralysis which his man Chen Li-fu systematically fostered through the rigid suppression of any tendencies to political thought among students other than the prescribed Kuomintang liturgy.

Of the "new" personalities (all have been part of the Kuomintang old guard for 20 years and more) only T. V. Soong is relatively important. His usefulness to Chiang at this juncture consists in his claim to the posture of a "modern" politician; his familiarity and even intimacy with the more important political and banking circles in New York, London, and Washington; his reputation as a man with whom the British and Americans know how to "deal" and vice versa -- i.e., he has had more schooling in the West than most of his tribe as student, banker, and diplomat - and finally in the fact that he was the loser when Kung was the winner in the constant intra-dynastic struggle for power behind and around the throne. Soong is an ambitious, power-hungry, unprincipled politician. His propensity for playing his hand a little too independently in the often bitter struggle for power within the Kuomintang caliphate is what has kept him out of the front rank for long periods of his career. The present tangled situation offers him a fresh opportunity. He represents no policy. He represents T. V. Soong.

On the military side, the advent of Chen Cheng can have only the most limited effect on the situation. He takes his orders from Chiang, just as Ho Ying-ching did. The starvation, the abuses, the generally diseased condition of the Chinese army was not a product of the Ho Ying-ching regime but of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In any case Ho's power has been not impaired but slightly shifted. Even if Chen deserved the good opinion held of him -- and that may be doubtful -- he is well-hemmed in.

These are the changes which the new US ambassador, Gen. Hurley, has publicly stated are responsible for guaranteed teamwork between the
American diplomatic and military establishment and the Chungking regime. The changes originally discussed were of course a little broader. They had to do with the possible entry of Communists and other non-Kuomintang elements into a coalition government.

The Kuomintang-Communist negotiations are still the main axis of present-day Chinese politics. These negotiations are at the present moment in a condition of total stalemate.

Early in November Hurley went up to Yenan and there he apparently worked out with the Communists a statement which was supposed to constitute the basis of their demands: a high-flown bit of prose about the Bill of Rights, the Atlantic Charter, with a touch of the Emancipation Proclamation. He brought Chow En-lai back to Chungking with him and brought Chow face to face once more with Chiang Kai-shek in which was meant to be a high dramatic gesture. In the Hurley dream, Chow and Chiang were supposed to fall promptly on each other's necks and, with tears of joy, seal an agreement— to go down in history doubtless as the Hurley Charter. But Chow and Chiang are a couple of hard-boiled politicians playing a game for power and neither one was inclined to swoon with emotion in the setting provided by Hurley. It was instead another hard session of bargaining. The Communist demands boiled down to full and powerful representation in a coalition government and a combined army command. Chiang's counter-offer boiled down to token representation for the Communists in both the government and the military command. Chow went back to Yenan. The Hurley dream fell flat on its face. That was several weeks ago. The negotiations are still in the same prone condition.

Taking over the embassy, Hurley embarked on a hearts-and-flowers campaign on the theme: "Let's all be friends and comrades together." I suspect he is trying to apply what he has been told about Chinese "face"— that the appearance of things is of prime importance in China. But it is to be wondered whether he realizes that Chinese politicians, ever vigilant as to "face", seldom lose sight of the realities underneath. Hurley has fallen among men whose brand of politics is a little too finely spun to compare with the Oklahoma frontier push-and-pull. They have gradually acquired the ability not to blink at all whenever Hurley lets go with his Choctaw warwhoop. It hasn't, so far, stampeded them into an agreement with the Communists.

3. The Command Situation. When Chen Cheng was made war minister, Ho Ying-ching remained chief of staff. When the Japanese started moving into Kweichow, Ho was made commander-in-chief of all Chinese armies south of the Yellow River. Thus actual control of the armies in the field remained in the hands of the man who was regarded as the obstructionist-in-chief of smooth Sino-American military collaboration. When Ho pleaded time needed to form a staff, Wedemeyer promptly offered — and organized—
a full American staff for him, headed by Brig. Gen. Lindsay. Ho's appointment was never formally announced and to this day his precise position is left somewhat foggy. The fact is he went straight to Kweiyang. Whereupon Gen. Lindsey and staff came dashing up from Kunming in a fleet of jeeps and weapons-carriers, like a band of Lochinvars. Ho indicated polite surprise. He wondered what they were doing in Kweiyang. He had simply come there, after all, on a visit of inspection in his capacity of Chief of Staff. Or such, at any rate, was the intimation. Lindsay's Lochinvars milled around Kweiyang for two weeks. Lindsay himself and part of his little band finally drifted back to Kunming. Ho evidently had no intention of organizing any military defense of the province. He found other means of meeting the crisis which proved more effective, and these did not exactly require the services of an American staff. Such, at any rate, was the way things appeared.

Meanwhile Wedemeyer had also set up what was called the China Training and Combat Command. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn was called up from the Salween to head it. The job amounts in effect to command of all American Army ground forces in China. With troops being brought into Yunnan from various places, Dorn's command proceeded to pull together and send out liaison teams in a dozen different directions. During the critical — or seemingly critical — last days of November, Dorn's headquarters had something of the atmosphere of a place where a Custer's Last Stand was being improvised. There didn't seem to be much hope for Kweiyang at that point but there was no doubt at all in the vicinity of Gen. Dorn that Kunming could be successfully defended if the Chinese High Command was ready and willing to use its troops for the purpose. But there was — and still is — no certainty at all concerning the Chinese High Command's intentions.

4. The Military Situation. The military situation right now is a political situation. On the surface there seem to be many plainly military reasons for the Japanese withdrawal from Kweichow. Extended lines. Lack of winter clothing and equipment. Accomplishment of limited objectives (destruction of a huge stockpile of Chinese supplies at Tushan, estimated at 50,000 tons by the US demolitioners who blew it up), possible — altho still unconfirmed — seizure of rails and rolling stock.

But the inside air seems to be thick with smoking rumors and circumstantial bits of more or less definite information all of which, taken together, give a decided political tinge to the Kweichow business.

