

● PSF

FRANCE

1943

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PSF: France folder
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Gusman 1-43

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JAN 5, 1943
1354Z

RC 17
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LB

From: Algiers
To: AGWAR - USFOR

No. 3996, January 2, 1943

Madame Darlan advises me that she is most interested in the Presidents kind offer to arrange for her and her son to visit Warm Springs X From Eisenhower for Marshall for Admiral Leahy from Murphy your four eight nine December two six X She is troubled however regarding expenses her total income apparently is less than dollars three zero zero per month X If the trip is made it would include Madame Darlan, her son, his wife and a doctor who is a relative of the family X She would much prefer to travel by airplane she cannot however finance the voyage X I shall be grateful for your advice.

No Sig

*Miss Tully
See how it can be arranged
with Dr. Lechner-*

FOOTNOTE: 489 is CM-OUT-8810 (12/26/42) JCS

ACTION COPY: JCS

INFO COPIES: OPD, ADM. KING, LOG

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

CM-IN-1252 (1/3/43) 2002Z eob

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 21

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

(559)

hm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

Hon. JOHN J. McCLOY

To read and return for our
files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Memo re Military Occupation dated 1/8/43
unsigned - concerning the situation with
respect to our military forces in North
Africa - (Looks as though had been pre-
pared by someone in State Department) (To
go in Trip File when returned)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 6,



MEMORANDUM FOR

Hon. JOHN J. McCLOY


To read and return for our
files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

February 6, 1943

Noted and returned herewith.


John J. McCloy

January 8, 1943.

MILITARY OCCUPATION

The situation with respect to our military forces in North Africa, especially as regards territory belonging to or under the control of France, is distinguishable from that of the ordinary military occupation of conquered territory.

In considering the nature of the occupation, it is necessary to bear in mind, first, the fact that we are not at war with France, second, the statements that have been made regarding our purposes, and third, the situation as it has developed. Our purposes, as stated by the President on November 7, 1942, are "to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of northern or western Africa and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic coast of the Americas". The President also stated that the French Government and the French people had been informed of the purposes of the expedition and had "been assured that the allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French authorities in Africa", also that the Government and people of France and of French possessions had been requested to "cooperate with and assist the American expedition in its effort to repel the German and Italian international criminals, and by so doing to liberate France and the French Empire from the Axis yoke".

In

In his radio address of the same day to the French people, the President stated with respect to the expedition in North Africa:

"We come among you to repulse the cruel invaders who would remove forever your rights of self-government, your rights to religious freedom, and your rights to live your own lives in peace and security.

"We come among you solely to defeat and rout your enemies. Have faith in our words. We do not want to cause you any harm."

He asked that our purpose be not obstructed and called upon them to help us where they were able to do so.

In a communication dated November 14, addressed to the Governor General of Algeria, the President stated:

"Be assured that the powerful American forces . . . which I am despatching will support you to the limit of their great resources . . .".

The temporary resistance by French forces was soon displaced by friendly cooperative military effort.

In announcing on November 17 acceptance of General Eisenhower's political arrangements made for the time being in northern and western Africa with Admiral Darlan, the President again referred to freeing the French people, and to the fact that French troops, under the command of General Giraud, had already been in action against the enemy in Tunisia, "fighting by the side of American and British soldiers for the liberation of their country".

There

There has been no proclamation or declaration of military law by General Eisenhower, nor has a provisional military government been set up for that region. On the contrary, the situation has been one of cooperation between the American and French authorities. Local French governmental personnel have been allowed to continue in the performance of their functions in the customary manner, under an injunction of loyalty to the purposes of the Commanding General and his forces. Measures for the maintenance of order and public administrative services are to be taken in consultation with the Commanding General. In these latter two respects the situation in North Africa is not unique. In certain other respects, such as the use of port, air, military and other facilities, the right to requisition, freedom from taxation, extraterritorial privileges, etc., the control bears close resemblance to authority exercised by a military occupant. But these matters, as well as matters relating to cooperation of the French air, military, and naval forces, are covered by the above-mentioned political arrangement. In other words, the occupation is on the basis of friendly and willing cooperation in a common cause as distinguished from forcible military occupation of territory of an enemy or unsympathetic people.

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

**PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300**

The President of the United States of America

Washington, D. C.

PSF; France folder
File
Personal
Confidential

AIRGRAM

Courier pouch
closed Feb. 11.

FROM: Martinique, F.W.I.

DATED: February 9, 1943.

REC'D: 5 p.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

A-34 - February 9, 3 p.m.

Reference my telegrams 48 and 49 of February 4.

The personal relationship between Admiral Battet and myself is such that I could ask him as a friend to write me personally and confidentially from San Juan regarding the nature of his conversation here last Thursday with the representatives of Admiral Robert. Yesterday, I received such a note from him in which he states that he gave Captains Roques and Constantin letters from General Giraud and Admiral Moreau to Admiral Robert, with various documents prepared by Admiral Darlan just before his death; that he told them order was being reestablished in North Africa with unanimity and the French warships at Dakar were en route to the United States; that he explained the attitude of mutual acquaintances (civilians) in Paris; that both officers seemed "very understanding" but that Captain Constantin, a very close friend, said "You have come too soon; your visit will do more harm than good".

Then Admiral Battet states, "I confess to you that I don't understand. In my opinion, it is necessary to obtain results quickly, if we do not want the morale of the sailors, soldiers and population (in Martinique) to suffer. It is only in moving fast that we will unite and plunge again into the war, as we have done in Africa ...I don't want to stop at this negative position of Admiral Robert's and I am writing him a letter which I ask you to read...I am remaining at Puerto Rico, because I consider it necessary to go to Martinique and help Admiral Robert despite what he pretends to believe. But I want to go only as a Frenchman, unaccompanied, without any diplomatic or any other cover."

The letter to Admiral Robert, translated, is as follows:

"The/

-2- A-34, Feb. 9, 3 p.m., from Martinique, F.W.I.

"The welcome you reserved for me this morning stupefied me, then pained me severely when I realized it was intended for me. Admiral Darlan, then General Giraud, wished me to make this long trip to enable you to interrogate someone who had been (1) a trustworthy witness of the events of October in France and the events of November and December in Algeria, (2) a witness of the messages exchanged and (3) a witness who had just seen actual persons, in particular of the Marshal's Office, who had left France in December. They thought that this someone had in addition the advantage of having your confidence.

"It was on learning that, with the passage of time, the situation was becoming terribly aggravated in the Antilles and Guiana, that I left Africa January 24. I stopped at Washington to complete my information; what I learned made me precipitate my departure for Martinique. Arrived at Puerto Rico, I sent you a cable informing you of my arrival.

"Constantin will have handed you what I confided to him for you, will have told you the few words we exchanged. A firm order is being established in North Africa; thanks to Governor Boisson and Collinet, healthy agreements made freely at the right time and with Admiral Darlan's approval, have placed French West Africa in a favorable position and saved what is left of our poor ships.

"I know, Admiral, that each one, better than others, believes that he holds, despite local perspective, a just view of events, but I am sure that the identity of opinion among officers like Admiral Michelier, Collinet, Gervais de Lafon, whom I saw before leaving--to cite only sailors--is such as to confirm that the road chosen is the only coherent one and susceptible of safeguarding the future of the French Nation.

"I know, Admiral, more than many others, how delicate has been your task in order--between Vichy and Washington--to keep until last November the Antilles for France, since you were often kind enough to keep me informed when I was near you and subsequently I spent near Auphan and Rochat the difficult hours of the discussions regarding the Antilles.

"I can appraise the internal situation of Martinique. I know the recent engagements that you, as well as

Michelier/

Michellier, took vis-à-vis the ex-Mason. It is because the situation, from very delicate was becoming catastrophic in the Antilles, that I was sent in order that you might talk with me.

"You, Admiral, were the man approved and desired by America, who could prevent civil war, keep for France--supreme end--the territories of which you have charge and which Brazil, Haiti, etc., will soon demand. I am frightened at the thought of the responsibility that no one above you can any longer cover and of which you alone are, in the eyes of all, to bear the tragic weight.

"I remain at Puerto Rico in order to come, on a call by cable from you, and place at your orders all my strength and all my heart.

"Please accept, Admiral, the expression of my respectful devotion."

Admiral Battet sent confidentially a copy of the above letter to Captain Constantin and another copy to a leading sugar-planter (Léon Hayot) for him and the Mayor of Fort-de-France, "in whom I have absolute confidence". I am able to state unreservedly that each addressee, including Admiral Robert, received the communication intended for him, yesterday afternoon.

Today, the Naval Observer received instructions from Admiral Hoover to report reactions to the letter and he replied that none were known, adding at my suggestion the third paragraph of my telegram 49, February 4.

