Grace:

You asked for copies of attached for the Map Room and the Secretary of the Treasury. (T-329)

Dot

Sent 6/30/44.
SECRET

June 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

Please transmit to General de Gaulle the following reply to his communication transmitted with your memorandum dated June 26, 1944:

The President is very pleased that General de Gaulle expresses a desire to visit America with the purpose of having conversations with the President on problems that are at this time of interest to France and the United States.

He hopes that such conversations may be of assistance in our common determination and in our joint effort to drive the Nazi invaders from the soil of France.

The President intends that there shall be no restrictions or limitations placed upon General de Gaulle during his visit to the United States.

The President has made no plans in regard to these conversations. He does not desire that any subject of discussion be excluded, or restricted as to scope. He wishes only that the limited time

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
available be utilized to further close cooperation in our essential war efforts.

The President will be pleased to see General de Gaulle between the 5th and 9th of July as suggested by the General, or at any other time between the 6th and 14th of July, which latter is the only period that he can make available in the near future.
U R G E N T

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1944.

Memorandum for the President.

I am transmitting herewith a copy and translation of a communication just received from General de Gaulle through M. Hoppenot, the representative of the French Committee of Liberation in Washington.

In transmitting this communication to the Department, M. Hoppenot said there was one further point on which General de Gaulle would desire information, but one which he did not wish to present in a formal communication. M. Hoppenot said that General de Gaulle would like to know whether there would be any restrictions or limitations upon his status during this short visit to the United States such as was announced with respect to General Giraud's visit last summer. You will recall that at that time it was your desire that the status of General Giraud during his visit here was to be considered entirely military and the press was informed that no discussions were to be entered into with General Giraud other than those relating to military subjects.
I should be very glad to transmit to General de Gaulle your decisions with respect to the questions raised in his memorandum and any information you wish me to convey to him with regard to the question of his status while here.

Enclosures.
Le Général de Gaulle, comme il l’a fait savoir au Président Roosevelt par l’Amiral Fenard qui lui portait sa réponse de principe à l’invitation qu’il lui avait transmise, serait heureux de se rendre à Washington pour s’entretenir avec le Président des problèmes intéressants en ce moment la France et les États-Unis.

Dans l’esprit du Général de Gaulle, ce voyage serait avant tout un hommage rendu par la France en guerre au Président Roosevelt ainsi qu’au peuple et aux armées américaines, qui subissent tant de sacrifices et déployent tant d’efforts dans leur contribution à la libération de l’Europe et de l’Asie.

Considérant l’atmosphère assez obscure qui pèse depuis quelque temps sur les relations officielles franco-américaines et l’état d’incertitude ou se trouvent à leur sujet les opinions publiques des deux pays, le Président du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française estime essentiel que le programme de son voyage soit attentivement étudié et fixé à l’avance. Il serait notamment heureux de savoir de quelles questions le Président à l’intention de l’entretien.

Le Général de Gaulle, pour sa part, n’exclut naturellement aucune question du cadre de ces entretiens. Tout en reconnaissant pleinement la valeur inappréciable du rôle actuel et futur des États-Unis dans la Libération et dans la reconstruction de la France, ainsi que dans l’organisation du monde de demain, il n’a cependant dans l’esprit aucune demande ou aucune recommandation spécifiques à présenter. La question notamment de la reconnaissance formelle du gouvernement provisoire de la République Française par le gouvernement des États-Unis, intéressera peu en elle-même le Général et il n’a pas l’intention de la soulever. L’harmonie générale des rapports franco-américains lui parait beaucoup plus importante et d’un intérêt plus urgent.

Des raisons d’obligations pressantes de gouvernement et de commandement d’une part, la nécessité de se trouver à Alger le jour de la Fête Nationale, d’autre part, font que la période du 6 au 14 juillet n’est pas celle qui conviendrait le mieux au Général de Gaulle pour sa visite. Par dévotion cependant pour le Président, qui a proposé ces dates, le Général de Gaulle, si le projet de voyage
se concrétise, envisagerait de passer aux États-Unis trois jours pleins, entre le 5 et le 9 juillet. Sa décision définitive cependant ne pourra être prise que lorsqu'il connaîtra exactement le programme de son séjour ainsi que le sujet et les modalités des entretiens que le Président des États-Unis se propose d'avoir avec lui.
General de Gaulle, as he has sent word to President Roosevelt through Admiral Penar to the President which he had received, will be happy to come to Washington for conversations with the President on problems at this time of interest to France and the United States.

It is the thought of General de Gaulle that this voyage will be for the purpose of rendering homage on the part of France at war to President Roosevelt, as well as to the American people and the American army, now undergoing so many sacrifices and exerting such great efforts in contributing to the liberation of Europe and Asia.

Considering the rather obscure atmosphere which for some time has surrounded official Franco-American relations, and the state of uncertainty of the public opinion of these two countries with regard to their relations, the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic considers it essential that the program of his voyage be carefully studied and fixed in advance. He would be particularly happy to know the subjects which the President intends to bring up in these conversations.

General de Gaulle for his part naturally does not exclude any question whatsoever from the framework of these conversations. While fully recognizing the inestimable value of the present and future role of the United States in the liberation and in the reconstruction of France, as well as in the organization of the world of tomorrow, he has not, however, in his thought any specific request or any recommendation to present. In particular, the question of formal recognition of the Provisional Government of the French Republic by the Government of the United States has little interest in itself for the General and he has no intention of raising that question. The general harmony of Franco-American relations appear to him much more important and of more urgent interest.

Because of pressing duties of government and of command on the one hand, and the necessity of being in Algiers the day of the National Holiday on the other hand, do not make the period from the 6th to the 14th of July the most convenient for the visit of General de Gaulle. In deference, however, to the President who has suggested these dates, General de Gaulle, if the projected voyage comes about, would count on passing three full days in the United States between the 5th and 9th of July. His definitive decision cannot be made, however, until he knows the exact program for his visit, as well as the subjects and procedure of the conversations which the President of the United States proposes to have with him.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter and the editorial have been read with interest and are now being returned to you in accordance with your request.

C.I.H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUN 19 1944
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
June 15, 1944.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Franklin:

Enclosed is an excellent editorial from the Shreveport "Times" of June 12, '44, about that cussed De Gaulle.

Yours ever,

James W. Gerard

JWG:MT
This Odd De Gaulle

Gen. Charles De Gaulle, head of the French Committee of National Liberation, seems to be peculiarly unsuited for leadership of the coming government of freed France.

This thought is inspired by his statement in London Saturday that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's proclamations to the French people on D-Day foreshadow a sort of taking-over of power in France by the Allied military command—a situation which De Gaulle says flatly "is not acceptable to us."

