

PSF

FRANCE: Wm. C. Bullitt

1940

PSF: Bullitt

[1940]



THE
JUPITER ISLAND
CLUB
HOBE SOUND, FLORIDA

file
personal

Dear Mr. President:

I can't thank you enough for having us over night at the White House. It was such fun and started the vacation with a lovely bang.

The weather here is marvelous but after fishing all day today (and not catching a thing) I've such a horrid sunburn that I run from people. It is so nice down

here with Daddy - I wish he
didn't have to go away
again.

I hope your cold is ever
so much better and that
you have finished your
Income tax things.

Thank you again.

Love,
Anne

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

CABLEGRAM

FROM

The White House

Washington

*File personal
sent in code
through State
Dept.*

*** 16-6481

January 27, 1940.

AMBASSADOR BULLITT
PARIS

DELIGHTED SEE ROSSOS. STILL EXPECT VACATION FEBRUARY FOURTEENTH
MARCH SECOND. SUGGEST YOU ARRIVE FOUR OR FIVE DAYS BEFORE THIS
OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER. KENNEDY PROBABLY NOT LEAVING HERE UNTIL
TWENTY FOURTH BUT SEE NO VALID REASON AGAINST YOUR COMING EARLIER

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

TELEGRAM

93WUD30Cable

The White House
Washington

Bullitt

y 4

PARIS January 30 1940

Marguerite LeHand

The White House

Please pat God fifth-eight times on his bald spot for me and
get him to issue that summons which has not yet arrived. Love.

Bill

1258pmd

PSF: Francey
Bullitt

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

AMBASSADOR BULLITT

The President asks me to send the enclosed list of nominations to you confidentially for comment. Will you please return it as soon as convenient?

M. A. LE H.

Enclosures:

Nominations (State Department)

List

Biographical sketches



THE
JUPITER ISLAND
CLUB
HOBE SOUND, FLORIDA

fill
personal

Personal

Bullitt

20 March 1940

Dear Mr President -

You should never read
thank you notes; but I am
very thankful to you for a
lot of things besides having Anne
and myself at the White House.
That was a joy to us both.
However, I want to thank you
more for that little radio
address which put the moral
case perfectly. And for the
private thing you said to me.
It meant much to me, and it
has changed in the happiest
way Anne's entire view of

the future. I did not realize until we were here together how lonely she felt, alone in America. And I am deeply grateful that she will not be.

If your cold doesn't improve, why not come down here? I can get you a house easily from almost any rich Republican. You won't I am almost sure — so that I shall see you Monday in Washington.

Thanks especially for just being yourself.

Yours affectionately

Bill.

Bullitt



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

y

April 1, 1940.

Personal.

Dear Mr. President:

I notice that Representative Hamilton Fish and Senator Reynolds have stated that they would like to have an inquiry into the outburst of German propaganda designed to prove that not Hitler, but Roosevelt, through his Ambassadors in Europe started the present war! As you know, for some time I have had arrangements made to return to Paris by the CLIPPER leaving the day after tomorrow. Under the circumstances, it may be desirable for me to delay my departure and appear before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, although I could add nothing to the denial that I have already issued.

Very sincerely yours,

William C. Bullitt
William C. Bullitt.

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

(TRANSLATION)

*PSF: France
Bullitt folder*

MINISTRY
OF WAR

FRENCH REPUBLIC

Paris, April 4, 1940.

OFFICE
OF THE MINISTER

My dear President:

I have just read the allegations of the Nazi Government on the subject of pretended declarations of Ambassador Bullitt.

No one can foresee to what limits German propaganda will carry its lies. Also I feel I should tell you that during the past two years when I was Prime Minister, Ambassador Bullitt always said to me that in case of a European conflict, France should make her decisions knowing that, according to the opinion of Ambassador Bullitt, the United States of America would not enter the war.

I have learned with keen regret that you have been suffering from a severe grippe. I hope that this letter will find you completely recovered and I address to you the assurances of my best regards.

(Signed) Edouard Daladier

PSF; France
Bullitt folder

Personal and
~~Confidential~~

Paris, April 12, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

Since my return to Paris, I haven't been asked a question by anyone about the German White Book. It fell completely flat here.

Daladier, however, did an extremely nice thing. I enclose a letter which he wrote personally with his own hand to you, dated April 4th and sent to the Embassy for forwarding.

In case you have difficulty with his handwriting, I enclose a typewritten copy which I have had made, and a translation in case you ever wish to publish it.

Daladier's idea was that the Germans might continue to attack you and me and that their attacks might be taken up during the campaign by the Republicans. He wished, therefore, to put a letter in your hands that you could publish at any moment you might see fit. I think his idea was a good one and it was certainly a gentlemanly and
generous

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

generous one.

If the Germans should make any further allegations and Senator Reynolds and Ham Fish or others should become annoying, the publication of Daladier's letter ought to smash the propaganda.

