PSF
FRANCE 1950
Memorandum from Cordell Hull to the President---Jan 3, 1940.

Encloses confidential note from the British Ambassador in which he requests that it be brought to the attention of the President as it outlines the text of communication the British and French Governments have made to the Swedish and Norwegian Governments.

See: Great Britain-Drawer 4-1940 (Jan 3, 1940 letter)
January 6, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT CALLAGHAN

Encloses Memo of Jan 5, 1940 to Chief of Naval Operations,

Admiral Stark, from W. S. Anderson.

Subject:—Japanese Diplomatic Pressure on France.

Japanese Minister outlined steps that would be necessary for France to take if their relations were to be improved.

Attached is memo of April 5, 1940
Subject—Franco-Japanese Relations affecting the Far East

See: Navy folder—Drawer 1-1940 (April 5-1940 memorandum)
February 13, 1940.

PA:

I want to show this to Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull when they come in this morning.

F.D.R.
Paris, February 2, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you,

I am attaching hereto a confidential memorandum on various aspects of developments in the European political arena.

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Riddle, Jr.

The President

The White House
MEMORANDUM

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Behind the scenes efforts of peace-at-any-price group in London

In a strictly confidential conversation with a source I have always found reliably informed on Western European affairs, and one which enjoys close confidential contacts amongst inner political circles in Britain, the following came to light:

1. That, as opposed (a) to the "bitter-enders" and (b) to those who regarded an early peace, short of definite victory, more in the light of a truce than a prelude to durable peace there was an important and influential element amongst the "upper bracket" moneyed interests in London which, perceiving a protracted war might spell revolution and bankruptcy for Europe, would be willing to accept peace at almost any price. Moreover, this element was constantly and vigorously at work behind the scenes.

I am inclined to feel that notwithstanding these reported efforts of the peace-at-any-price elements in London there are few, if any individuals amongst the influential political circles of France or Britain, who at this juncture would identify themselves at least openly with a move of this character. While there may possibly be those who would welcome some peace move, if adroitly presented by some leading statesman amongst the neutrals, I seriously doubt that they would risk antagonizing...
antagonizing mass opinion in their respective countries by initiating such a move themselves.

Moreover, my own observations lead me to believe that an early cessation of hostilities, attained on the basis of face-saving formula, would prove more in the nature of a truce perhaps marked by a period of recuperation and realignments, than a prelude to durable peace.

My same informant moreover, stated he had authoritatively learned that the British Secret Service had been in constant direct contact with the Reichwehr since the outbreak of war. He pointed out that this contact (a) afforded discreet soundings and exchanges of views; and (b) afforded the Reichwehr, if and when opposed to Hitler's contemplated military moves, means of "tipping off" the British and French in advance. Then, as the hour for the contemplated move approached, the Reichwehr were in position to point out to Herr Hitler the disadvantages of striking, in face of the adversary's anticipation.

In connection with the implications of this reference to the Reichwehr's differences with Herr Hitler, there appears to be a diversity of views amongst observers familiar with developments in Germany:

One observer, well-informed on German internal affairs, and enjoying important political and military contacts in that country, recently stated confidentially he had reason to believe that the Reichwehr were definitely
definitely opposed to Herr Hitler, and that the Reichwehr fully intended to replace Herr Hitler by a political figure of their own choice - someone already selected.

I felt that these remarks failed to present the picture with its full shadings. Accordingly, my inquiries regarding the aforementioned observer's appraisal as to the time required to carry out such a project, revealed his belief that this was the Reichwehr's long-term plan which might require an indefinite perhaps a somewhat protracted period of time to accomplish. Hence, I feel that it is well to bear this time element in mind when considering the possibilities of the Reichwehr's reported will to replace Herr Hitler.

Another view - and from another observer, long enjoying close political and military contacts in Germany:

He said that notwithstanding the fact that the people are experiencing deficiencies in certain lines of foodstuffs and other items, there were sufficient of the necessities of life and that the people as a whole were still behind Herr Hitler.

As for the Reichwehr - according to this informant, their opposition and long-term ambitions suffered a temporary check with the disappearance of General von Fritsch. This informant did not know how temporary this check would be, but made the significant observation that the Reichwehr would not yield to any greater degree to the terms of the Allies than Herr Hitler himself.

One of the features which is worthy of constant attention
attention is that the ambitions and "peace-aims" of the Reichwehr are not less in scope than that of Herr Hitler. In other words, the Reichwehr is sick of the unmannerly brutality of the Nazis, but not in violent disagreement regarding the role of Germany. Besides, my informant went on to say the army have meat, butter, sugar, coffee. In fact, the first concern of the Government is that the armed forces lack none of the essential things to keep them content.

From my own observations, the following seems to approximate the situation.

While there is a naval blockade, there is at the same time a German counter-blockade. So long as Germany is not encircled, as she was in the last war, by a chain of enemy powers, it would to my mind, be illusory to picture that Germany could be starved into anything like a military collapse and political submission, say, in the next six months. Moreover, the German "home front" is unlikely to crack unless and until Germany has suffered a spectacular defeat in the field - or unless something happened to Herr Hitler, an event which might conceivably give place to a military or other coup d'etat. However, it would again seem illusory for one to bank upon such happening in the immediate future. The chances, moreover, of an early allied military victory in the West are, I feel, remote so long as the Germans are able to fight on a single front. Thus, if the Western allies want a decisive victory before Germany effectively consolidates
New fronts, consolidates her recent adventures and perhaps embarks on further adventures, they must face the question as to the desirability and advisability of opening up new fronts with a view (a) to taking Germany in the rear, and (b) to combatting a Russian-German combination.

This in the first instance is a matter for allied diplomacy, statesmanship and strategy with a wide range of vision; a matter which raises the following among other questions: 1/ where and how are new fronts to be established, and who are the important allies available? 2/ could Anglo-French diplomacy succeed in securing a solid Balkan block concurrently with Italy against a Russian as well as a German aggression - and accordingly are Britain and France prepared to arm adequately the Balkan powers? 3/ would it be worth the Western powers' while to challenge Russia indirectly if by doing so they made sure of an Italian-Balkan Alliance against Germany as well as Russia? 4/ would it be worth the Western powers' while to challenge Russia indirectly by an attack - say by troops under the Polish flag - at Russia's vital points, Baku and Batum. 5/ would France and Britain be prepared to establish yet a further front directed equally against Russia and Germany in Scandinavia, and 6/ would the Western powers at the same time be prepared to wage some form of "inside job" vis-a-vis Russia, such as "slipping" Trotsky back into Russia to start an insurrection against Stalin, as the Germans in 1917, "slipped" Lenin and Trotsky into Russia to stir up
Russia's strategically vital points in Baku area

As regards Russia, the Baku oil fields and port of Batum represent vital points which to my mind might conceivably figure as strategic objectives in event of any campaign against Russia. Anywhere from 65 to 70 percent of current-day Russian agriculture is on a motorized basis. Aerial attacks either from the Black Sea or Iran or adjacent territories, against these points might readily serve to paralyse Russia's military as well as economic structures.

There is another factor which presents itself at the time for consideration in appraising developments in the making: when the Russian troops entered Poland they were accompanied by German observers. The German observers later reported to Berlin that, judging by the organization and performance of the Russian troops on this occasion, Germany could conquer the Russian forces if and when it so desired.

On top of these reports has come the poor showing of Russian versus Finnish troops - a development which undoubtedly went far towards confirming Herr Hitler's former reports from his aforementioned observers. It is not inconceivable, therefore that Herr Hitler, confident he could check the Russians at will, might come to look upon the Russian threat vis-a-vis Scandinavia as a potentially useful "scare factor" vis-a-vis the Western powers. He might indeed hope that in addition to the far-reaching implications of a Russo-German Pact, the "scare-factor" would serve to make the "Russian menace" appear
appear more acute to Western Europe.

It is also highly possible that Italy's radio broadcast and press "play up" of Russia as the "world's enemy No. 1" might be receiving subtle encouragement from Berlin, for I cannot help but feel that Signor Mussolini still feels that if Herr Hitler fell as a result of a conflict with the West, his own position might suffer in consequence. Signor Mussolini would hardly like to see Germany too thoroughly crushed lest the balance of power in Europe should disappear as it did for at least 10 years after the Great War. In that case, Italy would be once more relegated to the second rank in the hierarchy of powers.

However, failure to frighten the Western powers by the "Bolshevik menace" and by the implications of a German-Russian Pact, into giving him a free hand in the East, might possibly lead Herr Hitler to concentrate his energies on an alternative course - joint action with Russia to continue redrawing the map of Europe. A decision on this score might, in turn lead Herr Hitler to furnish Russia with much needed technicians to reorganize her economic and military structures. It is safe to say that the process of whipping these factors into effective shape, in terms of bare fundamentals, would occupy at least 2 years. During that time moreover, Herr Hitler might possibly attempt to freeze the Western front.

I think it essential to place before you the following concrete statements of policy and opinion as expressed in London and Rome.
These statements were made to my informant, a man in whose integrity of factual reporting I can trust. According to this source, Lord Halifax outlined the following points as constituting the basis of his policy as Foreign Minister:

1. Russia at best is a dubious friend and whatever events occur to shape relations between Britain and Russia, this point must ever be kept in mind.

2. Lord Halifax said the fundamental problem of this war is how to defeat Hitlerism without opening the flood gates of Europe to Bolshevism.

3. Lord Halifax hesitated in using the word "revolution" against the present German Government as one of the British war aims. He said he preferred "change of Government" for as long as he was Foreign Minister he would never agree to any discussion of peace which would enable Hitler to appear before his people as a victor. Any attempt by any combination in the Government to allow such a state of affairs to arise, would bring his immediate resignation.

5. Lord Halifax declared no permanent peace in Europe was possible without Anglo-German cooperation. He had always worked for that, and considered Hitler a fool for having missed his opportunity. Lord Halifax is prepared in the future to do everything he can to achieve such cooperation - but it cannot be with Hitler - or any Nazi identified with Hitler's extremist policy.
6. Lord Halifax is opposed to the carving up of Germany, admitting that his policy on this score is one which is certain to cause difficulties in the future. Moreover, Lord Halifax said "another Versailles will not satisfy me - nor will it solve the problems of Europe".

7. Lord Halifax made the highly significant statement: "making peace will be more difficult than making war", indicating war aims of the allies did not coincide as to the future.

My same informant recently talked with a number of key men of the Vatican and tells me in absolute confidence the following:

1. Monseigneur Montini, Under Secretary of State of the Holy See, declared that the present outlook for peace is discouraging. When questioned regarding the role which Signor Mussolini might play in possible peace negotiations he said in the utmost confidence. "The trouble is that we cannot trust him. We have confidence in him. His written words and other official utterances are plausible but he is interested only in seeking prestige for himself - whether by peace or by war. The King is the only man we trust - but the King is in a very peculiar position in that although he still enjoys the loyalty of his people, foreign policy is completely in the hands of Mussolini."

2. Secretary of State, Cardinal Maglione declared that the Vatican was anxious to have peace because war
war meant not only the unchristian destruction of millions of people but was destructive economically, morally, socially and from the religious standpoint. The Cardinal Secretary of State hinted that the Vatican had to be extremely cautious as to the steps it took regarding peace since it must be remembered that Germany as well as German and Russian occupied Poland had large catholic communities. He said that the formula so often repeated especially in Britain, that nothing can be done for peace until Hitler is removed, is one which is extremely difficult to accomplish. This, because at least as matters now stand, Herr Hitler is very powerful - has a firm grip on the situation and is supported by his people.

He stated categorically that the only way to endanger Hitler's position or to bring about his downfall would be by inflicting a decisive military defeat on him. The German people would then understand that Hitler was not the leader for them. Hence, the Cardinal's pessimism of any possibility of peace in the immediate future.

3. The Under Secretary of State, Monseigneur Tardine, who is very close to His Holiness, The Pope, was likewise pessimistic regarding peace possibilities at this time. He was of the opinion that economic factors would finally precipitate Germany's defeat - but believed that before Hitler would acknowledge defeat he would, with the aid of Russia, attempt in one mad frenzy to bring down the whole structure of Europe with him.
Disclosures by High ranking Italian Naval Officer

4. One of the highest placed Naval officers in Italy who frequently has the ear of Mussolini said he thought war would be decided in the "oil fields of Texas". Germany, he said had sufficient oil to last only 6 months if Germany undertook a smashing military drive against the Allies - but much longer if the present pace was maintained.

* * * * * * *
Angers, March 1, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you, I have the honor to attach hereto a memorandum covering the recent confidential report which has reached me regarding Herr Thyssen, the recently "escaped" prominent German industrialist, together with observations of the French Ambassador, accredited to the Polish Government, and my own preliminary reactions.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Beadley

The President
The White House
MEMORANDUM

An objective and discreet individual for whose integrity of factual reporting I have the utmost respect, has just informed me that in confidential conversation with Herr Thyssen, prominent industrialist who not long ago evacuated into Switzerland, Herr Thyssen stated that he and a group of his associates in Germany felt that together with their friends in German industrial cities, they had sufficient power to bring about the downfall of Herr Hitler.

Herr Thyssen emphasized however, that any such action of this character would entail great risk for the individuals involved, it would not be worthwhile, to his mind, unless they could obtain some definite assurance that France and Britain would not proceed with the dismemberment of Germany after the removal of Hitler.

My first reaction to the disclosure of Herr Thyssen’s remarks was an inclination to suspect that Herr Thyssen might conceivably have been deliberately let out of Germany, in a subtle play to employ him as an instrument of Nazi policy. Indeed, it is not altogether unlikely that Marshal Goering might have staged Herr Thyssen’s “escape” as a means of getting him out of the country, in order to serve as a contact with industrial and other important circles abroad.

It was with added interest therefore, that in conversation yesterday with Ambassador Noel, the French Ambassador
Ambassador still accredited to the Polish Government at Angers, that the latter confidentially disclosed (a) his knowledge of Herr Thyssen's conversations with important contacts of allied and neutral countries and (b) his inclination to suspect that Herr Thyssen's "escape" was staged in order that he might serve Nazi policy as a propaganda and sounding instrument abroad.

In the absence of further reports in connection with this matter, I pass on the foregoing information for what it is worth and in the belief that it might possibly prove interesting in view of the numerous channels presently being created for the dissemination of propaganda.

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Angers, March 1, 1940
My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing for the President a copy of Ambassador Biddle's strictly confidential despatch no. 25 of February 28, 1940. This despatch is concerned with confidential instructions which, it is understood, were issued to the German press by the German Ministry of Propaganda.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

From Angers, no. 25,
February 28, 1940.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State

BUREAU | Eu
DIVISION | Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 4/2/40

ADDRESS TO

Brigadier General Watson,
The White House.
No. 35
Angers, February 28, 1940

Subject: Transmitting copy and translation of authenticated copy of confidential instruction recently issued to the press in Germany and German occupied Poland, by the German propaganda Ministry.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to attach hereto a copy and a translation
translation thereof of an authenticated copy of a confidential instruction recently issued to the press in Germany and German occupied Poland by F.I.D. (Presse Information Dienst) of the German propaganda Ministry.

In giving me what he described as the aforementioned authenticated copy, Minister Zaleski informed me in strictest confidence that it had been secured and forwarded to him by Prince Janusz Radziwill whom I know personally as an objective and responsible individual.

In discussing the document Minister Zaleski pointed out that it was characteristic and enlightening as regards the lines wherein the German control of press information was being carried out and as such it called for careful attention.

Considering its importance from the standpoint of current-day German policy and methods, I am forwarding it for your information.

Respectfully yours,

A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of authenticated copy of confidential instruction issued by German propaganda Ministry.

2. Translation of copy.

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AJDB/emoq
(In Quintuplicate)

Im Wirtschaftsteil verschiedener Tageszeitungen sind Betrachtungen über den Rückerwerb deutsches Privateigentums im ehemaligen Ostoberschlesien, in Posen und Westpreußen angestellt worden. Die Frage, was aus den alten Besitztiteln wird, darf vorläufig unter keinen Umständen in der Presse erörtert werden.

Artikel über Neuaufbau und Organisation der zivilen Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich des Oberbefehlshabers Ost sind zensurpflichtig.

Den Zeitungen wird vorsorglich bekannt gegeben, dass anlässlich der Führerrede zur Reichstagssitzung verstärkte Auflagen erscheinen dürfen. Auf die heute wieder in Kraft tretende Verdunkelung darf weder in der Tagespresse noch im Rundfunk eingegangen werden. Über bezugsseinfreie Waren ist ab sofort nichts mehr zu berichten. Durch diese Sprachregelung soll der Hamsterei nicht bezugsseinfreipflichtiger Waren vorgebeugt werden.

Im Einvernehmen mit dem Chef der Zivilverwaltung ist für alle reichsdeutschen Zeitungen die Werbung im Ostoberschlesischen Industriegebiet nochmals auf weitere 4 Wochen verboten worden.

Aus gegebener Veranlassung wird noch einmal daran erinnert, dass über Eisenbahnunfälle nicht berichtet werden darf.

Die Zeitungen werden angewiesen, künftig keine Kirchenausritte mehr zu veröffentlichen.

Es wird noch einmal daran erinnert, dass das Verbot, sich mit Sohlproblem zu beschäftigen, für amtliche Zeitungen gilt.

a) Berichterstattung
a) Berichterstattung über Polen:
Die Presse wird darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass über Polen so wenig wie möglich geschrieben werden soll.


b) Es steht jetzt nichts im Wege, dass die Zeitungen der Gorlitzer und Laubener Gegend, die dem Ihnen zugesandten Bericht "Die Macht von Łomianki" veröffentlicht haben, noch nachträglich eine Notiz des Inhalts bringen, dass dieser Bericht das


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1. Bilder des amerikanischen Kronzeugen im "Athenia"-Fall, Andersoe, sind vorläufig in der Presse nicht zu veröffentlichen.