The truth is that De Gaulle is nothing more nor less than a figurehead created by the Allied military command. He came away from defeated France possessing nothing. All the arms and supplies the Free French forces have used in fighting the common enemy have been supplied by the Allies. And no doubt if the truth were known it would show that only a relatively small number of Frenchmen are as yet serving on the Allied side, in all theatres of war.

So it is silly for De Gaulle to say, as he did in London Saturday, that France is "waging war like her Allies in full sovereignty" and that she intends "tomorrow to make the peace also in full sovereignty."

That leaves no room for misunderstanding. De Gaulle considers himself and his committee the sovereign power in France. This is purely a case of self-appointment, so far as the wishes of the people of France are concerned. And De Gaulle can be sure that no matter what pretty words he hears from statesmen in London or elsewhere, on the showdown the Allies will see to it that the people of France, not De Gaulle, decide the sovereignty of future France.

The Allies do not intend to dictate to France, except during the period of military emergency. But at the same time, once having freed France of invading hordes, the Allies will not pull up stakes and leave France to whatever fate De Gaulle or some other person hungry for power may mete out to her.

If De Gaulle is arrogant and demanding now, what will he be when the danger is over, and France is restored? If he casts reflection on the Allied military chief now, at the moment when all of General Eisenhower's attention is concentrated on the task of driving the foe out of France, what is he, De Gaulle, apt to do when the victory is won?

There is such a thing as gratitude. De Gaulle obviously is not aware of it.
MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL MARSHALL

July 4, 1944

It is requested that in case any military matters are brought up by General de Gaulle or arise in your conversations with him, each case be referred to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. However, in order that you may be informed as to the situation and as to our views, there follows a brief statement regarding the present status or the present policy in these matters.

1. **French Commander for ANVIL**: De Gaulle has stated that he has two commanders capable of commanding French forces in ANVIL. It is presumed that he refers to General Juin and General De Tassigny. Because of Juin's outstanding record in Italy and his excellent relations with U. S. and British commanders, he is believed to be the most logical commander for a French force operating in conjunction with U. S. forces.

2. **Rearmament Program**: The presently approved French Rearmament Program consists of 6 Infantry Divisions and 4 Armored Divisions (of which equipment for 1 Armored Division has been indefinitely deferred) and 245 miscellaneous supporting units to be equipped from U. S. resources. Except for a few items, all equipment for units in this program will have been shipped by 3 August 1944. The United States is also furnishing equipment for a French Air Force consisting...
of 18 combat squadrons and 37 service units totalling approximately 30,000 men and have also agreed to participate with the British in a program to furnish light equipment for 140,000 Frenchmen liberated as a result of operations in Europe. The United States has also made arrangements to furnish, through lend-lease channels, certain construction and maintenance supplies for French forces not included in the Rearmament Program totalling 263,000 men. It is possible that De Gaulle may take up the matter of issue of clothing to French troops not included in the Rearmament Program.

We have made provision for supplying and maintaining French forces included in the Rearmament Program on a basis comparable to that of U. S. forces, but requests for clothing for other French forces must be handled through normal military lend-lease channels as provision for these additional requirements has not been made in the Army Supply Program.

3. Replacements: General Devers has reported that French forces have replacements for only two months' fighting after landing in France and that the French are incapable of operating without U. S. help due to lack of certain combat and service troops. The United States is making available the necessary supporting units for operation ANVIL, but the War Department expects the French Committee to make immediate arrangements to provide their own service and supporting units thereafter.
4. Additional Units: General De Gaulle may press for an increase in the number of units to be equipped from U.S. sources. Discussions have taken place with the French on a military level regarding certain specific additions and deletions of a few units now in the Rearmament Program. It is the War Department policy that except for minor readjustments from time to time to permit the utilization of trained French personnel, no additional U.S. military assistance and equipment should be promised the French beyond that now contemplated.

5. Transportation of French Units in event of German withdrawal or capitulation: De Gaulle may ask for the immediate transportation of the bulk of French forces to France in the event of German withdrawal or capitulation. Present plans envisage the movement of French forces to France as rapidly as transportation facilities will permit, but no definite commitment can be made at this time due to the present shipping situation.

6. The Clark-Darlan Agreement: Discussions are taking place on the military level regarding the revision of this agreement, the only major point of difference being the Allied assertion of their right to control and command certain essential military installations in North Africa. The French insist on recognition of their authority over these installations.

General Devers has reported that discussions are now being
carried on between General Wilson and the French Committee regarding this matter.

7. **Proposed agreement for the employment of French forces:** Presently under consideration by the C.C.S. is a proposed agreement originally submitted by the French for the employment of French forces under the C.C.S. The principal point at issue is the level on which the agreement is to be negotiated, the British Chiefs agreeing with the FCHNL that it should be negotiated as between governments and the U.S. Chiefs insisting that it should be negotiated on a military level. The French are unwilling to deal with General Wilson on this question and are insistent in their demands that the matter be resolved on a governmental level. De Gaulle contends that use of French forces in future operations is conditional upon resolution of the proposed agreement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff insist that the method of employment of French troops (as is the case with other Allied forces, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Polish) is a responsibility of the Supreme Commander in the area in which they are employed in agreement with the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

XXX This seems to be particularly important
MEMORANDUM

At some time during the conversations with General de Gaulle it would seem desirable, from the point of view of clarifying some misunderstandings and for the record, to bring up the following subjects:

We hear persistent stories from Algiers that the United States has some sort of a tie-up with Marshal Petain and Vichy.

One of the rumors is that the United States favors the constitution of a Chautemps government under the auspices of Petain of which M. Fabry would be a member.

You may be assured that the United States Government has no agreement of any kind with Petain or the Vichy Government, that the United States has no secret agreements with anybody in regard to France and no ulterior aims.

The United States does not favor any particular government for France to be formed by Chautemps or any other person.

The United States Government is of the definite opinion that a democratic form of Government would be best for France and hopes, that when the Nazi invaders are driven from France in defeat, the French people will choose for themselves without any foreign assistance or influence
a government which in their opinion is best suited to their needs.

It is my desire, and I believe it to be the almost unanimous desire of the American people, that immediately following the liberation of France by a defeat of the Nazis, American troops and American officials involved in the liberation effort be returned to America at the earliest possible date, leaving to France complete liberty of action to organize its government and to start without foreign assistance a rapid march toward its previous position of influence in the civilized world.

De Gaulle may bring up rumors that the U.S. contemplates setting aside bases of operations in French Colonial possessions. This is a difficult question and the only immediately apparent reply is:

The establishment of United Nations' bases for the prevention of future international wars is a matter that must be agreed to by the Allied Nations after our present enemies are forced to surrender and not before that time.