Good luck and every good wish.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

Enclosures:

- Original of Daladier's letter.
- French typewritten copy of Daladier's letter.
- English translation of Daladier's letter.

PSF: France
Bullitt

Personal and
Confidential.

Paris, April. 18, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

The war is so completely in the hands of the soldiers and so completely out of the hands of the diplomats that I have sent you few telegrams.

The German attack on Denmark and Norway; plus the fact that the harvest this year in Germany, Hungary, Rumania and Poland will be short; plus the concentration of 155 German divisions close to the French, Belgian, and Dutch frontiers; plus German actions which seem to indicate a menace to Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Hungary and Yugoslavia has convinced everyone here that Germany in the near future will launch new attacks. No one pretends to know where the first blow will fall but everyone expects action. The French General Staff expects an attack on the western front before the first of May. The Swiss remain confident that Germany will not attack Switzerland.

The belief is general that Mussolini is about to
make

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America.

make a move against either Yugoslavia or Greece. His complete approval of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway; plus further troop concentrations at Brindisi and in Albania; has made Reynaud, Daladier and the rest conclude that he will either seize Corfu or attempt to take the whole of Dalmatia.

I had hoped that the repercussions caused here by Welles' trip would have died down completely before my return; but Reynaud, Daladier, Chautemps, Blum and all the rest of the French politicians, to say nothing of all the diplomats here have insisted on talking about the trip. They have all said the same thing; to wit: that Welles "eulogized" Mussolini to everyone and in discussing Germany, produced the impression that Germany could not be beaten. Daladier used the word "eulogy"; Reynaud used the word "commendation"; Chautemps used the word "praises", etc. The meaning was the same.

Daladier said that the impression Welles produced was that you thought Germany was invincible and that France and England ought to try to get a peace of compromise which would leave Germany in control of Central and Eastern Europe by using the good offices of a great man -- Mussolini. Daladier was a bit shocked and sore; Chautemps went so far as to say that he was much too

intimate

intimate a friend of mine not to let me know that the visit had been exceedingly damaging both to your influence in France and to my influence, since the impression had been produced either that you were unaware of Mussolini's real character and intentions or that I was unaware of what was in your mind.

I replied in the same tone to everyone; that I was entirely certain that neither you nor Welles had had the slightest intention of using Welles' visit to persuade the French and British to stop fighting and leave the fate of Europe to Mussolini as arbiter. I added that I could not believe that Welles had praised Mussolini in any terms which would suggest that you thought Mussolini should be entrusted with the peace-making.

There are, of course, a lot of defeatists in this country, including Bonnet, who attempted to make great use of Sumner's praise of Mussolini, but their campaign was cut short by Mussolini's approval of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway.

The present fighting will soon wash out the memory of that visit. But for Heaven's sake, don't again let a Mussolini lemon be sold to you or anyone else.

I have been highly restrained in this report since
certain

certain of the remarks which have been made to me
have been violent in the extreme. Now let's forget
the matter for good.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

I received in Paris I got
your message. They were
and upon this
I am sure and sure convinced that Tony is just
the right man for this job at the present time, and
I am happy for a host of reasons that I shall be with
you in Washington. Thanks again.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House,

Bullitt

file
personal.
(not asked)

Personal and
~~Confidential.~~

Paris, April 18, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

The evening after my arrival in Paris I gave Tony and Margaret Biddle your message. They were, of course, deeply grateful. I impressed upon them that they should be sure not to say a word to anyone.

I am more and more convinced that Tony is just the right man for this job at the present time, and I am happy for a host of reasons that I shall be with you in Washington. Thanks again.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

Personal and
Confidential

Paris, April 28, 1940.

file →
Dear Mr. President:

A letter, ready to go forward to you tonight, predicting what would happen in Norway, has been overtaken by the event. There is no point in burdening you with a lot of words just to prove that I am a prophet. So I have burned up the letter, and instead will send you this line by the hand of Freeman Matthews, First Secretary of this Embassy, who will carry in the other hand five pates de foie gras.

In summary, the situation seems to be the following:

The Germans will be able to drive the Allies out of all positions in Norway except Narvik. Both Reynaud and Daladier are bitter about the manner in which the Norwegian affair has been handled. They both favored the idea; but insist that the British made no proper preparations and have handled and are handling the expedition with complete lack of intelligence, although with courage.

Reynaud

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

White House.

Reynaud is violent on the subject of lack of brains in the British Government and the British High Command. Daladier, who was not present at the meeting in England at which the Norwegian decision was taken, blames Reynaud as well as the British for not foreseeing the German riposte, and preparing adequately to meet it.

If the fighting in Norway should go as badly as Reynaud and Daladier expect, they believe that the neutrals of Central and Southern Europe will be so impressed by the superiority of the German Army that they will fall into the maw of Germany and Italy almost without resistance.