Admiral Battet would be a credit to any navy, including our own. He is at his best, however, in the fearless execution of orders, not at planning or execution the present delicate mission. A man of Admiral Robert's extreme sense of honor and integrity, a month after a pledge "to abstain from all relations with the dissident authorities of North Africa", could scarcely be expected to receive one of those authorities, especially one so recently under his orders. Admiral Battet is also handicapped because he was a protégé of Admiral Darlan (highly unpopular here); because as former Chef de Sûreté here he sent persons to detention camp for dissidence of negligible degree when compared to his own last November; because in certain influential circles here his comportment during almost three years

in/

-4- A-34, Feb. 9, 3 p.m., from Martinique, F.W.I.

in Martinique was regarded as beneath his dignity; and finally because he has evolved away from Vichy at a pace much faster than he would have had he remained here.

I question the remark of Captain Constantin, whom I know well and with whom I talked frankly for an hour before his friend's arrival, that the latter's visit would do more harm than good. In my opinion, it was simply premature. Admiral Robert regards it as a "closed incident". Captain Constantin witnessed the evacuation of Dunkirk as Commandant of the Port and his dearest wish is to fight the Germans again. He is probably even more impetuous than Admiral Battet. With others here like him, and with the prudent but slowly evolving Admiral Robert gradually moving in the direction that they and we want him to do, there is little that Admiral Battet's prestige can do to hasten the pace in this spot so far removed from the scene of action, where Admiral Robert is followed with such blind loyalty and where Admiral Battet would be no further advanced than Captain Constantin had he remained here.

MALIGE

MEM/jlw

France folder
1-43

file
personal

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


March 9, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of March 5, the message transmitted to you by Admiral Stark from General DeGaulle was apparently sent in reply to your message to General DeGaulle thanking him for his birthday greetings and expressing pleasure at having met him personally at Casablanca. This message from you was transmitted on February 5. In the circumstances no further reply from you would appear to be necessary.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



The President,
The White House.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I attach a message addressed to the President by General de Gaulle, which was enclosed in a communication sent by Admiral Stark to the Secretary.



George W. Renchard

UNITED STATES FLEET
United States Naval Forces in Europe
20 Grosvenor Square
London, W.1

February 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HULL:

The following was sent me by General de Gaulle for the President:-

"Je vous serais reconnaissant de transmettre au President des Etats-Unis l'expression du grand plaisir que j'ai eu a prendre avec lui un premier contact. Ses sentiments d'ardente sympathie a l'egard de la France ne pouvaient que toucher profondement un Francais. Je tiens, a ce sujet, a vous renouveler l'assurance de la volonte du Comite National de consacrer toutes ses forces morales au regroupement de l'Empire francais pour la guerre de liberation."

Translation:-

"I should be grateful if you would transmit to the President of the United States an expression of the great pleasure I have had in making a first contact with him. His sentiments of ardent sympathy with regard to France could not fail to deeply impress a Frenchman. On this subject I continue to assure you of the wish of the National Committee to devote all of its forces of morale to the purpose of bringing together the French Empire for the war of liberation."

H. R. Stark

France folder
1-43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

June 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR STEPHEN EARLY
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

I refer to your memorandum of June 9. While we have been notified that the French Committee of National Liberation has been formed there are many unsettled questions as to the future of that committee. Consequently, we agree with the President that any action at this time looking to the admission of the French into the United Nations would be premature. Furthermore, you are aware of our custom to consult certain other United Nations before admitting new members.

C. H.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a Memorandum to the President, written by Robert Sherwood, and one to me dictated by the President.

These are self explanatory and I will be most grateful to you if you will let me have your opinion in re France and the United Nations Roster.


STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Enclosures.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

S. T. E.

Will you talk with Cordell about this? I have distinct doubts as to whether a United France should be included in the roster of the United Nations next Monday. I should say that was premature. Also, I hesitate to make any statement.

F. D. R.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
224 WEST 57TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

June 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT E. SHERWOOD

Next Monday, June 14th is United Nations day which gives great opportunity for an outburst of propaganda to enemy and occupied countries. It would be particularly fine if this year we could celebrate the inclusion of United France in the roster of the United Nations. This would be particularly effective in North Africa and in the broadcasting from North Africa to France which, on that day, will be greatly augmented by the opening of the new and powerful medium wave radio station which we have installed near Algiers. A statement from the President on this, of course, would be overwhelmingly effective.

June 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a Memorandum to the President, written by Robert Sherwood, and one to me dictated by the President.

These are self explanatory and I will be most grateful to you if you will let me have your opinion in re France and the United Nations Roster.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Enclosures. 2.

STE:aw

Memo to the President from Robert E. Sherwood, dated June 6, 1943 - "Next Monday, June 14th is United Nations day which gives great opportunity for an outburst of propaganda to enemy and occupied countries. It would be particularly fine if this year we could celebrate the inclusion of United France in the roster of the United Nations. This would be particularly effective in North Africa and in the broadcasting from North Africa to France which, on that day, will be greatly augmented by the opening of the new and powerful medium wave radio station which we have installed near Algiers. A statement from the President on this, of course, would be overwhelmingly effective."

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Memorandum for S. T.E., from the President, dated June 8, 1943:
"Will you talk with Cordell about this? I have distinct doubts as to whether a United France should be included in the roster of the United Nations next Monday. I should say that was premature. Also, I hesitate to make any statement."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The discussions in Algiers appear to have brought the situation to the following status:

It is not yet clear whether the division of military power is still before the Committee as a project for acceptance or has been substantially agreed to on the basis of General Giraud remaining Commander-in-Chief of the French military forces in North and West Africa. If this latter has actually been agreed upon and accepted by General Eisenhower, then the reports of Governor General Boisson's resignation being accepted by General Giraud would appear out of place.

The question of our relations with the new Committee with respect to all territories other than North Africa now arises. Attached is a draft of a telegram to be sent to Ambassador Winant for the purpose of coming to an understanding with the British Government as to the basis on which both the British and ourselves will deal with the new Committee.

Once the new Committee is accepted, we assume there will be a unified representation in Washington on all questions dealing with the French Antilles. We would expect to cooperate with this representative on the basis that these French possessions, as in the past, must be admittedly within the American defense area.

As of possible interest, there is also attached a copy of a memorandum from the British Embassy regarding London's discussions with Moscow on the proposed recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.

Attachments:
Draft telegram to London.
British memorandum.

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personal*

CH

June 24, 1943

AMEMBASSY,
LONDON.

In view of the discussions now proceeding in Algiers on the subject of formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, the question of relations between this Government and the new Committee arises. We should be able to deal, subject always to military requirements in general and to military requirements in North Africa in particular, with this Committee. I believe that in dealing with this Committee it should be made clear that relationship with this Government will be subject to certain military considerations and other conditions which are necessary in pursuing the war against the Axis to which we are now pledged, and that these considerations should be accepted and agreed to by the new Committee as an earnest of their determination to take their place beside the United Nations in the prosecution of the war until the defeat of the Axis powers. The principal considerations which suggest themselves to me are as follows:

1. That this Government in considering its relationship with the Committee and the military and other conditions referred to above should be fully and frankly informed with

regard to any commitments or obligations which may be assumed by the Committee of National Liberation in the international field;

2. That the Committee should not continue or name or in any sense encourage or support representatives abroad who carry on activities inimical to the interests of any of the United Nations;

3. That the facilities and concessions required by the Allied military forces in North Africa and other French territories for the prosecution of the war be granted to the extent specified by the respective Allied military commanders;

4. That the facilities and assistance in the economic field desired by the American and British Governments with respect to communications, shipping, essential war materials, and all other economic needs, be granted to the extent required by the war effort.

5. That all agreements heretofore made with the Allied military commanders remain in force.

6. In so far as North Africa is concerned, responsibility for making political, economic, and relief decisions shall remain vested in the Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa until the military situation permits a change in this procedure.

It is generally recognized that it is the operation and success of the military forces of the United States and Great Britain which

(1) have secured the present comparative freedom from hazard and oppression of North Africa by the Axis forces; and

(2) give promise of continuing that security and of extending these successes to the securing of the future restoration and salvation of the Republic of France.

The French Committee must therefore recognize that so long as the German menace remains and so long as this necessitates the continued occupation of any portion of North Africa by these Anglo-American forces, the security of those forces must be maintained beyond peradventure; and that the means and measures by which such absolutely essential security of these forces must be maintained is a matter which in the last resort must rest solely upon the determination of the commanders of those forces.

