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FILE LOCATION

PSF: France: DeGaulle

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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It is a well-known fact in this country and elsewhere that General de Gaulle is a man with an exaggerated ego and believes that he is the male personification of Joan of Arc. But, nevertheless, it should be remembered that when he was in England the V for Victory movement started all over Europe and he was tied in with this particular movement as far as France was concerned. This was, as you undoubtedly remember, a very successful method of propaganda and to a large number of French people he is still the leading spirit of a New France and it has been impossible to separate him from the V for Victory movement owing to the physical means of getting this information to a large number of people with a minimum means of doing so. Frankly, I think it would be dangerous to attempt it now notwithstanding the type of man that he is.

The French Underground has now cut down to a much smaller number than previously and is composed today of experts in their various fields. They are, to all intents and purposes, the managerial end of a large mass movement or a distribution agency. From the information that I have received, they are extremely anxious to get a much larger supply of small arms, ammunition and hand grenades. They would presumably like to have larger equipment but realize the difficulty of transport.

Such material as may be sent should be waterproofed in every way as it has to be stored in various damp places and naturally would be useless if not kept in first class condition. As you probably know, a comparatively small supply has been sent up to date having been delivered by parachute from British airplanes. It was estimated that a little more than half only was recovered by this means of transportation owing to capture and seizure by the enemy. It is my belief that if some means of getting this material to the French Underground could
be effected, it would be a very satisfactory investment not only in morale but also in results at the proper time. It is quite obvious that a few machine guns in enemy hands cannot be contradicted by bare hands and knives. However, I am not advocating anything; simply passing along some information to you which I recently received.
Dear Admiral:

At the request of our friend Bob Murphy, I enclose his letter to me of May 11th and the attached copy of his mail despatch No. 512 of May 11, 1944, recounting his conversation with Madame Boisson. Boisson certainly does not seem to be getting very pleasant treatment.

Very sincerely,

H. Freeman Matthews

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,
The White House.

President might like to read
Please return to Adm Leahy

Enclosures.
May 11, 1944.

No. 512

Subject: Conversation with Madame Pierre BOISSON

SECRET

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that I received today the visit of Madame Pierre BOISSON, who called at her request. She came to describe the condition of her husband, M. Pierre Boisson, formerly Governor General, French West Africa, who is now under arrest and confined in the Villa Roussier, in the vicinity of Braria, Algeria. Braria is situated at a distance of about eight miles from the city of Algiers, where Madame Boisson is temporarily residing with an old friend, Madameisselle Kellerman, who has placed at her disposal a small room in a tiny apartment.

Madame Boisson said that she had no desire to burden either the American Government or myself with her troubles and anxiety regarding the future of her husband. Her situation, however, does call for our sympathy. She recalled that M. Boisson had ample occasion to leave the territory and could now be residing comfortably abroad if he had wished to follow the example of others who had done so. He, however, actuated by motives of patriotism and a strong conviction that her conduct throughout the many years he had administered French colonial territory is not only above reproach, but merits from his countryman gratitude and commendation rather than attack. Having insisted on remaining and taking no special measures to protect himself, he was, without warning, arrested by the French Garde Mobile. Eventually, through an officer of the Garde Mobile he obtained the benefit of counsel. His case is now being handled by Mr. Sansinetti, a Corsican attorney with offices at No. 9 Rue Henri Martin, Algiers. According to Madame Boisson, Mr. Sansinetti is a De Gaulle sympathizer, but she states that Sansinetti is convinced that Boisson is the victim of malicious and vindictive desire on the part of several individuals for personal vengeance.
Madame Boisson said she would not burden me with a recital of the petty acts of meanness to which her husband has been subjected since his detention, but she did mention that he is confined in a room without toilet facilities, and as he suffers from chronic dysentery incurred in the tropics, and as he is also a cripple (it will be recalled that he lost a leg and his hearing as a result of a shell explosion during the Battle of Verdun) she finds the treatment accorded to her husband heartless. Madame Boisson states that she is allowed to visit her husband two or three times weekly. As transportation is not provided she travels the eight miles by bicycle, carrying on the bicycle whatever provisions and medicinal supplies she is able to obtain. This, of course, is difficult as no special facilities have been accorded her.