Both expect Mussolini to attack Yugoslavia. Reynaud is apparently opposed to making war on Italy, even though Italy should attempt to seize Dalmatia. Daladier, on the other hand, favors war in support of Yugoslavia.

Both Reynaud and Daladier expect defeat in Norway to produce most serious repercussions in France. Reynaud foresees his own fall and Daladier thinks that he as well as Reynaud will be completely discredited and that a defeatist government of Flandin, Laval and Bonnet will come in, with a program of peace at almost any price.

I think that is much too gloomy a view. The fighting spirit of the French people is untouched and one defeat will not damage it greatly. Moreover, defeat in Norway would, I think, merely awaken the English. It is incredible, but everyone coming to Paris from London tells me that the British have not yet realized that they are engaged in a life and death struggle.

In

In any event, the immediate prospects are unpleasant and it is clear that the United States has to be ready to meet the consequences of a defeat of France and England. You and I agree on what that would mean. I find myself thinking about the security of our communications through the Panama Canal. I remember a talk we had in 1932 about a Nicaraguan ditch.

The gloom at the top here — Herriot and Chautemps are as pessimistic as Reynaud and Daladier — is thick. I spend my time reminding people that the worst usually doesn't happen. But I am being careful to avoid expressing any opinions on what should or should not be done.

If by chance both Daladier and Reynaud should be discredited, it would be difficult to find an adequate replacement. The chief deficiency in France and England, as usual in most countries at most times, seems to be lack of really first-rate men at the top.

The only particularly cheerful news that I have to give you is that Offie is catching bigger and better brochet.

Love to you all.

Yours affectionately,



William C. Bullitt.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
Bullitt
4

May 3, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
TO DALADIER AND A LITTLE LINE
TO BULLITT TRANSMITTING IT.

F. D. R.

P.S. Please return enclosures.

*file
personal*

*PSF: France
Bullitt folder*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


May 4, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of May 3, I am enclosing herewith a suggested reply for you to send to Daladier and a covering letter addressed to Bill Bullitt.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Encs.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Bill:

I have been very much pleased with Daladier's letter of April 4. As you say, it was a very generous gesture on his part. I am enclosing my reply to him which I wish you would hand him and tell him personally how much I appreciated his thinking of writing.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Enc.

The Honorable
William C. Bullitt,
American Ambassador,
Paris.

My dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Bullitt has sent to me the letter which you were good enough to address to me on April 4. I have read your letter with much appreciation and I am grateful to you for your thought in sending it to me.

I hope that you have now fully recovered from the effects of your accident last winter.

I send you the assurances of my highest regard, and believe me

Yours very sincerely,

His Excellency
Monsieur Edouard Daladier,
Minister of War,
Paris.

(FRENCH COPY)

MINISTÈRE
DE LA GUERRE

cabinet
du Ministre

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

Paris, le 4 Avril 1940.

Mon cher Président,

Je viens de lire les allégations du gouvernement nazi au sujet de prétendues déclarations de l'Ambassadeur Bullitt.

Personne ne peut prévoir jusqu'à quelles limites la propagande allemande portera ses mensonges. Aussi je tiens à vous dire que pendant les deux dernières années où j'ai été Président du Conseil des Ministres de France, l'Ambassadeur Bullitt m'a toujours dit que, dans le cas d'un conflit européen, la France devait prendre ses décisions en sachant que, d'après l'opinion de l'Ambassadeur Bullitt, les États-Unis d'Amérique n'entreraient pas dans la guerre.

J'ai appris avec un très vif regret que vous avez souffert d'une forte grippe. J'espère que cette lettre vous trouvera tout à fait rétabli et je vous adresse l'assurance de mes meilleurs sentiments.

(Signé) Ed. Daladier.

(TRANSLATION)

MINISTRY
OF WAR

F R E N C H R E P U B L I C

OFFICE
OF THE MINISTER

Paris, April 4, 1940.

My dear President:

I have just read the allegations of the Nazi Government on the subject of pretended declarations of Ambassador Bullitt.

No one can foresee to what limits German propaganda will carry its lies. Also I feel I should tell you that during the past two years when I was Prime Minister, Ambassador Bullitt always said to me that in case of a European conflict, France should make her decisions knowing that, according to the opinion of Ambassador Bullitt, the United States of America would not enter the war.

I have learned with keen regret that you have been suffering from a severe grippe. I hope that this letter will find you completely recovered and I address to you the assurances of my best regards.

(Signed) Edouard Daladier

(TRANSLATION)

MINISTRY
OF WAR

FRENCH REPUBLIC

Paris, April 4, 1940.

OFFICE
OF THE MINISTER

My dear President:

I have just read the allegations of the Nazi Government on the subject of pretended declarations of Ambassador Bullitt.