Furthermore, in connection with eventual acceptance of relationship with French Committee of National Liberation we expect to ask for a reaffirmation of Catroux's assurances regarding respect and protection of American rights as defined by the Treaty of 1924, and to request the Committee, in concert with the British:

- 1) To confirm the Catroux proclamations of independence of Syria and Lebanon;
- 2) Progressively to transfer real powers to local governments and to reduce role of French representative from that of High Commissioner to that of diplomatic officer.

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You are requested to take this matter up with Mr. Eden as soon as convenient with a view to discussing with him the suggestions outlined above and with a view to concerting the action of this Government and the British Government with respect to the basis of our respective relationships with the French Committee in order that each Government may conduct its dealings with the new Committee on the same basis.

It would be our intention to set up a separate diplomatic representation with the usual political and economic staff near the seat of the new Committee.

PA/D:JCD:ACK

AIDE MEMOIRE

On June 20th His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow received a private letter from Monsieur Molotov stating that he had now received a communication from the Fighting French representative asking for recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. Monsieur Molotov went on to say that the Soviet Government had studied the question alike in the light of the request of the Fighting French representative and of the communication made by His Majesty's Ambassador on June 15th (in this communication Sir A. Clark Kerr stressed the importance of the Governments of ^{the} Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America and the United Kingdom adopting a common attitude on the question of recognition and had expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would not make any communication to the French Committee of National Liberation on this subject without consulting His Majesty's Government). The Soviet Government had reached the conclusion that it was not expedient to postpone recognition because postponement would not be calculated to help the French forces opposed to Hitler in general. The Soviet Government found the Committee's declaration satisfactory and considered recognition to be necessary because such recognition by the Allies would have the effect of rallying the French forces. The Soviet Government hoped therefore that His Majesty's Government would declare themselves to be in favour of recognition.

In view of the above, instructions were sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow on June 22nd, to speak to Monsieur Molotov on the following lines:- His Majesty's Government could well understand the wish of the Soviet Government to avoid undue delay over recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. His Majesty's Government were also anxious to regularise their relations with the new Committee as soon as possible, and were indeed somewhat embarrassed in the transaction of day to day business by the present irregular position. They found it impossible, however, to carry the matter further until they knew the outcome of the latest crisis at Algiers and until they saw how the new Committee functioned.

Sir A. Clark Kerr was also authorised to explain that General Eisenhower had received authority from the United States and British Governments in view of his responsibilities and of impending operations to insist on the effective control of French forces being in the hands of General Giraud, with whom he knew he could work smoothly. The present military arrangements were working well and it was unsound to make drastic changes at this moment. In view of the presence of millions of Allied soldiers in North Africa the command of the French forces was not a political but a military matter,
and/

and the Commander-in-Chief dare not have any doubt about the security of his rear. General Eisenhower had the full support of the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in this matter for it was clear that the Allied Commander-in-Chief must have the last word and that he could not expect to work with subordinate commanders in whom he had not full confidence.

His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to urge that the Soviet Government should continue to consult His Majesty's Government before committing themselves about recognition. His Majesty's Government hoped that Monsieur Molotov would see that the question involved military considerations in a theatre where the Americans and the British had the responsibility. His Majesty's Government would do their best to keep Monsieur Molotov informed of developments.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON. D. C.
June 24th, 1943

Deves

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *file*

THE SECRETARY

June 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the telegram I left with you yesterday to be dispatched to London, setting forth the conditions under which we would consider accepting the new French Committee of National Liberation as the French authority to deal with with respect to matters other than the military situation in North Africa, I wish to lay before you for consideration an additional condition which seems to me necessary in view of the likelihood of having a de Gaulle control of the new Committee.

I suggest an additional condition along the following lines:

"The requirements of the defense of the United States, particularly in the Caribbean area, must be recognized.

"Until this Government is thoroughly satisfied as to the exact character and nature of the attitude and policies of the new Committee toward the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere relations between this Government and those possessions will be under the control of General Giraud and he will have the responsibility as to all decisions with regard to political, economic and military questions in those territories."

If you agree with the advisability of this condition, I suggest that it be sent along to the British through the channel you had in mind yesterday.

Since it is undoubtedly the Foreign Office who will handle this matter in detail, if you have no objection I should like to send a complete copy of the conditions to Ambassador Winant for his guidance.

CH

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Civil Affairs Office

July 6, 1943.

SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Dear Mr. President:

This may be an opportune moment to sum up the situation in French Africa as we see it.

The French Committee of National Liberation.

The French Committee of National Liberation was established by an Ordinance of June 3 on the basis discussed in the negotiations, that is, a Committee of seven members. A secret change was made on June 7, on the inspiration of Jeen Monnet without advising us, expanding the Committee to a membership of fourteen. The added membership appears to give a preponderant influence to the de Gaulle group, but several civilian members seem determined that the collective body rather than any one man should govern. It remains to be seen whether they or de Gaulle will dominate.

The Committee stood the initial shocks and held together after a number of disputes and violent differences of opinion. I believe it will weather the storm and continue, with some possible future modifications, as the de facto governing body of French overseas territories until metropolitan France has been cleared of the enemy. Therefore, I telegraphed on July 5, 1943, a recommendation to the effect that appropriate recognition be granted because I feel it is in our interest to do so before the Husky operation. I believe, of course, that Husky will be a success from the start, but it seems to me that if we are to recognize this French Committee, it would be well, as explained in our telegram, to do so now during Giraud's presence in the United States and also because of the contingency, extremely remote as it may be, that something might go sour with Husky plans. In such a contingency a subsequent act of recognition might be misconstrued by some of the less friendly Frenchmen as an apologetic effort on our part to gain their support.

GIRAUD.

I sincerely hope that General Giraud's visit is not a headache for you. He was determined to proceed at this time and I felt that from the local point of view there was every reason in favor of his

going . . .

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972

going. His presence or absence will not make the slightest difference in de Gaulle's campaign to improve and strengthen his personal position. Giraud's weakness, as you know, is an indifference to, if not contempt of, politics, and, I am sorry to say, a lack of understanding of the value of political action to support a military position. This weakness has badgered both his administration and our position here for many months, but as it was counterbalanced by an honesty of purpose, and loyal cooperation in the military field, I considered it just one of those things which had to be accepted in the bargain. It has, however, left us open to a number of attacks on the part of the press and the de Gaulle organization, which could well have been avoided. However, the military results achieved provide a definite compensation.

Giraud's future is hard to discern. It is difficult to visualize Giraud and de Gaulle working together as a team. De Gaulle refers to it derisively as "half and half unity", implying that the solution is one imposed by the Allies contrary to the better judgment of the French people. It may be that one or the other, or both, will be eliminated. Catroux, for example, I know has definite ambitions to replace them both and in this he has the support of people like Monnet as well as some of our British friends. Catroux might not be an unhappy solution as he is an intelligent and able person who is well disposed and reasonable. Catroux, according to his statements to me, considers de Gaulle a menace for elimination at the first appropriate moment. Adjustment between Catroux and Giraud would be simple. They understand each other and Catroux is conscious of Giraud's lack of political ambition.

De Gaulle.

De Gaulle, as you know, is another cup of tea. He suspects Catroux and has no intention of permitting Catroux to supersede him. I doubt seriously that Catroux will be able to overcome de Gaulle's energy, ambition, and his intention to appeal for popular support by using every trick dear to the heart of a demagogue who believes in his own publicity.

The de Gaulle Movement.

The de Gaulle movement has many characteristics which are reminiscent of the traditional methods of Tammany Hall. Some of these characteristics also remind one of the technique employed in the early twenties by the German National Socialist Party. This French faction, immediately on its arrival in North Africa, began the execution of what appears to be a well-formulated program of establishing a political grip on this area to be used as a base for future political operations in France by attempting to gain control of the levers of command of the armed forces and by placing adherents in

public . . .

public office throughout the territories. Their method is to seek out the office holder and describe the conditions enjoyed by members of the de Gaulle organization who have been treated well financially (it is not generally known here that the de Gaulle leaders were well taken care of financially out of the drawing account which the British Government very wisely put at their disposition when the necessities of the situation required it--thus, General Catroux received a salary of sterling £3600, plus expenses, and other members proportionately liberal salaries). Such bidding for official support is frequently successful. Many North African officials are not averse to material advantage. Patronage in North Africa is not radically different from the American variety.

An important local official recently was approached along these lines and his interlocutor added supplementary argument to the effect that it was the official's patriotic duty to join up with de Gaulle because the latter is the champion of French rights in the face of the Allied "occupation" of North Africa. He was informed that the "Americans have no intention of ever leaving here." Other arguments disparaging the American position are to the effect that during the last war France provided American forces with equipment without imposing any conditions. We are represented as restricting French liberties and grudgingly providing arms and economic supplies only after we have exacted conditions tantamount to occupation and control of the area.