Item: On Dec. 4 at the regular Monday memorial meeting of the top Kuomintang circle, Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have told his associates that trying to deal with the Hunan-Kwangsi Japanese push by "military means" was a mistake, that the Kweichow situation would be handled by "political means" and that he expected to have good news for them in less than ten days' time.
Item: That week-end Ho Ying-ching went to Kweiyang. In his entourage were Wu Kai-hsen, a notorious collaborationist, long a go-between for Chungking and the Nanking puppets, and Ku Chen-chang, minister of social affairs, one of the more sinister characters in the government.

Item: Commander of Japanese troops in Central China is Gen. Okamura, who participated in the negotiations leading to signature of the notorious Ho-Umetsu agreement of 1934... the "Ho" being Ho-Ying-ching, present Chinese Chief of Staff, and the Umetsu being Gen. Umetsu, present Japanese chief of staff.

Item: The Japanese spearheads reached Pachai, east of Tuyun, 112 miles east of Kweiyang, on about Dec. 3. The fallback began apparently on Dec. 5 or 6. It began simultaneously from the railroad zone in Kweichow and from the Poshe trail, far to the south. It continued for more than ten days, with the Japanese retreating from the vicinity of Tuyun to Hohhih on the railroad, and from the direction of Poshe all the way back to the Yuning area in Kwangsi. There was virtually no contact between the retreating Japanese forces and pursuing Chinese. When the Japanese stopped retreating at Hohhih this week, the Chinese stopped pursuing.

Item: Gen. Fang Cheng-huei and his whole staff, "captured" at the fall of Hengyang, all miraculously "escaped" and turned up in Chungking, where they are being built up as heroes.

Item: Fear for the safety of Chungking suddenly evaporated. High Chinese officials are reported to have expressed certainty that Chungking was "safe" and that the Japanese withdrawal is "permanent". Confidence was expressed that the Japanese would not want to crush the Chungking government and risk the certain rise of a more recalcitrant Communist-dominated coalition regime in its place.

Thus query: If there has been "political" contact and there was a "deal" which resulted in evacuation of Kweichow - then what did the "deal" involve as to Kunming?

Query: Have the Japanese agreed not to attack Kunming in return for Kuomintang assurances that American military efforts will be neutralized by non-cooperation and obstruction?

Query: Or did the Kuomintang throw Kunming into the kitty, thereby relieving itself of the necessity to meet constant American pressure for military activity?

A deal along such lines would not be at all abnormal in the Kuomintang manner of conducting its war. It would be consistent with the basic pattern of Chungking's war policy: to hold on with minimum expenditure of effort until US forces accomplish the defeat of Japan.
On the Japanese side, there may be hopes still of striking a basic bargain with the Kuomintang for the future. There is also the theory that the Japanese desire to keep lines intact to the Chungking regime as a channel for political negotiations with the US at some later date. At the very least, it is calculated that the Japanese prefer preserving the Chungking to overthrowing it and opening the road to a new Chinese regime with which they could not so readily maneuver.

However, I personally cannot pin this thing down as an absolute matter of fact. I report only the straws, the smoke, the circumstantial evidence.

Meanwhile there remains the question of the defense of Kunming in the event the Japanese do move in that direction. Troops - some excellent, some worthless - have been moved into the prospective Yunnan-Kweichow war zone. Considering the defensive possibilities of the terrain, American military opinion is that Kunming can be defended if the will to do it is present in the Kuomintang top command. If Kunming has been sold out, execution of the deal will have to be blatant indeed.

5. The Supply Situation. To boss supply in the China theater, Wedemeyer was given the services of Maj. Gen. Gilbert X ("Buck") Cheeves, formerly commanding the base section of SCS in Calcutta. Cheeves had been waiting for months to come up to China as part of the general reorganization contemplated by Stilwell on the basis of increased US control. The Stilwell plan, of course, fell through with a loud crash, but Cheeves came up anyway to join the new theater command.

Buck Cheeves is the hard-boiled, shrewd, driving, don't-ever-tell-me-why-you-can't-do-it type. In Calcutta by a combination of roughshod tactics, bluff, hard talk, and competent organization, Cheeves made a notable record in the movement of supplies. A small, proud, bouncing, vain, energetic officer, Cheeves believes in rigid discipline and maximum comfort for himself and the men in his command. He is something of a benevolent martinet. In his job, he believes obstacles are talked up too much. He thinks the first step toward licking them is to talk them down. If some of his engineers come in and tell him the best they can plan to do is move, say, 50,000 tons in a certain operation, Cheeves will look up at them with a cold, quizzical smile and say: "The idea is to move 100,000. Go and do it." He has worked out a system for maintenance and inspection of vehicles in his command and his own records show it to have been 95 percent effective in Calcutta. If you ever come into a place where all parked vehicles sit with their hoods lifted, then you have come into the Cheeves' domain. The theory is that an engine left open to constant casual inspection will be kept in tiptop shape by the man responsible for it. It looks funny but it works.

Cheeves now has the job of commanding general, Services of Supply, China Theater. Thru him supplies will be requisitioned, brought over
the hump or—eventually—over the road, and distributed to Chinese forces in the field. I believe Cheeves conceives it to be his job to see to the movement of war supplies from the time they come in to the time they reach the individual Chinese soldier in the field. That means that to one degree or another Cheeves will be wanting to have a hand in the accumulation, warehousing, and transportation of all military supplies in China. (Delivery to China terminals, incidentally, will be the responsibility of the IB Theater). This Cheeves would have to accomplish without formal control but thru "cooperation" with the Chinese service of supply and too command. The idea of American control of Chinese supply went out with Stilwell. The suggestion you get, largely by inference, is that more or less de facto American control will be established. Cheeves is now in the early phase of building his organization. Actual accomplishment will have to be measured on the record from here on out. Certainly there will be increased Kuomintang "cooperation" in direct ratio to the increase in the flow of supplies passing into Chungking government hands.