No one can foresee to what limits German propaganda will carry its lies. Also I feel I should tell you that during the past two years when I was Prime Minister, Ambassador Bullitt always said to me that in case of a European conflict, France should make her decisions knowing that, according to the opinion of Ambassador Bullitt, the United States of America would not enter the war.

I have learned with keen regret that you have been suffering from a severe grippe. I hope that this letter will find you completely recovered and I address to you the assurances of my best regards.

(Signed) Edouard Daladier

MINISTÈRE
DE LA GUERRE

Cabinet
du Ministre

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

Paris, le 14 Avril 1940

Mon cher Président,

Je viens de lire les
allégations du gouvernement nazi
au sujet de prétendues déclarations
de l'ambassadeur Bullitt.

Personne ne peut prévoir
jusqu'à quelles limites la propagande
allemande portera ses mensonges.

Aussi je tiens à vous dire que
pendant les deux semaines écoulées

J'ai été Président du Conseil des
ministres de France, l'Ambassadeur
Bullitt n'a toujours dit que, dans
le cas d'un conflit européen, la France
deverait prendre les décisions ~~elles~~
sachant que, d'après l'opinion des
l'Ambassadeur Bullitt, les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique n'entreraient pas dans
la guerre.

J'ai appris avec un très vif
regret que vous avez souffert d'une
forte grippe. J'espère que cette

Puisse vous trouver tout à fait rétabli
et je vous adresse l'assurance de mes
meilleurs sentiments.

Ed. Delécluse

MINISTÈRE
DE
LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
ET DE LA GUERRE.

CABINET DU MINISTRE.

Son Excellence

M. Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt

Maison Blanche

Washington D. C.

Bullitt 4

PS
Have these
come in?




Paris, May 16, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the arrangement that you and I and Jim Farley made with Pan-American, I am sending an officer of our Army and an officer of our Navy to Lisbon today with certain papers which I am asking the Captain of the Clipper to carry personally to the White House for safe-keeping. Please have them put away in the most careful manner. I have asked the Captain to deliver these packages personally to Miss le Hand.

Yours very sincerely,


William C. Bullitt

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

PSF: Bullitt

May 22, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. SUMNER WELLES

Please let Bullitt know about these 25 old PM obsolete planes. It would be silly for France to buy them. The same thing applies to the P2X2-3's which are becoming obsolete. They only make 139 MPH without bombs.

F. D. R.

Report from DJC to Gen. Watson re Bullitt's despatch asking about 54 old PB Navy Bombers, considered obsolete by our Navy -- speed 225 MPH

*file
personal*
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

With regard to the attached telegram from Bullitt and with reference to our conversation of May 18, questions two and four mentioned in Bullitt's telegram have already been answered. After my talk with you on Saturday I sent word immediately to Mackenzie King and a telegram informing Bullitt of that fact has been sent to him. Our telegram sent to Bullitt relating to the question of destroyers was approved by you on May 17 and was sent out immediately thereafter.

With regard to questions one and three, I am not in a position to make any reply to Bullitt until you let me know what your wishes and decisions may be.

With regard to point five, it would be my own impression that it might be better for you to make no reply to this communication from the French Prime Minister and merely inform Bill Bullitt that you approve of the statements he made to Monsieur Paul Reynaud indicating the undesira-


The President,

The White House.

bility of the French Prime Minister making any communication in the sense proposed.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. K. H. H. H.' with a large, stylized initial 'A'.

Enc.
Telegram 759
from Paris.

HSM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone. (D)

Paris
Dated May 20, 1940
Rec'd 7:26 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

759, May 20, 10 a. m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Please give me answers at the earliest possible
moment on following questions in previous telegrams:
(One) 54 PB Navy bombers; (two) Mackenzie King--
reserve pilots to Canada; (three) 2,000 French 75's;
(four) destroyers; (five) Reynaud's communication which
was made orally to me instead of by written note.

BULLITT

RR

4
Bullitt

file
↓
Personal and
Confidential.

Paris, May 30, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

This may be the last letter that I shall have a chance to send you before communications are cut.

The morale both of the French Army and the civilian population is a vast credit to the human race; but there are four German soldiers to every one French, and there is no longer either a British or Belgian Army, and supplies of material on this side are already running low.

When the Germans strike on the Somme and Aisne, therefore, in spite of all the courage and character that will go into stopping them, the Germans may reach Paris very soon.

Everyone here believes -- and by everyone I mean
the

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

the hardboiled like Mandel as well as the softboiled like Herriot -- that the moment the French Government leaves Paris the Communists of the industrial suburbs will seize the city, and will be permitted to murder, loot and burn for several days before the Germans come in.

Since I am not persona grata either to the Communists or to the Nazis, I do not expect to have much influence with either regime which may be set up, but I shall do my best to save as many lives as possible and to keep the flag flying.

