This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Cairo
Dated August 15, 1944
Rec'd 9:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2414, August 15, 9 a.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR BUTTERWORTH.

During the period I was in charge in Vichy (May
November 1942) I came frequently into contact with
Lequerica who was generally known to be 100% pro-
totalitarian in his political sympathies. (Your
August 12, 1 p.m.). He was in close touch with Laval
and other of the more pronounced collaborationists in
the Vichy Government and made frequent trips to Paris
where his contacts with the German Embassy and Military
authorities were a matter of common knowledge. He was
on the closest terms with the then Argentine Ambassador
Olivera who was also a fervent pro-totalitarian.

On one occasion Lequerica expressed the opinion in
my presence that Germany was undefeatable in Europe and
the only solution that remained for the United Nations
was to accept a negotiated peace.

Lequerica

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972
Lequerica was ruthless in his attitude towards the Spanish Republican refugee elements who were then numerous in unoccupied France and he is believed to have furnished Vichy authorities with information regarding certain of these people which led to their arrest and eventual handing over to the Gestapo authorities north of the line of demarkation.

Lequerica is a man of considerable intelligence and is a hard worker. He is an entertaining conversationalist, a qualified gourment and has the reputation of being very fond of the ladies.

Unless he has since made a complete volte face in his political opinions, which is most unlikely, I consider his selection as Minister for Foreign Affairs as a very unfortunate one from the point of view of the United Nations.

Sent to Madrid, repeated to Ampolad Caserta and Department.

TUCK

JIM WMB
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In regard to proposal for Lend Lease to France, my recommendation is that for the time being we postpone taking any action.

H.M. Jr.

APPROVED:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY:

Will you handle this with Harry

Hopkins and Cordell Hull?

F.D.R.

Memo to the Pres. Re: French Lend Lease Agreement, Sept. 11 from Cordell Hull, attached longhand note from H.L.H. saying "I think this is O.K. - it gives the final decision to you and in the present situation that I think is essential. If you will initial this the matter will be handled that way".
Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

SEPTEMBER 15, 1944

MR-OUT 412:

FROM MR. HARRY HOPKINS TO MISS GRACE TULLY, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL:

I SENT TO THE PRESIDENT MEMORANDUM ENTITLED FRENCH LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT AND DATED SEPTEMBER 11TH FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT. FEA AND STATE DEPARTMENT ARE ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAS INITIALED IT.

COULD YOU HELP ME GET AN ANSWER ON THIS TOMORROW?

NO SIG

RECEIVED

SEP 15 1944 AM

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I have had lengthy talks with the Prime Minister in regard to recognition of the Provisional Government in France. He and I are both very much opposed to it at this time. The Provisional Government has no direct authority from the people. It is best to let things go along as they are for the moment.

F.D.R.

Secret telegram from Chapin, Paris, 9-15-44, to the Secretary of State, re question of new consideration to extending recognition to the Provisional Government of France.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I still think that it is premature to recognize the French Government. We should remember that there are still several hundred thousand Germans in France.

F.D.R.

Returning FDR memo, 9-19 to the Secy. of State re recognition of the Provisional Govt. in France and Secy. Hull's memo, 9-21 to the President in answer to it, with a copy of Secy. Hull's memo, 9-17 re the possible recognition.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 3, 1944

Subject: Proposed Recognition of a Provisional Government of France

In my memorandum of September 21 on the above subject I expressed to you my fear that the British would make every effort to make it appear that they favor extending recognition to the French and that it is due to the unyielding attitude of the United States that this has not been done.

The obviously inspired article in today's "New York Times" by Raymond Daniell in London fully confirms the fears which I expressed. I am quoting below for your information the most striking parts of the article in the event that you have not seen it:

"This Government (British) is more eager than ever to see full recognition extended to Gen. Charles de Gaulle's regime as the Provisional Government of France in order that it may share in the discussions leading up to the final settlement with Germany and assumes its share of responsibility for enforcing it.

"This viewpoint, it may now be disclosed, was presented to President Roosevelt in Quebec with all the eloquence that Prime Minister Churchill could muster, reinforced, it may be taken for granted, by all Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's background of experience and knowledge of European diplomacy."...

"But Mr. Roosevelt remained unconvinced. Therefore, while Britain and the United States agreed to exchange ambassadors with the Italian Government, Washington and London will be represented in Paris by special representatives to the French Committee of National Liberation with the technical rank of Ambassadors."...

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-44
By J. Schauble Date 8  1972
"Were it not for the necessity for avoiding any action that might offend the United States Government the British Government would lose no time in recognizing the French Government on its own, purely as a provisional government pending an election. It is hardly a secret that diplomats here have been searching their brains for a way out that would not be taken as an affront in Washington."...
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  

CONFFDENTIAL  

October 3, 1944  

Dear Admiral:  

I am enclosing for your information this interesting memorandum by Doug MacArthur of his talk with M. Friol, M. Herriot's confidential secretary. According to M. Friol, M. Herriot wanted particularly to have the President know the facts leading up to his removal to Germany. Doug adds that Herriot's "martyrdom" at the hands of the Germans will enhance his popularity with the masses and the bourgeois elements which have great confidence in his moderation and that, consequently he will almost certainly join Jeanneney in any government which may be functioning, if he survives captivity in Germany. At the moment, at any rate, it appears that Herriot was in good health physically and mentally at the time when he was taken from France. 

Sincerely yours,  

[Signature]  

H. Freeman Matthews  

Enclosure:  

Memorandum.  

Admiral William D. Leahy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander-in-Chief of the  
Army and Navy,  
The White House.
MEMORANDUM

September 15, 1944

M. Friol, who has been Herriot's confidential secretary for a number of years, called on me this morning. I knew Friol well from Vichy days, when he arranged a number of meetings for me with Herriot. He stated that he had seen Herriot recently when he was brought to Paris by the Germans, who were endeavoring to use him as a figure-head in forming a German-controlled French "government" to take the place of Vichy. Herriot, according to Friol, had requested him to get in touch with the American authorities and explain exactly what had happened to him. He was particularly desirous that President Roosevelt, for whom he had the greatest admiration and respect, should know exactly what transpired.

Friol gave me the following account of events:

Shortly after the disembarkation in North Africa, Herriot, who at that time was in "residence-surveillé", had been seized by the Gestapo and interned in France. He was locked up for well over a year in one small room with no news except the Pariser Zeitung, which was the only newspaper he was permitted to read. He was permitted to receive from his immediate family one open letter each week.

Subsequently he was transported to an asylum near Nancy, where he was locked up, and a carefully fostered campaign was inaugurated in the French press to the effect that he had gone mad and was a raving lunatic. There he remained until August 12, when to his surprise he received a visit from Laval.

Laval said that he had come to give him his freedom; that France was in danger of social revolution and Bolshevism, and that it was his, Herriot's, duty to forget past differences and to work for France by participating in a "reorganized French government". This was the only way to avoid complete anarchy in France.

Herriot replied that he would take his freedom, but that he had no intention of associating in any way with Laval, who had not only betrayed France but had been primarily responsible for his imprisonment, and thereupon bade Laval goodbye. Thereupon the latter said to him that his freedom would be accorded him in Paris and that he, Laval, would accompany him to that city. When Herriot stated...
stated that he was capable of making his own arrangements to go to Paris, Laval informed him that one of the conditions of his liberation was that he accompany him to Paris.

Upon arrival in Paris Herriot was taken to the Prefecture, where he was held under joint German and Vichy guard. He at once protested and demanded that he be given his freedom. This was refused and Laval stated that he would make the necessary arrangements and return the following morning. When he returned the next day, Laval then said that Herriot would only be liberated if he agreed to become a member of the French Government. This Herriot refused even to consider and demanded to see the German authority responsible for his detention. Abetz called upon him about an hour later and said that he was happy that Herriot had returned to Paris; that his apartment in the Chamber of Deputies had been evacuated by the Germans and was ready for him; and that he, Abetz, was pleased that Herriot was going to cooperate with Laval in saving Paris in particular, and France in general, from destruction.

In a stormy session Herriot not only told Abetz that he had no intention whatsoever of participating in any French Government composed of traitors, but that in addition, he wished the Germans to fulfill their promise made to Laval to liberate him at once. Abetz departed and stated that he would have to communicate with the Wilhelmstrasse.

He returned the next day with Laval and offered further inducements to Herriot to "collaborate" and went so far as to state that should he do so, he could replace Marshal Petain or Laval. He also stated that Paris was in danger of imminent destruction and that Herriot, who was well regarded in American and British circles, could usefully serve a liaison purpose between the Germans and Allied forces to prevent the total and complete destruction of Paris. Herriot maintained his refusal to consider any such proposition, and again demanded his freedom.

Abetz thereupon said to Laval and Herriot that if they would formally request him in writing for permission to proceed to Switzerland, the German authorities would grant such authorization. Laval jumped at this proposal and thanked Abetz most effusively. Herriot stated that he was a prisoner in German hands, that from past experience he did not believe that any request he made would receive any consideration and that he simply asked the Germans to fulfill their promise to liberate him at once. Abetz departed and shortly thereafter
a German guard came to the prefecture and bundled Herriot into a car and drove him off to Nancy, informing him that his ultimate destination was Germany.

Friol, who was permitted to see Herriot on three separate occasions while he was being held in Paris, stated that he had witnessed some of the foregoing events and that the other details had been given him by Herriot and by a Frenchman who worked in the Prefecture. Friol stated that physically and mentally Herriot was not in any way broken, although he had lost considerable weight. His mind was still clear and he had continued to the last to remain true to his principles. M. Friol requested particularly that no publicity be given to the foregoing information at the present time, since Herriot, he understood, was now in Germany and should efforts be made to use the story for propaganda purposes, he might suffer dire consequences at the hands of the Nazis.

Mr. Friol also said there were abundant indications that Laval had sold the idea to Abetz that he, Laval, could lure Herriot into the "French Government" where, because of his close association with the United States and Great Britain, Herriot would be a most useful intermediary for the Germans in connection with arranging a negotiated peace. In other words, Herriot would act as the bridge between the Germans and the Allies.

Friol concluded by stating that no such possibility ever existed in so far as Herriot was concerned and that Laval was profoundly disappointed when his efforts met with no success and his last effort to serve his German masters met with complete failure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FRENCH LEND-LEASE NEGOTIATIONS

I attach a copy of the memorandum which I sent on September 11 and which was given to you at Quebec by Mr. Hopkins. This memorandum suggested a basis for a Lend-Lease agreement with France differing somewhat from that set forth in my memorandum of July 15, 1944, which you approved on July 18. I also attach a copy of this memorandum.

I understand that you requested Mr. Morgenthau to discuss this matter with me and with Mr. Hopkins. Before Mr. Morgenthau had an opportunity to discuss this question with us you approved on September 15 a memorandum which recommended indefinite postponement.

I wish to recall that on the basis of your July 18 approval we reached agreement with the French on August 25 to continue negotiations on Lend-Lease with a view to reaching agreement in detail. The Treasury Department approved this agreement prior to its conclusion.

My staff is under almost daily pressure from the French to submit a draft agreement for discussion. Whatever may be your decision on the memorandum of September 11, we are under obligations to proceed in some way.

I would point out to you that in the draft upon which my memorandum of September 11 was based, there are four articles, VI, VII, VIII, IX, in which the Treasury has a specific responsibility. These they approved.

I hope very much, therefore, that you will authorize me to proceed to negotiate with the French on the basis which you decide is appropriate.

Enclosures:
Memoranda of July 15 and September 11, 1944.
September 11, 1944

Memorandum for the President

French Lend Lease Agreement

We need instruction from you on one important phase of this proposed agreement; i.e., how to deal with Monnet's request, which I understand he mentioned to you, for industrial items to get French production going again for the maintenance of the civil population.

We have been working under the memorandum of July 15, 1944, which you approved. This provides that

(a) The French get under straight lend lease what you approve as necessary military aid for their forces and for short-life supplies for war production. When you determine the aid to be no longer necessary, they will accept and pay for on credit terms the undelivered, non-munitions items you have authorized.

(b) They pay currently in cash for food, clothing, and other items consumed by the civil population.

(c) Here is the trouble. Long-life industrial articles and other industrial articles would be furnished to them on credit only if necessary to the prosecution of the war in Europe or to the maintenance of Allied forces in the period immediately following an armistice in Europe.

Viewed as of the present date and position of the war, the memorandum of July 15th means, in effect, a rejection of Monnet's program and would require the French to pay cash currently for all items not required as necessary military aid. I do not think you intended, nor would I recommend, so flat a position. On the other hand, you would not wish to approve at this stage the French program, amounting as it does to something over a billion dollars of industrial items to be paid for on credit terms. I do not think that there is any formula which describes what you may wish to approve and what you may not wish to approve. What seems to me necessary is to leave in your hands complete discretion to do what you may think necessary from time to time in the light of French behavior.

Therefore,
Therefore, I recommend that you authorize us to provide that such long-life articles and such other articles as may be included from time to time in a list to be attached to the agreement, and which are contracted for or purchased before you determine that aid under the Act is no longer necessary for the prosecution of the war, we shall deliver (subject to your right of cancellation in the national interest) and the French shall accept and pay for on credit terms. I recommend also that you instruct the Foreign Economic Administration to submit to you proposed French programs under this provision before they are included in the list. Such a disposition of the matter will give authority to go ahead, with flexible control in your hands to do as much or as little as you determine to be desirable at any time.

The Foreign Economic Administration agrees with this proposal.
July 16, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In dealing with the French representatives here, they insist upon having an outline of what we expect to do in respect to mutual aid for Continental France. The attached is a revised memorandum on the subject, for presentation to the French, which has received the approval of State, War, Treasury, and FEA. We believe this program will fully promote war objectives and at the same time protect United States interests. We hope for early consideration and decision as the French will delay agreement on civil administration and currency arrangements until mutual aid question is clarified. In any event, final texts for lend-lease and mutual aid will have to be worked out in detail and submitted to you for approval before closing with the French.

On July 8 I submitted for your information a memorandum outlining the general basis on which we suggested lend-lease arrangements with the French would be negotiated. It is my understanding that you did not discuss the contents of the July 8 memorandum with General de Gaulle. The revised memorandum which is attached outlines the lend-lease arrangement along somewhat narrower lines than were proposed in the July 8 memorandum. Specifically, the eligibility of consumable industrial goods under lend-lease is tightened, and in point of time the proposed arrangements are tied generally to the end of the war in Europe rather than to the end of hostilities with all our enemies.

While as stated above, FEA approves the attached memorandum, FEA states that it still prefers the July 8 draft.