Meanwhile details of the system of control and supervision of the prospective Burma Road traffic are still up in the air. I am told by authoritative US spokesmen that the matter has been under discussion and is not yet settled. T. V. Soong, on the other hand, in answer to a question I put at a press conference here this week, said it was his "impression" that "there is a decision in the matter." I am sure there is a decision in the minds of the Kuomintang tops: to acquire all the war supplies they can and to use as little as they can against the Japanese.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO
CHINA

(Translation)

February 17, 1945

Dear President Roosevelt:

I count it as my great good fortune to have
General Hurley here, first as your personal representative,
and later as your ambassador to China. General Hurley has
not only helped to strengthen the friendship between our two
nations, but has literally achieved wonders in the improvement
of the situation in the entire Far Eastern Theater. Ever
since his arrival, I have kept the closest contact with him
and have profited by his wide experience and insight. The
breadth of his political views and his sound judgement together
with his indefatigable spirit have contributed immensely
towards the realization of our common aims. I could have
wished for no better choice as your representative to me.

On the occasion of his going home, I have
asked him to report to you in detail on the latest political
development in China, the general policy pursued by the
National Government and also my own opinion on the outstanding
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO
CHINA

problems. I hope you will derive satisfaction from his report and let me know your own views.

The achievement of the Crimean Conference is a lasting tribute to your great and inspiring leadership. I hope you may be disposed to acquaint me with any decisions which may have been taken regarding the Far East. I also hope that General Hurley will soon return to China to continue the important mission you have assigned him.

Yours Sincerely,

Chiang Kai-shek
Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
324, February 28, 1 p.m.

The situation in China appears to be developing in some ways that are not conducive to effective prosecution of the war, nor to China's future peace and unity.

One. The recent American attempt through diplomatic and persuasive means to assist compromise between the factions in China was a necessary first step in the handling of the problem. Unity was correctly taken to be the essence not only of the most effective conduct of the war by China but also of the peaceful and speedy emergence of a strong, united and democratic China.

But the cessation of Japanese offensives, the opening of the road from China, the rapid development of our army plans for rebuilding Chiang's armies, the increase of other assistance such as the WPB, the
expectation that the central government will share in the making of important decisions at San Francisco, and belief that we are intent upon the definite support and strengthening of the central government alone and as the only possible channel for aid to other groups-those circumstances have combined to increase greatly Chiang's feeling of strength and have resulted in unrealistic optimism on his part and lack of willingness to make any compromise. (See our 301, February 26, 4 p.m.).

This attitude is reflected in, among other things, empty hopes of a settlement with Russia without settlement of the Communist problems, when nothing was finally offered but an advisory inter-party committee without any power or place in the government, and in recent military-political appointments which place strong anti-Communists in the strategic war areas and name reactionaries such as Admiral Chan Chak (Tai Li subordinate) to be mayor of Canton and General Ho Kuo Kuang (former Commander in Chief of Gendarmerie) as chairman of Formosa.

Two. The communists for their part have come to the conclusion that we are definitely committed to the support of Chiang alone, and that we will not force Chiang's hand in order to be able to aid or cooperate
cooperate with them. In what they consider self-protection, they are therefore following the line of action (forecast in statements of Communist leaders last summer if they continued to be excluded from consideration) of actively increasing their forces and aggressively expanding their areas southward, regardless of nominal Kuomintang control, reach southeast China. The Department is referred to our 284, February 24, 9 a.m. reporting large movements and conflicts with central government forces already taking place. In grasping time by the forelock, the Communists intend to take advantage of the isolation of east China by the Japanese capture of the Canton-Hankow Railway to make themselves as nearly invincible as possible before Chiang's new armies now in process of formation in Yunnan are ready and to present us the dilemma of accepting or refusing their aid if our forces land anywhere on the China coast. Communists close to the leaders are now talking of the necessity of their seeking Soviet assistance. The party itself is broadcasting demands for Communist and other non-Kuomintang representation at San Francisco, and is actively considering creation of a unified council of their various independent guerrilla governments.
Three.

The conclusion seems clear that, although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group but the central government have been diplomatically correct, if this situation continues and our analysis of it is correct, chaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated. Even for the present it is obvious that this situation, in which we are precluded from cooperation with the large, aggressive and strategically situated armies and organized population of the Communist areas, as well as the forces such as the Hi Chi-Shon Tsai (repeat Tsai) Ting-Kai group in the southeast, is unsatisfactory and hampering from a purely military standpoint. As indicated above, the situation is also dangerous to American interests from a long-range point of view.

Unless checked, this situation is apt to develop with increasing acceleration as the tempo of the war in China and the whole Far East is raised and the inevitable resolution of China's internal conflict becomes more urgent. The time is short and it will be dangerous to allow affairs to drift.

Four. If the high military authorities of our government agree that
agree that some cooperation with the Communists and other groups who have proved themselves willing and are in position to fight the Japanese is or will be necessary or desirable, we believe that the immediate and paramount consideration of military necessity should be made the basis for a further step in American policy. The presence of General Wedemeyer in Washington as well as General Hurley should be a favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter.

Predicated on the assumption that the military necessity exists, the first step we propose for consideration is that the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan (this would not under present conditions include forces such as the Szechuan warlords who are not in actual position to attack the enemy) and that we are taking direct steps to accomplish this end. We can assure the Generalissimo that we are not contemplating reducing our aid to the central government (any aid we give the Communists or other groups must because of transport difficulties be at first on a small scale and will probably be less than the natural increase in the flow of supplies into China). We may include
include in the statement that we will keep the central government informed of the extent and types of such aid. We can also tell the Generalissimo that we will be able to use the lever of our supplies and cooperation to limit independent and aggressive action on their part, restricting them to their present areas. And we can point out the advantages of having the Communists helped by us rather than seeking Russian aid or intervention, direct or indirect.

At the time of making this statement to the Generalissimo, he might also be told, if it is considered advisable, that although our effort to persuade the various groups of the desirability of unification has failed and we can no longer delay measures for the most effective prosecution of the war, we consider it obviously desirable that our military assistance to all groups be based on unity and the coordination of military command; that we are prepared to continue to lend our good offices to this end, where feasible and when asked for; and that while we believe that the proposal should come from the Generalissimo, we would be disposed to support: (One) The formation of something in the nature of a supreme war council or war cabinet in which Communists and other groups would have effective representation.
representation and some share in responsibility for the formulation and execution of joint war plans, and (two) the nominal incorporation of communist and other selected forces into the central government armies under the operational command of American officers designated by the Generalissimo on the advice of General Wedemeyer, on agreement by all parties that these troops would operate only within their present areas or specified extended areas. It should be made clear, however, that our decision to cooperate with any forces able to assist the war will not be delayed by or contingent on the completion of such internal Chinese arrangements.