My guess is that, shortly after the first shock and disorder, a stern, cruel, but orderly German regime will be installed, which will in one way or another prevent me from having contact with anyone. Probably I shall have to transact all business through Bob Murphy, the Counselor of Embassy, who is a corker. Under those circumstances, I could certainly be of more practical use running that Department in Washington than here.

No American Ambassador in Paris has ever run away from anything, and that I think is the best tradition that we have in the American diplomatic service. But

if

if the calm of death descends on Paris, I should like to be in very active life trying to prepare the USA for Hitler's attack on the Americas which I consider absolutely certain.

If that silence of death descends for a couple of weeks, I think the wisest course would be for you simply to announce my appointment, and inform the German Government that you desired my return to the United States to be facilitated.

Since Italy -- unless you can throw fear into Mussolini now -- will be in the war, I should probably have to travel through Germany and the Baltic States to Finland, and take a boat from Petsamo to the United States. The Finns are, I understand, about to start a line by that route.

It is curious, but, if Italy should come into the war, there would be no other way to get home except via Siberia; and while I don't mind in the least facing German bombs, I should not like again to have to face those Siberian lice!

In case I should get blown up before I see you again, I want you to know that it has been marvelous to work for you and that I thank you from the bottom of my heart
for

- 4 -

for your friendship.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

Bullitt 4

Paris, June 1, 1940.


Dear Mr. President:

This letter will introduce to you Mr. René de Chambrun who needs no introduction. He has a clearer and more vivid idea of German tactics than anyone with whom I have talked. He has seen with his own eyes a series of the greatest German assaults.

I am certain that you will be interested in having an immediate talk with him and that you will wish to have him talk as soon as possible with the competent officials and officers of our War and Navy Departments.

With every good wish, I am,

Yours very sincerely,



William C. Bullitt.

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

PSF: France
Bullitt

Bullitt 4

Memo to Welles from FDR-June 1, 1940

Suggests reply to Bullitt's No 963, Paris,
May 31st, 9 A.M., re selling of some of
our destroyers--suggests that some of the
American Republics have destroyers that they
might be willing to sell.

See: Welles-Drawer 1-1940

ADD BOMBINGS, PARIS

THE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD BEEN DRINKING SHERRY WITH OTHER GUESTS WHEN THE AIR RAID BEGAN, INSPECTED THE DAMAGE, VISITED OTHER POINTS WHERE BOMBS FELL AND THEN RETURNED TO THE EMBASSY.

THE RAID WAS CARRIED OUT BY ABOUT 155 GERMAN BOMBING PLANES, INCLUDING BOMBERS THAT USED A NEW "SIREN BOMB" WHICH MADE A WEIRD WHISTLING NOISE.

6/3--R1030A

ADD BOMBINGS, PARIS

THE LUNCHEON GIVEN BY EYNAC AND INTERRUPTED BY THE CRASH OF A GERMAN BOMB THROUGH THE CEILING WAS RESUMED AT ANOTHER PLACE WHEN THE RAID ENDED. BULLITT DECLINED TO COMMENT.

THE AMBASSADOR AND OTHERS AT THE LUNCHEON WERE SHOWERED WITH FLYING GLASS AS EVERY WINDOW IN THE (HERE TWO WORDS CENSORED) WAS SHATTERED.

6/3--R1034A

ADD BOMBINGS, PARIS

THE BOMBERS, IN FIVE WAVES OF 25 EACH PLUS ONE WAVE OF 30 PLANES, WERE FORCED TO KEEP AT A HIGH ALTITUDE -- AROUND 30,000 FEET--AND IT PROVED IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO AIM BOMBS ACCURATELY AT MILITARY OBJECTIVES FROM THAT HEIGHT.

WHENEVER THE PLANES CAME LOWER THEY WERE ATTACKED BY FRENCH FIGHTERS. (HERE 12 WORDS CENSORED).

DESTRUCTION WAS REPORTED FROM 12 WIDELY SCATTERED PLACES AS A RESULT OF THE POOR AIM OF THE GERMANS.

6/3--R1035A

PARIS.--SIX WAVES OF GERMAN BOMBERS SWEEP OVER PARIS TODAY, DROPPING
A SCORE OF BOMBS ON THE OPEN WESTERN SECTION OF THE CITY AND NARROWLY
MISSING U. S. AMBASSADOR BULLITT.
6/3--RS1013A

PSF: France (Bullitt)

J. Bullitt

ADD BOMBINGS, PARIS
A BOMB FELL THROUGH THE CEILING OF A BUILDING WHERE MINISTER OF
AIR LAURENT EYNAC WAS GIVING A FORMAL LUNCHEON.
THE BOMB MISSED BULLITT, ONE OF THE GUESTS, BY LESS THAN 10 FEET,
IT WAS REPORTED. HE WAS NOT INJURED.
6/3--RS1021A

MISSING IN ACTION
A SCORING
6/3--RS1021A

ADD BOMBINGS, PARIS
BULLITT'S LIFE WAS SAVED BECAUSE THE BOMB THAT FELL WITHIN A FEW FEET
OF HIM FAILED TO EXPLODE.