Madame Boisson repeated that she had no complaint to make personally, although for a French woman from Lorraine, whose father had been killed by the Germans in action during the 1914-18 war, whose first husband was also killed by the Germans in that war, and whose present husband was terribly wounded in the Battle of Verdun, she could only describe her situation as tragic. She said that after all her husband and she had tried to do for their country through many years of colonial service, the patent injustice of the present accusation against him is unbearable.

Madame Boisson inquired whether our Government would permit Mr. Thomas Wasson, Foreign Service Officer, now detailed to the Department of State, former American Consul in Dakar, to make a statement incorporating whatever factual information he possessed regarding M. Boisson's attitude and conduct relating to the Allied war effort during the period of Mr. Wasson's incumbency at Dakar. I told Madame Boisson that I would be glad to forward her request informally to Washington.

I also took occasion to express to Madame Boisson my deep personal sympathy for the situation in which she and her husband find themselves and I propose to aid her informally in whatever manner I can, observing the official proprieties. I recommend that sympathetic consideration be given to Madame Boisson's request for a statement from Mr. Wasson which could be available for use eventually if M. Boisson is tried.

Madame Boisson stated that she has no doubt whatever of the intention of certain French individuals to liquidate her husband. According to her, if a trial is held, it will be a farce, as these individuals have no desire to see justice done, but are seeking personal vengeance. She has no faith that such proceedings will be delayed until France is liberated, because she states pressure for earlier action continues. However, there is no present indication of an early trial. Madame...
Madame Boisson also inquired whether the Department of State would authorize Governor Boisson to introduce into evidence a message sent to Boisson during his tenure in office which thanked him for his cooperation with the United States in putting French West Africa and all its resources back into the hostilities against Germany and his contribution to the war effort. Madame Boisson stated that the message was delivered to M. Boisson by Consul Flexer.

Respectfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy
American Ambassador.

In Triplicate to the Department.
To give to the Pres.
When + if de Gaulle
comes here.
KEM-713
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

IMPORTANT
1781, May 30, 3 p.m.

Press gives prominence this morning to NEW YORK TIMES Washington report alleged to State United States will not (repeat not) send delegate from Washington to participate in Anglo-French discussions during de Gaulle's London visit. Press also features Reuter's despatch asserting Allied military forces will not only have choice of dealing with non-committee anti-German elements following landing in France but will also decide which of local administrators and officials have been sufficiently anti-collaborationist to retain offices. Both dispatches have been received with widespread unfavorable criticism.

Michel Rouze, editor of ALGER REPUBLICA in. editorial this morning states: "the policy of the American State Department with regard to France has been for four years marked by lack of comprehension".

Present

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
Present state of Franco-Allied relations is by implication blamed on White House and State Department since recent British policy as well as Eisenhower messages to de Gaulle are warmly praised as indicating desire to reach full understanding with de Gaulle. Echo de Postro Phsalger quoting FRANCE AFRIQUE expresses surprise at information contained in TIMES despatch.

French sources this morning commenting orally on press stories said that if true they might conceivably prevent de Gaulle from making London visit particularly if United States would not be represented in talks. In the meanwhile, however, Callender in response to his urgent query was advised by his newspaper that their understanding was that Eisenhower would participate in military talks and that Winant would be available for non-military discussions. Callender said he was immediately making known this message to the French authorities.

It is also reported that Faltowsky and Bethovart will accompany de Gaulle to London in addition to Massigli, de Postro Phsalger and Latroquary.

Sent to the Department as 1781, repeated to London as 185.

CHAPIN

REP RB
GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT WHEN DeGAULLE COMES.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

The other day in the New York Times, a propos of General De Gaulle's pending visit to London, it was stated that he was going to conclude arrangements in London not only in respect of political and civil administration matters, but also in connection with (1) supplies for the French population, and (2) fiscal matters.

Arrangements for supply have long ago been worked out right here, and so have fiscal matters with the assistance of the Treasury and the regular civil affairs organizations.