Such a modus operandi, we believe, would bridge the present deadlock in China and serve as a preliminary move toward full solution of the problem of ultimate complete unity. As one result of the recent negotiations the principle and over-riding issues have become clear. The Generalissimo and his government will not at this time on their own initiative take any forward step which will mean loss of face, prestige or personal power. The Communists will not, without guarantees in which they have confidence, take any forward step which will involve dispersion and eventual elimination of their forces upon which their present strength and future political existence
existence depend. The step we propose taking will exert
on both parties the force necessary to break this dead-
lock, and the modus operandi embodied in those two pro-
posals should initiate concrete military and, as an
inevitable result, political cooperation and accordingly
provide a foundation for increasing future development
toward unity.

These proposals would not exclude the political con-
sultation committee plan which, if adopted, could function
alongside the war council and the government. In fact,
it should be expected that the committee would be
greatly strengthened.

The statements to Chiang should, of course, be made
privately. But the possibility of the logical and much
more drastic step, in the event of his refusal to accept
it, of a public statement of policy such as that by
Churchill in regard to Yugoslavia would be clearly
understood.

Even though not made public, however, the fact
of our assistance to the Communists and other forces
would soon become generally known throughout China.
This, we believe, would have profound and desirable
political effects in China. There is tremendous internal
pressure in China for unity based on a reasonable
compromise.
compromise with the Communists and a chance for the presently repressed liberal groups to express themselves. However, these liberal groups, even within the Kuomintang such as the Sun Fo group, and the minor parties were ignored in the recent negotiations by the KMT but not by the Communists (with whom they present what amounts to a united front) and they are disillusioned and discouraged by what they feel is American commitment to the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. By the steps we propose we would prove that we are not so committed, we would greatly raise the morale and prestige of those liberal groups, and we would exert the strongest possible influence through these internal forces to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the concessions necessary to unity.

There is no question that such a policy would be greatly welcomed by the vast majority of the Chinese people (although not by the very small reactionary minority in control of the Kuomintang) and that it would raise American prestige. Sun Fo himself has stated to a responsible American: "If the Generalissimo were told, not asked, about American aid to the Communists and guerrillas, this would do more than anything else
-10--324, February 28, 1 p.m., from Chungking via Navy.

to make the Generalissimo come to terms with them". The majority of Chinese believe that the settlement of China's internal problem is not so much a matter of mutual concessions as reform of the Kuomintang itself. They also declare, with justification, that American "non-intervention" in China cannot help but be in fact intervention in favor of the present conservative leadership.

Also by such policy, which we consider realistically accepts the facts in China, we could expect to secure the cooperation of all of China's forces in the war, to hold the Communists to our side rather than throw them into the arms of Russia (which is otherwise inevitable if Russia enters the war against Japan), to convince the KMT of the undesirability of its apparent present plans for eventual civil war, and to bring about some unification which, even though not immediately complete, would provide the basis for peaceful future development toward full democracy.

Five, This telegram has been drafted with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this Embassy and has been shown to General Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, General Gross.

ATCHESON

WTD
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT:

TO TAKE UP WITH GENERAL WEDEMEYER
AND GENERAL HURLEY WHEN THEY ARRIVE.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 28, 1945

Subject: Presentation to the Chinese Government of a Draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

The Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China, signed January 11, 1943, provides that the United States and China will enter into negotiations for a comprehensive treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation.

In order to supply a basis for these negotiations the Department of State has prepared a draft treaty which proposes rights and privileges for the nationals, vessels and commerce of each party in the jurisdiction of the other, and is designed to provide a basic legal framework for mutually advantageous relations between the two countries over a long period of time. In preparing it the Department has had the benefit of suggestions from representative organizations in the United States which are active in the promotion of cultural and commercial interchange with China. Particular articles have been discussed informally with other federal agencies whose work is directly related to the subject matter.

The Department plans to instruct the Embassy at Chungking to present the draft treaty to the Chinese Government at an early date, as a basis for preliminary discussions.

Acting Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the attached copies of letters I have received from Sultan and Wedemeyer.

Chief of Staff.
General of the Army George W. Marshall  
War Department  
Washington, D.C.  

Dear General Marshall:

The sole purpose of this letter is to give you information that may be of general interest to you. I should like to have the opportunity of discussing matters with you personally but as that is not possible I am using this letter as a substitute.

The War Department has been prompt and clear in its instructions to me and in the formulation of policies on important matters affecting the India-Burma Theater. I believe I understand clearly what is expected of me.

The air route to China is secure. Japanese interference in the air is negligible. On the ground we have defeated him and are now driving him from North Burma. Four excellent air fields have already been built at Myitkyina and are available for the staging of Air Transport Command planes.

The land route to China has been opened and convoys are using it. Much work, however, remains to be done if it is to be a reasonably satisfactory and adequate two-lane highway all the way through. The Road is an adequate, all weather, two-lane highway as far as Myitkyina. From Myitkyina to the junction with the Old Burma Road at Mongyu it is one-way for long convoys at the present time. It is being surfaced with gravel throughout and will therefore be a good all weather one-way route by the time the monsoons begin. For several months to come, I visualize its use primarily for carrying vehicles, artillery, and non-flyable equipment which will go to China and remain there. All vehicles will, of course, carry pay loads.