De Gaulle will probably bring up for discussion the future of Indo-China.

A satisfactory reply would be that Indo-China, now occupied by Japan, is beyond our area of interest and that its future status, having no bearing on either the safety
or welfare of America, should probably be settled by negotiation by France with the Allied Nations who might be interested.

De Gaulle will probably ask for a statement of American policy in regard to providing France with additional arms, equipment, etc., under Lend-Lease.

A suggested reply is:

Under the Lend-Lease Act of Congress, the President has authority to sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, or lend, any "defense article" to any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

This authority has been interpreted to warrant the provision of arms and equipment to those French Naval and Military Forces that were preparing for actual operations against the enemy or were engaged in such actual operations against the enemy.

It is my intention to continue the provision of arms and equipment, so far as is permitted by the availability of such material, to the French Army and Navy who are actually operating against the Nazis.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a statement of the result and future potential of the joint effort of the British SOE and American OSS in arming and supplying French Resistance Groups.

William J. Donovan
Director
PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF FRENCH RESISTANCE

I. PERFORMANCE

The achievements of French resistance since D-Day have far exceeded expectations. SHAeF, 21 Army Group and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London have credited French resistance for much of the delay in the build up of German forces in Normandy.

Rail Communications

868 D-Day rail cuts were planned. As of about D plus 10, 314 of these had been reported "successfully attacked" and 211 as "being attacked" but results not yet known. Fresh cuts are being effected as soon as the original ones have been prepared. All principal North-South lines with the exception of the most westerly rails, Bordeaux-Nantes, Bordeaux-Saumur, have been cut at numerous points. The important rail link with Italy through Modane appears to be completely controlled by resistance forces. Numerous attacks on rail tracks in the areas of spina, Nancy, Metz and Thionville have cut the three main lines from Strasbourg to Paris. Resistance groups report that as of 15 June all rail traffic in South Brittany had ceased except for the single track line from Nantes to Rennes and that temporary cuts were effected on the Brest-Rennes line. Seventy rail cutting s were effected within a radius of 30 kms of Lyons in one night. By
8 June all movements of transport in the Rhone valley had been brought to a standstill. By 13 June all main railway lines in the Lot Department had been cut and all traffic on the Paris-Toulon and Paris-Bordeaux lines had been stopped. Concrete evidence of the effectiveness of resistance activity is provided by the SS Panzer Division which was first reported to be moving from the Toulouse area on 8 June. As of 18 June, elements of this Division were still tied down in the Brive area. The "Das Reich" Panzer Division was reported by air reconnaissance and also by secret sources to be trying to move from the Montauban area on D plus 1. On D plus 10 it had not yet been identified in action and reports show that a large number of their heavy tanks had been left behind at Montauban through lack of rail facilities to move them north.

**Telecommunications**

Bordeaux, Dole and Orleans were completely cut off. All long distance telephone lines from Paris, except Paris-Vichy, had been cut by 7 June. The lines between Caen-Rouen, Rouen-Amiens, St. Lo-Avranches-Miniac, all of which were close to the battle area, were successfully cut.

**Roads**

Roads have been sabotaged in many places and ambushes carried out against troops on the move, staff cars, dispatch riders, etc. Over a thousand bazookas have been placed in the hands of resistance elements in north-east France and are being effectively used in knocking out tanks and other enemy vehicles.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA, 1107622
letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973
Diversion of Enemy Forces

In the north and east of France resistance has remained clandestine - small groups executing sabotage missions against selected targets. In the central, south and west of France, guerilla activities flared out openly, resulting in bitter fighting between German and Patriot forces, tying down substantial German forces and giving resistance forces control of fairly large areas. The departments of Dordogne, Correze, Vienne, Ardeche, Indre, Ain, Jura and parts of Gers, Drome, Savoie, Haute Savoie and Saone et Loire are in a state of general insurrection. Throughout these areas there are recurring engagements between resistance forces and German regiments and divisions.

II. POTENTIAL

Performance and development of resistance since D-Day has resulted in serious consideration of expanding resistance activity into what might be described as an "interior" or "4th" front. In line with this thinking, the Supreme Commander has already approved assignment of a large formation of bombers with fighter escorts to make a day-light delivery of supplies to resistance forces in southern France.

Growth of Resistance Forces Since D-Day

Since D-Day, resistance has crystallised in a number of areas into large groups openly resisting the enemy. These groups have mostly formed round previously existing Maquis groups and the people who have flocked to them consist not only of active members
of resistance groups but also of many townspeople, who are seeking to avoid being rounded-up by the Germans.

A remarkable feature has been the development in Brittany, where before D-Day it had not been possible for either the Independent French Section or the Allied French Section to build up a strong and reliable organization. Parties of S.A.S. troops have been sent to this area, accompanied by Jedburghs and a new Delegue Militaire for the French. Some 3,000 members of resistance have been found in the eastern half of Brittany and a further 3,000 in the area of Finistère. A large number of stores operations have been sent to these people and they now constitute a considerable force which, on a short-term policy, may be of great importance to the battle. Two Jedburghs were also sent to the Indre, where, in conjunction with S.A.S. troops, another centre of resistance is being organized.

Security

German counter measures to resistance before, on and immediately after D-Day were much less vigorous than had been expected. Wireless communication has been maintained with all parts of France and very few casualties have been suffered among W/T operators. The amount of W/T traffic in France is approximately the same as before D-Day. Resistance organizations are active in areas much closer to the line of battle than was thought possible before operations began.
Strategic Use of Resistance Forces

Thus far resistance has been effectively used to harry and disrupt the enemy's communications. It is now considered feasibly to build up and expand resistance forces to the point where they can keep the enemy fighting, not only along orthodox lines against invasion troops but also in the greatest depth possible in order to retain control of his rear. By arming and directing the steadily expanding Maquis the enemy can be faced with the alternative of diverting divisions, critically needed elsewhere, to combat resistance or losing control of a large part of central and southern France. It is believed that the enemy cannot spare the divisions necessary to liquidate expanded and properly supported resistance forces. At the same time, the enemy would be compelled to assign some forces to avert danger to his communications, possibility of resistance gaining control of certain sections of the coast line and possibility of our using large controlled areas held by resistance as an air head where considerable numbers of air borne troops could be landed.

Day-Light Deliveries

The areas in which Maquis forces are strong enough for open combat are located in the south and west of France so that supplies cannot be delivered under cover of darkness, except possibly during winter months. However, on 22 June, 180 Liberators with fighter escort travelled to southern France by day light and delivered over 2,000 containers to large areas held by resistance. 3 aircraft were lost. 20,000 men were armed. American air strength
is now such that aircraft can be assigned for this purpose and the rate of packing containers at the OSS packing station can be stepped up to maintain the necessary rate of deliveries with enough additional men to operate on a 24-hour basis.