2. Die Zeitungen werden darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass bei der neutralen Haltung Amerikas amerikanische Filme, die im deutschen Reich zur Veröffentlichung freigegeben wurden, auch sachlich einwandfrei besprochen werden müssen. Es ist auch nichts dagegen einzuwenden, wenn hier und da ein Bild aus amerikanischen Filmen ev. dessen Darstellung berücksichtigt werden (V.I. Nr. 1199/39 v. 24 Oktober 1939).


5. Über die Feier des 100-jährigen Bestehens der evangelischen Kirchengemeinde in Kummerwitz sollen in der Presse Berichte nicht erscheinen. Auch eine Vorberichterstattung ist ungewünscht.

6. Eine genaue Beobachtung der Schlesischen Presse hat ergeben, dass mehrfach nichtige Flanzenweisungen einfach nicht
8. Verbesserung zu "V.l."—

Das Buch "Das Land mit den schwarzen Schiffen" von Prof. Frederick Passche darf nicht besprochen werden.

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Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 23, February 28, 1940 from the Embassy, Angers, France, on subject of: Transmitting copy and translation of authenticated copy of confidential instruction recently issued to the press in Germany and German occupied Poland, by the German propaganda Ministry.

Source: Vertrauliche Information des "Kleinen F.J.D."

Translation.

Any report dealing with prison camps is in the future forbidden. Information already published on this subject will also be suppressed.

Mention has been made in the economic column of different newspapers that private property in East Upper Silesia, Posen and West Prussia might be returned to their owners. The question as to what is to become of the old property deeds is not allowed, under any circumstances, to come up in the Press.

Articles concerning reconstruction and organisation of civilian administration in the department of the East High Commissioner are submitted to censorship.

Newspapers have been carefully instructed to hand out amplified editions of the Fuhrer's speech at the Reichstag. There should be no mention made of the black-outs put in force to-day, neither in papers, nor through the radio. No more should be said about merchandise having free entry. There is hope that this censorship might put a stop to the hoarding of free entry merchandise.

In accord with the head of the Civil Administration German newspapers have received orders to withhold for four more weeks the publication of request for employment of German nationals in East Upper Silesia's industrial area.

It should
It should also be remembered that no mention should be made of railroad accidents.

Newspapers are requested not to give any reports about people who have withdrawn from the church. It is prohibited to publish dealings with religious problems.

a). Information on Poland:

We draw to the attention of the Press, that matters concerning Poland should be discussed as little as possible.

It is not advisable to give out information on the present Polish situation. This includes all questions relative thereto, for example: "Greiser intends to send Germans to West Poland"... In the event of future reports on Poland, the Press is made to understand that articles and information should reflect the instinctive aversion of the German people for anything Polish. This should be so presented that a permanent and latent aversion will grow out of the present instinctive one. These statements should not appear in long-worded articles, but hinted at in short sentences. It should be emphasized that in the eyes of all Germans, Poles, Jews and Gypsies stand on a same level. To create a feeling of hatred is essential because for some time to come Poles will be employed as agricultural laborers and it will be necessary to put up a racial defense front. We must consider as the basis of all information the fact that anything showing signs of culture or economical organisation in Poland should be traced back to German influence. Information of Polish prisoners should not be too friendly. The best would be for the Press not to mention the subject.

b). There exists no reason anymore for the Gorlitz and Lauben newspapers having published "The Night of Lomianki" not to have later inserted that this information concerns

the Infanterie
the Infanterie Regiment 30. However they must not reveal that there was any connection between this special Regiment and the place where peace was signed, neither should they reveal that this was a local regiment.

c). All correspondence with the army, also with reserve troops, is free of charge in both directions. Letters have to bear the mention "Feldpost". Letters to Headquarters are free of charge if marked "Feldpost".

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1. Pictures of the American witness Anderson in the "Athenia" case, are for the time being not to be given out by the Press.

2. Newspapers are made attentive to the fact that American pictures being shown - in consideration of America's neutral attitude - they may also be spoken of. They may also print from time to time a picture taken from an American film. (V.L.No. 1199/39 of October 24th 1939).

3. A publication of the letter sent by the Chief of the Reichs Press Bureau, Dr. Dietrich, to Postmaster General, which appeared in the official paper of the Ministry of Post is undesirable.

4. Calling to arms and information on military training is not allowed to be published. An official notice will therefore be given out in a few days.

5. The Press should not mention the Jubilee taking place in Runewitz to celebrate the 100th year existence of their Protestant Church. No announcement concerning this Jubilee should be made.

6. A thorough observation of the Silesian Press publications shows, that important instructions concerning place of articles have not been observed. For instance: the information
about the Turkish pact should have appeared on page 2 or 3, but most of the newspapers printed it on page 1. No attention was paid to the withdrawal of the information on "Salzgitter", three days after the withdrawal the information was still in several papers. This shows a complete lack of discipline of some of the publishers, which will force us to take stricter measures to secure absolute observation of any order of the Ministry.

v. Addition to "V.l."

The book "The Land of Black Ships", of Prof. Frederick Passche should not be mentioned.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U. S. A.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
TORA P (CK TO FOLLOW) ERE VERY RUSH ETAT FG 1 VIA IMP
S TOURS #A-120

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
WASHINGTON

A MOSIERU LE PRESIDENT DANS LE MALHEUR QUI S ABAT SUR LA PATRIE
IL FAUT AVAT TOUT QU UNE CHOSE SOIT DITE AU MOMENT OU LE SORT
LES ACCABLE JE VEUX CHIER AU MONDE L HEROISME DES ARMEES FRANCAISES
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LES AVIONS ROMpus PAR LES MARCHES ET PAR LES COMBATS CES HOMMES
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AU LOIT GRANDIR L'ESPOIR D'UNE VICTOIRE COMMUNE LA SUPERIORITÉ
EN QUALITÉ DE L'AVIATION BRITANNIQUE S'AFFIRME IL FAUT QUE DES
RUEES D'AVIONS DE GUERRE VENUS NI OUTRE ATLANTIQUE ECRASENT LA
FORCE MAUVAISE QUI DOMINE L'EUROPE MALGÊRE NOS REVER LA PUissance
DES DEMOCRATIES RESTE IMMENSE NOUS AVONS LE DROIT D'ESPERER QUE
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EST POURQUOI AUSSI NOUS AVONS VOULU QUE LA FRANCE GARDE UN Gouvernement
LIBRE ET POUR CELA NOUS AVONS QUITTE PARIS IL FALLAIT EMPECHER QU
HITLER SUPPRIMANT LE GOUVERNEMENT LEGAL DECLARE AU MONDE QUE LA
FRANCE T'A PAS D'AUTRE GOUVERNEMENT QU'UN GOUVERNEMENT DE FAITCOCHES
A SA SOLDE SEMBLABLE A CEUX QU'IL A TENTE DE CONSTITUER UN PEU
PARTOUT AU COURS DES GRANDES EPREUVES DE SON HISTOIRE NOTRE PEUPLE
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ARRIVE DANS LES JOURS QUI VIENNENT OU QU'ILS SOIENT LES FRANÇAIS
VONT AVOIR À SOUFFRIR QU'ILS SOIENT DIGNES DU PASSE DE LA NATION
QU'ILS DEVIENNENT FRATERNEL QU'ILS SE SERVENT AUTOUR DE LA PATRIE
BLESSEE LE JOUR DE LA RESURRECTION VIENDRA.

PAUL REYNAUD
United Press report of Prime Minister Reynaud's appeal to the President. It is believed that this message is being transmitted officially by Ambassador Biddle, from whom a later message has been received. If and when Mr. Biddle's message is received it will be forwarded.
[Translation]

TELEGRAM

21WUDG GOVT.
CABLE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOURS June 14, 1940.

The President,

The White House.

Mr. President:

In the misfortune which is descending upon our native land one thing above all must be said. At a moment when misfortune overwhelms them I wish to proclaim to the world the heroism of the French Armies, the heroism of their Chiefs. I have seen arriving from the battle front, men who had not slept for five days, harried by airplanes, broken by marching and by combats. These men whose nerves the enemy had thought he could break had no doubt of the final issue of the war; they had no doubt of the fate of their country in the combats which are being waged from the sea to the Argonne. The soul of France is not conquered; our race does not allow itself to be crushed by invasion. The soil on which it lives has seen so many of them in the course of the centuries. It has always repulsed or dominated the invaders. All that - the suffering and the pride of France - the world should know. Everywhere free men must know what they owe to her. The hour has come for them to pay their debt. The French Army has been the van-guard of the Army of the Democracies. It has sacrificed itself
itself but in losing this battle it has inflicted re-
doubtable blows on the common enemy. The hundreds of tanks
destroyed, the airplanes brought down, the losses in men,
the factories of synthetic gasoline in flames, all that
explains the present state of the morale of the German
people in spite of their victories. Wounded France has
the right to turn to the other democracies and say to them:
(I have claims on you.) No one who has feelings of justice
could deny this; but it is one thing to approve and another
thing to act. We know how great a place ideals have in the
life of the great American people. Would it still hesitate
to declare itself against Nazi Germany? As you know, I
asked this question of President Roosevelt. This evening
I am addressing to him a new and final appeal. Each time
that I have asked the President of the United States to
increase in every form the aid which American law permits
he has done so generously and he has been approved by his
people, but today the life of France is at stake, at any
rate, France's reasons for living are at stake. Our
struggle, each day more painful, has henceforth no meaning
unless in continuing it we see arising even from afar the
hope of a common victory. The superiority in quality of
the British aviation is being confirmed. It is necessary
that swarms of war planes come from the other side of the
Atlantic
Atlantic to crush the evil force which is dominating Europe. Despite our reverses the power of the democracies is still very great. We have the right to hope that the day is coming when that power will be put to work. That is why, also, we have wished France to keep a free Government, and for that we have left Paris. It was necessary to prevent that Hitler, after suppressing the legal government, should declare to the world that France has no other government than a government of puppets in his pay like those he has tried to set up almost everywhere. In the course of the great trials of its history our people has known days when counsels of defeat might have troubled it. It is because it never abdicated that it has been great. Whatever may happen in the coming days, whatever the French may have to suffer, let them be worthy of the Nation's past, let them become fraternal, let them close ranks around the stricken Fatherland. The day of resurrection will come.

PAUL REYNAUD.

1211PM

*At this point the text is apparently slightly garbled.--Tr.
[The attached version has the same fault.]
THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

TOURS June 14 1940

A MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT DANS LE MALHEUR QUI S'ABAT SUR LA
PATRIE IL FAUT AVANT TOUT QU'UNE CHOSE SOIT DITE AU MOMENT
OU LE SORT LES ACCABLE JE VEUX CRIER AU MONDE L'HEROISME
DES ARMÉES FRANÇAIS L'HEROISME DE LEURS CHEFS J'AI VU
ARRIVANT DE LA BATAILLE DES HOMMES QUI N'AVAIT PAS DORMI
DEPUIS CINQ JOURS HARCELÉS PAR LES AVIONS ET PROMPU PAR
LES MARCHES ET PAR LES COMBATS CES HOMMES DONT L'ENNEMI AVAIT
CRU BRISER LES NERFS NE DOUTAIENT PAS DE L'ISSUE FINALE DE
LA GUERRE ILS NE DOUTAIENT PAS DU SORT DE LA PATRIE DANS
LES COMBATS QUI SE LIVRENT DE LA MER À L'ARGONNE L'AME DE
LA FRANCE N'EST PAS VAINQUEE NOTRE RACE NE SE LAISSE PAS
ABATTRE PAR UNE INVASION LE SOL SUR LEQUEL ELLE VIT EN A
TANT VU AU COURS DES SIECLES ELLE A TOUJOURS REFOULE OU
DOMINE LES ENVAHISSEURS TOUT CELA LES SOUFFRANCES ET LA
FIERTÉ DE LA FRANCE IL FAUT QUE LE MONDE LE SACHE IL FAUT
QUE PARTOUT SUR LA TERRE LES HOMMES LIBRES SACHENT CE QUI
ILS LUI DOIVENT L'HEURE EST VENUE POUR EUX DE S'ACQUITTER
DE LEUR Dette L'ARMÉE FRANÇAISE A ÉTÉ L'AVANT GARDE DE L
ARMÉE DES DÉMOCRATIES ELLE S'EST SACRIFIEE MAIS EN PERDANT
CETTE BATAILLE ELLE A PORTE DES COUPS REDOUTABLES À L'ENNEMI
COMMUN LES CENTAINES DE CHAR DÉTRUITS LES AVIONS
ABATTUS LES PERTES EN HOMMES LES USINES D'ESSENCE SYNTHETIQUES EN FLAMMES TOUT CELA EXPLIQUE L'ETAT PRESENT DU MORAL DU PEUPLE ALLEMAND MALGRE SES VICTOIRES LA FRANCE BLESSEE A LE DROIT DE SE TOURNER VERS LES AUTRES DEMOCRATIES ET DE LEUR DIRE (J A I DES DROITS SUR VOUS) AUCUN DE CEUX QUI ONT LE SENTIMENT DE LA JUSTICE NE POURRAIT LUI DONNER TOUT MAIS AUTRE CHOSE EST D'APPROVER ET AUTRE CHOSE D'AGIR NOUS SAVONS QUELLE PLACE TIENT L'IDEAL DANS LA VIE DU GRAND PEUPLE AMERICAIN HESITERAIT IL ENCORE A SE DECLARER CONTRE L'ALLEMANDE NAZIE? JE L'AI DEMANDE AU PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT VOUS LE SAVEZ JE LUI ADDRESSE CE SOIR UN NOUVEL ET DERNIER APPEL CHAQUE FOIF QUE J'AI DEMANDE AU PRESIDENT DES ETATS UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE SOUS TOUTES LES FORMES L'AIDE QUE PERMET LA LOI AMERICAINNE IL L'A FAIT GENEREUSEMENT ET IL A ETÉ APPROUVE PAR SON PEUPLE MAIS IL S'AGIT AUJOURD'HUI DE LA VIE DE LA FRANCE EN TOUT CAS DES RAISONS DE VIVRE DE LA FRANCE NOTRE COMBAT CHAQUE JOUR PLUS DOULOUROUX N'A DESSORMAIS DE SENS QUE SI EN LE POURSUIVANT NOUS VOYONS MEME AU LOIN GRANDIR L'ESPOIR D'UNE VICTOIRE COMMUNE LA SUPERIORITE EN QUALITE DE L'AVIATION BRITANNIQUE S'AFFIRME IL FAUT QUE DES NUEES D'AVIONS DE GUERRE VENUS D'OUTRE ATLANTIQUE ECRASENT LA FORCE MAUVAISE QUI DOMINE L'EUROPE MALGRE NOS REVERS LA PUISSANCE DES DEMOCRATIES RESTE IMMENSE NOUS AVONS LE DROIT D'ESPERER QUE LE JOUR APPROCHE OU TOUTE CETTE PUISSANCE SERA MISE EN OEUVRE CE EST POURQUOI AUSSI NOUS AVONS VOULU QUE LA FRANCE GARDE UN GOUVERNEMENT LIBRE ET POUR CELA NOUS AVONS QUITTE PARIS IL FALLAIT
EMPECHER QUE HITLER SUPPRIMANT LE GOUVERNEMENT LEGAL DECLARE
AU MONDE QUE LA FRANCE N A PAS D AUTRE GOUVERNEMENT QUE UN
GOUVERNEMENT DE FANTOCHES A SA SOLDE SEMBLABLE A CEUX QU
IL A TENTE DE CONSANTUIER UN PEU PARTOUT AU COURS DES GRANDES
EPREUVES DE SON HISTOIRE NOTRE PEUPLE A CONNU DES JOURS OU
DES CONSEILS DE DEFAILLANCE ONT PU LE TROUBLE C EST PARCE
QU IL N A JAMAIS ABDIQUE QU IL FUT GRAND QUOI QU IL ARRIVE
DANS LES JOURS QUI VIENNENT OU QU ILS SOIENT LES FRANCAIS
VONT AVOIR A SOUFFRIR QU ILS SOIENT DIGNES DU PASSE DE LA
NATION QU ILS DEVIENNENT FRATERNELS QU ILS SE SERRENT AUTOUR
DE LA PATRIE BLESSEE LE JOUR DE LA RESURRECTION VIENDRA
PAUL REYNAUD.

133pmd
[Translation]

Cablegram

June 14, 1940
8:35 A.M.

654 STC
NB48 (TOTAL FOLLOWS) VIA FRENCH
Tours 14 1210

President Roosevelt,
Washington, D. C.

Mr. President:

In the misfortune which is descending upon our native land one thing above all must be said. At a moment when misfortune overwhelms them I wish to proclaim to the world the heroism of the French Armies, the heroism of their Chiefs. I have seen arriving from the battle front, men who had not slept for five days, harried by airplanes, broken by marching and by combats. These men whose nerves the enemy had thought he could break had no doubt of the fate of their country in the combats which are being waged from the sea to the Argonne. The soul of France is not conquered; our race does not allow itself to be crushed by invasion. The soil on which it lives has seen so many of them in the course of the centuries. It has always repulsed or dominated the invaders. All that - the suffering and the pride of France - the world should know. Everywhere free men must know what they owe to her. The hour has come for
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guard] of the Army of the Democracies. It has sacrificed it-
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No one who has feelings of justice could deny this; but it is
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Roosevelt. This evening I am addressing to him a new and
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American law permits he has done so generously and he has
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is at stake, at any rate, France's reasons for living are
at stake. Our struggle, each day more painful, has hence-
forth no meaning unless in continuing it we see arising
even from afar the hope of a common victory. The superiority
in quality of the British aviation is being confirmed. It
is necessary that swarms of war planes come from the other
side
side of the Atlantic to crush the evil force which is dominating Europe. Despite our reverses the power of the democracies is still very great. We have the right to hope that the day is coming when that power will be put to work. That is why, also, we have wished France to keep a free Government, and for that we have left Paris. It was necessary to prevent that Hitler, after suppressing the legal government, should declare to the world that France has no other government than a government of puppets in his pay like those he has tried to set up almost everywhere. In the course of the great trials of its history our people has known days when counsels of defeat might have troubled it. It is because it never abdicated that it has been great. Whatever may happen in the coming days, whatever the French may have to suffer, let them be worthy of the Nation's past, let them become fraternal, let them close ranks around the stricken Fatherland. The day of resurrection will come.