The impression has been created that because of the lack of a combined directive to General Eisenhower, no planning has been done on these matters and it remains for the coming visit between General De Gaulle and Mr. Churchill to straighten them out. This impression is entirely false, for our plans for the supplying of the French as well as the other liberated populations of Western Europe for the military period have practically been completed. Food will be available in quantities which I am satisfied will well cover the needs, and other relief and rehabilitation supplies are in likewise good condition. As for fiscal matters, we many months ago cleared with the President the types of currency we were to use, and they are now on hand ready for use with rates of exchange agreed on.

My inclination would be to have someone issue a statement or release to this general effect, but before taking any steps in this direction, I would like to know whether there is any objection from the point of view of the White House to such a release, as it relates to French civil affairs.

Can you let me know (1) whether the President would approve the issuance of such a statement, and (2) if so, whether he has any ideas as to how it ought to be put out, (a) by him, (b) by the State Department, (c) by the War Department.

Of course any such statement would not make reference to General De Gaulle's visit and it need be only a very brief one.

John J. McCloy
Major General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
SECRETARY of State,
Washington.

US URGENT

Juno, June 8, 1944

At Massigli's request the British Charge and I called on him this afternoon. He appeared to be quite agitated and stated that the committee had had a special session this morning to consider General De Gaulle's cable with regard to the omission and use of Franc notes by the Allied command (in reading from a cable of De Gaulle's he let slip the expression used by the General 'counterfeit money').

The following is a close paraphrase of the identical note delivered to Holman and myself which was approved by the committee, text of which has been cabled to De Gaulle.

"Information has reached the provisional government of the French Republic with regard to the putting in circulation by the Allied High Command in the first liberated French territories of notes payable in francs.

The Government is astonished that the Allied Command should have taken this initiative which has never been undertaken.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
undertaken in the past by a friendly army. The practical exigency requiring the military command to dispose of currency in the course of operations is fully realized by the provisional government. Military authorities have always received immediately and without limit such funds as they have requested throughout the whole of French overseas territories. The same system could and should have been put into practice in French Metropolitan territories at the time when the latter are about to acquire their full sovereignty. Within the framework of the agreement, whose conclusion it has been seeking from the Allied Governments for some months, the Government stands ready to take the necessary dispositions.

Since the right of issuing currency has traditionally belonged to the national authority in France and to it alone, the provisional government cannot accord any legal value to the stamped paper (vignettes) which has been put into circulation without its consent. Accordingly it makes reservations as to the political, moral and financial consequences which may result from this action of which it has been apprised.

In this spirit it draws the most earnest attention of the Government of the United States to the grave consequences which
-3-, 1894, June 8, 8 p.m., from Algiers.

quences which must follow in France under existing circumstances the inevitable recognition of the fact that no agreement exists between the Allied Governments and the French authorities to which the French interior forces refer and upon which they depend."

Massigli stated that according to advices from London the British Foreign Office had at De Gaulle's request asked General Eisenhower not to issue any proclamation in Metropolitan France with regard to the acceptance of this currency and so far as he knew no proclamation had been issued. When asked specifically Massigli stated that the French authorities here did not intend to give any publicity to the matter, at least for the time being.

Saxon requests copy be furnished Treasury.

CHAPIN

EMB
On June 3 Senator Mallarme of Algiers was arrested and sent to the concentration camp at Bosquet. The official reason given was alleged activities by the Senator of an anti-Republican and anti-National character.

In October of 1943 Mallarme came out strongly against what he called the "de facto Algiers Government", and since then he has been critical of those ordinances of the French Committee which he thinks are absolutely contradictory to Republican institutions. The same stand has been adopted by most of the Radical Socialists of the Consultative Assembly and recently by the President of the Algiers General Council in a speech which reliable authority attributes at least partially to Mallarme's inspiration. Mallarme has substantial popularity in Algiers, where he is generally respected as a wise and honest elderly statesman.