Wedemeyer called for the 14th and 22nd Chinese Divisions and the entire move was completed by the end of December 1944. The loss of these two divisions delayed our tactical operations in North Burma. The 22nd Division was the farthest advanced of any of my units and some time had to be consumed in regrouping the forces before going ahead with operations. We have been successful in these operations and this success should continue. Present indications are that we will capture Lashio, our objective in Phase 2 of the CAPITAL operation, before the monsoon. When the CAPITAL operations
were planned it was considered that the securing of Lashio was necessary to render the air and land routes to China absolutely secure from enemy interference. The Jap has been so thoroughly defeated in North Burma that he has now been rendered incapable of any real offensive. There is every indication that he will withdraw when forced to do so. He made a determined effort to prevent the opening of the road to China and we secured the area only after strenuous fighting. He is giving ground more easily now. We still need Lashio, however, and must capture it as soon as possible in order to make the land route safe and also to permit the supply of our troops in forward areas during the coming monsoon. The Lashio Area has a good road net, is strategically important and has an all-weather airfield which we will need.

The Chinese Army in India originally consisted of the New First Army, composed of the 30th and 38th Divisions, and the New Sixth Army, composed of the 14th, 22nd, and 50th Divisions. The 22nd, 30th, and 38th Divisions were trained at Ramgarh. The 22nd and 38th Divisions had extensive combat experience under Stilwell in the advance to Myitkyina. The 30th had very little combat experience until the opening of the fall campaign on October 15, 1944. The 14th and 50th Divisions were flown over to Burma from China at much reduced strength during the spring of 1944 and prior to the present campaign only a few of the units of those two divisions had combat experience—principally incident to the capture of Myitkyina. In combat efficiency the divisions could properly be rated in the following order: 22nd - 38th - 30th - 50th - 14th. General Liao and the headquarters of the New Sixth Army went to China with the 14th and 22nd Divisions. In the initial move to China, which was entirely by air, no motor transport was carried except a few jeeps and only one thousand animals of the 22nd Division and five hundred animals of the 14th Division were carried. Motor transport of these divisions is now moving by road to China.

Stilwell did an extremely efficient job in training the Chinese Army in India and one of his outstanding accomplishments was in the expert handling of the troops during the early stages to instill the offensive spirit in them. The 22nd and 38th Divisions are as good as any commander could wish. The 30th and 50th Divisions have gained combat experience this fall and are close behind them. In the combat operations to open the road, the Chinese Expeditionary Force from China met the New First Army of the Chinese Army in India in the Muse-Mongyu Area. The American trained and equipped Chinese troops could there be compared with the Chinese troops which had not had the benefit of being thoroughly American trained or equipped. The difference was startling. This is in no way a criticism of the divisions of the Chinese Expeditionary Force but I make the point in order to emphasize the value to the Chinese divisions of sound American training plus adequate equipment. We have demonstrated in India
and Burma that Chinese troops, if properly equipped and trained, make splendid fighting units.

The Tenth Air Force, which operates in close support and cooperation with the forces under my command in the Northern Combat Area, has not only defeated the Jap and driven him from the air but has performed marvels in air supply. I believe this theater is an outstanding example of what can be accomplished by air supply and air evacuation of wounded.

The Air Transport Command has, within the past twelve months, stepped up its monthly over-the-hump tonnage from 10,000 to 44,000 tons. It is now talking about 60,000 tons and thinking about 100,000 tons. Much of this increased tonnage has been due to more and better equipment but a lot of it is due to increased efficiency of operation. I consider their performance truly remarkable.

You will remember that the Assam L of C was the cause of much concern last spring and summer. It is now meeting all requirements and I have no particular worries for the future. The demand for gasoline in Assam is almost insatiable. Not only do the planes flying to China need gasoline but the principal cargo is itself gasoline. Much of the Assam L of C tonnage is gasoline. We also have one 6" pipeline operating from Calcutta to Assam and are pushing the second 6" line with every available resource. We are delivering gasoline via a 4" line as far as Bhamo and, working from both ends, we are pushing this line through to China. The second 4" line to Myitkyina has been completed and is in operation. I consider a 6" line all the way through to China as being essential for the future.

This theater has always had a very low priority on personnel, equipment and supplies. This I consider entirely justified in view of the total American war effort in all theaters, but it has been a handicap in the accomplishment of our various missions. The road to China is not as good a road as we would like to have and the pipeline capacities are not what we would desire. We have, however, a more adequate road to China than we have trucks and equipment to use it. Trucks are a critical shortage in this theater but the War Department is making every effort to help us.

Having secured the land and air routes to China, the main mission of India-Burma Theater is to render all possible aid and support to the China Theater. The India-Burma Theater is far from being a zone of the interior with enormous resources available for China and for maintaining the ports and lines of communication necessary for the supply and support of China as well as India-Burma. Wedemeyer and I are working out our problems with a view to giving China everything possible in the way of personnel, equipment and supplies. I have confidence in him and believe that he has confidence in me. We should, can, and will work out our problems of allotting available
resources without serious friction or disagreement. I have just offered Wedemeyer the entire American Task Force consisting of the 124th Cavalry Regiment, the 475th Infantry Regiment, two battalions of pack artillery, six pack troops and a veterinary evacuation hospital (totaling 360 officers and 6600 men). I understand they will be broken up and used as demonstration troops for training Chinese units and for liaison groups. The loss of these troops will postpone the capture of the Lashio Area but I believe Wedemeyer needs them worse than I do. With the troops remaining, I still expect to capture the Lashio Area before the monsoons.

My command in North Burma goes under the name of Northern Combat Area Command, N.C.A.C. for short. I have been designated personally by the Generalissimo to command the Chinese Army in India. The command also includes the British 36th Division and the American Mars Brigade. As theater commander I command the Tenth Air Force. Having been designated individually to command the Chinese Army in India I cannot delegate this authority and it is therefore necessary for me to spend much of my time in North Burma in actual command of operations. I make frequent visits to Theater Headquarters in Delhi in order to keep my hands on general theater matters.

Our relations with the British in this theater are excellent. Field Marshal Wavell and General Auchinleck have been most friendly and most cooperative in every way. Admiral Mountbatten seems entirely satisfied with the conduct of American affairs within his theater and my relations with him are on a very frank and cordial basis. General Leese, the Allied Land C in C, is doing a fine job. He is a fighter. There is absolutely no friction of any kind evident at this time. Admiral Mountbatten is much inclined to integration of American forces and agencies with the British. This I have resisted and always have been able to find a satisfactory solution which did not jeopardize American interests in this part of the world. I foresee further problems after Burma has been cleared of the Jap and SEAC advances towards Malay. I shall keep the War Department thoroughly informed of the situation as it develops or progresses. I expect to see Admiral Cook and Colonel Lincoln, who have just left the Argonaut Conference, in Nyitkyina on February 17th. I hope to get some further clarification of future policies in this theater from them.