PAUL REYNAUD.

1211PM

*At this point the text is apparently slightly garbled.---Tr.*
Washington, June 12, 1940

Your very deeply moving message has reached me and I wish to tell you how truly grateful I am for what you were good enough to say.

The American people will not forget the brilliant, courageous and effective resistance which you carried on at the head of your Government in the name of France.

The American people and their Government share the conviction that the ideals which France has exemplified for so many generations -- the ideals of human liberty, of democracy and of the highest form of human civilization -- will still triumph and that France herself will ultimately regain her full independence and freedom.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

"O.K.
F.D.R."

Original of this message returned to Mr. Sumner Welles, State Dept., 6/19/40.
Bordeaux, le 17 juin 1940 au soir.

Au moment où je quitte mes fonctions, je veux vous dire, Monsieur le Président, que je sens que la réponse que vous avez faite à mon dernier message allait à l'extrême limite de ce que permettent les circonstances actuelles.

Je vous en exprime ma vive gratitude.

Dans l'immense malheur qui l'accable, la France sent que, parce que l'Amérique existe, la forme de civilisation qui est la sienne ne mourra pas et qu'un jour la liberté revivra dans la vieille Europe.

Paul Reynaud.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made of me this morning, I am sending you herewith a suggested reply for you to send to Paul Reynaud when we know exactly where he is.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What action on this?

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Ambassador Biddle from Bordeaux suggesting that our war vessels now at Lisbon proceed to Bilboa to evacuate Americans.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

June 26, 1940

There is returned herewith your memorandum of June 20, 1940, together with its enclosures, a copy of a telegram no. 22, June 18, 6 p.m., addressed to the Department by Ambassador Biddle at Bordeaux recommending the dispatch of war vessels now at Lisbon to Bilbao to evacuate Americans there.

After consultation with Admiral Stark, a telegram was sent on June 22, 1940 to Ambassador Biddle advising him that "naval vessels now in European waters cannot be effectively used for large scale evacuation and are not, therefore, being dispatched to Bilbao or to French ports". The matter of the evacuation of Americans from the Bordeaux area to the United States is having the close attention of the Department. The American Ambassador at Madrid has arranged with the Spanish authorities facilities for the entrance of Americans from
from southern France into Spain, there to await provisions for their transportation to the United States. The American Export Lines is beginning a weekly service of its four passenger-carrying vessels from New York to Lisbon, the first being scheduled to sail from New York on June 27. Another American ship is due to arrive at Funchal on June 30 and may proceed to Lisbon to embark passengers for the United States. Several freighters of the United States Lines, now in the vicinity of Bilbao, may also be used. Finally, consideration is now being given to the dispatch of the steamship Washington to Lisbon in addition to the ships mentioned.

Enclosures:

1. President's memorandum, June 20, 1940.
2. Telegram from Bordeaux, June 16, 1940.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What action on this?

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUN 20 1940

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
TRIPLE PRIORITY.

22, June 18, 6 p.m.

My telegram No. 13, June 17, 1 p.m.

I recommend that the Department arrange to have our war vessels now at Lisbon proceed to Bilbao. From that point they will be more readily available for evacuation of Americans in the emergency which may materialize with great rapidity. St. Jean de Luz or Bayonne may well be the only points from which such evacuation could be effected if the Spanish should close their frontier.

In view of the growing influx of Americans I believe the estimate of those now in this area who would want to be evacuated in case of serious disturbances should be raised to 700.

BIDDLE
My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum covering the factors which in my opinion contributed towards France's defeat, and three attached annexes: Annex A, covering an outline of defense and counter-tactics against mechanized thrusts, as well as mechanized thrusts coordinated with successive waves of low-flying planes, as developed by the Polish forces in Poland, and subsequently improved by the Polish General Staff in France; and Annex B, covering the political developments which culminated in France's capitulation; and Annex C, containing notes pertaining to the main text.

Hoping that the foregoing may prove both of interest and of help to you, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Riddle, Jr.

The President

The White House.
SAN SEBASTIAN, SPAIN
JULY 1, 1940

MEMORANDUM

Observations on factors which contributed to France's defeat.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND THE UNDERSECRETARY.

The following factors, in my opinion, contributed towards France's defeat:

Events have shown that France was (A) militarily, (B) diplomatically, and (C) morally unprepared.

(A) The French military system, based upon a general scheme envisaging mainly defensive warfare, proved faulty, obsolete, incapable of coping with the maneuverability and crushing force of Germany's modern equipment and attack or "Blitzkrieg" tactics of total warfare. Moreover, with the exception of several days previous to the major attack on the Somme, the French forces, as was formerly the case with the Polish against the German forces, were afforded no "breathing spell" in which to reconsolidate and to redress their lines. Moreover, French military and Naval Intelligence Services had failed either to estimate correctly the effective striking force of the adversary or to stress the importance of maintaining French equipment upon a standard capable of coping with that of Germany, and thus to adopt French tactics to German strategy which had already been demonstrated in
in Poland.

In this connection I discerned upon arrival in France from Poland, at the close of the Polish-German conflict, that Western European political and military circles were more given to criticising the break-down in Polish defense than to acknowledge the brilliance and effectiveness of the German attack in all its aspects (aside of course, from the barbaric tactics). While I am aware that the French military authorities were impressed by the effective employment of German tanks in Poland, and accordingly ordered a rapid increase in French tank production, I am inclined to believe that insufficient importance was attached to that form of attack which entailed the coordination of tanks and low-flying planes. Moreover, it was evident that insufficient attention was devoted both to defense and to countering measures against this form of attack. It was the latter which proved so demoralizing to the French 9th Army at the Meuse as well as elsewhere along the battle front.

Although the Commanding General of the Polish Army in France, in collaboration with General Sosnkowski, the Defender of Lwow, had rendered General Gamelin a complete report in early November, on Polish counter tactics against tanks and low-flying
low-flying planes*, it was not until the night of General Gamelin's replacement by General Weygand that the French General Staff, according to General Sikorski, showed lively interest in the Polish report. That night, however, General Sikorski was urgently requested to rush to General Weygand an outline of his former report, it being pointed out to him that while the report was undoubtedly somewhere in the files, a search therefor might occupy too much time, and that time was precious. (I recite the foregoing as an illustration of the point I have frequently made: - that events showed that neither the French nor the British manifested sufficient disposition to profit by the experience of the Poles).

According to French military authorities, events showed that the following ratios existed between French and German equipment respectively: tanks 1-18; automatic rifles 1-35; guns (French 75s) - (German 105s) 1-12; combat divisions 1-3. Moreover, military authorities point out that under the Popular Front Government, the Hochkiss plant was turning out one tank per month and that on May first of this year, Hochkiss was producing four tanks per day, or one hundred and twenty tanks per month.

Insufficient air strength both for attack and for intercepting adversary's bombers in defense of centers which were the objectives of German bombing attacks. According to

* See Annex A attached hereto.
to General Sikorski, the quality of planes flown by thirty Polish, among other pilots composing the intercepting forces in defense of Paris, as well as those planes flown by pilots defending the industrial region of Clermont-Ferrand, and the supply bases of the Le Mans-Angers-Nantes area, were distinctly second class.

Germany's effective bombardment of French air fields, especially in southwest France during the latter part of the struggle, served to disorganize French aerial defense. Moreover, a large part of the aviation industry, located in the Paris district, was by that time in the adversary's hands. Indeed, only about 20 percent of the machinery entailed in this industry had been evacuated southwestwards by June 12. Events showed moreover, that France's main industrial centers, and a large part of French fuel oil storage, were disadvantageously located from a strategic standpoint. This unfortunately also proved the case with regard to the coal mines. Indeed, the adversary's rapid advance cut off, even in the early stage of the conflict, France's access to these essential centers and thus crippled France's ability to replace equipment lost in action.

Moreover, and it is a sad commentary, there were hundreds of thousands of French soldiers in depots behind the lines, for
for whom not a gun or revolver was available. When the French nation as a whole becomes cognizant of this fact, the reaction may be expected to be a bitter one.

(B) French diplomacy, it would seem, lacked a sense of reality; it suffered from the following illusions:

It overestimated Britain's potential capacity to aid France, and under estimated the potential striking force of Germany's military and aerial strength, and Germany's determination to gain supremacy over Western as well as Eastern and Central Europe. In my opinion, moreover, both French and British diplomacy have, for the past few years in their relations to one another, conducted what frequently smacked of a game of bluff. In fact, I have long doubted that full disclosure and frankness as to the respective position of each country, was at all times practiced between London and Paris.

It overestimated the mood and capacity of the United States to arm and prepare itself adequately and in sufficient time to come to the aid of the Allies.

In this connection, I am inclined to feel that French diplomacy failed to discern that Germany was counting upon succeeding in a "Blitzkrieg" vis-a-vis Western Europe before the United States could achieve a state of thorough war-preparedness. Moreover, statesmanship and diplomacy of Britain as well as France tried to apply 1914-18 methods to the settlement of 1935-40 problems.

France
France had for long, on the one hand, practiced an 
offensive foreign policy, and on the other hand, a defensive 
military policy, whereas an offensive foreign policy calls 
for a like military policy. (Six years ago, M. Paul Reynaud 
had drawn the French public's attention to the foregoing. 
At the same time, he had publicly urged the High Command to 
include in its military program, 10 heavy and 1 light 
motorized armored divisions. In this connection, he told 
me that it was with profound regret that it was the Germans, 
rather than the French, who had adopted his suggestions. Indeed, 
he added, he had put forth these suggestions on March 5, 1935, 
one month before the Germans moved into the Rhineland).

(C) Morally, France as a whole, was comparatively speaking unprepared. In the first place, France went to war half-
heartedly. Once mobilized, the country was lulled by the 
High Command's and the Government's declared policies, into 
believing they could sit behind the Maginot Line and prevent 
German invasion of their country. Thus they were not prepared 
morally to meet a surprise move by the adversary.

As in the case of Poland, Germany's total tactics included the terrorization of the civilian population. The 
French failed to profit by lessons derived from Poland's 
experience and therefore did not anticipate the terrorizing 
effect upon the civilian population of aerial bombardments and 
swift mechanized thrusts into villages and towns behind the 
lines of combat. Accordingly, the French Government's
failure to regulate in advance the evacuation of cities and farm communities in the path of the attack, led to a repetition of chaotic conditions formerly witnessed in Poland: 1/ the congested traffic caused by the automobiles and wagons of fleeing refugees frequently impeded the necessarily rapid shifting and transportation of troops and supplies; 2/ the sight of long lines of refugees which frequently cut through the lines of march, had a demoralizing effect upon the troops; 3/ arrival of these long pathetic lines of disorganized and be-drugged refugees in towns in the non-combat areas, and the refugees' accounts of what they had witnessed and experienced, served to spread fear and confusion in the interior. Furthermore, the evacuation of great numbers of refugees into Western and Southwestern areas threw an excessive burden thereon and caused the social and economic dislocation of the communities upon which the refugees descended. It is estimated that housing is required for 800,000 refugees in Southwest France.

Over and above the question of French refugees, there was the overwhelming problem of the great mass of Belgian refugees which fled to West and Southwest France after the German invasion of Belgium. In brief, all of this contributed towards a diminution of the fighting spirit throughout the country, at a time when unity of resistance was essential.

Politically, France's post-Great-War period might be characterized in my opinion, by a tendency to "ward politics". It

* See Annex B attached hereto.
It seemed to me that in the shuffling and reshuffling of cabinets, the main national objective was frequently lost in the machinations of petty politics. M. Paul Reynaud appears to have had a clear intellectual foresight as to the nation's military and financial requirements. He came into power late. However, even he did not thoroughly succeed in rising above "ward politics", as was demonstrated by the general character of his cabinets.

Of pertinent bearing, the part which politics played in the French High Command during the period leading up to the outbreak of war and thereafter, until General Gamelin's replacement by General Weygand, was a factor which history will show importantly contributed towards France's defeat.

In illustration of this point: 1/ At the close of the Polish-German conflict, General George imparted to General Sikorski that in early September, the French General Staff, having ascertained that there were only between 12 and 20 divisions in the Siegfried Line, the remainder being engaged in Poland, urged that it was the opportune moment to strike at the adversary. The Government, however, opposed the project and prevailed upon General Gamelin to over-rule his Staff's recommendations. General George, in recounting the foregoing, added his own opinion that an opportunity which might never repeat itself, had thus been lost; 2/ despite the fact (a) that it was generally recognized in military
military circles that both Holland and Belgium would play both sides up to the last moment, (b) that for years the "Schlieffen plan" of attack had been an open secret, and (c) that French military observers had already witnessed the German "Condor Legion" take by storm and penetrate a "line" in Southwest Poland, similar in character to the "Daladier Line", the French Government and High Command neglected to extend the Maginot Line to the Channel.

Moreover, when the time came for the French Government and High Command to make a decision as to the strategic wisdom of sending an Allied Expeditionary Force into Holland and Belgium, to aid these countries against the invader, the French General Staff, (according to my authoritative informants), were definitely opposed thereto, giving as reason therefor, the fact that Holland's and Belgian's call for assistance had come too late to afford the Allied forces essential time and opportunity to advance without being subjected to aerial attack, and to gain strategic position in the invaded territory in order to render effective aid; furthermore, the Germans had gotten the jump on the Allies, and a rush expedition might therefore encounter the grave danger of being cut off by the adversary. French Government circles, however, due to political consideration, favored the expedition. They felt that failure to aid Holland and Belgium would incur unfavorable world opinion. Hence, as against the General Staff's opinion, Government circles

finally
finally prevailed upon General Gamelin who, due more to political than military considerations involved, issued the orders for the expedition.

On the other hand, it may be said that the battle of the Somme proved a forerunner to the "crack up" of French organized defense. Accordingly, from June 8, (the start of this battle) to June 13, when I discerned that the last vestige of organized resistance was crumbling, (a matter of but five days), the coordination of French combat forces rapidly disintegrated.

In my telephonic conversation from Cande, with Ambassador Bullitt, in Paris, on June 12, he asked me as to when, from my point of observation, I expected the "whistle to blow", I replied "48 hours". It was clear to me, at that juncture that the end was near at hand. As matters turned out, by June 13, the Germans had succeeded in definitely dividing the French forces into three separate groups with little if any coordination and liaison between them. (Similar to what occurred in Poland).

On the evening of the same day of my aforementioned telephone conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, accompanied by Lord Halifax and Lord Beaverbrook, arrived in Tours by plane. That night (June 12), President Lebrun called a meeting of his Government. M. Reynaud subsequently told me that he sensed at that meeting that French resistance was practically exhausted.
He was aware that Marshal Petain, Generals Weygand, Colson, Georges and other military authorities, were opposed to further resistance. The Marshal went even so far as to state that there was no hope and that he was ready to sacrifice himself to preserve what was left of France. He emphasized moreover, that he would not be one to leave France to carry on the war from some colonial territory.

M. Reynaud went on to recount that in the course of the meeting he went to the Prefecture at Tours to meet Mr. Churchill and his two companions. He spent an hour in conversation with Mr. Churchill. In response to M. Reynaud's conveying the French military authorities' stated requirements from Britain in terms of aid, Mr. Churchill revealed that Britain could offer comparatively few planes (about one third of France's stated requirements) to be permanently based upon France, and but 20 divisions, by March 1941. M. Reynaud thereupon asked Mr. Churchill whether under the circumstances, the British Government would understand if France had to give up the struggle - and accordingly if he should find it necessary to step aside for another Government which might ask for an armistice. He moreover asked Mr. Churchill whether the British Government would still feel that France had not welched on its contract and whether France might be given favorable consideration when the time came to sit around the Peace Table. Mr. Churchill thereupon walked about the garden in consultation with Lord Halifax and Lord
Lord Beaverbrook, deliberating for another three quarters of an hour. Meanwhile, the French Council of Ministers awaited M. Reynaud's return. Finally, Mr. Churchill, as spokesman for his two companions, told M. Reynaud that they would understand France's position in the event of what M. Reynaud had pointed out. At the same time, however, Mr. Churchill emphasized that anything that he and his two companions might say must not be construed as a decision of their Government - but a decision representing only the reactions of three individuals. Mr. Churchill and his two companions thereupon took leave of M. Reynaud, stating that their time was up and that they must return by plane to England. M. Reynaud went back to the awaiting Council of Ministers and conveyed to his associates the substance of his conversation with the British Prime Minister and his two associates, pointing out that they could not attend the meeting themselves as their time was limited.

In view of Marshal Pétain's remarks to the effect that France's position was hopeless and that he was prepared to sacrifice himself to preserve what was left of France, and in face of opposition to M. Reynaud's stated policy of continued resistance, especially on the part of High military authority, M. Reynaud told me that he sensed, before the close of the meeting, that he was destined to pave the way for another Government which he would have to step aside to make peace on the best possible terms, and one which might at the same time be able to prevent revolution throughout the country. (It was at this meeting that M. Chautemps proposed
proposed that it should be ascertained what would be the proposed peace terms, rather than armistice terms.

M. Reynaud told me that his reaction was to agree with M. Chautemps, but he stated without being very clear as to the reasons, that the proposition was not adopted.

I recall his having added that since taking office as Prime Minister he had initiated a policy of resistance, economically, politically and militarily, but his ascendancy to power had come too late. Statesmen, he said, should not listen too intently to specialists, who see only their own particular problems - a statesman must maintain an open mind and imagination - he alone can judge in perspective, once he has all the facts in hand. He must take into consideration internal as well as external political conditions, and the bearing of the one on the other.