6/3--R1028A

ADD A
AIR THE BOMB
IT WAS REPO
6/3--R1028A

ADD BOMBINGS, PARIS
HALF A MILLION SCHOOL CHILDREN WERE ENTERING CLASS-ROOMS AS THE FIRST
WAVE OF GERMAN BOMBERS ARRIVED. THE CHILDREN WERE HERDED TO
UNDERGROUND SHELTERS AND SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES.

6/3--R1101A

ADD BOMBINGS
IN A 7 JAN
WAVE OF GERM
UNDERGROUND
7-2-42

LONDON.--OFFICIAL DUTCH CIRCLES SAY THERE IS "NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER"
TO A HAMBURG RADIO REPORT THAT QUEEN WILHELMINA, A REFUGEE IN LONDON,
PLANS TO GO TO THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
"NO SUCH

LONDON.--OFFICIAL DUTCH CIRCLES SAY THERE IS "NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER"
TO A HAMBURG RADIO REPORT THAT QUEEN WILHELMINA, A REFUGEE IN LONDON,
PLANS TO GO TO THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
"NO SUCH PLAN HAS BEEN URGED UPON HER MAJESTY BY HER MILITARY OR
OTHER ADVISERS," IT IS SAID. "CONSEQUENTLY THERE HAS BEEN NO QUESTION
OF HER MAJESTY FIRST OPPOSING AND NOW RECONSIDERING HER DECISION,
AS THE GERMAN RADIO PUT IT. THE STORY, WHICH WAS SAID TO HAVE EMANATED
FROM PRIVATE, USUALLY WELL INFORMED SOURCES IN LONDON, IS A COMPLETE
INVENTION."

6/3--RS1029A 45E

PSF: Frances
Bullitt
4

Memo to Sec Morgenthau from FDR of June 4, 1940

Re: Despatch from Bullitt re request for
Thompson sub-machine guns

See: Morgenthau-Drawer 1-1940 (June 4, 1940 memo)

*file
president*

*3
4*

FROM: AMBASSADOR BULLITT Ø6184ØCR225 6 JUNE 194Ø
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA RESTRICTED CABLE

I THINK YOU WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT THIS MORNING
THE PISTOLS WHICH GEORGE WASHINGTON GAVE TO LA
FAYETTE WERE PRESENTED TO ME IN THANKS X THEY
WERE LEFT BY LAFAYETTE TO HIS AID DE CAMP JOLLAND X

TOR CODEROOM 21Ø5

DISTRIBUTION:
ACTION.....NAVAID

PSF: Francis
Bullitt
4

June 6, 1940.

Memo for Sec of State from FDR

Asking for report on enclosed dispatch from Ambassador Bullitt in re Italian Government transshipping to the German Gov an average of 175,000 tons of oil products permonth and asking, in view of Mussolini's announcement that he was about to make war on France and England, whether it would be possible for this Gov to call off all supplies to Italy of oil and petroleum products.

See:Hull folder-Drawer 1-1940

PSF: France
Bullitt

Paris, June 6, 1940.

file =>
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Mr. President:

I am glad you approved my Jeanne d'Arc speech. I shall make it Sunday, the Lord willing, and it will help.

The French troops have held again magnificently today, and only in the region of the lower Somme where the British collapsed have they had to retreat. Everyone is full of fighting spirit and hope.

While the French soldiers and civilians are displaying a courage and character beyond praise, strange things are still going on at the top. Paul Reynaud, who has great personal qualities, is completely dominated by his mistress, the Comtesse de Portes, who has the virtue of being sincerely fond of him.

The changes in the French Cabinet yesterday were dictated by her. She hates Daladier; therefore Daladier has disappeared in disgrace, and Baudoin, of whom she

is/

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

The White House,

Washington.

is fond, becomes Undersecretary of the Foreign Office. He is the official of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine who conducted, with invariable success and without a single loss, speculations against the franc on information received from various Ministers of Finance whose duty it was to support the franc with the money of the French taxpayer. Henry Morgenthau has full information with regard to this matter.

Bouthillier, whom the Comtesse de Portes has had appointed Minister of Finance, is a stupid functionary who will do anything that he is told to do. The day of his appointment Reynaud said to me, "He is intolerable", but the Comtesse de Portes said to me that night: "He is so fond of Paul!" That was decisive!

Incidentally, the Comtesse de Portes has compelled Reynaud not only to give diplomatic passports to her father, mother and children (M. and Mme. Rebuffel and Herve and Ann de Portes) but also to give them a Mission Speciale, which means that the French taxpayer pays their way, and at the request of the Prime Minister we have given them diplomatic visas.