Attachment:
Memorandum dated July 15, 1944.
MEMORANDUM

I. The United States Government proposes that aid be made available for Continental France on the following basis:

1. Equipment and supplies for the French armed forces and short-life industrial and maintenance articles and materials for employment in French war production or communications, to the extent approved as necessary military aid, would be furnished under straight lend-lease until such time after the end of hostilities in Europe as the President may determine to be necessary in the war effort. Thereafter, such equipment, supplies, articles, and materials, to the extent that the United States Government had agreed to make them available and had them either in inventory or under contract, would be delivered and paid for on credit arrangements under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act.

2. Long-life industrial articles and materials for French production essential to the prosecution of the war in Europe or to the support, supply, and protection of Allied armed forces in the immediate period following the end of hostilities in Europe would be furnished on credit arrangements under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act.

3. All other supplies furnished by the United States Government would be paid for currently in dollars. These would include supplies furnished under Plan "A". If the amount of dollars acquired by the French authorities on account of troop pay is inadequate to pay for such supplies, the French authorities will use for this purpose the gold now held in the territories under the control of the French authorities and such other gold and dollar assets as may be or may become available to the French authorities.

II. It is proposed that the following types of assistance would be made available as reciprocal lend-lease aid from France, and all territory under the control of the Committee, to the extent that they can be most effectively procured
procured therein:

1. Military equipment, munitions, supplies, materials, services, projects, and facilities for the United States armed forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces;

2. Such materials required for use in war industries of the United States, as the Committee may be in a position to supply;

3. In exceptional cases, and particularly in cases of local procurement of supplies, where it is more practicable to secure such reciprocal aid by direct purchase, French francs will be used for this purpose, and the goods so purchased will be considered as reciprocal aid.

III. It would be agreed that the United States would undertake to replace or refund in dollars, the cost of any articles obtained from the Committee as reciprocal aid which have been imported at the cost of the Committee and which can only be replaced from sources other than France and territories under the control of the Committee. This does not apply to component parts or component material.
Dear Admiral:

I hope that I am not burdening you unduly with material on the French situation, but I thought that you would be interested to know that we have a telegram from Mr. Reber indicating that final arrangements for the setting up of a "zone of the interior" are expected shortly and announcement by the French may be made within a few days. As a result of the preliminary conversations, it appears that the zone will consist of the territory west and south of a line running roughly from the mouth of the Somme River, through Amiens and Reims and thence south through the Rhone valley, omitting the cities of Dijon and Marseille, but including Paris.

We may confidently expect that pressure for recognition, which is already growing at a rapid pace, will increase significantly when a zone of the interior is established.

In this connection I have just finished reading the article by Raymond Daniell from London on the front page of today's NEW YORK TIMES. You will recall the fear which I expressed to you in our recent conversation--and which was strongly expressed in the Secretary's memorandum of September 21 to the President--that the British would lose no opportunity to place on us the onus for not extending provisional recognition at this time. If you have not seen the article, which is quite clearly officially inspired, I think you will be interested in reading it. Here are some of the pertinent passages:

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy,
The White House.
"This Government (British) is more eager than ever to see full recognition extended to Gen. Charles de Gaulle's regime as the Provisional Government of France in order that it may share in the discussions leading up to the final settlement with Germany and assumes its share of responsibility for enforcing it.

"This viewpoint, it may now be disclosed, was presented to President Roosevelt in Quebec with all the eloquence that Prime Minister Churchill could muster, reinforced, it may be taken for granted, by all Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's background of experience and knowledge of European diplomacy."...

"But Mr. Roosevelt remained unconvinced. Therefore, while Britain and the United States agreed to exchange ambassadors with the Italian Government, Washington and London will be represented in Paris by special representatives to the French Committee of National Liberation with the technical rank of Ambassadors."...

"Were it not for the necessity for avoiding any action that might offend the United States Government the British Government would lose no time in recognizing the French Government on its own, purely as a provisional government pending an election. It is hardly a secret that diplomats here have been searching their brains for a way out that would not be taken as an affront in Washington."...

Sincerely yours,

H. Freeman Matthews
Memorandum

From: Simon L. Millner
To: Foreign Economic Administration
Subject: CURRENT CONDITIONS IN FRANCE.
New York, N. Y.
October 9, 1944.

Memorandum:

From: Simon L. Millner.

To: The Foreign Economic Administration Bureau of Areas.

Subject: Current Conditions in France.
Memorandum:

From: Simon L. Millner.
To: The Foreign Economic Administration Bureau of Areas.
Subject: Current Conditions in France.

Introduction: In my memorandum of September 5th (paragraph #2) I indicated that De Gaulle will be forced to make sweeping changes in his cabinet in order to take into account the men of the Resistance movement. I was also correct in my selection of the men for the cabinet, but not as a prophet -- let us leave prophecy to the so-called experts of the press who vacillate from one prediction to another -- but on the basis of my knowledge of the French situation. Similarly, I was correct in indicating on September 5th (paragraph #3) that there will be a reorganization in the Council of the Resistance and the Nationalization of key industries. In order to fully understand the current memorandum it is important to bear in mind the memorandum of September 5th.

Planned Economy: The forecast which we made in May has now become a reality. On October 1st General Charles De Gaulle in a speech made at his birthplace Lille, committed himself
and his Government, for the first time, to the creation of a new economic system in France -- a system of planned economy ("économie dirigée" was his expression) under the direction and the control of the Government. He called this system a "national system of French Economy". He made an allusion "perhaps some foreigners will not approve of our step, but we French are primarily concerned with France and will work toward the betterment of our people and our nation. France will show the world that she had not suffered in vain. We are a great people who know what we want, who know what we are going to do and who are getting to work. We do not want to return to that political, social and moral situation that took us to the edge of the abyss. Our duty is to make the fullest use of what we possess in our soul, our sub-soil and our empire. We want the state to direct the economic effort of the entire nation for the benefit of all and to insure that the life of every Frenchman and Frenchwoman shall become a better one. We cannot longer tolerate those concentrations of interests called trusts. For this planned economy, this fullest use of the resources of the country, the first essential is that the collective -- that is, the state -- should take over the direction of the great sources of the common wealth and should control certain other activities, but, of course, without excluding the stimulus of just profit and initiative." This last phrase seems to reflect an idea often expressed.
in resistance circles - that there should be a nationalized sector of the French economy, a controlled sector and a free sector where individual initiative would have free rein.

As I have already indicated in my memoranda of April, May, and again on September 5th that De Gaulle will be obliged to take this position sooner or later and to follow the pronounced popular sentiment as expressed through the National Council of Resistance. Hence the loud applause from the crowd, echoed throughout the nation, "That's what we want."

De Gaulle's speech got such unanimous approval from the Paris press, particularly from the left-wing papers, that for the first time in a long while you get a real feeling of French unity behind a common program. And it isn't a return to the "good old days". Obviously, a Socialist newspaper like "Le Populaire" would approve this program, but even the conservative newspaper "L'Aube" gives it full approval, saying, "Directed economy does not exclude the organization of relations between owners and workers. The Government has proved that in forming mixed production committees especially charged to associate the workers with the management of industries. Clearly, Gen. De Gaulle is not only the first of the resisters, he is also the first revolutionary of this country." These are the words of L'Aube, whose editor was none other than Georges Bidault. The new French Minister of foreign affairs is very popular
in France. A Catholic, a distinguished writer, a great scholar from the Ecole Normale Superieure, esteemed for his character, honesty and sincerity. Before the war he wrote the daily editorials in his newspaper L'Aube, which was read by intellectual and political circles and certain members of the clergy, including priests from the Paris suburbs. He was called the "Great Christian" whose broad and generous political views were close to those of the socialists. He, however, protested this, saying that his ideas are close to the New Testament.

It must be noted, that although the entire French press lauded with great praise the speech of De Gaulle the communist press, "Humanite" and "Front Nationale" allotted less than half a column to the speech and completely ignored it in their editorial comment.

What is happening in France today is in no way a surprise to those familiar with the situation. At the end of 1943, the Commission on Economic Affairs of the Algiers Provisional Assembly unanimously adopted the following principles for postwar France:

1. Complete freedom of operation cannot be granted to all industries on the day of liberation.

2. Enemy holdings in French industries must be confiscated by the State.

3. Certain industries must be operated by the Government in the common interest.

4. Certain other industries may be operated by
private interests under strict governmental control.

5. The remaining industries may operate free from government interference.

A few months later, the Socialist delegates (15 out of 80 submitted to the full Assembly a program embodying substantially these proposals. The final text has been signed by 55 delegates (majority support). This text went further than the original. The original proposed "nationalization of all economic, financial and commercial enterprises essential to the life of the nation", in the final draft "nationalization" was replaced by "socialization". The signatories included, in addition to the Socialists, half a dozen of conservatives, an equal number of "Radical Socialists" (bourgeois liberals of Ed. Heriots party), about ten "Social Catholics", a Dominican monk, army officers in active service, and five progressives with no party affiliation.

In his speech of March 18, 1944, before the Provisional Consultative Assembly, De Gaulle said: "The French democracy must be a social democracy, that will ensure to everyone the right to work in freedom, that will guaranty the dignity and security of all through an economic system planned with a view to developing our national resources, and which will not be to the advantage of private interests. In this system the great sources of national wealth will belong to the nation, and the direction and control of this wealth
by the state will be undertaken with the assistance
both of those who work and those who give work."

Long before he made this speech a ten year plan has
been worked out in London by Andre Dupart, a French
industrialist, in cooperation with technicians of
the underground, which has won wide approval. The
plan provides for the ownership by the state and
administration "under state supervision" of the
sources of power (mines, oil, waterpower, etc.) of
public utilities (light, transportation, tele-
communication, etc.) and of institutions of public
utility (banks, insurance companies, etc.) private
ownership under strict state supervision of industries
vital to national defense (steel works, the automotive
industry, etc.) private ownership without state
supervision of the smaller industries (glove making,
"industries de luxe", etc.)

Undoubtedly, the situation in France today is confused,
Some are quick to point out that such confusion paves
the way for communism. I believe such fears to be
wholly unfounded. Those who are alarmed are prone to
forget that in a Europe whose economic life has been
wrecked by four years of war and Nazi occupation, that
many changes are inevitable. France especially must
make changes, for she has indeed suffered a great deal.
We note that:

Until August 4, 1944 there were:
killed fighting, 163,000; civilians killed,
France an Impoverished Country:

80,000, whereof 4,000 children; executed by Germans or died in Concentration camps, 155,000; prisoners of war in Germany, 850,000, whereof 350,000 at forced labor; civilians deported to Germany, (conditions unknown) 2,000,000; children dead of malnutrition, 1,000,000; Alsace-Lorrainers deported, 500,000; Alsace-Lorrainers forced to fight in German army, 186,000; children's death rate, eight times higher in France than in Germany; property destroyed and art treasures stolen, ?; total cost of war, incalculable. The final figures -- according to the official United Nations Information Office, which furnish these data, -- are almost certain to be even blacker. France, at the end of the war, will be an impoverished country. The French middle classes are already ruined and will suffer more in the future through the unavoidable inflation. The rentier, backbone of France's economic stability will no longer exist. The big bourgeoisie has lost its independence since the Armistice. German capital has penetrated French economy to a large extent. After the defeat of Germany, most of the collaborationist French firms will face collapse. The French bourgeoisie is only a shadow of its former self. In addition to having a great part of her productive machinery destroyed or removed, her agricultural production deteriorated for lack of cattle, machinery and fertilizers, nearly two million of her able-bodied men are now in captivity or forced labor.
battalions in Germany. France no longer ranks among the Great Powers.
Although her Empire is intact, she will have to make concessions and give strategic bases to the United States and possibly England. It is here that we get the cry for economic reforms, nationalization, etc. "Economic ruin is a ruthless foe of orthodoxy", remarks the London Economist in a recent review of French developments. And indeed, nearly all economic thought expressed by De Gaulle's government and in the Underground resistance circles, is resolutely opposed to economic liberalism and orthodoxy. But the Economist is right: "What has taken place is an economic mood rather than an economic theory." The Underground knows what it opposes, there is less clarity on what is to replace it. What the future holds for France time will tell, but the road it will follow to achieve it I will attempt to show in my next memorandum.

Which industries are to be nationalized and which are to be controlled -- this topic is now under serious discussion. A special commission has now been set up to study this problem, and a promise has been made to the French people that some definite conclusions will be arrived at by the end of the year.
The cooperative movement which played an important role in pre-war times will greatly influence the decisions of the future.

In view of the fact that the export-import trade will be government controlled, there is a strong possibility that certain aspects of this trade will fall into the realm of the cooperative movement. (A special Memorandum which I am now preparing on the cooperative movement, will show the reasons for the above statement.)

There are in De Gaulle's cabinet individuals who advocate that foreign trade should be modeled on the Soviet "Vneshtorg" (Foreign trade organization).

It is under discussion that the movie industry, must be government controlled and that any foreign movie producers will need government license in order to show their productions in France.

The political and economic development in France will, through the Resistance Movement, influence future developments in Spain and other neighboring countries. It is interesting to note that in the ranks of the Resistance movement as well as in De Gaulle's government there exists a plan for a future alliance between France, Spain and Italy, which is based on a Politico-Economic foundation. In order to achieve this alliance France will give all necessary help to
the revolutionary forces in these countries.
The French Government ignores any requests submitted from the Franco regime in Madrid to curb the armed Spanish Republicans who have seized control of a number of Spanish Consulates in Southern France. The Republicans are intimately associated politically and militarily with the French forces of Interior.

The expressed policy of De Gaulle is: "France would never feel secure as long as fascism continued in Spain. France will never forget the 50,000 Spanish Republicans who fought in the ranks of the Maquis."

Many questions have been raised here. We will try to answer these in our following memoranda.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Proposed French Participation in the Pacific War

It will interest you to know that the representative of the French de facto government, Mr. Henri Hoppenot, is telling his government that he thinks he has made a forward step in arranging for French participation in the Pacific war. He attributes this to his approach through Harry Hopkins and through Admiral Fenard's conversation with you, and proposes to follow up the matter.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with your request of November 3, 1944 there is attached herewith a translation of the secret memorandum by Colonel Jean Fabry, dated September 29, 1944, which was sent to you on October 31 by General William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

Enclosures:
1. From General Donovan.
2. From Col. Fabry.
3. Translation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1944.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

FOR TRANSLATION.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAY 15 1974
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The enclosed memorandum from Colonel Jean Fabry in Paris dated 29 September 1944 has been forwarded by our representative in Paris. It is the document which, I believe, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt advised you was on its way.

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment
MEMORANDUM

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Les événements du 6 Juin à aujourd'hui ont été caractérisés par une vitesse d'exécution surprenante en ce qui concerne les opérations militaires.

Il s'y est ajouté à l'intérieur de la France et en particulier à Paris une intervention brusquée des forces de la résistance.