Potential Strength

There are 7 areas in France which are now substantially controlled by resistance. They are indicated on the attached map. Some of these areas can be expanded and combined to form very large areas which would represent a substantial threat to German communications and which could not be liquidated by less than 8 German divisions. The present strength of these areas, numbers armed and deliveries required to fully arm and maintain them are indicated by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Mobilized</th>
<th>Armed</th>
<th>To be Armed</th>
<th>Initial Supply</th>
<th>Re-Supply (No.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3,500</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

680 sorties in the first month and 410 each month thereafter would equip and maintain the forces presently mobilized.

However, it is believed that the forces now mobilized can be substantially expanded and merged so that the four areas indicated in A, B, C and D of the attached map will achieve the strength indicated in the following table.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973
To supply and maintain these forces, estimated initial deliveries of 755 tons plus additional monthly deliveries of 1180 tons will be required.

**Strategic Implications**

If Areas A and B were held by resistance, German supply lines from the south to the north would be cut off and German divisions now along the south coast would be blocked. At area C, communications to and from Strasbourg and the west would be cut off. Forces holding area D would cut the railway of Toulouse to Dox. 8 divisions would be required to eliminate all of these threats. 5 divisions would be required to give the Germans any control at all of southern France. It is believed that Germany can spare no more than 3 divisions to cope with these threats.

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DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA 6-76-73

*Letter of 6-26-73*
By SR Date JUL 6-1973

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Now Mobilized</th>
<th>Potential Expansion</th>
<th>Total Potential Force</th>
<th>Divisions Required to Counter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>94,000</td>
<td>8 (only 3 available)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

CURRENT

Special Force Headquarters is now tri-partite. The integration of French representatives and the union of all French resistance elements in the Forces Francaises Interieures General Koenig's command has worked out successfully. Both the Giraudist Organization Militaire Armee and the Communist France Tireuses et Partisans have allowed themselves to be integrated with the Forces Francaises Interieures, and the authority of the Delegues Militaires and of the regional and departmental chiefs appears to be recognized by all the movements that operate within their respective areas.

One major result of the integration of the French personnel in Special Force Headquarters is a much greater recognition and appreciation by the French of the scale and scope of American aid to resistance. Previously French officers in England had heavily underestimated the extent of the aid provided by the United States.

Since D-Day, large numbers of new recruits, including elements of the Vichy garde, the gendarmes and even the Premiere Regimente de France, have joined the Maquis. As a result, resistance leaders have found themselves with more men than they can feed or arm, and have been forced to turn recruits away.

Moreover, large numbers of Frenchmen have already come out in the open, armed opposition to the enemy. Although resistance leaders have been warned that they cannot for the present rely on a sufficient supply of arms to justify large-scale guerrilla
warfare, the revolt in the south seems to have gathered too much momentum to be checked. Failure to support these forces on a sufficient scale to prevent their liquidation by the enemy will not only destroy a valuable military asset but will produce very unfavorable political repercussions.

**POTENTIAL**

While a decision to expand aid to resistance to create an "interior front" will be made on military grounds, it is obviously full of political implications. The following possibilities seem of vital importance in the crystallization of U. S. policy on French political problems:

(a) Creation of an "interior front" in southern and western France would give large masses of the French people their long desired opportunity of National self-expression. While the effort would be under the leadership of General De Gaulle and General Koenig, it would produce and give lustre to other military and political leaders. The net political effect would be the creation of a larger number of potential leaders for the French people to appraise and select and the building of the national self-respect vital to a strong and democratic France.

(b) It is now possible to publicize our aid to French resistance and thus to cultivate for the United States the good will of the French people. This could offset any loss in the good will of the French masses which might result from any dissatisfaction on the part of de Gaulle with our attitude towards his political
ambition.

Last week's daylight arming of 20,000 Frenchmen by 180 American bombers under fighter escort, carrying over 300 tons of supplies (mostly American) all packed by OSS personnel in OSS packing station of over 2,000 American containers was not only a tremendous morale builder but it also generated good will and gratitude from the Maquis toward the United States. It was a 100% American show and the Prime Minister is being urged to put on a similar British effort.

You may wish to use America's contribution as a fair answer to attempted criticisms.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

In view of the current visit of General Charles de Gaulle in Washington, it seems desirable to bring to your attention a request addressed by the French Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the British representative in Algiers wherein the French Committee of National Liberation asked that the British Government approve three proposals which were said to have been accepted by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, subject to confirmation by the British Government, namely the dispatch of a French military mission to his headquarters, the dispatch of a French "Corps leger d'intervention" for service in India, and, eventually, dispatch of a French Expeditionary Corps. The French urged that the French Military Mission under General Blaizot should be constituted at Southeastern Command Headquarters without delay or that at least General Blaizot should be authorized to pay a visit to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as soon as possible. As far as is known, the British Government has not yet replied to the French Committee of National Liberation with regard to this matter.
Model of submarine presented on July 9, 1944.
July 13, 1944

My dear General:

Thank you very much for your note -- and also for the wonderful surprise which I found on my return from the office last night. The model of that little submarine is a very great addition to my collection, and I am waiting for my return from my trip to try it out in the swimming pool. It will be great fun and I am sure that all of us will be there to watch it move and dive.

Also, may I thank you on behalf of my daughter, Anna, for the delightful bouquet of lovely roses. You made her very happy.

It was a real pleasure to me to have those talks with you and I am sure that they will prove to have been of great benefit both to France and to the United States because you and I have become so much better acquainted and see alike in regard to the larger problems before us.

As you know, I am leaving today for a trip to the westward to be gone three or four weeks, but you can always reach me through the War Department or the Navy Department.

I hope that you are having a smooth trip on your return. Happy landings.

Always sincerely yours,

General Charles de Gaulle,
Algiers,
Algeria.

P. S. Thank you, too, for that very fine photograph with its particularly nice inscription.
Le 10 juillet 1944

Monsieur le Président,

En quittant les États-Unis, je veux vous remercier encore une fois de l'accueil si cordial que vous avez bien voulu me réserver et de l'hospitalité chaleureuse que j'ai reçue du Gouvernement Américain.

Les manifestations sympathiques qui m'ont été prodiguées ici reflètent les sentiments d'amitié et de confiance que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer. Au-delà de ma personne, elles vont à la France et j'en porterai l'écho à mon pays, unanime lui aussi dans son amitié pour le vôtre et dans sa détermination de lutter et de travailler côte à côte avec ses Alliés pour la Victoire et pour la Paix.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération et de mes sentiments bien dévoués.