With the best of wishes for you personally,

Faithfully,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

(sgd.) Dan I. Sultan
DAN I. SULTAN
Lt. Gen., USA
Commanding
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

On the 15th of each month I will send a brief personal letter to accompany memoranda embodying information concerning China Theater. The memoranda will include information that can safely be disseminated to staff heads in the War Department without violating security. In my personal letter I should like to mention subjects of private or security nature which should not be widely disseminated. By force of circumstances I must at times discuss personalities pro and con with you, Handy, Arnold and Hull. I am finding how important personalities can be. They really cause me more concern than arriving at sound strategic plans. We could operate with the most stupid organization provided officers in key positions were intelligent and cooperative. On the other hand, no matter how sound our organization, unless the personalities in key positions are cooperative and determined to give their best, our efforts are nullified. Our personnel difficulties will, however, be gradually alleviated.

After four months of careful study and analysis of past and current operations and allocation of resources, I have concluded that the efforts of the Air and Ground Forces of this Theater have not been properly related, either in combat employment or in logistical support.

The Fourteenth U.S. Air Force has received a disproportionate amount of tonnage if realistic ground operations or effective ground-air operations were visualized. An examination of past operations indicates that ever increasing quantities of supplies were given to the Air Forces. Admittedly the latter delivered very destructive and effective blows against the enemy. However, in the interim Ground Forces were neglected and when the Japanese retaliated, the air effort could not alone prevent the loss of vital areas and air installations. There were no ground forces worthy of the name. Even today there are only a few Chinese divisions that could be termed combat effective by mediocre standards and Chinese service elements are practically worthless.

I disagree with the overall plan or strategic premise, if there were one, that placed undue emphasis on the strong support of Air Forces and dangerously neglected the Ground Forces, both combat and service elements. Today we would have nothing between us and the Japs except difficult terrain, and an Air Force, were
it not for the reassuring presence of the two divisions recently moved from Burma to selected positions in China. We are striving to create effective Ground Forces as rapidly as possible. I still feel that the airplane is the important weapon of modern warfare and that our surface forces (ground and water) should be employed to create favorable conditions for the effective employment of air. However, this does not by any means infer that the Ground Forces are no longer necessary. They remain an important part of the team and I intend to insure that we have ground forces equipped and trained to perform effectively their role as combat or service elements.

Having reached the above conclusions, the employment of Air Forces here may be somewhat restricted for the next four or five months. On the other hand, ever increasing hump tonnage may permit logistical support of air operations on the present scale and concurrently provide for increased allocations to Ground Forces.

Later when the 10th Air Force is moved into this Theater, I visualize creating a Strategic Air Force and a Tactical Air Force. Super-imposed over the two, I plan a small Air Headquarters to integrate and coordinate air effort not only within the China Theater but also with operations of forces based in contiguous areas. This will not entail radical organizational changes in China or India-Burma Theaters. At the propitious time Stratemeyer could establish such an Air Headquarters in China. General Davidson could move the 10th Air Force into selected China areas to perform the tactical air role and the 14th could be assigned exclusively to the strategic.

Allocation of hump tonnage has always been of tremendous importance and of course must be in consonance with the overall strategy adopted. The decision to create realistic combat Ground Forces and also effective Service Forces will require certain hump tonnage that, under previous concepts of China Theater strategy, would have been allocated to the Air Forces. There has already been some resistance by Fourteenth Air Force. However, I have pointed out that even though greatly increased tonnages might become available over the hump, unless we take timely steps to insure successful ground operations in cooperation with the air, the enemy can gradually take away or neutralize airfields and can control or deny areas from which we might conduct air operations. We would thus end up with a diminishing return on a greatly expended hump tonnage.

The first part of January, I received a radiogram from Nimitz suggesting that I visit his Headquarters. At that time the progress of Luzon operations could not be predicted. Also, I was very busy with local problems. I replied that such a meeting would be helpful and thanked him, however, I did not mention a date. Later I received another radio from him suggesting that I visit his Headquarters about the 25th of February. Realizing that you would
probably be at the Yalta Conference, I radioed Tom Handy concerning Nimitz's suggestion. In the meantime the Generalissimo became keenly interested in effecting coordination between Pacific operations and our own and discussed the subject with me. I believe that he was somewhat piqued in that he was not invited to attend the conference. After the Generalissimo urged that I attempt to bring about closer coordination with MacArthur and Nimitz, I radioed a second time, addressing both you and Handy suggesting that I visit Nimitz' Headquarters and continue on to Washington for a short visit with you. Ambassador Hurley has been very desirous of getting back for a conference with the President and the Secretary of State and he will accompany me. There are several matters which can be better clarified by personal contact.

I am reluctant to leave the Theater. I feel that we are beginning to scratch the surface and make our presence felt in a satisfactory, almost remunerative way. Confidence is gradually being restored and a friendly spirit engendered. You have been absolutely tops in your support concerning personnel, policies and intricate problems. I believe we are realizing dividends by acquiring new blood, men who have brains, who are not defeatists, who are loyal and who are definitely representative Americans. We do not supinely agree with everything the Chinese propose. In fact, when I first arrived there was so little to which I agreed, and the news and reports I submitted were so uniformly depressing, it would have been understandable if the Generalissimo and other Chinese officials had formed an unfavorable opinion of me and my objectives.