The conflict, in terms of leadership, armed forces and equipment, might be described in parlance of the boxing ring, as that of a good but inadequately trained amateur, versus a first class well conditioned professional. Indeed, France's defeat proved an illustration of a nation "gone soft" in face of what the leaders of France should realistically have foreseen as an inevitable clash with the modern equipment and total tactics of modern warfare of a Germany determined to gain sovereignty over an envisagedly pan-Germanic Europe. In fact, during the post Great-War period there was a bankruptcy in leadership in France.

Judging
Judging by what I have witnessed in Poland and again in France, I am of the definite opinion that it is of the utmost urgency that we in the United States, are not merely in terms of defense, but in terms of the capacity to attack.

Moreover, it is essential that we either rid the country of, or place in concentration camps, any and all persons involved in 5th column activities, for no matter how efficient and well coordinated our military, naval and aerial services might be, 5th column activities can undermine and dislocate even the best organized systems, as well as various aspects of the national structure as a whole. In this connection, I am of the firm conviction (as I confidentially recommended to Director Edgar Hoover of the F.B.I. in 1934, after an extensive study and report on gangster conditions and their extermination), that we should immediately institute a system of identity cards - perhaps "softened" for public consumption, by some such title as "internal passports". This would facilitate the efforts of the police and Secret Services in combating "inside job" machinations.

Of pertinent bearing, the outcome of events thus far indicates that for the immediate future at least, the countries of the Western Hemisphere are, with few exceptions, the only ones now left wherein diplomacy as we have hitherto been accustomed to regard it, can still succeed. Even in Mexico, Central and South America, however, our diplomats must
must henceforth be backed up by factors capable of countering 5th column activities of other powers. Otherwise, the effective subversive work carried out among the masses would more than counteract the efforts, no matter how successful, of the diplomatic representatives. Indeed, we may look with certainty to increasing pressure upon our direct and indirect interests, through 5th column activity agents in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and other bases in Central and South America.

As for the Continent, there appears to be little if any field left for diplomacy as formerly recognized. No formal relations between sovereign states, based upon friendship, trade agreements, pacts of other character, and alliances would appear possible. When a large portion of the world is taken over by countries whose principle industry is conquest by force of arms, the practice of diplomacy, in so far as concerns the latter, may naturally be expected to disappear. As I personally witnessed in Poland, and as I was informed by Polish official circles, regarding Argentina and Brazil, the Germans use the immunity which diplomatic status renders them, to create centers of propaganda and to organize spy systems. Indeed, it is now clear that the diplomatic representatives of the European dictators, are merely the agents of spy systems or organizations for internal disruption of countries which have been picked out as prospective victims.

Whether and how long the democratic system of our country and the other Americas can live across the ever-narrowing ocean from a continent dominated by dictators,
and all that this implies, without clashing, is problematical. What with Germany's intoxication over her series of successes in having gained control over virtually the whole European continent, I do not exclude the likelihood either of a veiled or open challenge to our rights under the Monroe Doctrine in the near future. Of one thing there is little doubt however: that our normal trade channels may soon be expected to experience the strain of pressure of the two European Dictators to elbow out our trade, with their barter system, clearings, and other forms of restricted trade. Hence, I take occasion to reiterate with emphasis, that in arming, we should do so in terms not merely of defense, but in terms of the capacity to attack if need be.

a.60/27
Outline of plan for defense and counter-tactics against mechanized thrusts as well as mechanized thrusts coordinated with successive waves of low-flying planes, as developed by the Polish forces in Poland, and subsequently improved by the Polish General Staff in France.

Plan of defense and counter tactics against mechanized thrusts; envisages the following:

1. It is of utmost importance to anticipate mechanized attacks. It is therefore essential to maintain constant reconnaissance over the adversary's front and back areas to detect signs of mechanized concentrations, in order to be prepared to counter with tanks coordinated, whenever possible with successive waves of low-flying planes.

2. In case (a) the counter attack fails at the outset to arrest the advance of the adversary's column, however; or (b) part of the adversary's column breaks loose from the engagement and heads for the front line; or (c) of a surprise attack; the plan calls for the following:

   The front line of combat must open a gap sufficient through which to permit only the tank column to pass, thereupon attacking the motorized infantry column, and motorized fuel oil supply. It is important moreover, that the line of combat is to remain at the line, and not to pursue the columns towards the rear.

3. An area of from 60 to 80 kilometers in depth behind the front line and running the length thereof, is to be regarded
regarded as a "battle area" wherein mechanized thrusts which might penetrate the front lines are to be intercepted and destroyed. For this purpose, (a) swift moving anti-tank units composed of heavy plated tanks equipped with 75s and heavy caliber anti-tank cannon, are to be stationed at strategic points just behind the fighting front, and (b) troops and mobile units equipped with 75s are to be strategically placed in echelon throughout this area. It is the duty of these units to engage, run down, and "put out of business" within the "battle area" the adversary's mechanized thrusts if and when the latter break through the front line of combat. Collaboration between the "anti-tank units and the troops in echelon is essential. The latter as well as the crews of the anti-tank units are to be equipped with anti-tank grenades and anti-tank rifles (such as were developed in Poland just as the war broke out).

4. It is important that planes of the light bomber type (equipped with heavy machine guns as well as bombs) collaborate with the "anti-tank units" in the "battle area". (At the battle of the Somme, once the vulnerability of the German tank roofs to heavy machine gun fire was revealed, French planes equipped with the newly developed machine gun, synchronized with the Hispano engine, performed effectively from low altitude).

Defense and counter tactics against mechanized thrusts coordinated
coordinated with low-flying planes calls for measures similar in general to the foregoing with the following additional tactics:

It is necessary whenever possible that planes, coordinated with tanks, counter attack and engage the aerial as well as ground units entailed in the adversary's attack.

It is important to note that the front line infantry, unless in the open, should take intelligent advantage of whatever cover their trenches offer, i.e. they must shoulder into the side of the trench against the direction of the aerial machine gun fire. As the direction of fire changes, so should the infantrymen accordingly adjust their position. (To facilitate cover against aerial machine gun fire, trenches should be dug according to a crenelated pattern. 

[Signature]
ANNEX B

Political developments which culminated in France's capitulation.

Upon arrival in Tours on June 11, it was evident to me that a struggle between defeated and resistance elements in Governmental and High military circles had gotten well under way. Each hour thenceforth saw this conflict increase in intensity. By June 13, the night of the Government's arrival in Bordeaux, the conflict was clearly headed for an early showdown.

Despite the known presence of the 5th column and its ever-alarm ears, moreover, both in Tours and subsequently in Bordeaux, it was apparent that at least certain members of the Government were exercising a marked lack of discretion. Frequently important decisions of even the most confidential character, taken behind the closed doors of the Councils of Ministers meetings, quickly became common gossip on the street of Tours and Bordeaux. That this indiscretion enabled the 5th column to keep Berlin posted on practically every thought and move of the French Government, there is little doubt in my mind.

Marshal Petain declared his opinion at a Council of Ministers on June 14, that after June 13, France had no hope. (M. Paul Reynaud later confirmed this fact to me). Whether

* See section 1, Annex C
this was deliberately put into circulation by certain
defeatist members of the Government then already aligned
on the side of the Marshal, as opposed to M. Reynaud, and
his supporters, it nevertheless spread rapidly among the
masses, who by that time had reached a point where they
apparently preferred peace at almost any price rather than
continue a war which from the outset seem to be not a
popular issue. If the defeatists had circulated the
Marshal's statement in order to demobilize whatever fighting
spirit might have remained at that time, they decidedly
accomplished their purpose.

Generally speaking, Southwest France at that juncture
was a combination of (a) local population; (b) people who
had sought refuge there from the war zone some months
previously and who were generally disgruntled over cramped
living conditions; (c) those who had only recently fled to
this region from sections of Northern France in the path of
the invader. These had experienced in many cases aerial
machine gunning and bombardments as they fled along the roads.

As regards the mental attitude of the foregoing
categories, there was in general, marked apathy and complacency
in connection with Marshal Pétain's reported opinion and the
subsequent report of the Government's intention to seek
armistice terms.
On the other hand, this apathy and complacence indicated that little if any considered thought had been devoted to what might be in store for the country, once demobilized and under the German yoke. Further, this apparent apathy and complacence might perhaps be attributed to the following among other factors:

A latent state of mind prepared to accept defeatism, ran, in my opinion, like an undercurrent, through the minds of all France - not in Governmental circles alone, but probably throughout the whole country at large. As circumstances became more acute, the potential defeatists became emboldened to express themselves without fear of being arrested or even shot. It was like a rising tide that quietly permeated. Hence few were surprised to learn that France was defeated, and certainly not sufficiently enraged to react.

As for those who composed the energetic element of the inner circle of the "Dictatorship of Defeatists", history may tell whether, through possible indirect contact with German official sources, they were under the illusion that a cessation of resistance would not comparatively easy terms.

Between June 14 and 16, when M. Reynaud was succeeded by Marshal Petain, the latter's supporters were busily engaged in setting the scene for the Marshal's advent to power, and in atuning mass mentality to acceptance of armistice negotiations.
negotiations. The keynote of their program at this juncture was to deplore openly the sad plight of the rapidly increasing lines of hungry and homeless refugees along the roads between the Loire and Bordeaux and points further south. This, among other subtle machinations, presaged, to my mind, an early move for peace.

During this period a number of leading members of the Government, as well as the Admiral of the Fleet, solemnly assured me (as I subsequently cabled in each case) that if an armistice were sought, the Fleet would never be allowed to fall into the hands of the adversary, regardless of the character of the terms. In fact, Admiral Darlan emphasized to me that he had dictated to his Chief of Staff, a message which had already been ciphered and awaited only the date, containing certain instructions to the officers of the Fleet. While in response to my question the Admiral said he could not disclose the contents of the message, he could however, assure me that his instructions definitely prevented the Fleet's falling into the hands of the adversary.*

On the night of June 18, a Council of Ministers was held wherein Marshal Pétain and his supporters for a separate armistice, formed a majority against M. Reynaud and his supporters for continued resistance - culminating in M. Reynaud's resignation. (As I have formerly pointed out, M. Reynaud subsequently told me that as early as the night of the 12th at Tours, he sensed in the face of growing opposition, especially among the leading Generals, that he was destined to make

* See sections 2,3,4 of Annex C.
make way for another Government which might make peace and prevent revolution within the country).

Of connected bearing, it was generally acknowledged among unofficial as well as official circles, that Marshal Pétain had been chosen as Chief to the succeeding Government, in that he was considered the only man who could lead the people into acceptance of what was expected to be stiff armistice terms, and at the same time prevent revolution. (At that juncture, I was of the opinion that the Marshal, General Weygand and the other Generals who favored capitulation, were picturing "dealing across the table" in terms of the Germans of the era of Bismark and Wilhelm II).

Immediately after M. Reynaud's resignation he and his group of supporters for continued resistance: Messez Herriot, Jeanonnet, Mendel among others, decided on a bold move: - to persuade President Lebrun to leave France for Morocco where, together they would forthwith set up a Constitutional Government. This move, they felt, would enable the French Fleet and what remained of the French air force, to continue operations in cooperation with the troops in North Africa. Although M. Herriot was a staunch advocate of this action, he told me with no uncertain emphasis that he felt that the people of France had been martyrs, and that while he believed in the setting up of a Government in Morocco, and the continuance of the struggle, he would be the first one to call
call a halt to this continued resistance if he felt that the French Fleet, Air force, and remaining troops in Morocco were to be left alone to carry on the fight without early active aid from the United States.

When it was decided at the Council of Ministers meeting on the 10th of June, to ask Germany for armistice terms, the line subsequently adopted by members of Marshal Petain's Government was to the effect that upon receipt of the German terms, public opinion would be sounded out in regard thereto. The belief was expressed moreover, that the terms would be so stiff as to cause mass revulsion thereto and thus enable the Government to refuse them. This in turn would justify the departure of sufficient of the Government to Morocco to form a Constitutional group there.

Subsequent events however, showed that the foregoing expressed belief on the part of Marshal Petain's supporters was aimed merely at retarding the resistance groups' preparations to make a speedy departure for Morocco, and thus to gain time wherein to exercise strict police surveillance over the movements of the resistance group.

Moreover, it did not take Marshal Petain and the directing "brain" behind the scene of his Government, M. Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, long, to jockey the aforementioned resistance group out of position both in relation to the masses and to the Naval and Air forces. The Marshal's regime instantly adopted the role of a "Dictatorship of Defeatists" seized
seized control of the press and radio, and thus deprived
the resistance group of the means of contacting or influencing
public opinion.

I furthermore sensed that the appointment of Admiral
Darlan as Minister of Marine in the Marshal's Government was
motivated by a subtle purpose. That the Marshal and his
supporters were aware of the Admiral's avowed determination
to prevent the Fleet's falling into the adversary's hands,
I had little doubt. Hence, I had more than a suspicion,
that his inclusion in the Government envisaged the exercise
of close surveillance over his activities, and if need be,
bringing the strongest kind of pressure to bear upon him,
in event of any signs of sabotage by his officers and men.

I must admit, moreover, that his acceptance of the
appointment shocked my illusions to no small degree— for
I had gained a high opinion of him and I felt that the
Admiral's place during war time was with his fleet and not
around the table with a Government engaged in surrendering
the country to the adversary. Indeed, his cabinet appointment
and his acceptance thereof represented to my mind a subtle
victory for the defeatists.

Shortly after his assuming office, reports reached me
through competent channels that word, which in my opinion,
found its inspiration among the more resourceful and more
energetic of the Admiral's cabinet associates, was being
circulated
circulated throughout the Admiralty and the Naval officers and ranks, to the effect that to sabotage the terms of armistice would result (a) in bringing down reprisals on the heads of the people in France; and (b) in causing reprisals against the families of the officers and men engaged directly or indirectly in the sabotage.

On the heels of this report, came the report from the Chief of the Second Bureau of the Admiralty, to my Military Attache, to the effect that already 95 percent of the Admiralty had become Anglo-phobes and that there was a discernible tendency to pro-Germanism.

Concurrent with these reports, Foreign Minister Baudouin in my frequent conversations with him, emphasized that one of the most difficult problems his Government had to contend with, was the curbing of the rapid growth of Anglophobia in all sections of French public opinion.

The inclusion of M. Laval in the Government as Vice Prime Minister was the occasion for an address by him to a group of French parliamentarians. This address was given wide circulation by Radio broadcast and throughout the press. In effect, M. Laval declared it was the duty of all political leaders to remain in the country, and that any who left would be rendering their country a great disservice.

At this stage, reports were reaching me that French troops along the Loire were increasingly throwing down their arms and deserting the lines, subsequently straggling southward
southward in small groups along the roads. Competent witnesses thereof informed me confidentially that in most cases these men openly declared that rather than remain in the line of combat with little if any ammunition supply, they preferred to return to their homes and defend their families with bare fists. They moreover declared their bitterness against the Governments which had let them down by not having sufficiently prepared the country for this war. Thus the atmosphere of defeatism mounted from hour to hour.

By this time, I was authoritatively informed that President Lebrun had developed a severe case of "jitters" and that he was incapable of making a decision to proceed to Morocco. On the other hand, M. Mandel, sensing the futility of further attempts either to persuade President Lebrun to accompany the resistance group to Morocco or to overcome Marshal Petain's attempts to prevent the resistance group's departure, seized the first opportunity to sail for England with a number of leading politicians, aboard a French transport.

It is interesting to note in this connection that M. Laval's declaration stigmatizing as deserters, Frenchmen who left the country, had already had such a widespread effect that the crew of the French transport mutinied against sailing for England with French political leaders, and it therefore became necessary to replace the crew with a French naval crew.

a. jobar
NOTES PERTAINING TO THE MAIN TEXT:

1. Before leaving Angers on June 11 for Tours to be near the French Government I conferred at length with the military authorities at the Polish Ministry of War as well as with the Polish Foreign Office. It was the consensus of opinion that while the collapse of the French 9th Army, under pressure of the German mechanized attack might have been attributed in part to the element of surprise, the mechanized break-through two days after the commencement of the battle of the Somme, indicated that the capacity of the French equipment was inadequate to withstand these thrusts. Nevertheless, the French acquitted themselves creditably, considering the odds against them in terms of tanks, since they succeeded in putting out of business about 25 percent of the adversary's 1200 tanks engaged in the thrust. However, about 900 thereof actually penetrated far into the back area, destroying with their "flame-blowing" units, ammunition dumps and other supply stores. Having in Poland, witnessed like tank penetrations deep into the back areas, due to lack of sufficient equipment to check their advance at the outset, I recognized that the aforementioned break-through at the Somme, represented a grave turn for the French forces, presaging perhaps even an early collapse thereof.

2. I had a lengthy conversation with the British First Lord of Admiralty, Mr. Alexander, together with the British Ambassador
Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell, during the First Lord's visit to Bordeaux. They both spoke with complete frankness. The First Lord said that Admiral Darlan had given him solemn assurances that the French Fleet would not fall into German hands. Moreover, Mr. Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had given the Ambassador like assurances in behalf both of himself and the other members of the Government. I sensed however, that despite these solemn assurances neither the First Lord nor the Ambassador were at heart optimistic as to the final outcome.

It was during the course of this discussion that, as I subsequently cabled, the First Lord emphasized with great earnestness that it was of the utmost importance that Britain acquire at the earliest moment no less than 5 flotillas of destroyers (each flotilla numbering 9 destroyers, according to his calculations). He said moreover, that if we could not let them have the "leaders", the British Navy could, in a pinch, make other arrangements. He furthermore stressed the importance of our making available to them all possible planes, for newly created conditions would necessitate among other activities, daily reconnaissance over about 2000 miles of coast - from the North Cape to Brest.

3. On several occasions Mr. Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Pétain Government, solemnly assured me that it was the unanimous determination on the part of himself and
the other members of the Government that the Fleet should not fall into the hands of the adversary - that I could assure the President on this score.