Du point de vue politique, tout le monde a été pris au dépouvu ou pris de vitesse. Le Gouvernement de Vichy a disparu en quelques heures. Aucune combinaison, aucun plan n'ont pu être réalisés, à plus forte raison établis. Dans la confusion qui régnait à Paris aucun groupement n'a pu s'imposer absolument ; même le parti communiste, malgré sa hâte à brûler les étapes et la précipitation qu'il a mise à commencer le bagarre, a dû s'arrêter devant l'arrivée des troupes de la Division Leclerc. Dans leur sillage, le Général de Gaulle mettant très opportunément à profit le mouvement national exalté par cette arrivée, a trouvé le chemin libre qui l'a sans opposition conduit au pouvoir.

Ainsi s'est constitué avec l'approbation tacite des Alliés un gouvernement de fait, non reconnu d'ailleurs par eux comme tel, qui a succédé au gouvernement légal que les États-Unis avaient reconnu comme tel en 1940, et qui d'après la constitution française toujours en vigueur, l'était effectivement.

Il faut noter tout de suite que ce gouvernement de fait a avant tout autre acte prononcé et proclamé le désaveu formel du gouvernement légal, qualifiant de faute contre la patrie sinon de crime, tout acte d'obéissance dans le passé au gouvernement de Vichy. Ainsi se trouve nettement affirmé le caractère révolutionnaire de la période actuelle.

Il n'est pas étonnant que la situation politique ainsi créée demeure très incertaine.

Je remarquerais d'abord que le memorandum que j'avais fait remettre en Mai 1944 à Monsieur le Président Roosevelt se trouve en grande partie vérifié par les faits. La succession rapide des événements, le manque ou l'insuffisance de préparation de solutions politiques, ont placé tout le monde devant le fait accompli.
Il n'en demeure pas moins comme je le disais en Mai :

1°) que le parti communiste français continue à vouloir faire coïncider la libération du pays et la prise par lui du pouvoir ;

2°) que ce parti, comme tous les partis communistes existants dans tous les pays, reçoit un élan irrésistible de la constatation des victoires russes ; il fait dire partout que si à l'Est les Russes s'arrêtent de se battre, leurs alliés seraient mis en grande difficulté à l'Ouest ;

3°) que tout gouvernement parlementaire régulier est actuellement impossible ; et qu'en tous cas, plus que jamais, il ne parait réalisable dans l'avenir que si l'ordre est rétabli et maintenu sur tout le territoire français.

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Ceci dit, voici comment la situation politique se présente en France.

1°.- Le Gouvernement est agité de crises successives internes. Il est sorti du choc entre les éléments venus d'Alger et les éléments de la résistance à l'intérieur ; ceux-ci tiennent les premiers pour moins méritants qu'eux sinon indéfendables. Le Gouvernement actuel est donc un dosage, un compromis entre deux groupes, chacun peu satisfait, et avec toutes les faiblessees d'un compromis.

Le Conseil National de la Résistance - C.N.R. - double le Gouvernement qu'il contrôle et à chaque occasion réprimande. Disposant près de chaque Ministre de Comités d'Action qu'il avait préparés et mis en place dès les premiers jours, alors qu'il exerçait en fait le pouvoir, il constitue à vrai dire un État dans l'État.

Le Gouvernement a-t-il l'appui de l'opinion ? Il a pour lui la popularité de son Chef. Mais des élections, si elles avaient lieu, dresseraient contre lui quatre éléments importants : le parti communiste, le Mouvement de Libération Nationale, le monde parlementaire, les victimes de l'épuration.

2°.- Parti Communiste.

Il est entendu - c'est l'avis exprimé par les experts anglais et américains - que le parti communiste français est très en dessous du degré de qualité auquel a pu atteindre le parti communiste russe. Celui-ci a incontestablement formé et dégagé une élite d'hommes très supérieurs aux dirigeants.../
du parti communiste français.

Ceux-ci en sont encore à l'époque où les appétits tiennent lieu d'aptitudes réelles. Il est donc possible qu'il reçoive de Moscou des conseils de modération ; il est bien plus probable qu'il engagé dans une entreprise décisive pour la conquête du pouvoir, il usera si besoin est de la violence, qui reste toujours sous la forme de la terreur qu'il sait répandre, son meilleur argument. On aurait bien tort de sous-estimer sa résolution de tout oser et ses chances de réussir. Il est armé, bien organisé, et dispose de cadres rompus à la manœuvre révolutionnaire. Il a parcouru une première étape qui l'a mené en vue du pouvoir ; il est installé dans une foule de tranchées de départ pour une nouvelle étape ; il place ses hommes aux postes de commandement en faisant de l'"épuration" une opération lucrative dont la règle est : "L'épuration" d'où il s'est moi-même, Derrière un écrivain ressurgit : "Le Front National", il groupe des troupes, surtout la jeunesse, qui ne lui appartiennent pas, mais qu'il commande. Il est actuellement en France le seul parti politique agissant.

5°.- Le M.L.N. - "Mouvement de Libération Nationale" - est tout-à-fait intéressant à connaître. Il représente (voir note annexe) tout ce qui dans la "résistance" n'était pas communiste. Il rassemble des volontés jeunes, des coeurs purs, des âmes ardentes ; il possède une flamme et une foi qui peuvent lui assurer un rayonnement irrésistible, s'il ne s'égarera pas jusqu'à tirer les marrons du feu pour les communistes. Cherchant comme eux à s'appuyer sur le peuple, très épris de réformes sociales généreuses, il est en coquettement avec le parti communiste, et de peur de paraître moins généreux que lui, peut être amené à surenchérir sur les promesses ou les thèses du parti communiste. Celui-ci le maintient habilement par le jeu de sa camaraderie de combat dans l'opposition au Gouvernement où l'a placé immédiatement le goût naturel qu'il a des responsabilités du pouvoir. Le M.L.N. est donc lui aussi candidat au pouvoir.

S'il comprend vite qu'en travaillant en accord avec les Communistes il ne travaille pas pour lui-même, il deviendra un parti politique de loin le plus neuf, le plus intéressant, le plus sincère, et sans doute le plus puissant.

Il faut attendre pour le juger que la situation dans les provinces soit mieux connue. Il est probable que les éléments provinciaux du M.L.N. donneront à l'élément dirigeant de Paris l'impulsion qui le dégagera de l'emprise communiste et les moyens de lui faire écho.

C'est fort à souhaiter. L'intérêt bien compris des Américains, comme j'essaierai de le montrer, est de semble-t-il d'y aider.
4°.- Le Monde parlementaire dont beaucoup de représentants sont incarcérés et qui est presque en totalité réprouvé et même flétri par le Gouvernement, est contre lui. La présence de M. Jeanney au Gouvernement est sévèrement jugée et ne saurait être tenue pour la représentation du Parlement.

Les Parlementaires conservent dans leurs circonscriptions électorales une influence certaine, qu'on aurait tort de sous estimer. Vichy n'a rien gagné à ignorer les parlementaires, parmi lesquels se trouvent de remarquables compétences. Le Gouvernement actuel commet la même faute.

Ainsi s'il faisait appel à l'opinion pour le confirmer au pouvoir, il aurait déjà de nombreux opposants ; le temps qui s'écoule, difficile à vivre pour tous, vise nécessairement le crédit du Gouvernement qui risque de l'avoir épuisé avant les élections.

5°.- Il faut en outre compter avec les très nombreuses familles et groupements d'intérêts que l'épuration indispose, irrite, d'autant plus qu'elle frappe souvent injustement et apparaît moins comme la justice rendue que comme des ressentiments assouvis ou la satisfaction des appétits déchaînés. Beaucoup de Français en viennent trés vite à prendre l'épuration pour la révolution.

On voit combien est encore mal assis le Gouvernement ; s'il faisait faillite, à quelles nouvelles secousses ne serions-nous pas exposés !

Il faut ajouter encore à ces éléments de dispersion sinon de division la crise des P.F.I. dont l'intégration dans l'armée ne va pas sans difficultés. Les éléments sains y trouvent naturellement leur place. Mais ils laissent derrière eux un peu partout dans le pays, un nouveau maquis, composé de mauvais garçons qui préfèrent la vie en marge de la Loi dont ils ont pris l'habitude et dont presque tous les risques ont disparu au retour au foyer, au travail, au régiment.

Au-dessus de tous se détache la forte personnalité du Général du Gaulle, qui est le maître de l'heure, et qui peut beaucoup s'il veut beaucoup. La France ne cherche pas un dictateur, mais elle ne réclame pas la liberté de faire ce qui lui plaît ; elle suivrait certainement un guide qui commanderait plus qu'il ne parlerait. En un mot elle attend du Général de Gaulle, Chef du Gouvernement, qu'il soit le chef du pays en guerre.
C'est avec tous ces éléments qu'il faut faire une France forte.

Bien entendu elle ne le sera que si les Français se réconcilient et se rassemblent. Nous avons perdu notre meilleur sang de 1914 à 1918, après nous n'avons plus fait d'enfants ; puis vient le sang perdu de 1939 à 1944 ; il continue à couler pour la victoire totale ; elle nous rendra deux millions et demi de Français actuellement en Allemagne ; dans quel état physique reviendront-ils ?

Alors nous ne pouvons pas nous payer une hémorragie nouvelle ; c'est pourquoi la guerre civile, le terreur, le terrorisme sont pour nous des risques mortels.

C'est affaire aux Français de refaire une France forte ; c'est exact.

Les Français demandent à leur tour si les Alliés veulent vraiment une France forte.

Seuls les États-Unis d'Amérique paraissent vraiment le vouloir.

J'ai vu déjà des Anglais et des Américains bien placés pour connaître les intérêts de leur pays et les intentions de leurs gouvernements.

Les Anglais, comme les Russes, s'accommoderaient aisément d'une nouvelle hémorragie en France, ou d'une amputation. Cela apparaît tout de suite quand on parle de notre redressement ou du maintien de notre Empire colonial.

S'il s'agit de notre redressement, les milieux anglais estiment que nous devons aller jusqu'au bout des exigences de la révolution à faire, ce bout fut-il la terreur. Un Anglais bien averti m'a dit : "La France est une femme qui a accouché plusieurs fois au cours de ces dernières années et qui a toujours avorté ; il lui faut un curetage !" D'accord si on pense qu'une opération est nécessaire pour la débarrasser de tant de pratiques et de moeurs politiques qui l'ont mise bien bas. Et je suis le premier à dire qu'il est impossible de revenir purément et simplement au régime d'avant-guerre. Mais il y a curetage et curetage ; il y a celui que peut faire un boucher avec un couteau de cuisine ; il y a celui que pratique le chirurgien des hôpitaux, avec des instruments aseptisés et des gants de caoutchouc. Il faut choisir entre la lune et la (clinique)
Le boucher c'est en l'espèce le communisme ; il infecterait la malade, déclencherait ces hémorragies.

Le chirurgien peut être de Gaulle, et le M.L.N. par exemple.

En bien les Anglais, et les Russes, ne faisaient pas un geste pour empêcher le boucher d'opérer et peut-être les Russes le pousseraient-ils en avant.

S'il s'agit de notre Empire colonial on est alors au cœur du Problème posé aux Alliés en ce qui concerne la France.

S'ils veulent une France forte, il faut lui garder intégralement son empire.

Pourquoi ? Parce qu'il représente par sa mise en valeur la chance de la France d'avoir une part du travail qui se fera dans le monde.

Sans doute le problème le plus réel de la Paix sera-t-il d'abord pour chaque pays de choisir suivant son caractère propre et ses ressources une organisation nationale du travail (C'est le problème social posé à tous et partout) ; et ensuite, pour toutes les nations, de répartir entre elles la production mondiale.

Un pays qui ne travaille pas est perdu. La France de 1918 à 1936 a perdu ; elle n'a pas fait grand chose de 1936 à 1939 ; depuis 1939 elle n'a travaillé que par force, et sans goût, et très peu. Si on ne lui rend pas le goût du travail, but et satisfaction de la vie, source de la force, elle ne se relèvera pas.

L'Amérique, après la Russie et l'Allemagne, a fait la démonstration du résultat à attendre du travail.

Les industries américaines et russes, sursaturées, ont à résoudre les problèmes vitaux que pocean leur passage du temps de guerre au temps de paix ; quelle part ces industries feront-elles au travail français ?

Le problème pour nous serait insoluble, quelle que puisse être la valeur de la construction sociale que nous réaliserons, si la mise en valeur de notre empire colonial nous échappait.

Son intégrité, sa mise en valeur, le travail ainsi représenté sont des données nécessaire d'une France forte.

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DECLASSIFIED
Seuls les États-Unis semblent préparés à nous assurer l’intégrité de nos territoires coloniaux ; seuls ils représentent pour nous l’assistance nécessaire pour leur mise en valeur.

C’est là peut-être une des pièces essentielles d’une bonne paix. Étant entendu que la France ne peut toute seule entreprendre actuellement la mise en valeur de l’Empire, et qu’elle aura besoin d’un associé, elle souhaite qu’il soit : les États-Unis. Le souhaitent-ils aussi ? Dieu le veuille car sans cet accord, quelle terrible bataille à venir autour de cet empire !

En tous cas le M.L.N. dont je disais qu’il doit retenir l’attention des États-Unis préconise cette politique. Je la crois la seule bonne pour mon pays.

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Après cela il est fort possible qu’Anglais et Américains laissent entendre à tous à Paris que leurs gouvernements ne veulent en rien se mêler de notre politique intérieure. Et sans doute nous protesterions s’ils voulaient nous gouverner.

Mais les États-Unis peuvent-ils se désintéresser de notre crise révolutionnaire ?

Certainement non, alors quelle est la limite entre "ne pas se mêler" et "ne pas se désintéresser" ?

La vérité est que l’Amérique pour la sécurité de ses armées, la France pour les exigences de son redressement, ont un intérêt commun et essentiel à voir l’ordre régner absolument sur tout l’étendue des territoires français.

Alors il suffit aux Américains d’exiger cet ordre, et de l’assurer eux-mêmes au besoin, pour se mêler de leurs affaires propres, et ne pas se désintéresser des nôtres.

J’ai entendu exprimer la crainte qu’ainsi faisaient, la popularité des Américains en serait menacée.

Je crois que cette popularité sera saine et sûre si la France comprend que l’Amérique la veut vraiment forte, et surtout si elle sait qu’elle lui doit son empire colonial.
Il y a là un admirable terrain d'entente, et un sujet magnifique de propagande.

Les États-Unis ne peuvent-ils aider ceux qui en seront les bons artisans, et doivent-ils les mettre sur le même pied que le parti communiste par exemple qui sert d'autres ambitions ?

Je complèterai ces notes au fur et à mesure que les événements se dérouleront. On connaît encore fort mal ce qu'est la situation dans les provinces. Il est possible qu'elle soit de nature à modifier certaines considérations de ce memorandum ; mais certainement elle ne changera rien aux conclusions ci-dessus.