S.E. Monsieur F.D. Roosevelt
Président de la République
des États-Unis d'Amérique
Washington, D.C.
July 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Anna called and asked me to remind you to write General DeGaulle to thank him for the model of the submarine as well as the photograph which he inscribed to you. Also, we are to include in your letter a "thank you" from Anna for the beautiful red roses. Do you wish to do this, or should I do it or the State Dept. in the regular diplomatic language?

G.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Brown

Colonel Clark, the Officer in Charge of "Ultra" in the War Department contacted the Navy Department "Ultra" Section and said that General Marshall wanted the President to see the three attached dispatches relative to General De Gaulle.

Very Respectfully,

[Signature]

R. H. Myers
From: Washington (HOPPENOT-BAUDET)
To: Algiers
4 July 1944
FAI

#4078-80 (3 Part Message, Complete)

Diplo #1576.

For General DE GAULLE.

All contacts made by us these last few days with press circles lead us to note that the active campaign against the Government and against you, yourself, three weeks ago, has left its traces in people's minds and the journalists, especially, still maintain a marked reserve.

It is (Part 2) probable that on your arrival at the airport you will be asked to make a brief talk into the microphone. I suggest that you stress the following points:

The object of your visit is to bring the homage of France to the American President, people, and armies. The Government and you, yourself, wish to see the closest collaboration developed in war (Part 3) and in peace between France and (the Allies?).

The feeling of admiration which all French people have for the sacrifices and the heroism of American soldiers

French African

Page 1

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.
in the campaign for the liberation of France.

May I inform you, for the record, that you go with your suite and me directly from the airport to the White House?

- Syntax as in text.

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per Est. 3/26/45
From: Washington (Hoppenot)(BAUDET)
To: Algiers
27 June 1944
PMS

#3921-8

For Gen. De Gaulle.
Diplomatic #1512.
The White House reply to the step I took yesterday, which was given to me by Mr. Dunn, ended with the --G—. It leaves the field open to a complete exchange of views, while at the same time giving priority to those which will concern the common war effort. I have learned, moreover, from a reliable source that the President has let it be understood that he would receive you with the highest personal regard and friendliness. Since you have let him know that you are not coming to ask him for anything, your conversations can be maintained on a courteous and informative level --2G-- run no risk at all of coming to a deadlock, and your visit will bear all the more fruit since

French African #129366

Page 1

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you will not have given the impression of wanting to derive concrete and immediate advantages from it. In this connection, it would be important --G-- for you to declare publicly before your departure, that the main object of your trip is to convey the respects of France to the President, to the people and to the armies of America, and to PRO--G-- an ever closer and more confident collaboration between the two countries. It would likewise be desirable that nothing should come up to give the impression that you will seek personally to exploit and push --G-- the advantages which we are about to secure in London. It is the atmosphere that will be created by your visit which will ultimately make possible this alignment of the American position with the British position. That is why --2G-- after --G-- reflections, that you not let any member of the Government accompany you, although Mr. DUNN may incidentally find satisfaction in the fact that the presence of Mr. MENDES- FRANCE

French African      #129366

Page 2

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.
will doubtless coincide with your in order to --G-- in case the question of bank notes should be raised between the President and you, while the questions treated by Mr. MONNET, he added, are of a purely technical nature and can wait.

--G-- reflection conceal an underlying design to get you involved in a discussion of the disputable problems which have not yet been solved and from which we now can expect nothing, your coming --G-- your personal collaboration alone will more readily make possible the frustration of the scheme.

The question which troubles me most at this time is that of bases. After --G-- Mr. HULL's declarations of yesterday, we (?ought?) no longer to be blind to the gathering confusion. It would perhaps be dangerous to bring the matter up before your arrival. But could you keep from openly broaching to the President a question which will have so great an influence on the whole development

French African #129366
Page 3

per E.Q.T. 3/24/15

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.
of (?Franco?) - American relations? Since I had certain apprehensions, which are not entirely cleared away, I should have preferred to have your visit --G-- one of the attempts to secure agreement between the two countries rather than to run the risk that our endeavors might not achieve this result. The basis on which you have chosen to put it, however, gives us the best opportunity of bringing about an appreciable improvement in relations. I think --4G-- the attempt.
From: Washington (HOPPENST)
To: Algiers
2 July 1944

#4046-4049

Diplo #15(760?).

In reference to your telegram #1162 of 2 July.

I am afraid that the contemplated program for the General's visit will arouse keen susceptibilities in influential circles here. I shall try tomorrow to sound out discreetly, the State Department on this subject; but as long as our first talk, Mr. DUNN told me how much they would appreciate, if not that the General's visit be limited to Washington alone, that at least his trip to New York should not be marked by certain spectacular demonstrations which might unfortunately (Part 2) be encouraged and exploited by those opposed to the President. An official reception by the Mayor, official visits likewise to the FOCH Monument, to the Statue of Liberty, to France Forever, might be classed as demonstrations designed to bring together a large gathering of people -- a situation which, in the present pre-election period, the White House and the State Department will view with equal --G--. Friends as reliable and as devoted to our interests
as (Part 3) WALTER LIPPMAN and MICHAEL WRIGHT, Counsellor of the British Embassy, have explicitly called my attention in the most emphatic manner to the dangers, presented in their opinion, by a visit of the General to New York, and to the necessity, if the General nevertheless decides to go there, of limiting the program to a single contact made with our Colony. Nothing would better indicate the desire on the part of the General to impart --V-- visit the character defined by the messages (Part 4) which he has had sent to the President. Nothing would be inscribed here more surely to his credit than if he limited his visit to French and American contacts which he could make in the national capital. If he still insists on going to New York, it must be carefully indicated that it is only to see our compatriots whom he would receive in the afternoon of Sunday, 9 July, as well as the Office and the principal members of France Forever and to see a few American individuals in a private capacity.

a - Not identified.

Inter 2 Jul 44 (59) French African #129365
Rec'd 3 Jul 44
Trans 5 Jul 44 (10619-y) Page 2

per E.A.T. 3/26/75

TOP SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.
Mr. President:

Thanks to the courtesy of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, I have been able, though absent from New York, to collect some data on the question of recognition which seem to me pertinent both from an historical point of view and on account of their bearing upon the problem of General de Gaulle.

The act of recognition is essentially the establishment of a fact (in French: une constatation de fait) it declares that the government to be recognized is actually the legally constituted government of the State over which it claims authority.

According to the fundamental tenets underlying all the French Constitutions, and expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, introducing the Constitution of 1791, the principle of sovereignty dwells in the nation alone; no body of men, no single individual can claim or exercise power who have not been specifically appointed, the word used is "expressement" which means both specifically and voluntarily.