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4. In conversation with Mr. Baudouin at the time his Government had asked for armistice terms, I reminded him that since it was not unlikely that the adversaries' terms would involve colonial demands, it was important that his Government bear in mind that, for obvious reasons, the United States could not look with indifference upon a change in the status of French colonies. Mr. Baudouin assured me he was well aware of this, and that I need have no fears on this score, emphasizing that he voiced the reactions of his associates as well as himself.

I subsequently learned that an act had been framed envisaging the vesting in Colonial Governors full authority to act independently of the French Government. (Whether this bill was written and given superficial consideration merely as palliative for the "resistance group" in order to gain time during armistice "negotiations", remains to be seen). However, the bill which from its inception was guarded with secrecy, failed, to the best of my knowledge, to materialize.

Meanwhile armistice "negotiations" which had commenced, were proceeding rapidly.

Upon receipt of the Italian terms M. Baudouin pointed out
out with a discernible air of satisfaction that neither the German nor the Italian demands included the cession of Colonies. (I am still disinclined to believe that a mentality as alert as that of M. Baudouin could make such a remark without being conscious of "whistling in the dark").
My dear Mr. President:

First of all, I want you to know that I am deeply sensible of the confidence you placed in me, and of the honor you payed me by having assigned me to the Special Mission near the French Government during the period when Bill Bullitt, due to his remaining in Paris, was cut off therefrom. I hardly need reiterate how I value your confidence and I assure you that I did everything within my power in an effort to justify that confidence.

Then I want you to know how grand it was to hear your voice on the telephone during those dark hours in Bordeaux. It inspired me to even greater determination to overcome the Capitulatist program of the "Dictatorship of Defeatists" which was then taking form.

I have, as you may well picture, witnessed a tragic spectacle. Having experienced all aspects of the tragedy in Poland, I was able to spot the symptoms on my arrival in Tours on June eleventh, of pending collapse. Bill Bullitt telephoned me on the twelfth to Chateau Conde (near Tours) and asked me when I thought "the whistle would blow"--I answered, "48 hours." It was clear to me by this that disintegration had already set in, that the end was near at hand -- a sad sight to behold!

Even before leaving Augiers for Tours, Polish Military as well as Governmental authorities emphasized, in my conversations with them, that, while the French 9th Army's defeat might be marked down possibly to a surprise attack by mechanized forces the fact that 2 days after the start of the battle of the Somme a mechanized thrust of 1200 tanks broke through the French front lines, and that 75% of this tank column succeeded in penetrating deep into the French back area, destroying ammunition dumps and other supply storages, showed that the French capacity, in terms of equipment, to arrest these thrusts at the outset, and to run them down in the back areas was no longer adequate.

Hence, even before leaving Augiers for Tours, I was aware that realistic military observers among the Polish War Office circles had ceased to be hopeful of the French capacity
to resist continued German mechanized attacks. It was clear by this time that the French lacked the equipment necessary for the task.

While I did my utmost to keep you posted by cable on the swift moving events, it occurred to me that you might like to have a summary of developments in their chronological order. Hence, I have written, and am attaching hereto a memorandum with annexes covering the more important aspects of the course of events. I hope it may prove further enlightening and helpful to you.

As my exhaustive search for means of travel either by air or sea to England via northern Spanish ports has netted no results, I am cabling you for permission to proceed to Lisbon, then to continue my search. As my inquiries from here concerning possible means of travel from Lisbon to England have thus far met with rather vague response, I feel that an on-the-spot inquiry may possible prove more fruitful.

These are indeed busy and important hours for you, and my thoughts are with you -- as are my every wish for your continued success with your tremendous task!

Margaret, who was deeply touched by your hating asked after her on the telephone the other day in Bordeaux, joins me in every good wish.

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle, Jr.,

July tenth, 1940
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July 1940

Your faithfully,

Tony Biddle
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a report from Tony Biddle which he feels is very timely right now and he hopes you will have a chance to glance through it.

M. A. LeH.
San Sebastian, Spain  
July 1, 1940

MEMORANDUM
OBSERVATIONS ON FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO FRANCE'S DEFEAT.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND THE UNDERSECRETARY.

The following factors, in my opinion, contributed towards France's defeat:

Events have shown that France was (A) militarily, (B) diplomatically, and (C) morally unprepared.

(A) The French military system, based upon a general scheme envisaging mainly defensive warfare, proved faulty, obsolete, incapable of coping with the maneuver ability and crushing force of Germany's modern equipment and attack or "Blitzkreig" tactics of total warfare. Moreover, with the exception of several days previous to the major attack on the Somme, the French forces, as was formerly the case with the Polish against the German forces, were afforded no "breathing spell" in which to reconsolidate and to redress their lines. Moreover, French military and Naval Intelligence Services had failed either to estimate correctly the effective striking force of the adversary or to stress the importance of maintaining French equipment upon a standard capable of coping with that of Germany, and thus to adopt French tactics to German strategy which had already been demonstrated
In this connection I discerned upon arrival in France from Poland, at the close of the Polish-German conflict, that Western European political and military circles were more given to criticizing the break-down in Polish defense than to acknowledge the brilliance and effectiveness of the German attack in all its aspects (aside of course, from the barbaric tactics). While I am aware that the French military authorities were impressed by the effective employment of German tanks in Poland, and accordingly ordered a rapid increase in French tank production, I am inclined to believe that insufficient importance was attached to that form of attack which entailed the coordination of tanks and low-flying planes. Moreover, it was evident that insufficient attention was devoted both to defense and to countering measures against this form of attack. It was the latter which proved so demoralizing to the French 9th Army at the Meuse as well as elsewhere along the battle front.

Although the Commanding General of the Polish Army in France, in collaboration with General Sosnkowski, the Defender of Lwow, had rendered General Gamelin a complete report in early November, on Polish counter tactics against tanks and low-flying
low-flying planes*, it was not until the night of General Gamelin's replacement by General Weygand that the French General Staff, according to General Sikorski, showed lively interest in the Polish report. That night, however, General Sikorski was urgently requested to rush to General Weygand an outline of his former report, it being pointed out to him that while the report was undoubtedly somewhere in the files, a search therefor might occupy too much time, and that time was precious. (I recite the foregoing as an illustration of the point I have frequently made: that events showed that neither the French nor the British manifested sufficient disposition to profit by the experience of the Poles).

According to French military authorities, events showed that the following ratios existed between French and German equipment respectively: tanks 1-18; combat divisions 1-3; automatic rifles 1-35; guns (French 75s) - (German 105s) 1-12. Moreover, military authorities point out that under the Popular Front Government, the Hochkiss plant was turning out one tank per month and that on May first of this year, Hochkiss was producing four tanks per day, or one hundred and twenty tanks per month.

Insufficient air strength both for attack and for intercepting adversary's bombers in defense of centers which were the objectives of German bombing attacks. According to

* See Annex A attached hereto.
to General Sikorski, the quality of planes flown by thirty Polish, among other pilots composing the intercepting forces in defense of Paris, as well as those planes flown by pilots defending the industrial region of Clermont-Ferrand, and the supply bases of the Le Man-Angers-Nantes area, were distinctly second class.

Germany's effective bombardment of French air fields, especially in southwest France during the latter part of the struggle, served to disorganize French aerial defense. Moreover, a large part of the aviation industry, located in the Paris district, was by that time in the adversary's hands. Indeed, only about 20 percent of the machinery entailed in this industry had been evacuated southwestwards by June 12. Events showed moreover, that France's main industrial centers, and a large part of French fuel oil storage, were disadvantageously located from a strategic standpoint. This unfortunately also proved the case with regard to the coal mines. Indeed, the adversary's rapid advance cut off, even in the early stage of the conflict, France's access to these essential centers and thus crippled France's ability to replace equipment lost in action.

Moreover, and it is a sad commentary, there were hundreds of thousands of French soldiers in depots behind the lines for
for whom not a gun or revolver was available. When the French nation as a whole becomes cognizant of this fact, the reaction may be expected to be a bitter one.

(B) French diplomacy, it would seem, lacked a sense of reality; it suffered from the following illusions: It overestimated Britain's potential capacity to aid France, and under estimated the potential striking force of Germany's military and aerial strength, and Germany's determination to gain supremacy over Western as well as Eastern and Central Europe. In my opinion, moreover, both French and British diplomacy have, for the past few years in their relations to one another, conducted what frequently smacked of a game of bluff. In fact, I have long doubted that full disclosure and frankness as to the respective position of each country, was at all times practiced between London and Paris.

It overestimated the mood and capacity of the United States to arm and prepare itself adequately and in sufficient time to come to the aid of the Allies.

In this connection, I am inclined to feel that French diplomacy failed to discern that Germany was counting upon succeeding in a "Blitzkrieg" vis-a-vis Western Europe before the United States could achieve a state of thorough war-preparedness. Moreover, statesmanship and diplomacy of Britain as well as France tried to apply 1914-18 methods to the settlement of 1935-40 problems.

France.
France had for long, on the one hand, practiced an offensive foreign policy, and on the other hand, a defensive military policy, whereas an offensive foreign policy calls for a like military policy. (Six years ago, M. Paul Reynaud had drawn the French public's attention to the foregoing. At the same time, he had publicly urged the High Command to include in its military program, 10 heavy and 1 light motorized armored divisions. In this connection, he told me that it was with profound regret that it was the Germans, rather than the French, who had adopted his suggestions. Indeed, he added, he had put forth these suggestions on March 5, 1935—more than one month before the Germans moved into the Rhineland).

(C) Morally, France as a whole, was comparatively speaking unprepared. In the first place, France went to war half-heartedly. Once mobilized, the country was lulled by the High Command's and the Government's declared policies, into believing they could sit behind the Maginot Line and prevent German invasion of their country. Thus they were not prepared morally to meet a surprise move by the adversary.

As in the case of Poland, Germany's total tactics included the terrorization of the civilian population. The French failed to profit by lessons derived from Poland's experience and therefore did not anticipate the terrorizing effect upon the civilian population of aerial bombardments and swift mechanized thrusts into villages and towns behind the lines of combat. Accordingly, the French Government's failure
failure to regulate in advance the evacuation of cities and farm communities in the path of the attack, led to a repetition of chaotic conditions formerly witnessed in Poland:
1/ the congested traffic caused by the automobiles and wagons of fleeing refugees frequently impeded the necessarily rapid shifting and transportation of troops and supplies; 2/ the sight of long lines of refugees which frequently cut through the lines of march, had a demoralizing effect upon the troops; 3/ arrival of these long pathetic lines of disorganized and be-draggled refugees in towns in the non-combat areas, and the refugees' accounts of what they had witnessed and experienced, served to spread fear and confusion in the interior. Furthermore, the evacuation of great numbers of refugees into Western and Southwestern areas three an excessive burden thereon and caused the social and economic dislocation of the communities upon which the refugees descended. It is estimated that housing is required for 800,000 refugees in Southwest France.

Over and above the question of French refugees, there was the overwhelming problem of the great mass of Belgian refugees who fled to West and Southwest France after the German invasion of Belgium. In brief, all of this contributed towards a diminution of the fighting spirit throughout the country, at a time when unity of resistance was essential.

Politically, France's post Great-War period might be characterized in my opinion, by a tendency to "ward politics" *.

It

* See Annex B attached hereto.
It seemed to me that in the shuffling and reshuffling of Cabinets, the main national objective was frequently lost in the machinations of petty politics. M. Paul Reynaud appears to have had a clear intellectual foresight as to the nations' military and financial requirements. He came into power late. However, even he did not thoroughly succeed in rising above "ward politics", as was demonstrated by the general character of his cabinets.

Of pertinent bearing, the part which politics played in the French High Command during the period leading up to the outbreak of war and thereafter, until General Gamelin's replacement by General Weygand, was a factor which history will show importantly contributed towards France's defeat.

In illustration of this point: 1/ At the close of the Polish-German conflict, General George imparted to General Sikorski that in early September, the French General Staff, having ascertained that there were only between 12 and 20 divisions in the Siegfried Line, the remainder being engaged in Poland, urged that it was the opportune moment to strike at the adversary. The Government, however, opposed the project and prevailed upon General Gamelin to over-rule his Staff's recommendations. General George, in recounting the foregoing, added his own opinion that an opportunity which might never repeat itself, had thus been lost; 2/ despite the fact (a) that it was generally recognized in military
military circles that both Holland and Belgium would play both sides up to the last moment, (b) that for years the "Schlieffen plan" of attack had been on open secret, and (c) that French military observers had already witnessed the German "Condor Legion" take by storm and penetrate a "line" in Southwest Poland, similar in character to the "Daladier Line", the French Government and High Command neglected to extend the Maginot Line to the Channel.

Moreover, when the time came for the French Government and High Command to make a decision as to the strategic wisdom of sending an Allied Expeditionary Force into Holland and Belgium, to aid these countries against the invader, the French General Staff, (according to my authoritative informants), were definitely opposed thereto, giving as reason therefor, the fact that Holland's and Belgium's call for assistance had come too late to afford the Allied forces essential time and opportunity to advance without being subjected to aerial attack, and to gain strategic position in the invaded territory in order to render effective aid; furthermore, the Germans had gotten the jump on the Allies, and a rush expedition might therefore encounter the grave danger of being cut off by the adversary. French Government circles, however, due to political consideration, favored the expedition. They felt that failure to aid Holland and Belgium would incur unfavorable world opinion. Hence, as against the General Staff's opinion, Government circles
finally prevailed upon General Gamelin who, due more to political than military considerations involved, issued the orders for the expedition.

On the other hand, it may be said that the battle of the Somme proved a forerunner to the "crack up" of French organized defense. Accordingly, from June 8, (the start of this battle) to June 13, when I discerned that the last vestige of organized resistance was crumbling, (a matter of but five days), the coordination of French combat forces rapidly disintegrated.

In my telephonic conversation from Cande, with Ambassador Bullitt, in Paris, on June 12, he asked me as to when, from my point of observation, I expected the "whistle to blow", I replied "48 hours". It was clear to me, at that juncture that the end was near at hand. As matters turned out, by June 13, the Germans had succeeded in definitely dividing the French forces into three separate groups with little if any coordination and liaison between them. (Similar to what occurred in Poland).

On the evening of the same day of my aforementioned telephone conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, accompanied by Lord Halifax and Lord Beaverbrook, arrived in Tours by plane. That night (June 12), President Lebrun called a meeting of his Government. M. Reynaud subsequently told me that he sensed at that meeting that French resistance was practically exhausted.

He
He was aware that Marshal Petain, Generals Weygand, Colson, Georges and other military authorities, were opposed to further resistance. The Marshal went even so far as to state that there was no hope and that he was ready to sacrifice himself to preserve what was left of France. He emphasized moreover, that he would not be one to leave France to carry on the war from some colonial territory.

M. Reynaud went on to recount that in the course of the meeting he went to the Prefecture at Tours to meet Mr. Churchill and his two companions. He spent an hour in conversation with Mr. Churchill. In response to M. Reynaud's conveying the French military authorities' stated requirements from Britain in terms of aid, Mr. Churchill revealed that Britain could offer comparatively few planes (about one third of France's stated requirements) to be permanently based upon France, and but 20 divisions, by March 1941. M. Reynaud thereupon asked Mr. Churchill whether under the circumstances, the British Government would understand if France had to give up the struggle - and accordingly if he should find it necessary to step aside for another Government which might ask for an armistice. He moreover asked Mr. Churchill whether the British Government would still feel that France had not welched on its contract and whether France might be given favorable consideration when the time came to sit around the Peace Table. Mr. Churchill thereupon walked about the garden in consultation with Lord Halifax and Lord
Lord Beaverbrook, deliberating for another three quarters of an hour. Meanwhile, the French Council of Ministers awaited M. Reynaud's return. Finally, Mr. Churchill, as spokesman for his two companions, told M. Reynaud that they would understand France's position in the event of what M. Reynaud had pointed out. At the same time, however, Mr. Churchill emphasized that anything that he and his two companions might say must not be construed as a decision of their Government - but a decision representing only the reactions of three individuals. Mr. Churchill and his two companions thereupon took leave of M. Reynaud, stating that their time was up and that they must return by plane to England. M. Reynaud went back to the awaiting Council of Ministers and conveyed to his associates the substance of his conversation with the British Prime Minister and his two associates, pointing out that they could not attend the meeting themselves as their time was limited.

In view of Marshal Petain's remarks to the effect that France's position was hopeless and that he was prepared to sacrifice himself to preserve what was left of France, and in face of opposition to M. Reynaud's stated policy of continued resistance, especially on the part of High Military authority, M. Reynaud told me that he sensed, before the close of the meeting, that he was destined to pave the way for another Government for which he would have to step aside to make peace on the best possible terms, and one which might at the same time be able to prevent revolution throughout the country. (It was at this meeting that M. Chautemps proposed
proposed that it should be ascertained what would be the proposed peace terms, rather than armistice terms.

M. Reynaud told me that his reaction was to agree with M. Chautemps, but he stated without being very clear as to the reason, that the proposition was not adopted.

I recall his having added that since taking office as Prime Minister he had initiated a policy of resistance, economically, politically and militarily, but his ascendancy to power had come too late. Statesmen, he said, should not listen too intently to specialists, who see only their own particular problems - a statesman must maintain an open mind and imagination - he alone can judge in perspective, once he has all the facts in hand. He must take into consideration internal as well as external political conditions, and the bearing of the one on the other.

The conflict, in terms of leadership, armed forces and equipment, might be described in parlance of the boxing ring, as that of a good but inadequately trained amateur, versus a first class, well conditioned professional. Indeed, France's defeat proved an illustration of a nation "gone soft" in face of what the leaders of France should realistically have foreseen as an inevitable clash with the modern equipment and total tactics of modern warfare of a Germany determined to gain sovereignty over an envisagedly pan-Germanic Europe. In fact, during the post Great-War period there was a bankruptcy in leadership in France.