It is understood that an order for the arrest of the editor of "Echo d'Alger", duroux, was issued simultaneously. This is the only paper in Algiers that has continued an attitude of relative independence toward the policies of the French Committee. Duroux has not been found and he apparently has gone into hiding.
The press of June 4 announces that Muscatelli, Prefect of Algiers, has been replaced by Perillier, Constantine's Prefect. No official explanation has been given, but both the public and the press assume Muscatelli was dismissed because of his failure or inability to control attacks against the French Committee that occurred in Algeria's General Council in May. Up to this time Muscatelli has been considered a good de Gaulist and he even had the distinction of being arrested after Darlan was assassinated.
10 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Bell of the Treasury advised me of the communications from the Prime Minister to you regarding the matter of the French currency. At the War Department we had already received communications from General Eisenhower on the same subject, and in order to get the general background I telephoned to Allied Headquarters and I think it may be interesting if I gave you the notes of my conversation.

I talked with General Holmes and with Colonel Bernstein. The latter is the Treasury official who was commissioned to deal with currency matters for the Army in connection with liberated areas. The conversation took place at about 4:00 p.m. today.

There had been many discussions with General de Gaulle and his mission over this matter. He was in a very arrogant and belligerent mood and it was quite apparent that the matter of the currency had been grasped by him and by his supporters in England as the touchstone of the whole political recognition issue. General de Gaulle had insisted that he only as head of the provisional government should issue the proclamation validating the currency and he refused to support the currency or General Eisenhower's proclamation unless
he did so as head of the provisional government. Every effort had been made to get him to support the currency save at the expense of treating him as the issuing authority; they had waited as long as they could before having General Eisenhower issue the proclamation himself in the hope that General de Gaulle would come along but it was finally necessary to post the proclamations independently of General de Gaulle, and it was done in the liberated areas today.

M. Alphand, who was acting as the financial man on de Gaulle's staff in London, was in conference today with Colonel Bernstein. He made three points:

1. Certain elements of the financial directive were objectionable to him. As they were relatively unimportant and as already we had agreed with Mendes-France, the Commissioner for Finance, when he was in Washington to eliminate them, they no longer constituted any problem and Alphand was advised that they were eliminated, and he seemed satisfied.

2. The matter of spending money for the American troops gave him concern. It was pointed out to him the work that had already been done, the series of orders that had already been issued, and the results we had already attained in getting down the available spending money of the troops. The steps taken are very extensive and in some theatres we have been able to get the available spending money down to 16% of the soldier's entire pay. Alphand seemed satisfied with these provisions.
3. The question of who should issue the currency was raised. His contention was that only the French Provisional Government could issue French currency. When it was pointed out that this involved the exercise of sovereignty, he agreed that this was so. He was told that we would be glad to have the Committee issue a statement supporting the currency but that we could not permit them to issue the currency and that if he took any steps to undermine the currency he would be impairing the operation. He then asked if we issued the currency could the French Committee have a representative to examine our account so that they could keep a record of how much was going into France. He was told that this would be acceptable. The same thing had been told to Mendes-France when he was here. He then asked what would be the eventual basis of settlement for the issuance of the currency and he was told that it was impossible to tell what the right basis for settlement would be as of this date but that it would presumably follow the same lines as the settlements in other countries. He seemed to be satisfied with this explanation. During the course of the conversation both officers emphasized the great "to-do" which the London newspapers and broadcasters were making of this point. They were centering upon the fiscal situation in order to press the political point, namely, the recognition of
the Committee. Both officers felt that a great deal of the newspaper account was inspired on the one hand by Algiers and on the other hand by elements in the British government, in the Cabinet and in Parliament, who were pressing very hard for full recognition. They pointed out that the Prime Minister was on a rather hot spot; that members of his Cabinet were very anxious to induce a recognition, and strong elements in Parliament were embarrassing him. Colonel Bernstein said that it was not too much to say that the emotionalism which had been turned on in this subject might result in a crisis in the government; that the comments on the fiscal situation could not be understood unless the intensity of the feeling on the political side was realized. He said that in this situation we could expect that there would be strong appeals from the Prime Minister for the recognition of the provisional government although the Prime Minister had been greatly irritated by de Gaulle's arrogance and recalcitrance.