The second point is that of the State. What is a State, in contradistinction with a nation or country? A State implies a well-defined territory (un territoire nettement délimité) within which the authority of the government is recognized and obeyed.

The government itself must exhibit a centralized legal order, with agencies (organes) suitable to the institution and the application of the rules constituting the said order.

Lastly the community recognized as the demesne of the government must be politically independent of the recognizing state.
It therefore appears that the act of recognition is in no way the expression of a will, a purpose or a plan, it is a unilateral step, or rather the asseveration of an aggregate of circumstances, as it were a publicized diagnosis of relevant symptoms and hence, it cannot be conditional.

Where any conditions obtain, the recognition becomes ipso facto a political instrument, which must take the form of a treaty that implies the common agreement on specified points.

An important feature of the political act of recognition is that, insofar as it has no legal bearing, it is not constitutive for the legal existence of the State or Government recognized.

These, Mr. President, are a few points upon which I take the liberty of drawing your attention, emboldened by the urgency of the occasion and the consciousness that I am not swayed by any personal objective or inducement.

Your most respectfully,

Richardson

Due de Richelieu
195 Toylesone Lane
Southampton 1.0
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algeria

Dated: August 19, 1944

Rec'd: 10:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

US URGENT
2721, August 19, 10 p.m.

General de Gaulle departed 6:30 p.m. from Casablanca (refer my 50, August 19, 10 a.m.) in substitute fortress stopping at Gibraltar for briefing en route landing field (Sent to Caserta as 55, repeated to London as 288 and to Department), near Cherbourg.

CHAPIN

WFS

WMB

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For translation
and return to me.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from the Secretary of State for the President, 8/19/44, with attached letter for the President from General de Gaulle, 8/14/44. Copies retained for our files.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I attach a letter just received by the Department from our mission at Algiers addressed to you by General de Gaulle.

Enclosure: Letter dated August 14, 1944, from General de Gaulle.
Le Général de Gaulle.
No. 1956/ Cab. Dir.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai suivi par les dépêches votre grand voyage stratégique sur le théâtre d'opérations d'Extême-Orient, et j'ai entendu avec un extrême intérêt le beau discours que vous venez de prononcer, notamment ce que vous y avez dit de la sécurité américaine dans le Pacifique.

Quand vous viendrez en France, et j'espère que ce sera bientôt, vous verrez d'après nos destructions et nos pertes de toutes sortes, matérielles et morales, pourquoi nous autres Français comprenons immédiatement qu'un peuple veuille sa sécurité et que cette sécurité doive être permanente, réelle, matérielle, ou bien ne pas être. Pour l'Amérique il est bien vrai que sa sécurité stratégique et économique est désormais au large dans le Pacifique. Pour l'Europe occidentale et pour l'Afrique, en particulier pour la France européenne et africaine, je suis certain que vous pensez que leur sécurité stratégique et économique est, plus que jamais, sur le Rhin et ses abords.

Dans quelques heures va commencer la grande opération en France du Sud, opération dans laquelle

Monsieur Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Président des États-Unis.

Cependant, je ne veux pas attendre jusque là pour vous dire avec quelle admiration et quelle reconnaissance les Français suivent les magnifiques opérations des troupes d'Eisenhower, de Bradley et de Patton.

Tous les rapports que je reçois de France me font penser qu'il sera possible d'y établir à la libération, sans grandes secousses, le bon ordre qui est nécessaire à une lente et dure reconstruction. L'esprit public est excellent, malgré toutes les épreuves. Le ravitaillement va être tout de suite le plus difficile problème et je vous remercie d'avance de ce qui a été préparé et de ce qui sera fait à cet égard par les diverses autorités américaines qualiﬁées, pour nous aider dans ce mauvais moment.

Je prévois pour Paris une situation vraiment tragique et je me permet de vous signaler quel prix nous attacherons à voir arriver sans délai, dès que Paris sera libéré, les denrées et objets que vous avez bien voulu prévoir pour
pour le ravitaillement de la capitale en vivres et
pour la remise en marche des services publics les plus
nécessaires (eau, gaz, électricité, santé). Il en sera
probablement de même pour Marseille, Lyon et les grands
centres du Nord.

En attendant l'honneur et le plaisir de pouvoir
poursuivre et approfondir les entretiens, pour moi
inoubliables, que nous avons eus à Washington le mois
dernier, je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président,
à mes sentiments de très haute et amicale considération,

C. de GAULLE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATTA

August 30, 1944

Attached is a letter of August 14, 1944 to the President from General de Gaulle, together with a translation in duplicate.

You will recall that you sent us this letter for translation.

C. G. Gray
(TRANSLATION)

GENERAL DE GAULLE

Algiers, August 14, 1944

Mr. President:

I have followed through news despatches your great strategic voyage over the Far Eastern Theatre of Operations and listened with great interest to the fine speech which you have just made, especially to what you said concerning America's security in the Pacific.

When you come to France, and I hope it will be soon, you will see from the destruction and our losses of all sorts, material and spiritual, why we Frenchmen understand at once that a people desires security and that this security must be permanent, real and concrete--or else not exist. For America it is very true that her strategic and economic security now lies far out in the Pacific. For Western Europe and Africa, particularly for European and African France, I am sure that you believe that their strategic and economic security lies more than ever on the Rhine and its approaches.

The great operation in Southern France, an operation in which American and French forces will march side by side, is to begin in a few hours. I recently went to see General Patch, Admiral Hewitt and General Eckart at their Headquarters, and I carried away a very good impression of all three of them. We shall see how it comes out. For my part I am full of confidence. Incidentally, I am planning to go north very shortly and I shall take the liberty of writing you again. However I do not want to wait until then to tell you of the admiration and gratitude with which Frenchmen are following the magnificent operations of the troops of Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton.

All the reports which I receive from France cause me to believe that it will be possible, at the time of liberation, to establish there without deep disturbances the public order necessary for a reconstruction which will be long and difficult. In spite of all trials, public...
public spirit is excellent. At the outset the question of food supply is going to be the most difficult problem, and I thank you in advance for what has been prepared and what will be done in this regard by the different American agencies to help us through this bad moment.

I foresee that there will be a truly tragic situation in Paris, and I take the liberty of pointing out to you how much importance we attach to having, as soon as Paris is liberated, the supplies which you have been good enough to set aside for the feeding of the capital and for the reestablishment of the essential public services (water, gas, electricity, health). It will probably be the same for Marseille, Lyon, and the great northern cities.