Judging
Judging by what I have witnessed in Poland and again in France, I am of the definite opinion that it is of the utmost urgency that we in the United States, arm not merely in terms of defense, but in terms of the capacity to attack.

Moreover, it is essential that we either rid the country of, or place in concentration camps, any and all persons involved in 5th column activities, for no matter how efficient and well coordinated our military, naval and aerial services might be, 5th column activities can undermine and dislocate even the best organized systems, as well as various aspects of the national structure as a whole. In this connection, I am of the firm conviction (as I confidentially recommended to Director Edgar Hoover of the F.B.I. in 1934, after an extensive study and report on gangster conditions and their extermination), that we should immediately institute a system of identity cards - perhaps "softened" for public consumption, by some such title as "internal passports". This would facilitate the efforts of the police and Secret Services in combating "inside job" machinations.

Of pertinent bearing, the outcome of events thus far indicates that for the immediate future at least, the countries of the Western Hemisphere are, with few exceptions, the only ones now left wherein diplomacy as we have hitherto been accustomed to regard it, can still succeed. Even in Mexico, Central and South America, however, our diplomats must
must henceforth be backed up by factors capable of countering 5th column activities of other powers. Otherwise, the effective subversive work carried out among the masses would more than counteract the efforts, no matter how successful, of the diplomatic representatives. Indeed, we may look with certainty to increasing pressure upon our direct and indirect interests, through 5th column activity agents in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and other bases in Central and South America.

As for the Continent, there appears to be little if any field left for diplomacy as formerly recognized. No formal relations between sovereign states, based upon friendship, trade agreements, pacts of other character, and alliances would appear possible. When a large portion of the world is taken over by countries whose principle industry is conquest by force of arms, the practice of diplomacy, in so far as concerns the latter, may naturally be expected to disappear. As I personally witnessed in Poland, and as I was informed by Polish official circles, regarding Argentina and Brazil, the Germans use the immunity which diplomatic status renders them, to create centers of propaganda and to organize spy systems. Indeed, it is now clear that the diplomatic representatives of the European dictators, are merely the agents of spy systems or organizations for internal disruption of countries which have been picked out as prospective victims.

Whether and how long the democratic system of our country and the other Americas can live across the ever-narrowing ocean from a continent dominated by dictators, and
and all that this implies, without clashing, is problematical. What with Germany's intoxication over her series of successes in having gained control over virtually the whole European continent, I do not exclude the likelihood either of a veiled or open challenge to our rights under the Monroe Doctrine in the near future. Of one thing there is little doubt however: that our normal trade channels may soon be expected to experience the strain of pressure of the two European Dictators to elbow out our trade, with their barter system, clearings, and other forms of restricted trade. Hence, I take occasion to reiterate with emphasis, that in arming, we should do so in terms not merely of defense, but in terms of the capacity to attack if need be.
Outline of plan for defense and counter-tactics against mechanized thrusts as well as mechanized thrusts coordinated with successive waves of low-flying planes, as developed by the Polish forces in Poland, and subsequently improved by the Polish General Staff in France.

Plan of defense and counter tactics against mechanized thrusts envisages the following:

1. It is of utmost importance to anticipate mechanized attacks. It is therefore essential to maintain constant reconnaissance over the adversary's front and back areas to detect signs of mechanized concentrations, in order to be prepared to counter with tanks coordinated, whenever possible with successive waves of low-flying planes.

2. In case (a) the counter attack fails at the outset to arrest the advance of the adversary's column, however; or (b) part of the adversary's column breaks loose from the engagement and heads for the front line; or (c) of a surprise attack; the plan calls for the following:

The front line of combat must open a gap sufficient through which to permit only the tank column to pass, thereupon attacking the motorized infantry column, and motorized fuel oil supply. It is important moreover, that the line of combat is to remain at the line, and not to pursue the columns towards the rear.

3. An area of from 60 to 80 kilometers in depth behind the front line and running the length thereof, is to be regarded
regarded as a "battle area" wherein mechanized thrusts which might penetrate the front lines are to be intercepted and destroyed. For this purpose, (a) swift moving anti-tank units composed of heavy plated tanks equipped with 75s and heavy caliber anti-tank cannon, are to be stationed at strategic points just behind the fighting front, and (b) troops and mobile units equipped with 75s are to be strategically placed in echelon throughout this area. It is the duty of these units to engage, run down, and "put out of business" within the "battle area", the adversary's mechanized thrusts if and when the latter break through the front line of combat. Collaboration between the "anti-tank units and the troops in echelon is essential. The latter as well as the crews of the anti-tank units are to be equipped with anti-tank grenades and anti-tank rifles (such as were developed in Poland just as the war broke out).

4. It is important that planes of the light bomber type (equipped with heavy machine guns as well as bombs) collaborate with the "anti-tank units" in the "battle area". (At the battle of the Somme, once the vulnerability of the German tank roofs to heavy machine gun fire was revealed, French planes equipped with the newly developed machine gun, synchronized with the Hispano engine, performed effectively from low altitude).

Defense and counter tactics against mechanized thrusts coordinated
coordinated with low-flying planes calls for measures similar in general to the foregoing with the following additional tactics:

It is necessary whenever possible that planes, coordinated with tanks, counter attack and engage the aerial as well as ground units entailed in the adversary's attack.

It is important to note that the front line infantry, unless in the open, should take intelligent advantage of whatever cover their trenches offer, i.e. they must shoulder into the side of the trench against the direction of the aerial machine gun fire. As the direction of fire changes, so should the infantrymen, accordingly, adjust their position. (To facilitate cover against aerial machine gun fire, trenches should be dug according to a crenelated pattern.)
ANNEX B

Political developments which culminated in France's capitulation.

Upon arrival in Tours* on June 11, it was evident to me that a struggle between defeatist and resistance elements in Governmental and High military circles had gotten well under way. Each hour thenceforth saw this conflict increase in intensity. By June 13, the night of the Government's arrival in Bordeaux, the conflict was clearly headed for an early showdown.

Despite the known presence of the 5th column and its ever-alert ears, moreover, both in Tours and subsequently in Bordeaux, it was apparent that at least certain members of the Government were exercising a marked lack of discretion. Frequently important decisions of even the most confidential character, taken behind the closed doors of the Councils of Ministers meetings, quickly became common gossip on the street of Tours and Bordeaux. That this indiscretion enabled the 5th column to keep Berlin posted on practically every thought and move of the French Government, there is little doubt in my mind.

Marshal Petain declared his opinion at a Council of Ministers on June 14, that after June 13, France had no hope. (M. Paul Reynaud later confirmed this fact to me). Whether

* See Section 1 of Annex C
this was deliberately put into circulation by certain defeatist members of the Government then already aligned on the side of the Marshal, as opposed to M. Reynaud, and his supporters, it nevertheless spread rapidly among the masses, who by that time had reached a point whereat they apparently preferred peace at almost any price rather than continue a war which from the outset seemed to be not a popular issue. If the defeatists had circulated the Marshal's statement in order to demobilize whatever fighting spirit might have remained at that time, they decidedly accomplished their purpose.

Generally speaking, Southwest France at that juncture was a combination of (a) local population; (b) people who had sought refuge there from the war zone some months previously and who were generally disgruntled over cramped living conditions; (c) those who had only recently fled to this region from sections of Northern France in the path of the invader. These had experienced in many cases aerial machine gunning and bombardments as they fled along the roads.

As regards the mental attitude of the foregoing categories, there was in general, marked apathy and complacence in connection with Marshal Petain's reported opinion and the subsequent report of the Government's intention to seek armistice terms.
On the other hand, this apathy and complacence indicated that little if any considered thought had been devoted to what might be in store for the country, once demobilized and under the German yoke. Further, this apparent apathy and complacence might perhaps be attributed to the following among other factors:

A latent state of mind prepared to accept defeatism, ran, in my opinion, like an undercurrent, through the minds of all France - not in governmental circles alone, but probably throughout the whole country at large. As circumstances became more acute, the potential defeatists became emboldened to express themselves without fear of being arrested or even shot. It was like a rising tide that quietly permeated. Hence few were surprised to learn that France was defeated, and certainly not sufficiently enraged to react.

As for those who composed the energetic element of the inner circle of the "Dictatorship of Defeatists", history may tell whether, through possible indirect contact with German official sources, they were under the illusion that a cessation of resistance would net comparatively easy terms.

Between June 14 and 16, whereon M. Reynaud was succeeded by Marshal Pétain, the latter's supporters were busily engaged in setting the scene for the Marshal's advent to power, and in atuning mass mentality to acceptance of armistice negotiations.

M. Reynaud subsequently told me that as early as the 15th at Tours, he sensed in the face of growing opposition, especially among the leading Generals, that he was destined to make...
negotiations. The keynote of their program at this juncture was to deplore openly the sad plight of the rapidly increasing lines of hungry and homeless refugees along the roads between the Loire and Bordeaux and points further south. This, among other subtle machinations, presaged, to my mind, an early move for peace.

During this period a number of leading members of the Government, as well as the Admiral of the Fleet, solemnly assured me (as I subsequently cabled in each case) that if an armistice were sought, the Fleet would never be allowed to fall into the hands of the adversary, regardless of the character of the terms. In fact, Admiral Darlan emphasized to me that he had dictated to his Chief of Staff, a message which had already been ciphered and awaited only the date, containing certain instructions to the officers of the Fleet. While in response to my question the Admiral said he could not disclose the contents of the message, he could however, assure me that his instructions definitely prevented the Fleet's falling into the hands of the adversary.*

On the night of June 16, a Council of Ministers was held whereat Marshal Pétain, and his supporters for a separate armistice, formed a majority against M. Reynaud and his supporters for continued resistance—culminating in M. Reynaud's resignation. (As I have formerly pointed out, M. Reynaud subsequently told me that as early as the night of the 12th at Tours, he sensed in the face of growing opposition, especially among the leading Generals, that he was destined to make

* See sections Nos. 2,3,4, of Annex C
make way for another Government which might make peace and prevent revolution within the country).

Of connected bearing, it was generally acknowledged among unofficial as well as official circles, that Marshal Petain had been chosen as Chief to the succeeding Government, in that he was considered the only man who could lead the people into acceptance of what was expected to be stiff armistice terms, and at the same time prevent revolution. (At that juncture, I was of the opinion that the Marshal, General Weygand and the other Generals who favored capitulation, were picturing "dealing across the table" in terms of the Germans of the era of Bismark and Wilhelm II).

Immediately after M. Reynaud's resignation he and his group of supporters for continued resistance: Messers Herriot, Jeanonnet, Mendel among others, decided on a bold move: -

to persuade President Lebrun to leave France for Morocco where, together they would forthwith set up a Constitutional Government. This move, they felt, would enable the French Fleet and what remained of the French air force, to continue operations in cooperation with the troops in North Africa. Although M. Herriot was a staunch advocate of this action, he told me with no uncertain emphasis that he felt that the people of France had been martyrs, and that while he believed in the setting up of a Government in Morocco, and the continuance of the struggle, he would be the first one to call
call a halt to this continued resistance if he felt that the French Fleet, Air force, and remaining troops in Morocco were to be left alone to carry on the fight without early active aid from the United States.

When it was decided at the Council of Ministers meeting on the 16th of June, to ask Germany for armistice terms, the line subsequently adopted by members of Marshal Pétain's Government was to the effect that upon receipt of the German terms, public opinion would be sounded out in regard thereto. The belief was expressed moreover, that the terms would be so stiff as to cause mass revulsion thereto and thus enable the Government to refuse them. This in turn would justify the departure of sufficient of the Government to Morocco to form a Constitutional group there.

Subsequent events however, showed that the foregoing expressed belief on the part of Marshal Pétain's supporters was aimed merely at retarding the resistance groups' preparations to make a speedy departure for Morocco, and thus to gain time wherein to exercise strict police surveillance over the movements of the resistance group.

Moreover, it did not take Marshal Pétain and the directing "brain" behind the scene of his Government, M. Beaudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, long, to jockey the aforementioned resistance group out of position both in relation to the masses and to the Naval and Air forces. The Marshal's regime instantly adopted the role of a "Dictatorship of Defeatists" seized
seized control of the press and radio, and thus deprived the resistance group of the means of contacting or influencing public opinion.

I furthermore sensed that the appointment of Admiral Darlan as Minister of Marine in the Marshal's Government was motivated by a subtle purpose. That the Marshal and his supporters were aware of the Admiral's avowed determination to prevent the Fleet's falling into the adversary's hands, I had little doubt. Hence, I had more than a suspicion, that his inclusion in the Government envisaged the exercise of close surveillance over his activities, and if need be, bringing the strongest kind of pressure to bear upon him, in event of any signs of sabotage by his officers and men.

I must admit, moreover, that his acceptance of the appointment shocked my illusions to no small degree - for I had gained a high opinion of him and I felt that the Admiral's place during war time was with his fleet and not around the table with a Government engaged in surrendering the country to the adversary. Indeed, his cabinet appointment and his acceptance thereof represented to my mind a subtle victory for the defeatists.

Shortly after his assuming office, reports reached me through competent channels that word, which in my opinion, found its inspiration among the more resourceful and more energetic of the Admiral's cabinet associates, was being circulated
circulated throughout the Admiralty and the Naval officers and ranks, to the effect that to sabotage the terms of armistice would result (a) in bringing down reprisals on the heads of the people in France; and (b) in causing reprisals against the families of the officers and men engaged directly or indirectly in the sabotage.

On the heels of this report, came the report from the Chief of the Second Bureau of the Admiralty, to my Military Attaché, to the effect that already 95 percent of the Admiralty had become Anglo-phobes and that there was a discernible tendency to pro-Germanism.

Concurrent with these reports, Foreign Minister Baudouin in my frequent conversations with him, emphasized that one of the most difficult problems his Government had to contend with, was the curbing of the rapid growth of Anglophobia in all sections of French public opinion.

The inclusion of M. Laval in the Government as Vice Prime Minister was the occasion for an address by him to a group of French parliamentarians. This address was given wide circulation by Radio broadcast and throughout the press. In effect, M. Laval declared it was the duty of all political leaders to remain in the country, and that any who left would be rendering their country a great disservice.

At this stage, reports were reaching me that French troops along the Loire were increasingly throwing down their arms and deserting the lines, subsequently straggling southward.
southward in small groups along the roads. Competent
witnesses thereof informed me confidentially that in most
cases these men openly declared that rather than remain in
the line of combat with little if any ammunition supply,
they preferred to return to their homes and defend their
families with bare fists. They moreover declared their
bitterness against the Governments which had let them down by
not having sufficiently prepared the country for this war.
Thus the atmosphere of defeatism mounted from hour to hour.

By this time, I was authoritatively informed that
President Lebrun had developed a severe case of "jitters" and
that he was incapable of making a decision to proceed to
Morocco. On the other hand, M. Mandel, sensing the futility
of further attempts either to persuade President Lebrun
to accompany the resistance group to Morocco or to overcome
Marshal Pétain's attempts to prevent the resistance group's
departure, seized the first opportunity to sail for England
with a number of leading politicians, aboard a French transport.

It is interesting to note in this connection that
M. Laval's declaration stigmatizing as deserters, Frenchmen
who left the country, had already had such a wide-spread
effect that the crew of the French transport mutinied
against sailing for England with French political leaders,
and it therefore became necessary to replace the crew with
a French naval crew.
NOTES PERTAINING TO THE MAIN TEXT:

1. Before leaving Angers on June 11 for Tours to be near the French Government I conferred at length with the military authorities at the Polish Ministry of War as well as with the Polish Foreign Office. It was the consensus of opinion that while the collapse of the French 9th Army, under pressure of the German mechanized attack might have been attributed in part to the element of surprise, the mechanized break-through two days after the commencement of the Battle of the Somme, indicated that the capacity of the French equipment was inadequate to withstand these thrusts. Nevertheless, the French acquitted themselves creditably, considering the odds against them in terms of tanks, since they succeeded in putting out of business about 25 percent of the adversary's 1200 tanks engaged in the thrust. However, about 900 thereof actually penetrated far into the back area, destroying with their "flame-blowing" units, ammunition dumps and other supply stores. Having in Poland witnessed like tank penetrations deep into the back areas, due to lack of sufficient equipment to check their advance at the outset, I recognized that the aforementioned break-through at the Somme, represented a grave turn for the French forces, presaging perhaps even an early collapse thereof.

2. I had a lengthy conversation with the British First Lord of Admiralty, Mr. Alexander, together with the British Ambassador
Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell, during the First Lord's visit to Bordeaux. They both spoke with complete frankness. The First Lord said that Admiral Darlan had given his solemn assurances that the French Fleet would not fall into German hands. Moreover, Mr. Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had given the Ambassador like assurances in behalf both of himself and the other members of the Government. I sensed however, that despite these solemn assurances neither the First Lord nor the Ambassador were at heart optimistic as to the final outcome.

It was during the course of this discussion that, as I subsequently cabled, the First Lord emphasized with great earnestness that it was of the utmost importance that Britain acquire at the earliest moment, no less than 5 flotillas of destroyers (each flotilla numbering 9 destroyers, according to his calculations). He said moreover, that if we could not let them have the "leaders", the British Navy could, in a pinch, make other arrangements. He furthermore stressed the importance of our making available to them all possible planes, for newly created conditions would necessitate among other activities, daily reconnaissance over about 2000 miles of coast - from the North Cape to Brest.

3. On several occasions Mr. Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Petain Government, solemnly assured me that it was the unanimous determination on the part of himself and the
the other members of the Government that the Fleet should not fall into the hands of the adversary - that I could assure the President on this score.

4. In conversation with Mr. Baudouin at the time his Government had asked for armistice terms, I reminded him that since it was not unlikely that the adversaries' terms would involve colonial demands, it was important that his Government bear in mind that, for obvious reasons, the United States could not look with indifference upon a change in the status of French colonies. Mr. Baudouin assured me he was well aware of this, and that I need have no fears on this score, emphasizing that he voiced the reactions of his associates as well as himself.