The de Gaulle movement is greatly strengthened by an effective propaganda department. Much of this work is done by Gaston Palewski, who has been clever enough to persuade one or two American newsmen of the justice of the de Gaulle cause and the injustice of American policy. Palewski is hostile to the United States but is losing ground here. I do not know whether practical considerations are involved in the cases of a very few newsmen who daily are fed data by Palewski and his associates. Their copy clearly is flavored by inspiration which can only come from this source. Of course a few correspondents are indifferent to the practical results our Government's policy has obtained, and seem to care little for the great advantages gained for the United States in its prosecution of the war.

Jean Monnet.

Jean Monnet arrived with a definite objective--to sell French unity. He succeeded. Some of his critics describe the result as a confirmation of disunity. Monnet respects the United States and Britain and, I am sure, will avoid giving offense to us, but he is definitely out to gain every advantage for the French he possibly can. He knows our methods so well that he will profit by every opportunity we offer him to seize advantage. He counts greatly on the support of Jack McCloy and Felix Frankfurter. Monnet is loyal neither to Giraud nor de Gaulle, but he is loyal to France and to Monnet.

After . . .

After the sale of French unity has been confirmed, Monnet intends to put on a drive for military equipment and economic support, possibly returning to the United States later in the summer for this purpose. His long term objective, aside from participating in the future government of France, is to represent his country at the peace negotiations.

French Communists.

We are witnessing a revival of the activity of the French Communist Party in North Africa. Beginning with the nucleus of twenty-seven French Communist Deputies who had been imprisoned in North Africa as the result of their opposition to France's entry into the war in 1939, at which time the French Communist Party was involved in sabotaging the war effort, this group, after release from prison by Giraud, has resorted to the customary party technique of developing sympathies among the workers in North Africa. They are gaining some favor with the Arabs by holding out carrots in the shape of promises of civic rights, and a similar line is adopted in respect of the Jewish element. Their activity would hold no particular interest for us except that there is a tendency to gain favor with the European population in North Africa by veiled criticism of the Allies, and especially the United States, on the ground that we are occupying this country and have no intention of departing from it. They add touches to the effect that we are champions of capitalism, ignore the rights of negroes, etc. In this they work hand in glove with some members of the de Gaulle group. The latter play it both ways. They say in one breath that de Gaulle is the only postwar bulwark against communism in France, and in the next that collaboration with the communists is France's only salvation.

The French Army and Navy.

The French army and navy are in a state of effervescence over the political changes which happened during the month of June, particularly the formula adopted by the French Committee for the High Command. The officers of the French North and West African forces are fully conscious that the de Gaulle group arrived here determined to eliminate high ranking officers who were considered either incompetent or antagonistic toward de Gaulle. Officers of de Larminat's army arrived with definite instructions to proselytize. They carried on a campaign by approaching individual officers, describing the conditions of better clothing and pay, rapid promotions and the modern methods and equipment available in the de Gaulle forces. Their attitude was that the officers of the de Gaulle army should dominate the North African situation and, considering that the de Larminat forces did not amount to more than fifteen thousand men at the outside, as compared with Giraud's three hundred thousand, they

cannot . . .

cannot be reproached with lack of audacity or a disdain of bluff. However, they arrived during a lull in military activity, which they exploited in their conversations with the officers and men here who are dissatisfied with lack of equipment, insufficient and worn-out clothing, low pay and comparatively slow promotions. As in all armies there is dissatisfaction in the North African army, accentuated by these deficiencies which are glaring because of the presence of large numbers of well clothed, well paid and well equipped Allied officers and men.

There is bound to be fusion of these French forces, even though it will be accomplished after dispute and perhaps violent differences. Badly informed or antagonistic Frenchmen have voiced criticism of our intervention regarding the French High Command. There is no doubt that General Eisenhower's intervention, which was made in the friendliest manner and with the maximum of tact, had a salutary effect. I think also that well-disposed Frenchmen generally, and by that I mean the majority, were relieved that we took action at a critical moment to prevent this situation from deteriorating to a point where the war effort might have been jeopardized.

Huskyland.

Your telegram regarding equality of status for Macmillan and myself as political advisers to the Commander-in-Chief for Husky and the post-Husky period has been carefully noted and is much appreciated. I would like you to know that I shall feel that with the successful launching of the Husky operation my mission in this area, which you were kind enough to entrust to me, is really accomplished. Should you find it useful or desirable to make a change, that would be quite normal and understandable. This has been a long and interesting job and I am deeply grateful to you for your confidence.

In that connection it might be well to add a word regarding British policy in this area. They have played ball with us, our relations are excellent, and the development of our relations has brought out in a natural way the fact that many of the theories advanced regarding union are justified. One contrast, however, is noteworthy: the British came into this area knowing exactly what they wanted in a practical way. Politically they want a strong France with a government they can trust. In this particular area they have a definite economic and financial program which was well and promptly implemented by British personnel equipped for the job. They know exactly what minerals they want, they have definite banking and insurance interests, a stake in the communications system, and intend to extend their field of commercial influence. We, on the other hand, have had the good fortune, or possibly misfortune, of wanting very little. There are only

insignificant . . .

insignificant American interests here and we need but little in the way of North African produce. The British have made a substantial effort to popularize themselves. More of their people speak the language than do ours. Nevertheless, should it come to a Gallup poll on relative popularity I have no doubt that the United States would win by a heavy majority.

Lieutenant General Anderson.

To conclude, this story may amuse you. General Anderson, recently in command of the British First Army, was given a dinner by the Chief of Staff before departing from Algiers. I had been in contact with him since the beginning of TORCH. He is a dour Scot with a religious bent I had not appreciated. Our relations had grown quite cordial after a bad start due, in December, to Anderson's extreme jumpiness and suspicion of the French. He suspected many French officers for whom later he formed a strong affection. After my departure he told our host that he had begun to believe that I was not a bad fellow, although he never trusted Catholics and has an especial distrust of Catholic diplomats. He ignored the fact that his host, to whom he told this, is an ardent Catholic.

Faithfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy

Robert D. Murphy.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following observations are submitted as of possible use in the event that General Giraud raises with you the question of American recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers.

1. We are frankly disappointed with the activities and apparent attitude of certain members of the Committee who seem more interested in playing a political game designed to promote their chances of gaining political power always looking towards France after the liberation, than they are in playing a useful part in the immediate war effort which alone will make liberation possible. This makes it particularly necessary for the British and ourselves to give careful study to the considerations which suggest themselves in connection with safeguarding and improving the military situation.

2. Some of the considerations which we have in mind were embodied in a proposed draft of a telegram to London for the Prime Minister submitted to you on June 25. A copy of this draft as prepared for the information of our Embassy in London is

attached



*France folder
file
personal
1-43*

attached. In the opinion of the State Department those considerations still stand, with the exception of the first paragraph under section numbered 5 which should be omitted in view of the attitude we have taken with respect to the new situation in Martinique and Guadeloupe.

3. General Giraud might well be told that our future relationship with the Committee will depend upon the Committee's acceptance, as an earnest of their determination to take their place beside the United Nations in the prosecution of the war, certain conditions which we feel will be required to safeguard the two objectives:

(1) To prosecute the war with all our energies.

(2) To prevent any steps which may have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people to exercise their free will in the choice of their leaders after the liberation of Metropolitan France.

4. It would seem desirable to impress again upon General Giraud that he has our unflinching support as the leader of French military forces in North Africa, and that we expect him to be firm in maintaining the power and prerogatives of his military command. In this connection, however, it is disturbing to note that under Article II of the Decree of June 3, "The French Committee of National Liberation directs the French war effort in all its forms and in all places".

#

C H

June 25, 1943

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

In view of the discussions now proceeding in Algiers on the subject of formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, the question of relations between this Government and the new Committee arises. We should be able to deal, subject always to military requirements in general and to military requirements in North Africa in particular, with this Committee. I believe that in dealing with this Committee it should be made clear that relationship with this Government will be subject to certain military considerations and other conditions which are necessary in pursuing the war against the Axis to which we are now pledged, and that these considerations should be accepted and agreed to by the new Committee as an earnest of their determination to take their place beside the United Nations in the prosecution of the war until the defeat of the Axis powers. The principal considerations which suggest themselves to me are as follows:

1. That the facilities and concessions required by the Allied military forces in North Africa and other French territories for the prosecution of the war be granted to

the extent specified by the respective Allied military commanders;

2. That the facilities and assistance in the economic field desired by the American and British Governments with respect to communications, shipping, essential war materials, and all other economic needs, be granted to the extent required by the war effort. In dealing with these matters, we would wish to have acceptance of the principle of joint devotion of economic resources and joint sacrifices.