Rien ne peut mieux et plus aider la France à redevenir forte, que la conviction qu'elle aura, que les États-Unis la veulent forte ; et force qu'il faut pour qu'elle le soit. Elle ne sera pas ingrate.

Paris 29 septembre 1944

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

The events from June 6 to date have been characterized by a speed of execution which is surprising as regards the military operations.

To this has been added, in the interior of France, and especially in Paris, a surprise intervention of the Forces of the Resistance.

From the political point of view, everyone was caught off his guard or found that a march had been stolen on him. The Vichy Government disappeared within a few hours. No scheme, no plan could be carried out, much less drawn up. In the confusion that reigned in Paris, no group was able to obtain recognition completely; even the Communist Party, in spite of its haste in pressing forward and its precipitation in launching the free-for-all fighting, had to stop in the face of the arrival of the troops of Leclerc's Division. Following in their wake, General de Gaulle, very opportunely profiting by the national movement, excited by this arrival, found the way open which led him unopposed to power.

Thus was established, with the tacit approval of the Allies, a de facto Government, although not recognized as such by them, which succeeded to the de jure Government which the United States had recognized as such in 1940, and which, according to the French Constitution still in force, was actually such.
It must be noted at once that this de facto Government pronounced and proclaimed, as the first of its acts, its formal disavowal of the de jure Government, qualifying as an offense against the country, if not as a crime, any act of obedience in the past to the Vichy Government. Thus the revolutionary character of the present period is clearly affirmed.

It is not matter for wonder that the political situation thus created remains very uncertain.

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I shall observe first that the memorandum which I sent in May 1944 to President Roosevelt has been in great part verified by the facts. The rapid succession of events, the lack or the insufficiency of preparation of political solutions, have placed everyone before the fait accompli.

It remains none the less true, as I said in May:

1) that the French Communist Party continues to wish to have the liberation of the country coincide with the seizure of power by itself;

2) that this Party, like all Communist Parties existing in all countries, is aroused to irresistible enthusiasm by noting the Russian victories; it spreads the word everywhere that if the Russians ceased fighting in the East, their Allies would be faced with great difficulties in the West;

3) that any regular Parliamentary Government is at present impossible; and that, in any case, more than ever, it appears feasible in future only if order is re-established and preserved throughout French territory.
This having been said, here is how the political situation appears in France:

1. The Government is shaken by successive internal crises. It was the result of the shock between the elements which came from Algiers and the elements of the Resistance in the interior: the latter consider the former less deserving than themselves, if not undesirable. The present Government is therefore a mixture, a compromise between two groups, each little satisfied, and with all the weaknesses of a compromise.

The National Resistance Council - C.N.R. - duplicates the Government, which it controls and takes every occasion to reprimand. Having at its disposal with each Minister Action Committees which it had prepared and installed from the beginning, when it in fact exercised the power, it constitutes, indeed, a State within a State.

Has the Government the support of public opinion? It has on its side the popularity of its Chief. But elections, if they should be held, would set up against him four important elements: the Communist Party, the Movement of National Liberation, Parliamentary Circles, the victims of the purge.

2. Communist Party

It is understood - it is the opinion expressed by the English and American experts - that the French Communist Party is far below the degree of quality which the Russian Communist Party has been able to attain. The latter has incontestably trained and separated out an élite of men very superior to the leaders of the French Communist Party.

The latter are still at the period in which appetites take the place of real aptitudes. It is therefore very possible that the French Communist Party will receive from Moscow
Moscow recommendations to show moderation; it is much more probable that, engaged in a critical enterprise for gaining power, the Party will if necessary use violence, which still remains, in the form of the terror which it knows how to spread, its best argument. One would be quite wrong to underestimate its determination to risk all, and its chances of succeeding. It is armed, well organized, and has at its disposal elements experienced in revolutionary tactics. It has finished the first stage, which has brought it within sight of the power; it is installed in many jumping-off trenches, ready to start on a new stage; it places its men in posts of command by making the "purge" a lucrative operation, the rule of which is: "Get out so that I may get in." Behind a reassuring placard: "The National Front", it groups troops, especially youths, that do not belong to it, but whom it commends. It is at present the only active political party in France.

3. The M.L.N. - "Movement of National Liberation" - is most interesting to know. It represents (see attached note) everything in the "Resistance" that was not Communist. It gathers together youthful aspirations, pure hearts, ardent souls; it possesses a flame and a faith which can assure it an irresistible radiance, if it does not go astray to the point of pulling the chestnuts from the fire for the Communists. Seeking like them the support of the people, very enthusiastic about generous social reforms, it is flouting with the Communist Party, and, for fear of appearing less generous than it, may be led to outbid the promises or theses of the Communist Party. The latter is cleverly keeping it, by playing on its comradeship in arms, in opposition to the Government, where its natural taste for the responsibilities of power immediately placed it. The M.L.N. is therefore also a candidate for power.
If it understands soon that, by working in agreement with the Communists, it is not working for itself, it will become by far the newest, the most interesting, the most sincere and without doubt the most powerful of political parties. Many Frenchmen are too soon ready to take the purge.

We must wait to judge it until the situation in the provinces is better known. It is probable that the provincial elements of the M.L.N. will give to the ruling element in Paris the impetus which will loosen it from the Communist hold and the means of checkmatining Communism.

This is much to be hoped. It seems to me - and I shall try to show this, - that it is to the American interest, if well understood, to help in this.

4. Parliamentary Circles, many of whose representatives are in prison and almost all of whom are condemned and even stigmatized by the Government, are against the latter. The presence of Mr. Jeanneney in the Government is severely criticized and could not be considered as representation of Parliament.

The Parliamentarians preserve in their electoral districts a certain influence, which it would be a mistake to underestimate. Vichy gained nothing by ignoring the Parliamentarians, among which there are remarkably able persons. The present Government is making the same mistake.

Thus, if it appealed to public opinion to confirm its power, it would already have many opponents; the time which is passing, difficult to live through for all, is necessarily using up the credit of the Government, which is in danger of exhausting it before election time.

5. Account
5. Account must be taken, besides, of the very numerous families and groups of interests that the purge is upsetting and irritating, more especially as it often strikes unjustly and appears less as justice rendered than as resentments appeased or the satisfaction of unbridled appetites. Many Frenchmen are too soon coming to take the purge for the revolution.
It is apparent how unstable the Government still is; if it became bankrupt, to what new shocks should we not be exposed!

There must also be added to these elements of dispersion, if not division, the crisis of the F.F.I., the incorporation of which into the Army is not proceeding without difficulty. The healthy elements naturally find their place there. But they leave behind them, almost everywhere throughout new the country, a "Maquis", composed of "bad boys," who prefer the lawless life to which they have become accustomed, and almost all the risks of which have disappeared, to a return to their homes, to work, to the regiment.

Above them all these stands out the strong personality of General de Gaulle, who is the master of the hour, and who can do much if he dares much. France is not looking for a dictator, but she does not demand the freedom to do what she likes; she would certainly follow a guide who would command more than he would talk. In a word, she expects General de Gaulle, Chief of Government, to be Chief of the country at war.

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An observant Englishman said to me: "France is a woman who has had several abruptions in the course of the last years; she must have a turmoil!"
It is with all these elements that a strong France must be built.

She will be so, of course, only if the French become reconciled among themselves and unite. We lost our best blood between 1914 and 1918; we produced no more children after that; then comes the blood lost between 1939 and 1944; it continues to be shed for total victory; victory will restore to us two and a half million Frenchmen at present in Germany; in what physical condition will they return?

We cannot then afford a new hemorrhage; that is why civil war, terror, terrorism are for us mortal dangers.

It is the affair of the French to rebuild a strong France; that is true.

The French in their turn ask whether the Allies really want a strong France.

Only the United States of America appears to wish it.

I have already seen English and Americans well placed to know the interests of their countries and the intentions of their Governments.

The English, like the Russians, would easily accommodate themselves to a new hemorrhage in France, or to an amputation. This is at once apparent when one speaks of our recovery or of the preservation of our Colonial Empire.

If it is a question of our recovery, English circles think that we must go the very limit of the requirements of the revolution to be effected, even if this limit should be a reign of terror.

An observant Englishman said to me: "France is a woman who has had several abortions in the course of the last years; she must have a curettage!".

Quite
Quite so, if one thinks that an operation is necessary to rid her of all the political practices and habits which have laid her low. And I am the first to say that it is impossible to return purely and simply to the pre-war régime. But there are curettages and curettages; there is the one which can be performed by a butcher with a kitchen knife; there is the one that the hospital surgeon performs with aseptic instruments and rubber gloves. We must choose between the street and the clinic!

The butcher in this case is Communism; he would infect the patient, start hemorrhages.

The surgeon may be de Gaulle, and the M.L.N., for example.

Well, the English, and the Russians, would not make a single move to prevent the butcher from operating and perhaps the Russians would urge him forward.

If it is a question of our Colonial Empire, we reach the heart of the problem presented to the Allies with regard to France.

If they want a strong France, her Empire must be preserved whole for her.

Why? Because it represents through its "development" France's chance to take part in the work which will be done in the world.

Doubtless the most real problem of the Peace will be: first, for each country, to choose, according to its own character and its resources, a national labor organization (this is the social problem existing for all and everywhere); and, secondly, for all nations, to apportion global production among themselves.
A country that does not work is lost. France idled from 1918 to 1936; she did little from 1936 and 1939; since 1939 she has worked only by compulsion, and without a taste for the work, and very little. If the taste for work, the goal and satisfaction of life, the source of strength, is not restored to her, she will not get on her feet again.

America, after Russia and Germany, has shown the results to be expected from work.

American and Russian industries, supersaturated, must solve the vital problems which their passage from war-time to peace-time will present; what share will these industries give to French labor?

The problem would be insoluble for us, whatever may be the value of the social edifice which we shall build, if the development of our Colonial Empire slipped from our hands.

Its integrity, its development, the work represented by this, are necessary postulates for a strong France.

Only the United States seems prepared to assure us the integrity of our Colonial territories; she alone represents for us the partner necessary for their development.

That is perhaps one of the essential elements of a good peace. Granting that France cannot by herself undertake at present the development of the Empire, and that she will need a partner, she hopes that it will be: the United States. Does the United States also hope so? God grant it, for, without this agreement, what a terrible battle will be fought around this Empire!
In any case, the M.L.N., concerning which I said that it must engage the attention of the United States, recommends this policy. I believe it to be the only good policy for my country.

X X X

It is also extremely possible that the English and the Americans will let it be generally understood in Paris that their Governments do not wish to interfere in any way with our internal policy. And we should without doubt protest if they attempted to govern us.

But can the United States remain aloof from our revolutionary crisis?

Certainly not. Then what is the dividing line between "not interfering" and "not remaining aloof"?

The truth is that America, for the security of her Armies; France, for the exigences of her recovery, have a common and essential interest in seeing absolute and tyrannical order reign throughout French territory.

Americans, therefore, have only to require this order, and to assure it themselves, if need be, in order to attend to their own affairs, and not to hold aloof from ours.

I have heard the fear expressed that, by so doing, the popularity of the Americans would be threatened.

I believe that this popularity will be sound and sure if France understands that America wants her to be truly strong, and especially if France knows that she owes to America her Colonial Empire.

This furnishes admirable ground for understanding, and a splendid subject for propaganda.

Can
Can the United States not help those who will be the good workmen in building this understanding, and must they place them on the same footing as the Communist Party, for example, which serves other ambitions?

I shall complete these notes as events unroll. The situation in the provinces is still very imperfectly known. It is possible that it is of a character to modify certain considerations in this memorandum; but it will certainly change nothing in the conclusions themselves.

Nothing can better and more greatly help France to regain her strength than the conviction she will have that the United States wants her to be strong, and is doing what is necessary to make her so. She will not be ungrateful.

Paris, September 29, 1944.

[Signed] Colonel Jean Fabry.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

31 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The enclosed memorandum from Colonel Jean Fabry in Paris dated 29 September 1944 has been forwarded by our representative in Paris. It is the document which, I believe, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt advised you was on its way.

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (secret)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

NIAC
t

480, November 13, 1 p.m.

One. Mr. Churchill told me last evening that in their conversations General de Gaulle has been insisting that it is very important for France to secure armament, et cetera, for sending more divisions to the front. Mr. Churchill observed that while he is well aware of the practical difficulties involved he would like to see the French have as strong an army as they can build up.

Two. Churchill said de Gaulle had spoken about a French zone in Germany. Churchill remarked he would be willing to cede a small part of the British zone to the French and he trusted we would be willing to cede a small part of ours.

Sent to Department as 480, repeated to London as 30.

Three. Churchill then said "I sent a telegram today to your President on the Argentine meat situation. I held off until after the elections but we must have the meat."
Paris

Dated November 13, 1944
Rec'd 11:28 a.m., 14th.

Secretary of State
Washington

NIACGT
481, November 13, 1 p.m.

One. Eden confirmed what Churchill said about French insistence on obtaining armament et cetera, at this time and he gave me to understand that they had endeavored to persuade the French not to insist on armament for immediate use in this war but rather to ask for the type of armament suitable for after-the-war use; but I take it they were not very successful with that.

Two. Eden confirmed what Churchill said about a French zone in Germany.

Three. Eden said they were not having an easy time with the French about Syria and Lebanon in view of French attitude that if British had really been helping they would have their treaties with Syria and the Lebanon but that the British were not trying to help.

Eden
Eden denied that. He said "the State Department knows our attitude in view of previous communications and recent conversations at Washington. We would like them to have treaties of the kind that Washington knows about. However, I have seen some prominent Near Eastern Arab leaders recently and they are violent in their attitude about the French in the Levant and it is not going to be easy".

Four. Eden then said they had not talked to the French about any sort of Western European block although "obviously" he said "we want to see France and the other Western European countries completely independent, prosperous, and as strong as possible. Furthermore, he said, I do not like the word 'block'".

However, later on, much later on, we may want to make some sort of special economic arrangements with them and perhaps even some other arrangements too but all of that is for the far distant future". I told him that in my opinion it is in our interest too to see France and the smaller countries of Western Europe independent, prosperous and strong again; that I dislike the word "block" perhaps even more than he does; that in my opinion it would be a mistake at this juncture.
NIAC\ 461, November 13, 1 p.m., from Paris

Junction to create the impression that Great Britain was trying to build up alliances in Western Europe.

He said he agreed. "However" he said "I am going to have to do some explaining in England because so much of our press and so many of our people in view of what they have gone through and in view of our population figures in the face of yours and the Russians feel that we should increase our numbers in some form or another. (Sent to Department as 461 repeated to London as 31).

But I am not thinking of alliances or blocks".