Both Holmes and Bernstein felt certain that de Gaulle would not denounce the currency; that he would rather refuse to do anything until he had gotten all he could from his position. It was the intention of Allied Headquarters not to ask de Gaulle again to issue a statement supporting the currency, but to be prepared to discuss any fiscal matter with the representatives of the Committee if they brought the subject up.
As an indication of the obduracy of de Gaulle, Holmes referred to the refusal of de Gaulle to permit the French civil officers to accompany the troops ashore. It had been a cardinal point in our directives that the Army should use as many French officers as possible to assist in the administration of civil affairs even in the military zones. A large number had been trained, attached to the armies and were eager to go, but apparently because he had been refused recognition General de Gaulle refused to allow them to embark. He finally relented and allowed 20 to go but the balance he has held up.

J. A. Moulton.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 13, 1944

I enclose herewith a brief statement on France and de Gaulle from which you might extract a few points for use in your press conference this afternoon in case you so desire.
DRAFT STATEMENT.

One of the great battles of history has just begun -- the battle for the liberation of France. British, Canadian and American soldiers are giving their lives on French soil that France may be free.

At this crucial moment, when the battle has just been joined and has yet to reach its full fury, comes a report that General de Gaulle has refused to send into France the greater part of the French liaison officers who have been training to assist the Allied Expeditionary Forces in their task of administering the territory immediately behind the lines. There could hardly be a worse time for letting political bickering interfere with the struggle for the liberation of France.

Lest there be any possible misunderstanding I wish to emphasize again the two cardinal principles which Secretary Hull and I have repeatedly made clear as the essence of our policy toward France. The first is that, until France has been liberated, military considerations are paramount -- our relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander. The second is the inalienable right of the people of France, when liberated, freely to choose their own Government.

Subject to these principles, this Government has recognized the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. We have given it every possible aid and cooperation toward the winning of the war and the liberation of
France.

We have not permitted political strife in Algiers or elsewhere to interfere with the provision of the latest American arms to a formidable French force or the reconditioning of the French fleet. Nor have the gallant soldiers of France permitted it to impede the heroic fight which they have waged shoulder to shoulder with our own in North Africa and Italy.

Secretary Hull recently voiced this Government's hope to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order in France under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Commander and this Government's offer of cooperation and help in every practicable way. He then declared "our central and abiding purpose is to aid the French people, our oldest friends, in providing a democratic, competent and French administration of liberated French territory".

The people of France are facing the decisive days of the struggle for their liberation. The more completely all Frenchmen subordinate everything to the supreme need of their country the quicker that liberation will come.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

M. Hoppenot, representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in Washington, left at the Department this afternoon a message to the following effect:

"General de Gaulle has received in London, through Admiral Fenard, the message setting forth the dates which President Roosevelt suggests for a visit to Washington.

"The President of the 'Provisional Government of the Republic' conveys his thanks to President Roosevelt for this information. General de Gaulle upon leaving England must return to Algiers. After his arrival in North Africa, the General, who hopes very much that circumstances will permit his visit, will not fail to inform the President of the date, from among those which the President was good enough to indicate, upon which it will be possible for him to proceed to Washington."

Attachment:

Message left by
M. Hoppenot
June 16, 1944.
Left with Mr. Dunn June 16, 1944,
by M. Hoppenot.

14 juin 1944.

Le Général de Gaulle a reçu à Londres, par l'Amiral Penard, communication des dates que le Président Roosevelt propose pour un voyage à Washington.

Le Président du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République remercie le Président Roosevelt de ces précisions. En quittant l'Angleterre il doit retourner à Alger. Dès son arrivée en Afrique du Nord le Général de Gaulle, qui espère vivement que les circonstances lui permettront ce voyage, ne manquera pas de faire connaître au Président à quelle date, parmi celles que celui-ci a bien voulu indiquer, il lui serait possible de se rendre à Washington./.
KEM-634
Algiers
Dated June 18, 1944
Rec'd 10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2079, June 18, 5 p.m.

I talked with Duff-Cooper this morning of de Gaulle's visit, the highlights of which have undoubtedly been reported from London. (Reference my 2070, June 17, 7 p.m.). However, he states that in last conversation with de Gaulle, Eden had let it be known that if necessary he was prepared to accompany him on his proposed visit to United States in order to obtain a better hearing for such agreement on civil administration in metropolitan France as might result from Anglo-French conversations starting in London tomorrow. When conversations, which are to be based on Belgian agreement, have made sufficient progress appropriate French Commissioners will proceed from here to London to sign final act. It is not expected negotiations will take long.