My views on projected strategy in the Far East and the role that the China Theater should play may be of interest to you. Certainly your reaction and that of your planners would be helpful to me. Operations in the Far East should be pointed toward the Japanese Archipelago including air, naval and amphibious. We should avoid, for the next several months at least, operations that would require large scale employment of American ground forces in the interior of China. If we fail to bring about the capitulation of Japan by above program and it becomes apparent that the enemy is determined to make a last ditch stand on the Asiatic continent, we can then undertake combined air and ground operations within China with a view to destroying the last vestige of enemy resistance. It appears sound to concentrate our main effort on the acquisition of air and naval bases increasingly close to and actually within the Japanese Archipelago. Subsidiary operation that would definitely contribute should be undertaken concurrently. In this latter category lodgements on the China Coast would be included for important enemy lines of communication could thereby be severed and operations on the Coast, air, ground and/or amphibious, would complement China Theater air and ground effort. The above is a very brief resume of my ideas concerning operations here and I will expand upon these remarks when in Washington.
Your inspiring Christmas message, the addition of an Oak Leaf Cluster to DSM and then my promotion, all make me feel deeply conscious of the confidence you place in me. I hope, General, that I shall fully justify that confidence and the wonderful support you have given me throughout. If determination and enthusiasm will help, you may be certain that the China Theater will make a realistic contribution to the war effort. Our problems are by no means solved and there is much hard work ahead. However, I believe that we are evolving an approach that portends successful accomplishments. We have made some stupid mistakes, but on the other side of the ledger, there have been a few satisfactory results.

Sincerely,

(sgd.) A. C. Wedemeyer

A. C. WEDEMEYER,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

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Date: 2-13-70
Signature: [Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Analysis of American Policy toward China

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a telegram from Chungking regarding the situation in China. In this telegram Mr. Atcheson has presented very clearly the dangers inherent in the failure of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists to reach agreement. It is obvious that continued failure to effect political unity must adversely affect the vigorous prosecution of the war against Japan and raises well-founded fears that civil strife and possible international complications may eventually result if the basic differences between these two groups are not reconciled.

Despite a number of encouraging developments during the last few months, we have been increasingly concerned over recent indications that the Generalissimo has adopted an intransigent attitude toward this vitally important problem. These developments emphasize the need of flexibility in applying our policies toward China. The forthcoming arrival of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer in Washington will afford an opportunity to go over the whole situation with them and in particular the Embassy's recommendation that we consider giving war supplies to the Chinese Communists as well as to Generalissimo Chiang.

Enclosure: Acting Secretary
Copy of telegram no. 324 from Chungking, February 28, 1945.
March 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WEDEMEYER:

TO PREPARE REPLY FOR

MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Ltr of 2/17/45 to the President from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; grateful for choosing General Wedemeyer for his present post as he has been of invaluable assistance in military reforms; hopes the President will formulate and send back the operational plans for the Pacific and China War Theatres. Handed to Col. Davenport 3/7/45.
Your Excellency:

It is very good to hear from you again and I appreciate the warm greetings embodied in your letter of 17 February 1945.

I appreciate also that you and your staff have confidence in General Wedemeyer's ability and that the relationship between you is promoting the best interests of our common effort. I am certain that the continued Chinese cooperation and the assistance which General Wedemeyer is able to provide in behalf of the United States will contribute strongly to the early and decisive defeat of Japan.

General Wedemeyer has reported to me and has outlined the plan which he recently presented to you. It appears sound and my Chiefs of Staff are studying it further. General Wedemeyer will give you more details concerning this matter upon his return. Also in response to your request for the operational plans from other theaters he will present the broad strategy which is in consonance with my views.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency Chiang Kai Shek
President of the National Government of China
National Government Headquarters
Chunking, China
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL WEDEMEYER:

TO PREPARE REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.
4 March 1945

MEMO FOR COL. DAVENPORT:

General Wedemeyer left this for delivery to the White House. Will you take it up next time you go?

Pasco
February 17, 1945

Dear President Roosevelt:

I avail myself of General Wedemeyer's visit to forward to you this message together with my warmest greetings. Since his arrival in China, we have greatly profited by his invaluable assistance in military reforms. His frankness, boundless zeal, and practical spirit have impressed me as a very gifted military leaders. It is, indeed, a pleasure to have this opportunity of co-operating with him. I may add that my colleagues have all taken him into their confidence, and have developed with him the most friendly and harmonious relation. As a result, we have been able to introduce many reforms into our army, which, in turn, have strengthened our position in no small degree. I am indeed grateful for choosing him for his present post.

I have asked General Wedemeyer to report to you
in detail our military situation and my personal views in connection with the further prosecution of the war. I hope that you will, at your earliest convenience, formulate and ask him to bring back the operational plans for the Pacific and China War Theatres in order to achieve speedily the final defeat of our common enemy.

Yours Sincerely,

Chiang Kai-shek
March 10, 1945

My dear Mr. Mao:

I received your letter of November 10, 1944 upon my return from the Yalta Conference and appreciate very much receiving your personal views on developments in China.

I have noted with special interest the emphasis which you place on the unity of all Chinese people and military forces for the defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.

It is my sincere hope that you and President Chiang Kai-shek will work together harmoniously to achieve internal unity. Through unity the Chinese people can add to their already magnificent contribution to the prosecution of the war against Japan.

I welcome your expression of appreciation of General Hurley. He has kept me informed of developments in China and I expect in the near future to have the opportunity of personal discussion with him.

The friendship of the Chinese people and the people of the United States is, as you say, traditional and deep-rooted, and I am confident that the cooperation of the Chinese and American peoples will greatly contribute to the achievement of victory and lasting peace.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Mr. Mao Tse-tung,
Chairman of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China,
Yenan, China.
November 10, 1944.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

My dear President Roosevelt:

I am greatly honored in receiving your personal representative, General Patrick Hurley. During his three day visit here in Yenan we have congenially discussed all the problems concerning the unity of all Chinese people and all the military forces for the defeat of Japan and reconstruction of China. For this I have offered an agreement.

The spirit of this agreement is that we of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have been striving for in the anti-Japanese united front during the past eight years. It has always been our desire to reach an agreement with President Chiang Kai-shek which will promote the welfare of the Chinese people. Through the good offices of General Hurley we have suddenly seen hope of realization. It is with great pleasure that I express my high appreciation for the excellent talent of your Personal Representative and his deep sympathy towards the Chinese people.