CAP\\ ERY

BB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Secret)

Paris

Dated November 13, 1914
Rec'd 9:39 a.m., 15th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

501, November 13, 5 p.m.

One. Eden told me also that the French in course of their conversations intimated that they are much interested in the future of the Ruhr and the Saar. By 501, November 13 to Department.

Two. I have been told also that in course of conversation about occupied zones British mentioned "possibility" that the Russians might be willing to cede a part of their zone to the French. (Sent to Department as 501 repeated to London 34) We believe French were not very receptive to that.

WPS

CAFFERY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Invitation to the President
and Secretary of State to Visit Paris.

As agreed in our conversation on Friday, we shall, for the time being, make no reply to General de Gaulle's invitation to you and the Secretary to visit Paris.

I felt, however, that you might wish to have in your files a copy of the French communication and a translation of it, which I enclose herewith.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date
4 Novembre 4.

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État,

J'ai été prié par M. Georges Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française, exprimant l'appréciation de la nation française toute entière pour l'éminente contribution que le peuple et les armées des États-Unis ont apportée à la délivrance de la capitale de la France et de la plus grande partie de son territoire, serait heureux de recevoir M. le Président Roosevelt dans Paris libéré.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire serait particulièrement heureux que Votre Excellence voulût bien accompagner le Président dans cette visite.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir transmettre cette invitation à M. le Président des États-Unis.

Je me tiens à votre entière disposition pour transmettre à mon Gouvernement la Réponse que M. le Président Roosevelt voudra bien lui faire et pour lui faire connaître, si, comme le Gouvernement Français le souhaite vivement, cette réponse est

Son Excellence
Monsieur Cordell Hull
Secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
Washington, D. C.
favorable, l'époque à laquelle cette visite pourrait être envisagée.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Henri Hoppenot
Ministre Plénipotentiaire
Delegué du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française aux États-Unis.
DELEGATION
OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE
FRENCH REPUBLIC

No. 387

Mr. Secretary of State:

I have been requested by Mr. George Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to inform Your Excellency that the Provisional Government of the French Republic, as an expression of the appreciation of the entire French Nation for the outstanding contribution which the people and Armies of the United States have made to the liberation of the capital of France and of the greater part of her territory, would be happy to receive President Roosevelt in liberated Paris.

The Provisional Government would be particularly happy should Your Excellency accompany the President on this visit.

I should be grateful if you would deliver this invitation to the President of the United States.

His Excellence
Mr. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State of the United States
Washington, D. C.
I hold myself at your complete disposal for the purpose of transmitting to my Government President Roosevelt's reply and of informing it, in the event that this reply, as the French Government hopes, is favorable, the time at which this visit might take place.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my high consideration.

Henri Hoppenot
Minister Plenipotentiary
Delegate of the Provisional Government of the French Republic to the United States
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (GRANDS)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
NIAC 516, November 14th., 7 p.m.

Bidault confirmed what Churchill and Eden told me (my telegrams Nos. 480 and 481 November 13, 1 p.m.) and gave us some additional information.

One. France has no desire to annex any German territory but she is most anxious to take part in a permanent international control of the left bank of the Rhine, Ruhr and Saar and that close control be exercised over all German industry located there and especially all near-war-industry.

Two. France hopes to be assigned an occupation zone to be taken from the British and ours.

Three. General de Gaulle and Bidault endeavored to impress on the British the need for arming eight divisions. I repeated to Bidault my conversation with de Gaulle (my telegram 482 November 13, 2 p.m.).

He said:
-2-#NIAC516, November 14, 7 p.m., from Paris.

He said: "I accept General de Gaulle's figures."

In addition to de Gaulle's argument he said: "we will have no authority in the occupied zone of Germany if we have not taken an adequate part in the war. To take an adequate part we need at least an additional four or five divisions. We could begin our training in part at least with second weapons to be replaced later on by new ones."

Four, Bidault said that Spain was discussed also. He told the British Prime Minister what he has told me before that France had no love for Franco but does want order on her southern frontier. The opposition groups to Franco are numerous but all fighting among themselves. In his opinion there is nothing to be gained in endeavoring to stir up trouble at this juncture for Franco. With that in mind he will receive the visit tomorrow of Sangrongs at the Quai d'Orsay.

Five, Italy was discussed. France has no territorial ambitions in regard to the Aosta Valley or any other Italian territory. She has no ambitions in the former Italian possessions in North Africa. In fact to avoid complications it might be better to leave them in Italian hands. However, the Italians in Tunis must lose their
Six. In the Far East France expects to reoccupy Indo-China but will be disposed to grant extensive rights to the native population.

Seven. A western block was not discussed. France does not want at this juncture to enter into a western block or alliance. France hopes that the United States and Great Britain will help her to stand on her own feet again. When she can do that she will be of more use to us (and she will certainly be close to the smaller countries of Western Europe) than if she were to join a block or an alliance.

Eight. Bidault in referring to the Syria Lebanon business remarked that our representative there had not been very "kind" to the French.

Repeated to London as 38.

CAPPERY

HTM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
NIACT 517, November 14, 8 p.m.

One. Duff Cooper confirms what Churchill, Eden and Bidault told me. He added that although he had not seen it Eden has a map with a projected French zone outlined.

Two. He told me that the discussions about Syria and Lebanon were not very satisfactory. He said: "most confidentially the trouble is Spears but up to now the Prime Minister has not been willing to remove him. I think he should be removed."

Three. He said that the Prime Minister had promised the French to see if he could find some odds and ends of arms but that he did not think he could find many. He said that the Prime Minister told the French that while he is most sympathetic he realizes that there are serious difficulties in the way of our giving to the French at this juncture the arms they are asking for.

Sent to Department, repeated to London.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

515 Fourteenth.

An interview with Bidault which is published this morning in his newspaper L'AUBE includes the following statements: "One thing however is certain: Germany should not be reduced to slavery but rendered incapable of making another war...peace with Germany should not be a peace of vengeance, it should be just and human. Germany should be controlled for years, but I am not of those who seek to render her harmless by dismembering her artificially".

"What control do you envisage for the Rhineland and the Ruhr", asked a journalist.

"We do not wish to incorporate any German territory stated M Bidault: we do not want a German minority within our frontiers. Our greatest interest resides in the control of the Rhineland because it represents our real frontier. An international control has been suggested..."
...if such a control were established, France, as a direct neighbor of Germany should perhaps enjoy a privileged position. The British and Americans will return home one day. We will remain and, consequently, we should have a full participation in the control of Germany.

After having stated that he did not think it fair to transform Germany into an agricultural country, the Minister added: "Germany gave us on our own soil a very good example of a discreet and efficacious control of industries. This method is worthy of careful study".

Passing to the question of France's participation in the European Advisory Commission, M Didault pointed out: "France can play an invaluable role in Europe as a bridge between east and west. France's ability to understand Soviet views, her geographic proximity and her spiritual affinity with the Anglo Saxon countries place France in a situation in which she can contribute materially toward eliminating the possibilities of friction between east and west. France therefore looks to her friends in the west as well as to those in the east".

Repeated to London.

Capper
RR
Secretary of State,

Washington.

473, Twelfth.

The National Council of Résistance has requested me to transmit the following message of congratulations to the President upon the occasion of his reelection:

"Le Conseil National de la Résistance, qui a dirigé l'insurrection nationale en France, vous adresse ses vives félicitations à l'occasion de votre réélection. Il salut en vous le chef librement choisi par la grande démocratie américaine, et un des plus grands artisans de la libération de l'Europe et de la commune victorie." 

CAPPERY

CSB
FMH-127
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated November 14, 1944
Rec'd 7:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

518, November 14, 9 p.m.

Everyone from General de Gaulle and Bidault down are anxious for news in regard to the invitation to the President to visit France.

CAPFERY

WMB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Churchill - De Gaulle Conversations

I believe you may be interested in reading in full the enclosed telegrams from Caffery reporting information in regard to the recent Anglo-French conversations which he has been able to obtain from Churchill, Eden, Duff Cooper and Bidault.

There is also enclosed a copy of a telegram of November 14 from Paris transmitting excerpts from a press interview given by Bidault setting forth in some detail French views in regard to the treatment of Germany, a question which was apparently one of the principal subjects of conversation between the British and the French at the recent meeting.

Enclosures:
1. Copy of telegram no. 480 from Paris, November 13, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram no. 481 from Paris, November 13, 1944.
3. Copy of telegram no. 501 from Paris, November 13, 1944.
4. Copy of telegram no. 516 from Paris, November 14, 1944.
5. Copy of telegram no. 517 from Paris, November 14, 1944.
6. Copy of telegram no. 515 from Paris, November 14, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

What would you think of
sending Bob Sherwood as Special
Representative to the President
to study and report on conditions
in France and Belgium, with the
rank of Minister?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 28, 1944

Subject: Membership in the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques

I am attaching a paraphrase of telegram no. 616 of November 21 from Paris relative to the action of the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in electing you and Prime Minister Churchill to membership in that body.

You will note that due to the fact that Marshal Petain is still a member the question has raised something of a stir and Ambassador Caffery suggests that for the moment it might be best for you to make no reply to the invitation.

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of telegram no. 616, November 21.
The news that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have been elected to membership in the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques is carried in most of the morning papers. The Académie simultaneously decided that the question of Marshal Petain would not be determined until after his trial by a high court. A number of resistance papers take the position that it is outrageous to invite the Prime Minister and the President to accept membership in an organization which refuses to take decisive action regarding Marshal Petain. The following is a sample of the comment: Under the headline "Académie of Immoral and Political Sciences associates Petain with Churchill and Roosevelt." The ultra-left FRANC TIREUR says in part "to put a demi quietus on the super traitor of Vichy is not sufficient for the Académie of Immoral and Political Sciences. It elects Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt as associate foreign members in an obvious effort to balance accounts. It is doubtful if Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill will appreciate the honor thus extended to them of becoming Marshal Petain's colleagues. It is difficult to imagine a worse boner."

It is respectfully suggested that for the moment the President make no reply to this invitation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

TO DO THE NECESSARY.

F.D.R.

Copy of Airgram from "Caffery", Paris, 11/22/44, to the Secretary of State, quoting message from Sen. Paul Benazet, President, Union Universelle pour le Droit International et la Paix, for the President, in French.
US URGENT

4700, December 8, 5 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

At General de Gaulle’s request I had a long talk with him yesterday, December sixth. It started quite formally by his informing me of the proposed pact with the Soviet Government along the lines of the British as reported in my 4657, December 5, 6 p.m. As the conversation progressed, he spoke increasingly freely of his hopes and fears in the relationship of France with the Soviet Government and of Soviet policy in general.

REPEATED TO PARIS AS SECRET FOR AMBASSADORS CAFFERY AND MURPHY.

He told me something of his talk with Stalin regarding the treatment of Germany. Stalin had explained the Soviet view regarding the eastern boundary of Germany giving Poland German territory to the Oder.

De Gaulle had
-2-, #4700, December 8, 5 p.m. from Moscow

De Gaulle had indicated that he had no objection to this provided settlement was made simultaneously as to Germany's western boundaries. De Gaulle hopes to get Stalin's approval of the Rhine as Germany's western frontier, subject to agreement of the other Allies; also placing the Ruhr under international control. De Gaulle does not consider it necessary to evacuate the German populations west of the Rhine as he believes they can be assimilated.

Stalin asked de Gaulle to send a representative to the Lublin Committee. De Gaulle stated that this question was premature but intimated that at some stage a recognition similar to what the United States and Great Britain had originally accorded the French Committee might be considered. De Gaulle became a bit vague when I asked him whether he had made it plain to Stalin that the French Government would not take any action without consultation with the British and ourselves. Later in the evening, however, when I saw him at a reception he told me that he had seen Stalin in the meantime, that the Polish political question had come up again and that he had made it plain to Stalin that the French Government wished to await further developments in Poland, hoped that further unification and conciliation of Polish groups could be accomplished and that in no event would the French Government
Government take any action without full consultation with the United States and British Governments.

De Gaulle expressed the fear that Soviet policy was directed not only toward expanding its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe but also toward incorporating states within the Union, readily possible through the Soviet constitution giving theoretical autonomy to the component republics. He would not predict whether the Soviets would be successful. He believes that the aggressive attitude of the Soviet Government in backing governments consisting of individuals subservient to Moscow would react adversely and create antagonisms against the Soviet Union among the populations of the different countries involved. He believes that the Soviet Government will be successful in superimposing governments of its choosing in the border countries and in the Balkans, excluding Czechoslovakia but including Hungary and Austria. Strong opposition would be created as a result and there would be political instability in these areas for many years. He spoke particularly of his concern over the recent developments in Iran and of his talks with the Shah and Iranian officials while in Tehran.

De Gaulle believes that it is of the utmost importance, not only to France but to the other western countries, that France
that France should become strong in spirit and in fact. With a weak Germany there will be no strong nation between Russia and France. The Soviet aggressive policy will, de Gaulle believes, create fear among the smaller nations in Western Europe and they will look to France to lead and cement Western European opinion in order to offset Russian domination of Europe. I understand he does not (repeat not) have in mind a Western European Bloc but rather close mutual relations.

I told him that I did not believe it was the Soviet Government's present policy to absorb any states and that its aggressive policy to dominate the new governments was motivated by the desire to have friendly neighbors as a means of attaining security. I agreed with him that this aggressive policy would react unfavorably to the Soviet Union and that I was hopeful that the Soviet Government would respond to world opinion to some degree in moderating its actions.

De Gaulle said that the Communist Party in France took direction from Moscow, had abandoned its revolutionary objectives but under the guise of pressing for radical social programs would continue to create difficulties and trouble. De Gaulle is satisfied that Moscow's interest in the Communist Party in France is as an instrumentality
-5-, #4700, December 8, 5 p.m. from Moscow

an instrumentality to further the Soviet Government's policy rather than any interest in France itself.

De Gaulle asked me whether I thought Stalin expressed his own views or forcefully presented the views of his associates. I told him partly both: his own views when he had had the opportunity to crystallize his own opinion, and the line of his associates on matters on which he was not personally fully informed. Therefore personal meetings such as the one de Gaulle was having with Stalin were of great value in getting before Stalin directly the foreign point of view.

I offered de Gaulle the United States C-54 plane now in Moscow to return to Cairo, which he gladly accepted. He plans to leave Sunday.

HARRIMAN

WTD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: General de Wavrin.

The Attorney General has informed me that he has written you on the subject of the presence in this country of General de Wavrin, usually known as "Colonel Passy".

At the request of General Donovan, visas were granted for a visit to this country by General de Wavrin accompanied by two aides. When the Department requested information as to the purpose of de Wavrin's visit to this country, General Donovan stated to me personally that General de Wavrin's presence was required here for the purpose of discussing military intelligence problems and that it was necessary and vital for the carrying on of General Donovan's activities to have him come here for that purpose. In view of General Donovan's personal intercession we authorized the necessary visas on the further understanding that no publicity should attend the visit.