Looking forward to the honor and pleasure of being able to resume and carry further the unforgettable conversations, which we had in Washington last month, I beg you to accept, Mr. President, my sentiments of very high and friendly consideration.

(Signed) C. DE GAULLE
Alger, le 14 août 1944.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai suivi par les dépêches votre grand voyage stratégique sur le théâtre d'opérations d'Extrême-Orient, et j'ai entendu avec un extrême intérêt le beau discours que vous venez de prononcer, notamment ce que vous y avez dit de la sécurité américaine dans le Pacifique.

Quand vous viendrez en France, et j'espère que ce sera bientôt, vous verrez, d'après nos destructions et nos pertes de
toutes sortes, matérielles et morales, pour-
quoi nous autres Français comprenons immédiate-
ment qu'un peuple veuille sa sécurité et que
cette sécurité doive être permanente, réelle,
matérielle, ou bien ne pas être. Pour l'Amé-
rique il est bien vrai que sa sécurité straté-
gique et économique est désormais au large dans
le Pacifique. Pour l'Europe occidentale et
pour l'Afrique, en particulier pour la France
européenne et africaine, je suis certain que
vous pensez que leur sécurité stratégique et
economique est, plus que jamais, sur le Rhin
et ses abords.

Dans quelques heures va commencer
la grande opération en France du Sud, opération
dans laquelle les forces américaines et fran-
çaises vont marcher côte à côte. J'ai été
récemment voir, à leur Quartier-Général, le
Général Patch, l'Amiral Hewitt et le Général Eckart, et j'ai emporté de tous les trois une très bonne impression. Nous allons voir ce que cela donnera. J'ai, pour ma part, une grande confiance. Je compte, d'autre part, me rendre très prochainement au Nord et je me permettrais de vous écrire ensuite de nouveau. Cependant, je ne veux pas attendre jusque là pour vous dire avec quelle admiration et quelle reconnaissance les Français suivent les magnifiques opérations des troupes d'Eisenhower, de Bradley et de Patton.

Tous les rapports que je reçois de France me font penser qu'il sera possible d'y établir à la libération, sans grandes secousses, le bon ordre qui est nécessaire à une lente et dure reconstruction. L'esprit public est excellent, malgré toutes les épreuves. Le ravitaillement va être tout de suite le plus diffi-
cile problème et je vous remercie d'avance de ce qui a été préparé et de ce qui sera fait à cet égard par les diverses autorités américaines qualifiées, pour nous aider dans ce mauvais moment.

Je prévois pour Paris une situation vraiment tragique et je me permets de vous signaler quel prix nous attacherons à voir arriver sans délai, dès que Paris sera libéré, les denrées et objets que vous avez bien voulu prévoir pour le ravitaillement de la capitale en vivres et pour la remise en marche des services publics les plus nécessaires (eau, gaz, électricité, santé). Il en sera probablement de même pour Marseille, Lyon et les grands centres du Nord.

En attendant l'honneur et le plaisir de pouvoir poursuivre et approfondir les entre-
tiens, pour moi inoubliables, que nous avons eus à Washington le mois dernier, je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à mes sentiments de très haute et amicale considération.

Monsieur Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Président des États-Unis.
Personnel.

Monsieur Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Président des États-Unis.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

The original of this letter to General de Gaulle has been sent to the Map Room as per note attached reading "Admiral Brown asks if this letter is signed, to return it to the Map Room and they will send it by special courier to Gen. Eisenhower to deliver."

9/4/44
hms
September 2, 1944.

Dear General de Gaulle:

I have been greatly shocked and distressed to learn of a recent attack on the life of General Giraud. My information about details is sketchy and I hope very much that his injuries may not prove to be serious.

I am sending you this personal letter to urge in the interest of France and in the interest of continued cordial relations between our countries that every effort be made not only to safeguard the lives of all Frenchmen who have aided United States forces to help to liberate France, but also to assign to such Frenchmen some duties as a recognition of their service. In such a group it seems to me that General Giraud should deserve from our standpoint very great consideration.

I send you this personal appeal in the hope that it may continue the good understanding we reached during our recent talks in Washington. I seize the opportunity to send you the felicitations of all of our citizens for the success of our united arms in the battle against our common enemy.

Always sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

General Charles de Gaulle.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

The President wishes to consider writing a letter somewhat as follows:

Dear General de Gaulle,

I have been greatly shocked and distressed to learn of a recent attack on the life of General Giraud. My information about details is sketchy and I hope very much that his injuries may not prove to be serious. I am sending you this personal letter to urge in the interest of France and in the interest of continued cordial relations between our countries that every effort be made not only to safeguard the lives of all Frenchmen who have aided United States forces to help to liberate France, but also to assign to such Frenchmen some duties as a recognition of their service. In such a group it seems to me that General Giraud should deserve from our standpoint the greatest of consideration. I do not believe that any of them covet great power or control of the processes of reconstruction.

I send you this personal appeal in the hope that it may continue the good understanding we reached during our recent talks in Washington. I seize the opportunity to send you the felicitations of all of our citizens for the success of our united arms in the battle against our common enemy.

Cordially yours,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

In reference to the memorandum I sent you yesterday of a suggested letter to General de Gaulle about General Giraud, Admiral Leahy asked me to say that he thinks the last sentence of the first paragraph - "I do not believe that any of them covet great power or control of the processes of reconstruction" - should not be included as he thinks it might suggest the line of attack on the character of Giraud and others who have helped our armed forces.

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 4, 1944

There is transmitted herewith the original, together with a translation prepared in the Department of State, of a letter dated September 13, 1944 from General de Gaulle to you, apparently in reply to a communication you addressed to the General.

Enclosure:

Original with translation of letter from General de Gaulle.
Mr. President:

I have the letter which you were good enough to send me to express your anxiety concerning General Giraud's health. I know the friendly sentiments (sympathie) you entertain towards him personally. Therefore, I am happy to tell you that his wound is not serious. I know that General Giraud expects to proceed soon to France where he will quietly complete his recovery.

As for the Frenchmen who have continued to fight for their country at the side of the Allies, I understand very well the interest you take in them. The Government is naturally taking steps to assign them posts best suited to their abilities. As for General Giraud, who was named Inspector General of the French Armies last April, I have been sorry that he did not feel that he could take up his position at that moment.

I thank you most heartily for the friendly congratulations which you were good enough to send me on the recent successes of the Allied armies. But it is yourself, Mr. President, who should be congratulated, and I do so in the most hearty and sincere manner.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

C. de Gaulle
M. le Président Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
Paris, le 13 Septembre 1944.

Monsieur le Président,

Je reçois la lettre que vous voulez bien m'adresser pour m'exprimer votre inquiétude au sujet de la santé du Général Giraud. Je sais quelle sympathie vous lui portez personnellement. C'est pourquoi je suis heureux de vous dire que sa blessure n'est pas grave. Je sais que le Général Giraud compte se rendre prochainement en France où il achèvera de se remettre tranquillement.