3. That all agreements heretofore made with the Allied military commanders remain in force.

4. In so far as North Africa is concerned, responsibility for making political, economic, and relief decisions shall remain vested in the Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa until the military situation permits a change in this procedure.

5. That all matters with respect to French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, except St. Pierre-Miquelon, and all theaters of operations where Americans exercise the Allied command, will be under the control of General Giraud and he will have the responsibility for all decisions as to political, economic and military questions in those territories.

The requirements of the defense of the United States, particularly in the Caribbean area, must be recognized.

6. That the Committee should not continue or name or in any sense encourage or support representatives abroad who carry on activities inimical to the interests of any of the United Nations;

7. That this Government in considering its relationship with the Committee and the military and other conditions referred to above should be fully and frankly informed with regard to any commitments or obligations which may be assumed by the Committee of National Liberation in the international field;

8. Furthermore, in connection with eventual acceptance of relationship with French Committee of National Liberation we expect to ask for a reaffirmation of Catroux's assurances regarding respect and protection of American rights as defined by the Treaty of 1924, and to request the Committee, in concert with the British:

a) To confirm the Catroux proclamations of independence of Syria and Lebanon;

b) Progressively to transfer real powers to local governments and to reduce role of French representative from that of High Commissioner to that of diplomatic officer.

It is generally recognized that it is the operation and success of the military forces of the United States and Great Britain which

(1) have secured the present comparative freedom from hazard and oppression of North Africa by the Axis forces; and

(2) give promise of continuing that security and of extending these successes to the securing of the future restoration and salvation of the Republic of France.

The French Committee must therefore recognize that so long as the German menace remains and so long as this necessitates the continued occupation of any portion of North Africa by these Anglo-American forces, the security of those forces must be maintained beyond peradventure; and that the means and measures by which such absolutely essential security of these forces must be maintained is a matter which in the last resort must rest solely upon the determination of the commanders of those forces.

You are requested to take this matter up with Mr. Eden as soon as convenient with a view to discussing with him the suggestions outlined above and with a view to concerting the action of this Government and the British Government with respect to the basis of our respective relationships with the French Committee in order that each Government may conduct its dealings with the new Committee on the same basis.

It would be our intention to set up a separate diplomatic representation with the usual political and economic staff near the seat of the new Committee.

Gen. Girard - 1943 July 18
1943

THE
Windsor
ON DOMINION SQUARE
Montreal

18. 7. 43.

Monsieur le Président,

Je regrette, just avant de
quitter le cabinet américain,

le recueil de vos "addresses",

avec un précieux souvenir.

Je vous en remercie de tout

coeur, comme aussi de la di-
vision que vos org. fait prendre
encourant le matériel destiné
à l'armée française.

L'armée franco-américaine
est un fruit de la cherchée
invitation que vos org. a.

devenir, et à laquelle j'ai été
si heureux de pouvoir me rendre.
C'est avec plaisir que j'ai
été tout mon amitié pour
vous et me confie dans
le succès de votre entreprise.

A. Girard

[Girard]

France folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I would like to see the
reply to the enclosed.

F.D.R.

Secret. telegram for Secretary and Under
Secretary from Murphy, dated 7-17-43, Algiers,
recommending an early recognition of the
Committee of National Liberation.

(1664)

hm
C
O
P
Y

*Original of these papers returned to the Secy. State
as per the President's notation.*

*8/31/43
hm*

*France folder
1-43*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Secretary

August 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft telegram to London, Moscow, and Chungking concerning the proposed adherence of the French Committee of National Liberation to the principles of the Declaration by United Nations.

C. H.

"O.K.
F.D.R."

August 30, 1943

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

This Government is of the opinion that adherence to the principles of the United Nations Declaration on behalf of those French territories free from Axis domination would now be timely and appropriate. Accordingly, this Government proposes to address the French Committee of National Liberation as follows, if the British, Chinese, and Soviet Governments concur:

"It was announced on January 4, 1942 that 'In order that liberty-loving peoples silenced by military force may have an opportunity to support the principles of the Declaration by United Nations, the Government of the United States, as the depository for that Declaration, will receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments.'

"The Government of the United States is gratified to welcome adherence of the French Committee of National Liberation to the principles of the Declaration by United Nations.

Nations. This is a further manifestation of the determination of Frenchmen to continue and to increase their assistance in the struggle of the United Nations for defeat of the common enemy and for freeing French and other territory from Axis bondage."

Please inform Foreign Office of above and ascertain its attitude.

OK.
FAR

SAME TO MOSCOW AND CHUNGKING

GC:CS:AMH

*file
Confidential*

France folder 1-43

W.D.L.

September 24, 1943

TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON #359
FROM THE PRESIDENT

Murphy reports the following in relation
to Corsican expedition by Giraud's forces:

QUOTE

PARAPHRASE

VCH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated September 21, 1943

Rec'd 3:17 a.m., 22nd

Secretary of State

Washington

1626, September 21, 8 p.m.

FROM MURPHY

After a complete silence on subject for several days news of French landings in Corsica was made public this morning since operation proving successful. General Giraud's military organization has for months past secretly armed about 12000 Corsican patriots. Committee has also published communique welcoming the successful landing, abolishing Vichy laws on island and appointing a prefect for Ajaccio, Mluizet. Giraud has appointed General Mallard military governor of island and General Martin in command troops.

Expedition has given rise however, to further discussion in committee with respect to status of CINC,

A dispute took place in meeting last Saturday which culminated in de Gaulle's abrupt departure from meeting. Giraud informed me that for reasons of military security and in agreement with Allied CINC he had not divulged to committee the preparations leading to Corsican

-2-, 1626, September 21, 8 p.m., from Algiers

to Corsican expedition. Twelve hours before departure he had informed de Gaulle personally and the latter expressed full approval. After reflection, however, at meeting on September 18 de Gaulle apparently lost his temper, protested against manner in which preparations had been held secret by military and particularly against installation of state of siege which brings island directly under jurisdiction of CINC. De Gaulle claims he should similarly exercise control as political leader of committee.

Situation at the moment somewhat tense but Giraud refuses to take matter seriously and has secretly left to assume command in Corsica. This latter move gives rise to the charge on part of some committee members that he is acting without committee's authority.

De Gaulle now taking advantage this discussion again to raise issue regarding the CINC somewhat along lines his proposal referred to in my 1526 September 3 and is reviving appointment of a defense commissioner and the single presidency of the committee.

Discussions in today's meeting were acrimonious but it was decided delay the issue until after Giraud's return on September 24.

MCBRIDE

CSE

PSF: *Frank folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
presmal*

October 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

When I saw Bedle Smith the other day I raised the question of sending further equipment to fit out the new French divisions. Just as a matter of interest, I dictated the enclosed to the Prime Minister on September seventh last but did not send it.

I think a showdown will come soon but it is a matter which, in a sense, relates a good deal more to Eisenhower than to Bob Murphy.

I hope you will keep in close touch with the situation.

Please return enclosures for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure - telegram from Mr. Murphy in Algiers to the State Dept., dated September 3, 1943.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

W.B.C.

Please read and speak to me about this. I have very distinct feelings that we should not send further equipment or munitions to the French Army in North Africa if our prima donna is to seize control of it from the old gentleman.

F.D.R.

PSF: France

Paraphrase

(Paraphrased copy sent to the Prime Minister by direction of the President)

~~MEM~~
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated September 3, 1943

Rec'd 4:40 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

FEB 8 1972

By J. Schauble Date

1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

~~SECRET~~ FROM MURPHY

Following recognition by the Allied Governments and the consequent clarification of the committee position, de Gaulle has raised the issue regarding the control by the committee over military affairs. He has sent a highly confidential memorandum to Giraud requesting that the latter agree to a more clearly defined control of the committee over the CINC and military activities and the limitation of military authority to operations against the enemy and organization of the armed forces. The memorandum further states that the powers exercised by the CINC in accordance with French law establishing a "state of siege" should be turned over ^{to} the responsible civil administrators and that all secret services should be amalgamated under one direction and controlled by the committee.

The memorandum in question was reported to me in the greatest secrecy and it is requested that its existence not be divulged.

Further

[Original of this ^{classified} Murphy telegram, 9-3-43, is in Map Room - OII No. Africa, French National Committee]

-2- #1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Algiers.

Further in this connection, the appointment of a defense commissioner has been suggested as well as the possibility of having only one president of the committee which in this case would be de Gaulle. The divergence with respect to the military authority is being further emphasized by Giraud's insistence that he alone has the authority to speak for the army, and that the rearmament furnished by the United States of America was given to him in his personal capacity.