The only action taken by the Department with respect to this matter was the granting of the visa. We have not seen him or had any contact with him or his associates during their visit here.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Franco-Soviet Treaty

The enclosed telegram from Caffery reports a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Paris in regard to this treaty.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 993 from Paris, December 19, 1944.
RS-70
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Paris
Dated December 19, 1944
Rec'd 6:20 a.m., 21st

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
993, December 19, 7 p.m.

Bogomolov talked to me today at some length about his trip to Moscow. He confirmed what Bidault told me yesterday (REMYTEL 977, December 18, 7 p.m.) except that he said it was the French who suggested the treaty.

He, too, has taken great pains to assure me that the treaty was in the Dumbarton Oaks framework.

He said that his Government wants to see France independent, strong, and prosperous (he said it in the same words in which I said it to him before he went to Moscow): Stalin is in accord with pact. He repeated that his Government is opposed to the formation of a western European block but has no objection whatever to France standing as the principal nation among a group of free and prosperous Western European nations.

We then had some conversation (in light vein) about his influence...
December 19, 7 p.m. from Paris

about his influence on the French Communist party and especially on HUMANITE which he laughingly denied.

I asked him if they were not being just a little "mean" to the British in Greece; he laughingly denied that too.

He then talked to me at some length endeavoring to justify the Russian attitude in regard to Poland; but there was nothing especially new in that.

I asked him if the Far East had been mentioned in the discussions at Moscow. He said "no" it had not been mentioned. I mentioned press reports that Stalin had brought up the question of Tangier. He said: "absolutely no".

He mentioned the British desire for a tripartite pact and asked me what I thought of a pact of ourselves, Russia, Great Britain and France. I told him that my personal opinion was no.

CAPPERY

RB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Mr. Robert Sherwood

You will recall our recent conversation relative to Robert Sherwood's trip abroad.

I have talked to Bob and made arrangements for him to go to Europe with the rank of Minister sometime in the latter part of January in order to make a survey for us of the impression representatives of various American agencies are making on the governments and populations of the liberated countries.

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

December 26, 1944

Subject: General de Wavrin ("Colonel Passy")

On December 18 I sent to you a memorandum stating that it was at the personal request of General Donovan that a visa was issued to General de Wavrin, better known as "Colonel Passy". A copy of this memorandum is attached for your convenience.

General de Wavrin and his two aides are presently in South America on an official trip for the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Permission for the trip was formally asked of the War Department by the French Military Mission here and supported by the French Delegate. Approval of the journey was granted after consultation with Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. It was the view of both the War Department and this Department that since this Government now recognized the Provisional Government of the French Republic there were no grounds on which an official request of the Provisional Government could properly be denied. It was also felt that if the request were refused the French authorities would merely achieve their purpose through other means. It was clearly understood however that General de Wavrin and his aides would not visit Argentina.

I am informed by the War Department that the group is due to reach Miami on January 16. They will proceed from there to Habana the following day and are due back in Washington on January 21. I understand it is intended that they shall be sent back to France as soon thereafter as possible. We are communicating this to O.S.S. so that the action will surely be carried out.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum.

[Signature]

[Stamp: DECLASSIFIED]

[Stamp: State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72]

[Stamp: By J. Scheuble Date JUL 3 1975]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arming of French Forces

In late August, the British Embassy approached the State Department, and the British Chiefs of Staff approached the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with reference to the adequate equipment of the forces of the Western European Allies, to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in occupying Germany. The question was asked whether the United States Government would be willing to re-equip a French Army for such purposes from American sources during the next few years, having in mind that present French land forces are provided with American munitions and materiel. British Chiefs of Staff suggested a continuance of British supply to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, through Admiral Leahy, stated to the Department that there was no objection on military grounds to the division of responsibility proposed but that no commitments should be made that will be rigidly exclusive for the future.

The authority to deliver supplies for security or occupation forces is given by the Lend-Lease Act, and these munitions could be furnished on straight lend-lease or on credit under Section 3(c) of the Act. We could also furnish such supplies for cash, but cash purchases might use up dollars needed for civilian supply and reconstruction.

I recommend that we accept the British proposal, but suggest dealing directly with the French. Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the
the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of this policy, and politically such a move could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see her as a strong nation. The furnishing of arms by the United States to France may provide this Government with a lever to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years. However, it must be borne in mind that France will make every effort to obtain arms from any source.

We are presently in the process of preparing a lend-lease agreement to be proposed to the French, and under that proposal these military supplies could be furnished on a straight lend-lease basis. However, unless the British are agreeable to furnishing comparable military supplies to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium on a similar basis, we may have to reconsider the implementation of our proposal in order to standardize the terms of our arrangements with the French and those made by the British with the other four countries in question.

I recommend further that the Soviet Government be informed of what the British and the American Governments propose to do, and that it be pointed out that the arming of the Western European Allies is on a non-restrictive basis.

(The foregoing proposal and recommendation are not of course related to the equipment and maintenance of French ground forces by General Eisenhower for utilization in the present campaign against Germany for which the General has full authority.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Policy towards Germany

You may wish to glance at the enclosed telegram from Caffery in which he reports that the French Government, while believing that all German war and near-war industries should be eliminated, would not wish to see Germany reduced to economic misery.

Enclosure:

Telegram no. 1160,
December 31, 1944,
from Paris.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to the President to Visit France.

The American Ambassador at Paris reports by despatch that on December 20 the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, again referred to the invitation extended to you to visit Paris and again expressed the ardent desire of the Provisional Government that you should come there at an early date.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. 

Secretary of State, 
Washington 

1160, December 31, 2 p.m. 

Bidault told me (confidentially and personally, he said) last evening that they are still engaged in their study of the position France will take in regard to the future of German economy in general and German industry in particular and have not reached definite conclusions. However, they believe that all German war industries and near-war industries should be eliminated, but they would not like to see Germany reduced to economic misery because they believe that such a situation would inevitably breed trouble. In one way or another the Germans would become aggressive again. In other words, on the one hand they want to make it impossible for the Germans to attack and on the other hand they want to fit them into the general European economic picture.

GAFFEY

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaub Date FEB 8 1972
Secretary of State,
Washington

US URGENT
NIACT, 26, January 3, 4 p.m.
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

When General De Gaulle asked me this morning to transmit the message contained in my 23, January 3, 3 p.m., I said that before transmitting it I would communicate with General Eisenhower and General Bedell Smith. I did communicate with them.

General De Gaulle had a conference this afternoon with General Eisenhower and General Smith and they have come to an agreement as to the operational measures to be taken in Alsace and Lorraine.

CAFFERY

JT
INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

General De Gaulle asks me to transmit following telegram to the President (a copy has gone to Churchill, my 22, January 3):

"General Eisenhower has taken the decision to pull back the Devers Army group to the Vosges. This decision is equivalent to the evacuation of Alsace and a part of Lorraine without fighting. The French Government cannot accept in so far as it is concerned such a retreat which does not seem to be justified strategically and which would be deplorable from the general point of view of the conduct of the war as well as from a French national point of view. I confidentially request you to intervene."

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, L-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972
-2-#NIAC 23, January 3, 3 p.m., from Paris

you to intervene in this affair which risks having
grave consequences in every respect. Signed
General De Gaulle."

CAFFERY

JT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany.

The Embassy at London reports that the French representative on the European Advisory Commission has circulated a memorandum giving the views of his Government concerning the instrument of surrender for Germany, the protocol and amendment on the zones of occupation in Germany, and the agreement on control machinery. The memorandum expresses approval of these agreements but specifically advances the following five proposals:

(1) French participation in the Supreme authority for Germany.

(2) French participation in signing the instrument of surrender.

(3) Allocation to the French Army of a zone of occupation in Germany and a part of greater Berlin.

(4) Substitution of quadripartite for tripartite agencies in the agreement on control machinery.

(5) Preparation of a French text of the instrument of surrender to be equally authentic with the Russian and English texts.

Subject
Subject to the approval of the military authorities, it is recommended that this Government approve the French requests. The following reasons suggest this course.

It is in the interests of the United States to assist France to regain her former position in world affairs in order that she may increase her contribution in the war effort and play an appropriate part in the maintenance of peace. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal that France should in due course become one of the five permanent members of the Security Council was a natural corollary of this policy. Furthermore, France's vital interest in the solution of the German problem and the realization of the part she will inevitably play in maintaining the future peace of Europe were acknowledged in the statement made on November 11, 1944 by the Acting Secretary of State when France was invited to become a full member of the European Advisory Commission. In the circumstances it was obviously only a question of time when France would put forward the requests now under consideration.

There is every likelihood that the British and Soviet Governments will support the French. Consequently, disapproval by this Government would probably result in our being placed in the position of being the only Government to stand in the way of French aspirations. It would seem the part of wisdom to accept the proposals now, when credit can be obtained for that action, rather than to wait until it is made to appear that the concessions are won from us grudgingly.

Acceptance of full French participation will probably prove popular with the other small countries of Europe which profess to fear the results of a peace imposed by non-European powers.

Acceptance of the proposals now may help to create a cooperative spirit among the French who may as a consequence be less inclined to raise objections to many of the arrangements which have already been agreed to.
This Government may well wish, after the early period of occupation, to withdraw a considerable proportion of its troops from Germany. It would be logical to assume that they would be replaced by French forces and this replacement is likely to be facilitated if the French are fully associated with plans for the occupation from the outset.

It can be justifiably argued that the French requests are out of all proportion to France's power today and that the acceptance of a fourth country on an equal basis may only serve to make more complicated an already complex problem. It is not believed, however, that these considerations can outweigh the arguments in favor of the move. In the long run this Government will undoubtedly gain more by making concessions to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and influence, than we will be treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.
January 4, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Part in the European Settlement

I believe you will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Caffery reporting the latest expression of General de Gaulle's views on the role which France should play in the European settlement.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 18 from Paris, January 2, 1945.
EOC-1231
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Paris
Dated January 2, 1945
Rec'd 2:49 a.m. 3rd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
18, January 2, 8 p.m.

General de Gaulle said to me also this morning (my telegrams 16 and 17 of January 2, 7 p.m.) "I hope that you will bear in mind my prediction that any and every settlement between any powers or group of powers on the European continent in which France does not have a voice will not be a lasting settlement. Look at Greece now; look at Italy; look at the Balkans; look at Poland. We could have helped in several of those cases if we had been allowed to have a say."

CAFFERY

JMS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany.

In my previous memorandum on the above subject I indicated that the French Provisional Government, through its representative on the European Advisory Commission, had put forward five specific proposals, the purposes of which were to place France on a footing of equality with the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union with regard to German affairs.

I recommended that subject to the approval of our military authorities, this Government approve the French request. The views of the War and Navy Departments are being sought through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

A subsequent telegram from the Ambassador at London (No. 59 of January 2, 1945) states that the British Government has considered the French memorandum and, through its representative on the European Advisory Commission, approved the French proposals in principle, at the same time reserving its final position until it has had an opportunity to examine the draft amendments to the existing agreements which the French intend to present.

I think
I think that it would be useful if we could take the same position at an early date prior to detailed consideration with the War and Navy Departments of the specific French proposals when they are received.

Ambassador Winant states that so far M. Massigli has taken a helpful part in the discussions of the European Advisory Commission.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Participation in Control of Germany

You will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Ambassador Winant setting forth his view that this Government should act promptly on the French request for equal participation in the occupation and control of Germany.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 108 from London, January 4, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schoenle Date FEB 8 1972
Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT

LILCT 108, January 4, 5 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY

DUNIH

I hope that the Department is giving careful consideration to the French request for equal participation in the occupation and control of Germany (my 11575, December 30, 8 p.m.; my 59, January 2, 11 p.m.). As soon as the three Governments decided to admit France without reservation to full membership in the European Advisory Commission, ultimate French participation in German affairs on a footing of equality with the other three powers, it must be supposed, became only a question of time.

An early decision on principle on the French request will, I am sure, greatly facilitate the work of the Commission. It is gratifying to be able to report that the French have taken a constructive attitude.
attitude in the EAC. Massigli implied strongly that if the three Governments agree in principle to modify the agreements on the surrender instrument, on zones of occupation and on control machinery so as to include France, his Government does not (repeat not) plan to present amendments of substance to these basic documents. The United Kingdom Government has already expressed its approval in principle of the French request.

If our Government wishes to avoid being last to accede in principle to the French request, it is urgent for me to make some informal arrangement with Gousev to move together on this question. I think Gousev would agree, if so requested, to inform me of his Government's decision prior to informing the Commission, but I cannot ask him to unduly delay transmitting a formal decision of his Government unless there is strong expectation of early action in Washington. I should like to have your immediate reactions as to the desirability of some such informal arrangement for synchronizing American and Russian action in this matter.

WINANT

LBS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: De Gaulle Letter on French Rearmament

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram from Caffery quoting the text of a letter to you from General De Gaulle in regard to the supply of American equipment to the French Army. Caffery is sending the original of this letter to you by air mail.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 16 from Paris, January 2, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: De Gaulle - Caffery Conversation

The enclosed telegram from Caffery reports the highlights of a recent conversation which he had with General de Gaulle concerning French views on the treatment of Germany and other important matters.

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Copy of telegram no. 187 from Paris, January 13, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By J. Scheible Date  FEB 8 1972
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ( )

Secretary of State
Washington

187, January 13, 5 p.m.

One. General de Gaulle repeated to me last night what Bidault has told me on several occasions: that France is not interested in annexing German territory but hopes most firmly that an international organization in which France will play a very prominent part will be set up for governing the well known Rhine regions. (My 516, November 14, 7 p.m.). Within that region no semblance of war industry or near-war industry should be retained. Furthermore no war industry or near-war industry should be allowed to exist in the future in any part of German territory. He maintains also with Bidault that German industry as a whole should not be destroyed but only that part having to do with war should be destroyed. He remarked that what he was saying embodies in general lines his present thinking.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972
-2-. #187. January 13, 5 p.m., from Paris

thinking on the subject. However, the French technicians are still engaged on a study of the whole business.

Two. He observed that in his opinion Stalin will go ahead and do exactly as he pleases in and with Poland. He very much depreciates that situation but sees nothing at this juncture that he can do about it.

Three. He said that he was more optimistic than he had been a few days ago in regard to operations at the front. Things are going much better in the Ardennes and the situation in Alsace is less dangerous; although the Germans will probably move as quickly as they can some divisions from the Ardennes to Alsace.

Four. He expressed much pleasure in connection with the President's recent statement for furnishing additional arms to the French forces.