This is, of course, dirty graft and, at this moment when every Frenchman is being asked to give his last drop of blood, a flagrant indecency.

I can conceive of no other diplomatic mission that
could/

could be entrusted to these people other than the removal of valuables from France illegally - probably valuables belonging to the Comtesse de Portes and Reynaud.

I see no reason why our customs officials should not examine their baggage and make a careful note for Henry Morgenthau of their contents.

Since Reynaud is as completely under the control of his Countess as the Duke of Windsor is under the control of his Duchess, I do not consider it inconceivable that after considerable resistance, Reynaud will be driven into making the most improper appointments from the shady groups that surround the Countess. I doubt, however, that even the Countess will be able to drive him into giving an important appointment to de la Grange, although she will undoubtedly ask for one because the Baroness de la Grange invites her for dinner, whereas no other lady does. Reynaud can't very well after what he said to me.

The people of France who are fighting with an absolute selflessness deserve better at this moment than to be ruled by a Prime Minister's mistress - not even a King's! In the end she will be shot. Meanwhile, she will rule the roost.

As I telegraphed you through the Navy, Reynaud

forbade/

forbade her to come in the room when he went to talk to you on the telephone; but she came right in and when he ordered her out of the room, refused to go. As I suggested, I think you should avoid such conversations in the future since the lady in question will repeat them all over town in exaggerated form.

Aside from his subservience to the Countess, Reynaud is doing good work, and indeed, it may not be at the moment a bad thing to have a number of smart crooks in public office. At least they are used to getting results even though they may be crooked results.

Needless to say, Offie enjoys the most intimate relations with the Comtesse de Portes, as with everyone else. She summons him for intimate conversations to her "love nest" almost daily; and he keeps her within reasonable bounds. I have less patience than he with lack of character so that more than ever, Offie is the power behind the throne. Indeed, he has almost become the power in front of the throne. A few days ago, the Comtesse de Portes said to him that if the American Embassy had any difficulty with any department of the French Government or the French Army, he had only to let her know and the matter would be settled to our satisfaction at once. He tried it once and it worked!

I am dictating the foregoing to Offie and he

objects/

objects to my sending it to you, but I am insisting on exercising the sole shred of authority that I still possess.

I trust that this sort of gossip will not seem to you unworthy of the tragic days through which we are passing. I thought that you would like to know that there is still some continuity in French life, and that the mistress of the ruler again directs the State as she has since time immemorial.

We had another air raid at five o'clock this morning, and I was delighted to find that I could sleep peaceably in my sumptuous wine cellar.

Good luck and love to you all.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

PSF: France
Bullitt

Personal and
Confidential.

Paris, June 7, 1940.

file →
Dear Mr. President:

I do not want you to conclude from a letter I wrote you this morning that Offie is indispensable in Paris. Tony Biddle will do just as well. In fact, the Comtesse de Portes already has had her eye on him and has done everything possible to introduce him and Margaret into the select circle which gathers nightly in her apartment.

Seriously, the job to be done here now consists in part in flattering the King's mistress. At that, I am rotten; so that I have no compunctions about saying that when Edison goes out on the twenty-fourth of June, I want to come in on the twenty-fifth. Something may arise here which may make it advisable for me to stay a bit longer, so that you had better phone me or give me some indication before making any announcement.

Tony is just as eager to get to work in Paris as

I

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

I am to get to work in the United States, and I can promise you with my customary modesty that from my experience here, I now know more about how to get ready for war than anyone except yourself.

I have just heard that the British have decided to send their pursuit planes to join in the battle now in progress. I assume that this is because you were as nasty on this subject as I was. I congratulate you.

As you will have learned from the telegrams, the Minister of Armament personally brought to me the secret plans, specifications and working drawings for the production of the French 47 millimeter anti-tank gun which is a wonder; and I received from him fifteen minutes ago the same documents for the production of the Saumur thirty-ton tank which has proved to be definitely superior in battle to the German tanks.

If there is anything that you want for either our army, navy, or air force, I will guarantee to get it at once and bring it home with me.

Love and good luck and may we drink a toast together on the Fourth of July.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

PSF: France (Bullitt)

June 11, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I suggest the following telegram to Bullitt which, if you O.K., should go out tonight. We may not be able to reach him tomorrow.

RUSH

American Embassy
Paris, France
For: Bullitt
From: The President
June 11 - 10 P.M.

It is strongly recommended that if all foreign chiefs of mission follow French Government to its temporary Capital, you should do likewise. Because it is impossible here to know last minute developments or the wishes of the French Government, I must rely on your discretion and assume you will make your decision in the best interests of the United States and of humanity.

As long as you are in communication with French Government you remain in full charge of relations between the two Governments. If in Paris or elsewhere you are out of access to French Government, Biddle will temporarily act as representative of United States.