The question of the organization and control of resistance movements and the authority to designate civilian administrators in territories of metropolitan France as they are liberated have been brought to the fore in the committee's discussions. It seems clear that the extreme elements of the Gaullist faction have decided that the time has come to make a further effort to reduce Giraud's power as the CINC as well as to increase de Gaulle's own control over even the civilian moderate elements of the committee. It is understood that the discussions which have taken place in the last few days in the committee meetings have led to no solution as yet.

KCBERIDE

WSB

KEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated September 3, 1943

Rec'd 2:00 am., 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The moderate element of Committee insist, however, that whatever solution is reached the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is basis of its recognition by Allied Governments.

As discussions of this nature continue the fear is beginning to be expressed that unless Committee is able to eliminate the personal differences and devote more attention to prosecution of the war the people of France when liberated will have lost respect for Committee and it will lose possibility of speaking for them when time comes. It is likely, however, that until French Army is able to participate more actively in prosecution of the war the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MCBRIDE

RSP

PSF: France

Paraphrase

(Paraphrased copy sent to the Prime Minister by direction of the President)

KEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

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Washington.

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The memorandum in question was reported to me in the greatest secrecy and it is requested that its existence not be divulged.

Further

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

- State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

FEB 8 1972

of Murphy telegram
[Original in Map Room - Oll. No. Africa French National Committee]

-2- #1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Algiers.

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KICBRIDE

WSB

KEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated September 3, 1943

Rec'd 2:00 am., 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1520, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The moderate element of Committee insist, however, that whatever solution is reached the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is basis of its recognition by Allied Governments.

As discussions of this nature continue the fear is beginning to be expressed that unless Committee is able to eliminate the personal differences and devote more attention to prosecution of the war the people of France when liberated will have lost respect for Committee and it will lose possibility of speaking for them when time comes. It is likely, however, that until French Army is able to participate more actively in prosecution of the war the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters.

(END OF MESSAGE)

LICBRIDE

RSP

file
Confidential

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT October 26. 1943

The State Department has been informed by a confidential source in the French Military Mission that General Bethouart has recently received a private communication from General Giraud in which the latter describes, presumably with disapproval, "the present efforts of General de Gaulle to orient the policy of the French Committee of National Liberation more and more in the direction of the Soviet Union". The communication was reported to contain the following passage:

"L'armée est saine. L'affaire de Corse vient de montrer sa valeur, son allant et son audace. La marine et l'aviation ont été à la hauteur des terriens. Quand toutes nos divisions seront armées ce sera une force irrésistible. Dites le bien à Washington et que le Président sache que je suis de très près la question militaire. Quand elle m'inquiètera il le saura."

The Department's informant stated, for what it may be worth, that in General Bethouart's opinion General Giraud was not speaking in a purely military sense when he stated that the divisions under his command would, when fully armed, constitute "une force irrésistible".

General Bethouart wished to have the foregoing brought to your attention.

E. D. Butting

(2042)

hms

C
O
P
Y

*Original of this memorandum sent to Mr. Stettinius,
10/31/43
hms
PSF France folder
1-43*

"E.R.S. Jr.

Yes defer

F.D.R."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The French Committee of National Liberation has informally inquired of us whether it can be represented on the Pacific War Council. In our opinion, this request is based on (a) a desire to enhance the Committee's prestige, (b) a desire to place the Committee in a better position to protect French interests in Indo-China after Indo-China's liberation from Japanese domination, as well as to insure the Committee's eventual control of that Colony.

If accepted, the Committee's representative would doubtless take the position that the Committee represented all French interests in the Pacific, including Indo-China, and that one objective of the Pacific campaign must be the reconquest of Indo-China and its return to France. In the circumstances it is recommended that the State Department be authorized to put off replying to the French inquiry for an indefinite period.

(Signed) E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

France - 1943

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

EB

In your letter of July 30 you requested that you be kept informed of developments with respect to the fines and levies imposed by the German occupation authorities on the Jewish Community in Tunis. There are attached paraphrases of cables which have just been sent to Algiers and London, setting forth the position of this Government with respect to this matter.

x198

x203-10

x76-6

The position taken by this Government is that funds should be given to the Jewish Community to cover the fines and levies and the obligation assumed by the French authorities in the first instance. The reasons for this position are (1) full relief can only be effected by having the French authorities assume responsibility at this time, and (2) such action is desirable from the standpoint of psychological warfare. In the cables under reference, it is also suggested that the position of this Government

be

The President,

The White House.

x229
x203
x4675-L

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 1/27/43


ADDRESSED TO

The President

be brought to the attention of the appropriate French authorities, but it should at that time be pointed out that we recognize that the ultimate decision is, naturally, a matter for the French to determine.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the cables under reference were discussed with representatives of the Treasury Department and had the full approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. x21

Faithfully yours,


Acting Secretary
x20

Enclosures:

Paraphrases of cables 6889
to London and 2048 to Algiers,
respectively, of November 3.

PARAPHRASE OF CABLE SENT
NOVEMBER 2, 1943

U.S. URGENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

LONDON

(6889)

Today Stettinius and Morgenthau transmitted following message to Murphy and Hoffman in Algiers:

QUOTE Your September 1, 1943; September 20, 1943; and October 11, BOC Airgram 128.

Detailed consideration given issue raised in airgram and telegrams under reference and following position decided upon:

1. The use of the United Nations Declaration as basis for this Government's position on issue of discrimination is not warranted as Declaration is not sufficiently relevant. Conclusion is in no way dependent on Declaration and issue stands on its merits.

2. We understand that fines and levies imposed on Jewish Community in Tunis cause Commissariat of Finance to examine three courses of action as possibilities for recommendation to Comité.

(a) Jewish Community would receive loans and would distribute funds to individual members, the Community acknowledging formally debt to banks but pledging no security. Tunisian Treasury would guarantee loans, which would be of indefinite maturity, and would pay all charges, including interest. Members of Community who mortgaged or sold property or advanced funds to meet fines and levies would be reimbursed for previous bank loans,

as amount of proposed advances would be sufficient for repayment of old obligations. Only after facts concerning levies and fines in other colonial and metropolitan French areas have been ascertained would ultimate decision be made on question of whether loans are to be repaid by Community or considered as Government's final obligation and if so, under what conditions and terms.

(b) To have responsibility assumed by French authorities in the first instance, i.e., to make available the funds as gifts by authorities, instead of by a loan which would leave for later determination the ultimate decision of authorities.

(c) To follow action proposed in (a) or (b) and also to make available up to fixed amount funds to all Tunis residents to repair damaged or destroyed property resulting from war.

3. Proposal as set forth in (b) and (c) is favored by this Government with responsibility in first instance assumed by French authorities, subject to additional point of following modification. Any group of persons or other person subjected to similar injury and discriminatory treatment should also be entitled to relief upon submitting proof of such injury and discriminatory treatment. For example, similar discrimination would seem to be proved if Nazis requisitioned or seized property from group of persons or person solely because of such group of persons' or person's political views or race.

4. The

London 4. The position of this Government is supported by these reasons:

(a) Total relief will be lacking unless funds are now made available as gifts, as recipients, in absence of knowledge that repayment of principal, as well as any of carrying or interest charges will not be expected, will not have same freedom regarding use of such funds, and this Government (b) Restitution for Jews is essential, from standpoint of psychological warfare, to show the world that Atlantic Charter guarantees of United Nations against racial discrimination mean what they say, and that Hitler's methods are being fought by Allies as well as Hitler.

The additional point by way of a modification provides a means for not disturbing the delicate Arab-Jewish relationship. The proposal contained in 2(a) and the strength of the argument as reported by you is recognized by us, but we have concluded that the considerations set forth in 4(a) and (b) overweigh this argument.

5. Unless you have an objection, it is requested that this Government's position be presented to appropriate French authorities. It should be made wholly clear at that time to such authorities that we present our views to them merely for their consideration and clearly recognize that the French are to make the decisions.

6. For your information, this is being repeated to

London

London with request that British be urged strongly to take similar position without delay, because of urgency of matter. Embassy in London is being asked by us to keep you directly informed. UNQUOTE

As soon as possible, please take this matter up with appropriate British authorities, keeping Algiers and Department informed. Since French have delayed decision until this Government formulated its views, and are anxious to make decision without delay, time is of the essence.

Acting.

PARAPHRASE OF CABLE SENT
NOVEMBER 2, 1943

U.S. URGENT

AMERICAN CONSUL,
ALGIERS, (ALGERIA).

2048

FOR MURPHY AND HOFFMAN FROM STETTINIUS AND MORGENTHAU.