Five. He spoke again about France's dire need for supplies from the United States; about the ever critical shipping situation; about France's need for railway material (in connection with Rene Mayer's visit to the United States).

Six. I intimated
Six. I intimated to General de Gaulle as tactfully as I could that sometimes in the past his way of doing and saying things in the international field has made it difficult to accomplish the things he wanted to accomplish in that field.

Seven. He remarked that in his opinion the British are getting "a little tired", tired of fighting, tired of restrictions. "But" he added hastily, "I do not mean to imply there will be any relaxing of their war effort." As for Churchill he said he looked younger last week than on his recent state visit here.

Eight. "The French are tired too" he said, "France is passing through what is perhaps the most critical period of her history and she will rise again if she is given the opportunity to live, to fight and to work and all Frenchmen of goodwill do fight and work." I said: "Will she rise again?" He replied: "Yes, I am convinced that she will but if she does not and falls and the Communists take hold, the lights will really go out in Europe for a long, long time; but France will rise again."

CAFFERY

BB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 16, 1945

Subject: French Request to Participate in Big Three Meeting

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram just received from Caffery in which he reports a formal request presented by the French Foreign Minister to the Ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that the Provisional Government of France be invited to participate in the forthcoming Three-Power Meeting.

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 214 from Paris, January 16, 1945.
MH-1122
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (ELECTRONIC)

Paris
Dated January 16, 1945
Rec'd 12:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

NIACT 214, January 16, 9 a.m.
FOR THE SECRETARY
At Bidault's request Duff Cooper, Bogomolov and myself called upon him last evening. He delivered to each of us a note (dated January 13) to be transmitted to our governments expressing the desire of the Provisional Government to participate in the coming so-called three power conference. Following is substance of points made in note:

(1) - That military operations in the West are taking place on or in the immediate vicinity of French territory and that France is making an important and increasing contribution both with its armed forces and through the use of French transport and ports.

(2) - That
(2) - That recent military events necessitate a constantly increasing participation of France in the common war effort and a revision of the programs of production, supply and transport which are at present in effect. This revision cannot be advantageously undertaken without direct participating of the Provisional Government.

(3) - That decisions between the great Allied powers without the participation of France cannot be considered as binding the Provisional Government and consequently lose their value.

(4) - That the Provisional Government believes its participation in such conferences is necessary since they treat general problems of the war as well as the future peace in which the responsibility of France is engaged.

(5) - That the Provisional Government does not doubt that its point of view will be shared by the other Allied powers.

Text and translation being cabled in immediately following telegram.

CAFFERY

WSB
January 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
BRIG. GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

PLEASE READ THESE PAPERS ON
COLONEL DE WAVRIN AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Memorandum to the President, 12-15-44
from the Attorney General re De Wavrin
sent to the Sec. of State - copy to Gen.
Donovan, together with copy of attached
memorandum.
I have been informed recently that a Colonel Andre De Wavrin, who was known to the French Underground forces prior to the Allied invasion of Europe as Colonel Andre Passy, is now in the United States. Sources possessing professional experience in the intelligence field and which have proved reliable in the past inform me that Colonel De Wavrin is in the United States to organize and set in operation a secret intelligence organization on behalf of the French Government. While Colonel De Wavrin ostensibly is in this country to reestablish the offices of the French Military Attaches, which he asserts are not concerned with intelligence matters, the sources referred to remain convinced that his visit here as well as his intended tour in the immediate future throughout South and Central America has for its real purpose the organization of a secret foreign intelligence organization in this Hemisphere.

As either the open or secret operation of a foreign intelligence organization on the sovereign soil of the United States and within spheres vital to the protection of the United States cannot but be fraught with serious danger to the welfare and future safety of this country, I wanted to bring this development to your attention and to furnish you with available information about the background of the individual reported to be devoting himself to such a cause. In this connection I am sure you will agree it is obvious that Colonel De Wavrin's background is such as to lend weight and likelihood to the statements referred to relative to the nature of his real purpose in coming to the United States at this time. His background also would seem to direct particular attention to the probable character of the intelligence organization reportedly being planned by him.

It appears that DeGaulle appointed De Wavrin, then using the alias Colonel Andre Passy, Chief of the French Secret Police in 1940. De Wavrin was said immediately to have proceeded to form a Gestapo-like organization and was said to have included in it many former members of the Cagoule. You may recall that that organization has been responsible for a number of bombings and assassinations of its political enemies in North Africa; it was reported to be rabidly Rightist in character and sometimes more extreme in its activities than the most radical members of the French Communist Party. The above report was substantiated by an article appearing in the London paper, The Tribune, early in 1944. This article revealed Passy to be M. Wavrin, described as the former secretary to Eugene De Leoncle, a guiding figure of the Cagoule movement. The article stated this accusation had not been denied by the French Committee authorities. Also, according to an individual writing as a French Liberal Unionist said to be in close contact with French events, the alleged authoritarian tendency of DeGaulle's regime had remained strong to a large extent because of elements within it such as Colonel Passy. Several French spokesmen in England, including some who were among the first supporters of DeGaulle and who had had personal experience with Colonel Passy's organization, were reported by this individual to have stated Passy had assisted in "removing from action non-DeGaullist 'resisters'".
Indicative of the methods of operation utilized by De Wavrin in achieving his objectives, the New York Times for September 18, 1943, carried an article concerning a court action against Colonel Andre Passy and others filed by a wounded veteran of the Battle of France who had escaped to Britain in February, 1941, and who alleged he had been unjustifiably beaten and jailed. According to this article when interviewed by Colonel Passy and two of his assistants, who attempted to obtain from this veteran information to which they were not entitled and when the French veteran refused to answer questions, he was threatened with death and beaten with fists and a steel rod. The veteran further charged in this suit against Passy that he had been confined for ten days to a cellar about three yards long and two and one-half yards wide, without furniture or light and with little ventilation. It has been reported that prosecution was suspended on this indictment in the interest of military expediency and political unity until the end of the war.

An informant has related that following De Wavrin's appointment by DeGaulle to his position as Chief of the French Secret Police certain highly confidential information pertaining to combined British-French operations was revealed without authorization and thereafter two of De Wavrin's principal aides were seized by the British authorities and have been held in custody since. It was reported further that at the same time the British, aware of De Wavrin's Cagoulard background, informed DeGaulle that they had refrained from seizing De Wavrin only because of the scandal that would follow the arrest of "DeGaulle's foremost adviser".

Colonel De Wavrin, as Colonel Passy, is reported by reliable sources which include among others officials of the present French Government, to have become known as DeGaulle's Himmler and has been described as "a political hatchet man". Allegedly De Wavrin added to his unsavory reputation by his "handling of various political purges" within the DeGaulle regime. Particular reference is made by these informants to De Wavrin's active connection with the trial and execution of the accused pro-Hitler collaborationist, Marcel Pucheu, in North Africa last spring. Relative to this trial, there is considerable opinion to the effect that the French Committee of Liberation was not such a duly constituted Government as would have enabled it to exercise legitimately such functions of sovereignty as were implied by its assumption of the power to sentence and execute individuals who in fact were considered by many to have been guilty of not more than pro-Petain actions as distinguished from pro-German activities. It is well to remember that during the period in which Pucheu's activities were in issue that the Vichy Government of Unoccupied France was accorded full recognition by the United States.

Another Frenchman, Lieutenant Caree of the French Army, was tried and found guilty of collaborationist activities and sentenced largely through the active efforts of Colonel Passy's organization. Indicative of the probable nature of the trial accorded this Frenchman, it is worthy of note that at the same time De Wavrin's men were looking for Caree to carry out the sentence of this DeGaulist purge committee for his alleged pro-German activities, word was received that Lieutenant Caree had been killed in action fighting at the side of the Allies on the Salerno beachhead in Italy.
The Attorney General

Recent developments in De Wavrin's career have resulted in his appointment as Chief of the newly created Services of Research and Counterintelligence which it is understood will operate under General Juin of the French War Department. De Wavrin as head of the new organization will supervise the remnants of the replaced intelligence organization which was known as the French Special Services. These remnants consist of three branches: namely, the Secret Intelligence, the Counterintelligence, and a Technical Branch. In the immediate future, De Wavrin plans to open an office in New York City with a branch in New Orleans, Louisiana, purportedly for the sole purpose of screening requests of French citizens in the United States for permission to return to France. However, it is reported by an officer connected with the present French Military Mission that these offices will also serve as a cover for the operation of intelligence officers of De Wavrin's new intelligence organization. These operators will be administratively assigned to the French Military Mission but it is understood will report directly to De Wavrin's Services of Research and Counterintelligence in all other matters.

I believe it is incontestable that even under the best of circumstances and when dealing with the friendliest and most stable of allies that intelligence organizations of foreign powers must not be permitted to become established on American soil and should be discouraged wherever possible from taking root any place in this Hemisphere. It is obvious that this position is sound, particularly when dealing with an intelligence organization of the government of a country which is provisional in character and within which strange and ruthless forces are at work. It has always been the position of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that should any foreign government desire information concerning individuals or activities occurring within the United States that such information would be sought through the duly constituted law enforcement agencies of this Government. I therefore must reiterate my conviction that, especially in view of the known background of De Wavrin as set out above, every effort must be exerted to the end that he be prevented from effectuating the establishment of a secret French intelligence system in the United States. To that end, I have brought the above to your attention and I will appreciate being informed of your attitude concerning this problem and of any action you may find it possible to take in connection therewith.
January 18, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Request for Participation in Big Three Meeting

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram from Caffery setting forth the full text of the formal request of the French Provisional Government that it be permitted to participate in the forthcoming conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 215 from Paris, January 16, 1945.
Secretary of State,  
Washington.  

US URGENT  
215, January 16, noon  
Reference my telegram 214, January 16, 9 a.m.  

The Provisional Government of the French Republic has learned through public information of a proposed conference between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the purpose of determining precisely the conditions of their cooperation in the war.

In this connection the Provisional Government of the French Republic believes it should bring to the attention of the Government of the United States of America the following observations: The Military operations in the West are taking place at the present time on French territory or in the immediate neighborhood of its frontiers. France is making to the full extent of its present possibilities, an important and increasing contribution thereto, not only by its land, sea and air armed forces, but also by certain resources indispensable to the struggle, especially its means of
means of transport and its ports.

Moreover, it appears, in the light of recent military events, that the continuation of the struggle to victory necessitates a constantly increasing participation of France in the common war effort. This participation cannot be assured under satisfactory conditions without a revision of the program of production, supply and transport which are in effect at the present time between the Allies, a revision which cannot be advantageously undertaken without the direct participation of the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Moreover, it must be observed that the conferences held between the other great allied powers lead these to decide in advance, without the participation of France, the settlement of certain questions of a political or economic character which, however, interest France directly or indirectly, in which case the Provisional Government of the French Republic evidently could not consider itself bound by any of the decisions taken without it and, consequently, such decisions lose some of their value.

Independently of motives of high political and moral propriety, it therefore appears opportune to the Provisional Government of the French Republic to make it known that its participation in such conferences is, in its eyes, necessary in matters relating to problems concerning the general conduct
-3-#215, January 16, noon from Paris

conduct of the war, as well as those, the settlement of which concerns the future of peace—problems in which the responsibility of France is obviously engaged.

The Provisional Government of the French Republic cannot doubt that its point of view will be shared by the other great allied powers.

January 13, 1945.

CAFFERY

WSB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We are returning herewith the papers on Colonel de Wavrin, in accordance with your request, together with a similar set which had been forwarded to the Secretary of State. Colonel de Wavrin has now left the United States for France.

General Donovan, upon his return to this country, may request the opportunity of discussing this matter with you.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
BRIG. GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

PLEASE READ THESE PAPERS ON
COLONEL DE WAVRIN AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 16 1945

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Re: Colonel Andrew de Wavrin, alias Colonel Andre Passy

I am advised by Edgar Hoover, as you will see from the attached memorandum, that Colonel De Wavrin is now in this country, ostensibly to reestablish the offices of the French Military Attaches, but actually to set in operation a secret intelligence organization in the United States and in Latin America.

De Wavrin has been the head of the DeGaulle Secret Police since 1940. He was formerly closely associated with the Cagoule, one of the most ruthless Fascist organizations in France. He is supposed to have been mixed up with several acts of violence, including murder and is thought to be a dangerous and unscrupulous man.

It is said that the mounting criticism in France against DeWavrin caused DeGaulle to get him out of the way by sending him over here. I do not know who is responsible for bringing him over. In any event, I should think he should not have been brought to America and should now be got out.

I am calling this to your attention as you may wish to make further inquiries about him.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Encl. Attorney General
TO: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  DATE: Dec. 13, 1944
FROM:  John Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: COLONEL ANDRE DE WAVRIN, alias Colonel Andre Passy

I have been informed recently that a Colonel Andre de Wavrin, who was known to the French Underground forces prior to the Allied invasion of Europe as Colonel Andre Passy, is now in the United States. Sources possessing professional experience in the intelligence field and which have proved reliable in the past inform me that Colonel De Wavrin is in the United States to organize and set in operation a secret intelligence organization on behalf of the French Government. While Colonel De Wavrin ostensibly is in this country to reestablish the offices of the French Military Attaches, which he asserts are not concerned with intelligence matters, the sources referred to remain convinced that his visit here as well as his intended tour in the immediate future throughout South and Central America has for its real purpose the organization of a secret foreign intelligence organization in this Hemisphere.

As either the open or secret operation of a foreign intelligence organization on the sovereign soil of the United States and within spheres vital to the protection of the United States cannot but be fraught with serious danger to the welfare and future safety of this country, I wanted to bring this development to your attention and to furnish you with available information about the background of the individual reported to be devoting himself to such a cause. In this connection I am sure you will agree it is obvious that Colonel De Wavrin's background is such as to lend weight and likelihood to the statements referred to relative to the nature of his real purpose in coming to the United States at this time. His background also would seem to direct particular attention to the probable character of the intelligence organization reportedly being planned by him.

It appears that DeGaulle appointed De Wavrin, then using the alias Colonel Andre Passy, Chief of the French Secret Police in 1940. De Wavrin was said immediately to have proceeded to form a Gestapo-like organization and was said to have included in it many former members of the Casoule. You may recall that that organization has been responsible for a number of bombings and assassinations of its political enemies in North Africa; it was reported to be rabidly Rightist in character and sometimes more extreme in its activities than the most radical members of the French Communist Party. The above report was substantiated by an article appearing in the London paper, The Tribune, early in 1944. This article revealed Passy to be M. Wavrin, described as the former secretary to Eugene De Loncle, a guiding figure of the Casouard movement. The article states this accusation had not been denied by the French Committee authorities. Also, according to an individual writing as a French Liberal Unionist said to be in close contact with French events, the alleged authoritarian tendency of DeGaulle's regime had remained strong to a large extent because of elements within it such as Colonel Passy. Several French spokesmen in England, including some
who were among the first supporters of DeGaulle and who had had personal experience with Colonel Passy's organization, were reported by this individual to have stated Passy had assisted in "removing from action non-DeGaulleist 'resisters'."