Duff-Cooper stated de Gaulle indicated to him he preferred the July date for his projected Washington visit.

CHAPIN

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HASSETT:

Dear Bill:

The attached clipping is from THE EVENING STAR of today, Monday, June nineteenth. It is the fruit of missionaries and I think the President will be interested.

Please show it to him.

S. T. E.
File confidential

Dear Grace: I spoke to the President about this De Gaulle public plan. It has been revised today. The attached, therefore, is the latest version. He P. said he wanted to look at one.

S. G.
June 23, 1944

The Honorable
Stephen Early

Dear Steve:

Enclosed is the revised version of our proposal for a De Gaulle plan.

The President might be interested in the following report from Sherwood:

"According to authoritative belief, De Gaulle was considerably sobered when he returned to Algiers. The complexity and magnitude of the operation in Normandy, as he witnessed it, could not fail to impress him. In addition, the reception which the Normans accorded him, while friendly, was not exactly what Joan of Arc might have received."

As always,

E. D.

Elmer Davis

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

SECRET By J. Schonle Date: FEB 8 1972
Dear Mr. President:

The De Gaulle situation seems to us in this Office the most currently dangerous point in American foreign policy—dangerous because of the reactions at home as well as abroad. I most earnestly hope that you may find time to read the enclosed suggestions for dealing with it.

Very respectfully,

Elmer Davis
Director

Enclosure

P.S.—This has not been cleared with the State Department, but I believe fully in line with existing policy.
PROPAGANDA PLAN FOR FRANCE

There is something radically wrong with the presentation of our French policy to the American and French peoples, and indeed to the world. Americans are dying on French soil for the liberation of France; American arms have equipped the French armies; America has guaranteed that Frenchmen will choose their own government. Yet there never was a time when Frenchmen who have free access to news were as hostile to America as they are today; and there is danger that this sentiment existing outside of metropolitan France may spread inside of France, as rapidly as the country is liberated.

De Gaulle, who, whatever his gifts as a statesman, is certainly a propagandist of the first rank, has cleverly diverted attention from the issue of "De Gaulle versus democracy" by creating the artificial issue of "De Gaulle and France versus Roosevelt." So long as the issue is thus presented Frenchmen are likely to take only one side, whatever their suspicions of De Gaulle.

The issue is being presented that way in this country, too, with the President pictured as a stubborn man waging a feud against De Gaulle because of personal dislike; and the worst of it is that the most violent opponents of his policy are people who ought to be for us. The irreconcilably hostile section of the press serves only as a reinforcement to a large bloc of liberal opinion, both newspaper and individual, which might have been expected to line up in support of our insistence on the preservation of French democracy.

To enlighten those elements of opinion our government's position should be stated clearly and unmistakably; and this should be done now. If it is not done now De Gaulle may again seize the initiative and put us on the defensive—either by refusing to come to Washington, and giving out his own reasons to a press which on the first day would have only his side of the story; or else by coming here and feeding out his poison to a press of which part will be ignorantly misled, and part hostile and receptive. We should tell our side of the story first.

The President himself should speak out on some apt and immediate occasion, such as the fall of Cherbourg. (To wait till Bastille Day, or even July 4th, would give De Gaulle that much more time for unexpected moves, or at best for the continuance of a propaganda which would make anything the President might say later seem like a defensive answer.) Suggestions for such a speech (the job could not be done adequately at a press conference) are appended. Its high points should be the following:

1. Assurance, based on the Atlantic Charter and other declarations, that America seeks no territorial aggrandizement; and that accusations of American designs on French territory are malicious propaganda.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaubel Date FEB 8 1972
2. Praise for De Gaulle as the symbol and rallying point of French resistance which made possible the ultimate restoration (with Allied aid) of French democracy.

3. Reiteration of our determination that when France is free, the French people shall choose their own government; with anything that it may be possible to say about the steps leading to the elections, and the unfairness of recognizing a provisional government before the French people have a chance to declare their choice.