The Central Committee of our Party has unanimously accepted the whole text of this proposed agreement and is prepared to fully support and to make it effective. The Central Committee of our Party has authorized me to sign this agreement, witnessed by General Hurley.

I am asking General Hurley to transmit to you this proposed agreement in name of our Party, our Army and the Chinese people. I wish also to thank you, Mr. President, for your great labors in the interests of the unity of China for the defeat of Japan and for making possible a united, democratic China.

The people of China and the people of the United States have a traditional and deep-rooted friendship. I hope that through your efforts and your great accomplishments the two great nations will continue to march together for the defeat of the Japanese invaders and the establishment of a lasting world peace and the reconstruction of a democratic China.

Very sincerely yours,

Mao Tse-Tung
Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA,
THE KUOMINTANG OF CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA.

1. The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist
Party of China will work together for the unification of all military forces
in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.

2. The present National Government is to be reorganized into a Coalition
National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties
and non-partisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for
reforms in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be pro-
mulgated and made effective. At the same time the National Military Council
is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting
of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies.

3. The Coalition National Government will support the principles of
Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for
the people and by the people. The Coalition National Government will pursue
policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice,
freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly and association, the right to petition the government for the redress
of grievances, the right of writ of Habeas Corpus and the right of residence.
The Coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make
effective those two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.

4. All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of the
Coalition National Government and its United National Military Council and will
be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The supplies acquired
from foreign powers will be equitably distributed.

5. The Coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality of
the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese
parties.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
President of the National
Government of China.
Signed: November 1, 1944.

MAO TSE-TUNG
Chairman of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China.
Signed: November 10, 1944.

WITNESS:

PATRICK J. HURLEY
Personal Representative of the
President of the United States.
Signed: November 1, 1944.
March 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has signed the letter to Mr. Mao Tze-tung, which you submitted with your memorandum of March sixth. I am returning it herewith for forwarding to him.

M. C. LATTA
Executive Clerk

elb
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to Mr. Mao Tze-tung

In compliance with your instruction of February 26, there is attached for your signature a letter to Mr. Mao Tze-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in reply to his letter of November 10, 1944.

Mr. Mao's letter to you is returned herewith, a copy having been made for the Department's files.

Enclosures:
1. To Mr. Mao Tze-tung.
2. From Mr. Mao Tze-tung, dated November 10, 1944.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 6, 1945

Acting Secretary
March 25, 1945.

Dear Evans:

Ever so many thanks for your letter about Lin Tsao-han. Although the press has reported the inclusion of Lin Tsao-han in the Chinese Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, we have no confirmation of such reports.

I am delighted that the hand is coming along so well. Do take care of yourself and let me hear from you from time to time.

With kindest regards,

Always sincerely,

F. D. R.

Colonel Evans Carlson,
RFD #2, Box 353E,
Escondido, California.
March 22, 1945

GRACE:

To do the necessary in preparing reply to Carlson.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 19, 1945

Subject: Lin Tso-han as Delegate to San Francisco Conference.

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 12, 1945. There follows information about Lin Tso-han, the subject of the letter addressed to you by Colonel Evans Carlson.

As Colonel Carlson states, Lin is an elder statesman of the Chinese Communists. He is a member of the People's Political Council, and, in its September session, presented the Communist version of the negotiations between the Central Government and the Chinese Communists, whom he represented. During General Hurley's recent visit to Yenan, Lin Tso-han participated in the discussions.

You will recall that, in your message to Chiang Kai-shek, transmitted in the Department's cable no. 247, March 15, 1945, you suggested the advantages that might derive from the inclusion in the Chinese Delegation of representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and other political parties.

You may wish to include the following statement in your reply to Colonel Carlson: Although the press has reported the inclusion of Lin Tso-han in the Chinese Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, we have no confirmation of such reports.

Enclosure: Letter returned.

Acting Secretary
Personal and Confidential

The Honorab le Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I notice in the news dispatches that Lin Tsao-han, one of the leaders of the so-called Communist group in China, has been appointed by the Generalissimo to the deleration which will represent China at the San Francisco conference. While you probably are informed about his background, I thought it might be useful for you to have my observations concerning him.

Lin Tsao-han (sometimes known as Lin Pai-chu) is sort of an elder statesman of the Chinese Communist Party. I should judge him to be about sixty five years of age. He was in charge of the Sian office of the Eighth Route Army when I applied for entrance into the Communist area in 1937, and I saw a good deal of him then, and again in 1938 when I was in Sian. He has a genial personality, is unusually intelligent and reasonable, and does not allow personal pride to stand in the way of attaining better understanding where human relationships are concerned. He has the complete confidence of Communist leaders such as Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai. I have noticed in recent years that Lin is the man whom the Communists have selected to represent them in negotiations at Chunchking whenever the situation was so tense as to suggest the possibility of detention by Chunchking of the Communist representative. In other words, while Lin has their confidence - his life is less valuable to them than is that of Chou En-lai.

Jim and Rommie spent a day with us here at the ranch not long ago. However, a note from Rommie yesterday reports that Jim got under way very suddenly for the open spaces. He was looking very fit.

I am gaining increasing use of my right hand. No rotary motion of the wrist as yet, but that will come in time. The medics surveyed me for limited duty three weeks ago, and I expect orders momentarily. Where and what type of duty, I do not know.

With warm regards, I am,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Evan D. Deflem

RFD #2, Box 358 E
Escondido, California
7 March 1945
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

TO READ AND PREPARE MEMOS
RANDOM OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Personal & Confidential ltr. 3-7 from Evans Carlson re background of Lin Tso-han, one of the leaders of the so-called Communist group in China, who has been appointed by the Generalissimo to the delegation to represent China at the San Francisco Conf.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Miss Tully:

Will you please hand the enclosed to the President. It contains another spot of information for him.

I am feeling as fit as the proverbial fiddle these days. My right wrist is still pretty stiff – and the elbow likewise. However, I have so much more use of it than I expected to, a few months ago, that I am very happy about it.

I hope all is well with you. I was terribly sorry to hear about Pa Watson. His absence must be keenly felt by all there.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

RFD Route #2, Box 253 F
Escondido, California
7 March 1945