Indicative of the methods of operation utilized by De Wavrin in achieving his objectives, the New York Times for September 18, 1943, carried an article concerning a court action against Colonel Andre Passy and others filed by a wounded veteran of the Battle of France who had escaped to Britain in February, 1941, and who alleged he had been unjustifiably beaten and jailed. According to this article when interviewed by Colonel Passy and two of his assistants, who attempted to obtain from this veteran information to which they were not entitled and when the French veteran refused to answer questions, he was threatened with death and beaten with fists and a steel rod. The veteran further charged in this suit against Passy that he had been confined for ten days to a cellar about three yards long and two and one-half yards wide, without furniture or light and with little ventilation. It has been reported that prosecution was suspended on this indictment in the interest of military expediency and political unity until the end of the war.

An informant has related that following De Wavrin's appointment by DeGaulle to his position as Chief of the French Secret Police certain highly confidential information pertaining to combined British-French operations was revealed without authorization and thereafter two of De Wavrin's principal aides were seized by the British authorities and have been held in custody since. It was reported further that at the same time the British, aware of De Wavrin's Cazoulard background, informed DeGaulle that they had refrained from seizing De Wavrin only because of the scandal that would follow the arrest of "DeGaulle's foremost adviser".

Colonel De Wavrin, as Colonel Passy, is reported by reliable sources which include among others officials of the present French Government, to have become known as DeGaulle's Himmler and has been described as a "political hatchet man". Allegedly De Wavrin added to his unsavory reputation by his "handling of various political purges" within the DeGaulle regime. Particular reference is made by these informants to De Wavrin's active connection with the trial and execution of the accused pro-Hitler collaborationist, Marcel Pucheu, in North Africa last spring. Relative to this trial, there is considerable opinion to the effect that the French Committee of Liberation was not such a duly constituted Government as would have enabled it to exercise legitimately such functions of sovereignty as were implied by its assumption of the power to sentence and execute individuals who in fact were considered by many to have been guilty of not more than pro-Petain actions as distinguished from Pro-German activities. It is well to remember that during the period in which Pucheu's activities were in issue that the Vichy Government of Unoccupied France was accorded full recognition by the United States.

Another Frenchman, Lieutenant Caree of the French Army, was tried and found guilty of collaborationist activities and sentenced largely through the active efforts of Colonel Passy's organization. Indicative of the probable nature of the trial accorded this Frenchman,
it is worthy of note that at the same time De Wavrin's men were looking for Caree to carry out the sentence of this DeGaulleist purge committee for his alleged pro-German activities, word was received that Lieutenant Caree had been killed in action fighting at the side of the Allies on the Salerno beachhead in Italy.

Recent developments in De Wavrin's career have resulted in his appointment as Chief of the newly created Services of Research and Counterintelligence which it is understood will operate under General Juin of the French War Department. De Wavrin as head of the new organization will supervise the remnants of the replaced intelligence organization which was known as the French Special Services. These remnants consist of three branches: namely, the Secret Intelligence, the Counterintelligence, and a Technical Branch. In the immediate future, De Wavrin plans to open an office in New York City with a branch in New Orleans, Louisiana, purportedly for the sole purpose of screening requests of French citizens in the United States for permission to return to France. However, it is reported by an officer connected with the present French Military Mission that these offices will also serve as a cover for the operation of intelligence officers of De Wavrin's new intelligence organization. These operators will be administratively assigned to the French Military Mission but it is understood will report directly to De Wavrin's Services of Research and Counterintelligence in all other matters.

I believe it is incontestable that even under the best of circumstances and when dealing with the friendliest and most stable of allies that intelligence organizations of foreign powers must not be permitted to become established on American soil and should be discouraged wherever possible from taking root any place in this Hemisphere. It is obvious that this position is sound, particularly when dealing with an intelligence organization of the government of a country which is provisional in character and within which strange and ruthless forces are at work. It has always been the position of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that should any foreign government desire information concerning individuals or activities occurring within the United States that such information would be sought through the duly constituted law enforcement agencies of this Government. I therefore must reiterate my conviction that, especially in view of the known background of De Wavrin as set out above, every effort must be exerted to the end that he be prevented from effectuating the establishment of a secret French intelligence system in the United States. To that end, I have brought the above to your attention and I will appreciate being informed of your attitude concerning this problem and of any action you may find it possible to take in connection therewith.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We are returning herewith the papers on Colonel de Wavrin, in accordance with your request, together with a similar set which had been forwarded to the Secretary of State. Colonel de Wavrin has now left the United States for France.

General Donovan, upon his return to this country, may request the opportunity of discussing this matter with you.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Attachments
1 February 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

In accordance with the President's request, we are returning the attached papers together with a memorandum which we would be pleased to have the President see.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Attachment
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.  

Dear Miss Tully:  

In accordance with the President's request, we are returning the attached papers together with a memorandum which we would be pleased to have the President see.  

Sincerely yours,  

Charles S. Chester  
Acting Director

PERSONAL &

Dear Mr. President:

I want to say again how much I appreciated seeing you at Algiers and what a real pleasure it was to hear about the Yalta Conference from you.

DeGaulle's failure to go to Algiers to see you has not redounded to his credit here. In fact, a great many people are criticizing him, - the first real criticism of him I have heard since I have been here. Bidault and the other good elements in his entourage do not hesitate to say how much they deprecate his failure to go. One indication of how much the French people are worried about it was shown in the fact that as soon as I got back here the press began playing up a story that you are to come here in the spring.

While perfectly willing to call deGaulle all the names in the devil's calendar, I would like to say that it is essential for us, with so many troops at the front, to have order maintained in France; on that, General Eisenhower and his extremely able Chief-of-Staff, General Bedell Smith, and I are in accord: we must not let lack of food and other things reach a point where the population might create difficulties for our lines of supply.

As far as I can make out, you enjoy Yalta conferences and the like: when I saw you last Sunday, you were certainly in good form.

With all good wishes,

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
PERSONAL & Secret.

Dear Mr. President:

According to the morning press, you said yesterday in Washington that you would go to London in the spring.

Adverting to our conversation as I left the luncheon table the other day, I still feel that it may well be a good idea for you to come here at the same time. However, I firmly believe that nothing should be said about that at this juncture. If you will permit me, I will take the liberty of giving you my advice on that later on, - and probably considerably later on, - whether or not it seems the right thing to do. In any event, the French should be kept guessing in the meantime.

Again with all good wishes,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House, D.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. SUMMERLIN:

TO DO THE NECESSARY.

F.D.R.

Telegram, 2-13-45, to the Secretary of State from Caffery, Paris, embodying message to the President from Felix Gouin, President of the Provisional Consultative Assembly, re the liberation of Manila.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Reference is made to the President's memorandum of March 1, 1945, transmitting to the Department for appropriate action a copy of a telegram from the American Embassy at Paris, in which is quoted a message to the American Armies in the Pacific from the French Provisional Consultative Assembly.

It appears that the necessary action has already been taken as a letter communicating the substance of the message in question was sent to the War Department on February 16, 1945, and a telegram quoting a message of thanks from General MacArthur to the French Provisional Consultative Assembly was sent to the American Embassy at Paris on February 27.

The telegram from the American Embassy at Paris and a copy of the Department's acknowledgment thereto are enclosed herewith.

Enclosures:


George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol
AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
PARIS.  
798

February 27  
3 p.m.

General MacArthur asks that following message be transmitted to Felix Gouin. (Your 665, February 13).

QUOTE All ranks under my command deeply appreciate your message and join me in respective thanks to the Provisional Consultative Assembly. I recall with so much pleasure and satisfaction my long service in closest association with French arms during the World War UNQUOTE.

GREW  
ACTING
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RECOMMENDED)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

665, February 13, 4 p.m.

The Embassy has received by mail a letter addressed to President Roosevelt from Felix Gouin President of the Provisional Consultative Assembly reading in translation as follows:

"Mr. President: I would be greatly obliged if you could transmit to the American armies in the Pacific the telegram which the Provisional Consultative Assembly addresses to them on the occasion of the liberation of Manila. Accept, et cetera."

The enclosed telegram reads as follows:

"On the occasion of the liberation of Manila the Consultative Assembly conveys to the American army of the Pacific their admiration for the brilliant victories which they have achieved and which are a prelude to the total liberation of the countries traitorously conquered by our common enemy Japan."

It would be appreciated if the Embassy could be informed promptly if this message is released to the press.

CAFFERY
Three more papers, last night and this morning, have reported President's remarks to French journalists on his personal relations with de Gaulle; ultra conservative MONDE; pro-government NOUVELLES; and non-political PARIS MONDIAL. NOUVELLES adds comments "all Frenchmen will rejoice to learn that relations between the two great statesman continue to be good." HERALD TRIBUNE reprints from New York edition an editorial praising presidents "statesmanlike gesture." FIGARO has prominent despatch from Jean Paul Sartre describing in enthusiastic detail Presidents reception of the French journalists.

CAFFERY

WFS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
1162, March 11, 1 p.m.

The President's remarks to the French journalists (see my 1129, March 10 and 1158, March 11) have had a very soothing effect on all circles here. They have been very well received indeed. I should like the President to know how helpful this has been.

CAFFERY

MJF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has signed
the letter to General de Gaulle sub-
mitted with your memorandum of March
twenty-first, and it is herewith re-
turned for forwarding to the General.

M. C. Latta
Executive Clerk
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to General de Gaulle.

I attach for your signature, if you approve, a proposed letter to General de Gaulle in answer to one which he sent to you on January 1 requesting the United States to undertake during 1945 the equipment of fifty French divisions. This reply is based upon a paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has had the approval of the State, War and Navy Departments.

Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Letter from General de Gaulle.
2. Proposed letter to General de Gaulle.
My dear General de Gaulle:

I have received your letter of January 1, 1945, in which you requested additional equipment for French forces. I appreciate your ardent desire to increase the contribution to our armed efforts to be made on the part of France.

The battlefield performance of French forces engaged in this titanic struggle has brought complete justification for our provision of arms and munitions to equip eight divisions during the critical months of 1943 when our industrial resources were so seriously taxed. On 29 December 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted in principle a program for the equipping of eight additional French divisions and certain essential service and supporting units. At the present time the United States, in spite of known shortages in many critical items, is making every effort to fulfill this program and to do so at the earliest practicable date.
Your request for equipment for divisions in addition to that needed for the above-mentioned sixteen divisions has been given the most careful, as well as sympathetic, consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

They have considered your request in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. They point out that the United States service and supporting units in the European Theater of Operations are strained to the maximum to maintain properly both the United States and French Armies that are now engaged and that before providing equipment for additional French divisions it will be necessary to equip French service and supporting units to maintain those divisions for which equipment has already been provided or approved in principle.

They also point out that requirements already placed upon the United States production, for the United States Army and the armies of our Allies, including the above-mentioned sixteen French divisions and supporting troops exceed the production capabilities of the United States.
Furthermore, they call attention to the fact that shipping availability for approved military operations and stated civilian requirements, as currently projected, indicates a continuing shipping deficit and that any further increase in military requirements for additional French rearmament would only serve further to aggravate this condition.

The United States Chiefs of Staff come to the conclusion, in which I concur, that in view of all the factors involved, it would be unwise to accept a further commitment for French rearmament at this time. In reaching this conclusion, the United States Chiefs of Staff, as do I, fully understand the natural desire of the French to participate to the greatest possible extent in operations against Germany and to make efficient use of all available French manpower.

I feel sure that, in the light of what has been stated above, you will appreciate the fact that attempts at French rearmament beyond the commitments which can
clearly be met by France and the United States would interfere with the prosecution of the war.

With the assurances of my highest regard,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
General Charles de Gaulle,
President of the Provisional
Government of the French Republic,
Paris, France.
PARIS, le 1er Janvier 1945

Monsieur le Président,

Les événements nous prouvent que nous ne battrons pas définitivement l'ALLEMAGNE sans engager des forces nouvelles; or la FRANCE, malgré la perte ou l'absence de trois millions d'hommes, est en mesure d'augmenter puissamment et rapidement ses forces militaires. J'ajoute qu'elle le désire ardemment.

Ici, nous remettons en route nos fabrications d'armement. Mais cela prend beaucoup de temps, car notre outillage a gravement souffert et surtout nous manquons de matières premières.

Vous nous avez déjà fourni, en AFRIQUE du NORD, l'armement et l'équipement de huit divisions. C'est un effort dont vous avez pu voir qu'il n'était pas perdu.

...
Vous venez maintenant d'accepter de nous envoyer l'armement et l'équipement de huit divisions nouvelles. Je vous en remercie vivement, mais je vous demande, dans notre intérêt commun, de hâter l'envoi de ce matériel que l'Armée Française est en mesure d'utiliser entièrement sur les champs de bataille d'ici à trois mois.

Si j'étais sûr que vous nous envoyiez ensuite d'autres matériels d'armement et d'équipement, et si je pouvais connaître à l'avance, même d'une manière approximative, les quantités, la nature et le rythme de ces envois, cela aiderait infiniment le Gouvernement Français à préparer ses plans de mobilisation.

Nous pourrions avoir, avant la fin de cette année, une cinquantaine de bonnes divisions françaises, à condition de pouvoir les armer et les équiper. Si vous vouliez bien me donner une réponse de principe favorable, tous les détails pourraient être réglés avec vos services techni-
ques par le Général JUIN, Chef d'Etat-Major Général de la Défense Nationale, que j'enverrais aussitôt à WASHINGTON.

Avec mes vœux profondément sincères pour cette année 1945 qui sera dure mais glorieuse pour nos deux pays, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mes sentiments d'amitié dévouée.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 27, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Visit of General de Gaulle to San Francisco Conference.

Ambassador Caffery reports that through the Minister of Finance, M. Pleven, he has learned that General de Gaulle is turning over in his mind the possibility of going to the San Francisco Conference. Mr. Caffery has asked for guidance, and I am enclosing a draft of a reply which will be sent to him, if you approve.

[Signature]

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft of proposed telegram to Paris.

"OK F.D.R."
You are authorized to speak to Pleven informally and confidentially along the following lines (Your 1443, March 26):

As far as we now know, no chief of state is planning to attend the conference at San Francisco for the purpose of taking part in its deliberations as the leader of his country's delegation. We assume that General de Gaulle would find it difficult to be absent from France for the full period of the conference and, consequently, that what he has in mind is a visit in his capacity of Provisional Chief of State either at the official opening of the conference or at some other suitable time. If he elects to make such a visit, he may count on a very cordial welcome.