I subsequently learned that an act had been framed envisaging the vesting in Colonial Governors, full authority to act independently of the French Government. (Whether this bill was written and given superficial consideration merely as palliative for the "resistance group" in order to gain time during armistice "negotiations", remains to be seen). However, the bill, which from its inception was guarded with secrecy, failed, to the best of my knowledge, to materialize.

Meanwhile armistice "negotiations" which had commenced, were proceeding rapidly.

Upon receipt of the Italian terms, M. Baudouin pointed out
out with a discernible air of satisfaction that neither the German nor the Italian demands included the cession of Colonies. (I am still disinclined to believe that a mentality as alert as that of M. Baudouin could make such a remark without being conscious of "whistling in the dark").
Mr. Henry Haye, newly appointed Ambassador of France to the United States

Mr. Henry Haye, newly appointed Ambassador of France, was born February 6, 1890. He has held the positions of Deputy, Consul General, and Mayor of Versailles. He was elected to the Senate October 20, 1935.

During the World War, he was a member of the French Military Mission instructing American troops in this country in trench warfare and later continued that instruction among American troops in France.

He speaks English fluently. He is married but his wife did not accompany him to the United States.
In reply refer to PR 701.5111/684

September 12, 1940

My dear General Watson:

Mr. Henry. Haye, the newly appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of France has assumed the duties of his office in Washington and is awaiting the pleasure of the President to receive him.

I am enclosing a translation of the remarks which the Appointed Ambassador will hand to the President upon his presentation.

A copy of the President's reply is also enclosed for him to hand to the Ambassador in exchange for the remarks which will be handed to the President. An extra copy of the President's reply is transmitted herewith, which may be retained for the White House files.

If there are any changes to be made in the President's reply to the remarks of the Ambassador, will you please let me know so that corrections may be made.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
If you will be good enough to inform me as to the day and hour when it will be agreeable for the President to receive the Ambassador, I shall be pleased to let him know.

A short biographical sketch of the Ambassador is enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Chief of Protocol.

Enclosures:
Translation of the Ambassador's remarks, with reply thereto;
Extra copy of the President's remarks;
Biographical sketch.
AMBASSADE
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS

Washington, le 13 septembre 1940.

Monsieur le Président,

Le Maréchal de France, Philippe Henri Pétain, Chef de l'État français, m'a confié le grand honneur de remettre à Votre Excellence les Lettres qui m'accréditent auprès d'Elle en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la République Française.

Le Gouvernement de la France m'a également chargé de Vous remettre les Lettres de rappel de mon éminent prédécesseur, M. Doyen de Saint-Quentin, appelé à un autre poste diplomatique.

J'ai, M. le Président, le privilège de connaître et d'aimer le grand pays aux destinées duquel vous présidez avec une si haute autorité. J'y ai fait de fréquents voyages et de longs séjours et je sais quelle est la générosité de cœur et d'esprit des citoyens des États-Unis. Cette expérience m'a encouragé à accepter la mission de représenter ma Patrie dans la Votre en des heures dont il est superflu de souligner le tragique.

Jamais, au cours de l'histoire de nos deux peuples, un Ambassadeur français n'a assumé une tâche semblable à celle dont je prends aujourd'hui la responsabilité.
Ma patrie malheureuse vient de subir les revers les plus cruels qu'elle ait eu à enregistrer au cours des vicissitudes de son long et glorieux passé. Entrée dans cette guerre par solidarité européenne et pour souscrire aux engagements qu'elle avait contractés, la France en est terriblement meurtrie et doit actuellement subir l'implacable loi du vainqueur. Mais, M. le Président, je puis vous dire que si mon pays ne peut pas se soustraire aux dures obligations qui résultent de sa défaite, l'Idéal, pour la défense duquel mes compatriotes ont courageusement repris les armes vingt années seulement après la plus sanglante des victoires, reste encore vivace au cœurs des Français.

Malgré les apparences, la guerre n'est pas achevée pour nous. De cruelles souffrances, matérielles et morales, atteindront pendant longtemps encore d'innombrables foyers. La plupart des familles françaises sont dispersées. Les femmes et les enfants de chez nous attendront peut-être longtemps encore le retour des hommes qui subissent à l'heure actuelle une dure captivité. D'autres femmes attendront, hélas en vain, le retour de leurs époux, de leurs fils ou de leurs frères qui ne reviendront plus.

Malgré ces nouveaux malheurs, laissez-moi vous assurer, M. le Président, qu'il est une force qu'aucune puissance ne pourra abattre, c'est celle qui, en dépit d'apparentes et passagères divergences, maintiendra fièrement l'unité française consacrée par tant de sacrifices.
Me permettrez-vous, M. le Président, de comparer la mission dont je suis investi par la République Française à celle qui, en 1776, a été confiée au grand Benjamin Franklin par les 13 États-Unis d'Amérique. Je n'aurai certes pas l'outrecuidance de prétendre posséder les incomparables qualités de l'extraordinaire ambassadeur américain. Mais sans doute puis-je espérer, pour tenter de résoudre les difficiles problèmes qui me sont posés, bénéficier de votre personnelle bienveillance et de la compréhension généreuse de vos compatriotes.

L'ardente foi patriotique que j'exprime devant Votre Excellence inspirera et guidera toutes mes initiatives et tous mes actes dans l'accomplissement de ma mission.

Tel est, M. le Président, simplement mais sincèrement exprimé, l'esprit dans lequel je m'efforcerai de représenter dignement mon pays dans le vôtre.

Puissé la Providence m'aider dans l'accomplissement de la tâche que le Gouvernement de la France m'a confiée auprès de Vous./.
AMBASSADE
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS
Letter of Credence of Henry Haye from Marshall Petain which Haye presented Sept 13, 1940 was withdrawn from files 11/27/40 and sent by R. F. to State Dept with translation of remarks of Haye on occasion of presentation and copy of President's reply to remarks made by Haye; also returned at same time was Petain's letter of recall from De M. de Saint Quentin.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

September 13, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching herewith memoranda of my conversation with the French Ambassador, Mr. Henry-Haye, in the belief that you may wish to read them before the Ambassador makes his formal call on you this afternoon.

C.H.
The new French Ambassador called to present his credentials and incidentally to have a general discussion regarding several phases of international affairs. He first proceeded to exonerate himself from any charges recently published in the press that he is pro-German or anti-British, or tainted in any way with German or anti-British sympathies.

The Ambassador then very earnestly referred to his request of the Treasury Department for a release of sufficient French funds to pay the diplomatic officials of France, wherever they may be stationed in the world. He said that the Treasury had agreed to pay those in this hemisphere only, and expressed the urgent wish that I would
would speak favorably to the Secretary of the Treasury about the other portion of the request. He stated that it was embarrassing, not to say humiliating, to have to come to our Treasury for money for these very limited purposes. I interrupted him to say that he must know that there was nothing of that sort in the mind of this Government; that the last thing it would be disposed to do would be to embarrass any of its loyal French friends. I added that the Ambassador should know, however, that this Government has a very definite fixed view as to the aspirations of Mr. Hitler, which are without geographical limitation, and that it does not propose in any circumstances to lend him aid or encouragement, financially or otherwise, either directly or indirectly, and that that is what is in the mind of this Government in respect to the matter about which he inquired.

The Ambassador then spoke generally about the way the French had been taken unawares and brought to their present humiliating situation. I replied that a number of us connected with this Government, including the President, myself and other associates, have for several years pursued the fixed policy of basing all of our utterances and actions on the assumption that Mr. Hitler was out to become the ruthless and utterly destructive conqueror of Europe,
rope, and that the Japanese military clique was bent on the same course in the Pacific area from Hawaii to Siam; that from the time Mr. Norman Davis came back from the Disarmament Conference and reported that the German and Italian Governments could no longer be expected to deal seriously with the question of disarmament, he, myself and others have been urging increased armaments here, and this goes back over a four to five-year period. I also reviewed the operation of our program for international economic restoration, which we initiated in 1933, pointing out the many appeals I have made to the British and French, and especially to the British, to aid in organizing the European countries along with the twenty-two American nations behind a broad program of economic reconstruction and then confront Italy and Germany with an offer of absolute equality in its benefits and its beneficial opportunities for security and progress, and this would bring a showdown as to whether Germany was willing to take a peaceful course or was secretly bent on nothing but war. I said that there was no definite response to this plea, which if acted on would have created a powerful organization of forty nations, which in turn might well have exercised a great influence in discouraging war.

C.H.

S CHMA
With regard to Martinique, the Ambassador sought to assure us that they would preserve order in the French islands. I raised the question of the ninety airplanes out in the weather deteriorating on the island of Martinique which the French Government purchased from American manufacturers, and stated very earnestly to the Ambassador that, according to every rule of fair play and reasonableness, the French Government should turn these planes back to the American manufacturers and perhaps get the benefit of the forty or fifty million dollars that had been paid out for them. I said that this Government had gone far out of its way and denied its own needs almost to an extreme extent in order to enable the French Government...
ment to make this purchase and to aid it in its emergency war situation. Therefore, I must very emphatically re-
quest that the French Government take this step.

The Ambassador, in a somewhat apologetic tone, stated that he would take the matter up further with his Government and that he earnestly hoped something could be done. He then proceeded at length to elaborate on the binding nature of the armistice agreement with the German Government, which he said might interfere with the return of these planes. I remarked that it would be a strange thing if the French Government has gone that far in its armistice agreement, especially in the light of the relief needs of France. I stated that here there was at least forty or fifty million dollars worth of French property going to waste and never a more urgent need for money with which to buy foodstuffs and other needed commodities, while somebody suggests that to placate Germany or to give the narrowest construction to the armistice agreement, this vast amount of money should be thrown into the ash hopper or sinkhole. The Ambassador repeated that he would take this matter up in earnest. I stated that it was due him that he should know in this connection and in several similar connections where the question of the real attitude of his present Government towards Germany and towards Great Britain might come up, directly or inferentially, that
that his Government is anti-British primarily, and, in some respects going beyond all the requirements of the spirit or the letter of the armistice agreement, pro-German. I said I merely called this to his attention for the reason that as we go along this Government and the American people, responding to the ancient friendship that has always existed and to this day fully exists between the Governments and the peoples of the two countries, will be extremely desirous to do anything and everything at all practicable and reasonable for the French people in their terrible misfortune. Then I added that the American people, however, look on Mr. Hitler as the most devastating and all-pervading conqueror and destroyer within a thousand years and that there is no geographical limit whatever to his infamous plans and purposes; that, therefore, the people of this country do not propose to say or do one single thing knowingly that would aid or encourage him and his ruthless forces of destruction to the slightest extent. I said this feeling on the part of the American people began when they discovered that the French Government had signed away to Germany the entire French Navy, and after this country had aroused the hostility of Hitler by its every possible aid to France in her war emergency, it was impossible for the American people to understand why the French Government would hand
to Mr. Hitler a loaded gun with which to shoot at their best friends; that I had emphasized this phase to the French Government for sometime before and until the last split second before they signed away their Navy to Germany; that, of course, we in this country could not possibly have been more deeply disappointed in the action of his Government.

The Ambassador made labored efforts to point out that the French fleet was sent to the African harbors where Germany could not reach it, and that all plans were made so that, in the event of any German attempt to get possession of it, it could either flee or scuttle itself, and that in no circumstances could Germany ever get it. To this I replied that no matter how good may have been the intentions of the French Government the theory that Germany could never get the French fleet was wholly fallacious. I then emphasized the point that the German power to prevail on the French to sign away their fleet for the period of the armistice would even to a more clinching extent enable Germany to require, and, if necessary, compel the French Government to turn over the French fleet, lock, stock and barrel, to Germany in the final peace agreement that Germany will write for her and France. I said that
the fleet could not be more securely in Germany's hands than it is now, and I should repeat the great disappointment that we feel in that respect; that, of course, when Germany comes to write the peace terms for France, probably its paramount purpose will be to secure possession and use of the fleet, and, of course, the French Government will feel far more obliged to sign on the dotted line and thus transfer the fleet, than when it signed the armistice and, regardless of the question of intention or desire, made certain its later transfer to Germany. The Ambassador never did attempt seriously to controvert or answer this statement.

At all stages I made clear to him the continued existence of the ancient friendship between our Governments and our peoples and of the earnest desire of my Government to be of any use at all reasonable or practicable to the French in their unprecedented misfortune with which everyone sympathized. I repeatedly made it equally clear that the American people are profoundly of the opinion that the French will have no really feasible way to recovery and restoration, except to a wholly inadequate extent, save through the halting by force of Hitler's onward march of conquest, devastation and destruction; that, therefore, the
people of this country observe with instant concern any reported act or utterance of other governments, including the French, which regardless of the actual facts, on their face, purport to be hostile to Great Britain in her struggle to check Hitler, or favorable and friendly to Hitler beyond any reasonable or legitimate requirements in the case of the French, of the armistice terms. They know in their own minds from past observation that there is no such thing as appeasing Mr. Hitler any more than a squirrel can appease a boa constrictor; that those poor little countries in Europe, with which the Ambassador is familiar, have had that identical experience; that this country is proposing to expend some 15 billions of dollars and organize a vast army on account of Mr. Hitler, and the French Government, of course, will realize that this is a most serious business for this country and its Government, if it has not realized it from its own experience and that of its neighbors.

The Ambassador appeared to take in the best of spirit these statements thus made to him and assured me that he would do what he could to clarify and clear up any and all questions presented.
The Ambassador called attention to a cable he had received on September seventh from Vichy, which, according to him, made it definite that the Government of Indochina had agreed to negotiate with the Japanese relative to a right of way for Japanese military purposes through Indochina and the right to station a Japanese command there for guard purposes. I said that this was another one of several occurrences which caused the American people to think that the French Government at Vichy was not keeping up those extremely important relations between our two countries as heretofore; that the Government of the United States had contested in every way short of military activities every
inch of the Japanese movement of aggression, which is intended to cover every square foot of land and sea from Hawaii to Siam for the purpose of the most drastic military, political and economic domination on the sole theory of enriching Japan and Japanese citizens at the expense of the natives everywhere, while all foreign nationals would be driven out and could only return to the Pacific area by paying sky-scraping preferences wherever a preference would be of any value to the Japanese interests; that this invasion contemplates the destruction of all international law, treaty obligations, sovereignty of other nations and liberty of their citizens, together with Japanese economic and financial monopolies of any and all kinds, as well. It was in these circumstances, while the United States was thus denying the right of Japan to assert such domination and insisting on the principle of equality in all commercial, industrial and other worthwhile relationships among nations, that the French Government in Indochina, presumably under the direction of the Government at Vichy, has taken the opposite position as to these principles and doctrines and freely conceded to Japan superior and exclusive influence and control in the Pacific area and preferences of all kinds such as must be combated unless two or three nations are to monopolize the world economic
economic and political situation; that to clinch this position the French Government in Indochina agreed to negotiate away the broadest and most vital phase of our contention and our opposition to Japanese intervention in such countries as Indochina, the Netherlands East Indies, et al; that a few weeks ago Japan had solemnly pledged to keep the status quo with respect to all these areas, and the French Government cannot imagine our surprise and disappointment when it took this step without any notice whatever to us.

The Ambassador repeatedly assured me that he would take this matter up at once with his Government, but, of course, it would seem now to be too late.

C.H.
Conf Memo to Myron Taylor from FDR—September 13, 1940

Asks for his thought on enclosed letter to FDR from Paul Appleby, Acting Sec of Agriculture, re Wallaces discussion with the President concerning relation of present regime in France to various religious groups in other countries—attaches additional information which tells of previous activities of new French Amb to U. S.—M. Henry Hays who was closely affiliated with Mr. Hitler’s agent, Abetz.

Mr. Taylor's reply of Sept 15, 1940 attached.

See: Wallace-Drawer 1-1940
My dear Mr. President:

The British Chargé d'Affaires has left with me the text of the message sent to Marshal Pétain by the King.

I am enclosing a copy herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
Message from His Majesty The King to
Marshall Pétain.

M. le Maréchal. At this serious juncture in the life of the British and French people I send you a message of goodwill. The armistice which you were forced to make with the common enemy and his occupation of so many French ports and aerodromes for attack on my country have been a very grievous addition to the burdens which my people have to bear. Nevertheless these tragic events have not weakened in British hearts the sympathy and sense of comradeship which have grown up over many years of peace and war between the British and the French nations. We are resolved to fight on to the end and we are sure that the end will be a complete British victory over Hitler and his régime. We have positively declared that our victory will carry with it the restoration of the freedom and greatness of France.

Reports are reaching me of an attempt by the German Government to secure from you undertakings that would go far beyond the terms accepted by you at the time of the armistice. I recall that there you expressed your determination to accept no terms dishonouring to the name of France. I am confident that now also you will reject proposals that would be a major dishonour to France and grave damage to an ally. The disaster that overwhelmed France deprived us of her assistance but it would indeed be a sombre event in history if France were to range herself against us and afford direct assistance to our enemy.
I do not doubt that, in refusing any such proposals that may have been made, you will carry with you the overwhelming assent of all those amongst both our peoples and in other countries who have put their faith in your honour as a soldier and who see in a British victory their hope of the salvation of France.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 4, 1940.

Attached hereto is a translation of the reply from Marshal Petain which the French Ambassador left with me this morning.

C.H.
[TRANSLATION]

EMBASSY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
IN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, November 2, 1940

The Chief of the French State has received the message which President Roosevelt sent to him through the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States.

Animated by the desire of preserving the friendship which, since the founding of the United States, has bound the French people to the American people, he will abstain from pointing out that which, in this communication, might cause him to be uncertain of the equitable attitude of the American Government.

In reply to the concern of President Roosevelt, he wishes to affirm that the French Government has always preserved its independence of action and he can only wonder at an appraisement which is as inexact as unjust. The French Government has declared that the French fleet would never be given up and nothing can justify questioning this solemn engagement today. President Roosevelt speaks of operations directed against the British fleet; he forgets, no doubt, that sea operations have, in fact, taken place, but that they were begun by the British fleet, and in the most unexpected manner.