No authority can be given to you to act as a representative of the French Government or local government but, again, being on the spot, you will, as a red-blooded American, do what you can to save human life.

We are doing everything possible in regard to your dispatches about Red Cross arrangements.

-2-

On behalf of the Government of the United States I salute you in this hour of crisis and personally you have my ever affectionate regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

file personal

FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT
IN THE LIGHT OF HIS TELEPHONE CONVER-
SATION WITH THE SECRETARY

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

\$

No Distribution

Washington,

June 9, 1940.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE) **RUSH**

FOR BULLITT FROM THE PRESIDENT

Your 1106, June 9, 7 p.m.

On the assumption that all or most of the foreign chiefs of Mission follow the French Government to its temporary capital, I have reached the conclusion that it would be preferable to alter the plans we had previously agreed upon, and have you do likewise. In the first place I doubt if the German military officials would cooperate with you in trying to ease the general situation. More important, however, I consider it highly desirable that you be in direct contact with the French Government in the event of certain contingencies arising. In order to forestall any possible criticism of a last minute change in your announced plans, you may inform the French Government that you are leaving Paris with the other Chiefs of Mission at my express request.

S:CH
EU:PM:HEA

Not sent
FHR

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

McC

GRAY

Paris

Dated June 9, 1940

Rec'd. 4:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1106, June 9, 7 p.m.

Hoppenot advises us that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is addressing letters to all missions advising them of the imminent departure of the Government from Paris. The letters are not yet signed and he could only say that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be based at Langeais in the Touraine. Departure of the competent officials is now under way. According to unconfirmed reports some of the German forces are approximately 25 miles from Paris.

BULLITT

CSB

Bullitt
4

Memo to Welles from FDR--June 14, 1940

Re enclosed dispatch from Amb Bowers of June 11, 1940 re request from Azana, the Spanish Premier and President who is ill in France and wants permission to cross in American ship with Mexico as destination. Reply from Welles of June 15, 1940 with copies of telegrams from Hull to Bowers and Bullitt re same subject.

See:Chile-Drawer 4-1940 (June 14, 1940 letter)

TELEGRAM

59WUD CABLE

file
The White House
Washington

WU Horta 721pm July 16 1940

LC Miss LeHand

The White House

Plane delayed Azores should arrive Thursday please inform
President and Anne.

Bullitt.

358pmd

PS F: France
Bullitt
Bullitt
4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
AMBASSADOR BULLITT

Will you let me have
your slant on the enclosed?

F. D. R.

List of nominations of
persons selected for promotion
in the Foreign Service sent in
by Under Secretary Welles.



File Personal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1940.

PERSONAL.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your instructions, I asked Offie to arrange an appointment with Mr. Welles at any time today that might be convenient to the Acting Secretary, in order that Tony Biddle's return to the United States might not be delayed.

Mr. Welles' secretary informed Offie that he had filled his book for this morning and that he would be too busy today to see me and that it would have to be put off until next week.

Since Tony asked me to request you to have him ordered home for consultation at once and explain to you that Margaret was far from well, I feel obliged to ask you to act without further delay. Incidentally, do you realize that Tony and Margaret have not been in the United States for two years and a half? As I said to you, it is indecent to keep them in Lisbon, especially since Margaret is ill.

Yours always,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.

Bullitt
4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
AMBASSADOR BULLITT
TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Letter of August 7, 1940
from Under Secretary Welles to
the President in re possibility
of promoting Douglas MacArthur.

Bulletin
f

Re:Contribution to Great Smoky Mt. Dedication Speech

See:Steve Early folder-Drawer 2-1940(Aug 26th memo)

PSF: France
Bullitt folder

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 14, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think this is fine.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think this is all right
but I want to know what you
think about it. Will you please
return the enclosures to me with
your reply?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think this is all right
but I want to know what you
think about it. Will you please
return the enclosures to me with
your reply?

F. D. R.

October 14, 1940.

Dear Bill:

Charges are still being made in some quarters that this government assured the Government of France that if France should become engaged in war in Europe, the United States would enter the war.

I think the time has come, once and for all, when we should reveal the falsity of such statements. I am, therefore, giving you a copy of a letter which I received from Prime Minister Daladier. This letter was written by the Prime Minister to me under the date of April 4, 1940. It is taken from the official records and should be accepted as indisputable proof of the fact that no such assurances were given the French by the Government of the United States.

I understand that you are to deliver an address in Chicago on Monday, October 21st and I hope that you will use this letter as part of the remarks you will make on that occasion.

Sincerely,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

ste/dj

Bullitt
4

Memo to FDR from General Watson 10/17/40

Re-message from Bill Bullitt that he has speech prepared for Chicago and wants to be sure of FDR's interpretation before he uses it.

See: Watson folder-Drawer 2-1940 for original memo