Your September 1, 1513; September 20, 1621; and October 11, BOC Airgram 129.

Detailed consideration given issue raised in airgram and telegrams under reference and following position decided upon:

1. The use of the United Nations Declaration as basis for this Government's position on issue of discrimination is not warranted as Declaration is not sufficiently relevant. Conclusion is in no way dependent on Declaration and issue stands on its merits.

2. We understand that fines and levies imposed on Jewish Community in Tunis cause Commissariat of Finance to examine three courses of action as possibilities for recommendation to Comité.

(a) Jewish Community would receive loans and would distribute funds to individual members, the Community acknowledging formally debt to banks but pledging no security. Tunisian Treasury would guarantee loans, which would be of indefinite maturity, and would pay all charges, including interest. Members of Community who mortgaged or sold property or advanced funds

funds to meet fines and levies would be reimbursed for previous bank loans, as amount of proposed advances would be sufficient for repayment of old obligations. Only after facts concerning levies and fines in other colonial and metropolitan French areas have been ascertained would ultimate decision be made on question of whether loans are to be repaid by Community or considered as Government's final obligation and if so, under what conditions and terms.

(b) To have responsibility assumed by French authorities in the first instance, i.e., to make available the funds as gifts by authorities, instead of by a loan which would leave for later determination the ultimate decision of authorities.

(c) To follow action proposed in (a) or (b) and also to make available up to fixed amount funds to all Tunis residents to repair damaged or destroyed property resulting from war.

3. Proposal as set forth in (b) and (c) is favored by this Government with responsibility in first instance assumed by French authorities, subject to additional point of following modification. Any group of persons or other person subjected to similar injury and discriminatory treatment should also be entitled to relief upon submitting proof of such injury and discriminatory treatment. For example, similar discrimination would seem to be proved if Nazis requisitioned or seized property from group of persons or person solely because of such

of such group of persons' or person's political views or race.

4. The position of this Government is supported by these reasons:

(a) Total relief will be lacking unless funds are now made available as gifts, as recipients, in absence of knowledge that repayment of principal, as well as any of carrying or interest charges will not be expected, will not have same freedom regarding use of such funds, and

(b) Restitution for Jews is essential, from standpoint of psychological warfare, to show the world that Atlantic Charter guarantees of United Nations against racial discrimination mean what they say, and that Hitler's methods are being fought by Allies as well as Hitler.

The additional point by way of a modification provides a means for not disturbing the delicate Arab-Jewish relationship. The proposal contained in 3(a) and the strength of the argument as reported by you is recognized by us, but we have concluded that the considerations set forth in 4(a) and (b) overweigh this argument.

5. Unless you have an objection, it is requested that this Government's position be presented to appropriate French authorities. It should be made wholly clear at that time to such authorities that we present our views to them merely for their consideration and clearly recognize that the French are to make the decisions.

6. For

6. For your information, this is being repeated to London with request that British be urged strongly to take similar position without delay, because of urgency of matter. Embassy in London is being asked by us to keep you directly informed.

Acting

C. F.
State

July 30, 1943.

Confidential

Dear Cordell:

I have just had the opportunity of reading your cable of July 9th to the American Consulate in Algiers and cable COB 769, dated July 15, 1943, which was sent out by the CCMA to the NAFB on "Tunisian Financial Problems Resulting from Enemy Occupation".

x 203-D

I want you to know how delighted I am with this vigorous and prompt action on the part of all the interested agencies.

I would appreciate it if you could let me have a report by August 7th on what has been done under Cable COB 769.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd)FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.

x20

x4675-L



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JULY 24, 1943

GRACE,

I SHOULD APPRECIATE YOUR
BRINGING THIS TO THE BOSS'S ATTENTION.

Lube
LUBE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUBIN *KL* *x4529*
SUBJECT: NORTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC SITUATION

The letter that you sent to Hull relative to the confiscation of property by the Axis powers in North Africa, has apparently borne excellent results. As the result of your letter, the Secretary of State sent the attached BOC airgram No. 60 to Murphy. A recent cable from Murphy stated that the matter is being currently studied by the French.

I think it might be a swell idea if something could be done to maintain the interest of the boys over at the State Department in this problem. One way to do this would be to congratulate them on the job they have done thus far. Such an expression of appreciation would also make them realize that you are personally maintaining an interest in the situation.

If you think it wise to write to Mr. Hull, the attached letter will, I am sure, keep the boys in Hull's office on their toes.

x396
x48

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Cordell:

I have just had the opportunity of reading your cable of July 9 to the American Consulate in Algiers and cable COB 769, dated July 15, 1943, which was sent out by the CCMA to the NAEB on "Tunisian Financial Problems Resulting from Enemy Occupation".

I want you to know how delighted I am with this vigorous and prompt action on the part of all the interested agencies. These are splendid cablegrams. Those responsible for their preparation are deserving of the highest commendation.

I would appreciate it if you could let me have a report by August 7th on what has been done under Cable COB 769.

May I again thank you for the way in which this matter has been handled.

Yours sincerely,

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

U. S. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~BRITISH SECRET~~

COMBINED COMMITTEE FOR FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS

The following communication has been sent
through State Department channels.

CC: Mr. Orchard
Mr. Simmons
Mr. Thayer
Mr. Mitchell (4)
Mr. O'Boyle (3)
Mr. Waagelein
Mr. Handler
Mr. Sundelson

STATE DEPARTMENT PARAPHRASE

State Department No. 1275, 9 July 1943

From: Secretary of State
To: American Consulate, Algiers
Subject: Property Transfers in Enemy Occupied Territories
Ref: BOC Airgram 60

1. On 5 January 1943, the Department announced the following declaration by the United States and certain others of the United Nations:

QUOTE. The Union of South Africa, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czechoslovak Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Greece, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and the French National Committee:

Hereby issue a formal warning to all concerned, and in particular to persons in neutral countries, that they intend to do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the governments with which they are at war against the countries and peoples who have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled.

Accordingly, the governments making this declaration and the French National Committee reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfers of or dealings with, property, rights and interests of any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in the territories which have come under the occupation or control, direct or indirect, of the governments with which they are at war or which belong, or have belonged, to persons, including juridical persons, resident in such territories. This warning applies whether such transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected.

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The governments making this declaration and the French National Committee solemnly record their solidarity in this matter.
END QUOTE.

2. I have been requested by the President to point out to you that the circumstances described in the airgram under reference fall within the policy stated in the above declaration not to recognize property transfers made by inhabitants of occupied territories under Axis duress.

3. Will the Consul please discuss this matter with the French authorities and try to learn from them what action they propose to take to implement the above declaration in regard to the condition reported in the airgram under reference. They should be informed that the United States Government regards with disfavor any attempt to foreclose or collect interest on mortgages executed as a result of Axis levies.

4. When this matter has been discussed with the French authorities, their reaction should be promptly reported to me, as well as any changes in the situation which may occur.

5. Please bring this cable to the attention of the Finance and Control Division of the North African Economic Board, since BOC Airgram 60 originated there.

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DISTRIBUTION: "A"

-2-

WITHIN THE
OF ITS

COMBINED COMMITTEE

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH CONFIDENTIAL

The following
by the N
9

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH SECRET

COMBINED COMMITTEE FOR FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS

The following communication was submitted
by the Treasury and has been sent after
clearance with those concerned.

P A R A S E

COB 769, 15 July 1943 (Treasury 35)
From: CCNA
To: NAEB
Subject: Tunisian Financial Problems Resulting from Enemy Occupation
Ref: BOC Airgram 33; BOC Airgram 60

1. The situation described in BOC Airgram 33 and BOC Airgram 60, S.D. 1275 of 9 July, as well as subsequent telegram to Murphy, and in other communications relating to conditions in Tunisia raises important questions in the financial field in connection with money and property loss inflicted by the enemy during its occupation due to despoliation or other destructive action, and loss suffered as a result of military operations occasioned by the presence of the enemy. These questions relate particularly to the following types of losses:

- (a) Direct damage as a result of military operations by the Allies or by the enemy such as the bombing of buildings, the destruction of power plants, etc.
- (b) Damage resulting from the intentional destruction of property by Allied sympathizers in their efforts to hurt the enemy.
- (c) Damage inflicted by the enemy through the looting of personal property, the requisitioning of real property, etc.
- (d) Loss suffered as a result of levies, fines, penalties, etc. imposed by the enemy and designed to further the enemy's war effort or to enable the enemy to discriminate against selected individuals or groups.