Quant aux Français qui ont continué à combattre pour leur pays aux côtés de ses alliés, je comprends très bien que vous vous y intéressez. Le Gouvernement fait naturellement en sorte de leur attribuer les postes qui conviennent le mieux à
leurs capacités. Pour le Général Giraud, qui avait été nommé en Avril dernier Inspecteur Général des Armées françaises, j'ai regretté qu'il n'ait pas cru devoir prendre son poste à ce moment-là.

Je vous remercie vivement des aimables félicitations que vous voulez bien m'adresser au sujet des récents succès des armées alliées. Mais c'est vous-même, Monsieur le Président, qu'il convient de féliciter et je me permets de le faire de la façon la plus vive et la plus sincère.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Camillo de Lancy

Monsieur le Président Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.
My dear Mr. Latta:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a despatch dated April 7, 1945 from the American Embassy at Paris, transmitting a communication addressed to the late President Roosevelt by General de Gaulle. A translation of the communication is also enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

1. From Embassy, Paris, no. 1555, April 7, 1945, with enclosure.
2. Translation of letter.

Mr. M. C. Latta,
Executive Clerk,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1555

April 7, 1945.

Paris, France.

RESTRICTED

The Ambassador has the honor to transmit herewith a
letter from General de Gaulle addressed to the President
of the United States.

Enclosure:

Copy of Letter from
General de Gaulle.
General de Gaulle

Paris, March 26, 1945

Mr. President:

I was very happy to receive Judge Rosenman and to talk with him.

He was able to appreciate the French economic and supply situation, and I observed with what seriousness and competence he fulfilled the mission with which you had charged him.

I beg you to believe, Mr. President, in my sentiments of friendly and faithful sympathy.

(S) C. de Gaulle

His Excellency,

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
Paris, le 26 Mars 1945

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai été très heureux de recevoir le Juge ROSENMAN et de m'entretenir avec lui.

Il a pu se rendre compte des conditions de l'économie et du ravitaillement français, et j'ai vu avec quel sérieux et quelle compétence il
LE GENERAL DE GAULLE.

a accompli la mission dont vous l'aviez chargé.

Je vous prie de croire,
Monsieur le Président, à mes sentiments d'amicale et fidèle sympathie.

Son Excellence Monsieur Franklin DELANO ROOSEVELT
Président des États-Unis d'Amérique.
Son Excellence Monsieur Franklin DELANO ROOSEVELT
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
WASHINGTON
Army Chiefs Declared
Opposed to De Gaulle

Observer Says French Leader
Has Overplayed His Hand

By David Lawrence

Many criticisms, fair and unfair, have
been directed against President Roose-
velt in his 11 or more years in the
White House but none so unfair as
that which is coming at him from his
own left-wing supporters—and from
some other critics with an ordinarily
balanced viewpoint—because of this
Government's policy toward Gen. de
Gaulle.

First the fire was aimed at Secretary
Hull, and when that failed the Presi-
dent was accused of having some sort
of a personal antipathy or grievance
against Gen. de Gaulle.

But the truth about De Gaulle lies in
that the opposition to him within our
own ranks comes from the Army. It
comes from men like Gen. Marshall and
Gen. Eisenhower. It comes from the
military people in whose side Gen. de
Gaulle has been a thorn from the very
beginning. It comes out of strictly
military considerations.

If the true story of what De Gaulle
has said and done were explained some
day to the American people by some
one like Gen. Marshall, for instance,
the folks who have been propagandis-
ing for De Gaulle would be left high
and dry. They would find it difficult
to support the thesis that only some
personal antipathy toward the French
general by Mr. Roosevelt himself has
been responsible for our Government's
policy in going slow about recognizing
him as the head of the provisional
French government.

Hand Overplayed

The De Gaulle movement is to be
distinguished from the personal am-
bitions of Gen. de Gaulle to win political
power. There is no doubt that the De
Gaulleites are the uncompromising
Frenchmen who have been militant
against Germany ever since the sur-
rrender of France in June, 1940. But
when Gen. de Gaulle, as their leader,
has sought to capitalize this movement
for political purposes he has over-
played his hand.

It is fortunate that De Gaulle has
gone back to Algiers. He butted into
the invasion picture last week and gave

just as the French general buttled in
on the military operations in North
Africa. When the Italian Invasion
for political purposes he has overplayed his hand.

It is fortunate that De Gaulle has gone back to Algiers. He butted into the invasion picture last week and gave Gen. Eisenhower a deplorable problem just as the French general had just begun to dig in on the military operations in North Africa. When the Sicilian invasion was launched, Gen. de Gaulle cried out that he hadn’t been consulted.

The truth is Gen. Eisenhower had little faith in De Gaulle as a military man and still less as a practical co-operationist in civil matters. It is one of the tragedies of our war operation in Europe that at moments when Gen. Eisenhower has carried the main burden of Allied responsibility in military operations of the greatest complexity he has been harassed by Gen. de Gaulle.

The patience of the American military men has been superb. Doubtless President Roosevelt has restrained many an outburst of public condemnation by our military spokesmen against De Gaulle.

Used by Enemy.

The enemy, of course, has been using the dissension for local propaganda in France but that can hardly be helped. Lately also an effort has been made to paint the President as an imperialist bent on breaking up France’s colonial empire. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States doesn’t want to own one inch of France’s colonies or any other nation’s colonies unless it be some of Japan’s strategic islands near our bases. What America wants is some means of leasing or securing naval and air bases from France and internationalizing these so as to prevent American lives from being sacrificed again because of the criminal neglect by French politicians in Paris of national armament and overseas protection.

There’s no closed door against De Gaulle. He can come here to visit the President and Secretary of State and he will be welcomed cordially. He must, however, realize that the United States Government isn’t turning over the millions of dollars of gold owned by the French people and held in America to any provisional group, nor is there the slightest desire to pick a President or Premier for France.

Above all, Gen. de Gaulle must realize that 15,000 casualties on the beachheads of Normandy were not suffered by the American people just for the doubtful privilege of messing in French politics or of letting some French politician come to the invasion area in the heat of battle and play French politics behind Gen. Eisenhower’s back in a manner calculated to interfere with the orderly task of liberation.

Gen. de Gaulle ought to come here. He ought to come repentant for his extraordinary behavior and sit down with American officials not to plan the future of any one man but the future of the French Republic for whose freedom and independence American and Canadian and British soldiers and sailors are making such a magnificent fight today.

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