4. We shall have nothing to do with Vichy except to abolish it.

***

Following this speech we should undertake an active campaign to make our French policy clear to the public, day by day. Desirable steps would be the following:

1. The President's direction of March 15 to General Eisenhower should be released to the press—all of it if possible; if not, as much as possible.

2. Paragraph 26 of the SHAEF civil affairs manual, showing how far General Eisenhower went to meet the French viewpoint, should be given to the press.

3. Rumors that the United States government is in touch with Vichy elements and French industrialists in Spain should be knocked down—perhaps by a planted question at the press conference of the Secretary of State.

4. Whenever the De Gaullists fail to live up to previous commitments (as in the matters of the currency and the liaison officers) we should see that our side of the story gets to the public first.

5. Everything possible should be done to present, instead of the distorted picture now before the public, the President as a man exercising the greatest possible patience with General De Gaulle because of his service as a rallying point of resistance; nevertheless the President is determined to live up to his own promise that the French people shall choose their own government.

6. We should prepare a spectacular gesture to French democracy on July 14th.

If De Gaulle comes to Washington, a propaganda plan for his visit should be worked out by the White House, the State Department, the War Department, and the Office of War Information.

FULLER SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SPEECH MENTIONED ABOVE ARE ATTACHED.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED IN ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

Initial success in the war of liberation gives the President an opportunity to state to the world, with more assurance and more imminence of fulfillment than ever before, the position of this government with regard to the purposes of the war and the future of the liberated nations. Particularly it is appropriate for him to address the people of France at a time when at least some hundreds of thousands of them may safely hear his words without fear of dread punishment for listening.

The President then cites the Atlantic Charter and suitable passages from his own speeches or declarations, and those of Secretary Hull, as evidencing that our only ambition so far as France is concerned is to guarantee to the French people a free choice of their government and their leaders.

The President is deeply gratified that the time when these pledges can be kept is no longer in a dim and distant future, but may reasonably be described as imminent.

The President pays tribute to General DeGaulle as the very living symbol and rallying point for French resistance and France's definite and unshakable resolve never to allow the torch of liberty to be forever extinguished in her land. No one admires more than the President and the American people General DeGaulle's famous appeal four years ago for resistance to the German invaders, which certainly is one of the brave documents in the archives of man's long struggle to gain and to preserve liberty.

The President goes on to say that General DeGaulle already is held in similar high regard and esteem in his own country, and it may be that the French people have even greater honors to confer upon him. The President does not know, and it is not for him or for the American people to say.

All the President can do is to make sure that there is kept the pledge of this government and of himself, so widely backed by the American people, that in the right way and at the right time the French themselves shall make their own choice free of coercion and without anyone not selected by themselves having been put in any position which would unfairly weight the scales.

The President then cites appropriate parts of General Eisenhower's proclamation, reminds his hearers that almost the moment Allied soldiers had freed one small bit of France, placards were nailed up

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and leaflets were distributed guaranteeing the French protection and liberty. He then goes on as definitively as possible to explain the whole question of civil liberty, the implacable determination of the Allied nations to deal with none of the fascist elements in France, and their complete willingness to accept from General DeGaulle as much assistance as he and his Committee will give in establishing honest, liberal government with trusted patriots administering it at every level.

The President then defines, as explained in the foregoing and as definitively as he is at liberty to, the plans for a free election, and explains that it could not be free if this country were in advance to recognize a provisional government which the French people themselves have had no real opportunity to select and which has no constitutional continuity such as is possessed by certain governments in exile. He then explains that this is perfectly fair and friendly with regard to DeGaulle and with regard to any other possible aspirant to the headship of the new French government. He calls upon the French people to understand that every single step in this program is in their interest and in the interest of genuine freedom for them, and asks them not to be misled by those seeking to distort his words and acts and the motives of the American people.

The President urges the French people to treat such efforts to belie the position of the American nation with the same scorn they should mete out to those liars who are trying to make the French people and even some credulous Americans believe that this nation has imperialistic designs and that he, the President, is carrying on secret flirtations with fascist elements with a view to achieving such designs. He declares that the American people do not desire and would not take one single inch or one single ounce of the soil of France; that they offer only help and friendship in the war of liberation and ask only friendship and the help of a risen France in perpetuating world peace in return.