2. It is our understanding that the French authorities have already adopted certain laws relating to war losses arising out of

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-1-
(over)

7-17-353

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, U.S.C. 50; 31 AND 32. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH CONFIDENTIAL

15-323

damage to property as well as injury to person with the end in view that certain war losses shall not be fully borne by the individual persons on whom they fell, either by chance or design of the enemy, but shall to some extent be borne by the Government waging the war. See Ordinances of 1 March 1943 relating to injury to the person, and the Ordinance of 10 March 1943 concerning reparation for damages caused through acts of war.

We desire full information with respect to all such laws and with respect to the manner in which they are being administered. In particular we desire information with respect to the types of losses which it is contemplated will be covered by these laws and the extent to which such losses will be compensated for.

3. In discussing with the French authorities the manner in which such laws are being administered, we submit for your consideration and for the consideration of the French authorities a program along the following lines:

(a) The French North African authorities would announce that all losses of the type described in the first paragraph will be recognized as legitimate war losses and that claims based on such losses should be immediately filed with the Government.

(b) A French special claims commission would immediately be set up to hear and determine the validity and extent of such claims.

(c) Upon the finding that any person had suffered a loss up to some stated amount (say 100,000 francs) the French North African authorities would immediately indemnify such person for such loss.

(d) Upon the finding that a person had suffered a loss in excess of the stated amount, the French North African authorities would indemnify such person up to the stated amount.

(e) It would be announced that any proven claim for loss sustained in excess of the stated amount would be given consideration at a later date.

(f) For the time being, and at least until some such program as that described above has been put into effect, a moratorium would be granted on all obligations which persons in Tunisia are unable to meet without great hardship as a result of the depletion of their assets through losses such as those described above, and the French North African authorities would take appropriate action to see that the creditors affected by the moratorium do not suffer undue hardship.

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4. In discussing this matter with the French, the following points should be taken into consideration aside from the local social and economic factors involved:

(a) If a definitive and effective program were adopted in Tunisia, and given wide publicity designed to create the impression that a similar program might be followed in other liberated areas such as France, such a program might increase the stake of the people in enemy-occupied territory in an Allied victory, particularly if the maximum immediate benefit were high enough (say 100,000 Francs) to cover the possible property loss of the great majority of the people in enemy-occupied territory.

(b) Such a program might have a heartening influence on the millions of Allied sympathizers in occupied territory, who not only are threatened with loss of their homes and other property as a result of military action but also live under constant threat of economic and financial reprisals against them and their families, imposed by the Axis in its attempts to secure submission and punish non-cooperation by means of fines, levies, confiscation and destruction of property.

(c) If, in an area such as Tunisia, the enemy is permitted to pick and choose the persons whom it wishes to injure economically and financially, such a policy if not counteracted might have an unfortunate effect on the action and attitudes of the peoples of other occupied Axis territory.

(d) In part, such a program would be a natural counterpart of programs designed to impose penalties on excess profits resulting from the enemy's efforts to gain cooperation. In the latter type of program one of the objectives in reducing the profits is to reduce the incentive to help the enemy in his efforts; the type of program now under discussion raises, in part, the question of mitigating the losses inflicted by the enemy as either a punishment for or deterrent against non-cooperation, and thereby increasing the incentive to resist the enemy. The one is designed to diminish the ability of the enemy to confer a lasting benefit as the price for cooperation; the other, in part, would be designed to lessen the enemy's ability maliciously to inflict permanent losses as a penalty for non-cooperation or resistance.

5. It should be noted that the program outlined above and the points raised for consideration in connection therewith have been addressed to the general problem of property losses inflicted on individual nationals as a consequence of the war. Obviously, the specific instances of property loss described in BOC Airgram 60, arising out of

~~U. S. OFFICIALS~~
~~BRITISH OFFICIALS~~

discriminatory measures taken by the enemy against the Jewish people and other groups, fall within the scope of any program of action to be discussed with the French authorities. In working out any program of action with the French, it is recognized that the success of any such program will depend upon the effectiveness of its administration and in turn upon the extent to which those administering the program are wholeheartedly in favor of its objectives. In this connection, you will appreciate that it may be difficult to obtain effective action by the French authorities with respect to the property losses suffered by the Jewish community, particularly in view of the lack of enthusiasm which the French North African authorities have demonstrated in the administration of those programs which they have announced from time to time as designed to eliminate (within those North African territories now freed from enemy domination for many months) discrimination against the Jewish people and other groups not only with respect to their property holdings but with respect to the more fundamental things of life. We would view with grave concern the administration of any program, designed to minimize property losses resulting from the war, in a manner which would discriminate against any group on grounds of race, religion or anti-fascist views.

6. It should be noted that any program of action, insofar as it relates to money and other property transfers including mortgages, arising out of discriminatory levies, fines, and penalties and other forms of expropriatory action or duress taken by the enemy, is within the spirit of the United Nations Declaration on property transfers of 5 January 1943 which was entered into by members of the United Nations and the French National Committee. Apart from the necessity of correcting the conditions such as those described in BOC Airgram 60 as a matter of justice, it is important as a warfare measure that the United Nations Declaration shall not be construed as an empty gesture. The immediate and effective solution of conditions falling within the spirit of the United Nations Declaration will have a real warfare value as an indication that the various rulings and pronouncements issued by the Allied governments are not mere propaganda but are serious statements of policy intended to be translated into action.

7. It should be noted that in all discussions on this subject with the French it should be clearly understood that any program adopted must not be construed as indicating any commitment on the part of the U.S. to assume directly or indirectly the cost of paying such claims. In the opinion of the War Department the payment of such war damage claims arising in foreign countries is expressly precluded by the Act of 2 January, 1942 (55 Stat 880; 31 USC 224D) as amended by the Act of 22 April, 1943, (Public Law 39 73rd Congress). In this connection reference should be made to Army Regulations No. 25-90.

8. London please comment direct to Washington, repeating to Algiers.

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DISTRIBUTION: "A"

Repeated to London by cable.

Ans

PSF: France

~~Gen Condo~~

3-43

December 29, 1943.

My dear Darlan:-

It was good of you to send me that Christmas and New Year's greeting.

I am especially happy that you are making real progress. I hope to come down to Warm Springs in the Spring of 1944, and I shall be delighted to see you there.

Please give to your wife and your mother my sincere regards, in which Mrs. Roosevelt joins.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Ensign A. Darlan,
Georgia Warm Springs Foundation,
Warm Springs,
Georgia.

GEORGIA WARM SPRINGS FOUNDATION

WARM SPRINGS,

GEORGIA

December 21, 1943

Mr. President:

On the occasion of the Christmas festival and of the New Year, I am taking the liberty of addressing to you my most sincere and most respectful good wishes. Among these good wishes, the warmest are for your health and for the success of all your endeavors.

There will result from these two factors, for the entire world, return to calm and peace after the victory, of which you will have been the principal architect.

You know that for me this festival is the first anniversary of a cruel bereavement, but I find a great consolation in the thought that my father fell at his post while defending our common cause.

I would also like, Mr. President, to express to you once more my gratitude.

I continue to make appreciable progress, and I do not forget that it is to you that I owe it.

Be so good as to present also, I beg you, my homage and good wishes to Mrs. Roosevelt and to accept the assurances of my respectful gratitude.

A. Darlan

TR: EKS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 24, 1948

Memo. of State Dept.

It will be appreciated if we may
have an immediate translation of this
letter.

C.E. Ingling
Chief of Files.

333



DEC 27 1948



GEORGIA WARM SPRINGS FOUNDATION
WARM SPRINGS,
GEORGIA

DEC 27 1943

21 décembre 1943.

Monsieur le Président,

A l'occasion des fêtes de Noël
et de la Nouvelle Année, je me
permets de vous adresser mes
vœux les plus sincères et les
plus respectueux.

Parmi ces vœux, les plus
ardents se rapportent à votre
santé, et au succès de toutes
vos entreprises.

De ces deux éléments,
résulteront pour le monde entier
le retour au calme et à la paix,
après la victoire, dont vous
avez été le principal artisan.

Vous savez que pour moi, ces
fêtes sont la première anniversaire
d'un deuil cruel, mais j'y trouve
une grande consolation dans la
pensée que mon Père est tombé
à son poste en défendant notre
cause commune.

J'y voudrais aussi. Monsieur le
Président, vous exprimer à nouveau
ma reconnaissance.

J'y continue à faire de visibles
progrès, et j'y n'oublie pas que
c'est à vous que j'y le dois.

Veuillez présenter également
j'y vous prie, mes vœux et mes
hommages à Madame Roosevelt
et croire à toute ma respectueuse
gratitude.

A. Darby

GEORGIA WARM SPRINGS FOUNDATION
WARM SPRINGS,
GEORGIA

Monsieur le President F. D. Roosevelt.