Furthermore,
Furthermore, England has taken a position against France and her Government which the French people cannot accept. His Majesty's Government is, in fact, lending its support to Frenchmen who are rebels to their country and whose action, thanks to the aid of the British fleet and aircraft, injures the unity of its Empire.

France - and her Government can assure it - will not carry out any unjustified attack; but, conscious of her duty, she will honorably insure respect for her essential interests.

The French Government remains very desirous of maintaining the traditional friendship which unites our two countries and will endeavor under all circumstances to avoid misunderstandings, or interpretations such as those which doubtless led President Roosevelt to send us this message.
The French Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador commenced the conversation by complaining again, this time in extremely bitter tones, of the ever-increasing misrepresentation of his Government that was appearing in the American press and the totally false and mendacious statements which were emanating from the British radio and news services tending to show that the French Government was under the complete control of Germany and was acting as a puppet for the German Government.

French Denial of presence of German officers in Dakar

The Ambassador then read to me three cables. The
first cable flatly denied that there were either German soldiers or German officers at Dakar and that our own consular representative in Dakar could confirm this information. The Ambassador said that the only German officers who had ever been in Dakar since the Armistice were the members of the German mission which had gone there under the terms of the armistice agreement to verify the munitions that existed there.

Alleged demands by Italy on France for submarine and air bases and demobilization of troops

The second cable the Ambassador read to me was from his Government stating that the reports alleging that Italy had made demands on France for the installation of air bases in Syria, submarine bases in North African French possessions, and the complete demobilization of all French forces in Syria were totally false. The French Foreign Minister by means of this cable informed the French Ambassador to inform this Government that no demands of any character with regard to Syria or other French African possessions had ever been formulated by Italy.

Alleged intention of French Government to fortify Martinique

With regard to the third cable, the Ambassador stated that reports sent by the United Press Correspondent
from Vichy alleging that the French Government intended to undertake large military and naval fortifications in Martinique were totally unfounded. The Ambassador said that the report was probably due to the fact that the correspondent had read the budget for the year 1941, which had included the provisions insisted upon by M. Mandel when he was Minister for Colonies and which budget had been approved by the French Chambers before the armistice, providing for the undertaking of military and naval fortifications in Martinique as well as in many other French colonies. The Ambassador said that this budget, of course, was now a matter of past history and the present French Government could not attempt to carry out any of the provisions thereof. The Ambassador was instructed to state that the French Government had no intention of undertaking any military or naval fortifications in Martinique and that the only work to be undertaken there was the dredging of the harbor at Fort de France and the improvement of certain of the docks for commercial purposes. The Ambassador specifically stated that the submarine base which had been planned for Martinique had been completely abandoned. In brief, the French Government desired this Government to know that under no conditions would they agree to any of their possessions in the Western Hemisphere becoming,
directly or indirectly, the source of disquiet or of danger to the United States.

Neutralization of French colonies in the Western Hemisphere

The Ambassador then referred to his conversation with the President of the other day and the suggestion made by the President that the French Government declare publicly that its possessions in the Western Hemisphere would be neutralized. The Ambassador said that he had this morning received a reply from his Government with respect to the suggestion made by the President and that in this reply the French Government declared that it desired to cooperate in every way with the United States so that the United States could assure itself that French possessions in the New World could in no event become a source of danger to the security of the United States. The French Government, consequently, made the following proposals:

1. The French Government would agree that United States official observers might be stationed in French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and St. Pierre-Miquelon, and that all facilities would be given these United States observers by the local French authorities to find out exactly what was going on and to assure themselves that no steps were
in progress which could result in endangering the security of the United States.

2. The French Government would instruct Admiral Robert, the French commander at Martinique with full authority over all of the other French colonies of the Western Hemisphere, to undertake with an American high ranking officer to be sent to Martinique for that purpose, the study and determination of such military steps as might in the judgment of the United States be required to avoid any disquiet on the part of the United States Government. The Ambassador stated that owing to the present situation of France anything in the nature of a written contract or treaty would have to be avoided but that such oral arrangements as might be arrived at with Admiral Robert would be meticulously complied with.

3. The French Government was appointing General Bonnavita as Military Attaché in Washington, and should the American Government so desire, the General would be instructed to leave immediately for the United States to cooperate in the coordination of such measures as might be agreed upon by Admiral Robert and the American officer to be sent to negotiate with Admiral Robert.

4. The French Government believed that in all of
the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere there was now a minimum of military forces stationed. In the opinion of the French Government, complete neutralization in the sense that the existing minimum military forces would either have to be sent away or be demobilized would be likely to stir up revolution in many of the colonies, or at least social disorder, since the implication would be understood by the native populations as being an invitation to license through the removal of all symbols of authority.

5. While the French Government would not discard the possibility of the issuance of an official statement by France with regard to the neutralization of the French colonies in the Americas, it desired to know before reaching a final decision whether, if the measures above set forth were undertaken, the President still believed that such a statement would be necessary.

I stated to the Ambassador that I would be glad to submit to the President the reply of the French Government as delivered to me and that at first glance it seemed to me that some of the steps suggested, if faithfully carried out, would undoubtedly remove some of the grounds for disquiet which this Government had possessed. I said that I was glad to note the friendly and coopera-
tive reaction evidenced by the French Government to the suggestion made by the President.

Purchase of munitions, etc., in the United States for French Indo-China

The Ambassador then said that he had received a further telegram from his Government on another matter which had occasioned him surprise. He said this message was to the effect that the German Government had given permission to the French Government to purchase munitions in the United States for the use of the authorities in Indo-China and that he had, consequently, been instructed by his Foreign Minister to take up the negotiations recently conducted by Colonel Jacomy on behalf of the Indo-China Government and to ascertain whether the munitions for the French authorities in Indo-China could now be obtained in the United States. The Ambassador said that upon receipt of this message he had sent a telegram to his Government inquiring whether this implied that the German Government would permit the shipment of the planes now in Martinique to Indo-China. He said that he had not received any reply to this inquiry as yet. The Ambassador thereupon inquired whether this Government would be prepared to facilitate the purchase by the French authorities in the United States of muni-
tions for Indo-China.

I said to the Ambassador that it must be as evident to him as it was to me that the situation had changed completely since the time some weeks ago when Colonel Jacomy had been informed that this Government would permit the sale of such munitions as might be available to the Government of French Indo-China. I said that since that time the Japanese forces had occupied many points in Indo-China and it would be the obvious thing for this Government to want to know what practical assurances could be given that the munitions that might be bought here, or the planes that might be sent from Martinique, would not fall into the hands of the Japanese authorities in Indo-China rather than into the hands of the French authorities. I said, furthermore, that in as much as all evidence of French resistance to the Japanese occupation had ceased, what reason could now be evidenced by the French Government that the dispatch of the munitions or aviation materiel was of any practical or urgent need.

The Ambassador replied that Indo-China would not only resist further aggression on the part of Japan, but would also probably soon be forced to resist aggression on the part of Siam.
I said that I was sure that the Ambassador must possess the feeling that any action taken by Siam under present conditions must be action taken at least with the tacit acquiescence of Japan. I asked, consequently, whether the Ambassador could for a moment believe that Japan would permit the French Government in Indo-China to acquire munitions at this moment which might be utilized either in resisting Japan or in resisting Siam. I also asked what explanation the Ambassador could give me as to why the German Government should accord permission for the purchase of these munitions at this particular moment when the French Government had been either unable or unwilling to obtain the acquiescence of the German Government six weeks ago to sending perfectly new and powerful airplanes to China before the actual occupation by Japan had begun. To all of these inquiries the Ambassador had no ready reply, and merely stated that he would give me further information as to the situation in Indo-China as a result of an inquiry which he would address to Admiral Decoux, the Governor General.

**Airplanes in Martinique**

In speaking again of the airplanes in Martinique, the Ambassador said that he was informed that these airplanes had now deteriorated to such an extent that they
would require a great deal of repair work before they could fly again.

I said that this was not my information, but that on the contrary I was informed that the airplanes were being protected and that mechanics were looking after them.

The Ambassador thereupon stated that should this Government desire to send a competent expert to look into the condition of these airplanes, he would be very glad himself to authorize the dispatch to Martinique of such an agent of the United States Government.

**Blocked French funds in the United States**

The Ambassador then inquired whether I had been informed by the President of his conversation with the Ambassador with regard to the request for the unblocking of French funds in this country so as to permit the French Embassy here to pay from these funds the expenses of French diplomatic and consular establishments in the Western Hemisphere and in certain countries of Europe, and also to utilize $1,500,000 for the purchase of beef in Argentina to be used in feeding French prisoners of war in Germany and in French occupied territory. The Ambassador also asked whether I had any information concerning his recent conversation on this subject with the Secretary of the Treasury.

I replied that while the President had spoken to me
concerning certain features of his interview with the Ambassador, the President had not spoken with me concerning the question of blocked funds.

The Ambassador thereupon stated that he had outlined the situation to the President and that as he was leaving, the President had said "I hope you will work out satisfactorily the question of your diplomatic and consular establishments on the American continent".

I said to the Ambassador that I had spoken only this morning with the Secretary of the Treasury on the telephone and that I was afraid the Ambassador had misunderstood the President, since I was informed by the Secretary of the Treasury that the President had made no commitment in that regard whatever. I then went on to say that I would have to inform the Ambassador that he could expect no relaxation by this Government of the blocking of French funds in so far as the suggested purchase of beef by France for the relief of French prisoners of war was concerned. I said that under the accepted rules of international law and in accordance with various international agreements, the German Government was obligated to undertake the proper feeding and care of the prisoners of war under its control. I stated that there seemed in the judgment of this Government no justification whatever for the purchase by the French Government of large
quantities of beef to be used in the feeding of prisoners of war, thus relieving the German Government of its valid obligations in this regard and making it easier for the German Government to feed its own troops and its own civilian population. I said that with regard to the facilitation of funds for the payment of diplomatic and consular establishments of France in the Western Hemisphere, I could at this time give him no definite reply. I said that all I could add in this regard was that questions of this character could undoubtedly be more readily solved if the French Government showed a more friendly and cooperative spirit in its dealings with the United States and that I trusted that the reply made by France as communicated to me this morning by the French Ambassador with regard to French colonies in the Americas would seem to the high officials of this Government as an indication of such desire on the part of the Vichy Government to cooperate to our mutual advantage.

The Ambassador then launched into a very long and exceedingly vehement tirade. He stated that the refusal of this Government at this juncture to release funds for the payment of French diplomatic and consular missions in the American continent was tantamount to a desire on the part of the United States to liquidate such establish-
ments and as proof that this Government did not regard
the Vichy Government as a sovereign government. He
said that our refusal to permit French funds in the
United States to be used for the purchase of food sup-
plies to relieve the situation of French prisoners of
war was a proof that this Government had no humanitarian
interest in the fate of these unfortunate individuals
and that our action in this regard would be equivalent
to a sentence of death for them.

I said to the Ambassador that with regard to the
first point, it seemed to me preferable that it be not
discussed, that it seemed to me that it was for many
reasons inadvisable to discuss the nature of the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the present French Govern-
ment and that I believed that on full reflection he would
agree with me that no useful purpose could be served
thereby. With regard to the second point, I said that
I could assure him, as I had in a previous conversation,
that while the American people possessed to a full degree
their traditional friendship for the French people and
were animated as they had been throughout their history
by a humanitarian desire to relieve distress and suffer-
ing of peoples in other parts of the world, it was the
considered policy of this Government that no step should
be taken which would in any sense facilitate or aid the
Government of Germany in its prosecution of the present war.

I said that it was well known to me that Germany had been exporting from occupied France many thousands of head of cattle for her own use and that if we agreed to permit France to send into the occupied zone very large quantities of beef, this would obviously only make it easier for Germany to pursue this course. The Ambassador immediately contradicted me and said that Wayne Taylor had told him that while the Germans had commandeered cattle in the occupied zone, these cattle were being utilized for feeding German troops in that area.

I replied that while I would not agree in any way that my information was incorrect, I could not see the slightest difference in the two cases presented. Here was the Ambassador demanding that the French Government be permitted to send beef into the occupied zone to feed the French prisoners of war, and yet at the same time admitting through him that the cattle in that region which might be used for this purpose were being utilized for the feeding of German troops of occupation. I said that what the Ambassador had just stated confirmed me positively in my belief that the step which was proposed was merely a means of relieving Germany of her inescapable
obligation to feed properly and give humanitarian treatment to the French prisoners of war under her control without assistance from the outside world.

The Ambassador then said that this made a "very grave situation".

I said that if he referred to the relations between the two countries, as I assumed he did, and had made this remark on the pretext that this Government was not giving friendly consideration to all the requests of the French Government, I might remind him that public opinion in the United States and the opinion of this Administration had been profoundly affected in a manner adverse to the present French Government by three things: first, the determination of the French Government with regard to the disposition of the French fleet as included in the terms of the armistice; second, the refusal of the French Government to return the airplanes in Martinique to the United States on the allegation that the terms of the Armistice made it necessary for all French munitions in French territory to remain where they were at the time of the signing of the armistice, when only a few weeks ago the American public had been informed that French airplanes in large numbers had left French possessions in Northern Africa in order to undertake the bombardment of Gibraltar; and third, the negotiation by
the Vichy Government of an agreement with Japan which
provided for a change in the status quo in the Pacific
by the occupation of Indo-China, although it was well
known to the French Government that the maintenance of
the status quo in the Far East was a matter of peculiar
concern to the United States.

Furthermore, I said, did the Ambassador think that
the statements made by his Foreign Minister in an inter-
view with the press which the Foreign Minister was said
to have given on the evening of October 4 in Vichy and
in which M. Baudoin is alleged to have stated, among
other things, "Japan is a great nation. Its preponderant
position in the Far East cannot be denied by any realis-
tic statesman, etc." , was the expression of a point of
view which would be well received by American public
opinion, or which would tend to bring closer together
the policies of the Government of the United States and
the Government of France.

At this point the Ambassador interjected to say
that he was sure that his Foreign Minister had been
misquoted again and that he would check up to ascertain
whether such a statement had actually been made. I
remarked to the Ambassador that I had been careful to
say that his Foreign Minister had been "alleged" to
have made this statement and that if this statement
was not accurate, I would be glad to be informed accordingly.

In conclusion, I said to the Ambassador that as soon as the President returned to Washington I would submit to him the reply of the French Government with regard to French colonies in the Western Hemisphere and that I would again discuss with him the question of the release of funds sufficient to meet the expenses of the French diplomatic and consular establishments in the American Republics. For that reason, I said, I would prefer to withhold any further discussion on these problems until this conversation had taken place, and I said that I would ask the Ambassador to come to see me as soon thereafter as might be possible.

Finally, I said that I trusted, in view of the cooperative spirit shown by the French Government in its latest communication to us, that the way might yet be found for a more friendly and understanding feeling between the two Governments than had seemed, at least on our part, possible because of the recent policies pursued by the Government of Marshal Petain.
CONFIDENTIAL

AM HONORED AND HIGHLY PLEASED TO ACCEPT.

CAN ARRANGE TO LEAVE PUERTO RICO IN A WEEK AFTER RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO.

IN MY OPINION REEVES FULLY QUALIFIED AND EXCELLENT CHOICE FOR THIS OFFICE.
The President offered the Ambassador-ship to General Pershing first.
For letter to Pershing
See: Gen corres-Drawer 2-1940 (Pershing)
VIA NAVAL RADIO

ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
GOVERNOR OF PUERTO RICO,
SAN JUAN (PUERTO RICO)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

We are confronting an increasingly serious situation in France because of the possibility that one element in the present French Government may persuade Marshal Pétain to enter into agreements with Germany which will facilitate the efforts of the Axis powers against Great Britain. There is even the possibility that France may actually engage in the war against Great Britain and in particular that the French fleet may be utilized under the control of Germany.

We need in France at this time an Ambassador who can gain the confidence of Marshal Pétain who at the present moment is the one powerful element in the French Govt. who is standing firm against selling out to Germany. I
feel that you are the best man available for this mission. You can talk to Marshal Pétain in language which he would understand and the position which you have held in our own Navy would undoubtedly give you great influence with the higher officers of the French Navy who are now openly hostile to Great Britain. I hope, therefore, that you will accept the mission to France and be prepared to leave at the earliest possible date.

What would you think of Admiral Reeves as your successor in Puerto Rico?

Please telegraph me your reply.
November 13, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith in accordance with your request the suggested letter to General Pershing, the suggested message to Admiral Leahy, and the letter which you desired to send to Arthur Sulzberger.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

Three

The President

The White House
VIA NAVAL RADIO

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GOVERNOR OF PUERTO RICO,
SAN JUAN (PUERTO RICO)

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Enciphered by ______________________

Sent by operator ________________ M., __________, 19_________
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What would you think of Admiral Reeves as your successor in Puerto Rico?

Please telegraph me your reply via Navy Radio as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

U.S.W.IJ
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our conversation of this morning, I am enclosing the draft of the personal letter which you wished Admiral Leahy to take from you to Marshal Pétain. If this is satisfactory, please return it to me and I will hand it to Admiral Leahy before he leaves.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
December 19, 1940

My dear Monsieur le Maréchal:

I am giving this personal letter to you to Admiral Leahy who is leaving Washington within the next few days and will soon present to you his letters of credence as American Ambassador to France.

Admiral Leahy has been a close personal friend of mine from the days of my first official connection with the United States Navy, nearly twenty-eight years ago, and in this Administration he has filled, as you know, positions of the highest trust. He possesses my entire confidence.

I feel sure that his mission to France will be productive of common advantage to our two countries and I am confident that you and he will find that you speak the same language.

Please accept the assurances of my personal regard, and believe me

Yours very sincerely,

His Excellency
The Marshal of France,
Phillipe Henri Pétain,
Chief of the French State.